A juvenile can be denied bail only on three grounds recorded in writing: Supreme Court

In Re-Exploitation of Children in Orphanages in the State of Tamil Nadu vs. Union of Indian & Ors. as reported in (2020) 14 SCC 327, the Supreme Court has held that bail to a juvenile can be denied only on three grounds as provided in the Proviso to Section 12(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: "7. Sub-section (1) makes it absolutely clear that a child alleged to be in conflict with law should be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person. The only embargo created is that in case the release of the child is likely to bring him into association with known criminals or expose the child to moral, physical or psychological danger or where the release of the child would defeat the ends of justice, then bail can be denied for reasons to be recorded in writing. Even if bail is not granted, the child cannot be kept in jail or police lock-up and has to be kept in an observation home or place of safety."

The ends of justice in the context of any Act is ascertained on the basis of the purpose and object of that Act and the objective of the J.J. Act is to reform and rehabilitate the juveniles and not to punish them, as emerges from the preamble to the J.J. Act, which reads: “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection by catering to their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment, social reintegration, by adopting a child-friendly approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters in the best interest of children and for their rehabilitation through processes provided, and institutions and bodies established, hereinunder and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

Section 12 of the J.J. Act is equally applicable to all juveniles in conflict with law without any discrimination of any nature. Even a juvenile, aged between 16 to 18 years and being accused of heinous offence and being tried by Children Court, is entitled to get bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. The nature and seriousness of the alleged offence is not relevant for consideration of bail under Section 12 of the J.J. Act. “The ends of justice” as used in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act is drastically different to one as used in general criminal jurisprudence. If the detention of the juvenile at Observation Home or other institutions as contemplated under the J.J. Act is helpful in protection, development and rehabilitation of the juvenile, only then it can be said that release of the child would defeat the ends of justice. The family of the child in conflict with law is the best and first desirable institution to achieve the object of the J.J.Act. Institutionalization of a juvenile in conflict with law is the last resort and every child in conflict with law has right to be reunited with his family at the earliest. Under Section 12 of the J.J. Act, 2015, bail to a juvenile is a rule and the refusal of the same is an exception and it can be denied only on the grounds as provided in the proviso to Section 12(1) of the J.J. Act, 2015. 26(6). The denial of bail must be reasoned and the grounds of denial must be based on relevant facts and circumstances, as emerging from the material on record. The Social Investigation Report (SIR) is one of the most significant such material. The perusal of SIR report is mandatory as per Section 15 (2) of the J.J. Act, 2015. The Board/Court is required to know not only about the offence committed by the juvenile but even about the socio-economic conditions/circumstances under which the offence was committed, in order to ensure that appropriate order in regard to the juvenile in conflict with law could be passed with intent to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile and reintegrate him with the mainstream of the society. All resources have to be mobilised including those of the family and the community for reforming and rehabilitating the juvenile in conflict with law to make him productive member of the society. 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha grants bail to a child in conflict with law, sets aside order Appellate Court, Saran and Juvenile Justice Board in a gang-rape case

Name of the offender juvenile anonymized, but the name of the victim of gang rape disclosed in the judgement, ignoring Supreme Court's repeated directions

In X vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated June 29, 2026 concluded:"15. Let the petitioner, a child in conflict with law, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra/concerned Court in connection with JJB Case No. 51 of 2025, arising out of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the parents of the petitioner and the other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent and shall give undertaking that he / she shall keep proper care and upkeep of the petitioner. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board. (iii) If the petitioner is found involved in similar nature of offence in future, the learned J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra will be at liberty to move for cancellation of his bail bond. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed." 

The respondent no. 2 is Tannu Kumari is the daughter of Rajendra Kumar Yadav, resident of village near Sadha Dhala, Bazar Samiti, Mufassil, Saran was impleaded as a opposite party no. 2 on the directions of Justice Jha by his order dated February 23, 2026. The order reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner is was directed to be implead the informant of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025 as opposite party no. 2 in course of the day."

Justice set aside the order by the Appellate Court dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra in Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2025. Subsequently, the order of the Juvenile Justice Board in a JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 was also set aside. 

The judgement records that in the revision petition, the identity details of the petitioner /child in conflict with law was disclosed, which is against the statutory provisions prescribed under Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandates protection of disclosure of identity of the child in conflict with law.  Therefore, the identity of the child in conflict with law is being referred to in the cause title as X. 3. Registry while uploading the order on the website shall also ensure that the cause title is reflected in similar manner. 

Notably, the petitioner is a son of Jitendra Ray, resident of village- New Basti Brahmpur, Bhagwan Bazar, Saran. His mother is Rinku Devi.  

The criminal revision petition was directed against the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra, in a Criminal (Juvenile) Appeal of 2025, whereby and whereunder the appeal was dismissed and the order of Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra dated September 8, 2025 passed in JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 70(1) and 3(5) of the B.N.S., 2023, was affirmed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 

As per prosecution case, the petitioner and other co-accused persons committed gang-rape with the informant. The petitioner was apprehended and was in custody since January 19, 2025 of the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. The petitioner was declared a child in conflict with law vide order dated August 11, 2025 passed by the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. 

Being aggrieved by the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the Appellate Court, the petitioner moved the revision petition before the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner/child in conflict with law submitted that the child in conflict with law was falsely implicated in this case and he was innocent. The prosecution story was not believable. The FIR was registered after a delay of more than twenty-four hours without any plausible explanation. Though the child in conflict with law was named as an accused in the written report on which the FIR was instituted, the informant did not name this child in conflict with law in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the B.N.S.S., 2023. He also submitted that the medical report did not support the allegation of gang-rape. The main accused against whom there was specific allegation of kidnapping the informant and taking her to a secluded place and committing rape with her, was been granted bail by First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra. The counsel further submitted that the Courts below failed to appreciate the mandate of law as under Section 12 as well as Sections 3(i), 3(IV), 3(V) and 3(XIV) of the Act of 2015. The counsel also submitted that the Courts below failed to consider that prolonged detention of a child in conflict with law defeats the very objective of the J.J. Act which is reformative and rehabilitative in nature. It was submitted that mother of the child in conflict with law undertakes to take full care of her son and further undertakes that she would not allow the child in conflict with law to come in contact with bad elements. The child in conflict with law was having antecedent of five cases and  he was on bail in all these cases. 

APP for the State and the counsel for the OP No. 2 vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner/child in conflict with law. The counsel for the OP No. 2 submitted that the Courts below has correctly passed the orders considering the antecedent of the child in conflict with law. The child in conflict with law was having altogether five criminal cases and he committed all these offences while on bail in two such cases. There was every likelihood that the child in conflict with law would again commit some serious offence if he was enlarged on bail. He also submitted that thus there was apparent mental, physical and psychological danger to the child in conflict with law (CICL) and it was also very likely that the CICL would again come in contact with his associates who appear to be inveterate criminals.

Justice Jha observed: "10. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements or there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or the release would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could not be denied to a CICL. 11. Further, the Act of 2015 is, in fact, child friendly. The central theme is that the interest of child is supreme. Section 3 of the Act of 2015 incorporates the general principles to be followed in the administration of the Act. According to which, “all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. In fact, Section 3(iv) of the Act of 2015 provides for the principle of best interest and for all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. Section 3(xii) of the Act of 2015 makes it abundantly clear that a child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry. Further, Section 3(xiii) of the Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for Principle of repatriation and restoration stating that a CICL shall have the right to re-unite with his family and be restored to the social, cultural and the economic background that he came from unless such restoration and repartition is not in the CICL’s best interest." 

The judgement reads: "12. Cumulative reading of aforesaid provisions show the CICL should be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. Further, the Courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a CICL." 

Justice Jha recorded: "It is true that the CICL is having antecedent of five cases and it also appears that he has been named in this case after release on bail in two such cases, but the intent and purpose of the J.J. Act is to reform a child delinquent and if the Court refused to release the child and bring him to his family would defeat the purpose if prayer for bail is rejected on the ground of criminal antecedent, though it becomes relevant factor for considering whether the case of the CICL falls in any of the exceptions under Section 12 of the Act of 2015. Since the bail of the CICL is refused solely on the ground of criminal antecedent, I think the CICL can be given an opportunity to reform himself and for reformation and rehabilitation of the CICL, the best place is his family and as his mother has undertaken to take care of him, I think considering all these facts and circumstances and the mandate of law, the prayer for bail of the CICL could be sympathetically considered." 

While the removal of the name of the a child in conflict with law has rightly been protected from disclosure, the disclosure of the name of the informant does appear to be appropriate.  

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Hukum Chand @ Monu 2026 INSC 290, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh concluded:"we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (((2019) 2 SCC 703)) which has mandated the non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences." The Bench drew attention towards the Court's decisions in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh 1996) 2 SCC 384 which touched upon this issue in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also towards Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of HP (2003) 8 SCC 551.

"Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14":Supreme Court

In Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 37-page long judgement dated March 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"The impugned Act authorises the State to take over the Institute & Library in its entirety, dissolving existing legal arrangements and divesting long-standing rights, without any demonstrated necessity, objective criteria, or prior inquiry. The manner in which this power is exercised is excessive, unreasoned and disproportionate to the stated object of 'better management and development'. We are therefore satisfied that the Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Vikram Nath authored the judgement. The judgement reads:"....the scheme of the Act permits deprivation of property without adherence to basic requirements of fairness and due process. The absence of any principled or meaningful framework for compensation underscores the arbitrary character of the legislative measure. While Article 300A permits deprivation of property by authority of law, such law must be fair, reasonable and non-confiscatory. The impugned Act fails to meet this standard. 52. In view of the above, the judgment and order dated 29th February 2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.7940 of 2015 is set aside. The Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is declared unconstitutional and is accordingly struck down. 53. Accordingly, the Trust governing the Institute & Library, together with its rights of management and administration, shall stand restored to its pre-existing legal position prior to the enactment of the impugned Act. This shall not preclude the State Government from providing financial assistance, administrative support or regulatory oversight in accordance with law. 54. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

The Court appeal arose on i. Whether the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ii. Whether the impugned Act effects compulsory acquisition and extinguishment of rights in a confiscatory manner, thereby offending Article 300A read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 

The Court heard the appeal which challenged 37-page long judgment dated February 29, 2024 passed by Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court in Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2024), whereby the appellant’s writ petition was dismissed by the High Court while upholding the validity of the Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015. The respondent no. 2 was the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The High Court's judgment was authored by Justice Chandran. 

Notably, the Institute & Library were established in 1924 by Sachichidanand Sinha, a distinguished public figure of Bihar, who served as the first President of the Constituent Assembly for an interim period. The Institute & Library was founded in memory of his wife, Radhika Sinha. For this purpose, Sachichidanand Sinha had addressed a letter to the then Governor of Bihar and Orissa, offering a sum of ₹50,000 from the sale proceeds of ancestral property belonging to Radhika Sinha. The offer was accepted, and the foundation stone was laid on March 28, 1922. The construction of the buildings for the Institute and Library was completed using the money.

Justice Chandran had concluded:"46. The vesting occurs of ‘the Institute & Library’ on the State Government for the purpose of better management and development of ‘the Institute & Library’. The objects of the Trust cannot be digressed from by the State Government nor is it intended to be, as is disclosed from the impugned enactment. Whatever rights, powers and duties that remained with the Trustees, in the management of ‘the Institute & Library’ as was available after Annexure-2 agreement was entered into, would also vest completely in the State Government by the impugned enactment. 47. We find absolutely no reason to entertain the writ petition and dismiss the same but hasten to add that the vesting does not absolve the State Government from carrying on the objects of the Trust; which obligation attaches itself to the Trust taken over by the State Government, intention of the original settlor. 48. The writ petition stands dismissed without any order on costs." His conclusion has been set aside and the Supreme Court declared the Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 to be unconstitutional, and has been accordingly struck down. 

Also read: Constitutionality of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 remains sub judice

Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 is constitutionally valid: Patna High Court 

Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justice Ashutosh Kumar with regard to validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under Pharmacy Act

In Md. Firoz Mansuri & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered a 31-page long judgement dated January 16, 2026 wherein it examined whether Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy erred in upholding the constitutional validity of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended by the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024) in its 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025. Supreme Court considered the question as to whether candidates holding Bachelor or Master of Pharmacy degrees, without possessing a Diploma in Pharmacy, satisfy the minimum eligibility criteria prescribed for appointment to the post of Pharmacist (basic category) under the said Rules. The Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 on October 10, 2014 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court concluded:"....we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the Division Bench in upholding the validity of the Cadre Rules."

Rule 6(1) stipulates the minimum educational qualification for appointment by direct recruitment to basic category posts, in the following terms: “Qualifications. (1) For appointment by direct recruitment to the basic category posts, minimum educational qualification shall be Intermediate/10+2 (Science) pass and passing in all parts (part I, II & III) of Diploma-in Pharmacy from the institution recognised by the Government and a certificate to that effect shall be necessary.” 

The note to Appendix-I(1) of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024 clarifies that: “Note: B. Pharma & M. Pharma certificate holder may be eligible provided they possess qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. The Appellants contended that Rule 6(1), read with the aforesaid Note, is repugnant to the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 framed thereunder, on the ground that the central legislation occupies the field of prescription of qualifications for pharmacists. The Pharmacy Act, 1948 was enacted to regulate the profession of pharmacy and to constitute pharmacy councils for that purpose. Section 2(i) of the Act defines a registered pharmacist as person whose name is entered in the State register for carrying on the profession or business of pharmacy. Section 10 of the Act stipulates that the Pharmacy Council of India may make the Education Regulations, prescribing the minimum standard of education required for qualification as a pharmacist. Sections 31 and 32 pertain to the registration of a person having the requisite qualification in the register. Further, Section 42 stipulates that no person other than a registered pharmacist or a medical practitioner shall be permitted to practice pharmacy.  

Supreme observe that "the scope of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, is limited to regulating the educational qualifications and professional conduct in the practice of pharmacy. The Act creates a pool of persons eligible to practise as pharmacists, it does not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for appointment to public posts. Its scope does not extend to conferring a right to public employment." 

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court noted that the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 were framed in exercise of the powers under Sections 10 and 18 of the Act. The objectives of the Regulations are stated to be improving the quality of health care,  ensuring high professional standards among pharmacists, reducing health care costs, and preventing the criminal misuse of medication. Additionally, Clause 2(h) of the Regulations provides the various classes of pharmacy practitioners including community pharmacist, hospital pharmacist, pharmacist. These Regulations govern professional practice and conduct. They do not govern public recruitment nor do they restrict the discretion of the State, as an employer, to select candidates from within the larger pool of registered pharmacists for specific public posts. The judgement reads: "49. Repugnancy arises only where compliance with one law necessarily results in disobedience of another, or where both laws occupy the same field and are irreconcilable. The Cadre Rules operate in the domain of public employment, while the Act and Regulations operate in the field of professional regulation. It is true that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot permit the appointment of persons who are not registered pharmacists under the 2015 Regulations, as Section 42 of the Act expressly prohibits such appointments. However, Section 42 cannot be construed to confer a right to public employment merely by virtue of registration. The Act only creates a pool of eligible persons who may be appointed as pharmacists, the 2015 Regulations certify who is technically competent to practice as a pharmacist, while the Cadre Rules reflect the State’s policy choice in selecting from the broader pool for public employment. No conflict arises unless the State appoints someone lacking the minimum technical qualification. 50. Once repugnancy is ruled out, the determination of eligibility criteria squarely falls within the domain of the employer. The power to frame rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the State to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment." 

The Court observed:"Therefore, it has been consistently recognised that it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of qualifications. The power of judicial review in matters of recruitment is limited to examining legislative competence, arbitrariness or violation of fundamental rights, if any. Courts cannot rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute their own assessment for that of the employer. The scope of judicial review in matters of public employment does not extend to questioning the State’s wisdom or policy in prescribing the minimum eligibility requirements for a public post. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the needs and interests of an institution, an industry or an establishment, as the case may be. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The assessment of the expediency, advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications do not warrant intervention of the Courts unless the same are shown to be perverse. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily in prescribing qualifications for posts." 

Justice Sharma who authored the judgement observed: "The prescription of eligibility criteria of 10+2 with Diploma in Pharmacy by the State cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. The State has articulated its rationale with reference to differences in course structure and the comparatively limited avenues of employment available to Diploma holders. 62. The course structure of Diploma in Pharmacy is governed by the Education Regulations, 1991, which has been replaced by the Education Regulation, 2020. The Diploma in Pharmacy course mandates 500 hours of compulsory practical training, including 250 hours devoted to dispensing prescriptions. The 2020 Regulation has refined the scope of training, limiting it to hospital, dispensary, or clinic-based activities. While, under the B. Pharma course Regulations, 2014, degree students are required to undergo 150 hours of practical training and they have the option to undertake the training either in a hospital/community centre or within the pharmaceutical industry. The diplomates and graduates are trained in different subjects. Merely because there is a provision for lateral entry of diplomates in the second year of B. Pharm course, it does not render the degree an in-line higher qualification. A qualification in one stream does not presuppose a qualification in another. Furthermore, the diplomates have limited employment avenues as compared to degree holders. Thus, the decision of the State in making possession of a Diploma an essential qualification for appointment cannot be said to be arbitrary. The State has merely identified a narrower catchment of candidates it considers most suitable for a particular purpose, from within the larger pool registered pharmacists....64. Additionally, there is no absolute exclusion of graduate or postgraduate degree holders. They remain eligible, provided they possess the essential qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. No disproportionate harm is caused to them so as to attract Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution." 

In Pharmacy Council of India vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy had delivered a 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025 wherein, it disposed all the writ petitions were disposed of without relief to the petitioners.   

