Justice Dr. Anshuman sets aside orders by Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation

In Manish Kumar vs.The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman delivered a 21-page long judgement dated May 14, 2026, wherein, he concluded: "20. In the present case, although the disagreement note refers to alleged violations of Letter Nos. 11067 dated 12.12.2013, 435 dated 13.01.2014, 7714 dated 06.12.2013, and 1162 dated 26.12.2013, it transpires that all those documents had already been duly considered by the Inquiry Officer, as reflected in paragraph 9 of the inquiry report. However, the Disciplinary Authority has failed to assign any specific or cogent reason as to why it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. This Court has also examined the deed of agreement and deed of pledge referred to in Letter No. 435 dated 13.01.2014 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) and finds that the conclusions drawn by the Inquiry Officer are in accordance with law. In the absence of any specific indication of violation in the disagreement note, this Court holds that the disagreement memo dated 11.03.2025 is legally unsustainable and suffers from material defects as well as in gross violation of Rule 18 of the CCA Rules, 2005." 

The other three respondents were: 2. Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, 3. The Under Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar, and  4. Managing Director, Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation (BSFCSC).  

The judgement reads:"....upon perusal of the order of punishment contained in Memo No. 10383 dated 06.06.2025, it is evident that the reply submitted by the petitioner to the second show-cause notice has not been duly considered. A mere statement that the reply has been “analysed” by a quasi-judicial authority, without any discussion or reasoning, does not satisfy the requirement of law. Accordingly, the said order of punishment is held to be bad in law and liable to be set aside."

Justice Dr. Anshuman observed: "22. Since the disagreement memo itself is vitiated in law, and the order of punishment is based upon such defective disagreement, the consequential order passed by the Reviewing Authority also cannot be sustained, as it is based on proceedings conducted in violation of Rule 18(4) of the CCA Rules, 2005. Accordingly, both the review order contained in Memo No. 12577 dated 09.07.2025 and the original order of punishment contained in Memo No. 10383 dated 06.06.2025 are hereby set aside." 

The writ petition was filed for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the Resolution contained in Memo No. 10383 dated 06.06.2025, issued under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna, whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of censure (pertaining to the allegation year 2013–14) along with stoppage of one annual increment of salary with non-cumulative effect. The petitioner further prays for quashing of the Resolution contained in Memo No. 12577 dated 09.07.2025, issued under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna, whereby and whereunder the review petition preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. The petitioner sought a direction upon the respondent authorities to grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner with effect from the due date, including promotion, to which the petitioner is legally entitled. The petitioner had prayed for issuance of any other appropriate writ(s), order(s), or direction(s) as the Hig Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

From a plain reading of these provisions, it was evident that the Disciplinary Authority was under an obligation to assign reasons for disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside order by Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Bihar for violating Rule 17, CCA Rules

In Anand Swarup vs. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 15-page long judgment dated April 21, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... in the opinion of the Court, this is a case of no evidence against the petitioner as also in categorical violation of the provisions as contained in Rule 17 of the CCA Rules. 34. Thus in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, neither the order of dismissal contained in memo no.4295 dated 18.3.2016 issued under the signature of the Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar nor the order rejecting the review contained in memo no.10532 dated 1.8.2016 issued under the signature of the Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar are sustainable and are both quashed and set aside. 35. The petitioner is held entitled for all consequential benefits including the arrears of salary for the period of suspension as also for the period of dismissal. 66. The writ application is allowed.". 

Rule 17 of Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005 is as follows: "17. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(1)No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007] of Rule 14 shall be made without holding an inquiry, as far as may be, in the manner provided in these Rules.
(2)Wherever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring about the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a government servant, he may himself inquire into it, or appoint under these Rules an authority to inquire about the truth thereof.Explanation. - Where the disciplinary authority himself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule (20) and in sub-rule (22) of this Rule to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a reference to the disciplinary authority.
(3)Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under this Rule, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i)the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article of charge;
(ii)a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a)a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government Servant;
(b)a list of such document by which, and a list of such witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
(4)The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
(5) (a)On receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may himself inquire into such of the articles of charge which are not admitted, or, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule, an inquiry authority for the purpose he may do so and where all the articles of charges have been admitted by the Government Servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record his findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall take action in the manner laid down in Rule 18.
(b)If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government Servant, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge or may, if it thinks necessary to appoint, under sub-rule (2) of this Rule an inquiry authority for the purpose, it may do so.
(c)Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry about such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a government servant or a legal practitioner to be known as the "Presenting officer' to present on his behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.
(6)The disciplinary authority shall, where it is not the inquiring authority, forward the following records to the inquiring authority-
(i)a copy of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(ii)a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the government servant:
(iii)a copy of the statement of witnesses, if any, specified in sub-rule (3) of this Rule.
(iv)evidence proving the delivery of the documents specified to in sub-Rule (3) to the Government Servant; and
(v) a copy of the order appointing the "Presenting officer".
(7)The Government Servant shall appear in person before the inquiring authority on such day and at such time within ten working days from the date of receipt by him of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, as the inquiring authority may, by a notice in writing, specify in this behalf or within such further time, not exceeding ten days, as may be specified by the inquiring authority.
(8) (a)The Government Servant may take the assistance of other Government Servant posted in any office, either at his headquarter or at the place where the inquiry is to be held, to present the case on his behalf:
Provided that he may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits:Provided also that the Government Servant may take the assistance of any other Government Servant posted at any other station, if the inquiring authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing so permits:Provided further that the Government Servant shall not take the assistance of any such other Government Servant who has three pending disciplinary cases on hand in which he has to give assistance.
(b)The Government Servant may take the assistance of a retired government servant to present the case on his behalf, subject to such conditions as may be specified by the Government from time to time by general or special order in this behalf.
(9)If the Government Servant, who has not admitted any of the articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has not submitted any written statement of defence, appears before the inquiring authority, such authority shall ask him whether he is guilty or has to say anything for his defence and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the inquiring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the Government Servant thereon.
(10)The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the Government Servant pleads guilty.
(11)The inquiring authority shall, if the Government Servant fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the Presenting Officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after recording an order that the Government Servant may, for the purpose of preparing his defence,-
(i)inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow, the documents specified in the list in sub-rule (3);
(ii)submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf;
Note:-If the Government Servant applies in writing for the supply of copies of the statements of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (3), the inquiring authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible.
(iii)give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time as the inquiring authority may allow for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Government but not mentioned in the list specified in sub-rule (3) of this Rule:
Provided that the Government Servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government.
(12)The inquiring authority shall, on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with a requisition for the production of the document by such date as may be specified in such requisition:Provided that the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisition such of the documents as are, in its opinion, not relevant to the case.
(13)On receipt of the requisition specified in sub-rule (12) of this Rule, every authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents shall produce the same before the inquiring authority:Provided that if the authority, having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents, is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the production of all or any of such documents will be against public interest or security of the State, he shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly and the inquiring authority shall, on being so informed, communicate the information to the Government Servant and withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or discovery of such documents.
(14)On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the Government Servant. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses, as it thinks fit.
(15)If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the inquiring authority may, in his discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Government Servant or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re-examine any witness and in such case the Government Servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The inquiring authority shall give the Government Servant an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring authority may also allow the Government Servant to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interests of justice:Provided that new evidence shall not be permitted or called for or any witness shall not be recalled to supplement the evidence. Such evidence may be called for if there is any inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence, produced originally.
(16)When the case for the disciplinary authority is closed, the Government Servant shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Government Servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed.
(17)The evidence on behalf of the Government Servant shall then be produced. The Government Servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Government Servant shall then be examined and they shall be liable to examination, cross-examination and, re-examination by the inquiring authority according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the disciplinary authority.
(18)The inquiring authority may, after the Government Servant closes his case, and shall, if the Government Servant has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Government Servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.
(19)The inquiring authority may, after the completion of the production of evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any, appointed and the Government Servant, or permit them to file written briefs of their respective case, if they so desire.
(20)If the Government Servant to whom a copy of the articles of charge has been delivered, does not submit the written statement of defence on or before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in person before the inquiring authority or otherwise fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Rule, the inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex-parte.
(21) (a)Where a disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (v) of Rule 14 [but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14], has himself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the article of any charge and that authority having regard to his own findings or having regard to its decision on any of the findings of any inquiring authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14 should be imposed on the government servant, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such disciplinary authority as is competent to impose the penalties mentioned in clause [(vi) to (xi)] [Substituted by Notification No. 3/M-166/2006-Ka-2797, dated 20.8.2007.] of Rule 14.
(b)The disciplinary authority to which the records are so forwarded may act on the evidence on the records or may, if he is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interests of justice, recall the witnesses and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witnesses and may impose on the Government Servant such penalties as it may deem fit in accordance with these Rules.
(22) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has and which exercises, such jurisdiction the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the basis of evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself:Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and reexamine any such witnesses as hereinbefore provided.
(23) (i)After the conclusion of the inquiry, a record shall be prepared and it shall contain:-
(a)the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
(b)the defence of the Government Servant in respect of each article of charge.
(c)an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge,
(d)the findings on each article of charge and the reasons thereof.
Explanation. - If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceedings of the inquiry may establish any article of charge different from the original articles of the charge, he may record his findings on such article of charge:Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the Government Servant has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge.
(ii)The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority, shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry which shall include-
(a)the report prepared by it under clause (i) of this sub rule;
(b)the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Government Servant;
(c)the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry;
(d)written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer or the Government Servant or both during the course of the inquiry; and
(e)the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry."

