Justice Arun Kumar Jha grants bail to a child in conflict with law, sets aside order Appellate Court, Saran and Juvenile Justice Board in a gang-rape case

Name of the offender juvenile anonymized, but the name of the victim of gang rape disclosed in the judgement, ignoring Supreme Court's repeated directions

In X vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated June 29, 2026 concluded:"15. Let the petitioner, a child in conflict with law, be released on bail, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra/concerned Court in connection with JJB Case No. 51 of 2025, arising out of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the parents of the petitioner and the other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent and shall give undertaking that he / she shall keep proper care and upkeep of the petitioner. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board. (iii) If the petitioner is found involved in similar nature of offence in future, the learned J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra will be at liberty to move for cancellation of his bail bond. 16. Accordingly, the present revision petition is allowed." 

The respondent no. 2 is Tannu Kumari is the daughter of Rajendra Kumar Yadav, resident of village near Sadha Dhala, Bazar Samiti, Mufassil, Saran was impleaded as a opposite party no. 2 on the directions of Justice Jha by his order dated February 23, 2026. The order reads:"Learned counsel for the petitioner is was directed to be implead the informant of Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case No. 22 of 2025 as opposite party no. 2 in course of the day."

Justice set aside the order by the Appellate Court dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra in Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2025. Subsequently, the order of the Juvenile Justice Board in a JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 was also set aside. 

The judgement records that in the revision petition, the identity details of the petitioner /child in conflict with law was disclosed, which is against the statutory provisions prescribed under Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandates protection of disclosure of identity of the child in conflict with law.  Therefore, the identity of the child in conflict with law is being referred to in the cause title as X. 3. Registry while uploading the order on the website shall also ensure that the cause title is reflected in similar manner. 

Notably, the petitioner is a son of Jitendra Ray, resident of village- New Basti Brahmpur, Bhagwan Bazar, Saran. His mother is Rinku Devi.  

The criminal revision petition was directed against the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra, in a Criminal (Juvenile) Appeal of 2025, whereby and whereunder the appeal was dismissed and the order of Juvenile Justice Board, Saran at Chapra dated September 8, 2025 passed in JJB Case of 2025, which arose out of a Bhagwan Bazar P.S. Case of 2025 for offences punishable under Sections 70(1) and 3(5) of the B.N.S., 2023, was affirmed and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was dismissed. 

As per prosecution case, the petitioner and other co-accused persons committed gang-rape with the informant. The petitioner was apprehended and was in custody since January 19, 2025 of the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. The petitioner was declared a child in conflict with law vide order dated August 11, 2025 passed by the J.J. Board, Saran at Chapra. 

Being aggrieved by the order dated January 12, 2026 passed by the Appellate Court, the petitioner moved the revision petition before the High Court. 

The counsel for the petitioner/child in conflict with law submitted that the child in conflict with law was falsely implicated in this case and he was innocent. The prosecution story was not believable. The FIR was registered after a delay of more than twenty-four hours without any plausible explanation. Though the child in conflict with law was named as an accused in the written report on which the FIR was instituted, the informant did not name this child in conflict with law in her statement recorded under Section 183 of the B.N.S.S., 2023. He also submitted that the medical report did not support the allegation of gang-rape. The main accused against whom there was specific allegation of kidnapping the informant and taking her to a secluded place and committing rape with her, was been granted bail by First Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Children Court, Saran at Chapra. The counsel further submitted that the Courts below failed to appreciate the mandate of law as under Section 12 as well as Sections 3(i), 3(IV), 3(V) and 3(XIV) of the Act of 2015. The counsel also submitted that the Courts below failed to consider that prolonged detention of a child in conflict with law defeats the very objective of the J.J. Act which is reformative and rehabilitative in nature. It was submitted that mother of the child in conflict with law undertakes to take full care of her son and further undertakes that she would not allow the child in conflict with law to come in contact with bad elements. The child in conflict with law was having antecedent of five cases and  he was on bail in all these cases. 

APP for the State and the counsel for the OP No. 2 vehemently opposed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner/child in conflict with law. The counsel for the OP No. 2 submitted that the Courts below has correctly passed the orders considering the antecedent of the child in conflict with law. The child in conflict with law was having altogether five criminal cases and he committed all these offences while on bail in two such cases. There was every likelihood that the child in conflict with law would again commit some serious offence if he was enlarged on bail. He also submitted that thus there was apparent mental, physical and psychological danger to the child in conflict with law (CICL) and it was also very likely that the CICL would again come in contact with his associates who appear to be inveterate criminals.

Justice Jha observed: "10. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that a CICL could be denied bail only on the ground that on release, the said child would come in contact with criminal elements or there was danger to the moral, physical and psychological well being of the CICL or the release would defeat the ends of justice. If these grounds are not present, the bail could not be denied to a CICL. 11. Further, the Act of 2015 is, in fact, child friendly. The central theme is that the interest of child is supreme. Section 3 of the Act of 2015 incorporates the general principles to be followed in the administration of the Act. According to which, “all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. In fact, Section 3(iv) of the Act of 2015 provides for the principle of best interest and for all decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. Section 3(xii) of the Act of 2015 makes it abundantly clear that a child shall be placed in institutional care as a step of last resort after making a reasonable inquiry. Further, Section 3(xiii) of the Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for Principle of repatriation and restoration stating that a CICL shall have the right to re-unite with his family and be restored to the social, cultural and the economic background that he came from unless such restoration and repartition is not in the CICL’s best interest." 

The judgement reads: "12. Cumulative reading of aforesaid provisions show the CICL should be released on bail unless the fact comes on record that there was chance of such child coming in contact with a known criminal or enlarging such child on bail might expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. Further, the Courts being parens patriae are supposed to look into for protection of best interest of the child. All such steps are to be taken by the Courts for reformation and rehabilitation of a CICL." 