Also read: Patna High Court upholds validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under the Pharmacy Act of 1948  

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ritesh Kumar bench directs release of minor, directs payment of Rs 5 lakh by erring officials as compensation for illegal arrest

In Md. Jahid (Minor) under the guardianship of cousin brother Mohammad Navi Hussain/Parokar vs. The State of Bihar, through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench-II of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....we direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith by the Juvenile Justice Board from the observation home/children’s home and in this regard appropriate release order shall be issued by the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura forthwith. 24. For his unlawful arrest and detention, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation. This amount, we are assessing, keeping in view that a young boy who is a juvenile at this stage has undergone physical and mental agony for two and half months by now. The State Government shall pay this amount to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Justice Prsad who authored the judgement drew on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1960 while dealing with the case of contravention of fundamental rights of a citizen. He referred to the decision in Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 5 by the Patna High Court which observed in paragraphs ‘27’, ‘28’ and ‘29’: “27. In the case of Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar and Another while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.” 28. In the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the learned Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials."

The judgement reads: "25. We find that the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ application of Habeas Corpus. He/his family has incurred expenses in contesting the litigation which were imposed upon them due to misuse of power by the police official. 26. We, therefore, award a cost of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) to the petitioner which shall also be paid by the State within the same period. 27. It is well settled in law that when the State is saddled with cost and compensation because of misuse of power by an executive, such cost and compensation must be realized from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which was subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019, however, the same has not been interfered with and the view is based on the earlier views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been duly discussed."

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement wrote: "28. We direct the competent authority/the Director General of Police, Bihar to institute an inquiry into the matter in administrative side, take a suitable view based on the materials which would come in course of the inquiry proceeding and realize the cost and the compensation amount from the erring officials. The cost and compensation amount which will be paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring officials after completion of inquiry, within a period of six months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 29. This writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Principal District Judge, Madhepura, the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura and the Director General of Police, Bihar for compliance."

The writ application was filed in the nature of a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release of the petitioner from the illegal detention of the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the I.O. in this case arrested the petitioner in complete disregard to the powers of arrest and without following the established procedure of law. The petitioner alleged gross violation of his fundamental right as embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One Khushboo Praveen wife of Md. Amzad, resident of village Sapardah Ward No. 8, P.S.- Puraini, District- Madhepura lodged a first information report giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 11, 2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 308(2), 109, 303(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. She alleged that in connection with a land dispute, a Panchayati was held with the intervention of the co-villagers, the accused persons called the prosecution side to participate in the said Panchayati but while the Panchayati was going on, the 14 named accused including this petitioner who are all the co-villagers of the informant assaulted the prosecution side. It was also alleged that the accused persons had taken away the silver chain and other ornaments. In connection with the said occurrence, the petitioner’s mother also lodged a counter case giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 16, 2025. The  case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 76, 126(2), 109, 303(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3) of the BNS, 2023. 

During investigation of the Puraini P.S. Case, the I.O. found that there was no sufficient material to proceed against ten named accused persons including thE petitioner. One accused, namely, Md. Naushad was arrested. The investigation was supervised by the Inspector and upon instructions, the I.O. filed a chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 235 of 2025 dated September 1, 2025 in which ten accused including this petitioner were shown in Column No. 12 as not chargesheeted accused. In another words, they were not sent up for trial. A reading of the chargesheet which is on the record  would show that the same was filed on the direction of the Senior Police officer, while the arrested accused Md. Naushad was chargesheeted, the investigation was kept open against three absconding accused, namely, (1) Md. Muktar, (2) Md. Zakir and (3) Md. Akhtar. It was apparent that after about 25 days, the I.O. received a review note/supervision note from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short ‘DIG’), Koshi Range, Saharsa. It was evident that the supervision note was recorded by the DIG on his own on the request of the informant who had visited the office of the DIG with an application complaining that the Inspector of Police had wrongly exonerated ten named accused persons. The DIG simply recorded in his note the allegations. Taking note of the statements of the witnesses, he issued a direction to the I.O. to proceed with the investigation of the case assuming that the allegations are true against the accused persons. He directed the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura to ensure further action and arrest all the remaining accused persons expeditiously. A perusal of the case diary would showed that the supervision note of the DIG was incorporated in the case diary on September 25, 2025 whereafter the I.O. straightway proceeded to conduct raid on the house of the accused persons. The case diary did not show that after the supervision note of the DIG, any instruction was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura. It did not show that the I.O., being fully aware of the fact that the ten accused persons had already been shown not sent up for trial, made any application in the court of Magistrate for permitting a further investigation. The I.O. could not lay his hand to any other material against the petitioner but on October 23, 2025, he arrested the petitioner, described his age as 19 years and produced him before the court from where he was sent to jail. It appeared that even at the time of his production before the Magistrate, the attention of the Magistrate was not drawn towards the fact that the petitioner was shown in the column of not chargesheeted accused in the chargesheet, therefore, once the chargesheet had been filed in the court, it was incumbent upon the I.O. to file an application seeking further investigation of the case if at all any material had come against the petitioner. Even the Magistrate did not look into these aspects of the matter and straightway in a mechanical manner sent the petitioner behind the bars. 

The petitioner approached the High Court by filing the writ application and informed this Court on November 24, 2025 in course of hearing that the petitioner was a juvenile as per his date of birth certificate i.e. the registration card of the Bihar School Examination Board showing his date of birth as January 1, 2010. The petitioner complained that despite the fact that he was a juvenile, the Magistrate did not assess his age at the time of sending him behind the bars and in complete breach of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the petitioner was languishing in jail. On 24.11.2025, the High Court noticed the submissions and asked the State to file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the I.O. who had effected the arrest of the petitioner. In the meantime, the High Court observed that “it will be open to the Jurisdictional Magistrate to take corrective measures after considering the date of birth certificate of the petitioner. If it is found that the petitioner is aged below 18 years, it will be incumbent upon the Jurisdictional Magistrate to send him to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for assessment of age and considering his date of birth certificate as per the Bihar School Examination Board, he would be kept in an observation home and not in jail with adults.”

The High Court was been informed at this stage that, in fact, after coming to know the claim of the petitioner that he was a juvenile, the Jurisdictional Magistrate had vide his order dated November 21, 2025 referred him for assessment of age to the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura. A Letter No. 13 dated January 7, 2026 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura showed that the petitioner was declared juvenile aged about 15 years 06 months and 08 days on the date of occurrence.

A question arose for consideration in the present case as to how the petitioner could have been arrested on October 23, 2025 when he was not chargesheeted in the case and, in fact, in the Chargesheet No. 235, he was shown one amongst the ten accused persons who were not chargesheeted/sent up for trial.

Justice Prasad observed:"We have already taken note of the fact that during investigation, sufficient materials were not found against the petitioner to send him to trial and after the supervision note of the DIG, the I.O. had not collected any other and further material against the petitioner. All that he did after receipt of the supervision note of the DIG was that he conducted a raid and ultimately arrested the petitioner from his house on 23.10.2025." 

Supreme Court seized with challenge against Patna High Court's order which set aside Children’s Court's order against order by Juvenile Justice Board

In Munni Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Supreme Court's Division of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi passed a 2-page long order dated November 20, 2025, upon hearing the SLP (Criminal) wherein the petitioner has challenged the 6-page long order dated July 31, 2025 by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of the Patna High Court in Gautam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025). The Division Bench condoned the delay, issued notice, returnable on January 9, 2026. The order reads: "5. In the notice itself let it be mentioned that the 1respondents are required to file the counter affidavit before the next date of listing. 6. In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of all further proceedings arising out of FIR No.644 of 2022 of Ara Town Police Station, Bhojpur District, Bihar." 

In Gautam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Justice Chaudhuri had passed the order dated July 31, 2025, wherein, referring to the case of Children in Conflict with Law (CICL), he had concluded: "11. The learned Children’s Court mis-appreciated the provision of Section 104(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The aforementioned provision provides that without prejudice to the provision for appeal and revision, under the said Act, the Committee or Board may on an application received in this behalf amend any orders passed by itself, as to the institution to which a child is to be sent or as to the person under whose care or supervision a child is to be placed under the Act. Clause-(2) of Section 104 speaks about amendment of clerical and arithmetical mistake. 12. Second application filed by the petitioner was not an application for rectification of any clerical mistake. This was an application for declaring the petitioner as a juvenile. The said application is maintainable and the order passed by the Children’s Court in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024 is set aside. The CICL shall be tried in accordance with the provisions contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 13. The instant revision is accordingly, allowed on contest. There shall be however, no order as to cost." 

The second respondent was/is Munni Devi, wife of Satya Narayan Rai, Badka Chanda village, Koelwar, Bhojpur. The case arose out of a PS. case 2022 Thana-Ara Nagar, Bhojpur.

This criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated October 1, 2024 passed by the First Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Children’s Court, Bhojpur at Ara in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024, whereby the Court of Appeal set aside the order dated May 1, 2024 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board in a J.J.B. case of 2023. The revision petition had challenged the order dated October 1, 2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024.

The Ara Town P.S. case of 2022 was registered on the basis of Fardbeyan of one Ramadhar Rai, which was recorded by the S.H.O. of Ara Town police station on July 17, 2020 at around 5:00 a.m., the informant went to the house of his step mother, namely, Sumitra Devi. As soon as he reached in front of the door of the house of Sumitra Devi, he found blood sipping out from beneath the door. Immediately he opened the gate and found dead-body of his step mother having bleeding injury on her body. He also found the dead-body of Ram Awadhesh Rai @ Munna lying on the bed having fetal injury on his abdomen. It appeared to the informant that both of them were shot dead then he rushed to call Premchand Rai, brother of Sumitra Devi, who used to reside in the neighborhood some other people also rushed to the place of occurrence and gathered on the basis of the said statement, police registered Ara Town P.S. case of 2022 dated July 17, 2020 under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

During investigation, the Investigating Officer suspected the informant, his son Gautam Kumar, Sonu Kumar, Bittu @ Arbaaz Khan as the perpetrated of the offence. On completion of investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against Gautam Kumar, Sonu Kumar, Bittu @ Arbaaz Khan while the investigation was kept pending against the informant Ramadhar Rai, Nikhil Kumar and Vikas Kumar.

The petitioner had filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur at Ara claiming himself to be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. The Chief Judicial Magistrate referred the case to the Juvenile Justice Board for further consideration. Initially the Board by an order dated December 14, 2022 rejected the petition filed by the CICL holding, inter-alia-that the plea of juvenility by the petitioner was wrong and concocted. The petitioner did not prefer an appeal against the said order. The petitioner filed a second petition on July 15, 2023 with similar prayer along with Admit Card, Mark-sheet,
Registration Receipt issued by the Bihar School Examination Board and Transfer Certificate issued by the R.N. High School, Birampur, Bhojpur and also his Aadhar Card. On the basis of the said documents, the petitioner claimed that on the date of occurrence he was aged about 16 years 03 months and 29 days as his date of birth was March 12, 2006. The Juvenile Justice Board on verification of those documents under the provision of Section 94(2) of the said Act held the petitioner as a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. Against the said order, one Munni Devi daughter of deceased Sumitra Devi preferred an appeal before the Sessions Judge, 1st Court-cum-Children Court at Ara, which was registered as Criminal Appeal
No.31 of 2024. The Trial Judge had allowed the appeal by setting aside the order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board dated May 1, 2024 holding, inter-alia, that Section 104 of the said Act does not contemplate for a review of the earlier order of the Board and the Board has no jurisdiction to pass subsequent order dated May 1, 2024 declaring the CICL as juvenile. 

The petitioner's Advocate submitted that the CICL did not seek for review, the subsequent petition filed on behalf of the CICL was indeed an application under Section 9(2) of the said Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur at Ara and the Chief Judicial Magistrate referred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for disposal. He also submitted that Section 9(2) of the said Act authorizes a CICL to raise claim of juvenility at any stage and whenever this plea is taken, it is the duty of the Court to direct the Board to conduct a fair and proper inquiry to ascertain the truth by examining the correctness of the documents or certificates or materials produced before the Court. Initially, the CICL could not produce enough document to prove that he was juvenile on the date of commission of alleged offence, subsequent application was filed on the basis of additional documents, viz. Matriculation certificate, Admit Card issued by the Bihar Secondary Board of Education, Transfer Certificate, Aadhar Card etc. On the basis of said document, the Board had power to pass fresh judgment declaring the CICL as a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2023) 15 SCC 683 and Rahul Kumar Yadav vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2739.

Now the matter is before the Supreme Court.

Constitutionality of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 remains sub judice

Anurag Krishna Sinha filed the appeal in the Supreme Court on March 7, 2024 against the judgement dated February 29, 2024 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Rajiv Roy in Anurag Krishna Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna & Anr. (2024). Justice Chandran had delivered the verdict after hearing the writ petition which challenged the constitutional validity Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library  (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 on January 8, 2024. The petition was filed in the High Court on May 15, 2015. The High Court reversed the interim order dated May 22, 2015 by the Division Bench of the then Chief Justice L. Narasimha Reddy and Justice Sudhir Singh which had suspended the operation of the Act as an interim measure. The case was registered in the Supreme Court on March 11, 2024. It was verified On March 14, 2024.

Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated November 11, 2025 reads:"Pursuant to order dated 29th April, 2025, we have been informed by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar that he has the Original Records of the 2015 enactment, i.e. Smt Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidananda Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015, with him. The said Original Records are to retained by him. List the appeal on 19th November, 2025 on the TOP OF THE BOARD. Till 19th November, 2025, status quo, as it exists today, be maintained."

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Hrishikesh Roy and Prashant Kumar Roy passed an order dated April 22, 2024. The order reads:"2. While various contentions are raised by the petitioner to assail the impugned judgment dated 29.02.2024 and the vires of Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015, it is noticed that the concerned Institute having, inter-alia a Public Library and an Auditorium, are located on Government land. 3. It is also pointed out that the State Government had enacted 2015 Act for the purpose of better management and development of the Institute and its Library." 

It referred to para 46 of the impugned judgment itself regarding the obligation of the State after they took over the Institute and Library. It reads: "46. The vesting occurs of ‘the Institute & Library’ on the State Government for the purpose of better management and development of ‘the Institute & Library’. The objects of the Trust cannot be digressed from by the State Government nor is it intended to be, as is disclosed from the impugned enactment. Whatever rights, powers and duties that remained with the Trustees, in the management of ‘the Institute & Library’ as was available after Annexure-2 agreement was entered into, would also vest completely in the State Government by the impugned enactment.” Later, the Court passed an order dated April 29, 2025. It reads: "We have heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties at some length and, in our considered 1opinion, it would be appropriate and just to examine the original records related to 2015 enactment, i.e. Smt. Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidananda Sinha Library (Requisition and Management) Act, 2015. We order accordingly. Mr. Nadkarni, learned senior counsel, to arrange for the production of original records on the next date." 

The Supreme Court recorded senior counsel's submission that the State Government intends to honour its commitment for proper maintenance of the Institute and Library and the steps that are being taken are in larger public interest. The order concluded: "5. Having considered the above, we feel that interim order as sought by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner may not be justified. The Interlocutory Application (IA NO.66319/2024) is accordingly dismissed. The IA No.73646/2024 – for impleadment is rejected." 

Also read: Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachidanand Sinha Library (Requisition And Management) Act, 2015 is constitutionally valid: Patna High Court


 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside Appellate Court's order in a juvenile's case

In XXX S/o Jeebachh Yadav @ Jivach Yadav Being Minor represented through under guardian ship of her mother namely Ramkumari Devi vs, The State of Bihar (2925),  Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-pagr long judgement dated November 4, 2025, wherein he concluded:''12. Therefore, having regard to all the facts and circumstances and considering the provisions of law applicable to grant of bail to a child in conflict with law, I am unable to agree with the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court and therefore, the order of the learned Appellate Court dated 07.05.2025 is set aside and the present revision petitioner is allowed. Hence, the petitioner/juvenile in conflict with law is directed to be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum- Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani/concerned court, in connection with Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the mother of the petitioner and other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board.'' The judgement was upon hearing the criminal revision petition.  

The petitioner was a juvenile in conflict with law and the revision petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 07.05.2025 passed in Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024 registered under Section 399, 402, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 25(1-b)a, 26, 35 of the Arms Act by the Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani whereby and whereunder the Appellate Court rejected the appeal of the petitioner and the prayer of the petitioner for grant of bail.

According to the prosecution case, police apprehended the petitioner and three other co-accused persons while they assembled for making preparation to commit crime and 2-3 persons managed to escape from the spot taking advantage of darkness. Recovery of arms, ammunition and mobile phones were made from other co-accused persons. From the possession of the petitioner a mobile phone was recovered.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the Appellate Court has passed the order without considering the facts and law. The Appellate Court rejected the prayer for bail on the ground of the Social Investigation Report of the petitioner but the said report has been prepared with false averments by submitting that petitioner was not in control of his mother and there was absence of moral and ethical values in the house and for this reason, there was possibility of involvement of the petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. But the petitioner never indulged in any illegal activities and his mother undertakes to take control of her son in future and not to allow him to indulge in any criminal activities. The counsel also submitted that petitioner was a minor and seriousness and gravity of offence could not be considered while granting bail to the petitioner who is a child in conflict with law. The Social Background Report and the Social Investigation Report have been prepared on the basis of wrong facts. It is the requirement of law that unless reasonable grounds are available to believe that in the event of grant of bail, the petitioner would go into association of any known criminals and he would be exposed to moral, physical and psychological danger or that the release of the petitioner would defeat the ends of justice, the prayer for bail ought not to be rejected. But the Appellate Court in general and vague terms and without considering the express provisions of law went on to reject the prayer for bail of the petitioner and at the same time also mentioned that the allegation against the petitioner was serious in nature. The same could not be a consideration for rejection of bail of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner further submitted  that the petitioner and other co-accused persons were apprehended by the police party with allegation that they had been making plan for committing dacoity and some of the co-accused persons were apprehended with firearms and ammunition but from the possession of the petitioner recovery of only a mobile phone was made and no firearm or ammunition were recovered from his possession. The petitioner had been made accused in two more cases on the basis of confessional statement of co-accused Pankaj Kumar and prior to that there was no criminal antecedent of the petitioner. Both the cases were lodged on 19.01.2024 and subsequently the petitioner was apprehended in this case on 23.01.2024 showing as one of the accused persons and since then the petitioner is in custody. Other co-accused persons were n granted bail by Co-ordinate Bench of the High  Court vide order dated 30.07.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 47886 of 2024, order dated 05.09.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 60492 of 2024 and order dated 04.12.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 82496 of 2024. The counsel submitted that since no grounds are forthcoming for believing that release of petitioner was likely to bring him into association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice, the order of the learned Appellate Court is not sustainable. 08. Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 reads: “Section 12 Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.

