Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar to take oath as Chief Justice of Gauhati High Court

The notification dated July 14, 2025 signed by Jaganrntth Srinivasan, Joint Secretary, Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India reads:"In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 217 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Ashutosh Kumar, Judge of the Patna High Court, to be Chief Justice of the Gauhati High Court with effect from the date he assumes charge of his office." The notification is addressed to The Manager, Government of India Press, New Delhi. He enrolled as an advocate on July 9, 1991, at Patna High Court. Justice Kumar was elevated as a judge of Patna High Court on May 15, 2014. He was transferred to Delhi High Court on January 7, 2015. During his first tenure as judge of the Patna High Court, Justice Kumar authored 52 judgements. He was repatriated again at Patna High Court on November 24, 2017. During November 24, 2017-January 13, 2024, the bench of which he was part delivered 3263 judgements. Justice Kumar was appointed as Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court. 

The notification dated January 13, 2024 for his appointment as Acting Chief Justice too was signed by Jaganrntth Srinivasan, Joint Secretary, Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India. On May 26, 2025, Supreme Court collegium led by Chief Justice of India Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai had recommended him to be appointed as chief justice of Gauhati High Court. He will retire on September 30, 2028. His date of birth is October 1, 1966. During January 13, 2024-July 14, 2025, Justice Kumar was part of the Division Bench which delivered 1129 judgements. 

 

As Acting Chief Justice, he passed his first 15-page long judgement dated January 16, 2024 in Alam Sarwar @ Md. Alam Sarwar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), wherein, he concluded "we set-aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the appellants, referred to above, and acquit them of the charges levelled against them. 42. The appeal stands allowed."  The trial court had convicted both the appellants. Alam Sarwar @ Md. Alam Sarwar (appellant No. 1), who is the son of Gulam Sarwar (appellant No. 2), were convicted under Section 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, whereas appellant No. 2 was only convicted under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C. vide judgment dated 16.08.2017 passed by the Sessions Judge, Khagaria in a Sessions Trial of 2010, which arose out of Morkahi P.S. case 2009. By order dated August 22, 2017, both the appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for six months for the offence under Section 302/34 of the I.P.C. Appellant No. 1 was also sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer R.I. for one month for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. There was no stipulation in the order as to whether the sentences as against appellant No. 1 would run concurrently or consecutively. The appellant No. 1 was married to the deceased on October 1, 1996. He along with his father (appellant No. 2) had come to the house of the deceased at 02:30 A.M. in the night intervening between July 6-7, 2009 and had shot at Nusrat Khatoon (his wife) and fled away along with his father. The deceased appears to have died immediately. While she was shot at, she was sleeping on a cot along with her mother. The mother of the deceased, namely, Madina Khatoon (P.W. 1), had lodged the F.I.R. about the occurrence at about 07:20 A.M. on 07.07.2009 at her house. She had alleged that after dinner, the entire family had gone to sleep. She heard a knock at her door at about 02:30 in the morning. She opened the gate and found the appellants. Appellant No. 1 was alleged to have being carrying a small weapon in his hand by which he fired at the deceased. The deceased was hit in her ear. On the sound of firing, all the family members were awakened. She informed all of them about the occurrence.The cause of murder as stated by P.W. 1 was the insistence of the appellants to compound the case which the deceased had lodged against appellant No. 1 in connection with the failed marriage. 

 

The second 20-page judgement dated January 16, 2024 was passed in Sheoji Tiwari & Anir. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), wherein, Justice Kumar partially allowed the appeal. The second appellant was Munna Tiwari. He observed: "Taking a lenient view, we are of the opinion that a sentence of five years to appellant no.1 would the meet the ends of justice. As far as appellant no. 2 is concerned, we deem it appropriate to saddle him with ten years of rigorous imprisonment. We say nothing regarding their entitlements to remissions." 

