Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026 amends Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 to increase strength of judges from 33 to 37 judges

Two weeks prior to Supreme Court's commencement of its six-week long Partial Working Days, the President of India has increased the  strength of judges in the Supreme Court from 33 to 37 Judges (excluding the Chief Justice of India) by promulgating The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, which has further amended the “Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956. The Ordinance has been promulgated to ensure the Court to “function more efficiently and effectively”. The Ordinance was notified in the Gazette of India on May 16 11 days after the Union Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister approved the proposal on May 11 for introducing The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026 in Parliament to amend The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 in the upcoming Monsoon session of Parliament. The government invoked Article 123 of the Constitution which empowers the President to legislate by Ordinance. The Ordinance is required to be laid before both Houses within six weeks of their reassembly else it will lapse.

The Court’s working strength is 32 including the Chief Justice of India. There are two vacancies and four judges are retiring this year. 

Article 124 (1) in Constitution of India reads:“There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges…” An act to increase the Judge strength of the Supreme Court of India was enacted in 1956 vide 2-page long The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act 1956. Section 2 of the Act provided for the maximum number of Judges (excluding the Chief Justice of India) to be 10. The Judge strength of the Supreme Court of India was increased to 13 by The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 1960, and to 17 by The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 1977. The working strength of the Supreme Court of India was restricted to 15 Judges by the Union Cabinet, excluding the Chief Justice of India, till the end of 1979, when the restriction was withdrawn at the request of the Chief Justice of India. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 1986 further augmented the Judge strength of the Supreme Court of India, excluding the Chief Justice of India, from 17 to 25. The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2008 further augmented the Judge strength of the Supreme Court of India from 25 to 30. The Judge strength of the Supreme Court of India was last increased from 30 to 33 (excluding the Chief Justice of India) by further amending the original act vide The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019 with effect from August 9, 2019.

The pendency in the Supreme Court is at a record 92,823 cases as of April 30, 2026. A writ petition filed in 2016 makes a case for constitution of a National Court of Appeal. It is pending with a Constitution Bench. In Krishna Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar (2017), a 7-Judge Constitution Bench held that the ordinance-making power to be subject of judicial scrutiny.   

While the Union cabinet seemed to be in a tearing hurry to expand the strength of the judges, it has not shown similar swiftness in clearing the names of the judges recommended by the Collegium.  

 

Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act pending in Supreme Court, Justice Ajit Kumar points out "a very sorry state of affairs" in UIDAI, a failed entity as per CAG

In Prashant Rajak vs  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology & Ors. (2026), Justice Ajit Kumar of Patna High Court passed a 3-page long order dated March 16, 2023, wherein, he concluded:"4. It is a very sorry state of affairs, which this Court has witnessed today, that in so many cases, for correction Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) in the Aadhaar date of birth, the applicants are forced to knock the doors of this Court. It is expected that the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, would issue appropriate instruction to the persons who are dealing with such issues, so that this Court is unnecessary not burdened with such petitions where, for correction of date of birth, the statutory requirement of documents are already being fulfilled and the persons who are at the helm of affairs are to carry out the formalities, and accordingly, the necessary corrections are required to be made in the Aadhar database, which somewhere is not being addressed properly." 

The order refers to "Central Identities Data Repository" (CIDR) envisaged under the Aadhaar Act, 2016. As per Section 2 (h) of the Aadhaar Act, CIDR "means a centralised database in one or more locations containing all Aadhaar numbers issued to Aadhaar number holders along with the corresponding demographic information and biometric information of such individuals and other information related thereto. "

Justice Kumar added:"5. Considering the nature of relief sought, this Court finds it appropriate to direct this petitioner to approach the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, within a period of one week, and on his appearance it is expected that necessary corrections shall be made looking to the nature of the document, which is required for making such corrections. 6. With the above observations, the instant writ petition stands disposed of." One week deadline given to  Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI ended on March 21, 2026.  The respondents were: Secretary, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, UIDAI Through its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), CEO, UIDAI, Director, UIDAI Regional Office, 4th Floor, Lalit Bhawan, Bailey Road, Patna.

The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the Respondent Authorities to make correction against Date of Birth, in his AADHAR card in accordance with his matriculation certificate. He has disclosed his Aadhaar Number which is refereed in the Court's order. The disclosure is contrary to the provisions of the Aadhaar Act. 

The petitioner committed the blunder of referring to 12-digit Aadhaar number as Aadhaar card, which has not been rectified by the Court. Under Section 2 (a) of the Aadhaar Act “Aadhaar number” means an identification number issued to an individual under sub-section (3) of section 3. 

