Supreme Court stays interim order by Justice Arun Kumar Jha who had directed compliance with Supreme Court's judgements in Arnesh Kumar and Asfak Alam

In Rakesh Kumar & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated June 8, 2026 staying interim order dated March 30, 2026 by Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High High Court. The Supreme Court's order reads:"4. Till further orders, there shall be stay of impugned judgment and order as well as further proceedings in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.256 of 2022" referring to Kumar Dushyant vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026).  Rakesh Kumar, the respondent no 11 is in S.D.P.O., Jamui P.S., Jamui before the High Court. The petitioner no. 2 is Pramod Kumar Mandal who is the respondent no.12 in the case which is pending in the High Court. 

The relevant paragraph in the High Court's order reads:"25. So far as other respondents, namely the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui are concerned, being not directly involved in the arrest of the petitioner or being liable for ensuring service of notice, it could not be said that they are in contempt of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, being the superiors of respondent no. 10, the then IO and also the then SHO, not taking appropriate action in accordance with law against him renders these two respondents liable for departmental action. 26. Therefore, in the light of discussion made hereinbefore, finding disobedience of the mandate of law as well as the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Director General of Police, Bihar/competent authority is directed to initiate departmental proceeding against the respondent no. 10, 11 and 12, the then SHO, SDPO, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, respectively. Till completion of departmental proceeding, no investigation work would be assigned to respondent no. 10." 

Supreme Court's order records that "the counsel for the petitioners states that despite recording that the petitioners were neither directly involved in the alleged act nor in violation of the directions issued by this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 8 1SCC 273, the High Court has proceeded to issue adverse strictures and direct initiation of departmental proceedings. 2. Issue notice by all modes, returnable on 20.07.2026. 3.Mr. Manish Kumar, learned AOR, accepts notice on behalf of Respondent Nos.1 to 8."

It is intriguing as to why the Supreme Court stayed the "further proceedings in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No.256 of 2022" when only respondent no. 11 and 12, two out of the 12 respondents had approached it for relief.   

Does it not imply that Supreme Court has put a stay on completion of departmental proceeding against respondent no. 10. Chandan Kumar, the then IO/ SHO who violated the directions of the  Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case in not issuing the notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of the CrPC to the petitioner and making the arrest in violation of the said guidelines, hence, is liable for the breach of law and non-compliance of direction of the Supreme Court and its willful disobedience? Does it imply that now investigation work would be assigned to Chandan Kumar although he ha sbeen found guilty? 

Justice Jha came to a finding that against the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, a case of Civil Contempt under the provision of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is made out and he is directed to furnish a show cause as to why contempt proceeding be not initiated against him for wilful disobedience of the directions of the orders of the Supreme Court. As a consequence of the Supreme Court's order, has the contempt proceeding been stayed? 

The case was filed in the Supreme Court on May 24, 2026, registered May 29, 2026 and verified on June 3, 2026.  The other ten respondents are: Principal Secretary, Director General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, District Magistrate, Suprintendent of Police, Sub-Divisional Police, Kumari Anchala, Chandan Kumar and Kumar Dushyant. 

It is clear that Kumar Dushyant's counsel will have to approach the Supreme Court to seek clarification with regard to the action initiated by High Court against Chandan Kumar.   

In Kumar Dushyant vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Jha of the High Court has passed a 28-page long order dated March 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded that CJM did not fulfill the requirement of the Supreme Court's decision in Arnesh Kumar because CJM's order dated November 25, 2020 authorizing the detention merely records that the offence is non-bailable and there were sufficient material available for remanding him from case diary. Such mechanical order by a judicial officer needs to be deprecated in strongest terms. Authorizing detention without recording reasons regarding satisfaction of the Court and, the same being non-speaking would be in violation of the guidelines of the Supreme Court and would make such judicial officer liable for departmental action. However, considering that it is a judicial order, this Court would not like to interfere with such order under its writ jurisdiction and leave it to the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action on administrative side. The right of the petitioner to personal liberty was curtailed not by a procedure established by law but in an arbitrary manner by the IO who also happened to be the SHO. Hence, Chandan Kumar, the SHO, the respondent no.10 defied the directions of the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case wherein, the Court held that for the event of non-service of notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC and for arrest without recording the reasons necessitating the arrest, contempt proceeding would be initiated, against the erring official and has, thus, made himself liable for initiation of contempt proceeding." The case is pending in the High Court. 

