Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justice Ashutosh Kumar with regard to validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under Pharmacy Act

In Md. Firoz Mansuri & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered a 31-page long judgement dated January 16, 2026 wherein it examined whether Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy erred in upholding the constitutional validity of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended by the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024) in its 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025. Supreme Court considered the question as to whether candidates holding Bachelor or Master of Pharmacy degrees, without possessing a Diploma in Pharmacy, satisfy the minimum eligibility criteria prescribed for appointment to the post of Pharmacist (basic category) under the said Rules. The Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 on October 10, 2014 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court concluded:"....we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the Division Bench in upholding the validity of the Cadre Rules."

Rule 6(1) stipulates the minimum educational qualification for appointment by direct recruitment to basic category posts, in the following terms: “Qualifications. (1) For appointment by direct recruitment to the basic category posts, minimum educational qualification shall be Intermediate/10+2 (Science) pass and passing in all parts (part I, II & III) of Diploma-in Pharmacy from the institution recognised by the Government and a certificate to that effect shall be necessary.” 

The note to Appendix-I(1) of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024 clarifies that: “Note: B. Pharma & M. Pharma certificate holder may be eligible provided they possess qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. The Appellants contended that Rule 6(1), read with the aforesaid Note, is repugnant to the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 framed thereunder, on the ground that the central legislation occupies the field of prescription of qualifications for pharmacists. The Pharmacy Act, 1948 was enacted to regulate the profession of pharmacy and to constitute pharmacy councils for that purpose. Section 2(i) of the Act defines a registered pharmacist as person whose name is entered in the State register for carrying on the profession or business of pharmacy. Section 10 of the Act stipulates that the Pharmacy Council of India may make the Education Regulations, prescribing the minimum standard of education required for qualification as a pharmacist. Sections 31 and 32 pertain to the registration of a person having the requisite qualification in the register. Further, Section 42 stipulates that no person other than a registered pharmacist or a medical practitioner shall be permitted to practice pharmacy.  

Supreme observe that "the scope of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, is limited to regulating the educational qualifications and professional conduct in the practice of pharmacy. The Act creates a pool of persons eligible to practise as pharmacists, it does not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for appointment to public posts. Its scope does not extend to conferring a right to public employment." 

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court noted that the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 were framed in exercise of the powers under Sections 10 and 18 of the Act. The objectives of the Regulations are stated to be improving the quality of health care,  ensuring high professional standards among pharmacists, reducing health care costs, and preventing the criminal misuse of medication. Additionally, Clause 2(h) of the Regulations provides the various classes of pharmacy practitioners including community pharmacist, hospital pharmacist, pharmacist. These Regulations govern professional practice and conduct. They do not govern public recruitment nor do they restrict the discretion of the State, as an employer, to select candidates from within the larger pool of registered pharmacists for specific public posts. The judgement reads: "49. Repugnancy arises only where compliance with one law necessarily results in disobedience of another, or where both laws occupy the same field and are irreconcilable. The Cadre Rules operate in the domain of public employment, while the Act and Regulations operate in the field of professional regulation. It is true that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot permit the appointment of persons who are not registered pharmacists under the 2015 Regulations, as Section 42 of the Act expressly prohibits such appointments. However, Section 42 cannot be construed to confer a right to public employment merely by virtue of registration. The Act only creates a pool of eligible persons who may be appointed as pharmacists, the 2015 Regulations certify who is technically competent to practice as a pharmacist, while the Cadre Rules reflect the State’s policy choice in selecting from the broader pool for public employment. No conflict arises unless the State appoints someone lacking the minimum technical qualification. 50. Once repugnancy is ruled out, the determination of eligibility criteria squarely falls within the domain of the employer. The power to frame rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the State to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment." 

The Court observed:"Therefore, it has been consistently recognised that it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of qualifications. The power of judicial review in matters of recruitment is limited to examining legislative competence, arbitrariness or violation of fundamental rights, if any. Courts cannot rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute their own assessment for that of the employer. The scope of judicial review in matters of public employment does not extend to questioning the State’s wisdom or policy in prescribing the minimum eligibility requirements for a public post. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the needs and interests of an institution, an industry or an establishment, as the case may be. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The assessment of the expediency, advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications do not warrant intervention of the Courts unless the same are shown to be perverse. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily in prescribing qualifications for posts." 