Section 3 (3) reads:"On receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual." 

Such an individual refers to a resident of India. Section 2(v) states that “resident” means an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment. 

Section 3 (1) reads: "Every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing the process of enrolment:Provided that the Central Government may, from time to time, notify such other category of individuals who may be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number."

Section 2 (k) states that “demographic information” includes information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information of an individual, as may be specified by regulations for the purpose of issuing an Aadhaar number, but shall not include race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history. 

Section 2 (g) states that “biometric information” means photograph, finger print, Iris scan, or duch other biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations. 

Supreme Court's 1448-page long judgment dated September 26, 2018 mentions " “demographic information" on 149 occasions, "biometric information” on 347 occasions, "core biometric information” on 72 occassions and "biological attributes" on 20 occasions. 

As per Section 2 (b) “Aadhaar number holder” means an individual who has been issued an Aadhaar number based on "biometric information” under this Act. The petitioner in question is such an individual. 

The counsel for the Union of India submitted that  that the petitioner with representation may appear before the Director, UIDAI Regional Office, Patna, on any working day, and the necessary correction in the Aadhar database shall be made by looking to the statutory documents, which are required for necessary corrections. It not clear whether UIDAI has complied with the deadline given by the High Court. 

Is it not strange that even before the adjudication of the Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act by the 7-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court vested interests like World Bank Group and NATO are making biometric profiling based Central Identities Data Repository CIDR of Aadhaar Numbers, the online database irreversible by making it's use a business as usual activity unmindful of its illegitimacy? 

Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar

In Mr. S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar    & Anr.(2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 29-page long judgement dated January 21, 2026 wherein, he quashed the order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The judgement recorded that despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of Milan Kumar Sudhaka, the opposite party no.2. Justice Kumar concluded:"33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case No.238 of 2024 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned sanction order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed qua the present petitioner. 34. Accordingly, the present quashing petition is allowed. "

The application was filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the order contained in memo dated December 28, 2020, passed by the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar whereby sanction for prosecution under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was granted against the petitioner in connection with a Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 registered on May 24, 2014. Subsequently, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner moved an Interlocutory Application in 2024 seeking amendment in the prayer portion of the petition and assailed the F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 and also the charge-sheet of 2021 filed against the petitioner. 

The Complaint Case of 2014 was filed on April 4, 2014 in the Court of C.J.M., Patna by the complainant namely, Milan Kumar Sudhakar in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his grandmother, Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav, against two accused persons namely S. Kumar, the petitioner and one Sitaram Chaudhary. In the complaint petition, the complainant stated that power of attorney (POA) was executed in the year 2011 and 2013 by the principal one Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav in his favour to look after her property including her family home, i.e., a three storeyed building situated at B/17, Road No. 12, Rajendra Nagar, Patna since the principal along with her family was living in the United Kingdom. It was stated that the principal had acquired the property at Rajendra Nagar, Patna from her husband, namely Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, who had passed away in the year 2008, through a registered deed in her favour, which was executed in presence of the witness namely one Kumar Indradev in the year 1985. Subsequently thep roperty was duly mutated in the name of the principal-Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav. The husband of the principal much prior to his death in the year 1999, had executed a POA in favour of the Kumar Indradev to look after the property situated at Rajendra Nagar. It was also stated that the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and her husband had two sons namely Gurvindar and Surender and one daughter Manjit Kaur.  

Later, it was alleged that on the strength of the POA when the complainant went to deposit the holding tax with the Patna Municipal Corporation, it came to his knowledge that the property at Rajendra Nagar was mutated in the name of one Kumar Gyanendra who was said to be the son of late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, whereas he was actually the son of the aforesaid Kumar Indradeo, who was previously given POA by the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav in his lifetime. Upon learning of this illegal mutation, the complainant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the Bankipur Circle Office and received a response that the name of Kumar Gyanendra was mutated vide Mutation No. 288/19A/2004-05 in Circle No. 29, Holding No. 687 in the year 2005 itself. It was alleged that the illegal mutation in favour of Kumar Gyanendra was effected asserting falsely that he was the son of Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav however, he was the son of the Kumar Indradev. The complainant accordingly informed the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and thereafter upon instructions of the aforesaid principal, the complainant filed a complaint case No. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Indradeo and his son Kumar Gyanendra, wherein cognizance was taken under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC against the two persons and the complainant also filed an Appeal against the illegal mutation, before the Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation, which was numbered as Appeal No. 17 of 2012. 

The Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation had remanded the matter back to the Executive Officer for fresh consideration holding that the house owner was neither informed nor the succession was minutely examined. The Additional Commissioner also duly noted that the house owner (principal) Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav was shown to have passed away on November 7, 2004 whereas a VISA was issued to her on December 27, 2007. 

The complainant thereafter alleged that the petitioner-the Executive Officer in connivance with other accused persons got a report dated February 16, 2013 from the Revenue Officer wherein the Kumar Gyanendra was falsely and incorrectly shown to be the son of the husband of the principal Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav and they had deliberately ignored the documents adduced by the complainant such as, family certificate issued at Darbhanga proving that Kumar Gyanendra was not the son of the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav. It was alleged in the complaint that subsequently, the petitioner in connivance with other accused persons passed a cryptic order wherein the further proceedings were stayed till the disposal of the Title Suit No. 507 of 2011 to unduly favour Kumar Gyanandra and his faher Kumar Indradeo. It was also alleged that the accused persons in collusion with Kumar Gyanandra and his father Kumar Indradeo also issued holding tax receipts bearing the name of Kumar Gyanandra wherein his parentage was shown incorrectly as Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav instead of his actual father Kumar Indradeo.

The C.J.M, Patna vide order dated April 5, 2014 had forwarded the complaint case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C for investigation to the Kadamkuan Police Station and thereafter the present F.I.R in Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 was registered on May 24, 2014 against two accused persons including the petitioner. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was serving as the Executive Officer at the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna Municipal Corporation and under such authority and in discharge of his duties, he passed the order of stay. He submitted that the petitioner being the Executive Officer had passed the stay order dated June 27, 2013 observing that with regard to the same property situated at Rajendra Nagar a Title Suit of 2011 was also pending and the house, in question, being in possession of Kumar Gyanendra, the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide the title and therefore, had kept the proceeding of the case pending till the final disposal of the aforesaid Title Suit. He submitted that the core allegation as against the petitioner was that he had passed the aforesaid order dated June 27, 2013 which was cryptic in nature staying the proceedings before him till the disposal of the Title Suit in collusion with the opponents of the complainant for extraneous considerations, however he had emphasised that the order of stay was passed by the petitioner in exercise of his quasi judicial authority and the same can be assailed/appealed before the superior authority in accordance with law, which in fact was done and an appeal had been preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation. 

It was the contention of counsel for the  petitioner that merely passing an order for stay, in discharge of his official duties, could not lead to initiation of criminal proceeding on the basis of mere imputations of collusion with the beneficiaries of the mutation which was in fact carried out much prior to the petitioner even joining the post as the Executive Officer in the Circle Officer, Bankipur. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that upon a bare perusal of the complaint petition, it would clearly manifest that the fraud was actually committed by Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo with respect to the property of the principal situated at Rajendra Nagar and the present petitioner was in no way involved in any alleged fraud whatsoever. It was also emphasised that the mutation of the property situated at Rajendra Nagar was effected in the year 2005 itself and the consequent holding tax receipts were issued in the same year in favour of Kumar Gyanendra by the then Executive Officer one R.P Gupta and pertinently the petitioner was not posted in the aforesaid office at the relevant time when the mutation was carried.

It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned sanction order was passed without considering the legal opinion sought by the sanctioning authority. Since the impugned order for sanction was passed de hors the legal opinion wherein unequivocal stand had been taken that the actions of the petitioner cannot be characterized as malafide and that the petitioner never acted beyond his jurisdiction while passing the order of stay, it was therefore submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that no grounds for granting sanction against the petitioner exists in light of the section 197 Cr.P.C. which protects the public servants from vexatious prosecutions and consequently the impugned order of sanction for prosecution is bad in law and cannot be sustained. 

In support of his submissions the counsel drew strength from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 and Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of sanction was passed in complete violation of the provisions contained in section 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Adverting to its provisions, he submitted that the petitioner acting as a quasi judicial authority was shielded and no civil or criminal proceeding against the petitioner could have been initiated since the actions of the petitioner was clearly within the ambit of bona fide discharge of his official duties. The counsel for the petitioner had also drawn attention of the High Court to section 77 of the Indian Penal Code to argue that the impugned sanction is in the teeth of the aforesaid section 77 of the IPC. He pointed that the complainant on the strength of the POA in his favour had earlier instituted a separate complaint case bearing complaint case no. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo, wherein the Trial Court had already taken cognizance. In the earlier complaint case the petitioner was not arrayed as an accused. It was only subsequently that the complainant had instituted this complaint case against the petitioner being the Executive Officer and the co-accused being the Revenue Officer in the year 2014. He submitted that the present criminal proceedings was initiated only to settle a personal score among the parties who are fighting over the property at Rajendra Nagar and no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Awdesh Sriwastava vs. State of M.P. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 693.