 

Justice Kumar relied on Supreme Court's decision in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab: 1958 SCR 1495, wherein, the  Court has declared that for the offence of murder, the prosecution must prove that the death has been caused by a bodily injury and that the injury was such as would have surely caused the death. He observed: "28. These are but purely objective investigations. The prosecution would be under an obligation to prove that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, i.e. to say that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. 29. Once these elements are proved to be present, the Court would proceed with an inquiry further and would look for evidence which would prove that the injury of the type suffered by the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 30. This inquiry also is purely objective and inferential and has got nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 31. The Courts in all such matters have to proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with utmost care and caution as that would decide whether the case would fall under Section 302 or 304 Part -I or 304 Part -II of the IPC. 32. Many petty or insignificant issues could lead to an altercation culminating in death. They could be with the usual motives of revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion or such impelling factors may not be present. How to gather intention under the latter circumstance viz. no usual impelling factor? In such cases, there may not even be any criminality. 33. It is for the Courts to be rather careful in ensuring that the cases of murder are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part -I/II of the IPC or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder are treated as murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The intention, therefore, to cause death has to be determined and gathered generally, which is dependent on a combination of many circumstances. Some of such circumstances would be:
(i) The nature of weapon used;
(ii)whether the weapon was carried by the accused or brought from home;
(iii) whether the blow was aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) what was the amount of force employed in causing such injury;
(v) whether the act was in course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free fight for all;
(vi) whether the incident occurred by chance or whether there was any premeditation;
(vii) whether there was any prior enemity or the deceased was a stranger;
(viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, what was the cause of such provocation;
(ix) whether the act committed was in a heat of passion;
(x) whether any undue advantage was taken by the offender over the person who was attacked;
(xi) whether any cruel and unusual method was adopted for killing the deceased; or
(xii) whether the deceased was dealt with a single blow or several blows etc. etc.
34. The list could go on and could never be exhaustive." 

He referred to Court's decisions in Pulichera Nagaraju vs. State of A.P (2006) 11 SCC 444; Santosh vs. State of Maharashtra (2015) 7 SCC 641 and Prasad Pradhan & Anr. vs. State of Chhatisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine Sc 81].

 

He observed:" 35. Before we test the circumstances of this case to form any specific opinion whether offence of Section 302 or 304 of the IPC is made out, it would be necessary for us to state in brief as to what is the actual import of the word ‘intention’. 36. Etymologically, the word ‘intent’ has some connection with archery and aim. This, therefore, refers to not a casual or merely possible result which could be foreseen. It connotes a definite object coupled with a dominant motive, without which the action would not have been taken. There is a world of difference between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive prompts a man to form an intention, consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and knowledge would merge into each other and mean the same thing. The intention could be presumed from the knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is very thin. However, it would be required to be perceived no matter how much of perspicaciousness would be needed, as it connotes different things." He referred to Court's decision in Anbazhagan vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857]." 

 

Drawing on the distinction between the intention and the knowledge, he added:"44. We have gathered from the circumstances and have formed an opinion that there was no intention to cause even such injury which would, in ordinary course of nature, have caused the death of the deceased. Even with the risk of repetition, we say so for the reason that there was only one blow given and there was no preparedness. The deceased was not at loggerheads with the appellants. There had been a peaceful co-existence. 45. This act was in a heat of passion, without understanding the nature and quality of the act." 

 

Justice Kumar concluded:"49. The appellants, therefore, cannot claim to have been over taken by any sudden and grave provocation for them to take the shelter of the exception to Section 300 of the IPC. 50. But we find that there is a deficit of intention to cause such bodily injury which would have caused death. However the appellant can be presumed to have the knowledge that such an exhortation and resultant assault might result in culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 51. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to convert the conviction of the appellants from one under Section 302/109 of the IPC and Section 302 of the IPC, simplictor to one under Section 304 Part-II/109 of the IPC and 304 Part-II of the IPC against the appellants respectively." 

