Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, Sikandra, Munger, Bihar on August 30, 1985 after her reported abduction by seven persons from the house which occurred on that day. The dead body of Neelam was not even discovered until the following morning. According to the post mortem report the death happened at 5 PM. But according to the informant the incident of abduction took place around 10:00 PM. Although, the post mortem report indicated that the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission of murder can-not be ruled out. But no direct evidence on record proved the commission of murder by the accused persons. The link of causation between the accused persons and the alleged offence was found conspicuously missing.
An FIR was lodged against seven accused
persons, namely –Krishna Nandan Singh, Ram Nandan Singh, Raj Nandan
Singh, Shyam Nandan Singh, Bhagwan Singh, Vijoy Singh/Sharma and Tanik Singh.
After investigation a chargesheet was filed. The Trial Court delivered
the judgement in June 1992. The High Court delivered the judgement in
March 2015 and the Supreme Court in September 2024.
Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma set aside the judgement of the Patna High Court's Division Bench comprising Justices Dharnidhar Jha and Amaresh Kumar Lal in a case arising out of 1985 case from Munger's Sikandra Thana on September 25, 2024. The High Court's 38 page long judgement was delivered on March 26, 2015. It was authored by Justice Jha.
In its 26 page long judgement, the Court concluded: "the findings of conviction arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court are not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the impugned judgment as well as the judgment rendered by the Trial Court (to the extent of conviction of A-1 to A-5) are set aside, and all seven accused persons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled upon them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if lying in custody."
The Supreme Court has recorded that the prosecution did not examine the three natural witnesses of the incident namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Kumud Ranjan Singh. "There is no explanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses." It has raised doubt about the conduct of Ramanand Singh (P.W.18) the informant who was the brother-in-law of Neelam, the deceased. Neelam was married to Ashok Kumar Singh who happened to be the brother of Ramanand Singh. He did not try to prevent the accused persons from entering the premises or from abducting the deceased or from taking away the deceased on their shoulders in front of his eyes. The Court has detected inconsistency in the testimonies of three Prosecution Witnesses who has submitted that while coming from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk, Ghogsha came first, followed by Lohanda and Simaltalla. In such circumstances, their presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must be explained to the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going to their village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla as it did not fall on their way. But no such explanation is forthcoming from the material on record. It found it strange that the High Court too had detected it with regard to the testimony one of the Prosecution Witnesses but it failed to extend its finding to the other two Prosecution Witnesses who were similarly placed. It has inferred that "the so-called eye witnesses of the incident were actually accessories after the fact and not accessories to the fact." It renders the entire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable.
The Trial Court and High Court did not doubt the fact that Neelam was residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla but Supreme Court has reservations regarding its veracity. It noted that the investigating officer had inspected the house and no direct material, except some make-up articles, could be gathered so as to indicate that Neelam was actually residing there. The Court has recorded that Chando Devi, the sister of Ram Chabila Singh one of the tenants in the house was also residing in the same portion of the house but the High Court did take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since Chando Devi was a widow, the make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up being a widow. The judgement reads: "Mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly residing there. Furthermore, if Neelam was indeed residing there, her other belongings such as clothes etc. ought to have been found in the house and even if not so, the other residents of the same house could have come forward to depose in support of the said fact." Notably, the prosecution has not spotted any room in the entire house wherein the informant was residing. His own presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful.
The Court observed: "In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any evidence on record."
The Court disapproved of the approach of the High Court in reversing the acquittal of Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma (Accused No. 6) and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad (Accused No.7) "was not in line with the settled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals." It observed: "The Trial Court had acquitted the said two accused persons on the basis of a thorough appreciation of evidence and the High Court merely observed that their acquittal was based on the improbable statement of PW5 and since the evidence of PW5 stood excluded from the record, there was no reason left for the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Pertinently, the High Court did not arrive at any finding of illegality or perversity in the opinion of the Trial Court on that count. Furthermore, it did not arrive at any positive finding of involvement of the said two accused persons within the sphere of common intention with the remaining accused persons. Equally, the exclusion of the evidence of PW5, without explaining as to how the evidence of PW2 and PW4 was not liable to be excluded in the same manner, was in-correct and erroneous." This is with reference to the three eye witnesses whose testimony appear unreliable.
