Chief Justice Pancholi led bench sets aside order by Justice Harish Kumar in land dispute case

In Vikash Ranjan @ Chaman Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 10-page long judgment dated August 11, 2025. This is the 18th judgement by Justice Pancholi as chief justice. In this Letters Patent Appeal in a civil writ jurisdiction case, Justice Pancholi concluded:"we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed an error by granting interim relief in favour of the writ petitioner till final disposal of the appeal and, therefore, the impugned order is required to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside." and allowed the appeal. He directed that the appellant "shall appear before the appellate authority within a period of one week from today and the appellate authority shall decide the appeal filed by the original writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order." The present appeal has been filed under Clause-X of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court Rules against the order dated September 11, 2024, rendered by Justice Harish Kumar, Single Judge in Guru Charan Ray vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024).  

The counsel for the appellant had contended that the Single Judge has disposed of the captioned writ petition by relegating the petitioner to the appellate authority i.e., the Divisional Commissioner, despite which, the Single Judge in paragraph No. 9 of the impugned order had observed that till final disposal of the appeal, the order passed by the concerned authority i.e., the Deputy Collector Land Reforms (D.C.L.R.), shall not be given effect to. The counsel had contended that though the Single Judge did not entertain the petition filed by the writ petitioner on the ground of availing statutory alternative remedy, granted the interim relief to the writ petitioner till final disposal of the appeal. It was contended that on the date of disposal of the petition, even the appeal was not preferred by the original writ petitioner. The counsel also contended that while passing the said order, the Single Judge did not assign any reason for grant of such relief in favour of the original writ petitioner. It had pointed out from the records that the aforesaid order came to be passed on September 11, 2024 and till date, the notice in the appeal filed by the original writ petitioner was not received by the present appellant. The counsel, urged that the impugned order be set aside. The counsel for the appellant had placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Queen Road Private Limited & Ors. vs. Ram Parshotam Mittal & Ors.; reported in (2014) 13 SCC 646, and more particularly paragraph No. 16 thereof. The counsel had also placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Mohan & Ors. vs. H.N. Rai & Ors.; reported in (2008) 2 SCC 507, and more particularly paragraph No. 24 thereof. The counsel, therefore, urged that in view of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, it was not open for the Single Judge to grant relief to the writ petitioner while disposing of the petition. The counsel, therefore, urged that the appeal be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Single Judge be set aside.

The counsel on behalf of the private respondent contended that as per provisions contained in Section 15 of the Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act, 2009, once the appeal was filed by the appellant, the order passed by the competent authority was automatically stayed. He referred to the aforesaid provision in support of the said contention. The counsel for the private respondent, thereafter, submitted that in the present case, the Single Judge disposed of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner before the appellate authority and, therefore, now, when the writ petitioner was filed the appeal before the appellate authority, the impugned order passed by the D.C.L.R. was required to be stayed and, therefore, the Single Judge has not committed any error while passing the impugned order. The counsel urged that this appeal be dismissed. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities had also supported the submissions canvassed by the private respondent. The counsel submitted that the appeal should not be entertained. 

From the records, it emerged that Guru Charan Ray, the respondent No. 6 had filed the captioned writ petition challenging the order dated August 10, 2024, passed by the Deputy Collector Lands Reforms, whereby, the said authority had held that the writ petitioner has illegally occupied the land in question by constructing the cattle shed. The D.C.L.R. also directed the concerned Circle Officer to take necessary action to ensure that the possession of the land in question be handed over to the concerned private respondent. It also transpired that the Single Judge did not issue notice to the private respondent in the writ petition/present appellant and the writ petition came to be disposed of on the ground that the original writ petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy of statutory appeal before the Divisional Commissioner as provided under Section 14 of the Act of 2009. 

Justice Pancholi recorded:"...the original writ petitioner has not challenged the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and, in fact, the original writ petitioner has already preferred the appeal before the appellate authority i.e., the Divisional Commissioner. However, at this stage, it is further required to be observed that though the learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to file appeal before the Divisional Commissioner within the stipulated time, the learned Single Judge has further observed that the order dated 10.08.2024, passed by the D.C.L.R., shall not be given effect to till the final disposal of the appeal. 15. Therefore, the limited question before us in the present appeal is 'whether the learned Single Judge could have passed the order of grant of relief in favour of the writ petitioner while relegating him to the appellate authority or not?' 

