5 year old mental health act case tagged with "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report", a Suo Motu PIL

In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report (2026), a Suo Motu Public Interest Litigation was initiated by the Patna High Court's Division Bench pursuant to the report dated February 17, 2026 submitted by the Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority (BSLSA). BALSA's inspection report with respect to the shortcomings of mental health facilities in the State of Bihar as well as in Bihar State Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS), Koelwar, Bhojpur is an independent report. The case was listed for hearing on April 20, 2026 by the High Court's Division of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar by its 54-page long order dated March 16, 2026.

The PIL was filed and registered on February 17, 2026 and tagged with a 5-year-old case  filed by Vishal Kumar Singh, Akash Keshav, Deepak Kumar Singh and Shashwat with Advocate Akanksha Malviya as petitioner in person. 

By its order dated February 25, 2019, the High Court had issued notice to the (i) Principal Secretary, Health Department; (ii) Secretary, State Mental Health Authority, Bihar; (iii) Director, Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS); (iv) DG of Police, Bihar; (v) I.G. of Prisons; and (vi) Union of India and asked the concerned authorities to submit their responses on the following aspects:-
“i) Whether any Mental Health Review Board has been constituted in accordance with Section 73 of the
2017 Act?
ii) If so, what are the functions being discharged by such Board under section 82 of the 2017 Act?
iii) How Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS) is performing its duties and carrying out its responsibilities relating to the admission and treatment of persons with mental illness? What provisions have been made by the Hospital Authorities for supplying free food to the patients and attendants, medicines and to maintain the cleanliness and hygiene of the hospital and to create a positive environment?
iv) DG of Police shall submit a report regarding the duties performed by police officers of different police stations of the State in respect of persons with mental illness and their protection as envisaged under section 100 of 2017 Act, and also, I.G. of Prisons in respect of the prisoners with mental illness as per section 103 of 2017 Act;
v) The Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Service Authority (BSLSA) shall submit a report regarding the legal aid facilities provided to the persons with mental illness and particularly to those who are coming
for treatment to BIMHAS;
vi) The Principal Secretary, Health Department shall submit a report regarding the steps taken by the government for rehabilitation of the persons with mental illness after their recovery and discharge from the Hospital;
vii) Report shall also be submitted by the State through a Responsible Officer regarding the steps taken to address the issues highlighted in the report of the Member Secretary, BSLSA.

The notice was issued pursuant to relevant sections of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, NALSA (Legal Service to persons with Mental Illness and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities) Scheme, 2024, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukdeb Saha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 2025 S.C. 3458 and in Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Mr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors. (CONMT. PET. (C) No. 1653 of 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 412 of 2016) vide order dated February 25, 2019. 

By its earlier 26-page long order dated February 18, 2026, the Division Bench had 9. The concerned authorities are to submit their responses on the following aspect: i) Whether any Mental Health Review Board has been constituted in accordance with Section 73 of the 2017 Act?
ii) If so, what are the functions being discharged by such Board under section 82 of the 2017 Act?
iii) How Bihar Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sciences (BIMHAS) is performing its duties and carrying out its responsibilities relating to the admission and treatment of persons with mental illness? What provisions have been made by the Hospital Authorities for supplying free food to the patients and attendants, medicines and to maintain the cleanliness and hygiene of the hospital and to create a positive environment?
iv) DG of Police shall submit a report regarding the duties performed by police officers of different police stations of the State in respect of persons with mental illness and their protection as envisaged under section 100 of 2017 Act, and also, I.G. of Prisons in respect of the prisoners with mental illness as per section 103 of 2017 Act;
v) The Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Service Authority (BSLSA) shall submit a report regarding the legal aid facilities provided to the persons with mental illness and particularly to those who are coming for treatment to BIMHAS;
vi) The Principal Secretary, Health Department shall submit a report regarding the steps taken by the government for rehabilitation of the persons with mental illness after their recovery and discharge from the Hospital; 
vii) Report shall also be submitted by the State through a Responsible Officer regarding the steps taken to address the issues highlighted in the report of the Member Secretary, BSLSA. 

The High Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sukdeb Saha vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in A.I.R. 2025 S.C. 3458, wherein it held:- “31. Mental health is an integral component of the right to life Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court has, in a consistent line of precedents, affirmed that the right to life does not mean mere animal existence, but a life of dignity, autonomy, and well-being. Mental health is central to this vision. In Shatrughan Chauhan vs. Union of India MANU/SC/0043/2014 : 2014:INSC:46: (2014) 3 SCC 1 and Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India MANU/SC/0947/2018 2018:INSC:790 : (2018) 10 SCC 1, this Court recognised mental integrity, psychological autonomy, and freedom from degrading treatment as essential facets of human dignity Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, a rights- based legislation, reinforces this constitutional mandate by recognising every person's right to access mental healthcare and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment in mental health settings. Section 18 of the MH Act guarantees mental health services to all, and Section 115 of the MH Act explicitly decriminalises attempted suicide, acknowledging the need for care and support rather than punishment. These provisions read with judicial precedents reflect a broader constitutional vision that mandates a responsive legal framework to prevent self-harm and promote well-being, particularly among vulnerable populations such as students and youth.”

In Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Mr. Dinesh Kumar & Ors. (CONMT. PET. (C) No. 1653/2018 in W.P.(C) No. 412/2016), the Supreme Court, by order dated February 25, 2019, held:- “7. For ensuring availability of rehabilitation halfway homes in the districts: (i) State Governments must either expand their existing homes or construct new homes at their own cost and provide facilities as per the ‘Rehabilitation Homes’ Guidelines approved by the Supreme Court. (ii) Another way out is for the States/UTs to encourage NGOs in their States to set up rehabilitation homes or even expand the existing homes run by NGOs. The State Government may provide financial assistance to the NGOs towards this objective or seek the assistance of the Central Government for the same. The Central Government already has a scheme to fund such NGOs on the recommendation of State Government (Project Halfway Homes). The State Governments may give wide publicity to this Central scheme. 8. In certain States, some NGOs/community-based organizations have been providing remarkable services in the area of rehabilitation of mentally ill persons. The State Governments may involve them to supplement their own efforts. 9. Assistance is required to be elicited from police departments of various States, in order to register FIRs and make efforts to trace the families of de-institutionalized persons, and to include the details of such persons in national missing persons databases.

Prior to this, the Division Bench of Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar had passed 2-page long order dated January 6, 2022 in Akanksha Malviya vs. The Union of India & Ors., a case of 2021 wherein, notice was issued considering pryer for issuance of a writ in the nature of a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ(s) or order(s) or direction(s) commanding the Respondents to establish a legitimate and functional State Mental Health Authority in adherence with Section 45 and Section 55 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.

The same bench passed a 4-page long order dated February 10, 2022, wherein it noted that Mental Health Care Act, 2017 was notified on April 7, 2017. The object and purpose of the Act was to provide for mental healthcare and services for persons with mental illness. Also to protect, promote and fulfil the rights of such persons during delivery of mental healthcare. The Act is divided into XVI Chapters. Chapter-VIII specifically deals with the establishment and composition of the State Authority, to be termed as the “State Mental Health Authority”. The composition of such authority in terms of Section-46 has to be of certain persons specified therein. The functions of the authority, as specified under Section-55 of the Act, are, inter alia, to- (a) develop quality and service provision norms for different types of mental health establishments in the State; (b) supervise all mental health establishments in the State and receive complaints about deficiencies in provision of services; (c) register clinical psychologists, mental health nurses and psychiatric social workers in the State to work as mental health professionals, and publish the list of such registered mental health professionals in such manner as may be specified by regulations by the State Authority; (d) train all relevant persons including law enforcement officials, mental health professionals and other health professionals about the provisions and implementation of this Act; (e) discharge such other functions with respect to matters relating to mental health as the State Government may decide. 

The order reads: "Shockingly, as is now evident from the affidavit filed by the State, the said authority has yet not been constituted. Also as to whether there was one under the repealed Mental Health Act, 1987 is not clear from the response....The purpose behind the enactment, as we have already noticed, is to provide mental healthcare and services to persons in need whose mental condition stands determined in terms of Chapter-II of the Act. We notice that such step for establishing the authority commenced only in the year 2020, that too, with the publication of an advertisement in the Newspaper and since then nothing has been done to expedite the process. Even the affidavit filed does not disclose the time-limit within which such process would be completed. We refer to para 8 of affidavit dated 22.01.2022 filed by Additional Director, Health, Bihar, Patna. The averments are as vague as they can be....It is in this backdrop, we are constrained to direct the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, to forthwith take all steps ensuring establishment of the authority as stipulated under Section-45 of the Act. Let an affidavit of compliance indicating the latest status, be filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, before the next date. We also expect the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar to indicate the steps taken for complying with the other provisions of the Statute; the deficiencies pointed out by the petitioner in the writ petition; and the suggestion given for proper and effective implementation on expeditious basis."
 
The same bench passed a 9-page long order dated April 1, 2022. It reiterated the importance and significancethe the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. The Act is divided into XVI Chapters containing 126 Sections. Chapter III deals with advance directive; Chapter V deals with rights of persons with mental illness; Chapter VI deals with duties of appropriate Government; Chapter VII deals with constitution of Central Mental Health Authority; Chapter IX deals with Finance, Accounts and Audit; Chapter X deals with establishment of Mental Health; Chapter XI deals with Mental Health Review Board; Chapter XII deals with admission, treatment and discharge; Chapter XIII deals with responsibilities of other agencies. In terms of Section 5 of Chapter III, every person, who is not a minor, shall have a right to make an advance directive in writing, specifying the manner in which he wishes to be cared for and not to be cared for and treated for a mental illness. 