As far as Sub-Divisional Police Officer and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui are concerned, being the superiors of respondent no. 10, the then IO and also the then SHO, not taking appropriate action in accordance with law against him renders these two respondents liable for departmental action  for disobedience of the mandate of law as well as the directions of the Supreme Court, the Director General of Police, Bihar/competent authority is directed to initiate departmental proceeding against the respondent no. 10, Dr. Rakesh Kumar, the respondent no. 11 and Pramod Mandal, the respondent no. 12, the then SHO, SDPO, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, respectively. Till completion of departmental proceeding, no investigation work would be assigned to respondent no. 10. Chandan Kumar, the then IO/ SHO has violated the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar case and Asfak Alam case in not issuing the notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of the CrPC to the petitioner and making the arrest in violation of the said guidelines, hence, for the breach of law and non-compliance of direction of the Supreme Court and its willful disobedience, Justice Jha came to a finding that against the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, a case of Civil Contempt under the provision of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is made out and he is directed to furnish a show cause as to why contempt proceeding be not initiated against him for wilful disobedience of the directions of the orders of the Supreme Court. 

The show cause must be filed within eight weeks. The case is listed for hearing on June 19, 2026. The High Court's order dated March 30, 2026 records that Chandan Kumar is presently posted as Barhiya S.H.O., P.S. and District- Lakhisarai.

The other 11 respondents are:the respondent no. 2 Principal Secretary, Home Police, Bihar, Patna, the respondent no.3, the respondent no.4, Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna, the respondent no. 5, Deputy Inspector general of Police, Central Bihar, Patna, the respondent no.6, District Magistrate, Jamui, Superintendent of Police, Jamui, the respondent no.7, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sadar, Jamui, the respondent no. 8, Chandan Kumar, Officer-in-Charge-cum-Investigation Officer, Jamui Town Police, Station, Jamui, respondent no. 9. Kumari Anchala D/O Parsuram Mishra, the respondent no. 10, Chandan Kumar, SHO., Dr. Rakesh Kumar, and the respondent no. 11, Pramod Mandal. 

The petition was filed for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents authority to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the erring Officer-in-Charge Jamui Town Police Station and Investigating Officer Jamui Town PS Case No. 379 / 2020 in connivance with Superintendent of Police and SDPO, Jamui who have illegally arrested the petitioner. The petitioner prayed to hold the officers involved in the case guilty of contempt of court as they have willfully and deliberately disobeyed the directions of the Supreme Court rendered in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar and the mandate of Article 144 of the Constitution of India. The petition sought direction to award exemplary damages to the petitioner as he suffered injury of mental and prestige due to negligent/arbitrarily/malafide act of the officers involved in the case.

On a written report by Kumari Anchala to the police, Jamui P.S. Case No. 379 of 2020 on July 26, 2020 under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 66(c)(d) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 was instituted. The allegation in the written report was about hacking of Facebook account of the informant and posting of obnoxious messages on the said account. The investigation was handed over to one Dinesh Ram, Sub-Inspector of Police who made a call to the petitioner on September 3, 2020 telling him that the petitioner was wanted in the case. The petitioner, thereafter, approached the said police official through a lawyer and when the lawyer had a meeting with the police official, he told the petitioner to go and meet the Investigating Officer as allegation was not serious and appeared to be trivial in nature. The petitioner went and met with the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer told him about pressure from his senior officials for making out the arrest of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted that, thereafter, the father of the petitioner along with his advocate approached Chandan Kumar, the concerned Station House Officer, Jamui Town, the respondent no. 10 and prayed for a fair investigation in the case. He also pleaded that the notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC be served upon the petitioner or alternatively he might be enlarged on bail since the offence as alleged in the FIR was bailable in nature and Section 420 of the IPC was wrongly inserted without any allegation for commission of the said offence. The respondent no. 10 disclosed that Section 420 of the IPC was inserted in the list of offences to make the case non-bailable and he was so instructed by the Superintendent of Police. Thereafter, the father of the petitioner approached the Sub-Divisional Police Officer again pleading for a fair supervision. Although the Sub-Divisional Police Officer showed his surprise about inclusion of Section 420 of the IPC in the light of allegation made in the FIR, he mechanically put a supervision note finding the case true under Section 420 of the IPC as well. The petitioner submitted that on November 24, 2020, the petitioner was sent by the Principal of the School to attend a Seminar at the District Education Office, Jamui which was just adjacent to the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Jamui. After the end of the seminar, while the petitioner was returning to his village on Scooty, he was waylaid by some unknown persons in plain dress riding two motorcycles who snatched his mobile and one of them identified himself as the Station House Officer of Jamui Police Station. These persons forcibly brought the petitioner to the police station and in the police station, the Station House Officer used abusive language against the petitioner. When the petitioner was apprehended, the country was under the grip of COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner was kept in the police station till late night of the next day and he was not allowed to meet any of his family members, who were not even informed about the arrest of the petitioner. Getting the news of abduction of the petitioner, his father came to the police station where he found that the petitioner was in police custody. When the father of the petitioner tried to meet him, he was shooed away by the police officials with threat that he would also be falsely implicated in some case and was told that petitioner would be sent to jail. The petitioner was sent to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamui in handcuffs. The petitioner brought to the notice of the Chief Judicial Magistrate the mala fide act of the Investigating Officer and Station House Officer and submitted that the Investigating Officer had no power to arrest in the said case under the provisions of Section 41 of the CrPC. Thus, against the act of the police officials claiming it to be illegal, the petitioner has approached the High Court. 

