Supreme Court upholds judgement by Justice Ashutosh Kumar with regard to validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under Pharmacy Act

In Md. Firoz Mansuri & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M. M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered a 31-page long judgement dated January 16, 2026 wherein it examined whether Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy erred in upholding the constitutional validity of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended by the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024) in its 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025. Supreme Court considered the question as to whether candidates holding Bachelor or Master of Pharmacy degrees, without possessing a Diploma in Pharmacy, satisfy the minimum eligibility criteria prescribed for appointment to the post of Pharmacist (basic category) under the said Rules. The Government of Bihar notified the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre Rules, 2014 on October 10, 2014 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court concluded:"....we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the Division Bench in upholding the validity of the Cadre Rules."

Rule 6(1) stipulates the minimum educational qualification for appointment by direct recruitment to basic category posts, in the following terms: “Qualifications. (1) For appointment by direct recruitment to the basic category posts, minimum educational qualification shall be Intermediate/10+2 (Science) pass and passing in all parts (part I, II & III) of Diploma-in Pharmacy from the institution recognised by the Government and a certificate to that effect shall be necessary.” 

The note to Appendix-I(1) of the Bihar Pharmacist Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2024 clarifies that: “Note: B. Pharma & M. Pharma certificate holder may be eligible provided they possess qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. The Appellants contended that Rule 6(1), read with the aforesaid Note, is repugnant to the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 framed thereunder, on the ground that the central legislation occupies the field of prescription of qualifications for pharmacists. The Pharmacy Act, 1948 was enacted to regulate the profession of pharmacy and to constitute pharmacy councils for that purpose. Section 2(i) of the Act defines a registered pharmacist as person whose name is entered in the State register for carrying on the profession or business of pharmacy. Section 10 of the Act stipulates that the Pharmacy Council of India may make the Education Regulations, prescribing the minimum standard of education required for qualification as a pharmacist. Sections 31 and 32 pertain to the registration of a person having the requisite qualification in the register. Further, Section 42 stipulates that no person other than a registered pharmacist or a medical practitioner shall be permitted to practice pharmacy.  

Supreme observe that "the scope of the Pharmacy Act, 1948, is limited to regulating the educational qualifications and professional conduct in the practice of pharmacy. The Act creates a pool of persons eligible to practise as pharmacists, it does not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for appointment to public posts. Its scope does not extend to conferring a right to public employment." 

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court noted that the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 were framed in exercise of the powers under Sections 10 and 18 of the Act. The objectives of the Regulations are stated to be improving the quality of health care,  ensuring high professional standards among pharmacists, reducing health care costs, and preventing the criminal misuse of medication. Additionally, Clause 2(h) of the Regulations provides the various classes of pharmacy practitioners including community pharmacist, hospital pharmacist, pharmacist. These Regulations govern professional practice and conduct. They do not govern public recruitment nor do they restrict the discretion of the State, as an employer, to select candidates from within the larger pool of registered pharmacists for specific public posts. The judgement reads: "49. Repugnancy arises only where compliance with one law necessarily results in disobedience of another, or where both laws occupy the same field and are irreconcilable. The Cadre Rules operate in the domain of public employment, while the Act and Regulations operate in the field of professional regulation. It is true that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution cannot permit the appointment of persons who are not registered pharmacists under the 2015 Regulations, as Section 42 of the Act expressly prohibits such appointments. However, Section 42 cannot be construed to confer a right to public employment merely by virtue of registration. The Act only creates a pool of eligible persons who may be appointed as pharmacists, the 2015 Regulations certify who is technically competent to practice as a pharmacist, while the Cadre Rules reflect the State’s policy choice in selecting from the broader pool for public employment. No conflict arises unless the State appoints someone lacking the minimum technical qualification. 50. Once repugnancy is ruled out, the determination of eligibility criteria squarely falls within the domain of the employer. The power to frame rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the State to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment." 

The Court observed:"Therefore, it has been consistently recognised that it is for the employer to determine and decide the relevancy and suitability of qualifications. The power of judicial review in matters of recruitment is limited to examining legislative competence, arbitrariness or violation of fundamental rights, if any. Courts cannot rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute their own assessment for that of the employer. The scope of judicial review in matters of public employment does not extend to questioning the State’s wisdom or policy in prescribing the minimum eligibility requirements for a public post. Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the needs and interests of an institution, an industry or an establishment, as the case may be. Similarly, equivalence of a qualification is not a matter which can be determined in exercise of the power of judicial review. Whether a particular qualification should or should not be regarded as equivalent is a matter for the State, as the recruiting authority, to determine. The assessment of the expediency, advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications do not warrant intervention of the Courts unless the same are shown to be perverse. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily in prescribing qualifications for posts." 

