Supreme Court issues notice to Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food Safety Standards Authority of India, CAG

In Dr. Aniruddha Narayan Malpani vs. Union of India & Ors., Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta has passed an order dated May 27 2026, whereby, it issued notice to Union of India and the Food Safety Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India and Union Ministry of Consumer Affairs, returnable within four weeks. The case was filed on May 13 registered on May 21 and verfied on May 25, 2026. 

The petition alleges that the existing penal provisions under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 is ineffective in deterring large food business operators from violating food safety standards, because the prescribed monetary fines are not proportionate to the commercial turnover of such entities. The petition seeks judicial directions for a revised enforcement architecture that incorporates turnover‑based penalties and other systemic improvements.

Notably, Section 97 of the Act has repealed the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Fruit Products Order, 1955, the Meat Food Products Order, 1973, the Vegetable Oil Products (Control) Order, 1947, the Edible Oils Packaging (Regulation) Order, 1998, the Solvent Extracted Oil, De oiled Meal, and Edible Flour (Control) Order, 1967, the Milk and Milk Products Order, 1992 and any other order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 relating to food.

The key issue raised by the writ petition is about the inadequacy of the penal provisions in Chapter IX of the 2006 Act, specifically Sections 49, 51 and 52. 

The petitioner has submitted that the statutory ceiling of Rs 5 lakh for sub‑standard food (Section 51) and Rs 3 lakh for misbranding (Section 52) is grossly insufficient to serve as a deterrent for large corporations whose annual turnovers may run into billions of rupees. It has been submitted that the fixed caps creates a “cost of doing business” rather than a punitive measure, thereby undermining the deterrent purpose envisioned by the legislature. It relies on the Court’s  decision in Centre for Public Interest Litigation vs. Union of India 2013 (16) SCC 279, wherein, it was held that consumption of hazardous food directly threatens Article 21 of the Constitution of India and directed the establishment of an effective food‑safety surveillance system. 

On October 22, 2013, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K. S. Radhakrishnan and Dpak Misra had concluded:"23. Enjoyment of life and its attainment, including right to life and human dignity encompasses, within its ambit availability of articles of food, without insecticides or pesticides residues, veterinary drugs residues, antibiotic residues, solvent residues, etc. But the fact remains, many of the food articles like rice, vegetables, meat, fish, milk, fruits available in the market contain insecticides or pesticides residues, beyond the tolerable limits, causing serious health hazards. We notice, fruit based soft drinks available in various fruit stalls, contain such pesticides residues in alarming proportion, but no attention is made to examine its contents. Children and infants are uniquely susceptible to the effects of pesticides because of their physiological immaturity and greater exposure to soft drinks, fruit based or otherwise. 24. We, therefore, direct the Food and Safety Standards Authority of India, to gear up their resources with their counterparts in all the States and Union Territories and conduct periodical inspections and monitoring of major fruits and vegetable markets, so as to ascertain whether they conform to such standards set by the Act and the Rules." The judgement was authored by Justice Radhakrishnan. 

The current petition points out systemic failures within the FSSAI. It cites CAG's performance audit report of 2017 which reported a 47 percent recovery rate for imposed penalties and chronic pendency of adjudication proceedings. It refers to data presented to the Rajya Sabha on March 13, 2026, indicating that only 2,997 Food Safety Officers were in post against a sanctioned strength of 4,208. It draws attention towards paucity of laboratory capacity. Many state‑level labs lack the infrastructure to test for pesticides, heavy metals, and microbiological contaminants, leading to incomplete testing of food samples.

It seeks introduction of turnover‑linked penalties that scale with the financial capacity of the offending entity; enhancement of the regulatory monitoring framework; augmentation of laboratory infrastructure; recruitment of additional Food Safety Officers; and greater public disclosure of violations. 

The petition also seeks direction from the Court for framing of rules that provide a rational connection between the severity of the violation, the economic gain and the penalty imposed.

Are Gram Kutcheharies functioning in every Gram Panchayat under Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006 constitutional?

Is the elected village judiciary keeping record of its decisions?

Speaking at the State-Level Consultation Meeting on Strengthening Accessible and Hassle-Free Justice through Gram Kachahari on May 30, 2026, Dr. Gopal Krishna, Advocate, Patna High Court commented on the recommendations to strengthen the village court and village court system. Besides public awareness campaign regarding Gram Kachaharis, their powers, scope and judicial process, there should be an effort to make the office bearers aware about social, economic and political justice, constitutional morality, constitutionalism and the Constitution of India. 

Dr. Krishna pointed out that there are no Gram Nyayalayas functioning in the State of Bihar. The State has a system of Gram Kutcheharies, as the court of first resort, functioning in every Gram Panchayat, established under the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006, to adjudicate on local issues and provide legal redressal. These Gram Kutcheharies are democratically elected judicial bodies, presided over by the elected Sarpanch who is assisted by Panchayat Sachiva and Nyay Mitra.