The order wondered as to "Whether there is any mechanism in place dealing with mandatory requirement of the statute or directives whereby and whereunder the person has a right to specify in advance the manner in which he wishes to be cared for and not to be cared for and treated for a mental illness and whether an Online Register as mandated by Section 7 has been set up and is being duly maintained? What are the steps undertaken to be made or already stand taken with respect to the right of community living for persons with mental illness under Section 19 where they have rights to not remain in Mental Health Establishments etc.? The Act under Section 20 grants a right of protection from cruel inhuman and degrading treatment and Section 21 provides for a right to equality and non-discrimination. Whether the staffs of already existing mental health institutions have been trained in accordance with these provisions to ensure the realization of these important basic rights? What are the steps taken in fulfillment of the duties imposed on the appropriate Government in this case, the Government of Bihar, vide Chapter VI, in particular Sections 29 and 31 which deal with promotion of mental health and preventive programme and human resource development and training respectively? The State to furnish detailed reasons as to why the time line provided under Section 45 of the Act for the establishment of the Mental Health Authority (nine months) has not been complied with, as noted in our order dated 10.02.2022. As also we note that the order dated 25.02.2022 directed the process to be expedited. What are the steps that have been taken in furtherance thereof. Section 66 of the Act provides the procedure for inspection and enquiry of mental health establishments. Details of inspection and enquiry as also under Section 67, carried out be furnished by the relevant authority before the next date. Section 100 of the Act details duties of Police Officers in respect of persons with mental illness. Whether any training, awareness or sensitization programme has been undertaken to ensure that police officers are able to carry out their duties towards this vulnerable group of people? Section 103 is titled as ‘prisoners with mental illness’. The authorities to furnish particulars of such prisoners as also the steps taken to ensure preparedness of prisons for accepting such
inmates? Section 123 grants power to State Authority to make regulations with respect to minimum standard of quality etc. Whether the State has framed such Rules? If in the affirmative, a copy of the said Rules be supplied to the Court." 

The order reads: "We may also note that the importance of this Act is reflected also in Section 125 where the Central Government has been bestowed with the power to remove any difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. Although there was a limitation to this section of two years from the date of commencement of the Act, the legislative intent is clearly that of furthering and improving the mental health institutions and their regulations. It is saddening to see that the State of Bihar even after the passing of more than four and half years has not taken adequate steps in line with the intention of the Parliament. Even more so, in the light of the fact that the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) was launched by the Central Government as far as back in 1982 with the following objectives:-
1. To ensure the availability and accessibility of minimum mental healthcare for all in the foreseeable future, particularly to the most vulnerable and underprivileged sections of the population;
2. To encourage the application of mental health knowledge in general healthcare and in social development; and
3. To promote community participation in the mental health service development and to stimulate efforts towards self-help in the community;
And yet the entire State of Bihar since after its bifurcation has only one functioning unit and even for that sufficient particulars have not been furnished. It is only after a public spirited person approaches this Court that action is initiated albeit with continued lethargy." 

The State did not address any one of the issues in its affidavit dated March 23, 2022 filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar. From the supplementary counter affidavit dated March 23, 2022, filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, it was not clear as to whether the provisions of Rule 6 of the Mental Healthcare (State Mental Health Authority) Rules, 2018 has been complied with. It was not clear as to whether the provisions of Section 62 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 stands complied with. The Court noted that there is only one mental health establishment registered within the State of Bihar although almost 1/10th people of India live within the State of Bihar. 

The Court directed Respondent No. 1, namely, the Union of India through its Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to file an affidavit dealing with each one of the averments made in the petition, also specifying as to whether each one of the statutory provisions and the rules framed thereunder were complied with. 

The 2-page long order dated April 7, 2022 noted that Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar filed his supplementary counter affidavit dated April 7, 2022 vide notification dated April 6, 2022 constituting State Mental Health Authority, as envisaged under the provisions of the Mental Health Care Act, 2017. This exercise was undertaken only pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court vide order dated April 1, 2022. The counter affidavit stated that a 272 bedded new hospital at BIMHANS, Koilwar at the cost of Rs. 128.96 Crores was being set up.

Notably, the High Court had passed orders dated February 13, 2014 and January 5, 2015 In the matter of News Reports published in The Hindustan Times, Patna Dated 24/10/2013 vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. in CWJC No. 21462 of 2013. 

In its order dated June 27, 2022, the Court noted that Additional Solicitor General "placed on record a chart indicating the budgetary allocation with respect to the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) under Flexible Pool for Non Communicable Diseases (NCDs) under NHM during the period from 2018-19 to 2020-21. Evidently, there is reduction in the budgetary allocation with each succeeding year. We are informed that only on account of non-utilization of funds, the Central Government has taken such a measure."

