Denied bail by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Arvind Srivastava in 2018 and 2023, appellants acquitted from murder charge by Justice Arun Kumar Jha

In Munna Yadav & Anr. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chandra Shekhar Jha and Bibek Chaudhuri delivered a 19-page long judgment dated April 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"35. In view of aforesaid, we are of the considered view that testimony of PW-4 & PW-7 being interested witness not appears wholly reliable. They are immediate family members of the deceased. Their depositions are full of contradiction creating a doubt qua their presence near to the place of occurrence, and also their claim as an eye witness to the occurrence. 36. Accordingly, both above-named appellants are acquitted from the charges levelled against them, by giving benefit of doubt. 37. Hence, appeal stands allowed. 38. Accordingly, impugned judgment of conviction dated 4th June, 2018 and order of sentence dated 12.06.2018, passed by learned A.D.J., F.T.C.- 1st, Jamui in S. Tr. No. 278/2011 arising out of G.R. No. 169/2011 arising out of Khaira P.S. Case No. 17 of 2011 is hereby set aside. 39. Appellants namely, Munna Yadav and Dilip Yadav are in custody in connection with this case, they are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Fine if any paid, be returned to appellants forthwith." 

The appeal was preferred under section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the impugned judgment of conviction dated June 4, 2018 and order of sentence dated June 12, 201, whereby and whereunder the two appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

The prosecution case as per Fard-e-beyan of Manju Devi (informant/PW-7) wife of Late Jageshwar Yadav of village – Mangobandar, P.S. - Khaira, District – Jamui, recorded by the S.I. of Khaira Police Station dated 08.02.2011, that on 07.02.2011 at about 7:00 P.M., the husband of informant (PW-7) had gone to supply the milk in the breakfast-cum-tea shop of one Vinod Rawat, which was situated in Mangobandar Bazar, but her husband did not return to his home. The informant alleged that when she went in search of her husband and was going on road at about 8:00 P.M., then, she saw that near to the house of one Prayag Thakur of village – Nai Tola, the accused persons, who belonged to the same family, namely, Dilip Yadav (appellant no.2) , Munna Yadav (appellant no.1) and Huro Yadav were assaulting her husband by means of
brick and stones and also dragging him by holding Gamchha in his neck. The informant further alleged that on seeing the such condition of her husband, she started raising alarm. Thereafter, all the accused persons fled away leaving the husband of the informant in injured condition at the place of occurrence. She further states that anyhow with the help of her Gotni (PW-3), she taken away the dead body of her husband to their house and informed the family members. The informant alleged that there was land dispute between the accused persons and the deceased husband of the informant and due to this reason her husband was murdered by the aforesaid accused persons/appellants. 

On the basis of said written information, Khaira P.S. Case was registered for the offences punishable under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After concluding investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against the appellants. The jurisdictional Magistrate after perusal of materials and records took cognizance accordingly and after compliance of section 207 of the Cr.P.C. committed this case to the court of sessions under section 209 of the Cr.P.C. for its trial and disposal.

After commitment, learned trial court, upon perusal of records, framed charges against accused persons/appellants under section 302/34 of the IPC and explained the charges to the accused/appellants in their vernacular language, which they pleaded “not guilty” and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, prosecution altogether examined seven witnesses

Justice Jha observed: "The missing links could have been provided by the Investigating Officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the Investigating Officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW-4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the Investigating Officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the Investigating Officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case."

Notably, by its order dated July 26, 2023, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices Arvind Srivastava and Sunil Dutta Mishra had declined to grant the privilege of bail to the appellants. Their prayer for bail was rejected by Justice Srivastava who had authored the order. The appellants had prayed for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of appeal. Their prayer for bail was earlier rejected by the Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Arvind Srivastava by its order dated October 3, 2018. The order was authored by Justice Kumar. The appellants were languishing in custody since June 4, 2018.

The judgement reads:" In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case.” 

Is it not noteworthy that both Justice Kumar and Justice Srivastava erred like Additional District Judge, Jamui in not considering the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer? Is it not because of S.K. Lal, the senior advocate that the Court could detect the issue of non-examination of the Investigating Officer?

Division Bench led by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad confirms death sentence in a case from Rohtas, Justice Sourendra Pandey authors concurring opinion, two accused persons still absconding

In Aman Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court's Division Bench delivered a 67-page long judgement dated January 22, 2026 confirmed the death sentence in a Death Reference case of 2024 and dismissed the criminal appeal preferred by the appellants. The Judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The second appellant was Sonal Singh. It was heard along with the criminal appeal The State of Bihar vs. Aman Singh & Anr. (2026).

The death reference registered under Section 366 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the criminal appeal preferred by the two appellants arose out of the judgment of conviction dated May 2, 2024 and the order of sentence dated  May 9, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-19, Rohtas at Sasaram in Sessions Trial of 2022 arose out of a Darihat P.S. case 2021 dated July 13, 2021 registered under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 

By the impugned judgment and order, the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC and were sentenced to death. The trial court recorded the guidelines of the Supreme Court as laid down in case of Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1983 SC 957. It also referred the principles relied upon by the Supreme Court in case of Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (1980) 2 SCC 684. The trial court held  that in this case, three unarmed persons have been ruthlessly butchered by the sword wielding convicts for a dispute pertaining to a small piece of land. Altogether five ante-mortem severe massive external and internal injuries were inflicted on the person of each of the deceased. The trial court found that consequent upon the death of the deceased persons, no male major person has been left to perform the rights and rituals ordinarily required in Hindu family. The trial court further considered as to whether there can be a justification in life imprisonment of the convicts or not. The court held that the incessant tears of the widows and the children cannot be dried out, however, by way of capital punishment, their sufferings are supposed to be mitigated. They may console themselves if convicts are awarded capital punishment. They are supposed to lead a secure and peaceful lives. On the contrary, if the convicts are awarded life imprisonment, they are supposed to come out after 14 years, only to revive the wounds of the surviving family members of the deceased. The trial court considered the aggravated factors which exist in this case. The nature and circumstances of the offence, the role of the accused in the commission of such a heinous crime of murder/massacre of the three deceased persons, the culpability of the deceased persons. The trial court held that in the facts of the case, the death penalty is the only sentence that can be given to the convicts for their offence under Section 302/34 IPC.

The appellants Aman Singh and Sonal Singh approached the High Court to pray for setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the trial court. 