The respondents in the Anand Swarup case had come out with the order of punishment dated March 18, 2016 under the signature of the Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar dismissing the petitioner from service.

10. The review preferred by the petitioner was rejected by order dated 1.8.2016 passed by the Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar.

11. It is against the order of dismissal dated 18.3.2016 and the order rejecting the review application on 1.8.2016 that the petitioner has preferred the instant writ application. The petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the enquiry report dated 16.7.2015 and reinstating him in service with all back wages.

It was submitted by Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner being an Officer of the Bihar Administrative Service was appointed by the

Governor of Bihar. The memo of charge as came to be issued by the Under Secretary of the Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, Bihar. 

The other four respondents were: Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Government. of Bihar,Additional Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, Special Secretary, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar and Commissioner of Departmental Enquiry, Bihar. 

The petitioner had prayed for quashing of the resolution contained in memo no. 4295 dated 18.3.2016 whereby and where under the disciplinary authority inflicted punishment of dismissal from service and no payment during the period of suspension except subsistence. 

Justice Sarthy relied on Supreme Court's judgement in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank; (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein, it held :-“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”

The petitioner, was a Block Development Officer, had no role to play in the appointment of a Panchayat Shikshak and was acquitted in the criminal case in the trial Court.

A perusal of the order dated March 18, 2016 inflicting the punishment of dismissal from service of the petitioner showed that additional charges were levelled against him that instead of acting on the request for guidelines received from the panchayat office, in conspiracy with the staff of the panchayat, he got the matter with respect to appointment of the complainant sent to the Block and kept it pending there.

The disciplinary authority stated that when the petitioner did not take any positive action in getting the matter sent back to the panchayat and left it pending in the Block Office, by remaining a silent spectator, even though he did not take any bribe himself, he was in league with them.  The conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the order of punishment reveals that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved against him but the petitioner was punished for his inaction which was not part of the charge. 

The order passed in review on August 1, 2016 did not deal with nor answers the submissions raised by counsel for the petitioner. The authority considering the review filed by the petitioner was of the opinion that the petitioner should have acted on his junior officers i.e., the Block Education Extension Officer who was demanding bribe from the complainant. Justice Sarthy recorded that "It may be reiterated that this was not the charge in the memo of charge in the instant departmental proceeding."

Justice Sarthy referred to the judgment of High Court's Division Bench in Devendra Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (judgment dated October 19, 2023 passed in LPA no.1302 of 2017). He observed:"...none of the charges against the petitioner were proved as required in law and the Conducting Officer erred in coming to the conclusion that charge no.2 was proved."

Justice Ritesh Kumar sets aside orders by Labour Resources Department, restores petitioner's pension to 100%, directs refund of 20% deducted pension

In Sudhanshu Shekhar Tripathi vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Ors. (2026), Justice Ritesh Kumar delivered a 37-page long judgment dated April 9, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"28. The respondent authorities are directed tor restore the pension of the petitioner to 100% and to refund/return the amount to the tune of 20%, which has been deducted from the pension of the petitioner till date, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the order. The respondent authorities are further directed to make payment of the entire 100% of the pension/post-retiral dues which have not been paid to the petitioner on account of pendency of the departmental proceeding, within the period aforementioned. If the entire exercise will not be completed within a period of three months, then the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 6% from the date of filing of the writ petition till the date of its actual payment. 29. The writ petition is allowed with the direction above mentioned."  

The other seven respondents were:  Principal Secretary, Department of Labour Resources, Government of Bihar, Deputy Secretary, Department of Labour Resources, Officer On Special Duty, Department of Labour Resources,  Director of Employment, Directorate of Empolyment and Training Department of Labour Resources, Accountant General (A and E) Bihar, Director of Provident Fund, Finance Department, and District Treasury Officer, Gaya, Bihar. 

The writ petition was filed with prayer calling upon the respondents to show cause why rule nisi in the nature of writ and/or in the nature of writ of certiorari be not issued upon the respondents and the order dated 15.05.2023 passed by the Officer on Special Duty, Department of Labour Resources, Government of Bihar be quashed and or cancelled; further for issuance of writ/order/directions upon the respondent(s) to quash the entire disciplinary proceedings under Memo No.2887 & 2888, both dated 31.10.2017 issued by the respondents upon the petitioner; further issue a writ of or in the nature of writ of mandamus commanding and/or directing the respondents to forthwith release the post-retirement benefits, withheld so far, with interest admissible to the petitioner.

The writ petition was filed because the petitioner having been allocated the Bihar Employment Service, gave his joining as a District Employment Officer on 02.04.1992. He was promoted to the post of Assistant Director of Employment on 02.04.2004 in the pay scale of Rs. 15600-39100/- with Grade Pay of Rs. 6600/-. Subsequently, the petitioner was granted promotion to the post of Deputy Director of Employment and thereafter superannuated from service on 31.10.2017. On 16.10.2017, the petitioner informed the Principal Secretary, Department of Labour Resources,  Government of Bihar, Patna about fake appointments on Class-III and Class-IV posts in the Department of Employment and the need to enquire into the matter. Pursuant to the Letter dated 16.10.2017, an enquiry was conducted and without any basis the department initiated departmental proceeding against the petitioner vide Resolution No. 2887 and 2888, both dated 31.10.2017, but the same was not served upon the petitioner, since on the same day he has superannuated. The said resolutions were not served upon the petitioner, since the same were said to have been sent to the previous place of posting of the petitioner i.e. Gaya Division, Gaya, therefore, the same was returned unserved. However, vide Memo Nos. 3112 and 3114 dated 16.11.2017 issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Labour Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna a decision was taken to convert the departmental proceeding, initiated against the petitioner vide Memo No. 2888 dated 31.10.2017, in the proceeding under Rule, 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rule, 1950. The petitioner was served with all the letters mentioned hereinabove i.e. Resolution Nos. 2887 and 2888 dated 31.10.2017 and Resolution Nos. 3112 and 3114 dated 16.11.2017, through registered post on 22.11.2017. Along with the letters, the charge of  Memo was also annexed, from where the petitioner came to know about the initiation of departmental proceeding against him. Subsequently vide Letter No. 3468 dated 04.12.2017 issued under the signature of the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Labour Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna the petitioner was informed that the entire gratuity has been kept withheld due to the pending enquiry against him and he was also informed that his pension has been reduced by 10%. 