Justice Sharma who authored the judgement observed: "The prescription of eligibility criteria of 10+2 with Diploma in Pharmacy by the State cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. The State has articulated its rationale with reference to differences in course structure and the comparatively limited avenues of employment available to Diploma holders. 62. The course structure of Diploma in Pharmacy is governed by the Education Regulations, 1991, which has been replaced by the Education Regulation, 2020. The Diploma in Pharmacy course mandates 500 hours of compulsory practical training, including 250 hours devoted to dispensing prescriptions. The 2020 Regulation has refined the scope of training, limiting it to hospital, dispensary, or clinic-based activities. While, under the B. Pharma course Regulations, 2014, degree students are required to undergo 150 hours of practical training and they have the option to undertake the training either in a hospital/community centre or within the pharmaceutical industry. The diplomates and graduates are trained in different subjects. Merely because there is a provision for lateral entry of diplomates in the second year of B. Pharm course, it does not render the degree an in-line higher qualification. A qualification in one stream does not presuppose a qualification in another. Furthermore, the diplomates have limited employment avenues as compared to degree holders. Thus, the decision of the State in making possession of a Diploma an essential qualification for appointment cannot be said to be arbitrary. The State has merely identified a narrower catchment of candidates it considers most suitable for a particular purpose, from within the larger pool registered pharmacists....64. Additionally, there is no absolute exclusion of graduate or postgraduate degree holders. They remain eligible, provided they possess the essential qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. No disproportionate harm is caused to them so as to attract Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution." 

In Pharmacy Council of India vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy had delivered a 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025 wherein, it disposed all the writ petitions were disposed of without relief to the petitioners.   

Also read: Patna High Court upholds validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under the Pharmacy Act of 1948  

Patna High Court's Chief Justice led Bench prevents unjust enrichment by Indian Oil Corporation Limited

High Court endorses arguments by P. K. Shahi, the Advocate General of Bihar against unjust enrichment  

Delay of 12 years after mistaken payment by PSU is inexcusable,  PSU suffers loss of Rs.1,17,06,169

Patna High Court's bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Harish Kumar concluded, "We find absolutely no reason to entertain the writ petition and dismiss the same leaving the parties to suffer their respective costs" in Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Barauni Refinery v. State of Bihar (2024). 

The petitioner's counsel was S.D. Sanjay, Senior Advocate and the counsel for the respondent was P. K. Shahi, Advocate General, Government of Bihar. The petitioner's counsel submitted that there is unjust enrichment on the part of of the State of Bihar. The Advocate General pointed out that there cannot be any unjust enrichment on the part of the State since a refund would result in unjust enrichment on the part of Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the petitioner. He asserted that the delay stands against the petitioner. On behalf of the State government he argued that the application for refund was neither in the form prescribed nor before the competent authority and the returns too were not filed in accordance with the statute. 

The Court recorded that the petitioner is involved in a manufacturing activity, sells its products manufactured using the electricity generated in the captive consumption units. The expenses for generation, which include the duty levied or paid, is also be factored in the price of the products sold by the petitioner. By stating that in such a situation, "the duty paid has already been factored in the price of the goods manufactured, thus passing it over to the end consumer. The petitioner cannot claim any refund, which would lead to unjust enrichment", the Court endorsed the argument of the Advocate General.  

The Court observed, "we are of the opinion that the delay stands against the petitioners. The amounts claimed now are those remitted between January 2011 to October 2011. Electricity duty was paid under a notification and the amendment made to the notification was also challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner and its officers were always aware and alive to the duty imposed and its ramifications; the subsequent amendments brought in having been agitated before Court. The contention of the petitioner is that its officers failed to notice an exemption notification, which can only be termed as rank negligence."

It demonstrates that the Indian Oil Corporation Limited has been starved of competent legal advice for long. It has been admitted  that there was no legal proceedings initiated for refund and the writ petition is filed almost 12 years after the mistaken payment came to the notice of the petitioner. 

The Court observed, "We cannot also ignore the fact that the State, involved in various welfare measures, frames its budget for successive years based on the revenue and deficits of its coffers and the anticipated income and expenditure. It is too late in the day for the State to be asked to refund the amounts, though mistakenly paid."

The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the petitioner before the High Court was claiming refund of Rs.1,17,06,169/- paid as electricity duty to the State Government between January 2011 to October 2011. The petitioner came before the Court for the first time in 2023, seeking a refund of the amounts mistakenly paid, without noticing the exemption notification, during the period January 2011 to October 2011. 

The Court observed, "In addition to the delay occasioned, we are appalled by the gross negligence of the Officers of the Corporation", a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU).

The Court noted that electricity duty was imposed under the provisions of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948, its schedule and notifications. Under Schedule 3 of the Electricity Duty Act, there was a duty imposed at the rate of 2 paise/unit of energy generated in a captive power plant under the head of agriculture, irrigation and industrial purposes. The petitioner had been paying such duty regularly, the captive power plant having been established for industrial purposes.

The Court recorded that a notification was issued in the year 2005 to amend the schedule incorporating a further entry at Serial No.3 to the effect that 6% of the value of the energy equivalent to the energy tariff as fixed by the Bihar State Electricity Board shall be leviable for consumption of electrical energy generated by captive DG Set/Power Plants. 