In its order dated September 27, 2022, it was recorded that the State Mental Health Review Board and State Mental Health Fund was constituted. In its order dated November 16, 2022, it recorded that Review
Board as envisaged under Section 73 of the Mental Health Act, 2017 was not constituted. There were more than 11.2 million persons, moreso below the age of 35 years, who are suffering from several psychiatric disorders as defined under the Act.  

In its 2-page long order dated December 8, 2023, High Court's Division Bench of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Rajiv Roy recorded the affidavit dated October 12, 2023 by the respondent pointed out that the State Mental Health Authority and the State Mental Health Review Board have been constituted. The Mental Health Review Board have been constituted in 9 divisional headquarters of the State, i.e. Patna, Chapra, Gaya, Muzzaffarpur, Bhagalpur, Purnea, Saharsa and Munger under the Chairmanship of District and Sessions Judges, the Districts which is the divisional headquarters. The order reads: "The District Judges of the divisional headquarters afore-mentioned shall file a report on the intimation of such constitution having been received by them and the steps taken to convene the Review Board, within a period of four weeks from today. The Registry shall issue a certified copy of this order to the above said District Judges at the divisional headquarters, who shall file a report through the Registrar General."

The High Court' Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Partha Sarthy, passed a 2-page long order dated November 22, 2024 recorded that out of the nine Divisional Commissionerates, in eight Commissionerates Mental Health Review Boards have been constituted, however, in Saran, no Board has been constituted for reason of the district having no medical colleges and no psychiatrist. The Court observed: "2. We do not think that this is a reason to not constitute a Board for the said Divisional Commissionerate also. 3. The learned AAG submits that steps will be taken to constitute a Board in the said district also within a period of two weeks." 

In its 3-page long order dated March 7, 2025, High Court's of Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy recorded that mere setting up of Review Boards in different Commissionerates would not be of any avail to the people suffering from mental health, unless funds were allocated for the purpose. There was no allocation of funds towards making the Mental Health Review Boards functional, thus, rendering the Boards in nine Commissionerates to be in existence only on paper. For effective implementation of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, the State must take pro-active steps with respect to prisoners who are suffering from mental health issues. There is no updated report on behalf of the State with respect to the number of half-way homes, shelter accommodation; supported accommodation and other places where persons suffering from mental health issues could be sent. The need for steps for the outreach of the Act to jail inmates remained unaddressed.

The same bench passed a 3-page long order dated May 16, 2025, wherein, it noted that for smooth functioning of the State Mental Health Tribunal, a fund of Rs. 40 lacs was allocated by the Health Department for 2025-26. The order reads: "The allocation of funds to Mental Health Review Boards shall be done after collating all information with respect to such Boards and the proposal of work which can be handed over or entrusted to them. Such allocation also shall be made without wastage of any further time. 4. With respect to the query of the Court regarding outreach of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 to jail inmates and the infrastructure in the shape of half-way homes and accommodation shelters, it appears that only information is being sought from the relevant quarters." It recorded that the allocated fund would be meaningless unless it comes to the Board along with the proposal of work programme which was mandated under Section 53(1)(c) of the Act of 2017. 6. Similarly, even with Review Boards, such allocation of fund and proposal for work programme has to be supplied by the State. The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 and Mental Healthcare (Rights of Persons with Mental Illness) Rules, 2018 command for setting up of a mental health establishment in at-least one prison in the State. It concluded: "8. It has rightly been pointed out that there is no information in the affidavit regarding compliance of such requirement under the Act and the Rules."

Significantly, it was after 38 order have been passed by the High Court that in the case filed on November 20, 2021 and registered on November 25, 2021, that a PIL entitled "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report" was filed in mid-February 2026.
  

Patna High Court adjudicated first fundamental rights case

In Brajnandan Sharma v. State of Bihar (1950), the Patna High Court had delivered a landmark decision concerning the constitutional validity of statutory provisions impinging upon fundamental rights. 

Brajnandan Sharma was represented by Advocate Awadhesh Nandan Sahay who had prayed for judicial intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to prevent the enforcement of an order restricting movement of Brajnandan Sharma. 

The order was issued under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, which barred him from entering the districts of Singhbhum and Manbhum. The High Court had to examine whether such statutory restrictions were justified under the newly enacted Constitution, specifically under Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 

The High Court's division bench of Chief Justice Meredith and Justice S. K. Das, examined the constitutional compatibility of Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. 

The counsel of the petitioner contended that the provision was unconstitutional as it violated Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to freely move throughout the territory of India. Furthermore, under Article 13(1), any law in force before the Constitution that is inconsistent with its provisions must be rendered void. The court concluded that Section 2(1)(b) was indeed unconstitutional as it imposed unreasonable restrictions not safeguarded by the Constitution. 

As a consequence, the High Court declared the provision void and prohibited the State from enforcing the order against the petitioner. The judgment drew on the following decisions:

King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande: Emphasized the burden of proof on the state to demonstrate reasonable grounds when restricting fundamental rights.

Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson: Distinguished between objective and subjective tests of reasonableness, advocating for an objective standard.

Union Colliery Company of British Columbia Limited v. Bryden: Highlighted the limits of judicial intervention in legislative matters.

Fletcher v. Peck: Reinforced the principle that legislative actions must conform to constitutional mandates.

These precedents collectively underscored the judiciary's role in scrutinizing legislative provisions that infringe upon fundamental rights, especially regarding the reasonableness of such restrictions.

The court's analysis focused on the interplay between Article 13(1) and Article 19 of the Constitution. Article 13(1) mandates that any pre-Constitutional law inconsistent with its provisions is null to the extent of such inconsistency. Article 19(1)(d) enshrines the right to freedom of movement, which is a fundamental right. However, Article 19(5) allows the state to impose reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public or the protection of any Scheduled Tribe.

The petitioner argued that Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Act did not constitute a reasonable restriction because it relied solely on the state's subjective satisfaction without any objective standard or criteria. The court concurred, emphasizing that the Constitution requires an objective test of reasonableness, which was absent in the statute in question. The provision allowed arbitrary restrictions based on the satisfaction of an unspecified official, thereby failing to meet the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.h

The court observed that the lack of procedural safeguards, such as the right to be heard or the requirement to specify grounds for restriction, made the provision inherently unreasonable. Without the ability to challenge the restrictions or understand the basis for them, the statute violated the fundamental tenets of justice and fairness enshrined in the Constitution.

The judgment is crucial  for the protection of fundamental rights in India. By invalidating Section 2(1)(b), the High Court reinforced the judiciary's role as a guardian of constitutional liberties against arbitrary state actions. It set a precedent that legislative provisions imposing restrictions on fundamental rights must adhere to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness, incorporating objective standards rather than subjective discretion.

The judgement made it clear that legislations and executive orders will be scrutinized by the Court for their conformity with constitutional guarantees. It  serves as a litmus test for assessing the validity of laws that infringe upon personal freedoms, ensuring that any imposed restrictions are both justified and subject to judicial review.

Article 13(1) of the Constitution of India declares that any law in force before the Constitution, which is inconsistent with its provisions, shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency. This ensures that the Constitution reigns supreme, and pre-existing laws must conform to its mandates.

Article 19(1)(d): Guarantees the right of all citizens to move freely throughout the territory of India.

Article 19(5): Allows the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(d), (e), and (f) in the interests of the general public or for the protection of any Scheduled Tribe.

The interplay between these articles emphasizes that while fundamental rights are protected, they are not absolute and can be subject to reasonable limitations under specific circumstances.

The court deliberated on whether reasonableness should be assessed objectively (based on external standards and societal norms) or subjectively (based on individual discretion). The decision leaned towards an objective test, asserting that restrictions must meet a standard that would be deemed reasonable by a "reasonable person" rather than relying solely on the satisfaction of a governmental authority.

The High Court's decision serves as a critical affirmation of the judiciary's role in upholding constitutional rights against arbitrary legislative overreach. By declaring Section 2(1)(b) of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, unconstitutional, the court underscored the necessity for laws imposing restrictions on fundamental rights to be framed with objective standards of reasonableness.

This judgment not only provided relief to the petitioner but also established a precedent that protects individual liberties. It established that  legislative or executive actions that seek to limit fundamental rights must do so within the boundaries of reasonableness as defined by the Constitution. The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Meredith. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench modifies judgement of Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Land Acquisition Fair Compensation case

We must ask: "why statements are acceptable in 'development' discourse that would be considered absurd in academic settings, but also why many acceptable statements from the realm of academic discourse - or even from that of common observation - fail to find their way into the discursive regime of 'development'"

-James Ferguson (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press. p. 67.

It seems all is fair in war, government, for "public purpose", and development. Warmongering, governmentality, veil of public purpose,  governmentality and  developmentality manifest themselves in myriad deceptive ways.