The petitioner's senior counsel submitted that being aggrieved with the decision of the State Government the petitioner preferred C.W.J.C. No. 720 of 2018 before the Hig Court, wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide its order dated 15.01.2018, while directing the respondent authorities to file counter affidavit, stayed further proceeding in the matter. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was finally heard by a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court and vide order dated 05.09.2018, the same was partly allowed by quashing the departmental proceeding in relation to Letter Nos. 2887 and 2890 dated 31.10.2017 and further directed that the proceeding related to Letter Nos. 2887 and 2888 dated 31.10.2017 will continue, subject to the observations made in  the order dated 05.09.2018. The petitioner also filed C.W.J.C. No. 16529 of 2017 and the same was disposed of vide order dated 19.04.2019 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court with a direction to the respondent to release the withheld retiral dues and 90% gratuity amount in favour of the petitioner.

The petitioner's senior counsel submitted that in view of the observations made by the Single Judge vide his order dated 05.09.2018, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 720 of 2018, the Joint Labour Commissioner, Bihar vide Memo No. 2010 dated 08.05.2019 directed the Enquiry Officer to produce the letters/documents mentioned therein, in the enquiry, so that decision can be taken that whether the departmental proceeding under Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rules has been initiated in violation of the provision contained therein or not, but even then no such documents were provided to the petitioner or produced before the authorities concerned. The petitioner filed an appeal before this Court against the order dated 05.09.2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 720 of 2018. The appeal filed by the petitioner was numbered as L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018. 

The petitioner's counsel also submitted that vide Letter dated 23.08.2021 the petitioner again requested the Conducting Officer to provide evidences with regard to proof of service of the charge-sheet upon the petitioner, before his date of retirement i.e. 31.10.2017, but no response was received by the petitioner, then he was constrained to again write a Letter dated 17.09.2021 to the Conducting Officer, wherein the petitioner again asked for the proof/evidence about the claim of serving notice/charge-sheet upon him before the date of retirement. Along with in the letter dated 17.09.2021, the petitioner also requested the Conducting Officer to call certain witnesses for their examination and cross-examination, to prove/disprove the charges against the petitioner, but no such document was ever provided to the petitioner.

The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Enquiry/Conducting Officer vide his Letter No. 354 dated 04.02.2022 proceeded to submit his enquiry report before the disciplinary authority, wherein he came to the conclusion that since the delinquent has not appeared and denied the charges levelled against him, therefore, the Letter No. 1262 dated 27.08.2007 of the District Magistrate, Vaishali, which is the evidence of the charge-sheet, on the basis of the said letter the charges are found to be proved. Subsequently, vide Letter No. 691 dated 24.03.2022 issued under the signature of the Officer on Special duty, Labour Resource Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to submits his reply within fifteen days, that why punishment be not imposed against the petitioner. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted his reply on 07.04.2022, wherein he took a defense that initiation of the departmental proceeding itself was in complete violation of the provisions contained in Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rule, 1950 and other statutory Rules, as well as in violation of the principles of natural justice, in violation of Rule, 17 (3) and 17 (6) (iv) of the Bihar CCA Rule of 2005. The enquiry report was submitted without appreciation of any evidence. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that a second supplementary counter affidavit was filed by the respondent-State on 13.08.2022 in LPA No. 1553 of 2018, filed by the petitioner, wherein the extract of the dispatch register was produced, which goes to show that the resolution letter (along with charge Memo Nos. 2887 and 2888) dated 31.10.2017 were dispatched for the first time through registered on 02.11.2017 i.e. after the retirement of the petitioner. The  appeal preferred by the petitioner i.e. L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018 was disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 31.08.2022 with a direction to the State-respondent to issue show cause notice to the petitioner in furnishing necessary materials with the Memo dated 31.10.2017 has been served upon the petitioner and on receipt of such notice and material, the petitioner was directed to file his explanation along with material information, if any and thereafter the disciplinary authority was directed to analyze the material fact and explanation to be submitted by the petitioner and take a decision within a period three months from the date of receipt of the order. The petitioner was directed to co-operate in deciding the issue with the disciplinary authority. It was further directed that till the decision is taken by the disciplinary authority, further action pursuant to the Memo dated 31.10.2017 shall be kept in abeyance, until decision is taken by the disciplinary authority.

Being aggrieved with the judgment dated 31.08.2022 passed in L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018, the petitioner preferred SLP (Civil) No. 20131 of 2022. In the meantime the respondent-State, in compliance of order dated 31.08.2022 passed in L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018, issued fresh show cause  notice to the petitioner, without providing any acknowledgment or any certificate mandated under Section 65 (B) of the Indian Evidence Act and in violation of the directions given by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018. In compliance thereof the petitioner filed his reply on 25.11.2022 to the fresh show cause notice dated 10.11.2022, wherein he explained that the proceeding initiated vide Memo Nos. 2887 and 2888 dated 31.10.2017 i.e. on the date of his retirement, are illegal, invalid and ultra virus, as the respondent authorities have failed to prove the service of the said notice/charge Memo upon the petitioner, during his service period and nor did they submit acknowledgment or certificate required under Section 65 (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, to make any electronic document admissible as evidence. The SLP preferred by the petitioner was disposed of on 06.12.2022 by the Supreme Court of India, in view of the fresh show cause notice issued by the State-respondent, with a direction to the petitioner to participate in the proceeding before the disciplinary authority and it was observed that it goes without saying that all the defences which may be available to the petitioner are kept open to be considered by the disciplinary authority in accordance with law and on its own merits.

The senior counsel of the petitioner relied on Supreme Court's decisions in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772, Roop Singh Negi vs. The Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors. reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1 and Mohd. Idrish Ansari vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR (1995) SC 1853.  

Justice Kumar observed:"...this Court finds that the department had not produced any witness in the enquiry, even though the charges levelled against the petitioner, were denied by him. Therefore, the enquiry itself stood vitiated. This fact finds support from a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case bearing civil Appeal no. 4130 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2900 of (Jai Prakash Saini Vs. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. & Ors).....". 

The Supreme Court held as follows:- “17. From the decisions of this Court in Sur Enamel (supra) and Kharak Singh (supra), followed in Chamoli District Cooperative (supra), which deals with similar service rules as are applicable here, it is now settled that unless the charged employee accepts his guilt in clear terms, an enquiry on the charges drawn against him would have to be held. In the enquiry, the employer/department would have to take steps first to lead evidence against the workmen / delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross examine those witnesses. Only thereafter, the workmen / delinquent shall be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and/or submit an explanation about the evidence led against him. Even in a case based solely on documentary evidence, unless the relied upon documents are admitted by the charged employee, a witness would have to be examined to prove those documents and when so examined, the witness would have to be tendered for cross-examination. 18. In the instant case, we find that the department had not produced any witness in the enquiry even though the charges levelled upon the appellant were denied by him. Therefore, in our view, the enquiry stood vitiated. Once the enquiry stood vitiated, the consequential order of punishment/ recovery cannot be sustained. We therefore allow this appeal. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition of the appellant stands allowed to the extent indicated below. The order of dismissal and consequential recovery is set aside. The Federation is, however, at liberty to hold a de novo enquiry, if it so desires, within a period of six months from the date of this order. If the Federation does not hold de novo enquiry as permitted above, the appellant shall be entitled to reinstatement with benefit of continuity in service including arrears of salary after adjusting suspension allowance, if any, paid already. In case the Federation chooses to hold an enquiry, it shall reinstate the appellant and place him under suspension till completion of the enquiry and during this period pay suspension allowance as may be payable in accordance with law. In case de novo enquiry is held, other service benefits including arrears of salary as well as benefits of continuity in service shall depend on the outcome of the enquiry.”

