Justice Partha Sarthy sets aside orders by District Magistrate, Nalanda, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division and Joint Director, Revenue and Land Reforms Department in ₹ 5,000 bribery case

In Suresh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein, he set aside the unsustainable order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Nalanda, the order dated July 29, 2015 rejecting Service Appeal no. 246 of 2014 by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, and the order dated October 14, 2016 by the Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar in a ₹ 5,000 bribery case. 

The judgement reads:"27. The writ application is allowed along with consequential benefits. 28. The petitioner will be reinstated in service with effect from the date of dismissal i.e. 31.1.2014 and the entire arrears of salary, after deducting the suspension allowance paid to the petitioner, shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." The writ application was allowed. The six other Respondents were: Chief Secretary, Bihar, Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Joint Director, Agriculture Ganana, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar, Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, District Magistrate Cum Collector, Nalanda at Bihar Sarif and Circle Officer, Hilsa, Nalanda.

The case of the petitioner was that while he was at the relevant time posted as revenue clerk in Circle Hilsa in the district of Nalanda, the petitioner was caught taking bribe in a trap case for which Vigilance P.S. Case no. 7 of 2012 was registered and he was taken into custody. The petitioner was subsequently enlarged on bail. An inquiry was started against the petitioner for which memo of charge was served on him with the charge that on January 25, 2012 the petitioner, a Rajaswa Karamchari, was caught taking bribe of Rs.5,000/- and he was taken into custody by the Vigilance Investigation Bureau. He was sent in judicial custody to the Adarsh Jail, Beur, Patna. The petitioner had filed his reply to the charges and the inquiry proceeded. The Enquiry Report dated August 29, 2012 was submitted by the Conducting Officer, a copy of which was provided to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply to the same.. The respondent authorities i.e. the District Magistrate, Nalanda came out with an order of punishment dated January 31, 2014 dismissing the petitioner from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division on July 29, 2015 and the revision filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar by his order dated October 14, 2016. 7.

The senior counsel, S.N.P. Singh appearing for the petitioner submitted that on perusal of the memo of charges, it emerged that it was alleged that the petitioner being caught taking bribe of ₹ 5,000/- on January 25, 2012, however when the inquiry proceeded, from the contents of the inquiry report it emerged that the inquiry proceedings dealt with three charges against the petitioner. 

It was also submitted that on perusal of the inquiry report, the so called informant of the criminal case who was said to have been examined, however neither any intimation was given to the petitioner of his examination nor was the petitioner given any opportunity to cross-examine him. Admittedly no document was either produced, marked exhibit or proved by any of the witness in course of inquiry. He relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.; (2009) 2 SCC 570. It was submitted that it was a case of no evidence. He submitted that even the memo of charge neither mentions about the witnesses who are proposed to be examined to prove the charges against the petitioner nor does it mention about any of the documents that is sought to be relied upon in proving the charges. It was submitted that it was categorically stated that neither the date of examination of the witnesses was fixed nor the petitioner was given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It was also submitted that the entire order sheet of the departmental proceeding was brought on record. 

Referring to the order dated August 16, 2012 of the Conducting Officer which mentioned about the examination of the informant who was said to have come with evidence as also other witnesses namely Yogendra Kumar and Raja Babu, it was stated that there was no mention of any cross-examination nor any of the witnesses having proved any document and the proceedings was concluded on the same day. 

A Division Bench of the High Court in Devendra Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) drew on Supreme Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & oOrs. (2009) 2 SCC 570 to underline that "the documents produced in a departmental inquiry has to be proved by examining witnesses. Even an F.I.R. was held to be not evidence by itself without actual proof of facts stated therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had also held that even an admission or confession to the police itself is not sufficient to find the delinquent employee guilty in a departmental proceeding if no evidence is brought on record to prove the offence or misconduct alleged. Departmental inquiry was held to be a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer functions in the status of a quasi-judicial authority. Not only should evidence be led in a departmental inquiry, the conclusions arrived at should be based on evidence which brings forth a probability that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged and charged against him. No Inquiry Report based on conjectures and surmises can be sustained and even in a departmental inquiry, the standard of However high the degree of suspicion is, it cannot be a substitute for legal proof.”  

Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Roop Singh Negi observed:“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence.”

In such a backdrop, the case against the petitioner being one of no evidence, the orders impugned were not sustainable. 