Justice Jha recorded: "It is true that the CICL is having antecedent of five cases and it also appears that he has been named in this case after release on bail in two such cases, but the intent and purpose of the J.J. Act is to reform a child delinquent and if the Court refused to release the child and bring him to his family would defeat the purpose if prayer for bail is rejected on the ground of criminal antecedent, though it becomes relevant factor for considering whether the case of the CICL falls in any of the exceptions under Section 12 of the Act of 2015. Since the bail of the CICL is refused solely on the ground of criminal antecedent, I think the CICL can be given an opportunity to reform himself and for reformation and rehabilitation of the CICL, the best place is his family and as his mother has undertaken to take care of him, I think considering all these facts and circumstances and the mandate of law, the prayer for bail of the CICL could be sympathetically considered." 

While the removal of the name of the a child in conflict with law has rightly been protected from disclosure, the disclosure of the name of the informant does appear to be appropriate.  

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Hukum Chand @ Monu 2026 INSC 290, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K. Singh concluded:"we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (((2019) 2 SCC 703)) which has mandated the non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences." The Bench drew attention towards the Court's decisions in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh 1996) 2 SCC 384 which touched upon this issue in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also towards Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of HP (2003) 8 SCC 551.

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ritesh Kumar bench directs release of minor, directs payment of Rs 5 lakh by erring officials as compensation for illegal arrest

In Md. Jahid (Minor) under the guardianship of cousin brother Mohammad Navi Hussain/Parokar vs. The State of Bihar, through Director General of Police, Government of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench-II of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ritesh Kumar delivered a 14-page long judgement dated January 9, 2026, wherein, it concluded:".....we direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith by the Juvenile Justice Board from the observation home/children’s home and in this regard appropriate release order shall be issued by the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura forthwith. 24. For his unlawful arrest and detention, we direct the State to pay a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) as compensation. This amount, we are assessing, keeping in view that a young boy who is a juvenile at this stage has undergone physical and mental agony for two and half months by now. The State Government shall pay this amount to the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Justice Prsad who authored the judgement drew on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1960 while dealing with the case of contravention of fundamental rights of a citizen. He referred to the decision in Arvind Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and Others reported in 2025 (6) BLJ 5 by the Patna High Court which observed in paragraphs ‘27’, ‘28’ and ‘29’: “27. In the case of Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar and Another while dealing with a case of unlawful detention in jail, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-“...In these circumstances, the refusal of this court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lipservice to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated.” 28. In the case of Pankaj Kumar Sharma Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has reviewed the case laws on the subject and upon finding that the petitioner was made to suffer in the lockup for only half an hour, the learned Single Judge directed for payment of compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the petitioner recoverable from the salaries of Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who were the erring officials."

The judgement reads: "25. We find that the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Court by filing a writ application of Habeas Corpus. He/his family has incurred expenses in contesting the litigation which were imposed upon them due to misuse of power by the police official. 26. We, therefore, award a cost of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) to the petitioner which shall also be paid by the State within the same period. 27. It is well settled in law that when the State is saddled with cost and compensation because of misuse of power by an executive, such cost and compensation must be realized from the erring officials. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of K.K. Pathak @ Keshav Kumar Pathak Vs. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Others reported in 2019 (1) PLJR 1051 which was subject matter of challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Crl) No. 003566/2019, however, the same has not been interfered with and the view is based on the earlier views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been duly discussed."

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement wrote: "28. We direct the competent authority/the Director General of Police, Bihar to institute an inquiry into the matter in administrative side, take a suitable view based on the materials which would come in course of the inquiry proceeding and realize the cost and the compensation amount from the erring officials. The cost and compensation amount which will be paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring officials after completion of inquiry, within a period of six months from the date of receipt/communication of a copy of this order. 29. This writ application stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 30. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Principal District Judge, Madhepura, the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura and the Director General of Police, Bihar for compliance."

The writ application was filed in the nature of a Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking release of the petitioner from the illegal detention of the respondents. It was the case of the petitioner that the I.O. in this case arrested the petitioner in complete disregard to the powers of arrest and without following the established procedure of law. The petitioner alleged gross violation of his fundamental right as embodied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One Khushboo Praveen wife of Md. Amzad, resident of village Sapardah Ward No. 8, P.S.- Puraini, District- Madhepura lodged a first information report giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 11, 2025 registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 76, 308(2), 109, 303(2), 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. She alleged that in connection with a land dispute, a Panchayati was held with the intervention of the co-villagers, the accused persons called the prosecution side to participate in the said Panchayati but while the Panchayati was going on, the 14 named accused including this petitioner who are all the co-villagers of the informant assaulted the prosecution side. It was also alleged that the accused persons had taken away the silver chain and other ornaments. In connection with the said occurrence, the petitioner’s mother also lodged a counter case giving rise to Puraini P.S. Case of 2025 dated July 16, 2025. The  case was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 76, 126(2), 109, 303(2), 352, 351(2), 351(3) of the BNS, 2023. 

During investigation of the Puraini P.S. Case, the I.O. found that there was no sufficient material to proceed against ten named accused persons including thE petitioner. One accused, namely, Md. Naushad was arrested. The investigation was supervised by the Inspector and upon instructions, the I.O. filed a chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 235 of 2025 dated September 1, 2025 in which ten accused including this petitioner were shown in Column No. 12 as not chargesheeted accused. In another words, they were not sent up for trial. A reading of the chargesheet which is on the record  would show that the same was filed on the direction of the Senior Police officer, while the arrested accused Md. Naushad was chargesheeted, the investigation was kept open against three absconding accused, namely, (1) Md. Muktar, (2) Md. Zakir and (3) Md. Akhtar. It was apparent that after about 25 days, the I.O. received a review note/supervision note from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (in short ‘DIG’), Koshi Range, Saharsa. It was evident that the supervision note was recorded by the DIG on his own on the request of the informant who had visited the office of the DIG with an application complaining that the Inspector of Police had wrongly exonerated ten named accused persons. The DIG simply recorded in his note the allegations. Taking note of the statements of the witnesses, he issued a direction to the I.O. to proceed with the investigation of the case assuming that the allegations are true against the accused persons. He directed the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura to ensure further action and arrest all the remaining accused persons expeditiously. A perusal of the case diary would showed that the supervision note of the DIG was incorporated in the case diary on September 25, 2025 whereafter the I.O. straightway proceeded to conduct raid on the house of the accused persons. The case diary did not show that after the supervision note of the DIG, any instruction was obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura. It did not show that the I.O., being fully aware of the fact that the ten accused persons had already been shown not sent up for trial, made any application in the court of Magistrate for permitting a further investigation. The I.O. could not lay his hand to any other material against the petitioner but on October 23, 2025, he arrested the petitioner, described his age as 19 years and produced him before the court from where he was sent to jail. It appeared that even at the time of his production before the Magistrate, the attention of the Magistrate was not drawn towards the fact that the petitioner was shown in the column of not chargesheeted accused in the chargesheet, therefore, once the chargesheet had been filed in the court, it was incumbent upon the I.O. to file an application seeking further investigation of the case if at all any material had come against the petitioner. Even the Magistrate did not look into these aspects of the matter and straightway in a mechanical manner sent the petitioner behind the bars. 

