Supreme Court reverses bail rejection order by Justice Sourendra Pandey

In Rajesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra passed a 4-page order dated July 30, 2025. The petitioner had challenged the 2-page long order dated July 4, 2025 in Rakesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025) passed by Justice Sourendra Pandey of the Patna High Court. Supreme Court's order reads:"In the event of arrest in connection with Crime No.166 of 2024 of Baligaon Police Station, Vaishali District, Bihar, the petitioner shall be released on bail on the appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Investigating Officer/Arresting Officer." The Court issued  notice, returnable on September 12, 2025.

Justice Pandey's order reads: "This is the second anticipatory bail application preferred by the petitioner as stated in the bail petition and from perusal of Annexure-1, it transpires that the petitioner had earlier moved for anticipatory bail along with three other co-accused persons, however, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had sought permission to withdraw the application for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner, namely, Rakesh Kumar @ Lalu. 3. In view of the same, since this is the second anticipatory bail application and the earlier application had already been dismissed as withdrawn, I am not inclined to entertain this application. 4. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail is rejected." The case had arisen out of a P.S. case of 2024. The case was filed in the High Court on June 11, 2025 and registered on June 26, 2025. 

Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi bench grants liberty to dismissed Mukhiya to file fresh petition

In Ravi Kumar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 4-page long judgement dated July 24, 2025. In his 5th judgement as Chief Justice, Justice Pancholi observed:"We permit the appellant herein to withdraw the aforesaid petition. We also at the same time permit the appellant to withdraw the present appeal by granting liberty to the appellant/petitioner to challenge the aforesaid two orders passed by the concerned respondent authorities. It is further observed that as and when the fresh petition/proceeding is filed by the appellant/petitioner challenging the aforesaid orders, the same shall be examined on its own merits without being influenced by the orders passed in I.A. Nos. 1 of 2024, 2 of 2025 and 3 of 2025 in the main writ petition. 8. It is always open for the appellant/petitioner to challenge the by-election held for the post of Mukhiya, which the appellant/petitioner was holding before his removal. As and when any proceeding is taken by the appellant/petitioner, the same shall be examined on its own merits. We have not gone into the merits of the matter." Notably, on July 28, 2025, Justice Pancholi passed a 2-apge long order wherein liberty was granted "to file a fresh petition."

The Letters Patent Appeal was filed under provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court Rules challenging the 5-page long order dated July 7, 2025 passed by Single Judge in I.A. No. 03 of 2025, filed in CWJC No. 1789 of 2024, whereby Justice Alok Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had rejected I.A. No. 03 of 2025. The appellant had filed CWJC No. 1789 of 2024 in which the appellant/petitioner had prayed for setting aside the letter dated December 11, 2023, issued under the signature of Sub Divisional Officer, Mahua, Vaishali at Hajipur, whereby and whereunder the said authority had recommended the District Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur to take action against the petitioner under Section 18 (5) of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. Petitioner has also challenged letter dated December 19, 2023, issued under the signature of District Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur whereby he had recommended the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur for taking action against the petitioner under the provision. The petitioner had also prayed for stay of notification dated June 9, 2025 issued by the State Election Commission for holding by-election to the post of Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat,, stay of order dated August August 7,  2024 passed by Additional Chief Secretary by which the petitioner had been removed from the post of Mukhiya, for impleading the State Election Commission, which was rejected on June 30, 2025.

The High Court did not grant any interim relief in favour of the petitioner in the main writ petition, the concerned respondent authority proceeded with the matter and ultimately Lok Prahari recommended for removal of the petitioner from the post of Mukhiya on April 13, 2024 and on the basis of the recommendation made by Lok Prahari now order dated August 7, 2024 was passed by the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, the Respondent No. 2 whereby the appellant/original petitioner was removed from his post.

The appellant/petitioner had filed I.A.s. in the main writ petition and had tried to bring on record the subsequent development which had taken place during the pendency of the writ petition. The Single Judge had passed orders in the said Interlocutory Applications filed by the appellant/petitioner. 

Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi bench grants relief without examining the merits of case

In Dhananjay Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 3-page long judgement dated July 24, 2025 granting relief to the appellants without examining the merits of case.

The appellants were the owners of the land in which, now, the respondent authorities had decided to construct Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan. The appellants had made representation before the respondent authorities.  Justice Rajesh Kumar Verm, the Single Judge had dismissed their petition mainly on the ground citing an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court, wherein it was held that "it is for the authorities to decide where the Panchayat Sarkar Bhawan is to be constructed." 

The counsel for the appellants submitted before Justice Pancholi led bench that if the respondent authorities are directed to decide the representation filed by the appellants, then the appellants would be satisfied with the same. In his 4th judgement as Chief Justice, Justice Pancholi concluded: "If the appellants file the representation within a period of four weeks from today, respondent No. 6 shall decide the same in accordance with law within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of such representation. 5. It is clarified that we have not examined the merits of the case of the appellants."

The appeal was filed under Clause-X of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court Rules against the 4-page long order dated February 17, 2025, passed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma, the Single Judge in Dhananjay Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025) CWJC No. 2840 of 2025, whereby the Single Judge had dismissed the petition filed by the present appellants/petitioners. 

Justice Verma had relied on  order dated April 7, 2023 passed by High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Madhuresh Prasad in Naveen Kumar Ram & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2023), because not a single cheat of paper annexed by the petitioners suggested that construction was going on the land of the petitioners. The order was authored by Justice Prasad. He concluded: "8. No case is made out for interference by this Court."

Patna High Court upholds judgment by Justice Madhuresh Prasad

In Mukesh Kumar S/o Late Guneshwar Prasad Singh & Anr. vs. The Union of India, through the Secretary, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 11-page long judgment dated July 24, 2025, wherein, Justice Pancholi concluded:"We are of the view that the Single Judge while passing the impugned order. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition filed by the present appellants / petitioners. Hence, no interference is required in the present appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed." This is the 3rd judgement authored by Justice Pancholi as Chief Justice. 

The Court was referring to the 13-page long judgment dated November 28, 2022 by Justice Madhuresh Prasad.  Justice Prasad had observed:"The petitioner cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time." 

He also observed: "The petitioner clearly does not fulfill thev“prescribed qualification” as per Clause R-3 (b). Therefore, also he is not in a position to claim appointment under the SABF. SABF stands for Superannuation Benefit Fund Scheme. 

The Court recorded that the petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner was pursuing his ITI course. The Authorities, therefore, should have provided the petitioner an opportunity of completing the ITI course and thereby acquiring the requisite qualification, by extending the normal waiting period of three years, up to seven years, under Clause R-3 (d) of he SABF Scheme for becoming eligible under option R-3 of the SABF.