 

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh upholds Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's verdict, dismisses "unsustainable order", LPA by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Bihar

"I express my anguish and displeasure over the manner in which the disciplinary proceeding has been held in the present case and the appellate order has been passed. 67. In numerous cases, this Court has experienced that more often than not, the authorities/functionaries, under the Rules, fail to adhere to the statutory provisions. Breach of statutory prescriptions in disciplinary proceedings, involving matters of serious misconduct by Government Servants, renders the disciplinary action unsustainable, which is not in public interest. I have dealt with various provisions under the Rules, in the present judgment, with an expectation, that top officials, under the State Government, shall take all possible corrective measures including by way of imparting training to the officials who play their respective roles under the Rules. For the said purpose, let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Bihar, for him to chalk out ways and means to ensure strict compliance of various provisions under the Rules, in the light of the observations made in the present judgment."

-Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), February 24, 2020 

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Abhay Kumar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma delivered a 4-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"4. From the perusal of records of the case it is apparent that the order of the learned Single Judge does not take away any right of the concerned parties, and the matter has already been remanded to the competent authority for taking a fresh decision in accordance with the law. 5. In addition to this, the department has already made compliance of the order awaiting the outcome of this appeal. We also could not find any impropriety in the said direction of learned Single Judge. Further, we find that there is no sufficient material available on record to substantiate the grounds of the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merit and not fit for interference. 6. The present Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly dismissed." 

The other four respondents were: Commissioner, Munger Division, Munger, Collector, Lakhisarai, Senior Deputy Collector, Lakhisarai and Circle Officer, Suryagarha Block, Lakhisarai.  

The Letters Patent Appeal was directed against 53-page long judgment dated February 24, 2020 passed in Abhay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2020), by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh whereby and where under the Single Judge had been pleased to allow the writ application and set aside the impugned order dated April 20, 2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and order dated November 16, 2016 passed by the appellate authority being unsustainable in the law. The Court directed the disciplinary authority to consider afresh, the report of inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry and take a fresh decision in accordance with law, observing that it will open for him to exercise his power under Sub Rule 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to Inquiring Authority for further enquiry consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order and further the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been concluded and the punishment has been imposed. The Court also directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment.

Justice Singh, the Single Judge had observed: “64. I direct the disciplinary authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to consider afresh, the report of the inquiry officer and the materials available on record of the departmental enquiry, and take afresh decision in accordance with law. It will be open for him to exercise his power under sub Rule (1) of Rule 18 of the Rules by remitting the case back to the Inquiring Authority for further enquiry. Consequent upon quashing of the impugned order of dismissal and the appellate order, the petitioner shall be required to be reinstated forthwith. Because of the manner in which the departmental enquiry has been conducted and the punishment has been imposed, I direct that the petitioner shall be entitled to full back wages for the period during which he remained out of service because of illegal order of punishment. 65. This writ application is allowed accordingly in terms of the directions and observations as made hereinabove.” 

Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had relied on the decision in Union of India vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon (AIR 2009 SC 1375), wherein, the Supreme Court, dealing with the role of the Inquiry Officer held as under:-
“15. The principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning a witness by the delinquent officer should be enquiry officer. It was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. It is not for the Railway Administration to contend that it is for them to consider as to whether any witness should be examined by it or not. It was for the enquiry officer to take a decision thereupon. A disciplinary proceeding must be fairly conducted. An enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably which is even otherwise the requirement of the principles of natural justice.”

He underlined the significance of recording of reasons which has been noted in a series of decisions; illustratively in G. Vallikumari vs. Andhra Education Society, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 497, Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 and Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496. 

In his first order as Acting Chief Justice Justice Sudhir Singh upheld the judgement by Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by Principal Secretary, Rural Department, Government of Bihar.   

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes punishment order by District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, appellate order by Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya

In Satyendra Kumar Pathak vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anil Kumar Sinha delivered a 11-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"The order of punishment dated 01.10.2016 passed by the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, as well as the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh  Division, Gaya, is hereby quashed. 23. The petitioner is entitled to be paid his full salary for the suspension period and the consequential benefits. The entire payments shall be made to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order." 

Justice Sinha observed: "This Court finds that the appellate order dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, is cryptic and non-speaking. The appellate authority has merely reiterated the conclusion of the disciplinary authority without assigning any independent reason, and without examining the correctness of the procedure adopted in the inquiry. The appellate order is, thus, nothing but a mere mechanical affirmation and suffers from clear non-application of mind. 21. Considering the facts as discussed above, this Court is  satisfied that the punishment order, dated 01.10.2016 as well as the appellate order, dated 16.01.2018, stand vitiated which violates the principles of natural justice causing serious prejudice to the petitioner. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed." 

The other seven respondents were:Principal Secretary, Department of Education, Government of Bihar, Director, Primary Education Bihar, Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Bihar, District Education Officer, Arwal, District Programme Officer, Establishment, Arwal, Block Education Officer, Block-Karpi, Arwal and Head Master-Cum Drawing and Disbursing Officer, Middle School, Karpi, Arwal.

