Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgment of 2013 by Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Ara in a case of kidnapping for marriage

In Harendra Yadav vs. The State Of Bihar (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 16-page long judgement dated June 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"24. The impugned judgment dated 18.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 20.04.2013 passed in Sessions Trial No. 149 of 2005 arising out of Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 by the learned Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge II, Ara is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the above-named appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, as such, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him. 25. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 26. There shall be no order as to cost. 27. Office is directed to send back the lower court records along with a copy of the judgment to the learned District Court forthwith."

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the criminal appeal which was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2005. The case arose out of a Ara Nawada P.S.Case of 2003, by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge IInd, Ara, whereby the trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence committed under Section 366 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo ten years Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I.) and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000.

The prosecution case was that the informant, Yogendra Yadav, while working in a Cotton Mill at Sapar, Rajkot (Gujarat), became acquainted with accused Nagendra Yadav, who was employed in the same establishment. On February 17, 2003, when the informant, along with his wife and minor son, was returning to his native village, Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and allegedly persuaded them to visit his residence at Ara Town. It was alleged that after reaching Ara on February 19, 2003 and staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, the informant found the very next morning that his wife, son and a box containing Rs.90,000/- were missing. Upon inquiry from the co-accused Ram Ayodhaya, he was informed that his wife and son had gone to the River Ganga and would return later, however, allegedly co-accused Ram Ayodhaya had allegedly served him food containing intoxicant and after consuming the same he remained unconscious for several days. The day he regained consciousness he found that his wife, son and the cash box were missing. Subsequently, on February 26,.2003, when the informant, along with witnesses had again approached the accused persons to know about the whereabouts of his son and wife, allegedly the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- to release his wife and son and in case of failure of fulfillment of the 
demand he had threatened that they would be killed, which led to institution of the complaint before the Chief Judicial  Magistrate.

The Magistrate directed the local police for investigation in exercise of power under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C., pursuant to which Ara Nawada P.S. Case No. 85 of 2003 was registered for the commission of offences under Sections 364, 379, 328 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) against four accused persons, including the appellant. 

The police submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 366, 364, 379 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code on November 26, 2023. Cognizance was taken on February 7, 2004, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions on March 18, 2005. Charges were framed against the appellant on January 7, 2006 leading the conviction of the appellant upon completion of trial. 

The counsel of the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the main allegation is against co-accused Nagendra Yadav and the appellant were implicated solely because he is the brother of the co-accused, in spite of the fact, no material came against the appellant that he had participated in the alleged abduction of the informant’s wife or son and he had shared any common intention with the main accused, so as, to attract the provisions
of 120-B of the IPC. 

He referred to the testimony of Om Prakash Yadav, the P.W.1, the son of the informant. He in his examination-in-chief, gave varying versions regarding the circumstances in which his mother allegedly went away on her own, which creates serious doubt about the veracity of his testimony and the prosecution case as a whole. 

The counsel submitted that neither any witness nor any material was brought on record in course of trial to suggest that the victim was kidnapped by the appellant as would also appear from the deposition of the victim Meera Devi, the P.W.5, who is the victim and she also has not supported the prosecution story. 

P.W.5 in her statement in police custody that she on her own had accompanied the co-accused which demolishes the accusation of kidnapping and, as such, the prosecution having miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, renders the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence to be set aside.

APP appeared for the State. While opposing the appeal, he submitted that the District Court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits submitted on behalf of the parties during the course of trial, has erred no mistake in passing the order conviction against the appellant.

The conviction of the appellant is under Section 366 and Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code. Section 366 reads: “Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.—Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

Section 120B reads: "Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.  (2)Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