The judgement of Patna High Court's division bench by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy reminds one of insights from The Anti-Politics Machine, the book by James Ferguson. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. He observed: "the direction of the learned Single Judge that it should be done first and then compensation be paid, would not be practical in the sense that updating the Circle Rates require time and in the present circumstance, time would be the essence especially if seen in the context of the land owners who have been divested of their land who would require money urgently for their resettlement" in Ranjeet Kumar and others vs. The State of Bihar & others (2025). Besides the State of Bihar, there were 16 respondents. In a batch of petitions, the 71-page long judgement of the division bench concluded:"We, therefore, modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge and direct that the MVR/Circle rates of 2014 must be updated, which would be an independent exercise which shall be carried out by the State after observing the due process in that regard but the payment of compensation to the land owners would not be contingent on such updation as it would take long time. Thus the appeals on behalf of the land owners are dismissed whereas the appeals preferred by the State and the PMRC are allowed to the extent indicated above." PMRC refers to Patna Metro Rail Corporation. 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had passed his 125-page long judgement and order on December 21, 2023 after hearing the petitioners who were land as well as the house owners, whose properties were acquired for the construction of Patna Metro Rail Depot, having a total area of 75.96 acres of land, in two mauza, i.e. Pahari and Ranipur. They had approached the High Court for quashing of the land acquisition notice, issued under Section 11 (1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with regard to 15.95 acres of land, situated in mauza Pahari and 23.35 acres of land, situated in mauza Ranipur, having a total area of 75.96 acre. the petitioners had prayed for setting aside the Social Impact Assessment Report prepared by the Development Management Institute, Patna. They had also prayed for quashing of the formation of Technical Expert Committee, constituted under Section 7 of the 2013 Act as well as quashing of the report of the Technical Expert Committee, dated June 30, 2021. They sought quashing of the order dated February 2, 2022 passed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Patna, by which objections filed by the petitioners were rejected, for quashing the paper publication, under Section 19 of the 2013 Act. They also sought quashing of the award, dated August 4, 2023, prepared in L. A. Case No. 29/2021-2022, under Sections 23 and 30 of the 2013 Act. 

Earlier two depots were to be constructed in mauza Aitwarpur and mauza Ramchak Bairiya, but subsequently it was decided to construct only one depot, at mauza Pahari and Ranipur. The Cabinet of the State of Bihar approved the Patna Metro Rail Project on October 9, 2018. Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES) had given the proposal for two depots. On September 3, 2019, the work of construction of Metro Rail and Depot in Patna was given by Patna Metro Rail Corporation Limited (PMRCL) to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and the same was approved by State of Bihar. The agreement between PMRCL and DMRC was entered on September 25, 2019. The DMRC made changes in the line alignment of the Patna Metro on February 8, 2020 and also changed the location of metro depot from two locations to one locations, i.e. mauza Pahari and Ranipur, which are under acquisition. The lands have been acquired under the general provisions of the 2013 Act. The Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar, issued an Office Order on March  17, 2020, in which reasons for relocation of the Metro depot from two depots to one depot, has been mentioned that there shall be large number of demolition of houses at previous location, drainage system, seamless integration of I.S.B.T. and the Metro depot, and further 11.6 Hectares for the purpose of Property Development Area. The revised detailed project report has been approved by the State Government and the Union Government.

Justice Sinha had framed the following questions for considerations by the Court:

(a) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act have been followed for acquiring the land, in question?

(b) Scope of rehabilitation and resettlement, if any

(c)Whether the property development area and the depot area are integral part of the PMRP?

(d) Whether the PMRP, including the property development area, is a project of larger public interest?

Justice Sinha had also  considered the question as to how to ascertain the just and fair compensation, which the petitioners and others are entitled. He observed: "The price of the land in Patna has skyrocketed and increased manifold, but the M.V.R./circle rate of the area has not been revised for many years. The Court has been informed that the compensation has been fixed on the M.V.R./circle rate prevalent in the year 2014. The M.V.R./circle rate is provided for the purpose of payment of stamp duty, but that cannot be made a basis to determine the actual price of the market value of the property. The purchasers, while purchasing the land, in the sale deed, quote the consideration amount on the basis of the M.V.R./circle rate and not the actual price paid for the purchase of the land.

The judgement of Justice Sinha reads:"let the M.V.R./circle rate, which has not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised by taking into consideration the relevant factors, including the opinion of the Expert. The concerned respondents are further directed to re-fix the compensation amount, payable to the petitioners, based upon the revised M.V.R./circle rate. Justice Sinha recorded that recommendations of the Expert Committee, have not been considered by the State Government, including the recommendation of the Expert Committee on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement, accordingly, I direct the State Government and the Collector, Patna, to consider the recommendation of the Expert Committee, and to take decision on the point of rehabilitation and resettlement of the land/house losers, as per Section 31 of the 2013 Act." He concluded that these "exercises must be completed by the respondents within the maximum period of six months from today. "

The Single Judge on the issue of breach of Rule -11 (3) of Rules of 2014 mandating that public hearing must be announced three weeks in advance through daily newspaper and clear 21 days time is required to be given to the landholders, had held that from the materials put forth by the parties, it transpired that in the public hearing during the course of preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report by the Development Management Institute, Patna, 111 persons had participated but according to the State, 250 people as well as representatives of Ward No. 56 had participated and that there was substantial compliance of the provisions except some procedural lapses here and there.

In the opinion of the Single Judge, the Social Assessment Impact Report clearly stated that the positive impact had a higher quotient than negative impact.

With respect to the opposition regarding non-consideration of alternative sites suggested by the land owners, the Single Judge was of the view that the same was considered but not found to be suitable as the site suggested for construction of depot would have incurred extra cost ranging between 500-700 crores and that no interference was required since the construction work has started at the selected site and the progress was to the extent of 44%.