The writ petition was filed for quashing the order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016 passed by the District Programme Officer, Arwal. It also prayed for a direction to the respondent/authorities for payment of salary and subsistence allowance for the entire period of suspension along with all consequential and monetary benefits. The petitioner sought amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition, stating that during the pendency of the present petition, the respondent no. 4, namely the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, Bihar, who is the appellate authority, had passed an order dated January 16, 2018, whereby the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority was upheld. The petitioner had also prayed for quashing of the appellate order.

The petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Matric Trained Scale on November 1, 1977, at Primary School, Kendua, Imamganj, District Gaya. In the year 1987, he was granted the first time-bound promotion and subsequently received ‘Pravar Koti’ promotion in the year 1989. Thereafter, he was posted as the In-charge Headmaster of the Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, District -Arwal, and was due to retire on June 30, 2017. While the petitioner was serving as In-charge Headmaster, the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, issued a letter dated February 17, 2010, placing the petitioner under suspension on the basis of a report submitted by the Area Education Officer cum Incharge, Mid-Day Meal Scheme, Arwal on the allegation that he was absent without notice and irregularities were committed in the mid-day meal scheme. Pursuant to the order of suspension, petitioner submitted his joining at headquarters on February 19, 2010. The District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, by order dated May 6, 2010, framed memo of charge in Prapatra “Ka” and appointed Block Education Officer, Arwal, as Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi, as Presenting Officer to conduct the departmental inquiry.

By order dated March 10, 2011, District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, revoked the suspension of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to be posted at Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi, Arwal. In the said order, it was clarified that the Departmental Proceeding would continue. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted his joining at Middle School, Kochahasa on March 15, 2011. Thereafter, a memo of charge was again served upon the petitioner vide order dated June 4, 2011 in Prapatra “Ka” by District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, and Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi was appointed as Presenting officer. At this stage, the Enquiry officer, submitted the inquiry report on April 4, 2016. 

In view of the inquiry report dated April 4, 2016, the District Programme Officer (Establishment), Arwal, passed the order of punishment dated October 1, 2016 imposing punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect alongwith warning regarding not to remain absent in the school in future without prior intimation and departmental permission. In the punishment order, it was also directed that apart from subsistence allowance during suspension period, nothing will be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner had filed an appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Magadh Division, Gaya, against the impugned order of punishment, dated October 1, 2016. The appellate authority disposed the appeal vide order, dated January 16, 2018, whereby the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority has been upheld. 

The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Enquiry Officer without issuing a show-cause notice or affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, proceeded to submit an inquiry report on April 4, 2016 before the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad. The enquiry report was submitted behind his back and in complete disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards, a copy of which was not furnished to the petitioner.

It was the specific case of the petitioner that, before passing the order of punishment, a second show-cause notice was not served upon him, nor was any opportunity of personal hearing afforded. The entire proceeding, according to him, was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. Non-supply of inquiry report and second show cause has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. During the entire period of suspension, the petitioner was neither paid his salary nor even the subsistence allowance to which he was entitled under the law.

Assailing the appellate order, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the appellate order also vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind and has been passed in a cryptic manner. The said order is nothing but a mere reiteration of the original punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority, without any independent reasoning, analysis of the grounds urged in appeal, or consideration of the procedural lapses pointed out by the petitioner.

To sum up, his argument was that the entire departmental proceeding is vitiated on multiple counts. Firstly, the petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy as charges were framed twice for the same misconduct. Secondly, the inquiry was conducted ex-parte without issuance of any show-cause notice or providing him any opportunity to defend himself. Thirdly, the order of punishment was passed after an unexplained delay of six years, thereby, causing grave prejudice to him. Fourthly, the denial of subsistence allowance during the period of suspension is not only violative of statutory provisions but also violates the petitioner’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The counsel for the State submitted that during posting of the petitioner as In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kochahasa, Karpi Block, serious complaints were received regarding petitioner’s conduct,
including the allegation that he remained absent from the school at Kinjar without any intimation to the competent authorities and that irregularities were found in the implementation of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme under his supervision. The entire departmental proceeding starting from suspension order, submission of the inquiry report, passing of the punishment order till the passing of appellate order are strictly in accordance with law after following the due process and that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Justice Sinha noted that the record disclosed that the petitioner was served with two separate charge-memos on two different occasions. The first was issued by the then District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, on May 6, 2010, and the second by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal, on June 4, 2011.  Though issued on separate dates, both charge-memos substantially contain the same set of allegations. However, it appeared that the inquiry was conducted only with reference to the second charge memo issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Arwal. The Block Education Officer, Kurtha, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Block Education Officer, Karpi as Presenting officer. The allegations put forth against the petitioner as evident from memo of charge dated June 4, 2011 were as follows:-
(I) While functioning as the In-charge Headmaster of Middle School, Kinjhar, the petitioner remained absent from the school on 09.02.2010 without giving any prior information or obtaining permission from the competent authority.
(ii) During the period of his suspension vide Memo No. 494 dated 17.02.2010 issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Jehanabad, the petitioner did not report at the Headquarters as required under the suspension order.
(iii)That the petitioner disobeyed the directions issued by the Superior officers, appointing officers as well as controlling officers.
(iv) That the petitioner did not comply with Memo No. 493 dated 14.05.2010 thereby violating the order of the superior authority.
(v) During his functioning as the Headmaster, irregularities were committed by the petitioner in the 

