In Manoj Prasad vs. The State Election Commission (Panchayat), Patna through the State Election Commissioner & Ors (2026). Justices Sudhir Singh and Shailendra Singh delivered a 14-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"18....this Court is of the considered view that the appellant, having taken inconsistent stand regarding his caste status, cannot be permitted to derive benefit therefrom. The claim advanced by the appellant is therefore, wholly unsustainable in the eyes of law. 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge call for no interference. 20. The present intra court appeal is, accordingly, dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Singh.
The intra court appeal was preferred against the 47-page long judgment dated August 9, 2023 passed in Manoj Prasad vs. The State Election Commission (Panchayat), Patna through the State Election Commissioner & Ors (2026), whereby Justice Rajiv Roy, the Single judge had dismissed the writ petition. The appellant, Manoj Prasad was Mukhiya, Gram Panchayat Raj, Bagahi Baghambarpur, Bairiya, West Champaran at Bettiah.
The limited issue which arose for consideration was as to whether the judgment and order dated August 9, 2023 passed by Justice Roy, the Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, warrants interference by the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction.
The appellant was elected as a Mukhiya in the year 2021 on the seat which was reserved for extremely backward class candidates. Thereafter Respondent No. 4 lodged a complaint under Section 136(2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 seeking his disqualification on the ground that he does not belong to the Extremely Backward Class. The said complaint was registered as Case No. 72 of 2021, and upon notice, the appellant appeared and filed his written statement disputing the allegations and asserting that the documents relied upon by the complainant were fabricated. Upon consideration, the State Election Commission referred the issue of caste status to the Caste Scrutiny Committee vide order dated July 15, 2022. Being aggrieved by the order of reference dated July 15, 2022, the appellant preferred the writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 14258 of 2022 before the High Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the State Election Commission to make such reference. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Caste Scrutiny Committee proceeded with the matter and, upon enquiry, returned a finding vide order dated January 12, 2023 declaring the appellant to be of Koeri (Kushwaha) caste. The appellant, thereafter, also challenged the said order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee in the pending writ proceedings; however, the writ petition ultimately came to be dismissed by the Single Judge vide judgment and order dated August 9, 2023, giving rise to the present intra-court appeal.
The Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, made the following observations: "75. This Court has gone through the facts of the case as also the submissions put forward by the rival parties and finds force in the averments made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 4, the State as also the Election Commission. As per the documents on record, the ‘Dangi’ caste was incorporated as a separate caste in the year 1995 and has not been carved out from Kushwaha/Koeri as pointed out by Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 4 and is also reflected from the Gazette notification. As per the letter no. 673 dated March 8, 2011 issued by ‘the GAD’, the land revenue record is the foremost document for the issuance of caste certificate and only in its absence, the other documents have to be relied upon."
In the case of the petitioner, the admitted fact is that his ancestor, Bhagelu Mahato has been shown in the ‘Khatiyan’ as ‘Koeri’ (Khushwaha). Even the petitioner purchased the land in 2018 showing himself to be of ‘Koeri’ caste. As per the findings of the Caste Scrutiny Committee; one Santosh Kumar, son of Nandlal Prasad of village Baghambarpur, P.O. Patjirwa, Shree Nagar, West Champaran who was a Government Teacher in Bhagambarpur Panchayat and own cousin of petitioner was having a ‘Koeri’ caste certificate. In view of such unimpeachable evidences before the Caste Scrutiny Committee which included the report submitted by ‘the CID’ showing the petitioner to be a ‘Koeri’ (Khushwaha) caste; it rightly came to the finding communicated on January 12, 2023 which cannot be faulted upon.
Justice Singh observed that the petitioner cannot be allowed to change colours like the Chameleons inasmuch as he cannot become a ‘Koeri’ (under OBC category) to purchase a land in 2018 and immediately thereafter turn into a ‘Dangi’ (under EBC category) to contest 2021 election from an Extremely Backward Class seat.”