Dr. Krishna endorsed the recommendation that Gram Kachaharis should be made fully functional legally, administratively and technically. But he pointed out that there should be coordination between the office bearers of the Gram Kachaharis and the courts to ensure that the police and administration complies with their decisions. He agree with the recommendation that the cases under jurisdiction of the Gram Kachaharis should be compulsorily transferred to them instead of being settled directly at the police station level. Guidelines in this regard should be issued in every police station and it should be monitored regularly. This requires separate administrative and technical arrangements. At present they are not receiving adequate resources and support. 4. Personnel should be appointed for notice serving and judicial process. Like before, Chowkidar, Dalpati or other personnel should be employed under the Gram Kachaharis so that notices can be served, information given to the parties and other judicial processes can be conducted effectively. 

The advocates have been demanding Advocates Protection Act for long. Now security and respect of judicial officers of Gram Kachaharis too should be demanded. 

Dr. Krishna observed that there should be a system for regular review and monitoring of the Gram Kachaharis by the High Court because if their review is under district administration and the state government, it will be contrary to Article 50 of the Constitution of India. Article 50 reads: "Separation of judiciary from executive- The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State." Unless the separation is ensured, office bearers of Gram Kachaharis cannot exercise their constitutional rights. As to the recommendation regarding whether or not Sarpanch and Panch who are also elected representatives of local self-government, also be given the right to vote in the Legislative Council elections like the Mukhiya and ward members will require careful consideration because the office bearers of Gram Kachaharis are acting as judicial officers as well. There can be no disagreement with regard to alternative dispute resolution system, mediation and community reconciliation centres  at the village level so that justice can become accessible and less expensive.

Dr. Krishna endorsed the recommendation regarding compulsory registration of all cases and recording of judicial proceedings. It should be made mandatory to register the disputes settled at the village level in the Gram Kachahari Register, so that the judicial proceedings can be properly recorded and the actual role of the Gram Kachari can be seen in the government statistics. For Gram Kachaharis to be deemed a credible judicial institution, they must function as a court of record. They must use their decisions as precedents and they too must draw on the decisions of the higher courts with rigorous referencing. These aspects cannot be set right unless there is regular judicial training for the judicial officers of the Gram Kachaharis. This will require adequate budgetary allocation and financial autonomy for the Gram Kachaharis. A separate budget should be allocated to the Gram Kachharis for its regular operations besides this, Sarpanch and Panches should be provided respectable honorarium, traveling allowance and necessary financial assistance for running the office. 

With regard to participation of women representatives and the tendency of family members to conduct judicial work in place of elected women representatives, Dr. Krishna suggested that there should be complete ban on such conduct, and in the aftermath of Supreme Court's directions regarding adequate representation of women in Bar Councils and Bar Associations, there is a compelling logic to apply the same to Gram Kachaharis.   

As to the infrastructure for Gram Kachaharis, Dr. Krishna referred to the Infrastructure Bench of Patna High Court which is hearing the batch of cases seeks remedy for infrastructural deficiencies faced by the courts of all the districts, advocates and litigants, to suggest that an application may be moved before it seeking relief. This suggestion was accepted by the organisers. 

Last year, at a similar consultation at Chanakya Law University, Dr. Krishna had observed that the idea of elected judiciary can have huge political ramifications because this ends up creating judicial institutions which are majoritarian. He wondered as to who is keeping records of decisions by Gram Kachaharis, the elected village judiciary.     

It significant that there are 8,053 Gram Kachaharis in Bihar. So far 1,09,118 criminal cases and 1,30,868 civil cases have been registered with them. They have disposed of 2,25,393 complaints. At present, 14,593 cases are pending. The disposal rate is 93.91% which is better than the Case Clearance Rate (CCR)—the number of cases disposed of compared to the number instituted—for the Subordinate Courts of Bihar stands at 90.66% across the various district and sub-divisional courts

Notably, the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 came into effect from October 2, 2009  but the Act does not make establishment of Gram Nyayalayas mandatory for the State Governments. As per Section 3(1) of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, “for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a Gram Nyayalaya by this Act, the State Government, after consultation with the High Court, may, by notification, establish one or more Gram Nyayalayas for every Panchayat at intermediate level or a group of contiguous Panchayats at intermediate level in a district or where there is no Panchayat at intermediate level in any State, for a group of contiguous Gram Panchayats”. Union law, justice and parliamentary affairs minister informed the parliament that "As per information provided by the State Government of Bihar, the main reason for non-establishment of Gram Nyayalayas is the likely conflict with and infringement upon the jurisdiction of Gram Kutcheharies established under the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006. Moreover, the system of Gram Kutcheharies which is working satisfactory does not warrant the setting up of a parallel system." Gram Nyayalayas are functional in other States. It is yet to be ascertained as to whether Gram Kutcheharies or Gram Nyayalayas are constitutional? There is a need to undertake a comparative study in this regard. 