He observed: "From perusal of the memo of charge, it would be evident that neither the charge-memos contains the statutory particulars required under Rule 17(3) of the Bihar CCA Rules. The charge-memos does not have any list of documents or list of witnesses as required by Rule 17(3) by whom the charges were proposed to be proved. The absence of these essential ingredients goes to the very root of the proceeding, for without being apprised of the documentary and oral evidence proposed to be relied upon. In order to sustain the charges, the delinquent cannot be expected to defend himself effectively. This Court
therefore finds that the very initiation of the departmental proceeding suffers from a foundational illegality." 

Justice Sinha observed: "19. It further appears that neither the petitioner nor the respondents have placed the inquiry report on record. In the absence of the report, this Court is unable to satisfy itself as to whether the inquiry was conducted in accordance with law, whether evidence was led in support of the charges, or whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceeding. The stand of the petitioner is that no notice of hearing was ever served upon him by the Enquiry Officer and that he was never given an opportunity to offer his defence. It is also his specific case that the disciplinary authority did not issue any second show-cause notice along with a copy of the inquiry report prior to imposition of the punishment, which is mandatory requirement under CCA Rules. These assertions have not been specifically denied on behalf of the State, and in the absence of such, the submissions of the petitioner is to be accepted."

Justice Harish Kumar sets aside Memorandum of Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University, Pusa

Patna High reiterates the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. 

In Dr. Shishir Kumar Gangwar vs. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University, Pusa, Samastipur through its Registrar & Ors. (2025), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 25-page long judgement on October 13, 2025, wherein, it concluded that there was substance in the writ petition, hence the charge memo, as contained in Memorandum April 2, 2025 as also the supplementary charge-sheet as contained in Memo dated July 9, 2025 are set aside. It remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law keeping in mind the specific prescription of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and the mandate of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath, reported in, (2014) 1 SCC 351.

Relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath, Justice Kumar observed: ''33. In view of the settled legal positing and the discussions made hereinabove, the issue answered accordingly; The Board of Management, being disciplinary authority, having power of delegation under the statute may delegate its power to the Vice-chancellor only to the extent of drawing the charge memo, but subject to approval by the disciplinary authority, before its issuance. Any memo of charge by the Chief Vigilance Officer without explicitly getting its approval by the Board of Management (Disciplinary Authority) cannot be held to be valid.''

The petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to challenge a Memorandum dated April 2, 2025 issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University, Pusa as also the departmental proceeding whereby and whereunder a charge-sheet for major penalty under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965[CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965] was proposed to be held against the petitioner on the imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour set out in the statement of charge. Challenge was also made to the Memorandum date July 9, 2025, issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority whereby a supplementary charge-sheet for major penalties under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was proposed to be held against the petitioner on the imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour mentioned in the article of charges. Since the aforenoted memorandum has been brought to the knowledge of the petitioner after filing of the present writ application, the same was challenged.

The petitioner, was initially appointed to the post of Associate Professor on contract in the Animal Project
Research Institute, Pusa. In the meanwhile, an advertisement dated December 4, 2017 was issued for appointment to the post of Programme Coordinator (Senior Scientist and Head) of Krishi Vigyan Kendra under Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agriculture University  (RPCAU), Pusa. The petitioner submitted application for the post aforenoted along with other applicants. The application forms of the candidates were duly scrutinized and a call letter in favour of the candidates, including the petitioner, was issued to participate in the selection process. A selection committee was constituted and after interview the committee recommended the name of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Programme Coordinator (Senior Scientist and Head). The recommendation was duly approved by the Vice-chancellor and the Board of Management whereupon offer of appointment contained in letter dated June 18, 2019 was issued.  On completion of probation period of two years, the services of the petitioner was confirmed vide letter dated August 28, 2021 w.e.f. June 18, 2019. On June 6, 2024, a show-cause notice, duly issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer, RPCAU, Pusa was served upon the petitioner as to why his services be not terminated, since the services rendered as SRF and Visiting faculty undertaken by the petitioner do not qualify for counting in experience, as those were project based contractual appointment. Since the petitioner did not possess the experience in the stipulated pay structure or for the stipulated period, thus was not eligible for appointment. The petitioner gave a response to the show-cause on July 18, 2024 refuting the allegation. On being found it unsatisfactory, the Chief Vigilance Officer issued impugned Memorandum dated April 2, 2025 for major punishment, which was challenged in the writ petition. 