Justice Singh observed: "12. To constitute the offence of abduction, it must be shown that a person was unlawfully taken away or induced to move from one place to another either by the use of force or through deceitful means. The essence of the offence lies in the intention with which the accused acts. It is the accused's conduct, volition and underlying purpose that are determinative of whether the offence is made out. The crucial issue in every case is the intention accompanying the act of taking or inducing the woman to leave a particular place. Once the requisite criminal intent on the part of the accused is established, the offence stands complete irrespective of whether the intended object was ultimately achieved and regardless of whether the woman subsequently consented to marriage or sexual relations. 13. It is a well-settled principle that, for bringing home a charge under Section 366 IPC, the prosecution must establish not merely that the woman was taken or induced to move from one place to another, but also that such inducement was effected by force or deceitful means and was accompanied by the requisite criminal intent contemplated under the provision. The prosecution is further required to prove that the abduction was committed with the intention that the woman may be compelled to marry any person against her will, or that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or with the knowledge that such consequences were likely to follow. Mere proof of abduction, by itself, is insufficient to attract the provisions of Section 366 IPC. The gravamen of the offence lies not only in the act of taking away the woman but also in the specific purpose and intention behind such act. Therefore, unless the prosecution succeeds in proving that the abduction was for one of the purposes enumerated under Section 366 IPC, a conviction under the said provision cannot be legally sustained.

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2018) 6 SCC 664, wherein, it observed that to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case which is reproduced hereinafter:“16. In order to constitute the offence of “abduction”, a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

The judgement reads: ".....to constitute an  offence under Section 366 IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge under Section 366 IPC is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 IPC, the court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under Section 366 IPC.” This proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yousuff vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2021) 16 SCC 461. 

Justice Singh explored as to whether the judgment of conviction dated April 18, 2013 and order of sentence dated April 20, 2013 passed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 366 and 120-B of the IPC was justified. During the trial, the prosecution has examined altogether four witnesses. P.W.1 – Om Prakash Yadav: P.W.1 is the son of the informant and one of the alleged victims. In his deposition, he stated that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) along with his parents, accused Nagendra Yadav accompanied them and persuaded them to visit Ara. According to him, after staying at the khatal of Nagendra Yadav, he and his mother were taken away by accused Nagendra Yadav and were kept at different places, including Kudhwa Tola and Mumbai. He also stated that when they later came to Buxar Railway Station, he met his father, whereupon the accused persons fled away with his mother. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was a student of Class V at the relevant time and supported the fact that he had stayed with his mother at Kudhwa Mohalla and Mumbai. The trial court found his testimony corroborative of the evidence of P.W.2, Yogendra Yadav, the Informant. 

P.W.2 identified his signature on the complaint petition. He substantially reiterated the allegations made in the complaint petition. He deposed that while returning from Sapar (Rajkot) on February 17, 2003 along with his wife and son, accused Nagendra Yadav persuaded them to visit Ara Town. After reaching the khatal of the accused persons and taking meals, he went to sleep and on waking found his wife and son missing. He stated that accused Ram Ayodhaya informed him that they had gone to the Ganga for bathing and worship. He further alleged that after consuming food provided by the accused persons, he became unconscious for several days and, upon regaining consciousness, found that his wife and son were still missing. He also deposed that the accused persons later demanded Rs.1,00,000/- for their release. In cross-
examination, he stated that Meera Devi was his second wife and that he had married her in the year 1995 after separating from his first wife. The trial court found that his evidence regarding the stay at the khatal and subsequent disappearance of his wife and son remained substantially unshaken.

P.W.3–SurendraYadav, did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He denied having any knowledge regarding the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been interrogated by the police in connection with the case. Nothing material supporting the prosecution case could be elicited from his evidence.

P.W.4–Vindhyachal Yadav was also declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the
alleged occurrence and did not support the prosecution version. His evidence did not advance the prosecution case in any manner.

P.W.5 – Meera Devi, the alleged victim and the second wife of the informant according to the prosecution case did not support the prosecution version and was declared hostile. She stated that she had never married the informant and also alleged that her statement recorded before the Magistrate had been made under pressure from the police. She specifically denied the prosecution allegation that accused Nagendra Yadav had forcibly abducted her after administering poison to the informant. Her evidence was completely contrary to the prosecution case and substantially weakened the allegation of kidnapping.

P.W.6 – Daya Ram Singh @ Dayanand Yadav was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied any knowledge of the alleged occurrence and stated that he had not been questioned by the police regarding the incident. No material supporting the prosecution case emerged from his testimony.

P.W.7 – Singhasan Yadav was also declared hostile. He denied knowledge of the occurrence and did not support the prosecution case. His evidence was of no assistance to the prosecution.