The petitioner approached the High Court by filing the writ application and informed this Court on November 24, 2025 in course of hearing that the petitioner was a juvenile as per his date of birth certificate i.e. the registration card of the Bihar School Examination Board showing his date of birth as January 1, 2010. The petitioner complained that despite the fact that he was a juvenile, the Magistrate did not assess his age at the time of sending him behind the bars and in complete breach of the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the petitioner was languishing in jail. On 24.11.2025, the High Court noticed the submissions and asked the State to file a counter affidavit duly sworn by the I.O. who had effected the arrest of the petitioner. In the meantime, the High Court observed that “it will be open to the Jurisdictional Magistrate to take corrective measures after considering the date of birth certificate of the petitioner. If it is found that the petitioner is aged below 18 years, it will be incumbent upon the Jurisdictional Magistrate to send him to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board for assessment of age and considering his date of birth certificate as per the Bihar School Examination Board, he would be kept in an observation home and not in jail with adults.”

The High Court was been informed at this stage that, in fact, after coming to know the claim of the petitioner that he was a juvenile, the Jurisdictional Magistrate had vide his order dated November 21, 2025 referred him for assessment of age to the Juvenile Justice Board, Madhepura. A Letter No. 13 dated January 7, 2026 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Madhepura showed that the petitioner was declared juvenile aged about 15 years 06 months and 08 days on the date of occurrence.

A question arose for consideration in the present case as to how the petitioner could have been arrested on October 23, 2025 when he was not chargesheeted in the case and, in fact, in the Chargesheet No. 235, he was shown one amongst the ten accused persons who were not chargesheeted/sent up for trial.

Justice Prasad observed:"We have already taken note of the fact that during investigation, sufficient materials were not found against the petitioner to send him to trial and after the supervision note of the DIG, the I.O. had not collected any other and further material against the petitioner. All that he did after receipt of the supervision note of the DIG was that he conducted a raid and ultimately arrested the petitioner from his house on 23.10.2025." 

Supreme Court seized with challenge against Patna High Court's order which set aside Children’s Court's order against order by Juvenile Justice Board

In Munni Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Supreme Court's Division of Justices Sanjay Karol and Vipul M. Pancholi passed a 2-page long order dated November 20, 2025, upon hearing the SLP (Criminal) wherein the petitioner has challenged the 6-page long order dated July 31, 2025 by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of the Patna High Court in Gautam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025). The Division Bench condoned the delay, issued notice, returnable on January 9, 2026. The order reads: "5. In the notice itself let it be mentioned that the 1respondents are required to file the counter affidavit before the next date of listing. 6. In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of all further proceedings arising out of FIR No.644 of 2022 of Ara Town Police Station, Bhojpur District, Bihar." 

In Gautam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr.(2025), Justice Chaudhuri had passed the order dated July 31, 2025, wherein, referring to the case of Children in Conflict with Law (CICL), he had concluded: "11. The learned Children’s Court mis-appreciated the provision of Section 104(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The aforementioned provision provides that without prejudice to the provision for appeal and revision, under the said Act, the Committee or Board may on an application received in this behalf amend any orders passed by itself, as to the institution to which a child is to be sent or as to the person under whose care or supervision a child is to be placed under the Act. Clause-(2) of Section 104 speaks about amendment of clerical and arithmetical mistake. 12. Second application filed by the petitioner was not an application for rectification of any clerical mistake. This was an application for declaring the petitioner as a juvenile. The said application is maintainable and the order passed by the Children’s Court in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024 is set aside. The CICL shall be tried in accordance with the provisions contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 13. The instant revision is accordingly, allowed on contest. There shall be however, no order as to cost." 

The second respondent was/is Munni Devi, wife of Satya Narayan Rai, Badka Chanda village, Koelwar, Bhojpur. The case arose out of a PS. case 2022 Thana-Ara Nagar, Bhojpur.

This criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated October 1, 2024 passed by the First Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Children’s Court, Bhojpur at Ara in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024, whereby the Court of Appeal set aside the order dated May 1, 2024 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board in a J.J.B. case of 2023. The revision petition had challenged the order dated October 1, 2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.31 of 2024.

The Ara Town P.S. case of 2022 was registered on the basis of Fardbeyan of one Ramadhar Rai, which was recorded by the S.H.O. of Ara Town police station on July 17, 2020 at around 5:00 a.m., the informant went to the house of his step mother, namely, Sumitra Devi. As soon as he reached in front of the door of the house of Sumitra Devi, he found blood sipping out from beneath the door. Immediately he opened the gate and found dead-body of his step mother having bleeding injury on her body. He also found the dead-body of Ram Awadhesh Rai @ Munna lying on the bed having fetal injury on his abdomen. It appeared to the informant that both of them were shot dead then he rushed to call Premchand Rai, brother of Sumitra Devi, who used to reside in the neighborhood some other people also rushed to the place of occurrence and gathered on the basis of the said statement, police registered Ara Town P.S. case of 2022 dated July 17, 2020 under Section 302 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

During investigation, the Investigating Officer suspected the informant, his son Gautam Kumar, Sonu Kumar, Bittu @ Arbaaz Khan as the perpetrated of the offence. On completion of investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against Gautam Kumar, Sonu Kumar, Bittu @ Arbaaz Khan while the investigation was kept pending against the informant Ramadhar Rai, Nikhil Kumar and Vikas Kumar.