After filing of the writ petition, the petitioner also came to know that a second memorandum containing supplementary charge-sheet for major penalty was also issued under Memo dated July 9, 2025 with a subsequent imputation that the petitioner was not eligible for the post at the time of submitting application on account of non-fulfillment of the essential age limit criteria. The maximum age limit for the post was 45 years, however, the petitioner at the time of submission of application was 46 years, 7 months and 27 days old. Furthermore, the petitioner was not entitled to any relaxation in age limit, as he was not a regular employee of RPCAU, Pusa at the time of submitting his application.

The senior advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned orders as well as initiation of departmental proceeding. He submitted that the alleged delinquence of the petitioner, if any, was known to the respondents in the year 2017, but the impugned memo of charge came to be issued in the year 2025, after a delay of eight years and, as such, belated initiation of departmental proceeding, besides it caused prejudice, the same is bound to affect his defence and thereby causing irreparable prejudice. It was submitted that this was not the case of the respondents or even the imputation against the petitioner that the documents/certificate submitted by the petitioner, were not genuine, forged and fabricated or manufactured one, rather the documents and the certificates were duly scrutinized by the screening committee in the office of RPCAU, Pusa, leading to issuance of the call letter. The petitioner faced the interview and on being recommended by the duly constituted selection committee, he was offered appointment after getting approval of the Vice-chancellor and the Board of Management of the University.

The senior counsel urged that the Board of Management of the University in its meeting held on December 6, 2023 had resolved to proceed for detailed enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for major penalty. After deliberation at length in each case, the Board of Management approved that the Vice-chancellor was authorized for approving Enquiry Officers and Presenting Officers, issuance of charge sheets, taking day-to-day decisions relating with the enquiry proceedings under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and submit enquiry report to the Board of Management for taking decision in the cases wherein the Board of Management was the disciplinary authority. Referring to the minutes of the meeting, it was submitted that once the Board of Management has delegated the power to the Vice-chancellor, the memorandum of charge can only be issued by the Vice-chancellor of the University itself and non-else. Issuance of the Memorandum containing charge-sheet for major penalty under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority is wholly without jurisdiction. Moreover, at delegated power must be conferred by the committee alone. He thus submitted that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. 

The senior counsel relied on decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in  A. K. Roy & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in, AIR 1986 SC 2160, Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. and another vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, reported in, (1994) 5 SCC 346 and Director General, ESI & Anr. vs. T. Abdul Razak, reported in, (1996) 4 SCC 708.

The petitioner's counsel relied on Supreme Court's decisions in Steel Authority of India vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in, (1980) 3 SCC 734, Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Madras & Anr. Vs. F. X. Fernando, reported in, (1994) 2 SCC 746 and Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath, reported in, (2014) 1 SCC 351.

In relation to the issue of inordinate delay in issuing charge memo, he drew upon the decision rendered by the Supreme  Court in State of M.P. vs. Bani Singh & Anr., reported in, AIR 1990 SC 1308, P.D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of India & Ors., reported in, (2006) 8 SCC 776, P. V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board, reported in, (2005) 6 SCC 636 and State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in, (1995) 2 SCC 570. The senior counsel concluded his submission that the impugned orders were unsustainable in law as well as on facts, inter alia, on the ground of delay and the same being issued by an authority, who is not competent to do so and the memo of charge contains no list of witnesses and documents and even if the allegation taken to be true, no case of misconduct is made out in absence of the allegation of suppression having been made by the petitioner and his testimonials/certificates are found
to be forged and fabricated.

Justice Kumar recorded that in the case of Bani Singh (supra), a delay of twelve years in initiating disciplinary proceedings without satisfactory explanation was held unfair and the enquiry was not permitted to proceed at such a later stage. The apex Court held that normally, pending or contemplated disciplinary proceedings have no impact on an employee’s right to be considered for promotion. Only when charges are framed after a prima facie case is made out, the sealed cover procedure applies. Where proceedings have not reached that stage, consideration for promotion cannot be withheld merely due to pendency of such proceedings. In the said case, even a preliminary enquiry on complaints regarding the officer’s integrity had not been completed, so the Screening Committee was wrong to defer his selection for the selection grade. Inordinate and unexplained delay of twelve years in initiating disciplinary proceeding renders enquiry unfair, as the pending unframed charges cannot  withhold promotion consideration.