The petitioner had filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the provisions which stood allowed. The State filed an SLP, which was not successful. The Court referred to this challenge made by the petitioner to emphasize that the petitioner had been diligently prosecuting the amendment made to the Electricity Duty Act before the Court. It is relevant because of the contention raised that an exemption notification under the very same enactment was omitted to be noticed by the officers of the PSU.

It has been admitted that by notification dated January 4, 2021, the payment of electricity duty on electrical energy generated by generator or captive plants for self-consumption was exempted from the levy. 

Notably, despite the exemption, the petitioner continued to pay the levy at the rate of 2% between January 2011 to October 2011. A refund application was filed on December 1, 2011 and then again, a reminder sent on January 21, 2012, after which the issue went into oblivion. It was revived and resumed, as is evident from paragraph 19 of the writ petition with reminders on January 22, 2020, September 28, 2021, February 7, 2022 and September 13, 2022.

Notably, the petitioner continued to pay the electricity duty even after the exemption granted. Subsequently, a half-hearted attempt was made on December 1, 2011 by a mere communication seeking refund, which was also not earnestly followed up by the petitioner or its officers.

Advocate General relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Jay Vee Rice and General Mills v. State of Harayana (2010) wherein, purchase tax was collected on paddy by the dealers from the District Food and Supplies Collectors along with procurement price. The tax collected was not deposited with the Government on the contention that an amendment in the taxing statute exempted payment of purchase tax. It was held, that the dealers, who collected the purchase tax along with the price of rice, cannot justify retention of the same with themselves, though purchase tax was exempted. The tax collected had to go to the State, was the finding.

The High Court factored in the judgement of the Supreme Court in Godfrey Philips India Ltd.v. State of U.P. (2005) wherein levy of luxury tax on tobacco was considered. While finding the levy to be not permissible under Entry 62 of List II, the State List as tax on luxuries, the declaration was made prospectively  permitting the State to retain the tax already paid to them after collection by the dealers but making it clear that the bank guarantees furnished in lieu of the tax levy were to be discharged. One other issue considered was that despite obtaining interim orders in the writ petitions, the dealers continued to charge tax from consumers/customers. On the principle of unjust enrichment, the collected tax was directed to be paid to the State Government. The duty liability was on the end consumer, who cannot be found out for effecting refund. It may be noted that Entry 62 of List II was inserted by Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976.

The High Court drew on the the judgement of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Orient Paper Mills Ltd v. State of Orissa (1961) wherein it was concerned with a provision which interdicted a dealer from seeking refund, who had collected tax under a provision, which was found to be not leviable for reason of the sale being outside the State. It permitted refund only to the person from whom such tax was collected, refusing it to the dealers who collected it and paid it to the Government. The provision was assailed as one depriving the dealer, the common law right to claim refund of amounts paid as tax under an error of law. The Supreme Court repelled the challenge, holding that “if competence to legislate for granting refund of sales tax improperly collected be granted, is there any reason to exclude the power todeclare that refund shall be claimed only by the person from whom the dealer has actually realized the amounts by way of sales tax or otherwise?”. Affirming in the negative, it upheld the provision. 

In its penultimate paragraph, the High Court concluded that "The trite principle is that when tax is collected and paid to the State, if the levy is declared illegal or unconstitutional; the dealer who has merely collected the tax and not borne the liability cannot claim a refund; which if granted would lead to unjust enrichment. In such circumstances, where refund is not possible to be made to the end consumer; who had the liability to tax and shouldered the liability to pay, the money be best left with the State for expending on welfare measures for the good of the general public. The same principle applies herein where the products sold by the petitioner, in its sale price would definitely have factored the electricity duty component, which liability arose in the manufacturing process; thus, passing on the liability to the end consumer of the product manufactured." The judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. 

The verdict drives home the message that Indian Oil Corporation Limited must hire permanent lawyers with expertise in business laws to safeguard its resources. The delay of 12 years after the mistaken payment by the PSU is inexcusable and indefensible. 

Union Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, the owner of the PSU must constitute a judicial inquiry committee to ascertain the cause of such "gross negligence of the Officers of the Corporation" which led to loss of Rs.1,17,06,169. The dereliction of duty on part of senior officials of the company must be probed to fix responsibility for their failure and in order to avoid similar losses in future.   

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Code on Wages, 2019 not in force as yet

The date of coming into force of the several provisions of the Code on Wages, 2019 is yet to be notified in the official gazette. Very few (less than three) provisions out of 69 provisions of the Act have come into force on 18 December 2020. Only three provisions (Sections 7, 8 and 9) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 have been repealed so far and not the other provisions. 

Under Section 69 of the Code, it is provided that all the provisions under Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 have been repealed. But these provisions have not been repealed in the official gazette. As a result, the non-notified provisions are inconsequential. 

Therefore, it is not surprising that the notification of Labour Department, Bihar which has notified the minimum wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, with effect from 10 April, 2023 does not make any reference to the Code on Wages, 2019.