Justice Pancholi referred to the decision rendered in the case of Ajay Mohan, wherein, the Supreme Court had observed in paragraph No. 24 as under :- “24. The order of the City Civil Court dated 13-10-2006 may be bad but then it was required to be set aside by the court of appeal. An appeal had been preferred by the appellants there against but the same had been withdrawn. The said order dated 13-10-2006, therefore, attained finality. The High Court, while allowing the appellant to withdraw the appeal, no doubt, passed an order of status quo for a period of two weeks in terms of its order dated 23-11-2006 but no reason therefor had been assigned. It ex facie had no jurisdiction to pass such an interim order. Once the appeal was permitted to be withdrawn, the Court became functus officio. It did not hear the parties on merit. It had not assigned any reason in support thereof. Ordinarily, a court, while allowing a party to withdraw an appeal, could not have granted a further relief. ”

He added: ''17. From the aforesaid observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it can be said that once the appeal was permitted to be withdrawn, the Court became functus officio and the Court had no jurisdiction to pass such an interim order. 18. In the case of Hotel Queen Road Private Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph No. 16....'' It reads: “16. In view of the aforestated judgments, it is very clear that if a petition is not maintainable and is ultimately withdrawn, the court should not continue interim relief for a period beyond withdrawal of the writ petition. However, the aforestated observation would not apply to a case where the matter is heard on merits and after considering the facts of the case the court permits withdrawal of the case. In such a case, the court is at liberty to extend the interim relief or can grant interim relief for a limited period after recording reasons for the same.”

The High Court observed:''it is clear that if a petition is not maintainable and is ultimately withdrawn, the Court should not continue interim relief for a period beyond withdrawal of the writ petition. 20. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the facts of the present case as
discussed herein above are examined, it transpires that while not entertaining the petition filed by the writ petitioner on the ground of availability of efficacious alternative remedy, the learned Single Judge has observed that the order passed by the D.C.L.R. shall not be given effect to till final disposal of the appeal. Further, while granting such relief in favour of the writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge did not assign any reason. 21. We are also of the view that the reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent No. 6/original writ petitioner upon Section 15 of the Act of 2009, is misconceived.''

Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi bench grants relief without examining the merits of case

In Dhananjay Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 3-page long judgement dated July 24, 2025 granting relief to the appellants without examining the merits of case.

The appellants were the owners of the land in which, now, the respondent authorities had decided to construct Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan. The appellants had made representation before the respondent authorities.  Justice Rajesh Kumar Verm, the Single Judge had dismissed their petition mainly on the ground citing an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court, wherein it was held that "it is for the authorities to decide where the Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan is to be constructed." 

The counsel for the appellants submitted before Justice Pancholi led bench that if the respondent authorities are directed to decide the representation filed by the appellants, then the appellants would be satisfied with the same. In his 4th judgement as Chief Justice, Justice Pancholi concluded: "If the appellants file the representation within a period of four weeks from today, respondent No. 6 shall decide the same in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of such representation. 5. It is clarified that we have not examined the merits of the case of the appellants."

The appeal was filed under Clause-X of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court Rules against the 4-page long order dated February 17, 2025, passed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma, the Single Judge in Dhananjay Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025) CWJC No. 2840 of 2025, whereby the Single Judge had dismissed the petition filed by the present appellants/petitioners. 

Justice Verma had relied on  order dated April 7, 2023 passed by High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Madhuresh Prasad in Naveen Kumar Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2023), because not a single cheat of paper annexed by the petitioners suggested that construction was going on the land of the petitioners. The order was authored by Justice Prasad. He concluded: "8. No case is made out for interference by this Court."

Unqualified, untrained teachers are the bane of any system of education: Chief Justice, Patna High Court

High Court interprets Section 23 of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act

Pursuant to its interpretation to Section 23(1) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017, the Patna High Court's bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran, Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Rajiv Roy pronounced its 35 page long judgement in Bibi Sakina Khatoon and nine others v. Union of India and 19 others.