Justice Ashutosh Kumar's tenure at Patna High Court 

On his first day as judge of the Patna High Court, Justice Ashutosh Kumar sat along with the Justice I. A. Ansari led Division Bench on May 15, 2024. Subsequently, he was part of the Division Bench led by June Navaniti Prasad Singh in June 2014. Justice Kumar wrote his first 6-page long judgement in Satya Narayan Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) setting aside the order taking cognizance dated 7th November, 2007 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khagaria. He concluded: "It is, thus, evident that the requisite guilty intention and knowledge with regard to a document having been forged is not available and therefore, even if such document was used in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C., that would not be squarely covered mischief of Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. As a result of the aforesaid discussions, the prosecution of the petitioners in the present case is meaningless. Allowing such proceeding to continue would be the abuse of the process of the Court and would create bad blood between the parties." The petitioner, a resident of Khagaria was the Bihar State Secretary of Communist Party of India (CPI). The other two petitioners were: Smt. Punita Kumari and Smt. Ashmita Kumari. The respondent no. 2 was Subhash Chandra, a resident of Khagaria. 

The case had arisen out of a P.S. case of 2003. The petition was filed by the petitioners seeking quashing of the order dated November 7, 2007 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khagaria whereby cognizance was taken under Sections 471 of the Indian Penal Code.  Section 471 deals with the offence of "Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record." It reads:"Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record." Subhash Chandra, the respondent no. 2 had filed an FIR alleging that when Satya Narayan Singh, the petitioner no. 1 and his persons started creating disturbances over his land, in order to restrain them from creating disturbances, he filed an application before the S.D.M. for initiating a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. On such application, respondent 2/Opposite Party No. 2 was treated as first party whereas petitioner no. 1 appeared as second party. During the enquiry, which was undertaken by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, a document was furnished on behalf of the petitioners which according to the informant was a forged document. The petitioners are said to have made use of a document namely, sale deed executed way back in the year 1919. The petitioners claimed that the descendants of Vendee of the sale deed of 1919 executed sale deed in favour of petitioner nos. 2 and 3, who are the married daughters of petitioner no. 1. When the informant enquired from theregistry office about the genuineness of such sale deed of the year 1919, he was informed that no such sale deed was executed on that particular day and by that number. On such information having been received, the FIR was lodged against the accused persons under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. The police after investigation submitted charge sheet under various sections for which the accused persons were charged with but by the impugned order, cognizance was taken only for the offence under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment to a person who fraudulently and dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reasons to believe to be a fraudulent document. The essential ingredients of the offence, therefore, are the fraudulent or dishonest intention of the accused namely his knowledge about a particular document being forged but still using it as a genuine. He also submitted that assuming for the sake of argument that the sale deed number 230 dated 1919 was a forged and fabricated document, nonetheless that by itself would not lead to the presumption that the accused persons (petitioners) had knowledge or had reason to believe the same to be forged document. It was further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that some of the persons, who survived the Vendee of 1919 sale deed sold some portions of land to the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 by a registered sale deed in the year, 1996. It was also submitted by the petitioners that the sale deed by which petitioner nos. 2 and 3 came in possession of the land in question, was not challenged anywhere in any Court of Law. The High Court noticed that after the 144 proceeding, no title suit was filed with respect to the determination of title and possession as between the parties. However, from the records, it was apparent that the mutation in favour of petitioner nos. 2 and 3 was cancelled at the instance of Opposite Party No. 2 (informant). Such cancellation was challenged by the petitioners but such challenge could not be sustained. The land remained in possession of the informant. The counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 contended that because of forged documents having been used by the accused persons, civil proceedings as between them stood forestalled for quite sometime. He tried to show that even with respect to the Sale deed of 1996, which was being claimed by the petitioners as having been executed by the surviving descendants of the Vendee of 1919 sale deed, the petitioner had the knowledge that all such transactions were sham and documents were manufactured for the purposes of defeating the claim of Opposite Party No. 2 as also creating disturbances in the peaceful possession of Opposite Party No. 2 It appeared to the High Court that the 144 proceedings in which, forged document was alleged to have been used was already terminated. There was no title suit pending between the parties. Even the sale deed of 1996 executed in favour of petitioner nos. 2 and 3 was not challenged. It also appears that the mutation of the property in the name of petitioner nos. 2 and 3 stands cancelled and the informant-Opposite Party No. 2 is in possession of the land.

