Traffic Manager on contract, the petitioner entitled to all consequential benefits, termination order unsustainable in law: Justice Dr Anshuman

In Santosh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman delivered a 11-page long judgement dated April 30, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order is stigmatic in nature and has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits, subject to the outcome of any fresh decision taken by the respondents after due process." 

The five other respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar, Transport Commissioner, Transport Department, Government of Bihar, Bihar State Road Corporation, Patna through its Managing Director, Phulwarisharif, Patna, Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna and Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transportation, Gaya. 

The writ petition has been filed for quashing Letter No. 570 dated 19.02.2024 issued by Respondent No. 5, namely the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, whereby the contractual engagement of the petitioner was terminated on the ground of alleged unauthorized absence from duty with effect from December 15, 2023. The petitioner had prayed for a direction upon the respondent authorities to reinstate him on his post, as he remained willing and available to discharge his duties during the subsistence of the contractual period. The petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Traffic Manager on a contractual basis for a period of one year issued by the Administration (Chief), Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna, pursuant to an advertisement issued by the Corporation. Prior thereto, an offer of appointment was issued by letter dated October 23, 2018, requiring the petitioner to execute a bond and submit an acceptance letter. The petitioner duly complied with the said requirements and joined his duties, which was formally accepted by Memo dated November 16, 2018. It was submitted that the petitioner continuously discharged his duties satisfactorily and no complaint was ever made against him. His contractual engagement was extended from time to time through various orders. Subsequently, by letter dated September 1, 2021, he was transferred from the post of Depot Superintendent to the Head Office, Patna. Thereafter, he was again transferred to Aurangabad Depot, where he assumed charge as Depot Superintendent and duly joined on June 17, 2022. During his posting at Aurangabad, the petitioner repeatedly requested the Regional Manager, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Gaya, through letters dated 16.05.2023, 18.06.2023, 01.07.2023, 29.08.2023, and 16.11.2023, to conduct physical verification of the store and accounts, apprehending possible manipulation by certain staff members. However, no such verification was undertaken despite repeated requests. It was further submitted that the petitioner sustained a fracture in his leg and, accordingly, submitted a leave application dated 10.10.2023 seeking leave from 12.10.2023 to 18.10.2023. Subsequently, vide letter dated 14.12.2023, the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, BSRTC, Patna directed all Regional Managers/Assistant Regional Managers (Accounts) to conduct physical verification of stores and accounts twice a month and submit reports, warning of strict administrative action in case of irregularities. Pursuant thereto, the Regional Manager, BSRTC, Gaya conducted verification at Aurangabad Depot and alleged financial irregularities amounting to Rs. 4,00,140/-. Consequently, an FIR bearing Town P.S. Case No. 896 of 2023 dated 15.12.2023 was lodged against the petitioner and one Rajeev Raj, an outsourced cashier.

The senior counsel submitted that the allegations were wholly misconceived. It was contended that the responsibility for maintaining cash, making entries in the account register, and depositing cash in the bank lies solely with the cashier, and not with the Depot Superintendent. The petitioner had no role in the alleged misappropriation. It was further submitted that by letter ated 15.12.2023, the petitioner was directed to stop work at Aurangabad Depot during the pendency of the enquiry and remain present at the headquarters. Thus, the allegation of unauthorized absence from 15.12.2023 is factually incorrect, as the petitioner was complying with official directions. However, without conducting any enquiry and without issuing any show cause notice, the respondent authority abruptly terminated the petitioner’s contract vide Memo dated 19.02.2024 on the ground of absence. It was submitted that such termination is arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, and was serious civil consequences. The petitioner’s contractual tenure was valid up to 5.05.2024, and at the time of termination, the contract was still subsisting. 

The senior counsel further submitted that the petitioner had already been granted bail by the High Court vide order dated 13.05.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 24489 of 2024, with a direction to deposit Rs. 2,00,000/- in installments, which has been duly complied with. In such a backdrop, it was submitted that the impugned order was liable to be set aside, and the petitioner deserved to be reinstated to the post of Traffic Manager, as the post was still vacant.

To substantiate his submissions, senior counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Swati Pridarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2024) 19 SCC 128. He relied upon the judgment rendered in Bhola Nath vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95, wherein the Supreme Court held that the State, being a “model employer”, cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by continuing them on a purely contractual basis for an indefinite period so as to evade its obligations of regular employment. It was also held that abrupt discontinuation of long-serving employees merely on the ground of contractual nomenclature, and that too without a reasoned or speaking order, was manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

Justice Dr Anshuman observed that the impugned order was "passed without adherence to the principles of natural justice, is unsustainable in law."

Anticipatory bail application of accused in judicial custody in different offence is maintainable under Cr.P.C.

Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra has "decided the issue of maintainability of an anticipatory bail application filed at the instance of an accused who is already in judicial custody in a different offence and have reached the conclusion that such an application is maintainable under the scheme of the CrPC" on  September 9, 2024 in Dhanraj Aswani Vs. Amar S. Mulchandani. It has directed the Court's Registry to "forward one copy each of this judgment to all the High Courts across the country" after examining the views of different High Courts on the issue in question. The judgement was authored by Justice Pardiwala. 

The Court observed: "Under Section 438 of the CrPC, the pre-condition for a person to apply for pre-arrest bail is a “reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence”. Therefore, the only pre-condition for exercising the said right is the apprehension of the accused that he is likely to be arrested. In view of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, custody in one case does not have the effect of taking away the apprehension of arrest in a different case."

The Court analyzed the question as to "whether a person, while in custody for a particular offence, can have a 'reason to believe' that he may be arrested in relation to some other non-bailable offence?" 

The Court recalled Court's decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, [1980] 3 SCR 383, (1980) 2 SCC 565 by a Constitution Bench. It has been held that "An accused is entitled to seek anticipatory bail in connection with an offence so long as he is not arrested in relation to that offence. Once he is arrested, the only remedy available to him is to apply for regular bail either under Section 437 or Section 439 of the CrPC, as the case may be." It observed that "There is no express or implied restriction in the CrPC or in any other statute that prohibits the Court of Session or the High Court from entertaining and deciding an anticipatory bail application in relation to an offence, while the applicant is in custody in relation to a different offence. No restriction can be read into Section 438 of the CrPC to preclude an accused from applying for anticipatory bail in relation to an offence while he is in custody in a different offence, as that would be against the purport of the provision and the intent of the legislature. The only restriction on the power of the court to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC is the one prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 438 of the CrPC, and in other statutes like the Act, 1989, etc."

The Court also observed that "While a person already in custody in connection with a particular offence apprehends arrest in a different offence, then, the subsequent offence is a separate offence for all practical purposes. This would necessarily imply that all rights conferred by the statute on the accused as well as the investigating agency in relation to the subsequent offence are independently protected."

It has held that "The investigating agency, if it deems necessary for the purpose of interrogation/investigation in an offence, can seek remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with a previous offence so long as no order granting anticipatory bail has been passed in relation to the subsequent offence. However, if an order granting anticipatory bail in relation to the subsequent offence is obtained by the accused, it shall no longer be open to the investigating agency to seek remand of the accused in relation to the subsequent offence. Similarly, if an order of police remand is passed before the accused is able to obtain anticipatory bail, it would thereafter not be open to the accused to seek anticipatory bail and the only option available to him would be to seek regular bail."

The Court underlined the importance of the rights conferred under the procedural laws as noted by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602. It was observed therein that no man can be denied of his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law, and not in derogation of it. The Court held that a denial of equal protection of laws, by being singled out for a special procedure not provided under the law, caused denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A few relevant observations are: “41. In the aforesaid view of the matter and the principle reiterated, it is manifest that the appellant has not been ordered to be tried by a procedure mandated by law, but by a procedure which was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. That is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution also, as is evident from the observations of the Seven Judges Bench judgment in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [(1952) 1 SCC 1: AIR 1952 SC 75 : 1952 SCR 284 : 1952 Cri LJ 510 where the Court found that even for a criminal who was alleged to have committed an offence, a special trial would be per se illegal because it will deprive the accused of his substantial and valuable privileges of defence which, others similarly charged, were able to claim. 

The Court had stated : "We proclaim and pronounce that no man is above the law, but at the same time reiterate and declare that no man can be denied his rights under the Constitution and the laws. He has a right to be dealt with in accordance with the law and not in derogation of it. This Court, in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial gave directions on 16-2-1984 as mentioned hereinbefore without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the 1952 Act and that being the only procedure established by law, there can be no deviation from the terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That is the only procedure under which it should have been guided. By reason of giving the directions on 16-2-1984 this Court had also unintentionally caused the appellant the denial of rights under Article 14 of the Constitution by denying him the equal protection of law by being singled out for a special procedure not provided for by law. […]”

It  drew on the decision of  a Constitution Bench of the Court in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in (1952) 1 SCC 1, wherein it was held that procedural law confers very valuable rights on a person, and their protection must be as much the object of a Court’s solicitude as those conferred under the substantive law. Few pertinent observations are: “27. The argument that changes in procedural law are not material and cannot be said to deny equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws so long as the substantive law remains unchanged or that only the fundamental rights referred to in Articles 20 to 22 should be safeguarded is, on the face of it, unsound. The right to equality postulated by Article 14 is as much a fundamental right as any other fundamental right dealt with in Part III of the Constitution. Procedural law may and does confer very valuable rights on a person, and their protection must be as much the object of a court's solicitude as those conferred under substantive law.” 

The Court endorsed the view that the right of an accused to protect his personal liberty within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India with the aid of the provision of anticipatory bail as enshrined under Section 438 of the CrPC cannot be defeated or thwarted without a valid procedure established by law. Such procedure should also pass the test of fairness, reasonableness and manifest non-arbitrariness on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.