The opening paragraph of the judgement reads: "Unqualified and untrained teachers are the bane of any system of education, in which, the students; often celebrated as the citizens of tomorrow, wallow in ignorance and get mired in misinformation, thus, stultifying the development and growth of a Nation State. Quite realizing the importance of a robust educational system; for maintaining and upgrading the teaching standards, with a vision to strengthen the social fabric of democracy and further the Directive Principles of State Policy, the crucial role of elementary education was emphasized by the Union Parliament in enacting the Right of Children to Free And Compulsory Education Act, 2009". The Act mandates free and compulsory education to all children up to the age of 14 years. 

The writ petitions had challenge the proviso under Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE Act), 2009 which provided a further period of four years after the initial hiatus of five years, on grounds of it being arbitrary, illegal and manifestly wrong. The petitioners asserted that the proviso which was introduced abruptly extinguished the right of those appointed, who were not able to get a training qualification in the interregnum; either on account of their own default or on the disinclination of the State to provide sufficient opportunities to acquire such training. 

Notably, Section 23 (1) and sub-section (2) only provided a conditional engagement, the proviso of which required attainment of the required qualification within the initial period itself; which was not been challenged. The challenge was to a proviso introduced subsequently providing a further period for attaining the qualification. That proviso, relaxed the rigor of the earlier requirement and if interfered with, would only result in persons who obtained the training qualification after the initial five years also being terminated. 

The appeals which were tagged along with the writ petitions, or rather vice versa, wee from the judgment of a learned Single Judge which considered a batch of writ petitions in which the teachers, who were sent out of employment for having not acquired the training qualification challenged their termination. 

The Chief Justice led bench desisted from looking at the individual facts since the interpretation of Section 23 and the second proviso introduced later, would bring a quietus to the issues raised and this would have to be applied across the board in considering the right of continuance as claimed by the individual petitioners/appellants. 

The petitioners pointed out the injustice in terminating teachers who had been appointed after a selection process and continued for long. They argued that many of the appointees were not provided with leave and an opportunity to acquire the required qualification. The State also did not have adequate training institutions to carry out the teachers training course and with the meager facilities, the time provided was grossly insufficient. It was submitted that the Single Judge found that there were different categories, whose training was in different stages and they should have been allowed to complete it. There were teachers who failed in some subjects in the duration of the course, but the institutes provide them with two or three supplementary chances to again appear in the exams. Then, the National Institute of Open Schools (NIOS, for short) had a minimum eligibility criterion of 50% for the intermediate exams, which was the essential basic qualification; later waived and relaxed. It is noteworthy that there are teachers appointed on compassionate grounds who cannot be terminated at all. It was submitted the Single Judge erred in so far as holding that even teachers who qualified later to the time provided or in whose cases the certificates were not issued, to be treated as fresh appointments from their date of qualification or issuance of certificate. This erased the entire service put in by them of long years. It was prayed that this Court extend the time for acquiring the qualification since the State Government is not averse to the continuance of the teachers. 

The Court recorded the 7 category classification of teachers by the Single Judge:  

(1) Teachers who opted for training after March 31, 2019, 

(2) Teachers who applied for training and registered with NIOS but did not qualify as on March 31, 2019; 

(3) Teachers who completed training but no certificate was issued till March 31, 2019, 

(4) Teachers who completed training but results not declared as on March 31, 2019, 

(5) Teachers who were Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) qualified but who could not
carry out the bridge course of 6 months, 

(6) Teachers who completed training but results withheld and 

(7) Teachers/persons disqualified from acquiring the qualification under the NIOS for reason of their
having not obtained 50% in the intermediate examination; which was the basic requirement as per the NIOS. 

It noted the date spoken of as March 31, 2019, is the date on which the Single Judge deemed the hiatus of 5 years plus the extended period of another 4 years, concluded; the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE) having come into force on April 1, 2010.

The Chief Justice bench underlined that the judgement by Single Judge considered the categories separately and at times together. 