The petitioner had filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur at Ara claiming himself to be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. The Chief Judicial Magistrate referred the case to the Juvenile Justice Board for further consideration. Initially the Board by an order dated December 14, 2022 rejected the petition filed by the CICL holding, inter-alia-that the plea of juvenility by the petitioner was wrong and concocted. The petitioner did not prefer an appeal against the said order. The petitioner filed a second petition on July 15, 2023 with similar prayer along with Admit Card, Mark-sheet,
Registration Receipt issued by the Bihar School Examination Board and Transfer Certificate issued by the R.N. High School, Birampur, Bhojpur and also his Aadhar Card. On the basis of the said documents, the petitioner claimed that on the date of occurrence he was aged about 16 years 03 months and 29 days as his date of birth was March 12, 2006. The Juvenile Justice Board on verification of those documents under the provision of Section 94(2) of the said Act held the petitioner as a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. Against the said order, one Munni Devi daughter of deceased Sumitra Devi preferred an appeal before the Sessions Judge, 1st Court-cum-Children Court at Ara, which was registered as Criminal Appeal
No.31 of 2024. The Trial Judge had allowed the appeal by setting aside the order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board dated May 1, 2024 holding, inter-alia, that Section 104 of the said Act does not contemplate for a review of the earlier order of the Board and the Board has no jurisdiction to pass subsequent order dated May 1, 2024 declaring the CICL as juvenile. 

The petitioner's Advocate submitted that the CICL did not seek for review, the subsequent petition filed on behalf of the CICL was indeed an application under Section 9(2) of the said Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur at Ara and the Chief Judicial Magistrate referred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for disposal. He also submitted that Section 9(2) of the said Act authorizes a CICL to raise claim of juvenility at any stage and whenever this plea is taken, it is the duty of the Court to direct the Board to conduct a fair and proper inquiry to ascertain the truth by examining the correctness of the documents or certificates or materials produced before the Court. Initially, the CICL could not produce enough document to prove that he was juvenile on the date of commission of alleged offence, subsequent application was filed on the basis of additional documents, viz. Matriculation certificate, Admit Card issued by the Bihar Secondary Board of Education, Transfer Certificate, Aadhar Card etc. On the basis of said document, the Board had power to pass fresh judgment declaring the CICL as a juvenile on the date of commission of offence. He referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2023) 15 SCC 683 and Rahul Kumar Yadav vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2739.

Now the matter is before the Supreme Court.

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside Appellate Court's order in a juvenile's case

In XXX S/o Jeebachh Yadav @ Jivach Yadav Being Minor represented through under guardian ship of her mother namely Ramkumari Devi vs, The State of Bihar (2925),  Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 8-pagr long judgement dated November 4, 2025, wherein he concluded:''12. Therefore, having regard to all the facts and circumstances and considering the provisions of law applicable to grant of bail to a child in conflict with law, I am unable to agree with the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court and therefore, the order of the learned Appellate Court dated 07.05.2025 is set aside and the present revision petitioner is allowed. Hence, the petitioner/juvenile in conflict with law is directed to be released on bail, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand Only) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum- Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani/concerned court, in connection with Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024, subject to the following conditions: (i) One of the bailors will be the mother of the petitioner and other bailor will also be relative of the petitioner having no criminal antecedent. (ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Board on each and every date of trial of the case fixed by the Board.'' The judgement was upon hearing the criminal revision petition.  

The petitioner was a juvenile in conflict with law and the revision petition has been filed for setting aside the order dated 07.05.2025 passed in Juvenile Appeal No. 07 of 2025 arising out of Khutauna P.S. Case No. 19 of 2024 registered under Section 399, 402, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 25(1-b)a, 26, 35 of the Arms Act by the Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-Special Judge, Children Court, Madhubani whereby and whereunder the Appellate Court rejected the appeal of the petitioner and the prayer of the petitioner for grant of bail.

According to the prosecution case, police apprehended the petitioner and three other co-accused persons while they assembled for making preparation to commit crime and 2-3 persons managed to escape from the spot taking advantage of darkness. Recovery of arms, ammunition and mobile phones were made from other co-accused persons. From the possession of the petitioner a mobile phone was recovered.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is not sustainable and the Appellate Court has passed the order without considering the facts and law. The Appellate Court rejected the prayer for bail on the ground of the Social Investigation Report of the petitioner but the said report has been prepared with false averments by submitting that petitioner was not in control of his mother and there was absence of moral and ethical values in the house and for this reason, there was possibility of involvement of the petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. But the petitioner never indulged in any illegal activities and his mother undertakes to take control of her son in future and not to allow him to indulge in any criminal activities. The counsel also submitted that petitioner was a minor and seriousness and gravity of offence could not be considered while granting bail to the petitioner who is a child in conflict with law. The Social Background Report and the Social Investigation Report have been prepared on the basis of wrong facts. It is the requirement of law that unless reasonable grounds are available to believe that in the event of grant of bail, the petitioner would go into association of any known criminals and he would be exposed to moral, physical and psychological danger or that the release of the petitioner would defeat the ends of justice, the prayer for bail ought not to be rejected. But the Appellate Court in general and vague terms and without considering the express provisions of law went on to reject the prayer for bail of the petitioner and at the same time also mentioned that the allegation against the petitioner was serious in nature. The same could not be a consideration for rejection of bail of the petitioner. The counsel for the petitioner further submitted  that the petitioner and other co-accused persons were apprehended by the police party with allegation that they had been making plan for committing dacoity and some of the co-accused persons were apprehended with firearms and ammunition but from the possession of the petitioner recovery of only a mobile phone was made and no firearm or ammunition were recovered from his possession. The petitioner had been made accused in two more cases on the basis of confessional statement of co-accused Pankaj Kumar and prior to that there was no criminal antecedent of the petitioner. Both the cases were lodged on 19.01.2024 and subsequently the petitioner was apprehended in this case on 23.01.2024 showing as one of the accused persons and since then the petitioner is in custody. Other co-accused persons were n granted bail by Co-ordinate Bench of the High  Court vide order dated 30.07.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 47886 of 2024, order dated 05.09.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 60492 of 2024 and order dated 04.12.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 82496 of 2024. The counsel submitted that since no grounds are forthcoming for believing that release of petitioner was likely to bring him into association of any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice, the order of the learned Appellate Court is not sustainable. 08. Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 reads: “Section 12 Bail to a person who is apparently a child alleged to be in conflict with law.