In the case of P. D. Agrawal (supra), the Supreme Court observed that delay in initiating departmental enquiry does not vitiate proceedings unless the delinquent demonstrates prejudice caused thereby. 

In P. V. Mahadevan case (supra), the Supreme Court noticing the fact that irregularity committed in the year 1990 led to disciplinary action in the year 2000, though the explanation that the matter came to light in the year 1994-95 and the audit report was already rejected, but no convincing explanation was given for the inordinate delay. The Court held that a protracted disciplinary enquiry causing mental agony and suffering to the employee, the same should be avoided, not only in the interest of the employee but also in public interest and to inspire confidence among Government servants. 

In Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the delay if long and explained, the Court may quash the charges. However, what constitutes ‘too long’ depends on the facts of each case. If delay is likely to prejudice, the petitioner defence, the enquiry must be stopped. Whenever such a plea is raised, the Court must balance the factors for and against on the totality of circumstances.

The High Court's judgement observed:''the authority with delegated power cannot sub-delegate the delegated power unless legislature provides so, is well settled principle. In the case of A. K. Roy (supra), the Court held that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare merely indicates that sub-delegation of powers is not normally allowable though the legislature can always provide for sub-delegation. Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. In the said case, the power to initiate prosecution for offence under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was delegated by the State Government, through Rule 3, to the Food (Health) Authority, which was further delegated to Food Inspector. The Court held that the Food Authority had no power to delegate as rules framed under the statute cannot go against the provisions of statute.''

In the case of Sahni Silk Mills Pvt Ltd. (supra), the supreme Court held: “The Courts are normally rigorous in requiring that statutory power be exercised only by the persons or bodies authorised by the statute. Delegated power must be exercised by the conferred authority alone. However, in the present administrative set-up, extreme judicial aversion to delegation cannot be carried too far. A public authority may employ agents to exercise its powers, which is why many statutes authorise delegation either expressly or impliedly. With the enormous rise in statutory activities, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare is not being strictly applied, especially in cases of administrative discretionary power. It is almost settled that the legislature may permit any statutory authority to delegate its power to another authority, provided the statute lays down the policy framework within which the delegatee must act. The real controversy arises in cases of sub-delegation, since when Parliament has specifically appointed an authority to discharge a function, it cannot be readily presumed that the delegate has the freedom to empower another person or body to act in its place.”

As to whether the memorandum containing the charge-sheet/supplementary charge-sheet issued by the Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority was valid or suffers from the vice of sub-delegation of power dehors the Rule and the decision taken by the Board of Management, who is the disciplinary authority in the case in hand; but before answering this issue, it would be pertinent to take note of other decisions.

In the case of Steel Authority of India (supra), the Supreme Court noticed that under the Company’s Discipline and Appeal Rules, only the Personnel Manager as the disciplinary authority to frame charges and constitute an inquiry committee. Since there was no approved rule authorising any other head of department for this purpose, charge-sheets issued and inquiry committee constituted by the Chief Medical Officer was held to be unauthorised. Consequently, the dismissal order passed by the Personnel Manager on the basis of such inquiry reports by such unauthorized inquiry committee was held invalid.

In the case of F.X. Fernando (supra), the Supreme Court considering the fact that on the direction of the State Government, the Registrar (Head of Department) issued a charge-sheet on March 20, 1989 to a Stateservice officer upon conferring the power under notification dated March 17, 1988 held the charge-sheet was valid. The Court also observed that the Registrar though not empowered to impose penalty, could validly issue charge-sheet and appoint an Enquiry Officer when such power was conferred by State
Government under the notification.

The similar issue was also considered in B.V. Gopinath (supra) where the Supreme Court on being found that the charge-sheet not having been issued by the disciplinary authority held to be invalid. Under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the disciplinary authority must draw up or cause to be drawn up the definite and distinct articles of charge. The phrase “cause to be drawn up” only permits a subordinate authority to prepare a draft, but the charges must be approved and finalised by the disciplinary authority. Thus, a charge-sheet without such approval is without authority of law.

In the aforesaid settled legal background, this Court notices the facts of this case. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 reads as follows:
“(3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule and rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-
(i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charge;
(ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain-
(a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government servant;
(b) a list of documents by which, and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be
sustained.