The informant's senior counsel relied upon the paragraph ‘13’ of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Bihari Yadav vs. State of Bihar and Harendra Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in (2023) 13 SCC 563 wherein the Supreme Court had held that the three main stakeholders in a criminal trial, namely the Investigating Officer, Public Prosecutor, and the Judiciary, all utterly failed to keep up their respective duties and responsibilities cast upon them. It had taken note of the subsequent conduct of the accused and has drawn adverse inference. It had taken judicial notice of the judgment in the habeas corpus petition regarding conduct of the accused, the investigating agency, the Public Prosecutor and the Presiding Officer conducting the trial. 

Amicus Curiae relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dayal Singh vs. State of Uttranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263 to submit that it was the consistent view of the Supreme Court that if the lapse or omission is committed by the investigating agency, negligently or otherwise, the prosecution evidence was required to be examined dehors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. In Paras Yadav vs. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126, the Supreme Court held that the contaminated conduct of officials should not stand in the way of evaluating the evidence by the courts, otherwise the designed mischief would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party. The counsel relied upon the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Edakkandi Dineshan @ P. Dineshan & Ors. vs. State of Kerela 2025 INSC 28 to submit that on account of defective investigation, the benefit would not accrue to the accused persons on that ground alone. Variance in statement of witnesses if minor would not drive their testimony unworthy. In Goverdhan & Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) 3 SCC 378, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated that minor discrepancies in details not touching the core of the case do not affect credibility and corroboration cannot be expected with mathematical precision. It was held that in case of rustic witnesses-appreciation of evidences from rural background witnesses, behavourial pattern and perceptive habits must be judged. Accordingly discrepancies, contradictions and embellishments in essential parts do not militant against the core truth if there was impress of truth and conformity to probability. The plea of alibi requires substantiation by leading evidence. It was submitted that keeping in view the judicial pronouncements when the evidences are examined, it would be found that the prosecution was duly proved the motive behind the occurrence. It was a land dispute which was the genesis of the occurrence and it was the consistent case of the prosecution right from the fardbeyan to the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, who have fully supported the prosecution case 

The prosecution case was based on the fardbeyan of Shakuntala Devi, wife of Late Vijay Singh recorded by ASI Bimlesh Kumar on July 13, 2021 at 23:00 hrs. near postmortem house, Sadar Hospital, Sasaram. 

In her fardbeyan, the informant, who was wife of one of the deceased and who was examined as a prosecution witness in course of trial. On July 13, 2021 at 18:00 hours, when her husband Vijay Singh and her son Deepak Singh were at home then, her Pattidars, namely, (1) Ajay Singh, (2) Sonal Singh and (3) Aman Singh started ploughing the disputed land adjacent to the house. When her husband and her son went to stop them, then they started abusing them and assaulted them with fist and lathi. Somehow, her husband and her son fled away from there to Rang Bahadur Singh’s door. After some time, the accused persons while chasing came to Rang Bahadur Singh’s door and they abused her husband and her son and also started assaulting them with lathi/danda. In the meanwhile, her younger son Rakesh Singh also came there from Dehri and on seeing his father and brother getting assaulted, after pacifying the fight he took his father and brother to his old house towards kitta. These three accused persons armed with sword while chasing them reached purana kitta and started hitting her husband and sons with sword. Sonal Singh with an intention to kill, hit her elder son Deepak Singh as a result of which he got cut on his neck, face, cheek, head and chest and blood started oozing out and he became unconscious. Aman Singh attacked her younger son Rakesh Singh with sword in his hand with an intention to kill him, Rakesh got cuts on both his hands, face, neck and head and fell unconscious. When her husband on seeing his children getting injured went to save them then Ajay Singh hit him with sword on his neck as a result of which he got a serious injury on his neck, he started bleeding profusely and he fell unconscious. Meanwhile, Gayatri Devi wife of Ajay Singh came with a spear in her hand and gave it to her husband and said that they should not be left alive, attack with this spear. Thereafter, the informant and her elder daughter-in-law reached there and asked for help from neighbouring people but no one came to help them. Thereafter, her niece Rajesh Singh, son of Rang Bahadur Singh came there and when he was getting all the injured to hospital, no villager came to help him. Then they informed the police. When police came, the police took her injured husband and two sons to hospital where doctor declared all three of them dead. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant, P.S. case was registered under Section 302/34 IPC. The S.H.O. Darihat (PW-5) took over the responsibility of investigation upon himself.

Justice Prasad relied on Supreme Court's decision in Ram Vijay Singh vs. State of U.P. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 142, wherein the Court had discussed the settled position that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) principle was foreign to our criminal law jurisprudence. A 3-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that “….. A part statement of a witness can be believed even though some part of the statement may not be relied upon by the Court….”. He observed:"I, therefore, find from the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3, it can be safely deduced that their depositions with regard to the place of occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence have gone unquestioned."  

He noted that it is well settled that a mere delay in lodging of the FIR cannot be a ground to throw away the prosecution case. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chotkau vs. State of U.P. reported in (2023) 6 SCC 742. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses would be required to be looked into. 

In the case of Chotkau, the Supreme Court observed: “64. To come to the above conclusion, reliance was placed upon a decision of a three-Judge Bench in Balram Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) 11 SCC 286: 2004 SCC (Cri) 149. In Balram Singh, the three-Judge Bench of this Court rejected the contention with regard to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Magistrate, on the ground that : (SCC p. 291, para 10) “10. … while considering the complaint in regard to the delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate, we will have to also bear in mind the creditworthiness of the ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution and if we find that such ocular evidence is worthy of acceptance, the element of delay in registering a complaint or sending the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate by itself would not in any manner weaken the prosecution case.”

Justice Prasad recollected Supreme Court's decision in Baso Prasad & Ors. vs. State of Bihar reported in (2006) 13 SCC 65, wherein the Court observed, inter alia, with regard to the presence of rigor mortis in the following words:- “….. The start of rigor mortis depends on the temperature and weather conditions…” He observed: "65. I, therefore, find that in this case the prosecution case fully stands on its own legs. There is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned trial court whereby these appellants have been convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 IPC. I affirm the judgment of conviction dated 2nd May, 2024 passed in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2022 arising out of Darihat P.S. Case No. 111 of 2021 and the direction of the learned trial court to the District Legal Services Authority, Rohtas, Sasaram for award of maximum compensation under the scheme to each of the three widows. The compensation must be paid, if not already paid, within a period of one month from the date of this judgment."

On the point of sentence, the judgement recorded the the counsel of the appellants prayed to the Court to  modify the death sentence awarded to the appellants to a life imprisonment. It was submitted that although the trial court referred the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bechan Singh vs. State of Punjab 1980 (2) SCR 864 and Machhhi Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470: 1983 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 681, it did not take into consideration the mitigating circumstances including that there are chances of reformation of the appellants. The counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Navas @ Mulanavas Vs. State of Kerala (2024) 14 SCC 82. The Court's attention was drawn towards various case laws discussed by the Supreme Court to lay down the principle of proportionality. 

