In Shardendu Bhushan vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated August 11, 2026, wherein, he set aside and quashed the impugned cognizance order dated June 26, 2019 with all its consequential proceedings in view of Supreme Court order dated July 22, 2024 as passed in Shivendra Nath Verma vs. Union of India and the provisions of Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act. The respondent no. 2 is the Vigilance Department, Government of Bihar. Arvind Kumar was the counsel for the Vigilance.
The petitioner had approached the High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of order dated June 26, 2019 as passed by Special Judge Vigilance Patna in Special Case No. 33 of 2015 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 01 of 2015 dated June 30, 2015 for the offences registered under sections 13 (2), r/w, 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 through which the Special Judge (Vigilance) Patna took cognizance against the petitioner by violating the section 19 (1) b of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018 in most mechanical way.
As per prosecution case, petitioner who was appointed as an Assistant Engineer in the Road Construction Department, Government of Bihar, while functioning as a public servant, had acquired wealth through corrupt and illegal means by abusing his official position, and had amassed movable as well as immovable assets in his own name and in the names of his wife and children, which were substantially disproportionate to his known sources of income. It is alleged that petitioner joined the government service as an Assistant Engineer on December 13 2007 and continued in the capacity thereafter. During the relevant period, his total income from salary was assessed at Rs. 36,00,000/-, whereas his expenditure under various heads was assessed at Rs. 17,03,405/-, leaving a likely saving of Rs. 18,96,595/-. However, against the said likely savings, he was alleged to have acquired movable and immovable assets and made investments valued at approximately Rs. 2,77,79,000/- in his own name as well as in the names of his wife and children. It was also alleged that he had made substantial investments in a business being run in the name of his wife with the intention of routing his alleged illegal earnings. Accordingly, the total value of the movable and immovable assets was stated to be Rs. 2,77,79,000/-, which, as alleged in the FIR, was substantially higher than his likely savings of Rs. 18,96,595/- and was, therefore, treated as disproportionate to his known sources of income.
The counsel for the petitioner raised single issue in support of his submission that cognizance was bad in eyes of law as same was taken in absence of sanction order. It was submitted that the legal provisions as available under Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018 categorically suggest that
no cognizance can be taken without sanction and relied upon legal report ofSupreme Court as passed in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335.
This submission was not disputed by the counsel appearing for the Vigilance. The counsel also referred to Court's order dated July 22, 2024 as passed in Shivendra Nath Verma vs. Union of India arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12708 of 2023. 6. It was accepted and admitted at the Bar that the competent authority has granted sanction vide order dated July 27, 2022.
Justice Jha relied on the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335, which reads as under:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
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