1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person: Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the persons release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. 
(2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation
home 1[or a place of safety, as the case may be] in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order.(4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.” Therefore, there exists a non-obstante clause that child in conflict with law shall be released on bail notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 

The relevant portion of Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides for the general principles of care and protection of children and are extracted herein below:- 
“Section 3 : General principles to be followed in administration of Act. (i) Principle of presumption of innocence: Any child shall be presumed to be an innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to the age of eighteen years.  (iv) Principle of best interest: All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential. (v) Principle of family responsibility: The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be. (xiv) Principle of fresh start: All past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.” 

The judgement reads: ''Underlying principle is the best interest of the child and gravity and nature of offences are immaterial for consideration of grant of bail to a child/juvenile in conflict with law. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that any decision taken in respect of the child must be based on the primary consideration of the best interest of the child. Proviso to Section 12 makes certain exceptions for refusal of bail to a child in conflict with law. Apparently, bail to a child in conflict of law could be denied only on certain conditions specially on the ground that the child in conflict with law would come into association of any known criminal or there would be moral, physical or psychological danger if the child is released on bail or that the ends of justice would be defeated by such release.''

Justice Jha observed: ''The Appellate Court has not discussed the issues except making bland assertion that the petitioner was an active member of a gang of robbers and was a criminal minded and was not under control of his parents. Though the petitioner is having antecedent of two cases, the circumstances around lodging of these two cases does not rule out the possibility of false implication. It has not been mentioned how the learned Appellate Court arrived at the finding that the child was not in control of his mother and there is absence of moral and ethical values in the house or that there was possibility of involvement of petitioner in anti-social activities after his release. Further, considering the serious nature of allegation against the petitioner for denying the bail was simply uncalled for and unwarranted.

"Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth": Supreme Court

On January 8, 2025, in Om Prakash @ Israel @Raju @Raju Das vs. Union of India (2025), the Supreme Court's bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Arvind Kumar, the Court recalled the words of Lord Atkin in United Australia Limited v. Barclay’s Bank Ltd (1941), …"When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” The judgement was authored by Justice Sundresh. 

The Court examined how the person was wrongly tried as a juvenile. The defence of his juvenile status could be raised even after conviction. It allowed the Appeal saying, "The impugned judgment stands set aside" refering to the judgement of Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma of Uttarakhand High Court dated August 23, 2019. 

Supreme Court's judgement states "the sentence imposed against the Appellant in excess of the upper limit prescribed under the relevant Act, shall stand set aside, while making it clear that the conviction shall continue. The Appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case." The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is the relevant Act which replaced the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. But prior to that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 addressed the issue of juvenile justice. 

The appellant was charged for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. The incident took place on November 15, 1994. 

A statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), 1973 was recorded by the trial Court. It stated that his age was 20 years, as on March 7, 2001. 

After his conviction, the appellant, an illiterate raised the plea of juvenility during the hearing on sentence by stating that he was about 17 years of age at the time of the incident. Assuming his status as as a major with reference to his bank account, the trial Court sentenced him to death. n The High Court too did not refer the case to Juvenile Court refusing to give him the benefit of being a juvenile. But relying on his bank account and the cheque book endorsed the order of the 

trial Court. 

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the appellant placed reliance upon the birth certificate issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School dated April 28, 2001, agreed with the High Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed a Review Petition, reiterating the fact that he was a minor at the time of the offence. It was also pointed out that it was appellant's deceased employer who filled the details to open his bank account. The Review Petition was dismissed. After the dismissal, a Mercy Petition was rejected by Governor of Uttarakhand. 

A Writ Petition was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellant’s parents and social worker under Article 32 of the Constitution. A copy of the school certificate dated June 19, 2003 from the headmaster and a transfer certificate dated April 28, 2001 was filed. This Writ Petition was dismissed on February 16, 2005 with liberty to invoke the curative jurisdiction of the Court. A Curative Petition was filed. A counter affidavit to the Curative Petition of Respondent No. 2 produced another certificate dated January 7, 2006 issued by the Dariya Para Bodinath Board School, after verifying the school certificate which reiterated the fact that the appellant was 14 years of age on the date of the incident. This Curative Petition was also dismissed by an order of the Supreme Court dated February 6, 2006.

After the amendment incorporating Section 7A into the 2000 Act, the appellant’s mother filed a Mercy Petition before the President of India. During the pendency of the Mercy Petition, the 2007 Rules came into effect. Notably, an ossification test of the appellant was done by a Medical Board constituted by the Meerut Jail, on a request made by the appellant by way of an application. The Medical Age Certificate issued therein also indicated that the Appellant was aged around 14 years at the time of the occurrence. 

Significantly, by the Presidential Order dated May 8, 2012, the death sentence of the appellant was commuted to life imprisonment, with a caveat that he shall not be released until the attainment of 60 years of age. An application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed by the appellant, through which information was obtained from the bank that any minor above 10 years of age can have an independent bank account, provided he knew how to read and write, and also that no cheque book was issued for the bank account opened in the name of the appellant. 

Subsequently, a Curative Petition filed by the appellant was also rejected by the Registry as not maintainable. 

In 2019, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution, laying a challenge to the Presidential Order while seeking yet another relief on the basis of Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court. It held that the power of judicial review over an executive order passed in exercise of Article 72 of the Constitution is limited, and the proceedings against the appellant had attained finality. 

The appellant approached the Supreme Court. Taking note of the background of the case, the Court observed: "Suffice it is to state that merits were not gone into in view of the clear stand of the State on the age of the Appellant."

