Chief Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Justice Soni Srivastava upholds judgement by Justice Rajiv Roy in case of land acquistion for Bharatmala Patna-Sahebganj corridor from Bakarpurhat to Manikpur, Muzaffarpur

In Ashok Rai @ Ashok Ray Son of Late Rajendra Ray & Ors. vs.  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Meenakshi Madan Rai and Soni Shrivastava delivrered a 14-page long judgement dated June 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"we find that the impugned Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2026, of the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case (C.W.J.C) No. 19292 of 2024) warrants no interference. Consequently, this LPA stands dismissed and disposed of." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Rai. It is one of the 39 judgments delivered by her Division Bench upon joining the High Court as its 48th Chief Justice on June 5, 2026. During her brief tenure she authored 791 orders besides some 40 judgements.  

In Ashok Rai @ Ashok Ray Son of Late Rajendra Ray & Ors. vs.  The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway & Ors. (2026), Justice Rajiv Roy of Patna High Court passed a 14-long order dated March 13, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"25. The petitioners who chose not to file any objection and sat over the matter are themselves to be blamed. It is further clear that knowingly, they suppressed this fact about the second notification while invoking the writ jurisdiction. The petition/representation claim to have been filed is/are belatedly in the year 2023 after the final notification was published on 14.06.2022. 26. Considering the aforesaid facts and taking into account the submissions/documents on record, this Court can only record that now that the land in question stands acquired and ‘the MOTH’ has taken the due legal process before issuance of the notification dated 14.06.2022, the petitioners if so want can take steps for getting the compensation amount inaccordance with law after showing their bona fide for the land that stands acquired. 27. So far as the writ petition is concerned, it is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The interim protection granted to the petitioners stands vacated."

The other six respondents were: Chief General Manager, National Highway Authority of India, Regional Office, Regional Director, National Highway Authority of India, Regional Office, Patna, Project Director, National Highway Authority of India, Motihari, District Land Acquisition Officer, Muzaffarpur, District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur. 

The appellants by filing the L.P.A had assailed the judgment by Justice Roy by which the writ petition was dismissed concluding that it was devoid of merit. The appellants seek the setting aside of the impugned Judgment. 2. The appellants’/petitioners’ case was that, vide Notification No. 2456(E) dated June 22, 2021 the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH) declared its intention to acquire the lands detailed in the Schedule thereto for building, maintenance, management and operation of Bharatmala Patna-Sahebganj corridor (Adalwari-Manikpur Section) ending in the stretch of land from Bakarpurhat to Manikpur, District-Muzaffarpur. The Notification was published in the Hindi newspaper Prabhat Khabar and Hindustan, both dated July 10, 2021 and Dainik Bhaskar and Times of India, both on December 1, 2021. Necessary measurements were undertaken and map prepared. Pursuant to such steps, objections were raised by some stakeholders, which were considered but disallowed by the competent authority. Subsequent thereto, the MORTH issued another Notification, dated June 14, 2022, bearing No. 2724(E), declaring its intention to acquire lands specified in the annexed Schedule. The appellants had submitted that the second Notification indicated an alteration in the acquisition of the lands, vide which the earlier alignment was deviated by about 400 feet allegedly to favour the owner of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. By such deviation, only a small portion of the property of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel, would be acquired, but a larger area of the appellants’ property would be taken thereby infringing on the property rights of the appellants. 

The contention of the counsel for the appellants is that on publication of the first Notification, the map regarding acquisition was prepared which proposed a straight alignment, for the formation of the four lane highway to minimize, and ensure equal distribution of acquisition on both sides of the existing road. However, subsequently without any technical justification or prior notice to the appellants, the alignment was altered exclusively as already agitated. Such realignment shifted the entire burden on to the appellants’ land and livelihood. Relying on Dev Sharan and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others  (2011) 4 SCC 769, it was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed therein that, Section-5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, embodies a very just and wholesome principle of giving proper and reasonable opportunity to a landuser of persuading the authorities that his property should not be acquired. That, Section-5A has to be read in tandem with the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is next put forth that, despite the appellants having approached the concerned competent authorities on the matter, no steps were initiated. It is contended that the impugned Judgment of the Single Judge, erroneously held that the appellants were at fault for not objecting to the Notification of 2021, when in fact no reason arose for the appellants to object to the said Notification, as it did not infringe upon their rights. That, the injury to the appellants was only caused by the subsequent clandestine re-measurement and revised map. 