1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person: Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the persons release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. 
(2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation
home 1[or a place of safety, as the case may be] in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order.(4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.” Therefore, there exists a non-obstante clause that child in conflict with law shall be released on bail notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 

The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for the general principles of care and protection of children and are extracted herein below:- 
“Section 3 : General principles to be followed in administration of Act. (i) Principle of presumption of innocence: Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to the age of eighteen years.  (iv) Principle of best interest: All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. (v) Principle of family responsibility: The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be. (xiv) Principle of fresh start: All past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.” 

The judgement reads: ''Underlying principle is the best interest of the child and gravity and nature of offences are immaterial for consideration of grant of bail to a child/juvenile in conflict with law. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that any decision taken in respect of the child must be based on the primary consideration of the best interest of the child. Proviso to Section 12 makes certain exceptions for refusal of bail to a child in conflict with law. Apparently, bail to a child in conflict of law could be denied only on certain conditions specially on the ground that the child in conflict with law would come into association of any known criminal or there would be moral, physical or psychological danger if the child is released on bail or that the ends of justice would be defeated by such release.''

Justice Jha observed: ''The Appellate Court has not discussed the issues except making bland assertion that the petitioner was an active member of a gang of robbers and was a criminal minded and was not under control of his parents. Though the petitioner is having antecedent of two cases, the circumstances around lodging of these two cases does not rule out the possibility of false implication. It has not been mentioned how the learned Appellate Court arrived at the finding that the child was not in control of his mother and there is absence of moral and ethical values in the house or that there was possibility of involvement of petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. Further, considering the serious nature of allegation against the petitioner for denying the bail was simply uncalled for and unwarranted.

Justice Purnendu Singh quashes termination order for violating principle of natural justice

In Smt. Archana Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through its Secretary Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, New Secretariat, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 6-page long judgement dated June 16, 2025 wherein, he concluded:"I also find that there has been gross violation of principle of natural justice. It is admitted that before termination order dated 15.11.2022 has been passed, no opportunity has been given to the petitioner. On this ground also, the order contained in Memo No.669 dated 15.11.2022 is fit to be set aside and quashed...." There were six other respondents including The Director Primary Education, Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, District Magistrate, Vaishali, District Education Officer, Vaishali, District Programme Officer, (Establishment), Vaishali, Block Development Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali and Block Education Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali.

The petitioner had prayed quashing "the memo no.669 dated 15.11.2022 issued by the Executive Officer cum Block Panchayati Raj Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Bhagwanpur (Vaishali) whereby and whereunder the petitioner was terminated from service with immediate effect on the ground she was working on the basis of Madhyama Visharad certificate issued from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelo Allahabad. She also sought direction from the Court to the respondent authority to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 

According to the State that the main issue involved in the present writ petition was the validity of the Madhmya Visharad degree obtained by the petitioner from Hindi Sahitaya Sammelan, Allahabad.  

Justice Singh recorded that there was violation of Section 14 of Bihar State School Teachers and Employees Disputes Redressal Rules, 2015 by District Education Officer, Vaishali who acted in a mechanical manner.

Justice P.N. Bhagwati has defined it as "fair play in action". The right to hearing encompasses the following concepts within its ambit:

1. Right to notice
2. Right to present case and evidence
3. Right to rebut adverse evidence
1. Right to cross-examination
2. Right to legal representation
4. Disclosure of evidence to the party
5. Showing the report of enquiry to the other party
6. Reasoned decisions or speaking orders

Therefore, pre-decisional hearing is one of the standard and essential rules of Audi Alteram Partem. But, it would be wrong to disregard the status of the post-decisional hearing. Post-decisional hearing is also a justiciable rule as it affords the hearing opportunity to the aggrieved person and is a better option than no hearing (I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Eastern Book Company 2022).. However, it is pertinent to note that a post-decisional hearing must be considered an exception rather than a rule.

 

"Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth": Supreme Court

On January 8, 2025, in Om Prakash @ Israel @Raju @Raju Das vs. Union of India (2025), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Arvind Kumar, the Court recalled the words of Lord Atkin in United Australia Limited v. Barclay’s Bank Ltd (1941), …"When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” The judgement was authored by Justice Sundresh. 

The Court examined how the person was wrongly tried as a juvenile. The defence of his juvenile status could be raised even after conviction. It allowed the Appeal saying, "The impugned judgment stands set aside" refering to the judgement of Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma of Uttarakhand High Court dated August 23, 2019. 

Supreme Court's judgement states "the sentence imposed against the Appellant in excess of the upper limit prescribed under the relevant Act, shall stand set aside, while making it clear that the conviction shall continue. The Appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case." The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the relevant Act which replaced the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. But prior to that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 addressed the issue of juvenile justice. 

The appellant was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. The incident took place on November 15, 1994. 

A statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), 1973 was recorded by the trial Court. It stated that his age was 20 years, as on March 7, 2001. 

After his conviction, the appellant, an illiterate raised the plea of juvenility during the hearing on sentence by stating that he was about 17 years of age at the time of the incident. Assuming his status as as a major with reference to his bank account, the trial Court sentenced him to death. n The High Court too did not refer the case to Juvenile Court refusing to give him the benefit of being a juvenile. But relying on his bank account and the cheque book endorsed the order of the 

trial Court. 

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the appellant placed reliance upon the birth certificate issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School dated April 28, 2001, agreed with the High Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed a Review Petition, reiterating the fact that he was a minor at the time of the offence. It was also pointed out that it was appellant's deceased employer who filled the details to open his bank account. The Review Petition was dismissed. After the dismissal, a Mercy Petition was rejected by Governor of Uttarakhand. 

A Writ Petition was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellant’s parents and social worker under Article 32 of the Constitution. A copy of the school certificate dated June 19, 2003 from the headmaster and a transfer certificate dated April 28, 2001 was filed. This Writ Petition was dismissed on February 16, 2005 with liberty to invoke the curative jurisdiction of the Court. A Curative Petition was filed. A counter affidavit to the Curative Petition of Respondent No. 2 produced another certificate dated January 7, 2006 issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School, after verifying the school certificate which reiterated the fact that the appellant was 14 years of age on the date of the incident. This Curative Petition was also dismissed by an order of the Supreme Court dated February 6, 2006.

After the amendment incorporating Section 7A into the 2000 Act, the appellant’s mother filed a Mercy Petition before the President of India. During the pendency of the Mercy Petition, the 2007 Rules came into effect. Notably, an ossification test of the appellant was done by a Medical Board constituted by the Meerut Jail, on a request made by the appellant by way of an application. The Medical Age Certificate issued therein also indicated that the Appellant was aged around 14 years at the time of the occurrence. 

Significantly, by the Presidential Order dated May 8, 2012, the death sentence of the appellant was commuted to life imprisonment, with a caveat that he shall not be released until the attainment of 60 years of age. An application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed by the appellant, through which information was obtained from the bank that any minor above 10 years of age can have an independent bank account, provided he knew how to read and write, and also that no cheque book was issued for the bank account opened in the name of the appellant. 

Subsequently, a Curative Petition filed by the appellant was also rejected by the Registry as not maintainable. 

In 2019, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, laying a challenge to the Presidential Order while seeking yet another relief on the basis of Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court. It held that the power of judicial review over an executive order passed in exercise of Article 72 of the Constitution is limited, and the proceedings against the appellant had attained finality. 

The appellant approached the Supreme Court. Taking note of the background of the case, the Court observed: "Suffice it is to state that merits were not gone into in view of the clear stand of the State on the age of the Appellant."