Chief Justice led bench approves order by Justice A. Abhishek Reddy

In Baba Debraha Enterprises a proprietorship firm through its proprietor namely Rakesh Ranjan...vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024), in his 7-page long order dated November 18, 2024, Justice A. Abhishek Reddy of Patna High Court concluded:"The petitioner cannot be faulted for the lapses which has been committed by the respondent-authorities....The Respondents are directed to pay the amount of Rs. Rs.28,45,790/- incurred by the petitioner for purchase of the vehicles as per the terms and conditions of the bid document. That in so far as the other prayer of the petitioner seeking interest, security charges etc. are concerned this Court is not inclined to grant the same and the same is rejected. The authorities shall pay the amount due to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In case the amounts are not paid by the authorities within the stipulated time, the petitioner would be entitled for payment of simple interest at the rate of 7% from the date of raising the invoice till the date of actual payment." Justice Reddy allowed  the writ petition. 

In The Nagar Panchayat Nirmali through its Executive Officer, District -Supaul & Anr. vs. Baba Debraha Enterprises a proprietorship Firm through its proprietor namely Rakesh Ranjan..& Ors. (2025), High Court's Division Bench led by Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered a 11-page long judgment dated July 22, 2025 disposed the case by partly allowing  the appeal. In his 2nd judgment as Chief Justice, Justice Pancholi concluded:". We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while issuing direction to the respondents to pay an amount of Rs. 28,45,790/- incurred by the petitioner for the purchase of the vehicles in question. However, at the same time, at this stage, we record that the learned counsel appearing for the present opponent/original petitioner has, under the instruction, submitted that the delivery of the remaining 2 vehicles in question would be given to respondent nos. 4 and 5 as per the bid document/work order within a period of one week. It is needless to observe that the original petitioner shall maintain the vehicles in question for a period of one year from the date of supply as per the original terms and conditions of the bid document."

Referring to Justice Reddy's order, Justice Pancholi observed:"....we would like to observe that the learned Single Judge has partly allowed the petition and the other reliefs prayed by the petitioner have not been granted in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the dispute is with regard to the payment of Rs. 28,45,790/- incurred by the petitioner for purchase of the 2 Hooper Tippers from the concerned manufacturer. We are of the view that once the petitioner has purchased the vehicles pursuant to the bid issued by the respondent and as per the work order, the respondent was required to take the delivery of the said vehicles as per the terms and conditions of the bid document. There was no fault on the part of the petitioner and because of the fact that the respondent did not take the delivery of remaining 2 vehicles from the petitioner, the petitioner has suffered a loss."

In his first verdict, Justice Vipul M. Pancholi upholds judgment by Justice Amanullah

In Shila Singh @ Shilanath Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Partha Sarthy delivered a 8-page long judgment dated July 22, 2025, wherein, the bench upheld the 4-page long judgment dated February 9, 2017 delivered by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah by Ravindra Nath Singh vs. The Union of India & Ors (2017) Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 16760 of 2016. This is first judgment authored by Justice Pancholi as the Chief Justice of the High Court. 

The bench observed that "in the order dated 09.02.2017 passed by learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the concerned petitioner, this Court did not examine the merits of the case of the said petitioner and the liberty was reserved to him to file representation before the concerned authority with further direction to the authority that as and when such representation is filed by the concerned petitioner, the same shall be examined on its own merits. We are, therefore, of the view that in the said petition the concerned learned Single Judge did not decide the case on merits. 

Justice Pancholi observed: "....We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while dismissing the petition. Accordingly, this appeal is required to be dismissed."

As Single Judge bench of the High Court, Justice Amanullah had passed the judgment upon hearing the petitioner who had moved the Court seeking a direction to the respondents to implement their policy of providing a job to the persons whose lands has been acquired for the purposes of constructing railway bridge over the river Ganga at Rupaspur in the District of Patna.

The Letters Patent Appeal was filed under provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court Rules, wherein the appellant/original petitioner had challenged the judgment dated December 12, 2022 passed by  Single Judge in CWJC No. 9163 of 2015, where by the  Single Judge had dismissed the petition filed by the appellant. The counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was the owner of the land which was acquired by the respondent-Railways. The appellant claimed that award in respect of 19 dhurs out of 2 kathas of land was made in favour of his mother. He also alleged that for remaining 1 katha and 1 dhur, award was prepared in the name of one Zubaida Bibi wife of Habib Mian, though she has no right, title, interest or possession over the said land. It was further submitted that L.A.R. Case No. 2/2013 was pending in the court of Sub-Judge-II, Saran at Chapra with regard to the dispute. 

The appellant claimed to be the son of Ram Jyoti Devi who died in the year 2005. He prayed that as per the policy of the Railways, which was framed in the year 2007, the son of the appellant was entitled to get employment in the Railways. 

But the Single Judge had dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner mainly on two grounds; firstly that the Single Judge considered that the land of the petitioner was acquired in the year 2002 whereas the petitioner filed the petition in the year 2015. Therefore, there was a delay of 13 years in filing the petition and, therefore, Single Judge did not consider the case of the petitioner on merits, so far as parcel of the land was concerned. Secondly, so far as remaining parcel of land was concerned, i.e., 1 katha 1 dhur land, which was acquired by the respondent-Railways, The Single Judge had observed that the dispute with regard to the grant of compensation for the said land is pending before court of Sub-Judge-II, Saran at Chapra in L.A.R. Case No. 2/2013. He also observed that the said land is less than 0.2 acres and as the dispute is pending before the concerned court, petitioner would not be entitled to any compensation. The Single Judge did not entertain the petition on that count also.

The appellant's counsel, had urged that the Single Judge committed an error while dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. He also submitted that this Court may grant liberty to the appellant to file appropriate proceeding after the dispute is resolved by Sub-Judge-II, Saran at Chapra in L.A.R. Case No. 2/2013. He further prayed that the appellant be permitted to file representation before the respondent authority with regard to the prayers made in the present petition. 

Supreme Court records "no one has put in appearance for State of Bihar" in Priyanka Kumari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025)

In Priyanka Kumari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Justices Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan passed a 2-page long order dated July 22, 2025, wherein it recorded:"The matter was taken up twice but no one has put in appearance for State of Bihar....Let the date of hearing of the present petitions be notified to the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar." Now the matter is listed for hearing on August  12, 2025. The case arose out of 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Amreshwar Pratap Sahi and Justice Anjana Mishra. The judgement was authored by Justice Sahi which affirmed 20 page long judgement dated February 22, 2018 by Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay who had relied on Supreme Court's "principle of useless formality theory in the matter of compliance of natural justice". 