The counsel also submitted that the finding of the Single Judge that non-joinder of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel owner is fatal, is legally flawed. On this count, strength was drawn from the decision in Smt. Savita Garg vs. The Director, National Heart Institute (2004) 8 SCC 56, wherein the Supreme Court held that so far as the law with regard to non-joinder of necessary party under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Order 1 Rule 9 and Order 1 Rule 10, lays down that no suit shall fail because of mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties. In any event the Court has the power under Order 1 Rule 10(4) to give directions to implead a person who is a necessary party. That, no such direction was given by the Single Judge. 

The counsel for the respondents walked the High Court through the provisions of Section 3A, 3C and 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956, and emphasized that it provides for as follows; Section 3A vests the Central Government with power to acquire land for public purpose, for construction of National Highway and to declare its intention a notification with description of land is to be published in the Official Gazette; Section-3C provides for hearing of objection raised by any person aggrieved by such acquisition and the competent authority has the discretion to allow or disallow the objection; Section-3D provides for declaration of acquisition and the purpose of such acquisition by 2 (2004) 8 SCC 56 publication of the declaration in newspapers. That it is specifically provided that once a declaration is made by the Central Government, it shall not be called into question by any Court or by any other authority. It was next contended that one two-lane Railway Under Bridge (RUB) was already in existence and another was proposed to be constructed. Since a mandatory distance was required to be maintained between the two Railway Under Bridges, the realignment of the road was proposed for that purpose. 

Drawing strength from the decision in Union of India vs. Kushala Shetty and Ors.,2011) 12 SCC 69, it was canvassed that judicial review has a narrow scope and that the decision to alter any alignment as part of National Highways is a policy decision within the clear domain of the Central Government. 8. The allegations pertaining to mala fides are without any specific reasons assigned to the allegations and the contention that a change in the alignment will benefit a party is baseless, in the absence of specific materials to show the mala fides. To that extent, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr(1974) 4 SCC 3,wherein, it was observed that the 3 (2011) 12 SCC 69 4 (1974) 4 SCC 3 burden of establishing malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The alteration of the alignment by the competent authority, was in line with the objectives of the Bharatmala Project, sans influence of any land owner. That, at the time when the DPR was submitted for approval at the headquarters of the NHAI, there was no Railway Under Bridge (RUB) nor were there Railway tracks, hence, the consultant had no occasion to inquire from the Railways. Based on the approved Letter of Award of Contract (LAC), dated May 18, 2020, the first Gazette Notification dated 21.06.2021 was issued, however, after the DPR consultant learned of the RUB construction while taking data on the field for 3D notification, the realignment took place to include the RUB, pursuant to which the Gazette Notification dated June 14, 2022 came to be published. 

Chief Justice Rai observed: "The entire process has been carried out in a fair manner. The order of the learned Single Judge thereby warrants no interference." She added:"11. In our considered view, it is appropriate to point out that the law relating to the exercise of Intra Court Jurisdiction has been laid down by a Division Bench of the Supreme court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited vs. Workmen of Narendra & Company  (2016) 3 SCC 340: 

The Supreme Court has held that:- “5……………………… Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.” 

Chief Justice Rai observed: "12. That, having cleared the cloud on Intra-Court Appeals, after examining the pleadings and considering the arguments advanced before us, in our considered view the appellants have firstly failed to establish the mala fides against the concerned authorities, for the purpose of benefiting the owner of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. Although, the learned counsel for the appellants hastened to point out to the Court, during the arguments advanced that no specific mala fides were alleged in the averments, however, we are inclined to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents, that, the suggestion that the road was being realigned for the benefit of ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel is sufficient to insinuate mala fides which is without substantiation. The submission on the facet of mala fides deserves to be and is accordingly, disregarded. 13. While considering the aspect on issuance of Notifications, the appellants concedely have no argument with regard to the first Notification. The grievance of the appellants is confined to the second Notification, dated 14.06.2022, which alleged was issued sans notice and to their prejudice. This submission cannot be countenanced for the fact that, the Notification was issued in the Government Gazette, which is an official legal process designed to bring inter alia administrative decisions into the public domain. Such publication is deemed sufficient notice to all interested parties fulfilling the requirements of transparency and in addition to the above it gives legal authority to governmental action including land acquisition." 