The appellant was represented by Senior Counsel, Dr. S. Muralidhar. He submitted that the High Court committed an error in not considering the independent prayer sought for by the Appellant. It is not in dispute that the age of the Appellant was 14 years at the time of commission of the offence. There is no judicial finality attained and the phrase “any stage” used in Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act must be given an extended meaning. There is no contrary finding given against the appellant vis-à-vis the plea of juvenility, which he has raised at every stage. It is a case where grave injustice has been meted out, as can be demonstrated by the lack of adjudication. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for immediate release. The appellant has been unfairly kept under incarceration including the earlier solitary confinement It is untenable and illegal. The appellant should be adequately compensated for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison.

He drew the attention of the Court towards decisions wherein it was held that Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 can be invoked even after the final disposal of the case. This was held in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 17 SCC 699 and Hari Dutt Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Order of the Supreme Court dated February 7, 2022 in Writ Petition (Crl.) 367 of 2021.

It has been held that beneficial and retrospective applicability of change in law post the dismissal of the Curative Petition on February 6, 2006 in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637 and T Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and another, (1983) 1 SCC 177.

It has been held that claim of juvenility can be raised and considered even after the President has exercised powers under Article 72, Constitution of India in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204 and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das, (2010) 14 SCC 209. 

Justice M.M. Sundresh observed: "We are dealing with a case where grave injustice has been perpetrated, on account of the consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility". 

The Court was reminded of the words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Jasraj Inder Singh vs. Hemraj Multanchand (1977). “Truth, like song, is whole and half-truth can be noise;Justice is truth, is beauty and the strategy of healing injustice is discovery of the whole truth and harmonising human relations. Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery agent of full fairness. This divagation is justified by the need to remind ourselves that the grammar of justice according to law is not little litigative solution….”

Justice Sundresh observed: "Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action. The primary duty of a Court is to make a single-minded endeavour to unearth the truth hidden beneath the facts. Thus, the Court is a search engine of truth, with procedural and substantive laws as its tools. When procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it. Similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos. Such an exercises is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation.In its journey, the Court must discern the truth, primarily from the material available on record in the form of pleadings, and arguments duly supported by documents. It must be kept in mind that the entire judicial system is meant for the discovery of the truth, it being the soul of decision. For doing so, a Presiding Officer is expected to play an active role, rather than a passive one."

He observed: "At every stage, injustice has been inflicted by the Courts, either by ignoring the documents or by casting a furtive glance. The Appellant despite being illiterate, raised this plea one way or another, right from the trial Court up to the conclusion of the Curative Petition before this Court. The approach of the Courts in the earlier round of litigation cannot be sustained in the eye of law. There can be no reliance on the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, 1973 particularly when the Appellant was asked to give his particulars for the purpose of recording his statement. Even the said statement shows that he was 20 years of age at the time of making his deposition, which could only mean that he was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. The bank account has no relevance under the Acts and the relevant rules, and in any case, it is to be proved, though not contemplated under Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. The statement given by the Appellant at the time of the hearing on his sentence, would also pale into insignificance, as even then he would have been a minor at the time of commission of the offence, under both the 2000 and the 2015 Acts." 

The judgement reads: "Though the 2000 Act was already enacted before the Appellant’s conviction, even assuming that only the 1986 Act was in vogue, the procedural mandate contemplated thereunder was also not followed by the trial Court and the High Court. Before this Court, the Appellant had relied upon the school certificate in the Criminal Appeal. It was once again relied upon in the Review Petition. Thereafter, additional documents were relied upon by the Appellant in the Writ Petition and also in the Curative Petition which was subsequently filed. In the Curative Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the State certifying the documents furnished by the Appellant to be true. Nonetheless, the said petition was dismissed without according any reason." 

The judgement points out that "even the then existing State Rules were not duly followed, and if followed, the same would have ensured to the benefit of the Appellant." 

The Court observed:"We would only say that when the plea of juvenility was raised, it should have been dealt with under the existing laws at the relevant point of time, especially when there exists a tacit and clear admission as to the age of the Appellant. In fact, there is no need for such an inquiry in view of the aforesaid position. In our considered view, this Court could have dealt with the Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, as it raised an independent prayer for the enforcement of a right conferred under a social welfare legislation. In the subsequent Writ Petition filed before the High Court, two different prayers had been made, namely, the determination of the appellant’s plea of juvenility and consequent release, or alternatively, judicial review of the decision of the President or the Governor and consequent release. As the Executive cannot be construed to have undertaken an adjudication on the determination of the age of the accused, and with the first prayer being a distinct one invoking Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, we feel that the High Court has committed an error in its reasoning. We would only state that this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts."

The judgement makes it clear that "It cannot be construed that the Presidential Order is interfered with, as the issue that we are concerned with, is the failure of the Court in not applying the mandatory provisions of the 2015 Act with specific reference to the plea of juvenility. Therefore, it is not a review of the Presidential Order, but a case of giving the benefit of the provisions of the 2015 Act to a deserving person."

The Court recorded:"We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored."

The Court observed:"From the custody certificate filed on record, it appears that the Appellant has undergone imprisonment for almost 25 years, during which time, the society has undergone significant transformation which the Appellant might be unaware of and find difficult to adjust with."

The Court directed the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority to play a proactive role in identifying any welfare scheme of the State/Central Government, to facilitate the appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release, with particular emphasis on his right to livelihood, shelter and sustenance guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It also directed the State Authority to assist him in availing any such scheme under which he is found eligible and wishes to avail, and such assistance may be effected through the concerned District Legal Services Authority, if the State Authority finds the same expedient and necessary. 

It is crystal clear that justice has been delayed. The appellant's senior counsel had prayed for adequate compensation  for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison. But the Court has not awarded him any compensation. It emerges that in the absence of compensation for the appellant, he has recieved partial justice. He awaits complete justice even after more than two decades. 

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 prevails over personal laws: Supreme Court

In Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action vs. Union of India and Others (2024), Supreme Court has passed the following directions:-"1. Empowering Magistrates to Take Suo Moto Action and Issue Preventive Injunctions
1.1.All Magistrates vested with authority under Section 13 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, are directed to take proactive measures, including issuing suo motu injunctions to prevent the solemnization of child marriages; and
1.2.Magistrates are encouraged to particularly focus on "auspicious days" known for mass weddings, when the occurrence of child marriages is notably high. Upon receiving credible information or even upon suspicion, Magistrates should use their judicial powers to halt such marriages and ensure child protection."

The judgment was delivered on October 18, 2024 by a 3-judge bench of 50th chief justice of India, Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra. The 141-page long judgement was authored by Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud.  

Notably, the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021 was introduced in Parliament on December 21, 2021. The Bill was referred for examination to the Department Related Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports. The Bill sought to amend the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 to expressly state the overriding effect of the statute over various personal laws. The issue, therefore, is pending consideration before Parliament. 

In such a backdrop, it is quite significant that Union of India in its submission before the Supreme Court has stated after the judgment was reserved in the case that "this Court may direct that the PCMA prevails over personal law." The note of the Union states as follows: “9. As a way forward, Ministry of Women & Child Development has following inputs to provide for kind consideration of the Hon’ble Court –i. There are conflicting pronouncements by various High Courts about the precedence of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 over the personal laws. Hence, Hon’ble Court may consider issuing directions pronouncing that the PCMA will prevail over the personal laws governing marriage.…” 

The Court observed: "we note that while the PCMA seeks to prohibit child marriages, it does not stipulate on betrothals. Marriages fixed in the minority of a child also have the effect of violating their rights to free choice, autonomy, agency and childhood. It takes away from them their choice of partner and life paths before they mature and form the ability to assert their agency. International law such as CEDAW stipulates against betrothals of minors. Parliament may consider outlawing child betrothals which may be used to evade penalty under the PCMA. While a betrothed child may be protected as a child in need of care and protection under the JJ Act, the practice also requires targeted remedies for its elimination." JJ Act refers to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. CEDAW refers to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women which was adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1981. India ratified CEDAW on July 9, 1993.

The concluding paragraph of the judgement reads:"A copy of this Judgment will be transmitted to the Secretaries of all concerned Ministries, the Government of India which includes the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Rural Development, statutory authorities, institutions, and organizations under the control of the respective ministries. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed to circulate this judgment to the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of all the States and Union Territories, as well as NALSA, and NCPCR for strict compliance with the directions. This shall be done within a period of four weeks from the date of delivery of this judgment."

In compliance with the judgement, Patna High Court's Registrar General has issued a Circular No.7 of 2024 for necessary observance of the aforementioned directions which should be strictly followed. A copy of the circular has been forwarded to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Justice, Jaisalmer House, 26 Mansingh Road, New Delhi, Director, Bihar Judicial Academy, Patna and Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority, Patna. The circular states that All the Principal District and Sessions Judges of Bihar are supposed  to circulate this circular order amongst all the Judicial Officers working in their respective Judgeships for its strict compliance.

 

Why is Law Day, celebrated as Constitution Day since 2015

Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment issued a notification dated November 19, 2015 which stated that Government of India has decided to celebrate November 26 of every year as the "Constitution Day" to promote constitutional values among citizens. 