Satya Prakash Parasar, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the action of respondent-authorities violates the right of the petitioner provided under Article 14, 19 and 21 and also violates Article 144 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner all along cooperated with the police authorities and there was no apprehension of petitioner fleeing away and hampering the investigation in the matter. The counsel also submitted that the mala fide of the police officials is writ large on the face of the record. Though from the written report it is clear that the only allegation was against some unknown person that he hacked the Facebook account of the Kumari Anchala, the respondent no. 9 still offence under Section 420 of the IPC was inserted in the FIR. Therefore, inclusion of Section 420 of the IPC is completely arbitrary and it appears the same has been inserted to make the case serious and non-bailable. As it is apparent from the record that no prima facie case under Section 420 of the IPC is made out in the given facts and circumstances.  Moreover, offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000 are of special category. It was a self contained legislation and a separate kind of procedure has been prescribed for investigation/inquiry/trial. Section 72 of the Information Technology Act provides that only the officers who are not below the rank of the Inspector can investigate the offences alleged to have been conducted under the provisions of IT Act. But for the reasons best known to the SHO and the Superintendent of Police, Jamui, a Sub-Inspector was appointed as the Investigating Officer of the case and the investigation got vitiated by this very fact. There is complete violation of the guidelines given by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273 wherein, the Supreme Court deprecated the tendency of the police officials arresting the accused unnecessarily and the Magistrate authorizing such detention casually and mechanically. These guidelines were issued while considering a case under Section 498A IPC but subsequently in the case of Md. Asfak Alam vs. The State of Jharkhand, 2023 INSC 660 the Supreme Court clarified that these guidelines would be equally applicable to the cases registered for other offences wherein the punishment extends up to seven years. Although no offences under Section 420 of the IPC could have been inferred from the allegation made in the written report of respondent no. 9 still, considering the guidelines issued in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam (supra) the police authorities could not have arrested the petitioner. The police officials acted beyond the mandate of law and did not follow the provisions of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. No reasons in writing were given necessitating the arrest of the petitioner. Therefore, the liberty of the petitioner was curtailed without any sanction of law and hence, the police officials are in contempt of the orders of the Supreme Court passed in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam (supra). The petitioner is a teacher and he has all along been performing his duty and never absconded, still, he had been wrongly arrested by the police officials.T he police officials were predetermined to put the petitioner behind the bar and issued press note and got the news published in local newspaper that a serious and heinous kind of crime has been committed by the petitioner. This news was circulated on Whatsapp through the mobile number 9386382267 by Chandan Kumar, the then S.H.O. Jamui Town and the respondent no. 10 and it shows his personal bias in the case. 

While the petitioner was taken to the Court of the CJM, he was put under handcuffs and was taken to the Court on foot through a busy market to malign his image. Even the application for remand before the CJM is full of wrong facts. The remand was sought on the ground that release of the petitioner would create law and order problem but the fact was ignored that the petitioner being a teacher was on his duty even on the date when he was arrested. Therefore, allowing of remand by the CJM, Jamui was also illegal. The counsel submitted that undue haste was shown by the Investigating Officer in effecting the arrest of the petitioner and the police authorities acted in most mala fide and arbitrary manner against the petitioner. The counsel also submitted that the fact was not considered that life and liberty of a citizen is sacrosanct and making arrest in such trivial matter without any material runs contrary to the fair play in action and goes against the mandate of law and judicial pronouncements made from time to time by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, learned counsel referred to the case of D.K. Basu vs. State of W. Bengal, (1997)1 SCC 416 wherein certain guidelines were issued to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention. The counsel submitted that none of the family members of the petitioner were informed about his arrest and this fact is clear from the arrest memo dated November 24, 2020 wherein in the column of persons who have been informed about the arrest, it has only been mentioned that information was given to family member (parijan) without specifying the name or relationship of the family member. The counsel reiterated that the arrest of the petitioner violates the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Arensh Kumar(supra), Asfak Alam (supra) and D.K. Basu (supra) and hence makes the respondent-authorities liable for contempt.  

The counsel also referred to the case of Joginder Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1349 wherein, the Supreme Court issued certain guidelines with regard to right of an arrested person flowing from Article 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The counsel submitted that for illegal detention of the petitioner, the authorities should be heavily penalized and departmental proceedings be initiated against them and they should be proceeded for committing Contempt of Court and petitioner should be adequately compensated. 