The judgedment reads: "14. On this facet strength is garnered from Union of India and Others Vs. Ganesh Das Bhojraj 2000 SCC OnLine SC 438, paragraph 14 which provides as follows; “14. From the aforesaid judgment it can be stated that it is an established practice that the publication in the Official Gazette, that is, the Gazette of India (sic is an) ordinary method of bringing a rule or subordinate legislation to the notice of the persons concerned. Individual service of a general notification on every member of the public is not required and the interested person can acquaint himself with the contents of the notification published in the Gazette. It is the usual mode followed since years and there is no other mode prescribed under the present statute except by the amendment in the year 1998 by Bill 21 of 1998.” 

Notably, reliance was also placed on Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 101, wherein at paragraph 16 the Supreme Court observed: “16. The requirement of publication in the gazette, therefore, serves a dual constitutional purpose, i.e. (a) it ensures accessibility and notice to those governed by the law, and (b) it ensures accountability and solemnity in the exercise of delegated legislative power. The requirement of publication in the gazette, is therefore not an empty formality. It is an act by which an executive decision is transformed into law. It is precisely for this reason that courts have consistently insisted that strict compliance with the publication requirements is a condition precedent for the enforceability of delegated legislation.” 

In the penultiumate paragraph of the judgement, the Division Bench observed: "16. Ignorance of publication of such Notification, cannot be a ground to demolish the case of the respondents. 17. Indeed, while agreeing with the submission of the appellants that they had no reason to object to the first Notification, as it appears that the objections raised by other stakeholders were considered but disallowed by the respondents, it is apposite to notice that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the National Highway Act, 1956 inter alia mentions therein that Parliament has exclusive powers of legislation with respect to Highways which are declared to be National Highways as proper development of road infrastructure is essential for economic development of the country. 18. Section-3A and 3C of the National Highways Act, 1956 as already discussed herein, also lays down the powers of the Central Government to acquire land where it is satisfied that for public purpose, any land is required for the building, maintenance, management or operation of National Highway or part thereof. The requirement of such intention is to be notified in the Official Gazette. Should objections be filed before the competent authority, it shall after hearing the objections and making further inquiries, may by order, either allow or disallow the objection. It is no one’s case that Notifications to acquire the property were not published, in the obtaining facts the respondents cannot be foisted with the responsibility of the lack of awareness of the appellants. We also cannot fault the observation of the learned Single Judge regarding non impleadment of the ‘Blue Lotus’ Hotel. It was for the appellants to have either sought for impleadment of the said Hotel as a respondent to the petition or mentioned it before the Court to enable the Court to take appropriate steps. In any event, it was for the petitioner to have ensured impleadment of the party as no order can be issued behind the back of a party who is unaware of the Court proceedings, the decision of which would likely affect it." 

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Petitioner directed to make an appropriate representation under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act

In Birendra Kumar Nidhi vs.The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary to the Government, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 2-page long judgement dated November 1, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. In view of the aforesaid, the petitioner is directed to make an appropriate representation before the competent authority under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, who shall consider the same and pass an appropriate order under Section 6 of the Act, preferably within a period of nine months from the date of filing of such representation, after giving opportunity of hearing to all the stakeholders. 5. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of." 

This was the tenth judgement authored by Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh. The other six respondents were: The Commissioner, Darbhanga Division, Darbhanga, District Magistrate, Madhubani, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Madhubani, Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Madhubani, Sub- Divisional Officer, Madhubani, Saslar, Madhubani and Executive Officer, Municipal Corporation, Madhubani. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that public land was encroached by some local persons.

Circle Officer, Barhara, Bhojpur directed to pass order under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act within nine months: Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh

In Ram Babu Singh vs.The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 2-page long judgement dated November 1, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"the petitioner is directed to make an appropriate application before the Respondent No. 5 under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, who shall consider and pass an appropriate order under Section 6 of the Act, preferably within a period of nine months from the date of filing of such representation, after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties. 5. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of." The respondent no. 5 was Circle Officer, Barhara, Bhojpur. This was the sixth judgement authored by Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh. 