Justice Sharma who authored the judgement observed: "The prescription of eligibility criteria of 10+2 with Diploma in Pharmacy by the State cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. The State has articulated its rationale with reference to differences in course structure and the comparatively limited avenues of employment available to Diploma holders. 62. The course structure of Diploma in Pharmacy is governed by the Education Regulations, 1991, which has been replaced by the Education Regulation, 2020. The Diploma in Pharmacy course mandates 500 hours of compulsory practical training, including 250 hours devoted to dispensing prescriptions. The 2020 Regulation has refined the scope of training, limiting it to hospital, dispensary, or clinic-based activities. While, under the B. Pharma course Regulations, 2014, degree students are required to undergo 150 hours of practical training and they have the option to undertake the training either in a hospital/community centre or within the pharmaceutical industry. The diplomates and graduates are trained in different subjects. Merely because there is a provision for lateral entry of diplomates in the second year of B. Pharm course, it does not render the degree an in-line higher qualification. A qualification in one stream does not presuppose a qualification in another. Furthermore, the diplomates have limited employment avenues as compared to degree holders. Thus, the decision of the State in making possession of a Diploma an essential qualification for appointment cannot be said to be arbitrary. The State has merely identified a narrower catchment of candidates it considers most suitable for a particular purpose, from within the larger pool registered pharmacists....64. Additionally, there is no absolute exclusion of graduate or postgraduate degree holders. They remain eligible, provided they possess the essential qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy. No disproportionate harm is caused to them so as to attract Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution." 

In Pharmacy Council of India vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy had delivered a 72-page long judgement dated April 10, 2025 wherein, it disposed all the writ petitions were disposed of without relief to the petitioners.   

Also read: Patna High Court upholds validity of Rule 6 (1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 under the Pharmacy Act of 1948  

High Court's Division Bench endorses termination of petitioner

In Deepak Dwivedi vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, General Administration Department (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy, dismissed the appeal and approved the judgement of Justice Madhuresh Prasad, the single judge because the appellant never joined his duty and, therefore, he was never confirmed as he never passed the required examination nor did he appear for any competency test for typing on a typewriter or computer." 

Justice Prasad had recorded that the Department had constituted a Medical Board to verify/ascertain his claim of being medically unfit, he refused to appear before the Medical Board for being examined in spite of repeated opportunities being granted to him. In the circumstance, the authorities have found thep petitioner's conduct to be unsatisfactory and undesirable in the administrative set up. Under the 2007 Act, there is a provision that an Assistant, as the petitioner, initially is appointed on probation for two years from the date of appointment. It also provides that the period of probation may, if the appointing authority may deem fit, be extended but for total period which may not in any case exceed three years. Even in the extended period, the service is found to be unsatisfactory, service is liable to be terminated. It is in exercise of this power that the petitioner's service, having regard to the facts and circumstances, has been found to be unsatisfactory. The petitioner has rightly been terminated. The petitioner was still a probationer as per the 2007 Act under which he was appointed. The impugned order therefore does not require any interference."

The Division Bench concluded that "it would be presumed that his period of probation continued and during the period of probation, his services being found to be absolutely unsatisfactory, he was terminated from service." The other respondents were: Additional Secretary to the Govt. of Bihar, General Administration Department, Bihar Patna and Under Secretary, Minority Welfare Department. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The Bihar Secretariat Services Act, 2007 would be applicable to the case of the appellant. Section 10 of the Act of 2007 provides that every person directly recruited to the grade of Assistant shall initially be appointed on probation. The period of probation shall be of two years from the date of appointment. The period of probation may, if the appointing authority deems fit, be extended but the total period of extension of probation shall not in any case exceed three years. In case of service being unsatisfactory in the extended period also, the service of the person may be terminated. It was noted that Section 10 has to be read with Section 12 which provides for the manner in which an employee is confirmed in service.

The petitioner's challenge to the order of termination failed before the Single Judge, on the ground that the appellant had never been confirmed in service and therefore there was no requirement before terminating his services to put him to the rigors of domestic proceedings, rejected the writ petition. The Court pointed out that it appears from the records that immediately after the appointment of the appellant as an Assistant on February 21, 2014, he was posted in the office of the Resident Commissioner, Bihar Bhavan on April 3, 2014. 

When he was transferred to the Minority Welfare Department of the Govt. of Bihar on October 10, 2014, he proceeded on leave on the ground of illness and remained on continued leave for a long time. The plea of the appellant was rejected and he was given 15 days time to resume his duties, failing which, disciplinary action would be taken for terminating his services. It could not fetch the appellant to his place of work. He later joined the services on 02.09.2015 along with a certificate of fitness from Allahabad. Since it was election time and there was requirement of man-power, therefore, the General Administration Department accepted his joining. The appellant again went on casual leave, never to return. In the meantime, two years passed by but because of the absence of the appellant, there was no confirmation and, therefore, he remained under probation.

It is essential to be noticed in this judgment that the appellant was asked to appear before a Medical Board for confirmation of his medical unfitness to join his duties and to test whether he had been malingering for all this while, but he refused to appear before the Medical Board for reasons inexplicable to the Department.

His services were terminated in this backdrop. The contention raised in the appeal was that the appellant had crossed the period of probation and therefore without subjecting him to departmental proceeding, his services could not have been terminated. The Division Bench observed:"A person appointed on probation after satisfactory completion of probation period as well as on completion of required training and on passing of required departmental examination and passing the test for competency in typing on typewriter or computer, shall be confirmed by the appointing authority."