The consultation was addressed by Sarpanchs from different Gram Kachaharis and Amod Kumar Niarla, State President, Panch-Sarpanch Association of Bihar besides Prof. Satish Kumar, Yogesh Chandra Verma, senior advocate, Patna High Court, Ravindra Nath Roy, a social worker, Ram Baabu Singh, Anil Rai, educationist, Advocate Ashok, High Court, Dr Sudhir Kumar, Vijoy Kant Sinha and Ritwij.      

  

 

Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Sudhir Singh uphold orders by Justices Satyavrat Verma, Nawneet Kumar Pandey

In the first two judgements dated January 7, 2026 authored by 47th Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo as part of the Division Bench-I which included Justice Sudhir Singh, the judgments by Justices Satyavrat Verma and Nawneet Kumar Pandey have been upheld in Meera Devi Mantri vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Government of Bihar (2026) and  Saroj Kumar Rakshit @ Nanu Da @ Saroj Rakshit @ Nanu Baba vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Land and Revenue Department, Government of Bihar (2026) respectively.    

In its 6-page long judgement, the Division Bench concluded:"5. The scope of a Letters Patent Appeal is very limited and it cannot be greater that the original Writ Petition. The Appellant Court, while exercising intra-court appellate jurisdiction, cannot go beyond the pleadings, issues and materials which were placed before the learned Writ Court." 

Chief Justice Sahoo referred to the judgment passed by Supreme Court in Netai Bag vs. State of West Bengal., reported in (2000) 8 SCC 262, wherein it observed:“13. …..The appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and in this Court being in continuation of the original proceedings in the form of writ petition, cannot enlarge the scope of inquiry at this belated stage…….”

He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Devilal Modi vs. STO, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 17, wherein it observed: “9. ….. the rule of constructive res judicata which is pleaded against him in the present appeal is in a sense a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred.” 

Endorsing Justice Verma's judgement, the Division Bench concluded:"7. In view of the limited scope of interference in the Letters Patent Appeal, since we find no palpable error on the face of the records, there is no illegality in the impugned judgment and we are not accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that she had not been given any opportunity of hearing to file the counter-affidavit. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 8. Accordingly, the L.P.A. stands dismissed."

In the related matter of Meera Devi Mantri, Justice Verma had delivered a 10-page long judgement dated January 20, 2025 in Ashok Kumar Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), wherein he concluded:"17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the Court comes to a considered conclusion that the State by applying its might is disturbing the petitioners. The authorities without challenging the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 23 of 1965 are settling the Jalkars in favour of the private respondents continuously which amply demonstrates that the authorities do not have any regards for the orders passed by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction rather it gives an impression that the authorities throws the order of the Civil Court in dustbin, pleadings made at para 13 of the counter affidavit borders on contempt for the reason that the State of Bihar was a party in Title Suit No. 23 of 1965 and the judgment and decree in the said title suit was passed in the year 1973 on contest and the suit was decided in favour of the petitioners herein and the State of Bihar never challenged the said judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 23 of 1965 before any superior forum but then after 51 years a plea has been taken that the State Authorities are contemplating to file an appeal against the said judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 23 of 1965 which amply demonstrates the conduct of the respondent authorities, the less said the better it is. 18. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the parties, the Court directs the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Bhagalpur and the District Fisheries Officer-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Bhagalpur not to interfere with the private Jalkars of the petitioners till judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 23 of 1965 is in existence. 19. The writ application is disposed of with the aforesaid direction and observation." 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that ancestors of petitioners had purchased fishery rights of 2 Jalkars, namely, Kharnai Nadi and Til Juggadhar from Mr. N.M. Grant by  two registered sale deeds both dated December 19, 1944. Since then ancestors of the petitioners had physical possession of the two Jalkars. They had fishing rights through their settlees by issuing Hukumnama. After purchasing the Jalkars, the names of the ancestors of the petitioners were recorded and registered in place of N.M. Grant in the Collectorate of Bhagalpur as owners and proprietors in the Jalkar Register known as Register-D and the Jalkars. It was also submitted that after coming in force of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, Parwana for the year 1964-65 was issued in favour of Machuwa Sahyog Samiti on the premise that Jalkars in question have vested in the State of Bihar. The ancestors of petitioners filed Title Suit in 1965 in which the State of Bihar was impleaded as a defendant along with Machuwa Sahyog Samiti and others for a permanent injunction against the defendant State and Machuwa Sahyog Samiti and also for declaration that the right of fishing in the said Jalkars have not vested in the State under the provisions of the 1950 Act. The Sub-Ordinate Judge, Bhagalpur after hearing the parties vide judgment and decree dated February 16, 1973 permanently restrained the State Authorities and Machuwa Sahyog Samiti from interfering with the Jalkars. The judgment and decree in the Title Suit of 1965 attained finality in absence of any challenge and, as such, the ancestors of petitioners and petitioners after them remain in physical possession of the Jalkars and exercise their fishing right through their settlees by executing settlement and the said position continued till 1990. 