The other six respondents were: District Magistrate, Bhojpur, Ara, Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Ara, Sub-Divisional Officer, Ara Sadar, Bhojpur, Circle Officer, Barhara, Bhojpur,Officer-in-Charge, Babura Police Station, Bhojpur, and Smt. Poonam Kumari Singh (61), Wife of Sanjay Kumar Singh @ Gandhi, Semra, Bhojpur.

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondent Authorities to immediately remove the illegal encroachment made by Smt. Poonam Kumari Singh (61), the Respondent No. 7 over the public village road in Village Semra, Bhojpur. He had also prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondents to conduct a thorough and time-bound inquiry into the illegal obstruction of the public road and to lodge a First Information Report (FIR) against the said Respondent for criminal intimidation and obstruction of public access. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that on a public land, encroachment has been made by the private parties.

Circle Officer, Saur Bazar Anchal, Saharsa directed to pass order under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act within nine months: Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh

In Ashutosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar, Saharsa & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 5-page long judgement dated November 1, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"....the petitioner is directed to make an appropriate application before the Respondent No. 5 under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, who shall consider and pass an appropriate order under Section 6 of the Act, preferably within a period of nine months from the date of filing of such representation, after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties, 5. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of." 

There were 52 other respondents who were residents of village-Kanp (West) Ward No. 10, P.S.-Saur Bazar, Saharsa. Respondent No. 5 is the Circle Officer, Saur Bazar Anchal, Saharsa. Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh authored this fifth judgement. 

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions in the nature of mandamus by way of Public Interest Litigation whereby and whereunder the petitioner is the local and social worker and prayer for addressing the issue related to the structure of illegal encroachment of Gair Mazarua Aam Land (Anabad Bihar Sarkar) the aforesaid land under Mouza Kanp Thana no. 136, Khata no. 2559, Kheshra/Plot no, 8640, 8641, 8637, 8639, 8647 Total Rakwa 7 acre land Gair Mazarua Aam land has been encroached by the private respondents no. 07 to 53 in which the aforesaid land which was donated by RajMata of the Sonbarsa State under Anchal-Saur Bazar, District- Saharsa out of whom in Plot/Kheshra no. 8646 Shiv Mahade Temple (Baba Kapeshwar Nath Dham Mandir) area 3 dismal which is situated for Puja Paadh, and remaining 5 acre land there was a pond (pokhar) and over the said Mayor (Mahaar) of the pond the private respondents are forcibly encroached the Gair Mazarua Aam Land belonging to Shiv Temple Kanp. He had also prayed for removal of illegal encroachment over the land. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that on a public land, encroachment was made by the private parties.

Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."

 

Acting Chief Justice bench refuses to interfere with order of Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Md. Gholam Rasul @ Gulam Rasul vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Land Reform and Survey, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice led Division Bench concluded:"We do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment" of Single Judge Justice Mohit Kumar Shah in Md. Akhtar Alam Son vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Land Reforms and Survey, Govt. of Bihar (2025). The bench found the appeal to be  meritless and dismissed it. The judgement dated June 17, 2025 reads:"The appellant apprehends that in view of such a direction by the learned Single Judge, and in the event of hearing of the aforenoted encroachment case being expedited, the appellant, who is alleged to be the encroacher, would not be heard by the Circle Officer. This apprehension is absolutely misplaced. All that the impugned judgment directs is that the case be concluded at the earliest. This does not preclude the authority concerned from hearing the parties and passing a reasoned order, which can only happen if the parties to the dispute are heard."

Justice Shah bench had heard the petition seeking direction to the Circle Officer, Azam Nagar, Katihar, to conclude the proceedings of the pending Encroachment Case No. 1 of 2024-25 within a fixed time frame because the encroachment proceedings were not concluded. His order dated January 9, 2025 reads:"I deem it fit and proper to direct the Respondent No. 4 to conclude the proceedings of the aforesaid Encroachment Case No. 1 of 2024-25, if the same has not already been concluded, by passing the final order under Section 6(1) of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956, after hearing the affected parties and in accordance with law, within a period of six weeks of receipt / production of a copy of this order." He had disposed of the writ petition in terms of these directions. The Division Bench did not find any error in these directions. 