Justioce Prasad appreciated trial court's judgement which noticed that none of the convicts was injured in the occurrence, the severity and brutalities of the offences committed by the convicts would no way justify their acts. The other two accused persons have been absconding till date and they have not surrendered before the court nor they have been arrested. The matter could have been resolved through civil litigation but the temperament of the convicts did not suit the same. 

In his 2-page long concurring judgement, Justice Pandey observed: "72. I have gone through the judgment recorded by my esteemed brother, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad. While I entirely agree with the views expressed above, I am reminded of the great epic “Mahabharat” which is a tale of devastating feud over land and power between cousins. The Kauravas were the aggressors, who attempted to kill relatives for property or to seize the reign of the empire. Mahabharat culminates with a message that aggressors meet a tragic end as divine punishment for their “adharm”, i.e. to try to kill their brother (cousins) to seize power. 73. The story of Mahabharat leads us to one and only one conclusion that the appellants, who were the aggressors should be punished for their sin/crime, which has not only taken the three human lives but have also killed three women who after loosing their husbands have become lifeless, their children have been left to cry all over their lives and therefore I uphold the conviction of the appellants. I agree that it is one of the rarest of the rare cases in which the option to impose sentence of imprisonment of life or a special sentencing cannot be consciously exercised. I confirm the sentence imposed by the learned trial court."

Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman sets aside trial court judgement, reverses previous order by Justice Rakesh Kumar which relied on "inadmissible evidence"

Ajay Kumar Thakur's cogent arguments makes the High Court reverse orders by Justice Rakesh Kumar in 2018, Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh in 2021 and Justice Arvind Srivastava in 2024, and to set aside untenable and indefensible judgement of conviction of 2018 by the judge from the Araria Trial Court. 

In Vijay Kumar Yadav @ Vivek Kumar @ Golu vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 15-page long judgement dated December 17, 2025, wherein,  it concluded:" 31. In the instant case, the I.O. did not collect any certificate from IDBI Bank to prove the SMS sent to the mobile phone of the deceased from service provider. Certification of CCTV footage electronically generated money receipt from ATM swipe machine was also not obtained from the concerned authority by the I.O. Prosecution did not take any attempt to examine the shop owner of Maa Lakhi Jewelers. The appellant was not identified by any independent witness except the I.O. 32. For the reasons stated above, we have no other alternative but to hold that the trial court illegally without considering the basic requirement of the Evidence Act and the manner in which the charge can be proved held the accused guilty for committing offence and convicted and sentenced him accordingly. For such gross mistake, the accused unnecessarily remained in custody for more than 7 years. As a result, the instant appeal is allowed. 33. The judgment of conviction dated 11.04.2018 and order of sentence dated 17.04.2018 is hereby set aside. Let the appellant be released forthwith in connection with Sessions Trial No. 203 of 2017 arising out of Araria P.S. Case No. 856 of 2017, if not required in other case." 

The appellant was in custody approximately for more than 7 years while suffering sentence. The criminal appeal was filed on May 29, 2018 and registered on June 4, 2018. 

Justice Chaudhari who authored he judgement observed: "3. We are not constrained to note that this case is a classic example of conviction upon inadmissible evidence by the learned trial Judge. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, the appellant preferred a series of applications for suspension of sentence and bail, but his prayer was constantly rejected by the High Court, which also relied on inadmissible evidence." 

Notably, although Y.C. Verma, senior advocate had submitted before the Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Arvind Srivastava on August 9, 2018 that the case was completely based on circumstantial evidence without any proof of completion of chain and, as such, it was not a case for conviction, however trial Judge had incorrectly passed Judgement of conviction and sentence. Accordingly, he had submitted that it was a fit case for passing order for suspension of sentence and granting bail to the appellant during pendency of the appeal. In his 3-page long order dated August 9, 2018, Justice Kumar had concluded:"Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have also cursorily examined the evidence on record and after going through the same, it is evident that during investigation, the appellant was apprehended and his confessional statement was recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The confession led to recovery of certain facts, which were only within the knowledge of the appellant. His confession also led to recovery of ATM Card of the deceased and, thereafter, it was noticed that ATM Card was subsequently used and amount was transferred. The learned trial Judge considered that it was completion of chain of circumstantial evidence and, thereafter, he passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. The appellant was solely tried and held guilty. In view of the facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to pass favourable order. Accordingly, the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail stands dismissed." 

Notably, the Division Bench of Justices Ashwani Kumar Singh and Arvind Srivastava passed a 2-page long order dated February 2, 2021 reiterating the order by Justice Kumar. Justice Singh who authored the order, had concluded:"By way of the instant interlocutory application preferred under section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant, who has been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with section 34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, has renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during pendency of the appeal. A similar prayer made on his behalf was earlier rejected by this Court vide order dated 09.08.2018. For the reasons assigned in the order dated 09.08.2018, since there is no changed circumstance, we are not inclined to take a different view of the matter. Accordingly, his prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is rejected.Interlocutory application stands rejected." 

The Division Bench of Justices Arvind Srivastava and Sunil Dutta Mishra passed a 2-page long order dated January 3, 2024 reiterated Justice Kumar's order when the appellant prayed for suspension of sentence and grant of bail during the pendency of appeal. The counsel for the appellant had submitted that the prayer for bail of the appellant was earlier twice rejected by this Court. Now the fresh ground for bail of the appellant was that he was languishing in custody since December 28, 2016, as such he remained in custody for more than seven years and there was no likelihood of the appeal to be taken up for hearing in near future. The Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State opposed the prayer of the appellant by contending that the prayer for bail of the appellant was earlier twice rejected by this Court on merit. He also submitted that although the appellant remained in custody for more than seven years but it  came in evidence that the confession of the appellant led to recovery of certain facts which were only within the knowledge of him. His confession also led to recovery of ATM Card of the deceased and thereafter, it was noticed that ATM Card was subsequently used and amount was also transferred. Justice Srivastava who authored the order, had concluded:"As such, the prayer for bail of the appellant is not fit to be reconsidered. 5. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the materials available on record, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the appellant. His prayer for bail is again rejected."

Justice Chaudhary had reserved the judgement on December 9, 2025. The compelling submission by Ajay Kumar Thakur, counsel for the petitioner on December 9 when he concluded the argument and made the Court change it's mind and reverse orders by Justice Rakesh Kumar in 2018, Justice Ashwani Kumar Singh in 2021 and Justice Arvind Srivastava in 2024.