Justice Kumar observed: "The petitioner while discharging his duty as the Executive Officer in the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna had passed the order dated 27.06.2013 staying the proceedings of Mutation case till the conclusion of the Title Suit No.507 of 2011 since the same parties were ventilating their dispute in the aforesaid title suit for the very same property. There is no dispute that the aforesaid order dated 27.06.2013 has been passed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duty upon remand from the appellate authority." He referred to the decisions that have examined the question of applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 to revenue authorities. In this regard, the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Tamboli vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 3651 delved deeply into the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and its applicability to revenue officers.

Justice Kumar observed: "....it is quite vivid from definition of Section 2 of the Act of 1985 that the petitioner was empowered to give definite judgment in revenue proceeding. The petitioner at the relevant point of time was empowered to pass an order of mutation of subject land in the names of purchasers (co-accused) under Sections 178 and 110 of the Code respectively and he would fall within the meaning of person under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 who is empowered by law to give definitive judgment in revenue proceeding. 23. The question for consideration would be, whether the petitioners are entitled for protection under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 ?"

In Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Supreme Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duties, is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty.

Justice Kumar underlined that "it is patently clear that the petitioner would fall within the ambit of protections afforded by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. The protection is obviously not absolute and the State or appropriate authority could proceed against an erring officers in terms of section 3(2) of the aforesaid Act. 31. The order of stay passed by the petitioner which forms the basis for initiating the criminal prosecution is appealable before the appellate authority and any error committed by the petitioner therein could have been rectified by the appellate authority. From the records, it appears that an appeal was preferred agianst the order passed by the petitioner. The present petitioner by his order had stayed the mutation proceedings which was before him on remand from the appellate authority since there was a dispute over the title of the subject property. If the parties to the mutation proceedings were aggrieved by the order of stay passed by the petitioner then they could have availed remedies available under the law to assail the aforesaid order of stay. A bald statement that the order of stay passed by the petitioner being in favour of one of the parties to the mutation proceedings would not suffice to initiate a criminal prosecution against the petitioner. The criminal prosecution launched solely for passing an order of stay by the petitioner while discharging his duties, in the mutation proceedings simpliciter would squarely amount to malafide prosecution. 32. Further, in the present case, the sanction order is totally silent as to the circumstances under which the protection afforded to the petitioner from vexatious prosecution are required to be stripped. Moreover, the impugned sanction order also makes no mention of any material which would warrant initiation of criminal proceeding against the petitioner for staying the mutation case proceeding until the conclusion of the Title Suit which existed for the very same subject property. The substance of why a sanction is required to be passed for criminal proceedings was however entirely missed and skipped by the sanctioning authority, more so, when the petitioner was protected under the ambit of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Therefore the impugned order of sanction suffers from clear non-application of mind and can not be sustained."

Supreme Court sets aside Allahabad High Court's judgement, restores judgement of conviction in dowry case by Additional District Judge, Bijnor

Dowry, legally defined under Section 2 of the Dowry Prevention Act, 1961, refers to “any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly” by one party to a marriage to the other, or by the parents of either party, in connection with the marriage.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh delivered a 46-page long judgement dated December 15, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"the High Court has erred in setting aside the judgment of conviction returned by the Additional District Judge, Bijnor, and acquitting Ajmal and Jamila in connection with the FIR bearing No. 94/2001 registered at P.S Kiratpur, under Sections 498-A and 304-B, IPC and Section 3/4 of the DPA, 1961. The State’s appeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed. The judgment of the Trial Court, insofar as it relates to the conviction of both Ajmal and Jamila, is restored.... " The judgement was authored by Justice Karol. 

It observed" 26. With an intent to further this change, we issue the following directions: -

(a) to ensure that the change brought in is able to make an impact on the efforts to eradicate this evil, it is to be ensured that the future generation, youngsters of today, are informed and made aware about this evil practice and the necessity to eschew it. As such, it is directed that States and even the Union Government consider changes as are necessary to the educational curricula across levels, reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient to the other as is sought to be established by giving and taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage;

(b) The law provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area;

(c)the police officials, as also the judicial officers dealing with such cases, should periodically be given training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and psychological implications which are often at the forefront of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law;

(d) it is not lost on us that the instant case began in 2001 and could only be concluded 24 years later by way of this judgment. It is but obvious that there would be many such similar cases. The High Courts are requested to take stock of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the latest for expeditious disposal; and

(e) in furtherance of (a) above, we also recognize that many people today are/have been outside the education fold, and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is an offence in law. The District Administration along with the District Legal Services Authorities, by engaging and involving civil society groups and dedicated social activists, is requested to conduct workshops/awareness programs at regular intervals. This is to ensure change at the grassroot level."