On the point of compensation, counsel referred to the case of Dr. Rini Johar & Anr. vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 2679, wherein, the Supreme Court finding that the conditions precedent of procedure of arrest were not followed and liberty of the petitioners was curtailed, a compensation of Rs. 5 lacs was awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State. The counsel also referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. passed in CrWJC No. 2761 of 2025 dated November 13, 2025 and the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Rakesh Kumar vs. Vijayanta Arya (DCP) and Ors. in Cont. Case No. 480/2020 wherein, the petitioner was adequately compensated for his unauthorized detention. 

The counsel also referred to the decision in S. Rajarethinam(deceased) & Ors. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. in WMP No. 37619 of 2017 and Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. Mr. A.R. Srinivas, DCP, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1190 wherein, the Single Judge of Telangana High Court finding that notice was not served in terms of guidelines of Arnesh Kumar (supra) held the respondents to be contemnors having willfully disobeyd the judgment of the Supreme Court and ordered them to be punished for Contempt of Court.

Justice Jha noted that from the record, it also transpires that initially one Sub-Inspector Dinesh Ram was made the Investigating Officer but subsequently, Chandan Kumar, the  respondent no. 10, the then SHO was handed over the charge of investigation by the order dated November 17, 2020 by the Superintendent of Police, Jamui. Therefore, for all purposes Chanadan Kumar,  the Officer-in-Charge-cum-Investigation Officer, Jamui Town Police Station, Jamui, the respondent no. 8 and Chanadan Kumar, the respondent no. 10 are the same person.  

The petitioner has alleged non-compliance of Section 41(1) and Section 41-A of the CrPC as well as the guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra) and Asfak Alam(supra). On the other hand, the answering respondents have denied any non-compliance of mandatory provisions of law or the guidelines of the Supreme Court. 

Section 41(1) and Section 41-A of the CrPC reads: “41. When police may arrest without warrant. (1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person - (a)[ who commits, in the presence of a police office, a cognisable offence; (b)against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognisable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely: (i)the police has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary- (a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or (b)for proper investigation of the offence; or (c)to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or (d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer;or (e)as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reason in writing; [Provided that a police officer shall, in all the cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provision of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.]
[41A. Notice of appearance before police officer. (1) [The police officer shall], in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. [(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.]” 

Therefore it is only under certain conditions that a police officer may arrest a person without an order from a Magistrate or without any warrant. 

In Arnesh Kumar's case, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 11 gave the following directions:-“11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically.
In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:
11.1 All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;
11.2 All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii); 
11.3 The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention; 
11.4 The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
11.5 The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.6 Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of Cr.PC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
11.7 Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8 Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.” 

In Asfak Alam's case, the Supreme court in para 12 held that the directions of Arensh Kumar(supra) shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but also to such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years, whether with or without fine. 

Justice Jha observed that it is in this background that the arrest of the petitioner is to be tested. From the facts of the case and averment made in the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is evident that no notice was served upon the petitioner following the mandate of Section 41-A of the CrPC directing him to appear before the Investigation Officer considering the fact that the maximum sentence prescribed for offences mentioned in the FIR was seven years with fine. There has been no submission before this Court or any averment in the counter affidavit of any of the respondents that a notice under Section 41-A was served upon the petitioner. Though general averments have been made about compliance of Section 41(1), Section 41-A of CrPC and guidelines of Supreme Court regarding arrest and detention of an accused, no specific averment has been made about the satisfaction being recorded by the police officer for arrest of the petitioner, no documents have been brought on record by any of the respondents showing such satisfaction in terms of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of CrPC. Perusal of the remand application, shows even while seeking detention for a fortnight, only averment which has been made for keeping the petitioner in custody is that there was sufficient evidence against him and his release on bond would give rise to law and order situation but details are completely lacking. The Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar has made it very much clear that non-compliance of the guidelines would render the erring police officials liable for departmental action as well as for Contempt of Court. 

Justice Jha observed that from the order of the CJM dated November 25, 2020, "it appears petitioner was produced before the Court with Memo of arrest, seizure list without seized articles, checklist, photocopy of subscriber details, photocopy of medical prescription and photocopy of case diary. None of the respondents produced the checklist or any document to bring forth the fact before this court why arrest of the petitioner was necessary though maximum sentence prescribed for the offences mentioned in the FIR was imprisonment for seven years and fine. Therefore, there is non-compliance of Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC as no material has been brought on record to show that the arrest of the petitioner was necessary at the first instance. Mere bland assertion about release of the petitioner giving rise to law and order situation would not suffice to meet the obligation under Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC. It also runs counter to the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam(supra)."