The appellant was represented by Senior Counsel, Dr. S. Muralidhar. He submitted that the High Court committed an error in not considering the independent prayer sought for by the Appellant. It is not in dispute that the age of the Appellant was 14 years at the time of commission of the offence. There is no judicial finality attained and the phrase “any stage” used in Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act must be given an extended meaning. There is no contrary finding given against the appellant vis-à-vis the plea of juvenility, which he has raised at every stage. It is a case where grave injustice has been meted out, as can be demonstrated by the lack of adjudication. Therefore, the appellant is entitled for immediate release. The appellant has been unfairly kept under incarceration including the earlier solitary confinement It is untenable and illegal. The appellant should be adequately compensated for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison.

He drew the attention of the Court towards decisions wherein it was held that Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 can be invoked even after the final disposal of the case. This was held in Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 17 SCC 699 and Hari Dutt Sharma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Order of the Supreme Court dated February 7, 2022 in Writ Petition (Crl.) 367 of 2021.

It has been held that beneficial and retrospective applicability of change in law post the dismissal of the Curative Petition on February 6, 2006 in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637 and T Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and another, (1983) 1 SCC 177.

It has been held that claim of juvenility can be raised and considered even after the President has exercised powers under Article 72, Constitution of India in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204 and Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das, (2010) 14 SCC 209. 

Justice M.M. Sundresh observed: "We are dealing with a case where grave injustice has been perpetrated, on account of the consistent failure on part of the judicial machinery to recognise and act upon the constitutional mandate vis-a-vis the plea of juvenility". 

The Court was reminded of the words of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Jasraj Inder Singh vs. Hemraj Multanchand (1977). “Truth, like song, is whole and half-truth can be noise;Justice is truth, is beauty and the strategy of healing injustice is discovery of the whole truth and harmonising human relations. Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery agent of full fairness. This divagation is justified by the need to remind ourselves that the grammar of justice according to law is not little litigative solution….”

Justice Sundresh observed: "Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action. The primary duty of a Court is to make a single-minded endeavour to unearth the truth hidden beneath the facts. Thus, the Court is a search engine of truth, with procedural and substantive laws as its tools. When procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it. Similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos. Such an exercises is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation.In its journey, the Court must discern the truth, primarily from the material available on record in the form of pleadings, and arguments duly supported by documents. It must be kept in mind that the entire judicial system is meant for the discovery of the truth, it being the soul of decision. For doing so, a Presiding Officer is expected to play an active role, rather than a passive one."

He observed: "At every stage, injustice has been inflicted by the Courts, either by ignoring the documents or by casting a furtive glance. The Appellant despite being illiterate, raised this plea one way or another, right from the trial Court up to the conclusion of the Curative Petition before this Court. The approach of the Courts in the earlier round of litigation cannot be sustained in the eye of law. There can be no reliance on the statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, 1973 particularly when the Appellant was asked to give his particulars for the purpose of recording his statement. Even the said statement shows that he was 20 years of age at the time of making his deposition, which could only mean that he was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. The bank account has no relevance under the Acts and the relevant rules, and in any case, it is to be proved, though not contemplated under Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules. The statement given by the Appellant at the time of the hearing on his sentence, would also pale into insignificance, as even then he would have been a minor at the time of commission of the offence, under both the 2000 and the 2015 Acts." 

The judgement reads: "Though the 2000 Act was already enacted before the Appellant’s conviction, even assuming that only the 1986 Act was in vogue, the procedural mandate contemplated thereunder was also not followed by the trial Court and the High Court. Before this Court, the Appellant had relied upon the school certificate in the Criminal Appeal. It was once again relied upon in the Review Petition. Thereafter, additional documents were relied upon by the Appellant in the Writ Petition and also in the Curative Petition which was subsequently filed. In the Curative Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the State certifying the documents furnished by the Appellant to be true. Nonetheless, the said petition was dismissed without according any reason." 

The judgement points out that "even the then existing State Rules were not duly followed, and if followed, the same would have ensured to the benefit of the Appellant." 

The Court observed:"We would only say that when the plea of juvenility was raised, it should have been dealt with under the existing laws at the relevant point of time, especially when there exists a tacit and clear admission as to the age of the Appellant. In fact, there is no need for such an inquiry in view of the aforesaid position. In our considered view, this Court could have dealt with the Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, as it raised an independent prayer for the enforcement of a right conferred under a social welfare legislation. In the subsequent Writ Petition filed before the High Court, two different prayers had been made, namely, the determination of the appellant’s plea of juvenility and consequent release, or alternatively, judicial review of the decision of the President or the Governor and consequent release. As the Executive cannot be construed to have undertaken an adjudication on the determination of the age of the accused, and with the first prayer being a distinct one invoking Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, we feel that the High Court has committed an error in its reasoning. We would only state that this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts."

The judgement makes it clear that "It cannot be construed that the Presidential Order is interfered with, as the issue that we are concerned with, is the failure of the Court in not applying the mandatory provisions of the 2015 Act with specific reference to the plea of juvenility. Therefore, it is not a review of the Presidential Order, but a case of giving the benefit of the provisions of the 2015 Act to a deserving person."

The Court recorded:"We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored."

The Court observed:"From the custody certificate filed on record, it appears that the Appellant has undergone imprisonment for almost 25 years, during which time, the society has undergone significant transformation which the Appellant might be unaware of and find difficult to adjust with."

The Court directed the Uttarakhand State Legal Services Authority to play a proactive role in identifying any welfare scheme of the State/Central Government, to facilitate the appellant’s rehabilitation and smooth reintegration into the society upon his release, with particular emphasis on his right to livelihood, shelter and sustenance guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It also directed the State Authority to assist him in availing any such scheme under which he is found eligible and wishes to avail, and such assistance may be effected through the concerned District Legal Services Authority, if the State Authority finds the same expedient and necessary. 

It is crystal clear that justice has been delayed. The appellant's senior counsel had prayed for adequate compensation  for the loss of formative years suffered by him in the prison. But the Court has not awarded him any compensation. It emerges that in the absence of compensation for the appellant, he has recieved partial justice. He awaits complete justice even after more than two decades. 

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 prevails over personal laws: Supreme Court

In Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action vs. Union of India and Others (2024), Supreme Court has passed the following directions:-"1. Empowering Magistrates to Take Suo Moto Action and Issue Preventive Injunctions
1.1.All Magistrates vested with authority under Section 13 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, are directed to take proactive measures, including issuing suo motu injunctions to prevent the solemnization of child marriages; and
1.2.Magistrates are encouraged to particularly focus on "auspicious days" known for mass weddings, when the occurrence of child marriages is notably high. Upon receiving credible information or even upon suspicion, Magistrates should use their judicial powers to halt such marriages and ensure child protection."