The notification was published in the Gazette of India. It reads: "Whereas the people of India, having solemnly resolved to secure to all its citizens Justice, Liberty, Equality and to promote Fraternity among all, adopted, enacted and gave to themselves the Constitution of India in the Constituent Assembly on the 26th day of November, 1949; And whereas the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, under the Chairmanship of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, provided its invaluable services in drafting the Constitution of India and the nation is celebrating the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Birth Anniversary of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in recognition of his contribution to building modern India;Now, therefore, the Government of India has decided to celebrate the 26th day of the November of every year as the "CONSTITUTION DAY" to promote constitutional values among citizens."

Prior to this notification regarding "Constitution Day", since 1979 the day was celebrated as “Law Day”. It first occurred to the Supreme Court Bar Association in 1979, under the leadership of Dr. L.M. Singhvi, to select November 26 to celebrate the day as “Law Day”. November 26, 1949 was the day on which the people of India gave to themselves the fundamental document of law to govern their national life i.e. the Constitution of India.

Dr. Singhvi articulated the seven main purposes of celebrating “Law Day”:

1. To review the state of law and administration of justice;

2. To suggest ways and means to improve our legal and judicial system;

3. To strengthen the Bar and the Bench relationship;

4. To strengthen the independence of the judiciary;

5. To strengthen the freedom of the legal profession;

6. To make the legal and judicial system an effective instrument to serve the people;

7. To maintain and augment public confidence in our legal and judicial system. 

In the inaugural function of the Law Day, Dr. Singhvi had said: "We have gathered today at this inaugural ceremony to lay the foundation of the annual observance of the Law Day on November 26. I consider it a privilege to welcome you all on this historic and memorable occasion. We owe this occasion to the Executive Committee and the general body of the Supreme Court Bar Association and to the Chief Justice and his brother Judges who endorsed the idea so readily arid positively. I am also grateful to the Bar Associations of different High Courts for their concurrence in implementing the idea of Law Day. I am confident that in the years to come Law Day will be observed and celebrated not only in the Supreme Court and the High Courts, but also in every district and mofussil wherever there is a group of lawyers and judges. Indeed, it is my sanguine hope and ardent wish that Law Day may be observed not only by lawyers, judges and law faculties throughout the country but that it may equally be observed by legislators, governments and civil servants, by the press and the media, by traders and trade unionists, by all professions and vocations, by schools, colleges and universities and by citizen organisations and service associations. I need hardly stress that Law is not the privileged preserve of a few, and that it is the common heritage of us all. Its edifice rests in the ultimate analysis on the foundations of the allegiance and adherence of the community as a whole. That is why it would behave all sections of our society and the country as a whole to observe the Law Day.  Due to certain procedural and administrative difficulties, the Government of India did not find it possible to declare or ensure the observance of Law Day on the 26th November this year. I have, however, the assurance of the Minister of Law and Justice that hopefully the proposal would be considered later by the Government of India when the present constraints do not come in the way. I hope whole-heartedly that the Government of India and the State Governments will in due course of time and within the ensuing year adopt and endorse the idea of Law Day on November 26. The ultimate aim of all governments, whatever their complexion or lack of it, is to secure public order, safeguard public interest and advance the commonweal. Law is the chosen vehicle of those aims. It is well to remember in the midst of lawlessness, confusion and disarray of the present day that without Law there can be no public order and without public order there can be no Law and that there can be no progress, prosperity and happiness without Law and public order."

He further observed: "In a sense, in a Republic committed to Rule of Law, every day is and should be a Law Day. For us, lawyers and judges every day is inevitably a Law Day. Why then do we want to designate a particular day as Law Day? The answer is simple. We wish to emphasize highlight, and underline the cause of Law and its fundamental role in our society. We wish to rededicate ourselves to its noble ideals and sublime purposes. We wish on this day to consecrate Law to Justice and to reflect and ponder inter alia on the problems and concerns of legislation, law reform, legal education and administration of justice. Day after day we are concerned with facets and fragments of Law in their case to case application; on the Law Day we would concern ourselves more purposefully with the quitessence of law, with the mission of law and with its goals and modalities and its efficacy and adequacy in the social context. It is customary to designate a day to add emphasis to a particular theme. Our purpose in designating November 26 as Law Day is to emphasize the role and importance of Law in the life of our Republic, to review the state of law and administration of justice, to suggest ways and means of improving our laws and our legal and judicial system, to establish better and more meaningful equations between the Bench and the Bar, to strengthen the principle of the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the legal profession, to make our legal system an effective instrument of public service and to maintain, reinforce and augment public confidence in our legal and judicial system. The Law Day will enable as to set our sights on our goals and ideals; it will help to inform and create public opinion on issues of importance relating to Law and Judicial Administration and to dispel misunderstandings; it will prod us to focus our pointed attention on what ought to be priority items on the Law Agenda of our nation; it will provide an occasion to appraise our own profession and its problems. We should utilise the Law Day to give to the legal profession and the judiciary a better public image and a strong sense of identity, solidarity and purpose."

He added: "We have chosen November 26 to be the Law Day because it was on this day, thirty years ago, that we the People of India adopted, enacted and gave to ourselves the Constitution having resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, democratic Repulic. It was a day of national consensus when we resolved to speak in harmony, to march in unison and to exert together Vernacular matter omitted ...Ed. to secure justice, liberty and equality and to assure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation. It was truly a red letter day in our modern history. We shall observe and celebrate the Law Day on November 26 annually with the determination that the spirit and inspiration of that red letter day in our modern history may never become a dead letter, that our Law may always be the shield as well as the sword of iustice liberty. equality and freedom and that lawyers and iudges may strive and and endeavour with steadfast devotion in fulfilling the mission and office of Law."

He noted: "The judiciary and the legal profession have an ancient lineage in India's history. In its modern, westernized orientation and regulated form, however, our legal profession dates back to Regulation VII of 1793 whose author, Lord Cornwallis, thought that a man of character and education functioning as a "vakeel" would be a great asset to the scheme of administration of justice and to its consistency and impartiality. Cornwallis hoped that by the new institution of professional lawyers, a feeling would be generated in the minds of the people that "they have an impartial and all powerful protector in the laws, and that through "he means of public pleaders, they can all times command the exercise of the udiciat powers of the Government lodged in the courts, for the redress of any injuries which they may sustain either in their person or property." The hope and the prophecy of Lord Cornwallis could be fulfilled but partially under colonial rule but it is well to remember that legal profession in India came of age quickly and Indian lawyers and judges have played an important part in guiding our struggle for freedom and in giving to-ourselves a Constitution which has been a crucially unifying and stabilising factor in our national life after the advent of Independence. Without meaning to convey a sense of complacency, I would claim that our courts and the legal profession have played an important and creditable part in working out the terms and equations of justice between citizen and citizen and between the citizen and the State. A whole new jurisprudence of constitutional rights and of judicial review of legislation and of administrative action has been fashioned by Indian lawyers and judges in a short span of three decades and that is something to be proud of. We as a nation are prone to berate and belittle our own achievements and to give in to moods of melancholy and despair, but quite frankly I know of no other nation in the world which has battled with greater valour and gallantry on the legal front or which has achieved more in legal culture under such heavy and insurmountable odds. My fear and apprehension however is that those heavy odds are beginning to get the better of us. At this critical juncture, we cannot afford to yield to apathy,inertia or complacency lest Law and the legal system should become hapless victims of unfounded assumptions and irrational prejudices."

He said: "Let me illustrate. Increasing institution of cases, mounting arrears, accumulating congestion in courts and inevitable Law's delays have given rise not to a body of scientific and rational blueprints in terms of institutional organization and procedural methods or in terms of assessments of judicial manpower requirements, but to a spate of alarm signals and dire shibboleths. If there are more and more cases in courts, that is because we have a population explosion, we have a more complex and friction-prone society, our dispute resolution and conciliation systems are bereft of efficacy, we have increasingly greater awareness of rights, and perhaps because we have more injustice and more arbitrariness in our midst. The Governments are under an obligation to provide an adequate machinery for justice, to  appoint more judges and to give them better emoluments and facilities, to build more court houses, to enact better laws, to devise better dispute resolution procedures, and to administer more effectively and equitably, rather than to blame lawyers and judges for the increase and proliferation of litigation. Courts in India cannot apply a mechanical-statistical razor-blade or wave a magic wand to wipe out the enormous pendency of arrears. Nor can the courts afford to turn a blind eye or a deaf ear to the rank injustices and incongruities of administration merely because they have already too much on their hands. lithe courts begin to do that systematically, they might endanger the confidence and credibility they have come to enjoy. I might venture the view that we will have a lot more litigation in future when some of the long suffering sections of our people are made more aware of their rights by movements of legal literacy and are enabled and equipped by legal aid and advice to ask for their day in Court. Shall we then tell them that we are too preoccupied to take their briefs or to listen to them and their generation? I do not for a moment underestimate the crushing burden of arrears. The problem of arrears and Law's Delays must be solved and it should be solved urgently, sensibly and soon. It cannot be brushed under the carpet. It cannot be solved by short cuts. Lawyers and judges cannot solve the problem because they have no control Over the purse-strings nor have they any control on the system. By the same token, they cannot be blamed for the situation. Has any Government studied the problem in a comprehensive perspective? Has any Government prepared a Five-Year or Ten-Year Plan to solve the problem of arrears? Has any Government so far shown any determination to provide the necessary inputs? Clearly, tinkering, sloganeering and lip-service will not do when stark realities have to be faced."