The Court noted that the High Court was well within its powers to appreciate the evidence on record in its exercise of appellate powers but "in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a higher threshold is required." It underles that "For, the presumption of innocence operating in favour of an accused through-out the trial gets concretized with a finding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus, such a finding could not be reversed merely because the possibility of an alternate view was alive. Rather, the view taken by the Trial Court must be held to be completely unsustainable and not a probable view. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, took a cursory view of the matter and reversed the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding of illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view or non-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court."
The Court relied on the exposition of law in Sanjeev v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022)., wherein the Supreme Court has summarized the position in this regard. It is well settled that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal.
Justice Bela Trivedi led bench noted that "the case of the prosecution is full of glaring doubts as regards the offence of abduction", and "the offence of murder is entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence....The circumstantial evidence emanating from the facts sur-rounding the offence of abduction, such as the testimonies of eye witnesses, has failed to meet the test of proof and cannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law. Therefore, the foundation of circumstantial evidence having fallen down, no inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission of the offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable conclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is far from meeting that standard."
With regard to motive, the Court observed: "motive has a bearing only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the offences under consideration."
The Court observed: "Without the proof of foundational facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of motive alone....The accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is evident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from implicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon motive alone could be a double-edged sword."
These seven accused persons were put on
trial by the Sessions Judge who were charged under Sections 323, 302,
364, 449, 450, 380/34 and 120B of the IPC. The accused Vijoy Singh @
Vijoy Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh were
charged under Sections 342/34 of the IPC. The judgment of the Sessions
Judge had acquitted the two accused, namely, Vijoy Singh Sharma and Tanik Singh of all the charges.
The five other accused persons were convicted of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and
302/34 of the IPC. They were also acquitted of charges under Sections
449, 450, 380, 323 and 120B of the IPC. The five appellants, who had
been convicted under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the IPC were heard on
sentence and each of them was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for life under each of the two counts, the sentences being directed to
run concurrently.
The High Court set aside the judgment of acquittal delivered by 12th Additional Sessions Judge, Munger on June 5, 1992 in respect of respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh by allowing the Government Appeal. It held the two guilty of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and had directed each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment on each of the two counts each for life.
In his judgement, the High Court noted that the respondents had submitted that they had not committed the offences under Sections 364 and 302 of the IPC. He observed: the charges had been framed under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code does not define any substantive sentence rather it lays down a rule of evidence that if from material evidence, it is shown that the accused persons had acted in furtherance of their common intention, then even if the main act had been committed by any of them all of them was equally liable for the offence as if the same had been committed by him. In order to bringing the case of an accused into the purview of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court has to find out as to whether there was any pre-meeting of mind or in other words had there been any consultations between the accused persons which could fall in the class of conspiracy hatched up by them to commit some unlawful act or an act which may not be unlawful if the means of committing it was unlawful. There could not be direct evidence in such matters and in most of the cases, the Court has to depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case so as to find out as to whether there had been pre-concert between the accused persons before they had embarked upon achieving their goal.
The High Court's judgement records that the respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh had been shown from the evidence, to have put the informant under wrongful confinement when they had taken him into the corner of the house near a well. The purpose of this act of the two respondents was only to eliminate any chances of resistance coming into the further acts of the other accused persons of capturing Neelam from inside the house and taking her away. The other accused persons entered inside the house and dragged Neelam out and lifted her to take her away and subsequently her dead body was found in a paddy field. Thus, the sharing of the common intention by contributing into the commission of the offence in their own way by the two respondents of the Governmental Appeal is clearly established.
The High Court's judgement had "set aside the judgment of acquittal in respect of respondents Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh by allowing the Government Appeal." The Court held "the two guilty of committing offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and direct each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment on each of the two counts each for life. In the result, the Government Appeal is allowed. The connected two criminal appeals appear of no merit and they are dismissed."
These five appellants had preferred the two criminal appeals against their conviction and sentence imposed upon them. The State of Bihar had preferred a separate appeal for challenging the acquittal of Vijoy Singh @ Vijoy Kumar Sharma and Tanik Singh @ Awadh Kishore Prasad Singh. These appeals arose out of the same judgment. The High Court had heard them together and had disposed of by a common judgment.
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