The High Court's judgement records that "No evidence has been brought on record by the respondent authorities to suggest that the disciplinary authority had ever directed for service of notice upon the petitioner through electronic mode and even if the same was sent to the petitioner, the same was sent by a sub-ordinate employee, by using his private computer, which is not permissible in law. Further, there is no valid proof of service of the said notice through electronic mode, upon the petitioner, since the required certificate in terms of section 65(b) (4) of the Evidence Act, by a Competent Officer was not brought on record by the respondent authorities and the office clerk, whose letter was brought on record, was neither authorized to grant certificate nor was the In-charge of the computer and he used his personal computer for the same, without any valid authorization. Further, even during course of the departmental enquiry there are discrepancies with regard to the email I.D, on which the said memo of charge dated 31.10.2017 is said to have been sent/dispatched, since different email IDs were mentioned, upon which the which the same was said to have been sent. Even the charges which were levelled against the petitioner were for the period, more than four years prior to his retirement and no proceeding in terms of the Rule 43 (b) of the Bihar Pension Rule, 1950 could have been initiated/conducted against the petitioner, after his retirement on 31.10.2017." 

Justice Kumar observed:"The Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority did not bothered to take into account the directions given by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in C.W.J.C. 720 of 2018, Hon’ble Division Bench in L.P.A. 1553 of 2018 and even the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (Civil No. 20131 of 2022), which was preferred by the petitioner against the judgment dated 31.08.2022 passed in L.P.A. No. 1553 of 2018. 26. Accordingly from the considerations made above, this Court has got no option, but to set aside the Letter no. 1216 dated 15.05.2023 issued by the Officer on Special duty, Department of Labour Resources, Government of Bihar, Patna, resolution contained in memo no. 3480 dated 16.11.2023, issued under the signature of the Under Secretary to the Government, Labour Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, letter no. 425 dated 02.02.2024 issued under the signature of the officer on special duty, Labour Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and memo no. 848 dated 07.03.2024 issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Labour Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna." 

Justice Kumar relied on the High Court's judgment dated February 25, 2026 passed in Nutan Kumar Prabahat vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.), wherein, the Court held as follows:-“25. The High Court under Article 226/227 is entitled to interfere when the finding of fact is based on no evidence and if in every case where no valid evidence is laid at the enquiry proceeding, there is a remand made, it would be offering a premium to the negligence of the management/disciplinary authority and condoning the levity with which the departmental enquiry was conducted. It is the disciplinary authority, who appoints the Enquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer and it is expected that the Presenting Officer would be well versed in the procedures and also be informed in the manner in which evidence has to be laid before the Enquiry Officer, to prove the misconduct, alleged against a delinquent employee. In a disciplinary enquiry proceeding, it is also the trite principle that the standard of proof is preponderance of probability as distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt, as would be required in a criminal prosecution. However, if there is no evidence laid at the enquiry, there is no question of any preponderance of probability being drawn to find the allegations proved nor can the delinquent be penalised on the basis of peremptory finding without any valid evidence. The disciplinary authority had an opportunity in a properly constituted enquiry proceeding and if in such a proceeding no evidence was laid,the punishment of dismissal has to be found to be imposed on no valid evidence.”

Division Bench sets aside Justice Purnendu Singh's judgement, remits it back to him for reconsideration

In Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Police Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar delivered a 16-page long judgment dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded: ".....we find that there is perversity in the impugned order and hence, we feel it proper to set aside the same and remit the matter to the learned Single Judge for fresh adjudication of the case on merits. 12. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back for reconsideration of the matter and be placed before the Hon’ble Judge dealing with such matters as per roaster. 13. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the accusation leveled against the appellant, the punishment imposed and whether the same would be legally sustainable on the basis of the materials available on record, as was produced before the disciplinary authority. It is open to the learned Single Judge to consider the same on its own merits. 14. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated, hereinabove." It was Justice Purnendu Singh who had passed the judgement dated December 20, 2024 as the Single judge.

The eight other respondents were: Additional Chief Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, Director General of Police, Bihar, Inspector General of Police (Headquarter), Bihar, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Bihar, Inspector General of Police, Darbhanga Range, Darbhanga, Inspector General of Police, Modernization, Bihar, Patna-cum-Enquiry Authority and Superintendent of Police, Samastipur.

In the writ petition, the petitioner had prayed for the following reliefs:-

(i) That this is an application for issuance of a Writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the Resolution as contained in Memo No. 10819 dated 26.10.2022 issued under the signature of Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby and where under the punishment of censure (Nindan) (w.e.f. allegation year) and withholding the two increment with non cumulative effect has been inflicted upon the petitioner and further for quashing the resolution as contained in Memo No3253 dated 7.3.2023 issued under the signature of same very officer i.e., Deputy Secretary, Home Police Department, Bihar, Patna whereby and where under departmental appeal/ review petition of the petitioner has been rejected on erroneous grounds as well as on wrong facts which has been communicated to the Commandant, Bihar Special Armed Police (BSAP) Headquarter, Patna vide letter no.794 dated 16.3.2023 and subsequently same has been communicated to the petitioner by the Commandant, BSAP-9, Jamalpur vide memo no.37 dated 22.03.2023 and further directing the respondent authorities to issue integrity certificate of the petitioner and further for issuance of any other appropriate writ/ writs, order/orders it may deem fit and proper by the High Court.

(ii) That this Interlocutory application is being filed for addition in the prayer portion that to grant promotion to the petitioner w.e.f. 01/12/2020 and further for pass any appropriate order or orders it may deem fit and proper.

(iii) That this Interlocutory application is being filed for addition in the prayer portion to quash the inquiry report of the Inquiry Officer to the extent of finding/opinion with respect to Charge No. 1 and 2 as same is perverse.

(iv) That this Interlocutory application is being filed for addition in the prayer portion for also quashing memorandum of charge as contained in memo no. 6551 dated 9.8.2019 along with resolution as contained in memo no. 1072 dated 5.2.2021 issued under the signature of Additional Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Govt. of Bihar without approval of competent authority i.e. Governor, Bihar.

The counsel of the appellant had submitted that even though the re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible but the Single Judge should have appreciated the points raised that the findings of the disciplinary authority on charges nos. 1 and 2 are wholly arbitrary and based on no evidence. He placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in United Bank of India -Vrs.- Biswanath Bhattacharjee, reported in (2022) 13 SCC 329, wherein, the Court held in paragraph no.21 that if the finding of the disciplinary authority is beyond record i.e. no evidence or based on irrelevant or extraneous factors or by ignoring material evidence, some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of no evidence or perversity cannot be rendered sans such basic scrutiny of the materials and the findings of the disciplinary authority.

The counsel for the appellant also argued that even though out of seven charges framed against the appellant, two charges were stated to have been proved, but the materials available on record justifies that the disciplinary authority had erred in holding that the two charges had been proved and therefore, there was perversity in the finding of the disciplinary authority imposing the minor punishment. It was argued that the appellant has been seriously prejudiced, inasmuch as even though he had challenged the imposition of such penalty on merits, but the same was not considered.