Justice Singh noted that the Single Judge undertook a detailed examination of the documentary evidence and has rightly recorded that the foundational records, particularly the land revenue record (khatiyan), reflect the caste of the appellant’s ancestor as Koeri (Kushwaha). Such revenue records, being contemporaneous and maintained in the ordinary course of official business, carry a presumption of correctness and constitute primary evidence for determination of caste status. This Court, upon independent scrutiny, finds no reason to discard the evidentiary value of such records. It was an admitted position that the appellant himself, in the year 2018, while entering into a land transaction, declared his caste as Koeri. This conduct of the appellant, reflected in an official and voluntary declaration, assumes considerable significance. The appellant was unable to provide a justification as to how he declared his caste as Koeri in the document, and later declared his caste as Dangi for purposes of election. The Division Bench underlined that the Single Judge rightly took note of this aspect and drew an adverse inference with regard to the consistency and credibility of the appellant’s claim. A person cannot be allowed to oscillate between two caste identities claiming to be Koeri for one purpose and Dangi for another depending upon the benefit sought to be derived. Such conduct not only undermines the sanctity of the system of reservation but also strikes at the root of fairness in public administration.
Justice Singh observed that "the Caste Scrutiny Committee has taken into account all relevant materials, including the revenue records, the appellant’s own declarations, and the enquiry report submitted by the competent authority, and has thereafter arrived at a categorical finding that the appellant belongs to Koeri (Kushwaha) caste. Therefore, the plea taken by the appellant that the State Election Commission cannot adjudicate the issue relating to caste in view of the observations made by Full Bench decision rendered in case of Rajini Kumari (supra) is misconceived, because here the State Election Commission has not determined the caste of the appellant, rather it has forwarded the matter before the competent Caste Scrutiny Committee.
He relied on the decision of the Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105, wherein, it was held that a person who secures benefits on the basis of a false or doubtful caste claim cannot be permitted to retain such benefits. The relevant part of the order reads: "15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. When it was found by the Scrutiny Committee that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste community, then the very basis of his appointment was taken away. His appointment was no appointment in the eye of the law. He cannot claim a right to the post as he had usurped the post meant for a reserved candidate by playing a fraud and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under Article 311 of the Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate he cannot be considered to be a person who holds a post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have gone to a member of the Scheduled Castes. In view of the finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld up to this Court, he has disqualified himself to hold the post. The appointment was void from its inception. It cannot be said that the said void appointment would enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. As the appellant had obtained the appointment by playing a fraud, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit, such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all."
The judgement of the Division Bench referred to the decision of the High Court's Division Bench in Ishwar Dayal Sah v. State of Bihar [1987 Lab IC 390 : 1987 BBCJ 48 (Pat)], wherein, it examined the point as to whether a person who obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. In the case the employee had obtained appointment by producing a caste certificate that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community which later on was found to be false. His appointment was cancelled. It was contended by the employee that the cancellation of his appointment amounted to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution and was therefore void. It was contended that he could not be terminated from service without holding departmental inquiry as provided under the Rules. Dealing with the above contention, the High Court held that if the very appointment to the civil post is vitiated by fraud, forgery or crime or illegality, it would necessarily follow that no constitutional rights under Article 311 of the Constitution can possibly flow. It was held:(Lab IC pp. 394-95, para 12) If the very appointment to civil post is vitiated by fraud, forgery or crime or illegality, it would necessarily follow that no constitutional rights under Article 311 can possibly flow from such a tainted force. In such a situation, the question is whether the person concerned is at all a civil servant of the Union or the State and if he is not validly so, then the issue remains outside the purview of Article 311. If the very entry or the crossing of the threshold into the arena of the civil service of the State or the Union is put in issue and the door is barred against him, the cloak of protection under Article 311 is not attracted.”
The principle that a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent stands, has been reiterated in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, the relevant part of the said order reads: “Approbate and reprobate 26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.” Justice Singh applied this settled principle in order to dismiss it and endorsed the judgement by Justice Roy.
The other four respondents were: State Election Commissioner, Secretary, State Election Commission (Panchayat ), Patna, Santosh Kumar, West Champaran at Bettiah and State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar.
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