Justice Upadhyay drew on para 17 of the judgment of the Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy: (2005) 6 SCC 321 which reads: “17. What is known as `useless formality theory' has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1999] 6 SCC 237. It was observed as under: 22. "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused  even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of `real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., [1971] 2 All ER 1278, HL (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University, [1971] 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, [1980] 2 All ER 368, CA and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates. Court, ex p. Fannaran, (1996) 8 Admn. LR 351, 358) See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be `demonstrable beyond doubt. that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, CA has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant, (1959) NZLR 1014 however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is `real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice.' On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees, [1969] 2 All ER 274 stating that there are always `open and shut cases. and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the `useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that `convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms' More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the `useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the `useless formality theory. has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a `real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their `discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., [1996] 5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. 23.We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the `useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us,`admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."

The appellants had questioned the correctness of the dismissal judgment of the Single Judge dated 22nd February, 2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6827 of 2016 before the High Court's Division Bench in their appeal. The Single Judge had declined the claim of the appellants and their effort to save their employment on the strength of a degree awarded by the University of Technology and Science, Chhattisgarh.

The Single Judge relied on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 420 which had arrived at the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to the academic benefits of the said University which has been declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Court and therefore their employment on the basis of any degree by the University was rightly terminated.

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the very same judgment in para 64 and 65 indicated that the students’ career instead of being jeopardized should be revisited by the State Government in order to extend any benefit of affiliation or otherwise in order to sustain the career of such students who had been admitted in such Institutions. He submitted that this was a University created under an Act of the State Legislature, namely, Section 5 of the Chhatisgarh Viniyaman) Adhiniyam 2002 and therefore its existence cannot be doubted. The contention was that so far as the appellants were concerned, the legality of the establishment of the University or otherwise cannot be attributed to them for the purpose of virtually recalling the degrees already conferred on them by such University, inasmuch as, they had bona fidely pursued their studies and were awarded degrees which in the present case are degrees relating to Library Science on the basis whereof they were granted employment. It was their employment which was terminated on the ground of their degrees being invalid. It  was submitted that the declaration of law by the Supreme Court itself extended protection and issued directions to the State of Chhattisgarh for protecting the interest of students and their career. The contention, was that the appellants stand on a better footing, inasmuch as, they are students who had already been awarded degrees by the time the University was declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Apex Court. Consequently, any form of default on the part of the appellants who have pursued their academic career in this University cannot be a cause for recall of the employment which the appellants had been offered on the basis of a degree which otherwise was valid when it was granted. 

The Single Judge had recorded the findings and concluded that even assuming for the sake of arguments that the termination orders emanated without following any procedure of law and were in violation of principles of natural justice, relegating the matter back to the authorities for a decision afresh would be a useless formality, inasmuch as, on the admitted facts the degree on the basis of which the appellants had obtained employment was invalid and consequently all the appellants holding a degree, which was a nullity, cannot claim continuance in employment on the strength thereof. 

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the aspect with regard to any protection being given to such students who had already obtained degrees does not appear to have been negated by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) nor has the State Government of Chhatisgarh denied any such benefit. It is also submitted that even the learned Single Judge has not considered this aspect and, therefore, in the above background the termination of the employment of the appellants without following the due procedure of law cannot be justified. 

The counsel for the State of Bihar, had contended that an employment extended to the appellants on the basis of an academic degree which is a nullity cannot be sustained and any continuance thereof would be contrary to law. He submitted that it is in this background that the action was taken by the authorities and after having verified the status of the Institution the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 was issued informing the authorities to take appropriate action in relation to the engagement of the appellants as well as such other similarly situate employees who had obtained degrees from such Institutions. 

The counsel for the appellants had urged that the said document indicated the name of the University which was not a correct name, and even otherwise there is an indication that the University is closed from 2005. It was submitted that the closure of the University was on account of the judgment of the Supreme Court and such a closure, therefore, does not eclipse or abrogate the degree obtained by the appellants from the University when it was in existence prior to that. Consequently, the said directions issued by the Deputy Director (Education) would not be applicable in a retrospective manner so as to take away any impact of a valid degree which otherwise was capable of being acknowledged as it had been conferred by the University that was created under a Statute. The University, therefore, was empowered to confer such a degree and consequently, the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 does not take away the effect or nullify the effect of a degree already awarded by the University.

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "9. We have considered the entire arguments before us and we find that the Apex Court judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) derecognises such Universities by declaring the provisions of the Act under which the University was established to be ultra vires. The birth of the University, therefore, having taken under Statute which was declared to be ultra vires, therefore, cannot allow the acknowledgment of a degree granted by such a University to be valid which has been declared to be non-existent. In our opinion, it would be paradoxical to recognize a degree of a University that has been declared to be non-existent on account of an invalid law under which the University itself was created. If the creation of the University itself was unlawful, then any degree conferred by such a University cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of a lawful employment. 10. We, therefore, do not find any error in the conclusion ultimately drawn by the learned Single Judge in declining to entertain the writ petition for grant of any such benefit. 11. There is, however, one argument which deserves mention, namely, the Apex Court in the judgment of Prof. Yashpal (supra) did not specifically declare any such degrees already conferred to be a nullity. To that extent, the appellants could have raised their grievances before the State of Chhattisgarh for extending such benefits, but in the present case what we find that neither the University Grants Commission nor the State of Chhattisgarh have been made party respondents on the basis whereof any such determination can be attempted by this Court in order to gather as to whether the appellants would be entitled to any such benefit or not. There is no indication in any of the documents filed that the State of Chhattisgarh had taken any steps for recognition of such degrees which virtually by operation of law and the declaration of law by the Supreme Court stood lapsed without there being any further action for reviving or acknowledging them as to be surviving for the purpose of any employment under the State."

The Division Bench of the High Court had concluded: "....we are unable to further probe on the issue so raised by the appellants with regard to the validity or otherwise of their degree and we leave it open to the appellants to claim any such benefit, if permissible in law, inasmuch as, the question of recognition of such a degree would not be open to be examined by us in view of what has been stated hereinabove. 13. The appeal, therefore, is accordingly consigned to records with the said observations." 

 

 

Supreme Court reverses Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh's bail rejection order

In Sunil Dhanwat @ Atharva Sunil Dhanwat @Sunil Pandurang Dhanwat vs, The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and N.V. Anjaria passed a 2-page long order dated July 25, 2025 granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. The order reads: "Considering the nature of the case, we are of the view that custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required in this case, however, this will be subject to the total cooperation of the petitioner in the ongoing investigations. Consequently, we allow the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail and make the order dated 09.05.2025 as absolute. Accordingly, in the event of arrest, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail forthwith on the usual terms and conditions to be decided by the concerned Court." 

The petition was disposed of. The arose out of a 3-page long order dated March 24, 2025 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court in Sunil Dhanwat @ Atharva Sunil Dhanwat @Sunil Pandurang Dhanwat vs, The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025). 

Justice Singh had dismissed the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner because of the gravity of the facts and circumstances of the case.