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "10.....we are of the humble view that since specific challenges were made to quash the imposition of punishment vide resolution dated 26.10.2022 as well as the orders passed under departmental appeal/review, the learned Single Judge should have considered the grounds taken in the writ petition as to whether it is a fit case for quashing the resolution of imposing punishment of censure and withholding of two interments with non-cumulative effect or not and should not have disposed of the writ petition holding that since the appellant had already suffered two increments, therefore, he was entitled for being promoted after the expiry of the penalty. When it is the case of the appellant that there being no evidence whatsoever available on record to arrive at a conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the two charges, it should have been examined. If the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. Of course, adequacy and reliability of the evidence should not be gone into and the High Court should not interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. Needless to say that infliction of punishment of withholding two increments with non-cumulative effect along with censure casts stigma on the Government servant, visit the Officer with civil consequences, affecting his future career, and therefore, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge should have considered the matter on its merits, has got substantial force."

In his judgement, Justice Singh had taken notice, particularly, sub clause (i) and (iv) of the Explanation-2 of Rule 14 of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, which are reproduced hereinafter:

14. Minor and Major Penalties.

Explanation (2). (i)Censure. The Censure shall be entered in the character roll of the year the allegation or omission & commission. The adverse effect of censure on the confirmation and promotion of concerned Government Servant shall be for next three consecutive years after the year of allegation or omission & commission for which he or she is censured. For example, if a Government Servant is censured for the allegation or omission & commission of the year 2002-2003, it shall be entered in the character roll of 2002-2003 and its adverse effect shall be from the year 2003-2004 to 2005-2006. Such Government Servant who has been awarded with three censures, shall be deemed to be fit for promotion only if after expiry of the period of adverse effect of last (third) censure, during the next five years his work and conduct of at least three years is extraordinary and has not been awarded any adverse remarks for the period of next five years. For example, if the adverse effect of third censure of a Government servant expires in 2002 and his promotion is due in 2008 or before that, in that case his promotion shall be deemed to be due in 2008, i.e. five years after the expiry of adverse effects of last censure, with the condition that during the five years of 2003 to 2007 his work and conduct of at least three years is extraordinary and during the said five years he has not been awarded any adverse remarks.

iv)Withholding of increments of pay without cumulative effect. Such penalty shall be effective from the date of issue of order, i.e. the increments due after the issue of the order shall be withheld. It will be essential to mention clearly the number of annual increments withheld in the order by the disciplinary authority. After the communication of order of penalty the increment shall remain withheld from the due date of next increment. For example, if two increments of a Government Servant are withheld without cumulative effect, it will mean that after the date of communication of order of penalty. from the due date of next increment till one year the first increment and from the second due date till one year the second increment shall remain withheld. As the penalty is without cumulative effect, the salary from the due date of third increment after the withholding of increments shall be paid with increment after adding the stages of both the withheld increments, but the financial benefit of withheld period shall not be admissible. No promotion shall be considered during the period of operation of this penalty, i.e. for the number of years the increments are withheld. Only after the expiry of the period of penalty, it will be possible to consider on the promotion from the due date."

Justice Singh had concluded: "In view of the fact that petitioner has suffered already two increments, he becomes entitled for being promoted after expiry of the penalty and the adverse effect will amount to lose its force making the petitioner entitled for being considered for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) soon so that the petitioner may not further demoralize, as junior to him have been promoted." The judgement has been set aside by the Division Bench.

Justice Dr. Anshuman sets aside disciplinary order by Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order

In Bishwajeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary cum Home Commissioner, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court allowed the writ petition. He delivered a 5-page long judgement dated January 30, 2026, wherein, he sets aside the disciplinary order dated May 31, 2020 by the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order dated July 7, 2020. The matter was remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, considering points mentioned in reply to 2nd show-cause notice, within a period of 90 days from the date of production of a copy of this order. The four other Respondents were: Director General cum Inspector General of Police, Patna, Inspector General of Police, Patna Zone, Patna, Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and Sri Prakash Kumar Sharan, Inspector of Police, the then Bihar Police Station (Campt), Nalanda Bihar Police Station.

The petitioner had prayed for directing the concerned respondents to forbear from giving any effect to the order dated dated May 31, 2020 issued in a Departmental Proceeding of 2020 which was  affirmed by the
order dated June 30, 2020 by the Inspector General of Police, Patna, against the order of awarding punishment in the Appeal filed by the Petitioner, communicated by the S.P. Nalanda. The petitioner had filed memorial application before the Director General of Police which was also rejected and affirmed by the order passed by the above both authority on August 10, 2021. It was submitted that the orders were illegal, void and arbitrary manner. The orders were also contrary to Rule 824 read with Appendix 49 of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order was essentially one wherein the second show-cause reply was not considered at all, except for a cryptic one-line observation stating that the reply was “not found satisfactory.” He submitted that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, the submissions of both sides are required to be duly considered, and a mere one-line statement that the reply was unsatisfactory amounts to a gross violation of the settled principles of law. He also submitted that in the order-sheet, particularly in the first and fifteenth lines, interpolations were apparently made by using whitener and inserting other words, without any initials or authentication. He submitted that the enquiry report itself was not prepared in accordance with law. It was also submitted that the petitioner had filed a detailed second show-cause reply in defence, which was not considered at all. Therefore, he submitted that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in complete violation of the settled principles of service jurisprudence. He pointed out that the Appellate Authority had failed to consider these aspects of the matter and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal vide order dated July 7, 2020.
 

Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by District Magistrate, Nalanda, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division and Joint Director, Revenue and Land Reforms Department in ₹ 5,000 bribery case

In Suresh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein, he set aside the unsustainable order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Nalanda, the order dated July 29, 2015 rejecting Service Appeal no. 246 of 2014 by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, and the order dated October 14, 2016 by the Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar in a ₹ 5,000 bribery case. 

The judgement reads:"27. The writ application is allowed along with consequential benefits. 28. The petitioner will be reinstated in service with effect from the date of dismissal i.e. 31.1.2014 and the entire arrears of salary, after deducting the suspension allowance paid to the petitioner, shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." The writ application was allowed. The six other Respondents were: Chief Secretary, Bihar, Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Nalanda at Bihar Sarif and Circle Officer, Hilsa, Nalanda.

The case of the petitioner was that while he was at the relevant time posted as revenue clerk in Circle Hilsa in the district of Nalanda, the petitioner was caught taking bribe in a trap case for which Vigilance P.S. Case no. 7 of 2012 was registered and he was taken into custody. The petitioner was subsequently enlarged on bail. An inquiry was started against the petitioner for which memo of charge was served on him with the charge that on January 25, 2012 the petitioner, a Rajaswa Karamchari, was caught taking bribe of Rs.5,000/- and he was taken into custody by the Vigilance Investigation Bureau. He was sent in judicial custody to the Adarsh Jail, Beur, Patna. The petitioner had filed his reply to the charges and the inquiry proceeded. The Enquiry Report dated August 29, 2012 was submitted by the Conducting Officer, a copy of which was provided to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the same.. The respondent authorities i.e. the District Magistrate, Nalanda came out with an order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 dismissing the petitioner from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division on July 29, 2015 and the revision filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar by his order dated October 14, 2016. 7.

The senior counsel, S.N.P. Singh appearing for the petitioner submitted that on perusal of the memo of charges, it emerged that it was alleged that the petitioner being caught taking bribe of ₹ 5,000/- on January 25, 2012, however when the inquiry proceeded, from the contents of the inquiry report it emerged that the inquiry proceedings dealt with three charges against the petitioner. 