It is evident that it took the High Court over seven years to appreciate the argument of the  counsel of the petitioner. 

The judgement was delivered upon hearing an appeal under Section 374 (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the convict assailing the judgment of conviction dated April 11, 2018 and the order of sentence dated April 17, 2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge IIIrd Court, Araria in a Sessions Trial of 2017. The case arose out of Araria P.S. case of 2017 whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 1,00,000/. He was also convicted for committing offence under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced for rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- only. Substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment was directed to run concurrently.

One Shambhu Dharkar, a village Chowkidar of Azam Nagar, Kushimar village under the police station and district Araria received an information on December 23, 2016 at about 08:30 AM that dead body of one unknown person was kept on the southern side of village Diwari Fatak Bridge in a bamboo groove of one Vishundev Yadav. In order to work out the said information, the chowkidar went to the said spot. He found that police party also reached the spot. He found one unknown dead body with blackish ligature mark around the neck and bleeding from the left ear. Seeing the dead body, the chowkidar approximately ascertained his age around 35 years. He was wearing a black jacket, pink colored Shirt, a blue colored warm vest, red colored T-shirt, white colored vest and blue colored jeans full pant. There was a black thread on his neck with a locket inscribed thereon 786 and 92. He also found a blank cartridge of 315 bore in one of his pocket. Local people assembled there. Nobody could identify him. It seemed to the Chowkidar that the deceased was murdered at some other place and his dead body was tied with a Simul tree by a rope. A belt was tied around his neck.

One Ashok Kumar Singh, Sub-inspector of police recorded the statement of the said Shambhu Dharkar and treated the same as FIR. On the basis of the said statement, duly signed by Shambhu Dharkar, the SHO of Araria police station registered FIR dated December 23, 2016 under Section 302/301 IPC against unknown miscreants and entrusted Sub-Inspector King Kundan to investigate into the case. The I.O., on completion of the investigation, submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 302/34, 201/34, and 120(B) of the IPC against Vijay Kumar Yadav. After filing of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The Principal Sessions Judge transferred the case record to the Court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Araria for trial and disposal. The trial judge framed charge against the appellant under Section 302/34 and 201/34 as well as 120 (B) of the IPC on 13 June 2017. As the appellant pleaded not guilty, trial of the case commenced. In order to bring home the charge against the accused/appellant, prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify the accused. They also did not know how the deceased was murdered. The identity of the deceased was first ascertained on December 24, 2016 when a photograph of the deceased was published by the investigating authority in Urdu Daily. Seeing the photograph, PW-8 Md. Inteqab Alam identified the photograph of the deceased as his brother'S. In his affidavit, he stated that his brother Niyaz Ahmed was missing since December 22, 2016.  After he saw the photograph in Urdu Daily on December 24, 2016, he identified the deceased to be his brother Niyaz Ahmed and went to P.S. Araria. From the P.S., he came to know that the dead body was kept in the post-mortem room. He went there and identified the dead body as of his brother's. Thereafter, he filed an application and received the dead body of his brother. 

The appellant was made an accused in Araria P.S. Case of 2016 by the I.O. on the basis of the evidence which he collected during the investigation of the case. 

Notably, Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act states that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. It is a rule of thumb that a confession made to a police officer, of whatever rank and at whatever time, is inadmissible in evidence under the purview of Section 25. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act states: "No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved against such person."

The confession is required to be recorded by a Magistrate. In the instant appeal the confession of an accused while in custody can only be recorded by a Magistrate in terms of Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act read with Section 164 of the CrPC. Any statement recorded by an I.O. during investigation of the case of any witness or an accused is a statement under Section 161 of the CrPC and Section 162(1) clearly states that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XII of the CrPC shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, except to contradict such witness in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the evidence of the appellant admitting the guilt before the I.O. is not admissible in evidence and the said document could not be marked as exhibit by the trial court. The trial court committed illegality in relying on such statement allegedly made by the appellant. 

Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. Section 27 of the said Act states that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused of any offence while he is in custody, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. In other words, the language of Section 27 of the Evidence Act indicates that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person who is in the custody of the police in connection with an offence, it must relate distinctly to the facts so discovered. The phrase 'facts thereby discovered is preceded with words "that so much of such information, whether it amounts to confession or not as relates distinctly". The word 'distinctly' as used in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is made to exclude certain language and to limit and confine the information which may be proved within definite limits and not necessarily to include everything which may relate to that information. The word “distinctly” indicates directly, indubitably, strictly and unmistakably, apparently, used in Section 27 to limit and define the scope of probable information. Therefore, only that much information as is clearly connected with the fact discovered can be treated as relevant under the phrase 'facts discovered'. 

Justice Chaudhary observed: "28. In the instant case, the trial court in violation of Section 25 and Section 26 wrongly brought entire statement of the accused in evidence marking the same as Exhibit-9. 29. Had it been the fact that the accused made such a statement before the I.O. while he was in custody, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, i.e., the discovery of the black purse, ATM card, bill of Maa Lakhi Jewelers, and original receipt generated from the ATM machine, etc., would have been admissible in evidence. It is needless to say that the discovery of a fact must be distinctly connected with the statement of the accused; when the discovery of a fact is distinctly connected in consequence of information, that part of the statement made by the accused is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act." He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Govind vs. State of Haryana, reported 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2456 

He added: "There is no evidence as to whether the appellant accompanied the police party and the independent witness during discovery of ATM Card of the deceased and other materials. The witnesses to whom prosecution claimed to be the seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution case. From their evidence, it is clear that they were not present at the time of seizure of ATM Card of the deceased and other materials. They put their signature on the seizure list at Maranga P.S. on being instructed by a police officer. Therefore, seizure of the materials was also not proved. 30. Last but not the least, Call Details Report, CAIF, receipt generated from ATM Swipe Machine are electronic records which could have been proved only under Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act." 

The verdict by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Chaudhuri, and Dr. Anshuman has rectified the glaring blunder committed by previous orders of the High Court.  

Supreme Court sets aside anticipatory bail orders by Justice Satyavrat Verma in extortion related murder case

In Jagdeo Prasad vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 10-page long order dated September 17, 2025, wherein, it set aside an order granting anticipatory bail in Geeta Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2024) passed by Patna High Court's Justice Satyavrat Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated March 12, 2024 in a murder case. Apprehending their arrest, the accused-respondents had preferred anticipatory bail application before the High Court. Aggrieved by Justice Verma's grant of anticipatory bail, the appellant-complainant filed a criminal appeal in the Supreme Court on July 10, 2024 which was registered on September 17, 2025. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) was registered on December 16, 2024. 