Vaishali hotel seized under Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 released by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri, Patna High Court

Magistrate failed to comply with requirements under Section 18 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and the principles of natural justice

In Sunil Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Bibek Chaudhuri passed a judgement ordering that the building on which a hotel was run must be released in favour of Sunil Kumar Shukla, the petitioner on giving an undertaking that the said building would not be used in future as hotel and that the building would not be used for immoral purpose in future. Such undertaking shall have to be filed before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hajipur at Vaishali. The Court observed that subject to the filing of such undertaking, the building may be released in favour of the petitioner. The entire exercise shall be done within three weeks from the date of this order.

The petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of certiorari calling for the records and directing the respondents to release the hotel/hotel building that was seized and sealed on the basis of an allegation of commission of offence under Sections 3/4/5/7/9 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

Section 3 of the Act deals with punishment for keeping a brothel or allowing premises to be used as a brothel. Section 2 (a) of the Act defines brothel. "Brothel" includes any house, room, conveyance or place, or any portion of any house, room, conveyance or place, which is used for purposes of sexual exploitation or abuse for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes.

Section 3 reads: (1) Any person who keeps or manages, or acts or assists in the keeping or management of, a brothel shall be punishable on first conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than two years and which may extend to three years and also with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years and which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to two lakh rupees (2) a any person who,—(a) being the tenant, lessee, occupier or person in charge of any premises, uses, or knowingly allows any other person to use, such premises or any part thereof as a brothel, or (b) being the owner, lessor or landlord of any premises or the agent of such owner, lessor or landlord, lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the same or any part thereof is intended to be used as a brothel, or is wilfully a party to the use of such premises or any part thereof as a brothel, shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine. (2-A) Any person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of that sub-section, is knowingly allowing the premises or any part thereof to be used as a brothel or, as the case may be, has knowledge that the premises or any part thereof are being used as a brothel, if,—(a) a report is published in a newspaper having circulation in the area in which such person resides to the effect that the premises or any part thereof have been found to be used for prostitution as a result of a search made under this Act; or (b) a copy of the list of all things found during the search referred to in clause (a) is given to such person. (3) Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force, on conviction of any person referred to in clause (a) or clause (d) of sub-section (2) of any offence under that sub-section in respect of any premises or any part thereof, any lease or agreement under which such premises have been leased out or held or occupied at the time of the commission of the offence, shall become void and inoperative with effect from the date of the said conviction.

Section 4 deals with punishment for living on the earnings of prostitution. It reads: (1) Any person over the age of eighteen years who knowingly lives, wholly or in part, on the earnings of the prostitution of any other person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both, and where such earnings relate to the prostitution of a child, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years and not more than ten years. (2) Where any person over the age of eighteen years is proved,— (a) to be living with,or to be habitually in the company of, a prostitute; or (b) to have exercised control, direction or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a manner as to show that such person is aiding abetting or compelling her prostitution; or (c)to be acting as a tout or pimp on behalf of a prostitute, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person is knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution of another person within the meaning of sub-section (1).

Section 5 deals with procuring, inducing or taking person for the sake of prostitution. It reads: (1) Any person who—(a) procures or attempts to procure a person whether with or without his/her consent, for the purpose of prostitution; or (b) induces a person to go from any place, with the intent that he/she may for the purpose of prostitution become the inmate of, or frequent, a brothel; or (c) takes or attempts to take a person or causes a person to be taken, from one place to another with a view to his/her carrying on, or being brought up to carry on prostitution ; or (d) causes or induces a person to carry on prostitution; shall be punishable on conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than three years and not more than seven years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and if any offence under this sub-section is committed against the will of any person, the punishment of imprisonment for a term of seven years shall extend to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years: Provided that if the person in respect of whom an offence committed under this subsection, is a child, the punishment provided under this sub-section shall extend to rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years but may extend to life. (3) An offence under this section shall be triable,—(a) in the place from which a person is procured, induced to go, taken or caused to be taken or from which an attempt to procure or taken such persons made; or (b) in the place to which she may have gone as a result of the inducement or to which he/she is taken or caused to be taken or an attempt to take him/her is made. 5A. Whoever recruits, transports, transfers, harbours, or receives a person forthe purpose of prostitution by means of,—(a) threat or use of force or coercion, abduction, fraud, deception; or (b) abuse of power or a position of vulnerability; or (c) giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of such person having control over another person, commits the offence of trafficking in persons. Explanation.—Where any person recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives a person for the purposes of prostitution, such person shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have recruited, transported, transferred, harboured or received the person with the intent that the person shall be used for the purpose of prostitution. 5B. (1) Any person who commits trafficking in persons shall be punishable on first conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for life. (2) Any person who attempts to commit, or abets trafficking in persons shall also be deemed to have committed such trafficking in persons and shall be punishable with the punishment hereinbefore described. 5C. Any person who visits or is found in a brothel for the purpose of sexual exploitation of any victim of trafficking in persons shall on first conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees or with both and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees.