The judgment was delivered on October 18, 2024 by a 3-judge bench of 50th chief justice of India, Justices J. B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra. The 141-page long judgement was authored by Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud.  

Notably, the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021 was introduced in Parliament on December 21, 2021. The Bill was referred for examination to the Department Related Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports. The Bill sought to amend the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 to expressly state the overriding effect of the statute over various personal laws. The issue, therefore, is pending consideration before Parliament. 

In such a backdrop, it is quite significant that Union of India in its submission before the Supreme Court has stated after the judgment was reserved in the case that "this Court may direct that the PCMA prevails over personal law." The note of the Union states as follows: “9. As a way forward, Ministry of Women & Child Development has following inputs to provide for kind consideration of the Hon’ble Court –i. There are conflicting pronouncements by various High Courts about the precedence of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 over the personal laws. Hence, Hon’ble Court may consider issuing directions pronouncing that the PCMA will prevail over the personal laws governing marriage.…” 

The Court observed: "we note that while the PCMA seeks to prohibit child marriages, it does not stipulate on betrothals. Marriages fixed in the minority of a child also have the effect of violating their rights to free choice, autonomy, agency and childhood. It takes away from them their choice of partner and life paths before they mature and form the ability to assert their agency. International law such as CEDAW stipulates against betrothals of minors. Parliament may consider outlawing child betrothals which may be used to evade penalty under the PCMA. While a betrothed child may be protected as a child in need of care and protection under the JJ Act, the practice also requires targeted remedies for its elimination." JJ Act refers to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. CEDAW refers to Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women which was adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1981. India ratified CEDAW on July 9, 1993.

The concluding paragraph of the judgement reads:"A copy of this Judgment will be transmitted to the Secretaries of all concerned Ministries, the Government of India which includes the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Rural Development, statutory authorities, institutions, and organizations under the control of the respective ministries. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed to circulate this judgment to the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of all the States and Union Territories, as well as NALSA, and NCPCR for strict compliance with the directions. This shall be done within a period of four weeks from the date of delivery of this judgment."

In compliance with the judgement, Patna High Court's Registrar General has issued a Circular No.7 of 2024 for necessary observance of the aforementioned directions which should be strictly followed. A copy of the circular has been forwarded to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Justice, Jaisalmer House, 26 Mansingh Road, New Delhi, Director, Bihar Judicial Academy, Patna and Member Secretary, Bihar State Legal Services Authority, Patna. The circular states that All the Principal District and Sessions Judges of Bihar are supposed  to circulate this circular order amongst all the Judicial Officers working in their respective Judgeships for its strict compliance.

 

Bengal Police complies with Supreme Court's recommendations for adoption of Delhi Model to stop bias against disadvantaged communities

Before approaching the Supreme Court, Amanatullah Khan, the appellant had approached Delhi High Court through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of the ‘History Sheet’ opened against him and the proposal to declare him as ‘Bad Character’ with the entry of his name in the Surveillance ‘Register-X, Part II, Bundle A’ at Police Station Jamia Nagar, District: South-East, Delhi. Judge Sudhir Kumar Jain of Delhi High Court had dismissed the appellant’s writ petition by judgment dated January 19, 2023. The High Court's judgement reads: "The present petition is devoid of any merit, hence dismissed. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to make a representation for deletion/cancellation of his name from Surveillance Register X in accordance with Rules and Law which shall be decided by the respondents in accordance with law without any delay."

The case was filed in the apex court on April 17, 2023. Supreme Court's bench of Justices Surya Kant and K.V. Viswanathan modified the impugned judgment of the High Court by its judgement dated May 7, 2024. It has directed that all the State Governments should take necessary preventive measures to safeguard against inexcusable targeting or prejudicial treatment of individuals from the socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, along with those belonging to Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes by mechanical entries of innocent individuals in the History Sheet. 

Supreme Court has recorded in its judgement that the amended Standing Order No.L&O/54/2022 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi which pertains to ‘Surveillance of History Sheeters and Bad Characters’. The Original Standing order was issued on June 10, 2022 and paragraph 9(2) thereof titled as “Preparation of History Sheet” was replicated from provisions of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. By the amended Standing Order issued on March 21, 2024,  the Commissioner of Police has provided as follows:
“The space for “relation and connection” should be filled in with a view to afford clues about those persons with whom the criminal is likely to harbour when wanted by the police, including relations or friends living at a distance from his home, and his associates in crime, abettors and receivers. It may be noted that the space for “relations and connections” in the history sheet should reflect identities of those persons who can afforded him shelter when the offender is running/wanted by the police (in general) and should include his associates in crime, abettors and receivers (in particular) and no details of any minor relatives i.e. son, daughter, siblings should be recorded anywhere in the History Sheet unless there is evidence that the minor under question can, or has earlier had, afforded shelter to the offender, “while he was on run from police”. While preparing History Sheet, it may also be kept in mind that as per Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, there is a prohibition on disclosing the Identity of a child in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection of a child victim or witness of a crime through a report etc. Even though the History Sheet is an internal Police document and not a publicly accessible report, care must be taken that identities of only those minor relatives are entered into the History Sheet against whom evidence exists that minor in question has earlier had, afforded shelter to the offender, while he was on run from police”. In addition to above, the particular nature of each person’s connection should be noted against each, and, when persons shown as connections themselves have history sheets, a cross reference with those History Sheets should be given. Maximum phone numbers/mobile numbers or associates/relatives/acquaintances of BCs should be collected and placed for record. Aadhar Number, EPIC number, e-mail ID, social media accounts/profiles viz, facebook, Instagram ID, Twitter ID etc. to be placed on file. Further mobile numbers & other available details of associates/relatives/acquaintance of BC should be collected and placed on record.”