Justice Jha observed: "22. The liberty of a person is precious and the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases of Arnesh Kumar(supra) and Asfak Alam(supra) are only to ensure that police officers do not unnecessarily arrest any person and the Magistrate do not mechanically remand any person. Once the Investigating Officer/respondent-authorities came to know about the involvement of the petitioner in the case in hand, they were supposed to furnish him a notice within two weeks under Section 41-A of the CrPC but no such steps were taken. Rather the petitioner was arrested on 24.11.2020 and brought before the learned CJM, Jamui on 25.11.2020." He added: "23. Even the remand of the petitioner by the learned CJM does not fulfil the requirement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar (supra) because the order dated 25.11.2020 authorizing the detention merely records that the offence is non-bailable and there were sufficient material available for remanding him from case diary. Such mechanical order by a judicial officer needs to be deprecated in strongest terms. Authorizing detention without recording reasons regarding satisfaction of the Court and, the same being non-speaking would be in violation of the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and would make such judicial officer liable for departmental action. However, considering that it is a judicial order, this Court would not like to interfere with such order under its writ jurisdiction and leave it to the disciplinary authority to take appropriate action on administrative side. However, the contention made on behalf of the respondents that the order of the learned CJM dated 25.11.2020 remanding the petitioner into custody and subsequently cognizance being taken have put a cloak of legality over the previous action of the IO/SHO, Jamui in arresting the petitioner without notice, is without any substance. If the initial act is bad, then all subsequent proceedings become tainted and would suffer from illegality." 

Justice Jha drew on the decision of the Supreme court in State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 to state that "the orders of the CJM could not undone the previous act of the police authorities, if the same has been against the law of the land as the authorities must be reminded that under Article 144 of the Constitution of India, all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India are under a bounden duty to act in the aid of the Supreme Court and any guidelines issued by the Supreme Court is to be obeyed without demur by the authorities." 

The order concluded: "24. The right of the petitioner to personal liberty has been curtailed not by a procedure established by law but in an arbitrary manner by the IO who also happened to be the SHO. Hence, the respondent no.10 (the then SHO), has defied the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar(supra) & Asfak Alam(supra) wherein it has been held that for the event of non-service of notice under Section 41-A of the CrPC and for arrest without recording the reasons necessitating the arrest, contempt proceeding would be initiated, against the erring official and has, thus, made himself liable for initiation of contempt proceeding."

Patna High Court delivered seven judgments on October 31, denies interim bail to Rit Lal Yadav

Patna High Court delivered seven judgments on October 31, 2025 in Uma Pandey vs. Munna Pandey, Swarnima Gupta @ Anita Gupta, vs. Barun Kumar Choudhary, Kishor Kunal vs. The State of Bihar, Bhawa Nand Jha vs. The State of Bihar, Chunchun Kumar vs. The Union of India & Ors., Prakash Chandra Roy vs. Union Bank Of India & Anr. and Rit Lal Yadav @ Rit Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar.

In Rit Lal Yadav @ Rit Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court  delivered a 33-page long judgement, wherein, he concluded: "....it is clear that when alternative remedy is available, the power under Article 226 could be exercised under certain conditions/contingencies and none of these conditions are present in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court under some misconceived notion. If the petitioner was already before this Court by filing of bail petition and also before the learned trial court seeking regular bail, an equally efficacious remedy was available to the petitioner but he did not pursue the said remedy. 26. Moreover, considering the antecedent and background of the petitioner and pressing demand of the time that the Indian polity should be purged of criminal elements, the prayer of the petitioner could not be acceded to." 

He added: "A balance should be struck between the rights of citizens who deserve a clean India and rights of undertrial prisoners in custody who want to participate in the election process. Obviously the balance will tilt in the favour of common citizens. The people of India should be given a choice to elect people with clean image and antecedents and hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that allowing a person with criminal antecedents of serious nature, would not be in larger interest of the society and would not further the cause of democratic institutions. 27. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances in totality, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition and finding no merit, the present writ petition stands dismissed." 

Rit Lal Yadav was represented by Y. C. Verma, senior advocate and Advocates namely, Dr. Gopal Krishna, Ghanshyam Tiwary, Vikas Kumar Jha, Adarsh Singh, Saloj Kumar Rai, Khalil Faizan, Harsh Kumar, Rahul Deo Varman, Abhinav Kumar and Prinyanka Singh. 

Drawing on Supreme Court's decision in paragraph-5 in Vishwanath Pratap Singh vs. Election Commission of India and Anr. (decided on 09.09.2022, Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 13013 of 2022), Justice Jha observed:"Thus, there is no doubt that the right to canvass and campaign for getting elected in an election is not a fundamental right. It is only a statutory right on which restriction can be imposed by statutes." 