The criminal appeal on behalf of the appellant-complainant had assailed the order, wherein, Justice Verma had granted anticipatory bail to Geeta Kumari, the  respondent nos. 2 and  Neha Kumari, the respondent no. 3 who were “accused-respondents” in FIR, bearing no. 773 of 2023 dated December 16, 2023, registered under Section 302/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of Arms Act, 1959. 

It appears strange that in this extortion related murder case police did not register case for offence of extortion. 

On December 16, 2023 the appellant-complainant had submitted a written complaint before Police Station, Gopalpur, Patna alleging, that his wife Kumari Pushpa, the deceased was shot dead on the same day at about 03:30 P.M. The deceased was employed as a health worker at Primary Health Center, Pandarak. According to the appellant, his wife was killed at the behest of named accused persons, including accused-respondents, who had been continuously threatening and harassing the deceased to extort money. On account of the continuous threats as meted, the deceased had already paid lakhs of rupees to them. Finally, when the deceased was unable to meet the extortion demands, the accused got her eliminated by employing contract killers. The police thus, registered the present FIR dated December 16, 2023, against five accused persons, including accused-respondents. The investigation was commenced immediately. Upon investigation, the police examined a CCTV footage from the camera installed in a shop near the place of occurrence. In the video, the deceased was seen walking with a middle-aged man from Bhelwara turn at around 03:22 P.M. when two persons riding on a bike with helmets came there, shot the deceased and fled away. The police claimed to have achieved a breakthrough with the arrest of one Vishal Kumar, who gave a confessional statement stating that family members of the accused-respondents had hired one Bittu Kumar for a sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- for the murder of the deceased. During the investigation, it was also revealed that it was the modus operandi of the accused to lend money at exorbitant interest rates of about 35% per month to individuals. To recover this amount, the accused would then coerce the borrowers into taking loans from other moneylenders and forcibly take possession of the subsequently borrowed money.

Supreme Court observed: "5. At the outset, we are unable to side with the reasoning ascribed by the High Court to grant anticipatory bail to the accused-respondents for the reasons discussed hereinafter. 5.1. In the impugned order, the High Court has not given any cogent reason for granting anticipatory bail to accused-respondents. It appears that the High Court was influenced by the threefold contention of learned counsel for accused-respondents. First, the accused-respondents are women with clean antecedents. Second, it was highly improbable that the deceased who was working as health worker would give lakhs of rupees in extortion. In fact, the deceased had borrowed some amount from accused no. 1 (Murari Prasad) for purchasing land and were not returning it back. Third, it was for this reason that the complainant saw an opportunity to falsely implicate the entire family of the accused-respondents. 5.2. In the present case, the accused-respondents have been named in the FIR registered at the behest of the appellant. The High Court has not fairly appreciated the gravity of the accusations levelled against the accused-respondents. There is a categorical assertion by the appellant-complainant against the accused that the latter were running a racket of granting loans at higher interest rates and later extorting the loaned money. We therefore, are unable to understand what prompted the High Court to grant anticipatory bail to the accused-respondents in such a heinous offence. 5.3. While the protection of individual liberty is important, Courts must not turn a blind eye to the suffering of the victims. A balance has to be struck to protect the individual liberty of the accused as well as to secure an environment that is free from any fear in the hearts of victim of the alleged perpetrators. Although grant of bail is a discretionary exercise, the Courts must be cautious to exercise this discretion judiciously. 5.4. In the present case, this discretion was totally uncalled for especially at the stage of anticipatory bail. The aggravating factors that ought to have weighed in with the High Court before interfering at this stage are threefold. First, the murder of appellant-complainant’s wife was committed in broad daylight. Second, the murder was committed with the aid of hired assassins on contract. Third, there is a history of tensed relations between the parties that materially establish a prima facie case against the accused-respondents and all the more reasons to protect the victims, i.e. the appellant and his son. In our opinion, the grant of anticipatory bail to accused-respondents is unwarranted and without any valid reason which has resulted in miscarriage of justice."

Supreme Court concluded: ''6. However, before parting, we do wish to express our sincere concern with the haste at which the High Court has dealt with this matter. While the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides concurrent jurisdiction to the High Court and Sessions Court for entertaining applications for anticipatory bail, this Court has time and again observed that High Court should always encourage exhausting an alternative/concurrent remedy before directly interfering itself. This approach balances the interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving the aggrieved party a round of challenge before the High Court. Second, this approach provides the High Court an opportunity to assess the judicial perspective so applied by the Sessions Court, in concurrent jurisdiction, instead of independently applying its mind from the first go. Further, the High Court fails to record any reason for directly granting anticipatory bail without impleading the appellant-complainant as a party. 7. Having regard to the abovementioned facts and circumstances of the case, the serious nature of the allegations against accused-respondents and the gravity of the offences alleged, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order granting anticipatory bail to the accused respondents. 8. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court dated 12th March, 2024, in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 14816 of 2024 is set aside. 9. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Bail bonds stand cancelled. 10. Accused respondents are directed to surrender within four weeks and apply for regular bail. Needless to state that the bail application so preferred shall be considered on its own merits.

Supreme Court also granted leave and allowed the appeal upon hearing the appeal on behalf of the appellant-complainant assailing order dated September 3, 2024, passed by Justice Verma in Rajkumar Thakur @ Raj Karan Thakur vs. The State of Bihar Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42520 of 2024 whereby the anticipatory bail application preferred by respondent no. 2 in FIR, bearing no. 773 of 2023 dated December 16, 2023, registered under Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of Arms Act, 1959. The Supreme Court observed: ' 3. Despite due service of notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of respondent no. 2. Hence, the appeal is being proceeded ex-parte."

Supreme Court noted that the High Court had granted the benefit of anticipatory bail to respondent no. 2 on the ground of parity with accused-Vishal Kumar. It was upon the confessional statement of accused-Vishal Kumar that the name of respondent no. 2 had surfaced. As the said accused had been granted the benefit of regular bail, therefore, the High Court opined that no useful purpose will be served by sending respondent no. 2 to jail. 

Vishal Kumar, the petitioner had approached the High Court seeking regular bail in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code & Section 27 of the Arms Act in a case which arose out of PS. Case No.-773 Year-2023 Thana- Gopalpur, Patna. The informant's counsel had opposed the bail application of the petitioner. He had submitted that the anticipatory bail application of co-accused Pramod Kumar, Jitendra Prasad and Murari Prasad was rejected by the High court.  In his order dated September 3, 2024 in Vishal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Verma had concluded:"6. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner above-named, is directed to be released on bail...." 