In view of the above, the Supreme Court directed the police authorities to give effect to is the amended Standing Order dated March 21, 2024 in the appellant’s case as well.  It also directed the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to designate a senior police officer, in the rank of Joint Commissioner of Police or above, who shall periodically audit/review the contents of the History Sheets and will ensure confidentiality and a leeway to delete the names of such persons/juvenile/children who are, in the course of investigation, found innocent and are entitled to be expunged from the category of “relations and connections” in a History Sheet. If a Police Officer of Delhi Police is found to have acted contrary to the amended Standing Order and or the directions given herein above, prompt action against such delinquent officer shall be taken. 

In exercise of its suo motu powers, the bench of Justices Surya Kant and Viswanathan expanded the scope of the proceedings in para 14-16 of the judgement "so that the police authorities in other States and Union Territories may also consider the desirability of ensuring that no mechanical entries in History Sheet are made of innocent individuals, simply because they happen to hail from the socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, along with those belonging to Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes. While we are not sure about the degree of their authenticity, but there are some studies available in the public domain that reveal a pattern of an unfair, prejudicial and atrocious mindset. It is alleged that the Police Diaries are maintained selectively of individuals belong to Vimukta Jatis, based solely on caste-bias, a somewhat similar manner as happened in colonial times. All the State Governments are therefore expected to take necessary preventive measures to safeguard such communities from being subjected to inexcusable targeting or prejudicial treatment. We must bear in mind that these pre-conceived notions often render them ‘invisible victims’ due to prevailing stereotypes associated with their communities, which may often impede their right to live a life with self-respect." The Court observed: "The value for human dignity and life is deeply embedded in Article 21 of our Constitution. The expression ‘life’ unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and all that goes along with it. Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one’s surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter. It seems that a periodic audit mechanism overseen by a senior police officer, as directed for the NCT of Delhi, will serve as a critical tool to review and scrutinize the entries made, so as to ascertain that these are devoid of any biases or discriminatory practices. Through the effective implementation of audits, we can secure the elimination of such deprecated practices and kindle the legitimate hope that the right to live with human dignity, as guaranteed."

The Court's judgement reads:"We, therefore, deem it appropriate, at this stage, to direct all the States/Union Territories to revisit their policy-regime and consider whether suitable amendments on the pattern of the ‘Delhi Model’ are required to be made so that our observations made in paragraphs 14 to 16 of this order can be given effect in true letter and spirit. The Registry is, accordingly, directed to forward a copy of this judgement to the Chief Secretary and Director General of Police of all States and Union Territories to enable them to consider and comply with what has been held above, as early as possible but not later than six months."

In compliance with these recommendations of the Court, Bengal Police has issued guidelines on "disclosing identities of individuals connected with the offender in the history sheet" on October 24, 2024 before the expiry of six months deadline. This requires amendment in the Police Regulations of Bengal (PRB), 1943. The regulation 401 (a) of PRB states: "History sheets shall contain a short account of the life of the person to whom they relate and all facts likely to have a bearing on his criminal history. They shall be opened only for persons who are, or are likely to become, habitual criminals or the aiders or abettors of such criminals." Other States are yet to comply with the Supreme Court's directions of May 2024.

Courts, Tribunals, Boards, Quasi-Judicial Authorities must mention names of officials who sign orders: Supreme Court

In compliance with the judgment of Supreme Court dated May 7, 2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2411 of 2024 wherein certain directions have been issued to all the High Courts, the Registrar General of the Patna High Court has issued a circular dated September 24, 2024. The circular has been forwarded to the Secretary General, Supreme Court of India, Director, Bihar Judicial Academy, Patna and all District and Sessions Judges of Bihar for circulation amongst all the judicial officers working in their respective judgeships.

The Court's directions to all the High Courts is as under:-

1. In all the orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the Quasi-Judicial Authorities the names of the Presiding Officer and/or the Members who sign the orders shall be mentioned. In case any identification number has been given, the same can also be added.

2. The Presiding Officers and/or Members while passing the order shall properly record presence of the parties and/or their counsels, the purpose for which the matter is being adjourned and the party on whose behalf the adjournment has been sought and granted. It is therefore directed that necessary observance of the aforementioned directions should be strictly followed. Any deviation in this regard shall be viewed seriously.

In Child in Conflict with Law through his mother Vs. The State of Karnataka and Another, the Supreme Court' s bench of Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal endorsed the view of Karnataka High Court which noted that "while signing the order sheet and also orders, the names of the Judicial Member as well as Non-judicial Members are not noted below their signatures. This is coming in the way of anyone knowing the names of the members who were present and who were absent. Therefore, only on the basis of signatures, this Court was able to distinguish as to who was the Non-Judicial Member present on 05.04.2022 and who was the third member who joined in expressing dissenting opinion on 12.04.2022. This Court is of the considered opinion that it would be appropriate to mention the names of the members below their signatures, which would also help the transparency in conduct of the said proceedings and put the members on guard about their roles played in the said proceedings.”

Supreme Court observed: "The High Court has noticed an important issue which arises in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings throughout the country. The Presiding Officers or Members of the Board, as the case in hand, or Tribunals do not mention their names when the order is passed. As a result of which it becomes difficult to find out later on, as to who was presiding the Court or Board or Tribunal or was the member at the relevant point of time. There may be many officers with the same name. Insofar as the judicial officers are concerned, unique I.D. numbers have been issued to them."

Its judgement reads : "We expect that wherever lacking, in all orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the quasi-judicial authorities, the names of the Presiding Officers or the Members be specifically mentioned in the orders when signed, including the interim orders. If there is any identification number given to the officers, the same can also be added." The 77 page long judgement was authored by Justice Bindal. 

He noted:"In many of the orders the presence of the parties and/or their counsels is not properly recorded. Further, it is not evident as to on whose behalf adjournment has been sought and granted. It is very relevant fact to be considered at different stages of the case and also to find out as to who was the party delaying the matter. At the time of grant of adjournment, it should specifically be mentioned as to the purpose therefor. This may be helpful in imposition of costs also, finally once we shift to the real terms costs."

The Registrar General''s circular has also drawn attention towards Patna High Court's letters No. 12449-12486, dated 22.02.20 24 and 36819-36855, dated 07.05.2024 for reference. 

Supreme Court's directions were passed while adjudicating in a matter under Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.