Section 7 deals with prostitution in or in the vicinity of public place. It reads: (1) Any person who carries on prostitution and the person with whom such prostitution is carried on, in any premises: (a) which are within the area or areas, notified under sub-section (3), or (b) which are within a distance of two hundred meters of any place of public religious worship, educational institution, hotel, hospital, nursing home or such other public place of any kind as may be notified in this behalf by the Commissioner of Police or Magistrate in the manner prescribed, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months. (1-A) Where an offence committed under sub-section (1) is in respect of a child, the person committing the offence shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (2) Any person who: (a) being the keeper of any public place knowingly permits prostitutes for purposes of their trade to resort to or remain in such place; or (b) being the tenant, lessee, occupier or person in charge of any premises referred to in sub-section (1) knowingly permits the same or any part thereof to be used for prostitution; or (c) being the owner, lessor or landlord of any premises referred to in sub-section (1), or the agent of such owner, lessor or landlord, lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the same or any part thereof may be used for prostitution, or is wilfully a party to such use shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both, and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and also with fine, which may extend to two hundred rupees, and if the public place or premises happen to be a hotel, the licence for carrying on the business of such hotel under any law for the time being in force shall also be liable to be suspended for a period of not less than three months but which may extend to one year: Provided that if an offence committed under this sub-section is in respect of a child in a hotel, such licence shall also be liable to be cancelled. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “hotel” shall have the meaning as in clause (6) of Section 2 of the Hotel-Receipts Tax Act, 1980 (54 of 1980). (3) The State Government may, having regard to the kinds of persons frequenting any area or areas in the State, the nature and the density of population therein and other relevant considerations, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that the prostitution shall not be carried on in such area or areas as may be specified in the notification. (4) Where the notification is issued under Sub-section (3) in respect of any area or areas, the State Government shall define the limits of such area or areas in the notification with reasonable certainty. (5) No such notification shall be issued so as to have effect from a date earlier than the expiry of a period of ninety days after the date on which it is issued.

Section 9 of the Act deals with "Seduction of a person in custody". It reads: "Any person who having the custody, charge or care of or in a position of authority over any person causes or aids or abets the seduction for prostitution of that shall be punishable on conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years." 

The counsel of Sunil Kumar Shukla, the petitioner submitted that petitioner is the owner of the piece and parcel of land situated at Vaishali along with structure thereon. The petitioner inducted one Amit Kumar as a tenant in respect of the said building to run residential hotel (Awasiya Hotel) in the said building. The tenancy was granted for 11 months. It is also on record that the Amit Kumar used to run a hotel business under the name and style of Chandra Hotel at Hajipur, in the District of Vaishali.

A raid conducted on June 27, 2022 by the Officer-in-charge of Mahila P.S. and other Officers and the members of the force, it was found that the said hotel was being run for the purpose of immoral trafficking and accordingly Hajipur (Town) P.S. Case No. 482 of 2022, under Sections 114/290/370/509/354/34 of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4/5/7/9 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 was registered against the apprehended persons as well as the Owner/Manager of the said hotel namely Amit Kumar.

The judgement of the High Court records that Sunil Kumar Shukla being the owner of the land and structure made an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Hajipur for release of the said structure in favour of him on the ground that he did not run immoral trafficking in the said hotel. He was not associated with the hotel business. The house was transferred on rent to one Amit Kumar for 11 months and the said period was over. But the Magistrate refused to release the building in favour of Sunil Kumar Shukla, the petitioner.

Shukla assailed the said order in revision before the Sessions Judge, Hajipur at Vaishali. The Sessions Judge dismissed the said revision on the ground that the same was not maintainable. 

