In Jagdamba Harijan vs. The State (2026), Allahabad High Court's Division Bench of Justices Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary and Rajesh Singh delivered a judgment dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"39. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court balancing the gravity of the offence with the principles of justice and need of the society to live in a peaceful, safe and congenial environment with chance of reformation and integrating the appellant into the society, this Court is of the considered view that justice would be met, if the appellant is awarded a fixed term of imprisonment in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction under Section 304, 326A, 452 I.P.C., the maximum sentence of life awarded to the appellant- Jagdamba Harijan is reduced to a fixed term of 14 (Fourteen years) Rigorous Imprisonment. However, the fine under Section 304 and 326A I.P.C. and the punishment and fine under Section 452 is not being disturbed and are affirmed. 40.Consequently, the present Appeal stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms. 41. Having said so, it is directed that the appellant - Jagdamba Harijan shall be released only after undergoing the aforesaid sentence of punishment of 14 years, rigorous imprisonment, under the Sessions Trial No. 08 of 2015; arising out of Case Crime No. 147 of 2014; (State V/s Jagdamba Harijan), if he is not required in any other case. The Jail Authorities are accordingly directed to compute the period of custody, extending to the appellant the benefit of Section 427 and 428 Cr.P.C. in accordance with law."
The High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Masalti vs. State of U.P., reported as AIR 1965 SC 202. It held as under:-
"14. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct."
Therefore, the High Court did not find any force in the submission of the the counsel for the defense and as such the same is rejected.
It observed:"34. Thus, from the conceptus of the evidence brought on record and considering the testimony of the eye-witness, corroborated by the medical witness and the Investigation Officer, Court finds that the prosecution has been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt the charges under Sections 304, 326A and 451 I.P.C. against the Appellant. A reading of the entire statement and cross-examination fully established the charges against the accused/appellant. It is trite that eye witness testimony is given importance and the trial Court has given due weight to the said evidences and this Court does not find any error in the Trial Court's appreciation of their evidences. Further, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court nowhere missed the woods for the tree in returning the findings of guilt against the Appellant. This Court does not find any infirmity in the Judgment dated 30.08.2018 of the Learned Trial Court passed in Sessions Trial No. 08 of 2015 (State vs. Jagdamba Harijan), arising out of Case Crime No. 147 of 2014, relating to Police Station Aaspur Devsara, District Pratapgarh and as such the said judgment of conviction is upheld."
The High Court's judgment referred to Supreme Court in Edakkkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan & Ors. vs. State of Kerala, reported as 2025 INSC 28; while observing that the investigation had not taken place in a proper and disciplined manner refused to give any relief to the accused persons by referring to an earlier judgment of the Apex court in Paras Yadav & Ors. V/s State of Bihar, reported in 1999(2) SCC 126. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Ekakkandi Dineshan (Supra) held as follows:
32.".... Hence, the principle of law is crystal clear that on the account of defective investigation the benefit will not inure to the accused persons on that ground alone. It is well within the domain of the courts to consider the rest of the evidence which the prosecution has gathered such as statement of the eyewitnesses, medical report etc. It has been a consistent stand of this court that the accused cannot claim acquittal on the ground of faulty investigation done by the prosecuting agency.,"
Supreme Court in Birbal Nath vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 190 held that mere variation in two statements would not be enough to discredit a witness. Further, it is trite law that only such omissions which amount to contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. Minor omission in the statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of witness unreliable. It is quite natural that there is bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefore should not render the evidence of eye witnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. (Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana, 1999 (9) SCC page 525).
The High Court observed:"Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report."
It added: "23. No doubt, prompt lodging of F.I.R. is a significant step in ascertaining its reliability. However, there is no mathematical formulae by which an inference may be drawn either way merely on account of delay in lodging of F.I.R. In this connection it would be useful to note that the Hon'ble Supreme court in Tara Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 536); and Jamna vs. State of U.P. reported in (1994 (1) SCC 185); observed that by nc 18/31 settled that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. The Hon'ble Court acknowledged the fact that knowing the Indian conditions as they are, it cannot be expected from villagers to rush to the Police Station immediately after the occurrence of the incidence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the Police Station for giving the report."
The High Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Gian Chand, reported in 2001 (6) SCC 71. A 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed:
"Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the
In Ravinder Kumar and Anr. vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 690; Supreme Court held that:-"The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Of course a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is the ideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage. First is that it affords commencement of the investigation without any time lapse. Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false version. Barring these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuineness of the version incorporated therein. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident."
It added:"We are not providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. [Vide Zahoor vs. State of UP (1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 372; Tara Singh vs. State of Punjab (1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 536); Jamna vs. State of UP (1994 (1) SCC 185). In Tara Singh (Supra) the Court made the following observations:"It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case."
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