 

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.

 

Supreme Court sets aside Allahabad High Court order directing NCB to compensate NDPS accused under Section 439 of CrPC

In Union of India Through I.O. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Man Singh Verma 2025 INSC 292, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manmohan concluded: "we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly. The observations made hereinabove should not be taken to preclude any remedy that may be available to the respondent as per law. Hence, our observations are limited only to the correctness of the grant of compensation in the adjudication of a bail application."

It observed: "It is a settled principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred upon a Court under Section 439 CrPC is limited to grant or refusal of bail pending trial. In the following decisions, this Court has time and again held that the sphere of consideration, when exercising power under this Section, pertains only to securing or restricting liberty of the person in question." 

The Allahabad High Court had asked the Director of Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to pay a sum of Rs 5 lakh as compensation to the respondent for the alleged wrongful confinement. NCB had challenged the impugned order of the High Court.

The Court took note of the decision in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan (2004), wherein it was observed that at the stage of granting bail, a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of a case need not be undertaken. 

In State vs. M.Murugan (2020)15 SCC 251, Supreme Court reiterated that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to grant or refusal to grant bail, pending trial. In this case, the High Court, while taking a decision on bail application, had retained the file and directed the State to form a committee and seek its recommendations on the reformation and rehabilitation of convict/accused persons. The Court held that while ordering such directions the High Court has committed grave illegality and held that the jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC ends when the bail application is finally decided. The Court held as under :-

“11. We find that the learned Single Judge [M. Murugesan v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414] has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the decision [M. Murugesan v. State, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, order dated 18-2-2019 (Mad)] of the bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.”

Section 439 of CrPC reads: “439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,— (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; 

(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified: 

Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice. 

Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence triable under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice of such application.

(1A) The presence of the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing of the application for bail to the person under subsection (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] 

(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.”

The Division Bench added:"The undue restriction of liberty, i.e., without the backing of procedures established by law is unquestionably an affront to a person’s rights but the avenues to seek recourse of law in connection therewith are limited to remedies as per law. However, none was availed in the present facts”. 

It stated, “As such, we accept the submission of the Union of India that grant of compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- was without the authority of law. The order of the High Court, therefore, to this extent has to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. Appeal is allowed partly.” The judgement was authored by Justice Karol and delivered on February 28, 2025. 

In the case in question, the NCB had seized 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) from the possession of one Man Singh Verma (respondent herein) and one Aman Singh. A Criminal Case was registered against the respondent under Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. While awaiting the results of the samples from the laboratory, the respondent filed an application seeking bail but the same was rejected. Consequently, the respondent approached the High Court. The Central Revenue Control Laboratory's report showed that the sample tested negative for heroin and other narcotic substances.

The report from Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh revealed that the second set of samples also tested negative for any narcotic substance. The NCB filed a closure report before the Special Judge, NDPS, pursuant to which the respondent was released from the District Jail. 

Unmindful of the respondent’s release, the High Court had proceeded to adjudicate the pending bail application and, by the impugned order, observed that the respondent was a young person who had been wrongfully confined for four months despite the initial laboratory finding. The High Court had directed the Director, NCB to pay Rs.5,00,000 as compensation to the respondent. 

The fact remains the principle of awarding compensatory relief for the violation of fundamental rights by public officials was recognized in Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141; Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746; and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 

Acquittal of murder accused Darshan Singh, Rani Kaur, improvement of witness statement under Section 161 insignificant

In Darshan Singh vs. The State of Punjab (2024), a 3-judge bench of Supreme Court held that prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation – Evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [Para 26].

The case before the Court arose from the judgment and order dated July 23, 2009 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in CRLA No.593-DB of 2000. 

The deceased, Amrik Kaur was married to Darshan Singh, the appellant, some time in 1988. The marriage was arranged through Melo Kaur (PW-3), the cousin sister of the deceased. The prosecution alleges that their marital relationship was strained owing largely to the fact that Darshan Singh had developed an illicit partnership with Rani Kaur (A2). Several relatives had prevailed on the appellant to put an end to his relationship with Rani Kaur, but to no avail. The illicit relationship between Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur is said to have lasted for at least three years before the fateful day. It is the case of the prosecution that on the intervening night of  May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur, with the motive of eliminating the deceased, administered poison and intentionally caused the death of Amrik Kaur.

On these allegations, Darshan Singh and Rani Kaur were prosecuted for charges under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC. The Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for the offence under Section 302 r/w Section 34 and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life.