These appeals were at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh, laying challenge to a judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal under Section 374 Cr.PC. Nos. 5109 of 2003 and 5110 of 2003, entering a finding of acquittal of the respondents herein, setting aside the judgment and order dated October 7, 2003, of conviction returned by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor in Sessions Trial 573 and 574 of 2001 arising out of the First Information Report bearing No. 94/2001 registered at P.S Kiratpur, under Sections 498-A and 304-B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

In this case, a young girl, barely of twenty, when she was sent away from the world of the living by way of a most heinous and painful death, met this unfortunate end simply because her parents did not have the material means and resources to satisfy the wants or the greed of her family by matrimony. A coloured television, a motorcycle and Rs. 15,000/- is all she was apparently worth of.

Justice Karol observed:"The eradication of dowry is an urgent constitutional and social necessity. .....Although the law sought to prohibit the practice, dowry has persisted in society, slipping through the statutory definition, cloaked as “gifts” and social expectations. This practice is, at the most basic level, at odds with the values enshrined in the Constitution, i.e., the constitutional ethos of justice, liberty, and fraternity, and more particularly, Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, a principle directly undermined by a system that treats women as a source of financial extraction and reinforces structural discrimination."

The judgement reads:"27. Let a copy of this judgment be circulated electronically to the Registrar General of the High Courts who are requested to place the same before the Learned Chief Justices and solicit directions in accordance with the above, and also, to the Chief Secretaries of all States for necessary follow up action."

Supreme Court echoes views of Bar and Bench on unwarranted attack on independence, dignity and majesty of highest Constitutional Court

In Vishal Tiwari vs. Union of India (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India and Justice Sanjay Kumar dismissed the writ petition seeking initiation of suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against  Nishikant Dubey, the respondent No. 4 for having made deliberate and scandalizing remarks against the Supreme Court of India and the Chief Justice of India; for a direction to the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, to lodge a First Information Report under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and for a direction to the Union of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, to issue an advisory to all Chief Secretaries to curb hate and provocative speeches by political parties and their leaders relating to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, and its hearing before the Court. This petition was filed under Article 32 read with Article 129 of the Constitution of India. 

The Court observed: "Normally, this Bench would not have heard this matter but as we are not inclined to issue notice and the Waqf matter [W.P. (C) Nos. 276/2025, 314/2025, 284/2025, 331/2025 & 269/2025] was heard by the two of us, we would dispose of the writ petition with some observations and, accordingly, we have proceeded to consider the issue."

The order dated May 5, 2025 reads: "Judicial pronouncements result in an order or a decision which may aggrieve a party or sometimes a section of the public. Critical analysis and objective criticism of an order’s reasoning or even its outcome is protected under the fundamental right to free speech and expression under clause (a) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. The power of criminal contempt, however, is exercised by courts when publication by words, spoken or written, by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise, in terms of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is with the intent to scandalize or lower the authority of the courts; or tends to scandalize or lower such authority; prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings; or interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any manner. Exercise of the power of contempt, nevertheless, is discretionary."

It further reads: "We have examined the contents of the assertions made by respondent no. 4, which no doubt tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, if not interfere or tend to interfere with the judicial proceedings pending before this Court, and have the tendency to interfere and obstruct the administration of justice. The statements made reflect the clear intent to impute motives to the Bench itself by naming the Chief Justice of India as “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible”. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act carve out exceptions which, prima facie, are not attracted. There is no ‘civil war’ in India."

The Court observed: "In our opinion, the comments were highly irresponsible and reflect a penchant to attract attention by casting aspersions on the Supreme Court of India and the Judges of the Supreme Court. This apart, the statements show ignorance about the role of the constitutional courts and the duties and obligations bestowed on them under the Constitution. At the same time, we are of the firm opinion that courts are not as fragile as flowers to wither and wilt under such ludicrous statements. We do not believe that the confidence in and credibility of the courts in the eyes of the public can be shaken by such absurd statements, though it can be said without the shadow of doubt that there is a desire and deliberate attempt to do so. We, therefore, refrain from taking any action." 