Justice Kumar had concluded that the requisite guilty intention and knowledge with regard to a document having been forged was not available. Therefore, even if such document was used in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C., that does not get covered by the mischief of Section 471 of the IPC.

In one of his last judgments in The High Court of Judicature at Patna through the Registrar General, Patna High Court vs. Sundeshwar Kumar Das & Anr. (2025), Justice Kumar led bench delivered the 9-page long judgement dated July 14, 2025 concluded:"10. Without entering into the facts of the case, which led the learned Single Judge to assume that the Judge concerned requires training, we observe that such an order could not have been passed without letting the Judicial Officer concerned put on record his version. 11. That apart, we find it to be strange that such directions have been issued in a revisional jurisdiction. If at all, the learned Single Judge was not happy with the understanding of the Judge concerned, this could have been dealt with only in the administrative side." Justice Kumar added:"12. We believe that the jurisdiction to take any action in that regard lies with the Chief Justice in his administrative capacity. 13. We have no doubt that while issuing such directions, the learned Single Judge has acted beyond the scope of revisional jurisdiction and appears to have passed orders as if he were exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

The judgment reads:"15. Since we have found such observations in the order against a Judicial Officer without affording him any opportunity of explaining his cause as also the direction to the Registrar General to be completely beyond the scope of the reach of revisional jurisdiction, we set aside such observations and direct for expunction of the relevant paragraph, i.e., paragraph 5 at page 6 (which should otherwise have been paragraph 6 in the order referred to above) and allow this appeal to the extent indicated above. 16. We clarify that such observations against the Judicial Officer concerned shall not ever percolate in his ACR or would be used for any purpose in any proceeding whatsoever. 17. We further clarify that we have not questioned the correctness of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in the revisional jurisdiction, but have only expressed our dissatisfaction over the en-passant, unnecessary and adverse remarks against a Judicial Officer without affording him any opportunity of putting his version on record."

In conclusion, Justice Kumar recorded the observation of Piyush Lall, the Advocate for the appellant/the High Court of Judicature at Patna in his judgment saying, "there is complete non-application of mind by the learned Single Judge because the order which was impugned before him in the revisional jurisdiction was not even passed by the Officer against whom the comments have been passed." 

In Sundeshwar Kumar Das vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhary of the High Court had passed a 7-page long judgment dated June 26, 2025 had set aside the order dated 25th February 2023 passed by Additional District Judge-17, Rohtas at Sasaram, in Kargahar Police Station case of 2023, for the offence punishable under Sections 341/323/307/354B/504/506/34 of the IPC and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The P.S. Case was registered on the basis of a written complaint by Indrasani Devi on 28th January 2023. It was alleged in the FIR that on January 27, 2023 at about 12:00 noon, a minor boy of  Dhanaji Paswan, namely, Mallu, and other children were playing on the village road. At that time, one Abul Dafaat, son of Iqbal Mia, was proceeding through the village road. While he was going, a piece of earthen tile struck the said Abul. The boys who were playing abused Abul over the said incident; however, they were immediately intervened by Dhanaji Paswan, who asked the boys not to abuse him. Subsequently, at about 1:00 pm, when Dhanaji Paswan, wife of Upendra Paswan, Sanjay Paswan, and one Meena Kumari were grazing their goats in front of Kaliasthan, Iqbal Mia and his son Parvez Alam came to the spot and abused Paswans with filthy language and started to assault them. After some time, Sonu Mia, Ganni Mia, Salim Mia, and Muslim Mia came to the spot and severely assaulted the family members of the Paswan family and almost disrobed them. They were shouting for help. Thereafter, all the accused persons severely assaulted the victims, as a result of which they sustained severe injuries on their person. They were brought initially brought to the primary health center, from where they were referred to Sasaram District Hospital, where they were treated. On February 25, 2023, FIR-named accused Iqbal Mia was brought under arrest. Iqbal Mia was arrested by the investigating officer (I.O.) on February 24, 2023. 
 