The Trial Court had concluded that it was a case of homicide and not suicide. It has found that the appellant had a strong motive to commit the murder of his wife. It further held that the appellant and Rani Kaur were present in the house on the intervening night of May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999 and therefore, the burden lay on them to explain as to ‘how the body of Amrik Kaur who was alive on the night of May 18, 1999 turned into a corpse’ the next morning. The Court completely disbelieved the theory of suicide sought to be advanced on behalf of appellant. It was noted that merely because there were no injuries on the body of the deceased, that by itself would not obviate the possibility of forceful administration of the poisonous substance. On the basis of the above circumstances taken together, the Trial Court held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant and Rani Kaur.

In appeal, the High Court had agreed with the findings of the Trial Court in so far as the appellant is concerned and had acquitted Rani Kaur by extending her the benefit of doubt. It has found that there is no other evidence except the testimony of PW3 and PW4, to prove the presence of Rani Kaur on the intervening night of May 18, 1999 and May 19, 1999 at the appellant’s house.

The High Court had upheld the order of conviction and sentence, as against Darshan Singh (the appellant) and has allowed the appeal of Rani Kaur (Accused No. 2), thereby acquitting her of all charges. The State of Punjab had not challenged the acquittal of Rani Kaur by filing any special leave petition. Darshan Singh had sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court and leave came to be granted by order dated January 22, 2010.

In its January 2024 judgement, the Supreme Court concluded: There cannot be a gap in the chain of circumstances. When the conviction is to be based on circumstantial evidence solely, then there should not be any snap in the chain of circumstances. If there is a snap in the chain, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. If some of the circumstances in the chain can be explained by any other reasonable hypothesis, then also the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. [See: Bhimsingh Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 4 SCC 281.] Therefore, we allow this appeal and set aside the concurrent findings of conviction." The appeal was allowed. 

Court can convert petition under Section 482 CrPC as a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC: Supreme Court

In Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben (2024), Supreme Court's bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Sandeep Mehta directed the High Court to convert the petition under Section 482 CrPC as a criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC and decide it in accordance with law. It observed that the nomenclature of a petition is immaterial and for doing substantive justice. 

In the case in question, the Principal Judge, Family Court had fixed interim maintenance in favour of the appellant in exercise of powers under Section 125 of CrPC. The appellant was dissatisfied with the quantum of interim maintenance. The appellant wife filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in the High Court seeking enhancement of the quantum of the maintenance.  The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not maintainable as the appellant wife had a remedy of a revision under Section 397 CrPC.

Supreme Court observed: “This Court has, in a catena of decisions, provided that nomenclature of a petition is immaterial and for doing substantive justice, the High Court can always convert a petition under Section 482 CrPC to a revision under Section 397 CrPC and vice versa.”

The Court relied on decision in Prabhu Chawla vs. State of Rajasthan and Another(1977) wherein it has been held that availability of alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC, by itself, cannot be a good ground to dismiss an application under Section 482 CrPC. It also drew on Court's decision in Madhu Limaye vs. The State of Maharashtra (1977) . 

The Court noted: “Viewed in light of the above precedents, we feel that even if the High Court was of the view that the appellant should have invoked the jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC for seeking enhancement of interim maintenance, it ought not to have non­suited the appellant only on the ground of alternative remedy”.

The Court concluded:“The approach of the High Court in dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 CrPC on the hyper technical ground that she had to avail the remedy of revision cannot be appreciated because the same has unnecessarily compelled the appellant to approach this Court by way of this appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.” The judgement was delivered on December 4, 2024.

The Court decided the appeal assailing the judgment of the Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby a wife’s petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking enhancement of interim maintenance was dismissed.

Supreme Court sets aside Patna High Court's order in anticipatory bail case from Darbhanga

In Dulare Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2024), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine  George Masih set aside the final judgment and order of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Patna High Court on February 23, 2024 after hearing the appeal challenging the High Court's order. 

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the First Information Report in the instant case is nothing but a second Report lodged on the same facts as was lodged on earlier occasion wherein the appellant stood enlarged on anticipatory bail vide order dated 31.08.2021 annexed to the petition as Annexure-P/7. He also referred to the order granting anticipatory bail passed by the High Court in the case of co-accused in Crl. Misc. No.1400/2023 dated 08.02.2023, annexed to the petition as Annexure-P/12. This order was also passed in Ram Dinesh Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2023) by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court.

The Supreme Court observed: "Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 438 of the Code. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set-aside the order passed by the High Court and make the order dated 28.08.2023 absolute. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand Only) with two like sureties."  

Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the High Court and the Sessions Court to grant anticipatory bail to a person apprehending arrest in a non-bailable offense. Initially, by its order dated 28.08.2023, the Supreme Court had granted interim protection in favour of Dulare Choudhary, the appellant.

Prior to the Supreme Court's order, Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court had dismissed the application for anticipatory bail by concluding that "it is clear that there is ample evidence against the petitioner to support the prosecution case, therefore, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail" in Dulare Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar (2023). 