The petitioner was an accused in a complaint case of 2024, for the offences punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. He apprehended his arrest and his anticipatory bail application was dismissed by the High Court under the order impugned. Being aggrieved, he had approached the Supreme Court and vide order dated May 9, 2025, the Court while issuing notice, granted interim protection to the petitioner subject to cooperation in the  investigation.  

The prosecution case was that petitioner being the Proprietor-cum-Director of Spekans EPC Pvt. Ltd., Pune engaged the complainant for a project related to structure fabrication at a site in Surat (Gujarat). The complainant alleged that he invested Rs. 50,85,656/- in the said project, whereas petitioner made a payment of Rs. 23,38,000/-via RTGS, leaving outstanding amount of Rs. 27,47,656/-. It was also alleged that the petitioner issued a cheque of Rs. 17,47,656/-, which bounced due to insufficiency of fund.

The complainant's counsel had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail in the High Court. He had submitted that petitioner did not deny the allegation made in the complaint petition and the cheque issued by the petitioner bounced due to insufficiency of fund. In this case, petitioner neither appeared nor surrendered before the Court and as such, he was declared absconder and process of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. was initiated against him to ensure his appearance in the Court. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail. He relied on the following decisions in support of this submission: (i) Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730 (ii) State of MP vs. Pradeep Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 17 and (iii) Prem Shankar Prasad vs. State of Bihar 2021 SCC OnLine SC 955.

The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Srikant Upadhyay & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7940 of 2023.

Justice Singh's order reads: "It is a case of ‘cheque bounce’. The cheque, issued by the petitioner, got bounced due to insufficiency of fund. In this case, process of Section 82 Cr.P.C. has already been initiated on 12.12.2024 and as such, petitioner is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail. 8. Considering the aforesaid facts & circumstances of the case and gravity of the offence, the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is dismissed." Reversing, Justice Singh's order, the Supreme Court has granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner by making its order dated May 9, 2025 as absolute. By its earlier, the Court had granted interim protection to the petitioner. 

 

Phase IV, Phase V of Action Plan for Arrears Reduction in District Judiciary in Bihar

During Phase IV (July 2025-December 2025), with regard to more than 30, 20-30 and 10 years old cases for States with High Arrears like Bihar, the plan for arrears reduction includes disposal of all cases over 30 years old (including remaining cases which could not be disposed of in Phase III). With regard to with regard to cases which are between 20-30 years old (including remaining cases which could not be disposed of in Phase III), endeavour should be made to dispose all such matters during Phase IV.

During Phase V (January 2026- June 2026), complete disposal of 30 years and 20-30 years old cases is envisaged in the states of Bihar, focus shall be on final disposal of any remaining cases over 30 years and 20-30 years that could not be disposed of in the earlier phases, to bring down the number to zero.

Reference: Phase IV, Phase V of Action Plan for Arrears Reduction in District Judiciary

 

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhyan passed a 3-page long order dated July 24, 2025, wherein it set aside the 3-page long order dated September 12, 2024 by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court who had rejected the bail prayer.

The appellant's counsel contended that this was a case based on circumstantial evidence. Even the cause of death as per the autopsy report was not clear. He pointed out that it has been admitted that the body was found in river water, therefore, possibility of death on account of drowning cannot be ruled out given the fact that the autopsy report showed that lungs were found filled with water. It was submitted that the appellant has suffered incarceration of over a period exceeding one year and there was no likelihood that the appellant would misuse the liberty of bail during the course of trial. The counsel for the State could not dispute that as per the autopsy report, the cause of death is not ascertainable. 

Supreme Court's order reads:"6. Having regard to the facts of the case as also the contents of the autopsy report brought on record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we are of the view that the appellant has made out a case for release on bail during pendency of the trial on such terms and conditions as the trial court may deem fit to impose. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order rejecting the bail prayer is set aside." It ordered that the appellant be released on bail.

Patna High Court had heard an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated April 23, 2024 and modification order dated June 12, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Special Case No. 392 of 2023 which arose out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 dated August 23, 2023 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 364, 365, 506, 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

As per the prosecution case, It is alleged that the informant's grandson along with one Ganesh Kumar went to take bath in the Ganga River and she made suspicion that the appellant and the co-accused persons kidnapped her grandson with intent to kill and Pawan Kumar escaped.

The counsel for the appellant had submitted before the High Court that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to land dispute. He submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. He also submitted that no specific caste name was called by the appellant hence no case was made out under section of the SC/ST Act. There is nothing except suspicion. It was also alleged that the said occurrence took place at 7:30 AM on 23.08.2023 and the postmortem of deceased commenced on March 24, 2023 at 8:00 PM in which no ante-mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased. The dead body was decomposed and rigor mortis was absent which indicated that the death of the deceased had taken place much before the alleged time of occurrence. The appellant had three criminal antecedents. The appellant was in custody since February 16, 2024.  The counsel for the informant and the Special Public Prosecutor for the State vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail petition of the appellant. It was stated that the eyewitness Pawan Kumar had made specific allegation against the petitioner and the co-accused persons. It was further stated that the accused persons were pressurizing the deceased to withdraw the case bearing Salimpur P.S. Case No. 166 of 2023 dated July 25, 2023 which was filed by the deceased against the co-accused persons and as the deceased did not compromise, he was brutally assaulted and thrown in the river.

In Rahul Kumar@ Rikesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Justice Chandra Prakash Singh's order concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as the specific and heinous nature of allegation against the appellant, I am not inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 23.04.2024 and modification order dated 12.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge SC/ST (PoA) Act, Patna in Serial Case No. 317 of 2023, Spl. Case No. 392 of 2023 arising out of Salimpur P.S. Case No. 187 of 2023 and accordingly, the prayer for bail of the appellant is rejected." The respondent no. 2 was Bachchi Devi.  

It is noteworthy that although Justice Singh's order rejecting bail has been set aside, the Supreme Court has recorded in its order that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.  

Amid vacancy of 17 judges, Justice Sudhir Singh rejoins Patna High Court as second seniormost judge

Justice Sudhir Singh is back as the second seniormost judge of the Patna High Court. In November 2023, he was transferred from Patna High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court following the recommendation by the Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice Surya Kant. Justice Singh will retire on December 10, 2027. 

Reversing the recommendation of the previous Collegium, the current Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari and B.V. Nagarathna in its meeting held on May 26, 2025 recommended repatriation of Justice Singh to the parent High Court. These recommendations are made keeping in mind  the idea of 'better administration of justice'. 

Pursuant to the recommendation of the Collegium, a notification dated July 14, 2025 was issued by the Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India in this regard. In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India  transferred Justice Singh Judge Punjab and Haryana High Court to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.

Notably, Supreme Court Collegium comprising of Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice Surya Kant had reiterated its recommendation to transfer him to Punjab and Haryana High Court. The resolution of the Collegium was reiterated on August 11, 2023 keeping in mind  the idea of 'better administration of justice'.