Majority of the land owners, it was found, had already received compensation to the tune of Rs. 130 crores. The suitability of land, the learned Single Judge agreed, fell in the domain of the acquiring agency as also the agency executing the project and they are the best judge to decide the suitability and feasibility of the project including the site selected. Relying on Ramji Veerji Patel case, it was held that it was not open to the Court to examine the aspect of suitability and the Court substituting its opinion with that of the acquiring and executing agency.

With respect to the objection regarding the formation of the Expert Committee for appraisal of Social Assessment Impact Report as mandated under Section 7(2) (b) of 2013 Act, the revelation by the Advocate General that the proposal of the Expert Committee was not considered by the State Government as it was not found to be viable, was taken into account.

The argument with respect to the property development area component of the project not being relatable to public purpose, it was held that in view of the reason that Metro Rail Policy, 2017 contemplated provisions for enhancement of revenue of the Metro rail projects and included commercial/property development at stations and on other urban land which could be used as key instruments for maximizing revenue in Metro rail/railway systems in the cities, no fault could be found. The exemplars were drawn from Hongkong and Tokyo. It was found from the records that while conceiving of the project, the State had taken into all the above factors which would increase the non-fair box revenue which was in sync with the Metro Rail Policy, 2017 and hence the construction and development of property development area was held to be part of the public purpose and it was complementary to each other and therefore integral to the scheme of PMRP. 

It was thus concluded, in view of the judgment in Godrej & Boyce vs The State Of Maharashtra case, that even if there are some irregularities in the procedure followed by the acquiring authority for infrastructural project, the Courts, in exercise of their extraordinary discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to interfere, especially when the project is of public importance. In matters of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and public interest intermingle.

The Single Judge, therefore, refused to interfere with the process of acquisition.

However, while considering the issue of just and fair compensation to which the land owners would be entitled, a direction was issued that the MVR/Circle Rates which had not been revised since long by the Collector, be revised after taking into consideration the relevant factors including the opinion of the experts and then re-fix the compensation amount payable to the land owners based upon the revised MVR/Circle Rate.

While assailing the judgment of the Single Judge, Amit Sibbal, the Senior Advocate appearing virtually argued that even though right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right after the 44th amendment of the Constitution, it continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300A and therefore any expropriatory law which deprives a person of his property nust be in line with the overarching principles of law and must be just fair and reasonable. The exercise of power of eminent domain ought to be construed narrowly in favour of a person’s right to his property. It was argued that the land owners would not do good by challenging the public purpose behind the acquisition proceedings. The challenge thus is primarily to the manner in which the proceedings were concluded with complete disregard to the statutory safeguards. Whether the land is to be acquired under the Act, under the new law cannot be a unilateral decision. The process has to be humane, informed and transparent with least disturbance to the owners of the land and the affected families and the deprived persons would be entitled to just and fair compensation.

In this context, it was argued that Social Impact Assessment study is not a mere formality and the Single Judge has erred in law in being satisfied about substantial compliance of the provision, looking aside procedural lapses here and there.

Relying on Urban Development Trust, Bikaner vs. Gordhan Das (dead) Through LR (2024) 3 SCC 250; Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. vs.Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. (2024) 10 SCC 533; D.B.Basnett vs. Collector, East District Gangtok, Sikkim (2020) 4 SCC 572; Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 569; Dinesh & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2024) SCC Online SC 937; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25; Rajesh K vs. Managing Director, Kerala Rail Development Corporation (WP(C) 41009/22 (Kerala High Court) and Manekbben Rama Tandel vs. The Collector, Daman, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli & Daman and Diu & Ors.(MANU/MH/1796/2023), it was argued that the importance of property rights and requirements of strict adherence to procedure cannot be ignored or by-passed or else the entire acquisition proceeding gets vitiated.

Taking the argument of “acquisition by ambush” further, which is impermissible, it was pointed out that there was complete disregard to the procedural safeguards under Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 19 in as much as there was no finding or analysis with regard to land being the bare minimum land required for public purpose.

Even with respect to rejection of the alternative places where the depots could be constructed, it was argued that it was not prudent to discard such suggestions as the land suggested viz.

The Sahara land, Gair Mazarua lands and a dumping yard in close vicinity to the selected site would have caused minimum displacement and minimum requirement to resettle and rehabilitate human heads. It would have reduced the cost of acquisition for the Government. The rejection was not based on any sound reason.

A special grievance was made with respect to only three days having been given for voicing the objection in place of clear 21 days and that also at a time when the State was swept by COVID -19 pandemic. A special reference was made to the letter of one Councilor viz. Kismat Devi of Ward No. 56, where she had highlighted the difficulties faced by the affected people of the area and inefficacy and the infirmities in the S.I.A. study being conducted by the State.