Mohammad Sufyan, the informant's counsel had opposed the bail application of Vishal Kumar. He had submitted that the anticipatory bail application of co-accused Pramod Kumar, Jitendra Prasad and Murari Prasad was rejected by the High court. But Justice Verma was not persuaded. Now Supreme Court has vindicated the submissions made by the informant's counsel. 

Supreme Court's Division Bench observed: "In our opinion, the High Court has gravely erred in exercising discretionary remedy of granting anticipatory bail to respondent no. 2. There is no question of parity between accused-Vishal Kumar and respondent no. 2 as the former was granted regular bail, unlike anticipatory bail as granted to respondent no. 2. The whole object of regular bail is to secure the presence of the accused during the time of trial. If the Court is convinced that the accused is not likely to evade trial, bail must be granted. Likewise, the object of anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC is to protect the liberty of individuals and prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. In the present case, name of respondent no. 2 has come up during the course of investigation in the statement of accused-Vishal Kumar, who himself was not named in the FIR.'' 

Supreme Court's order concluded: ''From the allegations it is evident that accused person are running a syndicate of extorting huge amount of money by charging interest at preposterous rates. Hence, in view of the prima facie case being established against respondent no. 2, it was not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail to him.  7. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court dated 3rd September, 2024, in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42520 of 2024 is set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. 8. Bail bonds stand cancelled. 9. Respondent no. 2 is directed to surrender within 4 weeks and apply for regular bail. Needless to state that the bail application so preferred shall be considered on its own merits.''

In his 3-page long order dated September 3, 204, Justice Verma  had concluded:''5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned trial court within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned trial court where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 773 of 2023 subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C.'' Supreme Court has set aside the High Court's order because prima facie case is established.   

Justices Sourendra Pandey and Sandeep Kumar grant regular bail to Rajan Rai and Bhola Ray who are "accused of killing deceased by pressing his neck"

In Rajan Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court granted regular bail to the petitioner who faces the allegation that on March 12, 2024 while laying the pipe for watering his field there was scuffle between the accused persons and Gabbar Ray, the informant at 5.30 PM, the named accused persons including Rajan Rai, the petitioner "are said to have assaulted the informant and his parents, wife and his sister-in-law with lathi and danda. It is further alleged in the FIR that the petitioner and Bhola Rai had assaulted the father of the informant by bricks and danda and they also pressed the neck of the father of the informant who died on the spot." The petitioner's counsel drew the attention of the Court towards the post-mortem report wherein "ante-mortem injury was only 'abrasion on both knee of size 1/2" x 1/2' and the Doctor has reserved the opinion regarding cause of death..." The order recorded that the petitioner has three criminal antecedents and he was in custody since December 3, 2024. 

The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the prayer for bail of the petitioner. He submitted that there is specific allegation against the petitioner to have assaulted the informant and his parents, wife and his sister-in-law with lathi and danda as such he should not be released on bail. Justice Pandey's order dated May 13, 2025 reads:"Considering the aforesaid submissions of respective counsel and taking into account the fact that the post-mortem report does not support the allegations levelled against the petitioner and the petitioner is in custody since 03.12.2024, the petitioner above named, is directed to be released on bail..."

In Bhola Ray @ Bhola Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court granted bail to the petitioner who is "accused of killing deceased by pressing his neck" and by beating Sobhan Ray, the deceased using bricks and sticks and  him with on March 12, 2024 at 5.30 PM. The police station received information at 11.45 PM.

The case arose out of a  case of 2024 registered in Awtarnagar Thana, Saran. The FIR was registered against eight persons, namely Lalita Devi, Rajan Rai, Suresh Rai, Bhola Ray, Ramesh Rai, Rajiv Rai, Gyanti Devi and Rajeshwar Rai on March 13, 2024. Bhola Ray and Rajan Ray are directly accused in the FIR. Justice Kumar's order dated May 14, 2025 recorded that the petitioner was in custody since December 3, 2024.

The petitioner's counsel had submitted that "the post-mortem report does not support the allegations as alleged in the FIR." The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the prayer for bail of the petitioner. The order reads: Considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, this application for regular bail is allowed."

The trial of both the murder accused persons is pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Saran at Chhapra.

 

Supreme Court approves verdicts of Trial Court and High Court acquitting murder accused persons from Khagaria

In Saudagar Singh@Dhana Singh vs. The State of Bihar Through Chief Secretary, Home Department & Ors. (2025) Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2018, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadean heard and dismissed an appeal saying, "we are of the view that there is no good reason for us to interfere with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court. There are concurrent findings of two Courts below, i.e., the Trial Court and the High Court." Supreme Court's order was passed on January 30, 2025. 

The appellant, a resident of Etharua, Alauli, Khagaria was a de-facto complainant who was dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 299 of 2014 by which the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court came to be dismissed, affirming the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 

In this case the original accused persons were put to trial for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The deceased was the son of the appellant in the Supreme Court. The Trial Court had acquitted all the accused persons of the offence of murder. The appellant was dissatisfied with the acquittal and he preferred an appeal before the High Court. But the High Court dismissed his appeal and affirmed the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. 

In Saudagar Singh@Dhana Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.299 of 2014, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Jitendra Mohan Sharma had passed the 6-page long order on May 2, 2014.  The other respondents were: Khagaria residents, Paro Singh, Ramashish Singh and Fulchand Yadav @ Kapil Yadav @ Mukul Yadav from Srinagar, Sahebpur Kamal, Begusarai. It was authored by Justice V.N. Sinha.  

The appellant had assailed the judgment dated February 7, 2014, passed by 1st Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria, in a Sessions Trial because as Private Respondent Nos. 2 to 4  (Paro Singh, Ramashish Singh and Fulchand Yadav @ Kapil Yadav @ Mukul Yadav) were acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 of the IPC. 

The trial Court had concluded in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment that on April 17, 2012 there was a police camp established in Amausi village but the police camp was not informed about the occurrence in the night of the occurrence, which is indicative of the fact that the prosecution party came to know about the incident in the morning and thereafter lodged the First Information Report on April 18, 2012 at 8:15 A.M. 