It was in this backdrop that the writ petition was filed in the High Court. Shukla's counsel submitted that the Investigating Officer already submitted charge-sheet under Sections 114/290/370/509/354/34 of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4/5/7/9 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 against one Raju Kumar, Niraj Kumar, Rahul Kumar, Raunak Kumar, Ritik Roushan and Amit Kumar. Amit Kumar is qualified with the words as Owner-cum-Manager of the hotel. Therefore, it is submitted by the petitioner's counsel that charge-sheet has not been filed against Sunil Kumar Shukla and he is entitled to get back his property. He was absolutely unaware about the fact that Amit Kumar allegedly run the hotel business for immoral purpose.

The High Court's judgement refers to provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Section 18 (1) reads: “18. Closure of brothel and eviction of offender from the premises. (1)A magistrate may, on receipt of information from the police or otherwise, that any house, room, place or any portion thereof with a distance of two hundred yards of any public place referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7, is being run or used as a brothel by any person, or is being used by prostitutes for carrying on their trade, issue notice on the owner, lessor or landlord of such house, room, place or portion or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord or on the tenant, lessee, occupier of, or any other  person in charge of such house, room, place, or portion, to show cause within seven days of the receipt of the notice why the same should not be attached for improper user thereof; and if, after hearing the person concerned, the magistrate is satisfied that the house, room, place, or portion is being used as a brothel or for carrying on prostitution, then the magistrate may pass orders- (a) directing eviction of the occupier within seven days of the passing of the order from the house, room, place, or portion; (b) directing that before letting it out during the period of one year immediately after the passing of the order, the owner, lessor or landlord or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord shall obtain the previous approval of the magistrate: Provided that, if the magistrate finds that the owner, lessor or landlord as well as the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord, was innocent of the improper user of the house, room, place or portion, he may cause the same to be restored to the owner, lessor or landlord, or the agent of the owner, lessor or landlord, with a direction that the house, room, place or portion shall not be leased out, or otherwise given possession of, to or for the benefit of the person who was allowing the improper user therein.”

After referring to the relevant provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, the Court observed: "It is on record that no action under Section 18 has been taken as yet by the learned Magistrate." It emerges that the Magistrate did not comply with the relevant provisions of the law and the principles of natural justice. As a consequence, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri passed a judgement for release of Vaishali hotel seized under Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. 

Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act provides remedy for removal of encroachment from public lands: Patna High Court

Rekha Devi (West Champaran, Betiah) filed a case against the State of Bihar in the Patna High Court as CWJC No.3571 of 2023 for removal of encroachment from a public land. The writ application was filed as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking direction for removal of encroachments over alleged public lands.  The Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Madhuresh Prasad passed the final order dismissed the writ petition on April 17, 2023. 

The order referred to the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 which provides remedy for removal of encroachment from public lands. Section 4 of the Act allows an opportunity to the noticee (petitioner) to raise any defense which they could have raised if they were defendants in a properly framed suit for removal of encroachment. The Act also provides an opportunity of hearing under Section 5; as well as the consequences of non-appearance in the proceedings.

It is only after observing the above procedure that final order is to be passed by the Collector under Section 6 of the Act, either dropping the proceedings or passing orders for ensuring removal of encroachment, damages or otherwise. The order of the Collector for removing encroachment is also subject to appeal under Section 11 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act also provides an opportunity of review in case of any mistake or error in the course of any proceedings.

Notably, the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 was amended by the Bihar Public Land Encroachment (Amendment) Act, 2012. The amendment in Section 6 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956 deleted (i) Clause (C) of Sub-Section-(1) of Section-6 of the 1956 Act. It substituted  "(2) If any person does not comply with the orders passed by the Collector under this section, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to one year or with fine up to Rs. 20,000/-(twenty thousand) or with both" in place of (ii) Sub-section (2) of Section-6 of The Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1956.

The order notes that the issue raised by the petitioner was essentially an issue falling within the scope and ambit of the Act. The writ petition, by way of a PIL, therefore, is misconceived. If the instant case were to be entertained as a PIL, then all issues of encroachment would be required to be dealt with by this Court as a PIL.

The Court observed that "We find that no public interest concerning any marginalised section/society has been espoused in the instant writ proceedings, so as to allow the petitioner to bypass the statutory remedy whereby and whereunder the alleged encroachers of the public lands would be dealt with in a fair procedure, and leave it open for the petitioner to pursue remedy in accordance with law." The order was authored by Justice Madhuresh Prasad.