"Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth": Supreme Court

On January 8, 2025, in Om Prakash @ Israel @Raju @Raju Das vs. Union of India (2025), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Arvind Kumar, the Court recalled the words of Lord Atkin in United Australia Limited v. Barclay’s Bank Ltd (1941), …"When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” The judgement was authored by Justice Sundresh. 

The Court examined how the person was wrongly tried as a juvenile. The defence of his juvenile status could be raised even after conviction. It allowed the Appeal saying, "The impugned judgment stands set aside" refering to the judgement of Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma of Uttarakhand High Court dated August 23, 2019. 

Supreme Court's judgement states "the sentence imposed against the Appellant in excess of the upper limit prescribed under the relevant Act, shall stand set aside, while making it clear that the conviction shall continue. The Appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case." The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the relevant Act which replaced the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. But prior to that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 addressed the issue of juvenile justice. 

The appellant was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. The incident took place on November 15, 1994. 

A statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), 1973 was recorded by the trial Court. It stated that his age was 20 years, as on March 7, 2001. 

After his conviction, the appellant, an illiterate raised the plea of juvenility during the hearing on sentence by stating that he was about 17 years of age at the time of the incident. Assuming his status as as a major with reference to his bank account, the trial Court sentenced him to death. n The High Court too did not refer the case to Juvenile Court refusing to give him the benefit of being a juvenile. But relying on his bank account and the cheque book endorsed the order of the 

trial Court. 

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the appellant placed reliance upon the birth certificate issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School dated April 28, 2001, agreed with the High Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed a Review Petition, reiterating the fact that he was a minor at the time of the offence. It was also pointed out that it was appellant's deceased employer who filled the details to open his bank account. The Review Petition was dismissed. After the dismissal, a Mercy Petition was rejected by Governor of Uttarakhand. 

A Writ Petition was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellant’s parents and social worker under Article 32 of the Constitution. A copy of the school certificate dated June 19, 2003 from the headmaster and a transfer certificate dated April 28, 2001 was filed. This Writ Petition was dismissed on February 16, 2005 with liberty to invoke the curative jurisdiction of the Court. A Curative Petition was filed. A counter affidavit to the Curative Petition of Respondent No. 2 produced another certificate dated January 7, 2006 issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School, after verifying the school certificate which reiterated the fact that the appellant was 14 years of age on the date of the incident. This Curative Petition was also dismissed by an order of the Supreme Court dated February 6, 2006.

After the amendment incorporating Section 7A into the 2000 Act, the appellant’s mother filed a Mercy Petition before the President of India. During the pendency of the Mercy Petition, the 2007 Rules came into effect. Notably, an ossification test of the appellant was done by a Medical Board constituted by the Meerut Jail, on a request made by the appellant by way of an application. The Medical Age Certificate issued therein also indicated that the Appellant was aged around 14 years at the time of the occurrence. 

Significantly, by the Presidential Order dated May 8, 2012, the death sentence of the appellant was commuted to life imprisonment, with a caveat that he shall not be released until the attainment of 60 years of age. An application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed by the appellant, through which information was obtained from the bank that any minor above 10 years of age can have an independent bank account, provided he knew how to read and write, and also that no cheque book was issued for the bank account opened in the name of the appellant. 

Subsequently, a Curative Petition filed by the appellant was also rejected by the Registry as not maintainable. 

In 2019, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, laying a challenge to the Presidential Order while seeking yet another relief on the basis of Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court. It held that the power of judicial review over an executive order passed in exercise of Article 72 of the Constitution is limited, and the proceedings against the appellant had attained finality. 

The appellant approached the Supreme Court. Taking note of the background of the case, the Court observed: "Suffice it is to state that merits were not gone into in view of the clear stand of the State on the age of the Appellant."

The appellant was represented by Senior Counsel, Dr. S. Muralidhar. He submitted that the High Court committed an error in not considering the independent prayer sought for by the Appellant. It is not in dispute that the age of the Appellant was 14 years at the time of commission of the offence. There is no judicial finality attained and the phrase “any stage” used in Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act must be given an extended meaning. There is no contrary finding given against the appellant vis-à-vis the plea of juvenility, which he has raised at every stage. It is a case where grave injustice has been meted out, as can be demonstrated by the lack of adjudication. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for immediate release. The appellant has been unfairly kept under incarceration including the earlier solitary confinement It is untenable and illegal. The appellant should be adequately compensated for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison.

He drew the attention of the Court towards decisions wherein it was held that Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 can be invoked even after the final disposal of the case. This was held in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 17 SCC 699 and Hari Dutt Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Order of the Supreme Court dated February 7, 2022 in Writ Petition (Crl.) 367 of 2021.

It has been held that beneficial and retrospective applicability of change in law post the dismissal of the Curative Petition on February 6, 2006 in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637 and T Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and another, (1983) 1 SCC 177.