The prosecution case as set out in the fardbeyan of Saudagar Singh is  that on April 17, 2012 at about 7.30 P.M. he was at his Basa along with his son Pandav Singh, situated in Amausi Bahiyar (outer area of Amausi village). The three respondents along with two others came to the Basa of the informant armed with country made pistol and lathi, abused the informant and asked as to why did he not give Rs. 50,000/- for making Pairvi in Amausi murder case. Informant pleaded his inability to pay on the ground of being poor. Respondents forcibly caught his son Pandav Singh and dragged him towards the outer area of the village threatening both would be killed. It is alleged in the fardbeyan that informant attempted to save his son. The accused persons, however, threatened to kill both father and son but dragged the son of the informant Pandav Singh to Modo Bahiar. Informant also followed from behind and saw that the accused persons throttled his son by tying thin Gamcha (towel) in his neck. 

During trial this version was supported by Raj Kumar Singh (P.W.1) and Satya Narayan Singh (P.W.2) as it is said that on thrashing his wheat crop near the place of occurrence and P.W.2 was also present along with him. Umesh Singh (P.W.8) has also supported the occurrence. Hare Ram Singh (P.W.9) has deposed that there was alarm raised in the village (Icharua) that Pandav Singh has been killed and on hearing the alarm he along with villagers including informant (P.W.10) went to the place of occurrence.

The trial court disbelieved the prosecution case as set out by the informant in the fardbeyan as also in Court that on the date, time of occurrence he along with his son was at his hut (Basa in Amausi Bahiar) and in his presence son of the informant was dragged and taken by the accused persons and that the informant also followed the accused persons and in his presence his son was strangulated with the help of a thin Gamcha (towel) in the light of the evidence of P.W.9 in paragraph 2 that there was alarm raised in the village (Icharua) that Pandav Singh has been killed and on hearing the alarm P.W.9 along with villagers including informant had gone to the place of occurrence, which is indicative of the fact that at the time of occurrence informant was not at his Basa in Amausi Bahiar but was at his village Icharua. 

The informant was also disbelieved on the ground that in the First Information Report he had claimed that he even attempted to save his son but in paragraph 3 of his deposition informant stated that he did not try to save his son nor did he raise any alarm. The trial court has chosen not to place reliance on the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 as they failed to disclose any source of identification though P.W.2 admitted that it was a dark night and in the adjoining field there was maize crop of the height of 6 ft., as such, according to the trial court, it would not have been possible for P.Ws. 1, 2 to identify the miscreants in the dark night as in paragraph 2 P.W.2 has deposed that he was also under fear of death and that in paragraph 3 he has stated that he did not dare to light his torch. P.W.8 has been disbelieved as he has admitted that he did not make any statement in respect of the occurrence before any authority earlier. 

The informant (P.W.10), the Investigating Officer (P.W.12) the trial Court had concluded in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment that on April 17, 2012 there was a police camp established in Amausi village but the police camp was not informed about the occurrence in the night of the occurrence, which was indicative of the fact that the prosecution party came to know about the incident in the morning and thereafter lodged the First Information Report on 18.4.2012 at 8:15 A.M.

In paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, the trial Court had disbelieved the claim of the informant that he was an eye-witness of the occurrence with reference to the evidence of P.W. 2, which appears to be a mistake for P.W. 9 as in the earlier paragraph 13 of the judgment the trial Court with referenced to the evidence of P.W. 9 paragraph 2 had concluded that P.W. 9 and other villagers including informant went to the place of occurrence from their village after hearing alarm and thereby held that informant was not an eye-witness.

The High Court concluded: "it would appear that the trial Court has taken a plausible view of the evidence led by the prosecution party and there does not appear any perversity in appreciation of such evidence. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to proceed with the appeal any further, which is dismissed."

Supreme Court to hear criminal appeal 35 years after Trial Court verdict, 13 years post High Court's verdict in a dowry death case from Muzaffarpur

In Chinta Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), which awaits final hearing, the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan ordered on January 31, 2025 to list it after six weeks now that original records of the Patna High Court and Trial Court have been received by the Court. The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on July 23, 2013 and it was registered on May 13, 2014. The appeal arose from the judgement and order of Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Mihir Kumar Jha of the High Court's Division Bench dated August 14, 2012. 

On October 4, 2013, the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices A. K. Patnai and J.S Khehar condoned the delay in their order and recorded that Nagendra Rai, senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that at least the quantum of sentence should be reduced as the petitioner has been convicted for life under Section 304-B. The order reads: "Issue notice limited to the question of sentence under Section 304-B, IPC."

304B  of IPC deals with dowry death. It reads:(1) Where the death of a women is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
21. Section 304B of the I.P.C. as quoted above has to be necessarily understood in the context of the amended provision of the Evidence Act as incorporated under Section 113B, which reads as follows:-
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death." 

On September 5, 2014, the Division Bench of Justices Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla and Shiv Kirti Singh passed an order which reads:"We are not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. Application for bail is rejected. However, liberty is granted to the appellant to renew her bail application after six months." It rejected the bail application on May 13, 2015 as well. But on July 22, 2016, the Division Bench of Justices Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Amitava Roy heard the senior counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar and passed an order which reads:"For the reasons stated in the application for bail and having regard to the fact that the appellant is of 75 years of age and detained in jail custody for more than 6 years and 8 months, she is directed to be released on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial Court." The appellant in question is Chinta Devi, the mother-in-law who was convicted for causing the death of her dauther-in-law Indu Devi on May 22, 1987.

In its 32-page long judgement in Chinta Devi and Kukum Kumari vs. The State of Bihar Criminal Appeal (DB) No.309 of 1990, the High Court's Division Bench set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code but affirmed the conviction and sentence for offences under Section 304B/34 and Section 498A/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as awarded by the trial court in the impugned judgment, subject to the observations and direction made in the case of appellant Kumkum Kumari. The appeal was heard along with Dilip Kumar Sharma vs. The State of Bihar Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 312 of 1990. In the High Court, the appellants, the residents of Purshottampur, Maniyari, Muzaffarpur were represented by Shailendra Kumar Jha, Amicus Curiae and the respondent was represented by Sashi Bala Verma, APP. The latter had submitted that Indu Devi, the deceased was burnt to death by causing fire after tying her hands and feet. The alibi of the husband, appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma showing himself to be present for his treatment at Jamshedpur, was fit to be rejected. The issue relating to the appellant Kumkum Kumari being either juvenile or minor should have been gone into and enquired into had there been a prayer made by the appellant in the trial court but in absence thereof, now this matter cannot be examined much less reopened by the High Court in view of the prima facie material on record. The judgement was authored by Justice Mihir Kumar Jha. 

Both these appeals arose out of the common judgment dated June 12, 1990 in a Sessions Trial whereunder, the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur had convicted the three appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC as well as for offence under Section 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. They ere sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for life for both offences under Section 302/34 as well as Section 304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and additionally they have also been convicted for rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- each for the offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC and in default of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. They were further sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act as well as a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default thereof to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three months.