Justice Kumar observed:''25. Bare reading of the aforesaid rule, it is manifest that it is a disciplinary authority, who shall or shall cause to be prepared the article of charge and statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour and that memo of charge shall contain a list of documents/witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. 26. Admittedly in the case in hand, the Board of
Management being the disciplinary authority in its meeting as per Agent Item No. 21.8 authorized the Vice-chancellor to approve appointment of Inquiry Officers and Presenting Officers, issue charge sheet and make day-to-day decisions related to the inquiry proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. If under the Rule, the disciplinary authority is empowered and authorized to issue the article of charge and statement of imputation of misconduct and misbehaviour, then the same is required to be done by the disciplinary authority alone and none else. Even if it is accepted that after deliberation, the Board of Management has authorized the Vice-chancellor for approving the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer for issuance of charge-sheet and take day-to-day decision relating with the enquiry proceeding and submitted the enquiry report to the Board of Management for taking decision, the Memo of charge issued under the signature of Chief Vigilance Officer, for and on behalf of the disciplinary authority is not unsustainable in law, without its approval having been done by the Board of Management.''

In the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), the Court while emphasizing the Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India, which ensures that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service can be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed observed that to effectuate and ensure compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2), the Government of India has promulgated the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent found to be initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the Rules, 1965. It is further observed that Rule 14(3) clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the substance of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and distinct articles of charges. The Court further ruled that the term “cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the definite and distinct articles of charges once drawn up do not have to be approved by the disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority to perform the task of drawing up substance of proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary authority. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting documents including a list of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be proved. It is, therefore, not possible to interpret this provision as providing that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the charge-sheet can be drawn up by an authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. Such a charge-sheet can only be issued upon approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister.

In the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), the Supreme Court also underscored the principle of rule against delegation by explaining the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare and referred the decision of Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court held that the charge-sheet/charge memo having not been approved by the disciplinary authority is non est in the eye of the law.

The two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod Kumar, IPS and Another, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 677 clarified the necessity of approval of initiation of disciplinary proceeding distinguished from approval of charge-sheet. The Court noticing the decision rendered in B.V. Gopinath (supra) held that if any authority other than the disciplinary authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Court unequivocally held that the rule requires something to be done in particular manner it should be done in the same manner and not at all.

Taking note of mandatory requirement of Rule 8(4) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the Court observed that since the charge memo being drawn up or caused to be drawn up by the disciplinary authority is not complied with find no illegality in the order passed by the High Court on this issue, whereby it quashes the disciplinary proceeding, however, the Supreme Court also extended liberty to the disciplinary authority to issue a charge memo afresh after taking approval from the disciplinary authority.

Justice Purnendu Singh as part of DB upholds verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in a CCA case from 1991

Supreme Court's decision in Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255) irrelevant in this CCA case? 

Justice Purnendu Singh as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar authored a 9-page long judgment dated July 1, 2025 wherein, he upheld the verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Awadh Tiwari vs. The State of Bihar (2025). Justice Singh who authored the judgement observed:"...the appellant has not been able to show any illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge. The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal. The appeal is dismissed."

In the year 1989 while posted as Junior Engineer in the Minor Distributory Division-IX, Ghatshila Camp, Galudih, as a result of an agreement entered into, M/s Barauni Tiles was required supply PCC tiles which the appellant was to receive. Awadh Tiwari, the appellant received the same, however without waiting for the quality test report of the tiles, payment was made to the contractor, causing financial loss to the government.

By an order contained in Resolution no.1691 dated July 17, 1991, a decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant under Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 which was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Rule 55A of the Rules. The appellant was served with a memo of charge according to which he during his tenure had received substandard tiles for the purpose of lining of canal. The tiles supplied at the ratio 1:2.97 of cement and sand against the specified ratio of 1:2. A sum of Rs.11,73,000/ had been paid to the contractor causing loss to the State exchequer. 

The charge was to the effect that the appellant was negligent and casual in his duty causing financial loss to the State. He had prepared the bill for payment to the contractor without getting the quality of the supplied tiles tested. The appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice and on consideration of the contents thereof, the respondents came out with an order of punishment dated December 11, 1999 according to which there was stoppage of promotion for a period of ten years and further order of recovery of a sum to the tune of Rs.1,46,625.

The appellant had moved to the High Court in CWJC no.1015 of 2000 against the order of punishment which was allowed vide order dated February 17, 2006, the order of punishment quashed and the respondents were directed to refund the recovered amount on the basis of the said order to the appellant forthwith. 

The respondents preferred an appeal (LPA no.790 of 2007) against the order allowing the writ application (CWJC no.1015 of 2000). Though the judgment passed in the writ application was not interfered with and the appeal dismissed, however it was observed that if the law permits, the State of Bihar can proceed against the concerned employee in accordance with law.