The Collegium had reiterated its recommendation dated August, 2023 after considering the representation of Justice Singh and after consultation with the senior judges of the Patna High Court. Justice Singh was transferred during the tenure of Justice Krishnan Vinod Chandran, the 44th Chief Justice of Patna High Court. Justice Chandran is currently a judge of the Supreme Court since January 16, 2025. He is going to retire on April 24, 2028. 

Subsequent to that Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India had issued a notification dated October 18, 2023 to transfer Justice Singh, Judge of the Patna High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 

Justice Singh was elevated from the bar to be an additional judge of the Patna High Court on April 15, 2015 and was made a permanent judge on April 20, 2016. 

The High Court's approved judge strength is 53 but it is currently functioning only with 36 judges. As on November 30, 2022, the High Court was working with 34 judges. As of July 2025, the Court is functioning without its 17 judges. 

Kiran Rijiju, Union Minister of Law and Justice has informed Rajya Sabha that "Filling up of vacancies in the High Courts is a continuous, integrated and collaborative process between the Executive and the Judiciary. It requires consultation and approval from various constitutional authorities both at state and central level. While every effort is made to fill up the existing vacancies expeditiously, vacancies of Judges in High Courts do keep on arising on account of retirement, resignation or elevation of Judges and also due to increase in the strength of Judges." 

As per information provided by the minister in the Rajya Sabha in December 2022, the case load per judge in Patna High Court is 6631 cases, while the Case Clearance Rate (CCR) which is 114.39% in the Patna High Court. 

As of July 2025, 63,29,000 cases including 44,36,968 civil cases and 18,92,032 criminal cases are pending in the High Court due to paucity of judges.  Notably, 23% of the cases are more than 10 years old, 24% cases are 5-10 years old, 9% cases are 3-5 years old, 19% cases are 1-3 years old and 25% cases are less than 1 year old. 

The minister was replying to questions posed by Rakesh Sinha, MP in December 2022 regarding total strength of judges, number of vacancies and ime frame to fill them. The minister's reply and inaction during December 2022-July 2025 illustrates that quick delivery of justice is not a priority.  

Justice Sandeep Mehta Orders Rs 50 Lakh Compensation to Jammu & Kashmir Police Officer Who Suffered Custodial Torture

In Khursheed Ahmad Chohan vs. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 58-page long judgment dated, July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"40....the impugned judgment dated 18th September, 2023, passed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 111 of 2023 connected with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 592 of 2023, rejecting the qppellant’s prayer for transfer of investigation to the CBI, is hereby quashed and set aside."

The judgment reads:"The Director, CBI, shall forthwith direct registration of a RC in relation to the incidents of custodial violence and illegal detention of the appellant at the Joint Interrogation Centre, Kupwara during the period from 20th February, 2023 to 26th February, 2023, under relevant provisions of the penal statutes, based on the complaint filed by the appellant’s wife dated 1st March, 2023 and the medical evidence on record. The RC shall be registered within 7 days of this order.

II. The entire material collected in enquiry conducted so far, including all related documents, medical records, CCTV footage, forensic evidence, and case diary, shall be immediately handed over to the competent officer of the CBI. The Director, CBI, shall constitute a Special Investigation Team headed by an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police to investigate this matter. The police officials found responsible for the custodial torture shall be arrested forthwith and not later than a period of one month from today. The investigation shall be completed within 90 days of the date of registration of the RC.

III. The CBI shall also conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the systemic issues at the Joint Interrogation Centre, Kupwara, including examination of all CCTV systems, interrogation from all personnel present during the relevant period, forensic examination of the premises, and review of all protocols and procedures followed for detention and interrogation of suspects.

IV. FIR No. 32 of 2023, registered against the appellant under Section 309 of the IPC at Police Station Kupwara, is hereby quashed being prima facie fabricated as, in our considered view, the same was registered with mala fide intent to shield the guilty officers and prejudice the rights of the appellant.

V. A sequel to the above discussion and in order to provide some solace to the victim and his family for the barbaric acts of custodial torture leading to complete castration, we hereby direct the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir to pay compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) to the appellant (victim). The said amount shall be recoverable from the officer(s) concerned against whom a departmental proceeding shall be initiated upon conclusion of the investigation by the CBI. The CBI shall submit its status report to this Court by 10th November, 2025."

Supreme Court sets aside bail order by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar which "resulted ino travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 16-page long judgement dated July 21, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"...it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside." The judgement authored by Justice Mehta sets aside the 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 delivered by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court in Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024).  

Relying on Supreme Court's decision in Shabeen Ahmad vs.The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 which placed reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768, Justice Mehta observed:"we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration." The respondent no. 2 is Vandana Gupta.   

Vandana Gupta, had approached the High Court against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with a Mahila P.S. case of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the I.T. Act and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected.

The allegation was that Vandana Gupta, the appellant was a Superintendent of Remand Home who used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. The Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022 on Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna mentioned that "the nature of the informant/victim is quarrelsome". The appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022 before she was granted bail by Justice Pawar in January 2024.

The counter affidavit recorded that another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was submitted in the report of SP, Patna that few men used to come in Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna by covering their faces and on the permission of Vandana Gupta, the appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register. 

Justice Pawar had concluded:"Having heard learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed..." 

It emerges that Supreme Court's judgement has upheld the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna. 

Justice Mehta observed:"It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act." 

 

Supreme Court stays proceedings before Trial Court, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refused to quash FIR in a private dispute under corporate law

In Sarita Bajaj & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated July 18, 2025 staying further proceedings before the Trial Court. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court had passed a 20-page long judgement dated May 9, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....I have no other alternative but to hold that in the instant case, the F.I.R. being Kotwali P. S. Case No. 45 of 2024, dated 18th August, 2023, cannot be quashed. 32. The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. 33. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest."

Drawing on the judgement passed by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, Justice Chaudhari was "convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."  He observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

Sarita Bajaj, the Petitioner had invoked Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 at Kotwali Police Station in 2024 for the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Ajay Kumar Bajaj, Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer of Kotwali Police Station, alleging inter alia, that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He also alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, along with other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. The parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. 

The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicated that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. It was confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, Petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. On February 27, 2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. 

On February 27, 2021, on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated August 30, 2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so. On February 27, 2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on February 28, 2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a resolution, dated August 31, 2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On April 3, 2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting.

The informant had already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in 2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated February 27, 2021 were forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs. Notably, certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition were not complied with or honoured by the informant. In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which has been registered as a Title Suit of 2023. Among other allegations, the informant alleged that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant also claimed that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. 

Under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. 

Besides this, an application was filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in 2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400. 

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On November 8, 2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated December 4, 2023.

Notably, in the counter affidavit, filed by Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the Respondent No. 5, dated February 4, 2025, the High Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties falsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.. In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid.