The order recalled that this Court in, In Re S. Mulgaokar, [(1978) 3 SCC 339] had observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism, but when criticism is an obvious distortion or a gross misstatement, which is made in a manner designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence, it should not be ignored. However, the power to initiate contempt is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise. Every commission of contempt need not erupt in an indignant committal or levy of punishment, however deserving it may actually be. It is so because judges are judicious, their valour non-violent and their wisdom springs into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection. Courts believe in values like free press, fair trial, judicial fearlessness and community  confidence. Thus, courts need not protect their verdicts and decisions by taking recourse to the power of contempt. Surely, courts and judges have shoulders broad enough and an implicit trust that the people would perceive and recognize when criticism or critique is biased, scandalous and ill-intentioned. Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution.

It underlined that "In the course of dispensation of justice, courts draw inspiration from consecrated principles. The judiciary, as an institution, is accountable to the people through various mechanisms. Arguments take place in open court. Decisions and judgments are reasoned. Judicial procedure ensures transparency and accountability. Judgments are put to scrutiny and critique. Decisions are debated and if required, corrected by exercise of right of appeal, review, in curative jurisdiction and by reference to a larger bench. The judiciary’s legitimacy and credibility are rooted in public trust and are maintained through fair, impartial and transparent decision-making."

The Court observed: "To deny the power of judicial review to the courts would be to rewrite and negate the Constitution, as the power of judicial review is one of the cornerstones of democracy. This power is conferred in express terms by Articles 32 and 226 by the framers of the Constitution and hinges on the system of checks and balances. We believe that the general public does know the relationship amongst the three wings of the Government and their different roles. They are aware of the function and the role of the judiciary, which is to judicially review the actions of the other branches and to evaluate whether the other branches are acting lawfully under the Constitution. Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court’s consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty."

The judgement concluded:"While we are not entertaining the present writ petition, we make it clear that any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand. Hate speech cannot be tolerated as it leads to loss of dignity and self-worth of the targeted group members, contributes to disharmony amongst groups and erodes tolerance and open-mindedness, which is a must for a multi-cultural society committed to the idea of equality. Any attempt to cause alienation or humiliation of the targeted group is a criminal offence and must be dealt with accordingly." 

It is germane to recollect that Supreme Court Bar Association had passed a resolution dated April 21, 2025 condemning the "intemperate statement" made by Mr. Nishikant Dubey. Supreme Court Bar Advocates-On-Record Association had passed a resolution dated April 22, 2025 expressing "deep dismay and unequivocal condemnation" of the "factually baseless and deeply irresponsible" defamatory statement which amounted to "a direct and unwarranted attack on the independence, dignity and majesty of our country's highest Constitutional Court" which sought to "lower judiciary's authority in the eyes of the public." 

A statement of concern dated April 22, 2025 was issued saying "Be you never so high, the law is above you".           

It reads: "Taking note of the enduring faith of the people in the constitution and the judiciary in their quest for justice;
Recalling that the judiciary doesn't govern and the executive doesn't adjudicate;
Underlining that the constitutional intent of the Articles 141, 142, Article 145(3), is to empower the Supreme Court to "declare law", "do complete justice" and settle substantial constitutional questions;
Recognising the propensity of the Executive to engineer unquestioned obedience of the judiciary towards the Executive and alarmed by increasing  institutional confrontation;
Realising that if the executive can dodge accountability—by calling judges names, ignoring orders or complaining about interference—their legitimacy is undermined;
Speaking through its judgments, Supreme Court's message is: where Executive fails, we must step in. Not because we want to rule, but because it has to uphold the Constitution because even when elections give the Executive a strong mandate, it doesn't mean the Constitution takes a holiday;
Recalling that when the judiciary is made to retreat, history shows us what fills the vacuum is rarely democratic.
Underlining that people expect a system that works—and stays within its constitutional limits;
Taking note of the recent remarks by the Hon'ble  Vice President and one of the members of Parliament, Nishikant Dube and some others to make the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India and Hon'ble Supreme Court responsible for the tension gripping the society and the country as an attempt to defame the entire judiciary which is highly condemnable requiring a strong voice of legal fraternity and lovers of justice to maintain the majesty of law;
Concerned with a public perception of  lawlessness because of unreasoned and outrageous observations by demagogues, we appeal to brother advocates and fellow citizens to defend their courts of justice, the last resort for many against the government, the biggest litigant and the commercial czars, the unscrupulous political donors in order to safeguard against the possibility of emergence of unlimited government."

Significantly, Article 13 of the Constitution of India deals with laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. It reads: 

1. All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

2. The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

3. In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;

(b) "laws in force" includes laws passed or made by Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.

4. Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.

 

Article 13 (1) discusses the laws which were made before the commencement of the Constitution (26 January 1950) and Article 13 (2) delves about the laws which are made after the Constitution is in place.

​Article 13 (1) states that all the laws which are made before the Constitution will be void as long as they are violating the provisions of the Fundamental Rights. It further states that only that part of the law which will be void which is against the provisions of the constitution and not the whole law itself. This guarantee is against the existing laws and future laws and not to the laws which are made before the commencement of the constitution.

​Article 13(2) states that all the laws which are made after the commencement of the Constitution are void to the extent of the infringement of the Fundamental Rights given in part 3 of the Constitution.

The ‘Doctrine of Eclipse’ asserts that all the Pre-Constitutional laws which are against the fundamental rights of the Indian Constitution will become dormant and not dead. They will remain dormant as long as the state does not amend the law and its infringing nature. So this doctrine applies to only Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution.

In Keshavan Madhvan Menon v. State of Bombay, the court said that the law which is infringing the rights of the citizens after the commencement of the constitution is ‘void ab initio’ for the citizens of the country but it will remain enforceable for the non-citizens and companies. The doctrine of Eclipse makes the law unenforceable but it doesn’t make the law void ab initio.

The ‘doctrine of Waiver’ means that a person who is receiving a right or a privilege can waive that right according to his will. Once the right is waived by the individual then they cannot claim it back. In Behram v. State of Bombay, it was decided by the court that the rights which are given in part 3 of the constitution cannot be waived by an individual.

The ‘Doctrine of Separability’ means that if a part of a law is against the provisions of the constitution then only that offending part will be declared as void and not the whole statute. This doctrine is applied in both Article 13 (1) and Article 13 (2) of the Indian Constitution. In R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957, Supreme Court has given some rules relating to this doctrine:

“1. It is important to understand the intention of the legislature before using this doctrine.

2. When separation of invalid part of the statute is very difficult then the whole law will be held as invalid.

3. If after deleting the invalid part, the valid part has no value left to it then the whole act will be rejected in its entirety.”

Article 13(3) (a) defines “Law”. According to this section, Law includes any ordinance, order, bye-Law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages. This definition of law is given a wide meaning so that it can be added to a wide variety of state instrumentalities.

In Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, AIR 1977, Supreme Court said that personal laws (Hindu Law, Muslim Law, and Christian Law) are not part of the definition of Law under Article 13. The Bye-Laws made by the Cooperative Societies are also not part of the definition of Law.

There have also been other discussions on whether “Law” includes constitutional amendments. ​This question was first decided in the case of Shankari Prasad v. Union of India AIR 1951. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the word law under Article 13(2) doesn’t include a constitutional amendment. This entailed that the Parliament has power to amend the Fundamental Rights according to their will.

​Later in the case of Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967, the Supreme Court overruled the Shankari Prasad verdict and stated that the word ‘Law’ in Article 13(2) includes the constitutional amendments. If any constitutional amendment is infringing the Fundamental rights then that amendment will be void.

​To nullify the Golak Nath decision the Parliament passed the 24th Amendment Act, 1971, wherein parliament added Clause 4 in Article 13 which stated that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368.

​Later in the case of the Kesavananda Bharati v. the State of Kerala, AIR 1973, the constitutionality of the 24th Amendment was held valid. So the present position of the word “Law” is that a Constitutional Amendment does not include the word. This gives the Parliament the power to amend the provisions of the Fundamental rights as long as they align with the basic structure doctrine of the Indian Constitution. 

 

The Constitution (Twenty-Four Amendment) Act, 1971, enables Parliament to dilute Fundamental Rights through Amendments of the Constitution.

 

The 24th Amendment was effected to abrogate the Supreme Court ruling in I.C. Golaknath and Ors. vs State of Punjab and Anrs. The Supreme Court delivered its ruling, by a majority of 6-5 on February 27, 1967. 

 

The Court has held that an amendment of the Constitution is a legislative process, and that an amendment under article 368 is "law" within the meaning of article 13 of the Constitution and therefore, if an amendment "takes away or abridges" a Fundamental Right conferred by Part III, it is void. 

 

Article 13(2) reads, "The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the right conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of contravention, be void." 

 

The Court has ruled that Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Constitution are given a "transcendental position" under the Constitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. The Court also held that the scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the freedoms it granted incapacitated Parliament from modifying, restricting or impairing Fundamental Freedoms in Part III.

 

Patna High Court adjudicated first fundamental rights case

In Brajnandan Sharma v. State of Bihar (1950), the Patna High Court had delivered a landmark decision concerning the constitutional validity of statutory provisions impinging upon fundamental rights. 