The High Court observed: "Law also stands well settled that in order to prove the charge of Section 304B of the I.P.C., the following essential ingredients have to be proven:-
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances,
(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage,
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband,
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with, demand for dowry and'
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the women soon before her death."
It relied on the Supreme Court's decision Kunhiabdulla & Anr. vs. State of Kerala reported in 2004(4)SCC 23 wherein ingredients to prove the charge of Section 304B of the I.P.C. have been enumerated. The High Court analyzed the evidence on record in the light of these requirements of Section 304B of the I.P.C., to infer that "there is no dearth of material to establish the death of the deceased had taken place on account of injuries caused by burn and the fact that her such burn injuries were clubbed with a mark of tying of her hands and feet by rope would automatically lead to an conclusion that her death was caused in otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is also no dispute that the marriage of the deceased with the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma had taken place in the year 1984 and the occurrence in question had taken place on 22.5.1987 and thus, within seven years of the marriage. The third and fourth requirement of the deceased being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relatives of the husband is also fully satisfied in this case, inasmuch as, there are four witnesses on the point of demand of dowry and cruelty being inflicted on the decease".

The High Court concluded: The appellants who are on bail, their bail bonds are cancelled and appellant Chinta Devi and appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma are directed to surrender before the court below for serving out the rest of their sentence. The appellant Kumkum Kumari must appear before the trial court for establishing her claim of being a child/juvenile on the date of occurrence.  

Kumkum Kumari, the appellant had raised the specific plea that on the date of occurrence i.e. on May 22, 1987, she was a minor. She had adduced the evidence of Dr. Preeti Bala, the D.W.5 who had examined her as per the direction of the court on February 19, 1988 and had ascertained her age around eighteen years on the date of such examination. But the Trial Court assessed the age of Kumkum Kumari on January 30, 1989 as twenty years despite the claim of the appellant Kumkum Kumari that on January 30, 1989 when her statement was being recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., was only 15 years of age, and reject Kumkum Kumari 's claim of being a minor on the ground that the evidence of Dr. Preeti Bala, the D.W.5 was based upon certain radiological reports and records which were not proved by the defence in accordance with Evidence Act. 

The High Court observed: "This Court would find such reasons given by the trial court to be only unacceptable, inasmuch as, whenever such question of age relating to minority/juvenility would arise, there has to be necessarily an enquiry by the court itself but from the records it is evident that no such enquiry was conducted by the trial court. At the relevant point of time in the year 1989, when such an issue had arisen in the case of the appellant Kumkum Kumari, the provision of Children Act had to be followed in letter and spirit which also envisages an enquiry for ascertaining and fixing the age. Section 8 of the Bihar Children Act, 1982 which was then in vogue had prescribed for holding an enquiry for recording opinion as with regard to age for declaration of children. Similarly, provision of Section 20 of the 1982 Act also prescribes enquiry by Children's Court regarding delinquent children and Section 24 had laid down no joint trial of a child and a person of not being a child could be held. Thus the mandate of law of an enquiry by the court concerned having been not undergone by the trial court, this Court would find the sentence of Kumkum Kumari to be bad."

The Court further observed: "In this connection, we, while exercising out appellate power keeping in mind the provision of Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, would hold that there has to be a fresh enquiry as with regard to the determination of the claim of the appellant Kumkum Kumari of her being a child in terms of the Bihar Children Act, 1982 read with her being a juvenile in terms of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Such age of the appellant Kumkum Kumari must be determined children/juvenile in terms of Bihar Children Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act, 2000, her sentence would be determined afresh in keeping with the provision of the Bihar Children Act, 1982. If however, she is not found to be a child on the date of occurrence or her juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act on the date of occurrence, her sentence, as recorded by the trial court in the impugned judgment shall remain undisturbed."

Rajeshwar Prasad Singh (P.W.6) father of Indu Devi set out the prosecution case stated that his daughter Indu Devi was married to the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma in the year 1984. The informant also stated that his daughter had remained in her Sasural for a period of one year whereafter she had returned to her 'maika' i.e. the house of the informant. He has alleged that the appellant Kumkum Kumari sister of his son-in-law and Chinta Devi mother of his son-in-law had always been taunting and demanding dowry in the form of television, tape recorder, scooter and cash etc. In the year 1986, his daughter had returned back to her Sasural when his son-in-law the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma after Ruksadi (second marriage) had taken the deceased Indu Devi to his house. The informant alleged that even after the second marriage of his daughter, the demand of dowry by the appellant was continued and when the same was not fulfilled, all the three appellants had kept on threatening his daughter (deceased) that if the goods demanded in dowry were not given, she (Indu Devi) would be done to death whereafter the appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma would solemnize another marriage. The informant had also specifically alleged that some four to five days prior to his recording of Fardbeyan, his daughter was assaulted and on coming to know of this assault on her, when he had gone to the house of the appellant and had requested them to send his daughter back with him to his house (informant's house) as she was his daughter. But his such request was turned down by the appellants who had stated that unless all the goods of dowry such as television, tape recorder, scooter and cash were given to them, the girl (Indu Devi) would not be allowed to go back to her house. 

The informant stated that on May 22, 1987 while he was when in village Khabra, in the house of his brother-in-law Ram Japu Ojha, he came to know that his daughter had been done to death after being burnt by her husband appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma, her sister-in-law, Kumkum Kumari and her mother-in-law Chinta Devi and on receipt of such information, he had rushed to the place of his son-in-law appellant Dilip Kumar Sharma and there he could come to know from the neighbours that at about 1.30 PM on the same day i.e. May 22, 1987, his daughter Indu Devi was burnt to death after sprinkling kerosene oil over her body and when the villagers had gone to save her (Indu Devi), they were also prevented from doing so. 

The informant had categorically alleged that the death of Indu Devi, the daughter of the informant had taken place on account of concerted overt acts on the part of the three appellants. On the basis of the Fardbeyan of the informant, the father of the victim girl Indu Devi, Maniyari P.S. Case No. 27 of 1987 was recorded for offence under Section 302/34 and 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The police after investigation had submitted the charge-sheet whereafter the case being triable by court of sessions was committed by an order dated November 17, 1987. The trial court, framed charges for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC, Section 304/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, had conducted the trial which, ended with the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of all the appellants.

Supreme Court is likely to hear the appeal of Chinta Devi, the convict who is out on bail since July 2016 in March 2025. The current fate of Dilip Kumar Sharma, the husband and Kumkum Kumari, the sister-in-law who were also complicit in the death of Indu Devi for dowry is not known.