However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. Later, Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Court, claiming that, as a Director of Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as August 2, 2021. In the application under Section 7 of IBC, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated September 20, 2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by NCLT, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to NCLAT New Delhi.

 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Khatim Reza, restores stay on proceeding of Execution Case of 1999 in Court of Subordinate Judge V, Begusarai

In Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's division bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra has passed a 2-page long order dated July 18, 2025 saying, "In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of operation of the impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2025 in First Appeal Nos.268/1999 (Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors.) & 272/1999 (Bambam Kumar & Ors. vs. Bhusan Singh & Ors.) passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna." 

In Bihar State Financial Corporation & Anr. vs. Bhushan Singh & Ors. (2025), Justice Khatim Reza of Patna High Court, upon hearing the two appeals which arose out of judgment and decree dated May 19, 1999 passed in a Title Suit of 1996 by Sub-Judge-5th, Begusarai, passed an 73-page long judgement dated March 18, 2025 vacating the stay granted vide order dated September 15, 1999 with regard to further proceeding of the Execution Case of 1999 pending in the Court of Subordinate Judge V, Begusarai.

The plaintiffs had filed the Title Suit for declaration that the intervenor/defendant did not derive any right, title, interest or have possession by virtue of auction sale dated March 18, 1996 and also that the delivery of possession was void. It was also prayed to set aside auction sale and delivery of possession with a declaration that the plaintiffs had got title and interest in the suit property, and further for declaration that defendant had no right to auction sale the property under Section 29 and 30 of the Bihar State Financial Corporation Act and also sought mandatory injunction directing the defendant Corporation to put the plaintiffs back in possession of the suit premises.

As per the case of the plaintiffs, the defendant Corporation was established under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 to promote industrialisation in the State of Bihar by establishing and developing industries and by getting the project of each industry completed and also by maintaining working capital of each industry through some financial banks. The case of the plaintiffs was that on January 5, 1982, the plaintiffs applied for sanction of Rs. 15,00,000/- loan for its Motel Industry at Begusarai. The Corporation wrongly and illegally estimated the total project of the industry at Rs. 12.50 lakhs and sanctioned a loan of Rs. 8.50 lakhs only on 29.05.1982 to the plaintiffs and according to the terms of the loan, promoter’s contribution i.e., of the plaintiffs was to be Rs. 2 lakhs. It was also contended that the plaintiffs deposited original title deeds of land and buildings on September 24, 1982 for creating equitable mortgage of the same in favour of defendant Corporation. On December 2, 1982, the partner of the plaintiffs executed document in favour of defendant Corporation. The defendant Corporation realised its mistake concerning sanction of the said loan and on July 12, 1984, sanctioned another loan amounting to Rs. 3.15 lakhs and both the loans were repayable in installments, last installment was being payable on January 1, 1993. It was also pleaded that even out of total sanctioned loan of Rs. 11.65 lakhs, Rs. 8.29 lakhs only was disbursed to the plaintiffs and about three lakhs rupees was adjusted towards alleged due of the defendants, on account of interest from the very beginning of the loan, as a result of which the total project of the plaintiffs could not be completed.

The case of the plaintiffs was that after service of notice under Section 29 and 30 of the Act, the matter was finally settled on November 6, 1990 in terms of order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6104 of 1990 by the High Court. 

Supreme Court says, "no coercive steps shall be taken as against the petitioner" after Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh refused anticipatory bail

In Meera Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan passed an order dated July 18, 2025 saying, "Till the next date of hearing, no coercive steps 1shall be taken as against the petitioner herein vis-a-vis FIR NO.1099 OF 2024 dated 21.09.2024 of the Police Station Kishanganj." The petitioner has challenged the order dated April 28, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Justice Singh's order reads:"6. Considering the fact that petitioner is owner of the seized vehicle , prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner is refused." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Section 30(a) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act. As per prosecution case, 250.500 liters of illicit liquor was recovered from the seized scorpio vehicle of which this petitioner was the registered owner. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that no incriminating material was recovered from conscious possession of the petitioner. The petitioner had no concern with the alleged recovery but he was made accused in this case only on suspicion. 

Supreme Court to hear challenge against order of suspension of sentence, bail by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad headed bench in September 2025

In ABC vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan has notified September 12, 2025 as the date for hearing the challenge against the 7-page long order dated November 20, 2024 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ashok Kumar Pandey in Ricky Kumar @ Rikki Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024). The respondent no. 2 before the High Court was the unnamed victim from Panchsil Nagar, Ward No.4, Barh, Patna. On May 13, 2025, the respondent No.2 had sought time to file counter affidavit in the Supreme Court. By way of last opportunity, one week’s time was granted to file counter affidavit. The respondent no, 2 is Ricky Kumar @ Rikki Kumar. Supreme Court order reads:"Not to be deleted from the notified date i.e. 12.09.2025."

Notably, the High Court's order records that by order dated September 19, 2024, notice was issued upon the respondent no.2 in the High Court and State was given an opportunity to file show-cause but neither any show-cause was filed on behalf of the State nor any prayer for adjournment was made and no one appeared on behalf of respondent no.2, the victim. The counsel of Ricky Kumar @ Rikki Kumar, the appellant had prayed for suspension of his sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal because he had been in incarceration for more than three years and his case was not likely to be heard in near future. The appellant was convicted by judgment dated April 27, 2024 and sentence order dated April 30, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge (POCSO Act), Patna in Special (POCSO) case of 2021 for the offence under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. He was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Justice Prasad concluded:"....we are of the view that in this case, the learned trial court has determined the age of the victim on the basis of school living certificate of the second school of the victim girl which is not in terms of the scheme of the Juvenile Justice Act, moreover, the victim girl has herself stated about the circumstances under which she was being beaten by her mother and brother and she has also stated that she had left her house on her own and had gone to Bakhtiyarpur from where she had gone to Hyderabad, the allegation of commission of rape is being made after more than a month of leaving of her house, she had never made this complaint to anyone, to any authority either at Hyderabad or at any other place and the Medical report of the Doctor (PW-5) is not corroborating the allegation of sexual intercourse, in these circumstances, this Court directs suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail during pendency of the appeal". 

Justice Vipul Manubhai Pancholi to take oath as Chief Justice of Patna High Court

The notification dated July 14, 2025 signed by Jaganrntth Srinivasan, Joint Secretary, Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India reads:"In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 217 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Vipul Manubhai Pancholi, Judge, Patna High Court, to be Chief Justice of the Patna High Court with effect from the date he assumes charge of his office." The notification is addressed to The Manager, Government of India Press, New Delhi. Justice Pancholi has a Masters in Law. He had entered the Bar in September 1991 and started practice as an advocate at Gujarat High Court. He was elevated as Additional Judge, Gujarat High Court on October 1, 2014 and confirmed as permanent Judge on June 10, 2016. He was transferred to Patna High Court and took oath as Judge, Patna High Court on July 24, 2023. He will retire on May 27, 2030. His date of birth is May 28, 1968.