He underlined: "Judicial emoluments at all levels are inadequate and unattractive. What is worse, judges in the mofussils have to live and work under conditions which are not conducive to their dignity or independence. The Bar must educate public opinion on the issues and pressurize Governments and Legislatures in these matters."

He observed: "We have paid little attention to the quality and training of young entrants to the judiciary at the level of the munsif and the magistrate. Power without experience can have serious social consequences. What is more, younger judges are set into grooves of their own making and appellate reversals may not 'quite provide the cure. We need a number of national training and research institutions for the judiciary of the country where not only initial entrants to the judiciary may receive a basic training in the procedures, etiquette and ethos of the system but where sub-judges and district judges may also periodically refresh, systematise and update their knowledge and where functional time and motion studies in court management may be conducted to improve our procedural framework with a view to avoid wastage of time and to obviate public inconvenience."

He averred: "The Indian Bar is tho second largest in the world with 182 000 advocates on the rolls as of 1st January, 1979. A good deal of the country's legal resources and training remains idle and underutilised and yet there is an enormous unregulated addition to our ranks every year. The legal profession exercises merely perfunctory quality control over legal education which requires greater professional direction and better educational inputs. We as a profession have done little to tend to the young and new entrants to our profession, to impart appropriate skills and experience to them, to provide them with some support, and to relieve the rigours of their initial struggles. For the aging and the disabled members of the profession, we have neither insurance nor social security. Bar libraries in many parts of our country are far from satisfactory; in some parts they do not exist. At certain levels, the whole legal-judicial system is in a ramshackle condition. It is at these levels that the common citizen frequently encounters the Law and its machinery and develops a feeling of revulsion for it because he finds himself shortchanged, harassed and disillusioned. The poor, the illiterate, the disadvantaged and the underprivileged are frequently denied access to the courts and to the Law. No wonder, they feel frustrated and alienated. A comprehensive legal aid plan was conceived more than six years ago. It was in an advanced state of pregnancy in the years 1977 and 1978. No one now knows when it is going to be delivered. We can only look expectantly at our learned friend, the Minister of Law and Justice, to tell us about the health and the growth of the embryo and about the length of the period of gestation. Besides Legal Aid, Law reform mechanisms in our country require a fresh look and considerable overhauling. Modern research methods, post-audit of legalisation and empirical feedback procedures have yet to be introduced in our law reform agencies. Law Commission must be set up in every State. The Indian Law Commission and its innumerable reports should be salvaged from the dusty dungeon of official neglect. Our own professional tools need to be improved. We need to have refreshed Seminars from time to time. We need to discuss new developments in law. We need adequate court houses, bar rooms, bar libraries and lawyers' chambers throughout the country on a priority basis. It is time that lawyers and judges and legislators and law teachers should turn their attention to these grass-root problems." 

He concluded: "I shall not attempt at this Inaugural Ceremony of Law Day to place before you a long and "exhausting" catalogue of items and issues which may be eligible for the nation's Law Agenda. Suffice it to say that the accumulated arrears of such pending issues and problems of importance is very large and many of them deserve your special leave rather than a quick dismissal in limine. To meet the challenges of these manifold problems, we must formulate our ideals and goals and rededicate ourselves to them. Before the next Law Day I hope that we would have prepared a formal Law Day Charter enshrining those ideals and goals in consultation with the members of the Bar and members of the Judiciary in all parts of the country. I am glad to say that a Committee is being formed at the initiative of the Supreme Court Bar Association to frame a Law Day Charter and that at the instance of the Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice Bhagwati and Mr. Justice lyer, whose invaluable guidance permeates today's programme, have agreed to associate themselves with what promises to be an evocative and landmark document. The Law Day Charter will no doubt be a course of inspiration, but to resolve those issues and problems on the nation's Law Agenda, we will need both inspiration and perspiration. We will need to harness the resources of the Bench and the Bar to the utmost, to enlist the responsive and understanding support of Legislatures and Governments, to build up a strong pro bono publico image for the Bar, and to provide bridges of communication between the legal-judicial system and the citizen. The Law Day beacons us to these and other epoch making but intensely practical tasks. Its clarion call is urgent and compelling. We must answer that call for what is at stake is the future of law and justice and freedom and good life, for us and all our fellow citizens and for our succeeding generations. Let me conclude by saying prayerfully: Long Live Law Day. With my apology for a somewhat long introductory speech, I would now request the Chief Justice of India, for whom we have the greatest affection and esteem, to inaugurate the Law Day function and to proclaim the Law Day."

The Chief Justice of India had inaugurated and proclaimed the Law Day on November 26, 1979 at the function held by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA). Law Day is observed throughout the country.    

Since 1979, the legal fraternity had been celebrating November 26 as ‘Law Day’ every year on a call by the SCBA. In 2015, commemorating Babasaheb Ambedkar’s 125th birth anniversary and on 71st anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution of India. the Union Government decided to celebrate November 26 as the Constitution Day.  

In his concluding speech, Dr. Ambedkar, as chairman of the drafting committee:“What does social democracy mean? It means a way of life which recognizes liberty, equality and fraternity as the principles of life. These principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate items in a trinity. They form a union of trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy.” 

In Bhagvat Gita, Krishna says:“श्रेयान्स्वधर्मो विगुण: परधर्मात्स्वनुष्ठितात् | स्वधर्मे निधनं श्रेय: परधर्मो भयावह:” Chapter 3, Verse 35.

(Better do your own duty even if you slightly err in doing so, than to do another person’s job, even if occasionally that is well done. By sincerely doing your own duty, whatever may be the ultimate result of it, you will not be endangering yourself.)

Mothers and fathers of the Constitution of India framed it to ensure that the organs of the State do their constitutional duty, instead of endangering the nation by following dictates of those who undermine constitutional dharma.    

Maharshu Vyasa says:“अष्टादशपुराणेषु व्यासस्य वचनद्वयम् । परोपकारः पुण्याय पापाय परपीडनम् ॥” (The essence of eighteen puranas (scriptures) in two sentences(It is helping others which is punya; It is harming others which is sin.)

Our constitutional dharma prevents harm and safeguards natural rights.  

In the Bhagvat Gita, Krishna says:“यद्यदाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदेवेतरो जनः । स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्तते ” (Whatever the elders do, others try to do the same; whatever standard the elders set up, others try to set up the same standard.) Chapter 3, Verse 21

Most of the members of the Constituent Assembly articulated and emulated these pearls of ancient wisdom On January 24, 1950, the Constituent Assembly met for the last time. During its last sitting, Dr Rajendra Prasad’s name was announced as the first President of India. Responding to cheers and congratulations from the fellow members, the stalwart freedom fighter said:“I have always held that the time for congratulation is not when a man is appointed to an office, but when he retires, and I would like, to wait until the moment comes when I have to lay down the office which you have conferred on me to see whether I have deserved the confidence and the goodwill which have been showered on me from all sides and by all friends alike.” Rajen Babu echoed Sant Kabir who sang: "दास कबीर जतन करि ओढी, ज्यों कीं त्यों धर दीनी चदरिया॥" regarding removing the cloth of the human body in the same condition, without spoiling it. 

Notably, responding to a petition by the Centre for Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Geneva, a UN Sub-Commission appointed Dr Singhvi as Special Rapporteur to study the matters relating to the Independence and impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors, Assessors and of the independence of lawyers and to formulate his recommendations, by its decision 1980/24. In the same year, the 6th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of offenders, in its resolution No. 16, called for priority to be given to "the elaboration of the guidelines relating to the independence, selection, payment training and relation of Judges and prosecutors". In his preliminary report, submitted in 1980, Dr. Singhvi, referred to the entire history of the movement for the independence of the judiciary and said it was necessary to formulate a viable equation between 'independence' and 'accountability. He said that "the plateau of perils to the impartiality and independence of Judges, Jurists and Assessors and the independence of the legal profession should be, mopped up carefully and elaborately to enable negotiation of the the terrain and to overcome the hazards by way of constitutional, legal; institutional, cultural, procedural and other appropriate safeguards." Dr. Singhvi submitted his progress reports in 1980, 81 and 82. On the occasion of the Constitution Day, it is relevant to recollect that the work of Dr. Singhvi which makes a compelling case for the financial autonomy of the Indian judiciary.

Constitution Day reminds the State and the citizens of their constitutional dharma and morality which is the source of all law. The fact remains Constitution is the fundamental law of the country. 

Dr. Gopal Krishna