A Full Bench of High Court was constituted with three Judges by virtue of Order No.10 dated September 18, 2023 in the Letters Patent Appeals. The matter was referred to a larger Bench noticing the controversy as to the acquisition of diploma in elementary education; the minimum qualification for appointment of teachers in the primary schools as prescribed by the NCTE, having been answered by a Division Bench
approving the impugned judgment. The Division Bench of the High Court before whom the appeals and the writ petitions were posted found that a co-ordinate bench had dismissed one of the appeals from the common judgment of the Single Judge in L.P.A. No.744 of 2022. Therein, the petitioners were Panchayat teachers appointed in the year 2017 long after the relaxation, provided as per the first proviso to Section 23(2), expired. Though, various categories of teachers as classified by the learned Single Judge, were the appellants, it was opined that to have a quietus to the issue and also in the interest of judicial discipline, the matter be referred to a larger bench. 

The three Judge Bench was constituted and on November 28, 2023, it was felt that there should be more clarity in the counter affidavit filed by the State, which did not have the details of the training program as also the opportunities given to the teachers for the purpose of appearing in the qualifying examinations. While directing the State to ensure that such a counter affidavit is placed on record, it was also directed that the future appointments made would be subject to the result of the analogous cases. The said order was issued only noticing the fact that the State had brought out Bihar State Schools Teachers (Appointments, Transfer, Disciplinary Proceedings and Service Conditions) Rules 2023, under which a notification was issued for appointment of more than 1,70,000 posts in the primary, secondary and senior secondary schools within the State. There was considerable progress in the said process and some appointments were made. But the process was still going on and there were remaining vacancies; far more than the number of petitioners and appellants herein. In fact, a challenge was made by the existing teachers to the new recruitment and an interim order was prayed for, to restrain the State from proceeding under the Rules of 2023, which was rejected by an interim order dated July  4, 2023 by another Division Bench. The High Court was informed that the interim order was challenged before the Supreme Court without success. 

The 3-judge bench dealt with the challenge against the second proviso as introduced by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017. 

Section 23 reads: “23. Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers. – (1) Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorized by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. (2) Where a State does not have adequate institutions offering courses or training in teacher education, or teachers possessing minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1) are not available in sufficient numbers, the Central Government may, if it deems necessary, by notification, relax the minimum qualifications required for appointment as a teacher, for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in that notification: Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum
qualifications within a period of five years: Provided further that every teacher appointed or in position as on the 31st March, 2015, who does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of four years from the date of commencement of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017.](3) The salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teachers shall be such as
may be prescribed.”

Notably, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 was promulgated on August 9, 2017. The Amendment Act specifically deemed it to have come into force on April 1, 2015.

The Chief Justice bench issued the following directions:-

(1) those who were appointed prior to 01.04.2010 who have acquired the teaching qualification on or before 08.08.2021 would be entitled to be continued;

(2) the results withheld, when declared, if it relates back to the period before 08.08.2021, those persons should be continued in employment; 

(3) the issuance of certificates also would have to concede to the date of publication of results; which if published before 08.08.2021, those persons will be deemed to have been continued;

(4) the unqualified teachers who were appointed during the relaxation period, i.e. between 01.04.2010 and 31.03.2015 will also be deemed to have been continued, if they have acquired the teachers training qualification; the minimum qualification, on or before 08.08.2021.

(5) The persons, who were appointed after 31.03.2015, if are unqualified will have to be terminated even if, they have acquired the qualification within 08.08.2021; since their appointment itself is invalid. There could not have been any unqualified persons appointed after 31.03.2015.

(6) Those who were in place as teachers on 01.04.2010 and then on 31.03.2015, if not acquired the qualification before 08.08.2021 will stand terminated. 

The Court observed: "We find that L.P.A. No.744 of 2022 is correctly decided since it was filed by unqualified teachers appointed after 31.03.2015, whose appointments, at the inception, were bad for violating Section 23(1) of the RTE Act. On the above interpretation and reasoning the writ petitions, in so far as the challenge to Section 23, are dismissed and the L.P.As are partly allowed subject to the above directions; on the basis of which individual cases are to be considered by the State Government. Any teacher coming within the ambit of the first and second proviso to Section 23 can approach the State Government with individual representations, which will be considered in the light of our directions herein above. We specify individual representations since we have been shown a tendency to file enmasse representations on behalf of a group of persons, to enable a motion of contempt before this Court to again agitate the causes already decided. The claims raised by individuals should be based on the acquisition of qualification, which  revolves around individual facts." The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Vinod Chandran.