The respondents included Secretary, Water Resources Department, Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Deputy Secretary, Water Resources Department and Engineer-In-Chief Middle, Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar. 

The respondents came out with an order dated January 18, 2011 stating therein that a decision was taken to proceed against the appellant and two others under Rule 17 of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. The chargesheet containing the charges was enclosed with the order, to which the appellant filed his reply.

When the appellant retired from service on May 31, 2011, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was converted into a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.

The enquiry officer submitted his report dated January 12, 2012 not finding the charges to have been proved against the appellant. Disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report, a detailed second show cause contained in Memo no.683 dated June 26, 2012 was issued under the signature of the Engineer-in-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, which was brought on record with the counter affidavit of the respondents in the writ application.

The letter showed that the point of difference of the disciplinary authority with the report of the enquiry officer was two fold. Firstly, that inspite of the ratio of cement and sand in the tiles supplied by the contractor being 1:2.97 in place of the specified 1:2, steps had been taken by the appellant in the measurement book for payment to the contractor, though he should have obtained the directions of the higher authorities with respect to the quality test report and only thereafter should have proceeded to take steps for payment. The second point of difference was to the effect that a direction had been given to the Barauni Tiles i.e. the contractor to replace the tiles but the contractor had not carried out the directions. Inspite of having knowledge of this fact, the appellant proceeded to make entries in the measurement book and recommend for payment of amount to the contractor.

The appellant filed his response to the show cause notice dated June 26, 2012 of the disciplinary authority differing with the contents of the enquiry report. After considering the reply of the appellant, the respondents passed an order contained in Memo no.374 dated March 20, 2013 under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules imposing punishment of 5% pension. Following dismissal of the writ application preferred by the appellant against the order of punishment, the appeal was preferred.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that in the enquiry conducted in the departmental proceeding against the appellant, the enquiry officer in his report dated January 12, 2012 did not find any of the three charges to have been proved. Though the disciplinary authority issued a second show cause notice dated June 26, 2012, however no reason was given therein for differing with the contents of the enquiry report. It merely repeated the charges as contained in the chargesheet issued in the departmental proceeding. It was submitted that the second show cause notice as also the order of punishment are both unsustainable. The counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255). 

But Justice Singh observed:"So far as the judgment in the case of Ram Kishan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same is of no assistance to the appellant herein, the facts of the two cases being distinct and distinguishable.While the instant case relates to steps of payment having been taken by the delinquent/appellant inspite of sub-quality tiles having been supplied by the contractor, the case cited relates to misconduct of the Constable/appellant therein of having facilitate supply of alcohol to an under-trial prisoner and of having abused his superior officer." 

Siya Ram Sahi and Shally Kumari were the counsels for the appellant. 

The appellant was proceeded against departmentally under the CCA Rules while still in service, on his retirement on May 31, 2011, the proceedings were converted into one under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The enquiry officer submitted his report on January 12, 2012 not finding any of the charges levelled against the appellant to have been proved. The disciplinary authority disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report issued a second show cause notice to the appellant on June 26, 2012 to which the appellant submitted his reply. Not finding the reply to be satisfactory, another show cause notice was issued to the appellant on December 3, 2012 stating therein that it was proposed to impose a punishment on the appellant under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The appellant was given time of 15 days to submit his reply which was filed by the appellant on December 22, 2012. The reply of the appellant was not found satisfactory and the order of punishment was passed which was challenged unsuccessfully in the writ application before Justice Sinha, the single judge bench. 

The writ application was preferred against the order dated March 20, 2013 bearing Memo No.374 passed by Engineer-In-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby punishment of stoppage of 5% pension was imposed upon the petitioner in a departmental proceeding concluded under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. 

Before dismissing the writ application, in his 10-page long judgement dated March 14, 2023, Justice Sinha had observed:"...the Court while testing the validity of the order of the punishment is required to see the flaw into decision making process and cannot sit upon the decision itself as an appellate authority. Even assuming the aforesaid instruction of Cabinet (Vigilance) Department dated 06.07.1992 vide Memo No. 1045 is applicable in the case of the petitioner in relation to the permissible limit of difference in ratio up to 25% but the difference of ratio found by the Laboratory in the present case to the extent of 1:2.97 is more than the permissible limit of 25%. The petitioner has not pointed out any procedural infirmity and or violation of principle of natural justice in the departmental proceeding. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I come to the conclusion that the impugned order of punishment does not require any interference by this Court..."

The judgement by the Division Bench which upheld Justice Sinha's judgement appears to be a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court.