It was also submitted that on perusal of the inquiry report, the so called informant of the criminal case who was said to have been examined, however neither any intimation was given to the petitioner of his examination nor was the petitioner given any opportunity to cross-examine him. Admittedly no document was either produced, marked exhibit or proved by any of the witness in course of inquiry. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.; (2009) 2 SCC 570. It was submitted that it was a case of no evidence. He submitted that even the memo of charge neither mentions about the witnesses who are proposed to be examined to prove the charges against the petitioner nor does it mention about any of the documents that is sought to be relied upon in proving the charges. It was submitted that it was categorically stated that neither the date of examination of the witnesses was fixed nor the petitioner was given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It was also submitted that the entire order sheet of the departmental proceeding was brought on record. 

Referring to the order dated August 16, 2012 of the Conducting Officer which mentioned about the examination of the informant who was said to have come with evidence as also other witnesses namely Yogendra Kumar and Raja Babu, it was stated that there was no mention of any cross-examination nor any of the witnesses having proved any document and the proceedings was concluded on the same day. 

A Division Bench of the High Court in Devendra Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) drew on Supreme Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & oOrs. (2009) 2 SCC 570 to underline that "the documents produced in a departmental inquiry has to be proved by examining witnesses. Even an F.I.R. was held to be not evidence by itself without actual proof of facts stated therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also held that even an admission or confession to the police itself is not sufficient to find the delinquent employee guilty in a departmental proceeding if no evidence is brought on record to prove the offence or misconduct alleged. Departmental inquiry was held to be a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer functions in the status of a quasi-judicial authority. Not only should evidence be led in a departmental inquiry, the conclusions arrived at should be based on evidence which brings forth a probability that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged and charged against him. No Inquiry Report based on conjectures and surmises can be sustained and even in a departmental inquiry, the standard of However high the degree of suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for legal proof.”  

Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi observed:“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”

In such a backdrop, the case against the petitioner being one of no evidence, the orders impugned were not sustainable. 

 

Repeal of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005

President of India gave assent to the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) (VB-G RAM G) Bill, 2025 on December 21, 2025. The 31-page long VB-G RAM G) Act, 2025 "represents a comprehensive statutory overhaul of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005". It has 37 Section and two Schedules. The VB-G-RAM G Act repeals MGNREGA. It repeals not only MGNREGA but also "all rules, notifications, Schemes, orders and guidelines made thereunder". 

The MGNREG Act was passed unanimously by the parliament. Its repeal has repealed the unanimity, said Dr. Gopal Krishna, Advocate, Patna High Court at a Round Table in Patna. 

It is claimed that this law is aimed at establishing a rural development framework by providing a statutory guarantee of one hundred and twenty-five days of wage employment in every financial year to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to undertake unskilled manual work; to enable them to participate more effectively in the expanded livelihood security framework.

It claims to focus on empowerment, growth, convergence and saturation through public works aggregating into forming Viksit BharatNational Rural Infrastructure Stack. As per Section 2 (v) means the consolidated aggregation comprising proposed works emerging from the Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans aggregated at the District and State levels, and aligned with the four thematic domains of works specified in Schedule I of the VB-G-RAM G Act which provides Minimum features of VB—G RAM G Scheme. It is required to be read with Section 8 (3) of the Act.

Section 24 of the Act reads: "Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions, transparency and ccountability in the implementation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ensured through (a) biometric authentication of workers, functionaries, and transactions, in such manner as may be specified by the Central Government; (b) geospatial technology enabled planning, including geo-referencing, satellite imagery, digital mapping of works, and other approved spatial technologies, as may be specified by the Central Government; (c) mobile application based and dashboard-based monitoring systems providing real-time visibility of demand, works, workforce deployment, payments, progress and other indicators, as may be specified by the Central Government; (d) weekly public disclosure systems, including digital and physical disclosure of key metrics, muster rolls, payments, sanctions, inspections and  grievances, as may be specified by the Central Government; (e) strengthening of the social audit mechanism, and the adoption of such other technology-enabled systems as may be prescribed by the Central  Government." 

The new makes two direct references two Aadhaar Number and at least half a dozen indirect reference to it.  

Quite like its predecessor, the thematic focus of the new law is on water security through water-related works, core rural infrastructure, livelihood-related infrastructure and special works to mitigate extreme weather events. It is claimed that the new law will institutionalise convergence, saturation-driven planning and whole of government delivery through Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans, integrated with the PM Gati Shakti to address the varying needs of Gram Panchayats, and powered by geospatial systems, digital public infrastructure, District and State planning mechanisms, with such plans aggregated at the Block, District, State and National levels. It will modernise governance, accountability and citizen engagement through a comprehensive digital ecosystem, including biometric authentication at various levels, global positioning system or mobile based worksite monitoring, real-time management information system dashboards, proactive public disclosures, and use of Artificial Intelligence for planning, audits and fraud-risk mitigation.

Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Act reads: "The State Government, shall within six months from the date of commencement of this Act, by notification, make a Scheme consistent with the provisions of this Act and the features provided therein. (2) The Scheme made under sub-section (1) shall be implemented as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme, under which the financial liability shall be shared between the Central Government and the State Government in accordance with the  fund-sharing pattern provided under sub-section (2) of section 22 of this Act, including enhanced share of the Central Government in respect of the North-Eastern  States and Himalayan States, and the responsibility of the State Government to bear  any expenditure incurred in excess of its allocated share." 

Section 22 (1) and (2) reads:. (1) The Scheme implemented under this Act, shall be a Centrally Sponsored Scheme. (2) For the purposes of this Act, the fund-sharing pattern between the Central Government and the State Governments shall be 90:10 for the North Eastern States, Himalayan States and Union territory (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir) and 60:40 for all other States and Union territories with legislature." 

Section 22 (4) (5) (6) and (7) reads: "(4) The Central Government shall determine the State-wise normative allocation for each financial year, based on objective parameters as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (5) Any expenditure incurred by a State in excess of its normative allocation, shall be borne by the State Government in such manner and procedure as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (6) In accordance with the State-wise normative allocation determined under this Act, the share of the Central Government shall include expenditure towards, (a) payment of wages for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour employed under the Scheme; (b) the material component of works, subject to the provisions in Schedule I; (c) such administrative expenses as may be specified by the Central Government, including salary and allowances of Programme Officers and supporting staff, administrative expenses of the Central Council, facilities required under Schedule II, and such other items as may be prescribed by the Central Government. (7) In accordance with the State-wise normative allocation determined under this Act, the share of the State Government shall include expenditure towards, (a) payment of wages for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour employed under the Scheme; (b) the material component of works, subject to the provisions in Schedule I;(c) such administrative expenses as may be specified by the Central Government, including salary and allowances of Programme Officers and supporting staff, administrative expenses of the State Council, facilities required under Schedule II, and such other items as may be prescribed by the  Central Government. (8) The State Government, shall bear the expenditure towards unemployment allowance and delay compensation as may be prescribed by the State Government."

The new law makes the VB-G-RAM G scheme contingent upon executive notification, which allows the Union Government to decide when and where it will operate. It aims "to facilitate adequate farm-labour availability during peak agricultural seasons, and, in view of the wage employment guarantee for the rural workforce." G RAM G scheme mandates suspension of work for up to 60 days every year in the name of agricultural seasons. 

Section 4 (1) and (2) reads:"(1) All works undertaken under this Act shall be originated from the Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans prepared under sub-section (3), and consolidated at the Block, District and State levels and further aggregated into the Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack, which shall comprise a comprehensive listing of works aligned with National development priorities. (2) The Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack shall encompass four thematic focus domains, namely: (a) water security through water-related works; (b) core rural infrastructure; (c) livelihood-related infrastructure; and (d) works for the mitigation of extreme weather events."