Even if the argument on behalf of the State that 250 people had participated in the public hearing, the persons affected were numbering around 1300.

Section 15 of the 2013 Act provides the right of the people affected by the land being acquired under Section 11 notification to raise objections with respect to the suitability of the land being acquired and the findings of the S.I.A. study report. The objections raised by the displaced persons are stated to have been mechanically rejected without due consideration. The Single Judge having lightly dealt with the lapses suggested that it was not understood that the preparation of Social Impact Assessment Report and its vetting by the Special Expert Committee are the heart and soul of the Act and represent the very purpose of the humane, participative, informed and transparent process of land acquisition envisaged under the scheme of the Act. The argument of the State as also PMRCL regarding nonsuitability of the alternative site was not based on any pleadings on affidavit or any minutes of the meeting of a technical body or any data or reasoning. The dumping yard displacing none, in fact, could have been shifted elsewhere and that land which in itself would have sufficed the purpose could have been selected as the site in fact in one of the writ proceedings sometimes in the year 2012, the High Court had directed the State to consider relocating the dumping yard as it was within the municipal limits and was causing hazards and other health hazards. 

The Supreme Court and High Courts have recognised that the expression " public purpose " is not capable of precise definition. The concept of "public purpose finds mention in article 31(2) of the constitution of india. 

In University of Bombay v. municipal commr. of the city of Bombay, I.L.R.16 Bom. 217, it has been held that acquisition of land comes with the purview of public purpose if it is meant for providing suitable accommodation to the public servant.

In Radha Binode v. Surendra Nath, 105 I.C. 377, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing road facilities in municipal areas is public purpose.

In State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, A.I.R 1956, S.C. 294, it has been held that acquisition of land for providing housing accommodation for homeless is public purpose. 

In Iftikher Ahmed v. state of M.P, A.I.R. 1961 M.P 140, it has been held that acquisition of land for establishment of slaughter house for maintaining supplies of food in locality is public purpose.

In Ganga Prasad Verma v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 22, it has been held that acquisition of land for resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced persons is public purpose. 

In Walliammal v. state of Madras and Others, 1967 Mad 334: (1965) 2 Mad. 388: (1966) 79 Mad. LW 702, it has been held that acquisition of land for opening of a burial ground is public purpose.

In Guru Shiddawwavitra Sangayya v. state of Mysore, 1968 Mys 127, it has been held that removal of timber shops from the scattered places in the city area to a place outside the city area for the establishment of timber market comes under public purpose. An acquisition is for public purpose when it involves an element of public utility, provides public good and aims for social welfare. Acquisition need not be an acquisition which benefits each and every member of the public.

The 2013 Act which came into force on January 1, 2014 defines public purpose. The Act is applicable when the land is acquire by the government for its own use, including land acquired for public sector undertaking. The land is acquired by the land with the intention of transferring it for the use of private company for the specific stated public purpose. The acquisition of land by the government for immediate and declared use by private companies for public purpose.

The definition of public purpose is provided in the 2013 Act. Under Section 2 (1) (a) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for strategic purposes relating to naval, military, air force, and armed forces of the Union, including central paramilitary forces or any work vital to national security or defence of India or State police, safety of the people. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (i) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for infrastructure projects: excluding private hospitals, private educational institutions and private hotels.

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (ii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for projects related to agriculture and allied activities set up or owned by the appropriate Government or by a farmers' cooperative or by an institution set up under a statute. 

Under Section 2 (1) (b) (iii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for project for industrial corridors or mining activities, national investment and manufacturing zones. 

Under Section 2 (1) b (iv-vii) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken for water conservation structures sanitation, Government aided educational and research schemes or institutions, sports, healthcare, tourism, transportation or space programme or any infrastructure facility as may be notified in this regard by the Central Government and after tabling of such notification in Parliament. 

Under Section 2 (1) (f) states that acquisition of land for public purpose can be undertaken project for project affected families, for housing for such income groups, as may be specified from time to time by the appropriate Government, for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by the Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State. 

Under Section 2 (2) (a) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for public private  partnership projects, where the ownership of  the land continues to vest with the Government, for public purpose. 

Under Section 2 (2) (b) states that acquisition of land for can be undertaken project for private companies for public purpose. 

In this backdrop, the division bench of the Patna High Court opined that "there is no gainsaying that establishment of Metro line in the city of Patna is in public interest. No further ink is required to be wasted in deciding whether it is in public interest or not. Relieving the city dwellers of traffic congestion, providing fast moving traffic and the income generated from the property development area are by no means opposed to public interest."

It is apparent that the division bench of the High Court did not pay heed to the decision of Supreme Court in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar and Others reported in 2011(12) SCC 375 held that “Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power—sometimes called colorable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions, and satisfaction—is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for the promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colorable exercise and is undeceived by illusion”, a veil of public purpose was employed to acquire land from the people who were misled in the name of planned industrial development