On September 3, 2024, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Jitendra Kumar and Ashutosh Kumar upheld the judgment of acquittal dated March 7, 2019 delivered by Additional Sessions Judge-Ist- cum-Special Judge (POCSO Act), Sitamarhi in Soni Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar. The Trial Court judge latter had acquitted Sanjiv Kumar Singh, the respondent No. 2 of charges framed under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 and 12 of the POCSO Act. The Trial Court found that prosecution has failed to prove its case against the respondent no.2 beyond all reasonable doubts. The Trial Court found that the case of the prosecution is not supported by the medical evidence and there are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubts.
The Court endorsed the view that in case of appeal against acquittal, the principles required to be applied by the Appellate Court are somewhat different from those which are applied in case of appeal against conviction. In case of acquittal, Appellate Court is required to interfere only when the view taken by Trial Court is not reasonable one as per the evidence on record. Even if two views are possible and learned Trial Court has taken one view, the Appellate Court is not required to supplant the view of the Trial Court by another view. When the view taken by Trial Court is based on proper appreciation of law and facts, it does not require interference by the Appellate Court.
The Court relied on Supreme Court's decision in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 40, wherein it has been held that a court must examine not only questions of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and carefully examine the reasons which impelled the lower courts to acquit the accused and should interfere only if satisfied, after such examination that the conclusion reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has not been proved is unreasonable.
It drew on Supreme Court's decision in Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415. It has been held that an appellate court, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court and if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
It recalled Supreme Court's decision in Murugesan Vs. State, (2012) 10 SCC 383, wherein it has been held that so long as the view taken by the Trial Court is not impossible to be arrived at and reasons therefore, relatable to the evidence and materials on record, are disclosed any further scrutiny in exercise of the power under Section 378 Cr.PC was not called for.
In H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, Supreme Court has summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
“8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”
In Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC Online SC 561, Supreme Court has observed: “39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;
(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.
40. The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.”
The High Court observed that it is pertinent to note that despite statutory provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution is not absolved of its burden to prove that the alleged victim is a child i.e. below 18 years of age and he/she has been subjected to sexual assault by the accused and such foundational facts have to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts and once the presumption is raised against the accused, the accused can rebut such presumption either by cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by leading evidence in his/her defence, on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The presumptions are bats in law. They fly in a twilight, but vanish in the light of facts.
The Court examined question as to whether the prosecution has proved that the alleged victim was child i.e. below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence in terms of Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act. It is one of the foundational facts to be proved by the prosecution, as it is a prerequisite for application of the POCSO Act against the Appellant.
As per the statutory provision of Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the binding judicial precedents, the age of the victim is determined on the basis of birth certificate of the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate, if available. In other words, if the victim is a student of school, the aforesaid certificates have precedence over other mode of proof regarding the age. In the absence of such certificate, birth certificate given by Municipal Authorities or Panchayat is required to be considered for determination of the age of the victim. In the absence of the aforesaid certificates, the age of the victim is required to be determined by ossification test or any other latest medical test. Any other proof is impliedly excluded from consideration for age determination of the victim. Here the following judicial precedents may be referred to; (i) Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; (ii) P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846.
The Court observed: "There is also contradiction regarding arrest of the Accused/Respondent No.2. As per the victim and her father, the accused was apprehended with the help of co-villagers and taken to the police station whereas this witness (IO) has deposed that on information he visited the place of occurrence and arrested the Accused. There is also contradiction in regard to lodging of the FIR. As per the father of the victim, the written statement was given to the police by the victim at the police station, whereas this witness (I.O.) has deposed that the written statement was given to him at the place of occurrence. We also find that the written report was written by the victim herself. But find that the signature of the informant and the content of the written report are in different handwriting showing that the written report was written by someone other than the informant and the informant had only put her signature on that."
The Court observed: As per the medical evidence, there was no external injury found on the person of the victim which could have been caused due to dragging of the victim by the accused/respondent no. 2 while taking her into the room, nor is any medical finding in support of the allegation of rape. Neither any injury nor any spermatozoa was found in the private part of the victim. Moreover, there are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. As per the victim, there was a door in the room where occurrence had taken place, whereas as per the I.O., there was no door in the room. There are also contradictory statements regarding how father entered into the room where occurrence had taken place. As per the testimony of the father of the victim, he first broke the door open and entered into the room, whereas as per the victim, father had entered into her room silently without making any noise. Even the testimony of the I.O. is full of contradictions regarding lodging of FIR and arrest of the accused."
The Court concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances together with the evidence adduced by the defence, there are reasonable doubts created in the prosecution case against the accused/respondent no. 2 and hence, learned Trial Court has acquitted the accused/respondent no. 2 giving him benefit of doubts. Hence, there is no scope for this Court to interfere in the impugned judgment supplanting the view of learned Trial Court by other view. The view taken by learned Trial Court is reasonable and possible one based on proper appreciation of law and evidence on record. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Jitendra Kumar.
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