It has been held that claim of juvenility can be raised and considered even after the President has exercised powers under Article 72, Constitution of India in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204 and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das, (2010) 14 SCC 209. 

Justice M.M. Sundresh observed: "We are dealing with a case where grave injustice has been perpetrated, on account of the consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility". 

The Court was reminded of the words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Jasraj Inder Singh vs. Hemraj Multanchand (1977). “Truth, like song, is whole and half-truth can be noise;Justice is truth, is beauty and the strategy of healing injustice is discovery of the whole truth and harmonising human relations. Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery agent of full fairness. This divagation is justified by the need to remind ourselves that the grammar of justice according to law is not little litigative solution….”

Justice Sundresh observed: "Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action. The primary duty of a Court is to make a single-minded endeavour to unearth the truth hidden beneath the facts. Thus, the Court is a search engine of truth, with procedural and substantive laws as its tools. When procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it. Similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos. Such an exercises is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation.In its journey, the Court must discern the truth, primarily from the material available on record in the form of pleadings, and arguments duly supported by documents. It must be kept in mind that the entire judicial system is meant for the discovery of the truth, it being the soul of decision. For doing so, a Presiding Officer is expected to play an active role, rather than a passive one."

He observed: "At every stage, injustice has been inflicted by the Courts, either by ignoring the documents or by casting a furtive glance. The Appellant despite being illiterate, raised this plea one way or another, right from the trial Court up to the conclusion of the Curative Petition before this Court. The approach of the Courts in the earlier round of litigation cannot be sustained in the eye of law. There can be no reliance on the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, 1973 particularly when the Appellant was asked to give his particulars for the purpose of recording his statement. Even the said statement shows that he was 20 years of age at the time of making his deposition, which could only mean that he was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. The bank account has no relevance under the Acts and the relevant rules, and in any case, it is to be proved, though not contemplated under Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. The statement given by the Appellant at the time of the hearing on his sentence, would also pale into insignificance, as even then he would have been a minor at the time of commission of the offence, under both the 2000 and the 2015 Acts." 

The judgement reads: "Though the 2000 Act was already enacted before the Appellant’s conviction, even assuming that only the 1986 Act was in vogue, the procedural mandate contemplated thereunder was also not followed by the trial Court and the High Court. Before this Court, the Appellant had relied upon the school certificate in the Criminal Appeal. It was once again relied upon in the Review Petition. Thereafter, additional documents were relied upon by the Appellant in the Writ Petition and also in the Curative Petition which was subsequently filed. In the Curative Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the State certifying the documents furnished by the Appellant to be true. Nonetheless, the said petition was dismissed without according any reason." 

The judgement points out that "even the then existing State Rules were not duly followed, and if followed, the same would have ensured to the benefit of the Appellant." 

The Court observed:"We would only say that when the plea of juvenility was raised, it should have been dealt with under the existing laws at the relevant point of time, especially when there exists a tacit and clear admission as to the age of the Appellant. In fact, there is no need for such an inquiry in view of the aforesaid position. In our considered view, this Court could have dealt with the Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, as it raised an independent prayer for the enforcement of a right conferred under a social welfare legislation. In the subsequent Writ Petition filed before the High Court, two different prayers had been made, namely, the determination of the appellant’s plea of juvenility and consequent release, or alternatively, judicial review of the decision of the President or the Governor and consequent release. As the Executive cannot be construed to have undertaken an adjudication on the determination of the age of the accused, and with the first prayer being a distinct one invoking Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, we feel that the High Court has committed an error in its reasoning. We would only state that this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts."

The judgement makes it clear that "It cannot be construed that the Presidential Order is interfered with, as the issue that we are concerned with, is the failure of the Court in not applying the mandatory provisions of the 2015 Act with specific reference to the plea of juvenility. Therefore, it is not a review of the Presidential Order, but a case of giving the benefit of the provisions of the 2015 Act to a deserving person."

The Court recorded:"We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored."

The Court observed:"From the custody certificate filed on record, it appears that the Appellant has undergone imprisonment for almost 25 years, during which time, the society has undergone significant transformation which the Appellant might be unaware of and find difficult to adjust with."

The Court directed the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority to play a proactive role in identifying any welfare scheme of the State/Central Government, to facilitate the appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release, with particular emphasis on his right to livelihood, shelter and sustenance guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It also directed the State Authority to assist him in availing any such scheme under which he is found eligible and wishes to avail, and such assistance may be effected through the concerned District Legal Services Authority, if the State Authority finds the same expedient and necessary. 

It is crystal clear that justice has been delayed. The appellant's senior counsel had prayed for adequate compensation  for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison. But the Court has not awarded him any compensation. It emerges that in the absence of compensation for the appellant, he has recieved partial justice. He awaits complete justice even after more than two decades.