After his production before the Special Judge, he had passed an order. The I.O. of the case, as petitioner, had challenged the legality, validity, and propriety of the order dated February 25, 2023. Justice Chaudhary had heard the petitioner's counsel and the Advocate General,  State of Bihar but could not understand the purported meaning of the order. He observed:"It is needless to say  that if an accused is brought under arrest, the primary  duty of the Magistrate or the Special Judge is to take the accused into custody. Subsequently,he is at liberty to  offer him bail if he is concerned with the bailable  offence. Alternatively, if he is concerned in non-bailable offence, he will be remanded to JC unless no bail petition is filed praying for bail of the accused. If the bail petition is filed, it is the duty of the learned Judge to dispose of the bail petition in accordance with the law and pass the necessary order. 4. In the instant case, the accused was not taken to custody though he was arrested for committing non-bailable offence under Section 307 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The accused was not then remanded to JC. On the other hand, the accused was straightaway directed to leave the court by the  learned trial judge. This direction is unheard of under  the provision of the CrPC." He recorded;"Advocate General frankly submits that the investigating officer ought to have served a notice under Section 41A of the CrPC,in view of the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar...." 

 

The judgement by Justice Chaudhary reads:"Failure on the part of the investigating officer to comply with the provision of section 41A of the CrPC might be a ground for releasing the accused on bail with appropriate direction to meet the I.O. for interrogation, but without passing any order, an accused when produced before the court of law cannot be held to leave the Court in the manner in which it was done. I am constrained to note that the learned Additional District Judge 17th, Rohtas at Sasaram, is not aware about the Chapter XI and Chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is high time that the concerned officer be directed to take training at the Bihar Judicial Academy with regard to the provisions of investigation by police, Magistrates/Special Judges’ power during investigation, and provisions relating to bail. The High Court Administration is requested to direct the concerned judicial officer to take training on the above subjects at the Bihar Judicial Academy. The copy of the order be sent to the Registrar General, The High Court of Judicature at Patna, for information and compliance. In the meantime, criminal powers be withdrawn from the concerned judicial officer. 6. Accordingly, the order dated 25th February 2023 is set aside."

In The High Court of Judicature at Patna through the Registrar (2025), Justice Kumar led bench delivered the 9-page long judgement dated July 14, 2025 concluded:"we allow this appeal to the extent of expunging all adverse remarks against the Judicial Officer, who did not have any opportunity to place his case before the learned Court as well as the direction to the Registrar General for stripping the Judge of his judicial powers. 20. We further clarify that such observations against the Judicial Officer concerned shall not ever percolate in his ACR or would be used for any purpose in any proceeding whatsoever. 21. It is made clear that we have not questioned the correctness of the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in dismissing the revision petition on technical grounds, but have only expressed our dissatisfaction over the en-passant, unnecessary and adverse remarks against a Judicial Officer without affording him any opportunity. 22. The appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated above."

Justice Kumar observed:"....an Officer was castigated who was not the author of such an order of cancellation of bail of the accused persons. Without verifying these facts, caustic observations were made by the learned Single Judge against a Judicial Officer by his name and designation. 16. We find this to be absolutely unmerited, undeserved and not worth being retained in the order. 17. That apart, we find that this power is to be exercised in the administrative capacity by the Chief Justice and not a Judge acting in the revisional jurisdiction."

In the case at hand, some of the accused persons were granted bail in Kishanganj SC/ST P.S. Case of 2019 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 420/406/409/341/323/504/506/34 of the IPC; Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments. Act, 1881 and Section 3(1)(e)(R)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 on certain conditions. The accused persons/the petitioners before the Single Judge were directed to deposit the amount in question within a stipulated time. An amount of Rs. 90,000/ was deposited by the accused persons/the petitioners vide a cheque, which was never honoured. The bail order was cancelled; against which, a revision was filed by the accused persons before the Single Judge. The Single Judge dismissed the revision petition holding that any order passed by the Special Judge under the SC/ST Act was appealable under Section 14(A) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and thus no revision was maintainable.