His order reads: "The prayer for grant of bail on his behalf is hereby rejected" on July 20, 2023. The petitioner had approached to Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Darbhanga Sadar P.S. Case No.50 of 2022, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga. The prosecution case arose out of a typed report of Block Development Officer, Sadar, Darbhanga in pursuance of a memo issued by the District Magistrate. Several irregularities were found to have been committed by the accused persons in the appointment of panchayat teachers in the year 2016 and 2021 within gram panchayat Raj Kabirchak. It was alleged that the petitioner in collusion with other co-accused persons, appointed 9 panchayat teachers in the year 2016 and 2021, concealing the fact that panchayat teachers had already been appointed earlier but the vacancy was not in existence. Moreover, the panchayat teachers were appointed when code of conduct was in vogue owing to panchayat elections. An inquiry was conducted under the chairmanship of Deputy Development Commissioner. The inquiry report submitted by the committee indicated involvement of petitioner in the irregularities in the appointment of panchayat teachers. 

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that Dulare Choudhary, the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. The Block Development Officer without knowing the fact of his order of appointment has wrongly and illegally lodged the FIR against the petitioner and others and made false and incorrect statement in the F.I.R. The petitioner was posted as Panchayat Secretary in Kabrpur Gram Panchayat Raj in the district of Darbhanga and he appointed nine Niyojeet Teachers in compliance of order dated 10.08.2019 passed by the District Teacher Appointment Appellate Authority, Darbhanga in case no.07 of 2018. He further submitted that the petitioner had no option but to comply the order of the Presiding Officer District Teacher Appointment Appellate Authority, Darbhanga and as accordingly, the petitioner appointed the nine Niyojeet Teachers, hence the petitioner did not commit any offence. It was further submitted that with the similar allegation of offence in respect of appointment of 16 Niyojeet Teachers including the nine teachers appointed by the petitioner and F.I.R was lodged by the B.D.O., Darbhanga, against the petitioner and other co-accused persons and the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by the Sessions Judge, Darbhanga in aforesaid Darbhanga Sadar P.S.Case No.281 of 2021.

It was submitted that the Block Development Officer, Darbhanga Sadar before lodging the present case against the petitioner and others did not issue any notice to the petitioner regarding appointment of 9 Niyojeet Teachers, which shows the malafide intention and malafide action of the B.D.O. It was submitted that one of the Panchayat Secretary, who was posted in Kabirchak Gram Panchayat Raj prior to the petitioner was also made accused in the FIR lodged by the Block Development Officer, Sadar Darbhanga regarding appointment of Niyojit Teachers illegally was also granted anticipatory bail by the High Court vide order dated 08.02.2023 in Cr. Misc No.1400 of 2023. The petitioner joined Kabirchak Gram Panchayat Raj as a Panchayat Secretary on 01.07.2016 and submitted his joining report in the Sadar Prakhand on 01.07.2016 and the Secretary, Ram Dinesh Rai who handed over part charge on 15.07.2016 and no document was handed over to the petitioner in the charge report handed over by Panchayat Secretary, the then Panchayat Secretary and as such the petitioner had no knowledge about appointment of the teachers and the vacancies available before taking his charge if any teacher was appointed, it was appointed by the then Secretary of the said Gram Panchayat. 

The counsel for the State opposed the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail and submitted that during the investigation done by three men committee, it found that in Panchayat Kabirchak, the process of appointment of Niyojeet Shikshak was started in the year 2008 but the appointment letters were issued in the year 2016 which is apparently illegal. After perusal of counselling register and rectified merit list it is evident that in counselling register at Sl. No.31 name of Farhan Tabsum is mentioned but in rectified merit list at Sl. No.31, name of Vandana Kumari is mentioned. The names of candidates mentioned in serial number are not available in that serial number in counselling register or names are not found in the said register. Thereafter the appointments were made in the year 2019 and 2021 on that 09 vacant post which was filled up in year 2008. It was further submitted that Panchayat Secretary, Panchayat Raj Kabirchak was issued a letter bearing memo no.26 dated 09.11.2019 in which reference of letter BRC/434 dated 28.10.2019 of Block Education Officer, Darbhanga Sadar was mentioned which was not issued from the office of B.E.O. Sadar Darbhanga which shows that the petitioner was involved in doing illegal appointment of Niyojeet Shikshak in 2009 and 2021. It was stated that the petitioner was posted as Panchayat Sachiv in Kabirchak and Balha Panchayat (Darbhanga) and allegations that after concealment of facts (only nine posts were vacant) the appointments were made to the post of Niyojeet Shikshak was/is 18 in number without any sanction post in the year 2019 and 2021 which was apparently illegal.