Brajnandan Sharma was represented by Advocate Awadhesh Nandan Sahay who had prayed for judicial intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to prevent the enforcement of an order restricting movement of Brajnandan Sharma. 

The order was issued under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, which barred him from entering the districts of Singhbhum and Manbhum. The High Court had to examine whether such statutory restrictions were justified under the newly enacted Constitution, specifically under Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 

The High Court's division bench of Chief Justice Meredith and Justice S. K. Das, examined the constitutional compatibility of Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. 

The counsel of the petitioner contended that the provision was unconstitutional as it violated Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to freely move throughout the territory of India. Furthermore, under Article 13(1), any law in force before the Constitution that is inconsistent with its provisions must be rendered void. The court concluded that Section 2(1)(b) was indeed unconstitutional as it imposed unreasonable restrictions not safeguarded by the Constitution. 

As a consequence, the High Court declared the provision void and prohibited the State from enforcing the order against the petitioner. The judgment drew on the following decisions:

King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande: Emphasized the burden of proof on the state to demonstrate reasonable grounds when restricting fundamental rights.

Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson: Distinguished between objective and subjective tests of reasonableness, advocating for an objective standard.

Union Colliery Company of British Columbia Limited v. Bryden: Highlighted the limits of judicial intervention in legislative matters.

Fletcher v. Peck: Reinforced the principle that legislative actions must conform to constitutional mandates.

These precedents collectively underscored the judiciary's role in scrutinizing legislative provisions that infringe upon fundamental rights, especially regarding the reasonableness of such restrictions.

The court's analysis focused on the interplay between Article 13(1) and Article 19 of the Constitution. Article 13(1) mandates that any pre-Constitutional law inconsistent with its provisions is null to the extent of such inconsistency. Article 19(1)(d) enshrines the right to freedom of movement, which is a fundamental right. However, Article 19(5) allows the state to impose reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public or the protection of any Scheduled Tribe.

The petitioner argued that Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Act did not constitute a reasonable restriction because it relied solely on the state's subjective satisfaction without any objective standard or criteria. The court concurred, emphasizing that the Constitution requires an objective test of reasonableness, which was absent in the statute in question. The provision allowed arbitrary restrictions based on the satisfaction of an unspecified official, thereby failing to meet the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.h

The court observed that the lack of procedural safeguards, such as the right to be heard or the requirement to specify grounds for restriction, made the provision inherently unreasonable. Without the ability to challenge the restrictions or understand the basis for them, the statute violated the fundamental tenets of justice and fairness enshrined in the Constitution.

The judgment is crucial  for the protection of fundamental rights in India. By invalidating Section 2(1)(b), the High Court reinforced the judiciary's role as a guardian of constitutional liberties against arbitrary state actions. It set a precedent that legislative provisions imposing restrictions on fundamental rights must adhere to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness, incorporating objective standards rather than subjective discretion.

The judgement made it clear that legislations and executive orders will be scrutinized by the Court for their conformity with constitutional guarantees. It  serves as a litmus test for assessing the validity of laws that infringe upon personal freedoms, ensuring that any imposed restrictions are both justified and subject to judicial review.

Article 13(1) of the Constitution of India declares that any law in force before the Constitution, which is inconsistent with its provisions, shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency. This ensures that the Constitution reigns supreme, and pre-existing laws must conform to its mandates.

Article 19(1)(d): Guarantees the right of all citizens to move freely throughout the territory of India.

Article 19(5): Allows the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(d), (e), and (f) in the interests of the general public or for the protection of any Scheduled Tribe.

The interplay between these articles emphasizes that while fundamental rights are protected, they are not absolute and can be subject to reasonable limitations under specific circumstances.

The court deliberated on whether reasonableness should be assessed objectively (based on external standards and societal norms) or subjectively (based on individual discretion). The decision leaned towards an objective test, asserting that restrictions must meet a standard that would be deemed reasonable by a "reasonable person" rather than relying solely on the satisfaction of a governmental authority.

The High Court's decision serves as a critical affirmation of the judiciary's role in upholding constitutional rights against arbitrary legislative overreach. By declaring Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, unconstitutional, the court underscored the necessity for laws imposing restrictions on fundamental rights to be framed with objective standards of reasonableness.

This judgment not only provided relief to the petitioner but also established a precedent that protects individual liberties. It established that  legislative or executive actions that seek to limit fundamental rights must do so within the boundaries of reasonableness as defined by the Constitution. The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Meredith.