Section 4(5) of the VB-G-RAM G Act reads, “The Central Government shall determine the State-wise normative allocation for each financial year, based on objective parameters as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” The VB-G-RAM G scheme will cost Rs 55,590 crore (Rs 1,51,282-95,692) to the states if it is implemented across the country, according to its own Financial Memo (p.39). Indebted States like Bihar, which is the fifth most indebted State cannot afford it. 

Section 10 of the Act reads:."The Central Government may, by notification, specify the wage rate for the purposes of this Act, which shall apply to all unskilled manual work provided under the Scheme: Provided that different wage rates may be notified by the Central Government for different areas:Provided further that the wage rate so notified shall not be less than the prevailing wage rate as notified under section 6 of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005: Provided also that until a wage rate is notified by the Central Government under this section, the wage rates notified under section 6 of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, shall continue to apply in the areas covered by this Act."

GRAM G Act is likely to go the way the farmer laws went the way of Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 2014 and Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance (FRDI) Bill, 2017 which was aimed at destroying public sector banks and endangering the public interest. Its withdrawal was achieved after strong opposition from All India Bank Officers’ Confederation, trade unions, especially those of the financial sector, people’s movements and civil society organisations.

The FRDI Bill too was sought to be passed in similar flway.

The government had justified the withdrawal citing the ‘apprehensions’ of stakeholders, including the public about various clauses of the Bill like bail-in and inadequacy of deposit insurance. Further, it argued that comprehensive reconsideration of these issues would require time. While drafting the Bill, the union government borrowed from a report of the Financial Stability Board, an international body consisting of G20 countries called the “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”, this report was prepared after the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis and proposed measures to avert another such crisis. Doctored for a banking sector dominated by private parties where banks and other financial institutions engaged in rampant speculative activities, the report had little concerning a banking sector like India’s where publically owned entities catered primarily to small depositors, pensioners and working-class savings. This Bill if enacted would have completely undermined the RBI and other regulatory bodies, concentrating executive power in a Resolution Corporation (RC). The RC would have powers to sell, merge and liquidate Financial Institutions including PSBs. The Bail-in clause would have deprived people of their hard-earned deposits to pay for banks losses stemming from corporate defaults.

This significant defeat was due to a concerted effort by a large number of people and organisations, coming from diverse sections and strata of the society. From sending numerous submissions to the Joint Committee, helping to organise public meetings on the dangers of FRDI Bill in various regions across the country, sending online letters to MPs requesting them to take a position against the FRDI Bill and contributing to bringing out a critique of FRDI “Wrong Diagnosis, Harmful Prescription: A Critique of Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance (FRDI) Bill, 2017”, the coordinated, timely and consistent effort played a big role in defeating the FRDI Bill. 

Justice Sandeep Kumar sets aside 2022 orders of punishment by DM, Patnaand Divisional Commissioner, Patna against a Clerk

In Anish Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar  of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgement dated December 22, 2025. The other respondents are:Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, District Magistrate, Patna and Additional Collector, Departmental Proceedings-cum-Inquiry Officer, Patna.

Justice Kumar quashed and set aside the impugned order of punishment dated January 17, 2022 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna as well as the appellate order dated May 18, 2023 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna.

The petitioner had challenged the order dated January 17, 2022 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna, by which the petitioner has been awarded the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect as well as the appellate order dated May 18, 2022 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna, by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of the District Magistrate was dismissed. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as Clerk in the office of the District Magistrate, Patna. The District Magistrate, Patna by his order dated October 10, 2018 had suspended the petitioner in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding on the basis of a report submitted by the inquiry committee, for the charges of committing irregularities in mutation proceedings. Thereafter, vide letter dated January 14, 2019, the District Magistrate, Patna -cum-Disciplinary Authority, framed the memo of charge against the petitioner in which altogether four charges have been levelled against the petitioner. Thereafter, the Additional Collector was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Patna, was appointed as Presenting Officer for conducting the departmental proceeding. The Enquiry Officer had directed the petitioner to file his written statement of defense and in pursuance thereof, he had filed his written statement of defense and thereafter the Presenting Officer gave his comments on the show-cause reply filed by the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer, after enquiry, submitted his enquiry report on September 12, 2019 exonerating the petitioner from all the charges. However, the Enquiry Officer vide order dated January 9, 2020 had recorded that the file is received back for re-enquiry upon the direction/discussion with the disciplinary authority and thereafter, re-enquiry was conducted. Subsequently, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked on February 17, 2020. After re-enquiry, the report dated June 8, 2020 was submitted holding three out of four charges to be partly proved against the petitioner. Thereafter, a second show-cause was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority on December 3, 2020, to which the petitioner replied on February 10, 2021. The District Magistrate, after considering the response of the petitioner, has passed the impugned order dated January 17, 2022 awarding the major punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of punishment, the petitioner preferred an appeal unsuccessfully. 

Justice Kumar agreed with the counsel of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceeding conducted against the petitioner is in complete violation of Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, inasmuch as, no list of witnesses and documents have been supplied to the petitioner along with memo of charge. 

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's verdict, dismisses "unsustainable order", LPA by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Bihar

"I express my anguish and displeasure over the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding has been held in the present case and the appellate order has been passed. 67. In numerous cases, this Court has experienced that more often than not, the authorities/functionaries, under the Rules, fail to adhere to the statutory provisions. Breach of statutory prescriptions in disciplinary proceedings, involving matters of serious misconduct by Government Servants, renders the disciplinary action unsustainable, which is not in public interest. I have dealt with various provisions under the Rules, in the present judgment, with an expectation, that top officials, under the State Government, shall take all possible corrective measures including by way of imparting training to the officials who play their respective roles under the Rules. For the said purpose, let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Bihar, for him to chalk out ways and means to ensure strict compliance of various provisions under the Rules, in the light of the observations made in the present judgment."

-Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), February 24, 2020 

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Abhay Kumar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 4-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. From the perusal of records of the case it is apparent that the order of the learned Single Judge does not take away any right of the concerned parties, and the matter has already been remanded to the competent authority for taking a fresh decision in accordance with the law. 5. In addition to this, the department has already made compliance of the order awaiting the outcome of this appeal. We also could not find any impropriety in the said direction of learned Single Judge. Further, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merit and not fit for interference. 6. The present Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly dismissed." 

The other four respondents were: Commissioner, Munger Division, Munger, Collector, Lakhisarai, Senior Deputy Collector, Lakhisarai and Circle Officer, Suryagarha Block, Lakhisarai.  

The Letters Patent Appeal was directed against 53-page long judgment dated February 24, 2020 passed in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh whereby and where under the Single Judge had been pleased to allow the writ application and set aside the impugned order dated April 20, 2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and order dated November 16, 2016 passed by the appellate authority being unsustainable in the law. The Court directed the disciplinary authority to consider afresh, the report of inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry and take a fresh decision in accordance with law, observing that it will open for him to exercise his power under Sub Rule 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to Inquiring Authority for further enquiry consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order and further the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been concluded and the punishment has been imposed. The Court also directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment.

Justice Singh, the Single Judge had observed: “64. I direct the disciplinary authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to consider afresh, the report of the inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry, and take afresh decision in accordance with law. It will be open for him to exercise his power under sub Rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to the Inquiring Authority for further enquiry. Consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order, the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith. Because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been conducted and the punishment has been imposed, I direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment. 65. This writ application is allowed accordingly in terms of the directions and observations as made hereinabove.” 

Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had relied on the decision in Union of India vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon (AIR 2009 SC 1375), wherein, the Supreme Court, dealing with the role of the Inquiry Officer held as under:-
“15. The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice.”

He underlined the significance of recording of reasons which has been noted in a series of decisions; illustratively in G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 497, Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 and Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496. 

In his first order as Acting Chief Justice Justice Sudhir Singh upheld the judgement by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar.   

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes punishment order by District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, appellate order by Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya

In Satyendra Kumar Pathak vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anil Kumar Sinha delivered a 11-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"The order of punishment dated 01.10.2016 passed by the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, as well as the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh  Division, Gaya, is hereby quashed. 23. The petitioner is entitled to be paid his full salary for the suspension period and the consequential benefits. The entire payments shall be made to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." 

Justice Sinha observed: "This Court finds that the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, is cryptic and non-speaking. The appellate authority has merely reiterated the conclusion of the disciplinary authority without assigning any independent reason, and without examining the correctness of the procedure adopted in the inquiry. The appellate order is, thus, nothing but a mere mechanical affirmation and suffers from clear non-application of mind. 21. Considering the facts as discussed above, this Court is  satisfied that the punishment order, dated 01.10.2016 as well as the appellate order, dated 16.01.2018, stand vitiated which violates the principles of natural justice causing serious prejudice to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed." 

The other seven respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Director, Primary Education Bihar, Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Bihar, District Education Officer, Arwal, District Programme Officer, Establishment, Arwal, Block Education Officer, Block-Karpi, Arwal and Head Master-Cum Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Middle School, Karpi, Arwal.

The writ petition was filed for quashing the order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016 passed by the District Programme Officer, Arwal. It also prayed for a direction to the respondent/authorities for payment of salary and subsistence allowance for the entire period of suspension along with all consequential and monetary benefits. The petitioner sought amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition, stating that during the pendency of the present petition, the respondent no. 4, namely the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, Bihar, who is the appellate authority, had passed an order dated January 16, 2018, whereby the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority was upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the appellate order.

The petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Matric Trained Scale on November 1, 1977, at Primary School, Kendua, Imamganj, District Gaya. In the year 1987, he was granted the first time-bound promotion and subsequently received ‘Pravar Koti’ promotion in the year 1989. Thereafter, he was posted as the In-charge Headmaster of the Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, District -Arwal, and was due to retire on June 30, 2017. While the petitioner was serving as In-charge Headmaster, the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, issued a letter dated February 17, 2010, placing the petitioner under suspension on the basis of a report submitted by the Area Education Officer cum Incharge, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Arwal on the allegation that he was absent without notice and irregularities were committed in the mid-day meal scheme. Pursuant to the order of suspension, petitioner submitted his joining at headquarters on February 19, 2010. The District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, by order dated May 6, 2010, framed memo of charge in Prapatra “Ka” and appointed Block Education Officer, Arwal, as Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi, as Presenting Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry.

By order dated March 10, 2011, District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, revoked the suspension of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to be posted at Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi, Arwal. In the said order, it was clarified that the Departmental Proceeding would continue. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his joining at Middle School, Kochahasa on March 15, 2011. Thereafter, a memo of charge was again served upon the petitioner vide order dated June 4, 2011 in Prapatra “Ka” by District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, and Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi was appointed as Presenting officer. At this stage, the Enquiry officer, submitted the inquiry report on April 4, 2016. 

In view of the inquiry report dated April 4, 2016, the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, passed the order of punishment dated October 1, 2016 imposing punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect alongwith warning regarding not to remain absent in the school in future without prior intimation and departmental permission. In the punishment order, it was also directed that apart from subsistence allowance during suspension period, nothing will be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, against the impugned order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016. The appellate authority disposed the appeal vide order, dated January 16, 2018, whereby the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. 

The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Enquiry Officer without issuing a show-cause notice or affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, proceeded to submit an inquiry report on April 4, 2016 before the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad. The enquiry report was submitted behind his back and in complete disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards, a copy of which was not furnished to the petitioner.

It was the specific case of the petitioner that, before passing the order of punishment, a second show-cause notice was not served upon him, nor was any opportunity of personal hearing afforded. The entire proceeding, according to him, was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. Non-supply of inquiry report and second show cause has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. During the entire period of suspension, the petitioner was neither paid his salary nor even the subsistence allowance to which he was entitled under the law.

Assailing the appellate order, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate order also vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind and has been passed in a cryptic manner. The said order is nothing but a mere reiteration of the original punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority, without any independent reasoning, analysis of the grounds urged in appeal, or consideration of the procedural lapses pointed out by the petitioner.

To sum up, his argument was that the entire departmental proceeding is vitiated on multiple counts. Firstly, the petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy as charges were framed twice for the same misconduct. Secondly, the inquiry was conducted ex-parte without issuance of any show-cause notice or providing him any opportunity to defend himself. Thirdly, the order of punishment was passed after an unexplained delay of six years, thereby, causing grave prejudice to him. Fourthly, the denial of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension is not only violative of statutory provisions but also violates the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The counsel for the State submitted that during posting of the petitioner as In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, serious complaints were received regarding petitioner’s conduct,
including the allegation that he remained absent from the school at Kinjar without any intimation to the competent authorities and that irregularities were found in the implementation of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme under his supervision. The entire departmental proceeding starting from suspension order, submission of the inquiry report, passing of the punishment order till the passing of appellate order are strictly in accordance with law after following the due process and that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Justice Sinha noted that the record disclosed that the petitioner was served with two separate charge-memos on two different occasions. The first was issued by the then District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, on May 6, 2010, and the second by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, on June 4, 2011.  Though issued on separate dates, both charge-memos substantially contain the same set of allegations. However, it appeared that the inquiry was conducted only with reference to the second charge memo issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal. The Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi as Presenting officer. The allegations put forth against the petitioner as evident from memo of charge dated June 4, 2011 were as follows:-
(I) While functioning as the In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kinjhar, the petitioner remained absent from the school on 09.02.2010 without giving any prior information or obtaining permission from the competent authority.
(ii) During the period of his suspension vide Memo No. 494 dated 17.02.2010 issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, the petitioner did not report at the Headquarters as required under the suspension order.
(iii)That the petitioner disobeyed the directions issued by the Superior officers, appointing officers as well as controlling officers.
(iv) That the petitioner did not comply with Memo No. 493 dated 14.05.2010 thereby violating the order of the superior authority.
(v) During his functioning as the Headmaster, irregularities were committed by the petitioner in the 

He observed: "From perusal of the memo of charge, it would be evident that neither the charge-memos contains the statutory particulars required under Rule 17(3) of the Bihar CCA Rules. The charge-memos does not have any list of documents or list of witnesses as required by Rule 17(3) by whom the charges were proposed to be proved. The absence of these essential ingredients goes to the very root of the proceeding, for without being apprised of the documentary and oral evidence proposed to be relied upon. In order to sustain the charges, the delinquent cannot be expected to defend himself effectively. This Court
therefore finds that the very initiation of the departmental proceeding suffers from a foundational illegality." 

Justice Sinha observed: "19. It further appears that neither the petitioner nor the respondents have placed the inquiry report on record. In the absence of the report, this Court is unable to satisfy itself as to whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with law, whether evidence was led in support of the charges, or whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The stand of the petitioner is that no notice of hearing was ever served upon him by the Enquiry Officer and that he was never given an opportunity to offer his defence. It is also his specific case that the disciplinary authority did not issue any second show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report prior to imposition of the punishment, which is mandatory requirement under CCA Rules. These assertions have not been specifically denied on behalf of the State, and in the absence of such, the submissions of the petitioner is to be accepted."