P.W.8 – Paras Nath Yadav, (referred to as P.W.9 in portions of the trial court judgment) was declared hostile by the prosecution. He denied having any knowledge of the alleged incident and did not support the prosecution version. Nothing favourable to the prosecution could be elicited from his evidence.

Justice Singh recorded that on the basis of materials surfaced during the trial, the appellants/accused were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by putting incriminating circumstances/evidences surfaced against them, which they denied and show their complete innocence. 

Justice Singh observed:"....I find that the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the present appellant, Harendra Yadav, shared the common intention or was a party to any conspiracy with the co-accused, Nagendra Yadav, so as, to attract the allegations under Sections 366 and 120B IPC. 22. From the evidence available on record, it transpires that the main allegation of taking away the victim is directed against co-accused Nagendra Yadav. Significantly, the alleged victim, P.W.5 (Meera Devi), has herself not supported the prosecution case and has categorically denied that she was forcibly abducted by the accused persons. She has further denied material aspects of the prosecution story and has not attributed any overt act whatsoever to the present appellant. Mere relationship of being brother of the co-accused and his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be established that there was prior meeting of mind for establishing offence under Section 366 and 120(B) of I.P.C without any independent corroboration."

The judgement reads: "23. The record further reveals that P.Ws.3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were declared hostile and did not support the prosecution case, leaving the prosecution to rest substantially upon the testimonies of P.Ws.1 and 2. Even their evidence does not disclose any specific act on the part of the appellant indicating that he had induced, compelled, or deceived the victim into going from one place to another, nor is there any material to establish that he possessed the requisite intention contemplated under Section 366 IPC. Likewise, there is no cogent evidence demonstrating any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused so as to constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. From the records of the case and the testimony of the victim herself, it is evident that no specific allegation has been levelled against the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of the aforesaid offences. In such circumstances, the finding of guilt recorded by the trial Court is not borne out of the evidence on record."

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.

 

Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes rejection order by Bihar State Remission Board for pre-mature release of a life convict

In Ashok Yadav vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 15-page long judgement dated October 10, 2025, wherein, he quashed the order dated September 12, 2023 passed by Bihar State Remission Board rejecting the proposal of the petitioner for his pre-mature release saying, the petitioner was not eligible for grant of pre-mature release. It was one of the two judgements delivered by the High Court on October 10, 2025. 

Justice Kumar concluded: ''13. The petitioner is given liberty to approach the authorities for remission in light of the aforesaid judgment and if such an application is filed, the same shall be considered by the remission board in accordance with law and in light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Mishra Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (Supra). The application of the petitioner shall be disposed of within three months of its filing.''

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of CERTIORARI for quashing the decision of the State Remission Board dated September 12, 2023 so far it relates to the petitioner, whereby the State Remission Board had rejected the proposal of the petitioner for his pre-mature release interalia on the ground that under clause (iv) (ka) and (kha) of notification No. 3106 dated December 10, 2002 the petitioner was not eligible for grant of pre-mature release. He had also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of MANDAMUS commanding and directing the Respondent Authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for pre-mature release and release him in connection with Sessions Trial No. 55 of 2006 arising out of Fulwaria P.S. Case No. 1 of 2006 on the ground that now the petitioner has already completed more than 22 years of sentence with remission and more than 17 years of his physical incarceration, taking into consideration that the case of the petitioner has been covered under 1984 Policy prevailing at the relevant time of his conviction since the petitioner was convicted on April 10, 2006 and the notification no. 3106 dated December 10, 2002 came into force with effect from July 2, 2007.

The petitioner was aggrieved by the rejection of his application for early release as he had completed 19 years in actual imprisonment. The petitioner was convicted under section 364, 302, 201 of the Indian penal Code and were sentenced to death by the District & Sessions Judge, Gopalganj in Sessions Trial No. 55 of 2006 arose out of Phulwari P.S. Case No. 1 of 2006 vide Judgement dated April 5, 2006 and order on the point of sentence dated April 10, 2006. Subsequently, the High Court in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 329 of 2006 had commuted the death sentence of the petitioner to life imprisonment. 