On the first day at the Patna High Court, Justice Pancholi (who is all set take oath as the Chief Justice of the High Court), was part of the Division Bench headed by Justice Ashutosh Kumar (who is all set take oath as the Chief Justice of the Guwahati High Court) which pronounced their 19-page long judgement in Rupchand Kewat vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2023) wherein it set aside the judgement and order of the  2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hilsa at Nalanda, which had convicted the appellants under Section 304(B)/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offences under Sections 304(B) and 201/34 of the I.P.C. respectively along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar.

As part of the Division Bench of the High Court, Justice Pancholi authored his first judgement four days after joining the High Court in Shankar Yadav & Ors. vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) and Jagdeo Yadav  vs. The State Of Bihar (2023) wherein he upheld the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rosera, Samastipur in a Sessions Trial in a case which arose in 2012. The Trial Court had convicted the appellants/accused person from Muzaffarpur for the offences punishable under Sections-302 read with 149, 148 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellants/accused are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/-for the offences punishable under Sections-302/149 of the Indian Penal Code. In his 13-page long judgement dated July 28, 2023, Justice Pancholi observed that the Trial Court did not commit any error while passing the impugned order.  

In the penultimate of para of the judgement, he observed:" 19. We have also gone through the other documentary evidence, including the Panchnama of the place of incident. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence produced before the concerned Trial Court and we are of the view that all the eye-witnesses have specifically stated about the role played by each of the appellants/accused. They have supported the case of the prosecution. The version given by the eye-witnesses is fully supported by the medical evidence and, therefore, we are of the view that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellants/accused beyond reasonable doubt. Merely because there are certain minor contradictions in the depositions given by the prosecution witnesses, their version cannot be discarded and the same is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Thus, when the version given by the eye-witnesses is fully supported by the medical evidence, we are not impressed by the submission canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants that at the place of occurrence blood-stains were not found. 

Justice Pancholi concluded: "20. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while passing the impugned order and we are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned order and, therefore, no interference is required in the present appeals. 21. Accordingly, both these appeals are dismissed". 

In The State of Bihar vs. Ram Prakash Mahto & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered his 23rd 29-page long judgement dated July 1, 2025 upholding the judgment of acquittal dated September 22, 1999, rendered by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in a Sessions Trial of 1986, which arose out of Hasanpur P.S. case of 1983. The judgement authored by Justice Pancholi reads: "we are of the view that the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record. 30. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, no interference is required in the impugned judgment rendered by the Trial Court." He relied on decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. and Nikhil Chandra Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605. Against the judgment dated September 22, 1999 passed by the Trial Court by which the respondents-accused were acquitted of the charges levelled against them, the appellant/State of Bihar had filed the appeal. 

Notably, Fardbeyan of Ram Sagar Mahto was recorded on August 20, 1983 at 18:00 hrs. in Samastipur Malaout Door Hospital wherein the informant stated that on the previous day, i.e., on August 19, 1983 at 04:30 p.m., when he, Tarni Mahto, Ramlal Mahto, Hakru Mahto etc. were sitting in Dihwar Sthan, he saw that a mob of 40-50 persons armed with Bhala, Farsa, Lathi, Nalkatua, pistol etc. were going towards south direction raising slogans and abusing Kastakars. It was also stated that inthe said mob Dr. Umesh, Deo Shankar Sahu, Irfan Miyan, Guneshwar Mahto, Ram Prakash Mahto, Keshav Mahto, Dargahi Miyan, Sagar Mahto, Banarsi Das, Akbar Miyan, Ram Swaroop Mahto and Suresh Yadav were present. This mob was headed by Dr. Umesh Jha of Garpura. When the mob reached near Dihwar Sthan, Irfan Miyan said that these persons deposed in the case lodged by the C.O., kill them. At this, the  mob started attacking and Guneshwar Mahto assaulted him by means of Bhala which hit his thigh and others started assaulting by Lathis. Ram Dayal Mahto and Tarni Mahto were also assaulted. On their alarm, the village people came and encounter started between the village people and the said mob. Irfan Miyan shot fire and commotion started and members of the mob fled away. All three were brought to Gajpati Hospital by the villagers where the doctors were warned by the naxalites not to give treatment. Thereafter they were brought to Samastipur Hospital by train where their treatment is going on. The reason for the occurrence is that a few days ago, the naxalites committed a crime with C.O. Saheb and they (prosecution side) gave testimony against the naxalites. After registration of the formal FIR on the basis of the fardbeyan, the Investigating Agency started investigation. During course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the witnesses, collected the documentary evidence and thereafter filed charge-sheet against the respondents-accused. The case was exclusively triable by court of sessions and, therefore, the Magistrate committed the same to the concerned sessions court where the same was registered as Sessions Trial No. 55 of 1986. During course of trial, the prosecution had examined 13 witnesses. Three defence witnesses and three court witnesses have also been examined. Thereafter further statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code came to be recorded. 

Justice Pancholi observed:"It is required to be observed at this stage that none appears on behalf of the respondents-accused. However, as the present appeal is pending since the year 1999 and is listed for hearing since long, the same has been taken up for final disposal." He recorded:"23. We have re-appreciated the entire evidence led by the prosecution. From perusal of the evidence led by the prosecution, it transpires that one Ram Sagar Mahto gave his fardbeyan on 20.08.1983 at 18:00 hours. As per his case, the incident in question took place on 19.08.1983 at 04:30 p.m. Thus, it appears from the record that there is a delay of more than 25 hours in lodging the FIR for which the prosecution has failed to give any explanation." 

Justice Pancholi underlined that the prosecution has failed to examine Ram Sagar Mahto (informant) as prosecution witness and, therefore, the court had examined him as Court Witness (CW-1). From the deposition given by CW-1 and more particularly from his cross-examination, it was revealed that counter case has been lodged by the other side, i.e., Ram Prakash regarding killing of Bhuneshwar Mahto against the informant as well as the witnesses of the present case. The said witness had also admitted that all witnesses of the present case are accused of that case. It was also revealed that Ram Prakash lodged the FIR on the date of occurrence, i.e., on August 19, 1983 at 04:30 p.m. whereas the informant of the present case, i.e., Ram Sagar Mahto lodged the FIR on the next day. At this stage, we have also gone through the impugned judgment rendered by the Trial Court. It has been specifically observed in para-12 of the judgment that for the counter case, S.T. No.55/84 was conducted in which Tarni Mahto (PW-6) has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and his associates including both the injured have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code in the judgment pronounced on the same day. Thus, from the aforesaid evidence, it can be said that for the murder of Bhuneshwar Mahto, two separate trials were conducted and in the counter case, in fact, the informant of the present case as well as two injured witnesses and other witnesses have been convicted. 

He observed: "25. We have also gone through the deposition given by the injured witnesses and we are of the view that there are major contradictions and inconsistencies in their deposition. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the manner in which the incident took place and, in fact, they have tried to put a different story before the court. Even the prosecution has also failed to explain the injury sustained by the accused of the present case."

In Chandeshwar Das @ Baba Ji @ Baba Jee vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered his 24th 13-page long judgement dated July 2, 2025 upholding the judgment of the trial Court.  The judgement reads:"10. We are of the view that while considering the prayer under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for suspension of sentence, this Court cannot re-appreciate the entire evidence in detail and thereby tried to find out certain loopholes on the part of the prosecution. It is not open for this Court to pick up the lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution."

The appeal was filed under Section 374 (2) read with 389 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein the appellant challenged the judgment of conviction dated September 30, 2024 and order of sentence dated October 7, 2024 rendered by District and Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Samastipur in Sessions Trial of 2021, which arose out of Samastipur Town P.S. case of 2020, whereby the Trial Court had convicted the appellant for commission of the offences punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act. The trial Court sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

Justice Pancholi relied on paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgement by the Supreme Court dated April 9, 2025 in Janardan Ray vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. ETC. rendered in Cr. Appeal Nos. 1892-1893 of 2025 which arose out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 18326-18327 of 2024. In this case, the Court placed reliance upon another reported decision rendered in the case of Om Prakash Sahni Vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr., reported in (2023)6 SCC 123. 

He also relied on paragraph nos. 28 to 30 and 33 of the Supreme Court's judgement in Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases 230. 

Justice Pancholi observed:"...it can be said that it is not open for the High Court to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of prosecution at the stage of considering requests made under Section 389 of the Code. It is not open for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Code. Further, it is clear from the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in both the aforesaid cases that while considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the Court should consider all the relevant factors like the nature of accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed and the gravity of offence, the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after he has been convicted for committing serious offence of murder. Further, it is only in rare and exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension of sentence should be granted by the Appellate Court to the accused convicted for the serious offence under Section 302 of the IPC." 

The judgement reads:"14....We have considered the nature of offence and the manner in which the incident took place. From the post-mortem report, as observed hereinabove, it is revealed that total 14 bullet injuries have been sustained by the deceased. Thus, in brutal manner, the deceased was killed by the assailants." Justice Pancholi pointed out that the counsel for the appellant failed to point out that the present is an exceptional case in which this  Court has to exercise powers under Section 389 (1) of the Code. He added: "It is also required to be observed at this stage that it is specific case of the prosecution in the written objection with details that there are four FIRs registered against the appellant. The appellant has not filed any counter to the said written objection filed on behalf of the State. Thus, we have considered the antecedents of the appellant also while considering his prayer for grant of bail or for suspension of sentence. 17. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the present is not the fit case in which this Court should exercise the powers under Section 389 (1) of the Code. 18. Accordingly, the request made by the appellant for grant of bail and for suspension of sentence is rejected." 

In The State of Bihar vs. Rajeshwar Singh & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered his 25th 30-page long judgement dated July 7, 2025 concluded: "28.....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt. Further, we have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the trial court while passing the impugned judgment. We are of the view that the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. We are of the view that the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal." The case Sudarshan Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) was heard along with the The State of Bihar vs. Rajeshwar Singh & Ors. (2025). Both were decided by a common judgement but the High Court's website has committed a proofing error in referring to the judgement in the former as judgement dated July 6, 2025 (Sunday) on the home page.  

The State had preferred the appeal under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment dated November 25, 1998 passed by the court of Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Rohtas, Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 1992/92, whereby the Trial Court had acquitted all the respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. As per the fardbeyan dated November 18, 1991 given by Sudarshan Singh, given before S.H.O. of Shivsagar P.S., is that at 07:00 a.m. on November 18, 1991 the informant’s son Lalan Singh along with Janardan Singh and Rameshwar Singh had gone for answering the call of nature when some of the accused persons were standing in the lane near the door of Baij Nath Singh. When they reached near the orchard of Tileshwar Singh, accused Rajeshwar Singh, Baijnath Singh, Rajkeshwar Singh and Butai Singh instigated Kameshwar Singh to kill them upon which accused Kameshwar Singh fired on Lalan Singh from the house which hit Lalan Singh on his jaw and he fell down and died. Then Janardan Singh and Rameshwar Singh raised alarm. After they raised alarm, so many persons opened fire from the roof of Deo Nath Singh’s house out of whom he identified Deonath Singh, Shiv Kailash Raut, Surendra Raut, Vipin Raut, Suresh Raut, Ram Janam Singh, Dukhi Singh, Jairam Singh, Girish Singh firing from the roof of Deonath Singh’s house. The accused persons came out of the house of Deonath Singh and ran away towards their village. Deonath Singh also followed them. The reason behind the incident was a land dispute going on between Kameshwar Singh and Shivadhar Singh leading to Shiv Sagar P.S. case of 1991 in which charge-sheet was submitted against Kameshwar Singh and others. In that case, Babban Singh, brother of the deceased Lalan Singh, is a witness. Due to this previous enmity, accused persons have killed Lalan Singh by hatching a conspiracy.” After filing of the F.I.R., the investigating agency carried out the investigation and, during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the witnesses and collected the relevant documents and thereafter filed the charge-sheet against the accused. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The informant had projected himself as an eye-witness to the occurrence in question, which was disputed.

Justice Pancholi noted that from the deposition given by the aforesaid eye-witnesses, it transpired that there were major contradictions, improvement and inconsistencies in the story put forward by the so called eye-witnesses and the eye-witnesses are interested and related witnesses. He observed:"It is true that merely because a witness is an interested or related witness, his deposition cannot be discarded solely on the said ground. At the same time, the deposition given by such a witness is required to be scrutinized closely." He recorded that "from the medical evidence produced before the trial court, it transpires that the medical evidence does not support the version given by the eye-witnesses who are near relatives of the deceased. The story put forward by the eye-witnesses that firing took place from a roof, that too, from a height of 20-25 ft. does not inspire confidence."

In The State of Bihar vs. Dasharath Raut & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered his 26th 32-page long judgement dated July 8, 2025 concluded:"we examined the evidence led by the prosecution as well as the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the trial court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that no interference is required in the impugned judgment rendered by the trial court". He drew on decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in  para 42 in Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 and in para-22 in Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605.  It is apparent that this decision is the last judgement by Justice Pancholi before taking charge as the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court.

On July 17, 2025, Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar was given a warm farewell.  The proceedings are available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ofUBP6XYAiI

Also read: Justice Vipul Pancholi led bench dismisses Bihar Govt's appeal of 1999 against judgment of acquittal in 1987 case 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench upholds judgment of acquittal by Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya 

Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024, set aside judgment of 1991