The petitioner had previously approached the High Court through Cr.W.J.C. No. 103 of 2022, for pre-mature release after completing 14 years of actual imprisonment and the same was disposed vide order dated July 18, 2023. The relevant paragraphs of the order reads:-

“8. From perusal of the impugned order of the State Remission Board dated 19.05.2021 so far as it relates
to the petitioner, it transpires that the proposal of premature release of the petitioner has been rejected by merely quoting the provisions of Clause IV (क) of the Remission Policy and no further reasons have been assigned by the Board as to how the nature of offences committed by the petitioner comes under the purview of any other offence having similar effect of rape, dacoity and terrorist activities and as such is covered under Clause IV (क) of the Remission Policy. The impugned order is cryptic and non-speaking in nature, as such, in my opinion, the same is not sustainable under the law.

9. Accordingly, the impugned order of State Remission Board dated 19.05.2021 so far as it relates to the 
petitioner is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the State Remission Board for reconsideration of the proposal of premature release of the petitioner, in accordance with law.

10. It is made clear that the proposal of premature release of the petitioner shall be considered and disposed by a reasoned order by the State Remission Board within a period of six months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.”

The contention of the petitioner was that his case is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Ajit Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. 1195 of 2021) and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. 453 of 2021).

Justice Kumar recorded that the counsel for the State Prabhu Narayan Sharma could not defend the impugned order rejecting the prayer of the petitioner in view of the judgment of the High Court in Ajit Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.

Relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of the High Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Mishra, after quoting the minutes of the meeting dated December 23, 2020, Justice Kumar observed: "In view of the afore-quoted judgments, the impugned order cannot be sustained." 
 

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhyan passed a 3-page long order dated July 24, 2025, wherein it set aside the 3-page long order dated September 12, 2024 by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court who had rejected the bail prayer.

The appellant's counsel contended that this was a case based on circumstantial evidence. Even the cause of death as per the autopsy report was not clear. He pointed out that it has been admitted that the body was found in river water, therefore, possibility of death on account of drowning cannot be ruled out given the fact that the autopsy report showed that lungs were found filled with water. It was submitted that the appellant has suffered incarceration of over a period exceeding one year and there was no likelihood that the appellant would misuse the liberty of bail during the course of trial. The counsel for the State could not dispute that as per the autopsy report, the cause of death is not ascertainable. 

Supreme Court's order reads:"6. Having regard to the facts of the case as also the contents of the autopsy report brought on record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we are of the view that the appellant has made out a case for release on bail during pendency of the trial on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order rejecting the bail prayer is set aside." It ordered that the appellant be released on bail.

Patna High Court had heard an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated April 23, 2024 and modification order dated June 12, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Special Case No. 392 of 2023 which arose out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 dated August 23, 2023 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 364, 365, 506, 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

As per the prosecution case, It is alleged that the informant's grandson along with one Ganesh Kumar went to take bath in the Ganga River and she made suspicion that the appellant and the co-accused persons kidnapped her grandson with intent to kill and Pawan Kumar escaped.

The counsel for the appellant had submitted before the High Court that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to land dispute. He submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that no specific caste name was called by the appellant hence no case was made out under section of the SC/ST Act. There is nothing except suspicion. It was also alleged that the said occurrence took place at 7:30 AM on 23.08.2023 and the postmortem of deceased commenced on March 24, 2023 at 8:00 PM in which no ante-mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased. The dead body was decomposed and rigor mortis was absent which indicated that the death of the deceased had taken place much before the alleged time of occurrence. The appellant had three criminal antecedents. The appellant was in custody since February 16, 2024.  The counsel for the informant and the Special Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail petition of the appellant. It was stated that the eyewitness Pawan Kumar had made specific allegation against the petitioner and the co-accused persons. It was further stated that the accused persons were pressurizing the deceased to withdraw the case bearing Salimpur P.S. Case No. 166 of 2023 dated July 25, 2023 which was filed by the deceased against the co-accused persons and as the deceased did not compromise, he was brutally assaulted and thrown in the river.

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Justice Chandra Prakash Singh's order concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as the specific and heinous nature of allegation against the appellant, I am not inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 23.04.2024 and modification order dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (PoA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Spl. Case No. 392 of 2023 arising out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 and accordingly, the prayer for bail of the appellant is rejected." The respondent no. 2 was Bachchi Devi.  

It is noteworthy that although Justice Singh's order rejecting bail has been set aside, the Supreme Court has recorded in its order that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.