The State authorities again in 1991-92 issued Parwana in favour of the Samiti in complete disregard of the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit of 1965, compelling the petitioners to file Title Suit in1992 for a declaration that State of Bihar had no right to settle the Jalkars in favour of the Samiti and the State of Bihar and Samiti have no right to disturb and interfere with the fishing rights of the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) over the Jalkars in question. The Title Suit of 1992 was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on February 28, 2011 and the State Authorities were restrained them from interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs, thus, the judgment passed in Title Suit of 1992 reaffirmed the judgment and decree in Title Suit of 1965. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the settlees of the petitioners had also filed C.W.J.C. No. 19883 of 2021 for quashing the Parwana issued by the respondent dated November 8, 2021 for the year 2021-22 in favour of Meera Devi Mantri, Naugachia, Bhagalpur, the respondent no. 6 in complete disregard of the judgment and decree in Title Suit of 1965 and Title Suit of 1992.

The High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 19883 of 2021 had stayed the Parwana by an order dated December 15, 2021, thereafter the settlees of the petitioners started fishing in the said Jalkars but the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Naugachia, Bhagalpur, the respondent no. 4 initiated a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. and the High Court also based on the submission of the respondents vacated the order of stay dated December 15, 2021 in C.W.J.C. No. 19883 of 2021 by an order dated March 24, 2022 by Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma in Subhash Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2022) which led to looting of the entire fish of the Jalkars by the Samiti people. 

The judgement by the Division Bench implies that Justice Sharma's order has been reversed and Justice Verma's judgement has been upheld. 

During course of hearing before Justice Vema bench, it was submitted by the counsel of the petitioners that though the time of Parwana issued for the year 2021-2022 lapsed but the petitioners learnt that the District Fishery Officer-Cum-Chief Executive Officer, Bhagalpur, the respondent no. 5 had already issued Parwana for the year 2023-2024 in favour of Meera Devi, the respondent no. 6, as such, petitioners filed an application under the RTI Act seeking information about the issuance of the Parwana but no information was provided. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the authorities had no right to interfere with the Jalkars of the petitioners as Bihar Jalkar Management Act, 2006 had no application in the present case as Jalkars are privately owned Jalkars as was decided in the Title Suit of 1965. It was further submitted that the authorities were defying the judgment and decree passed in the Title Suit of 1965 and the Title Suit of 1992. This compelled the petitioners and their settlees to approach the High Court. It was submitted that notices were issued on Smt. Meea Devi, the respondent no. 6 by an order dated February 21, 2024 and the notice was been received by the husband of the respondent no. 6, as such, a jointness application was filed on April 24, 2024. Since jointness application was filed, as such, the notices were deemed to have been validly served and respondent no. 6 was represented by her lawyer.

The counsel of the petitioners pointed out that the State of Bihar never challenged the judgment and decree passed in the Title Suit of 1965 although the State of Bihar was a party. The counter affidavit by the State Authorities took a peculiar stand to state that the judgment and decree in favour of the petitioners in the Title Suit of 1965 was not brought to the notice of the State, as such, the State is contemplating to challenge the same and against the judgment and decree in the Title Suit of 1992 an appeal being Title Appeal No. 31 of 2021 was filed and the same was pending adjudication before the Additional District Judge, Naugachia. The case was taken up on January 15, 2025 and the State was directed to seek further instruction in the matter. 

The State Counsel submitted that he had personally talked to the Collector and after an inquiry a decision was taken at the level of the Collector to stay the settlement made in favour of Meera Devi, the respondent no. 6 for the year 2024-25. 

The petitioners' counsel submitted that this showed the might of the State and the audacity of the Collector and the District Fisheries Officer-cum-Chief Executive Officer that despite the instant writ application being pending adjudication before the High Court in which a stand was taken that the State of Bihar was permanently restrained from interfering with the private Jalkars of the petitioners in Title Suit of 1965 but still the State Authorities continuously was settling the Jalkars in favour of Meera Devi, the private respondent no. 6 and when the case was taken up on January 15, 2025 and an order was passed requiring the State Counsel to seek further instruction in the matter and based on instruction it was submitted that the settlement made in favour of respondent no. 6 for the year 2024-2025 was stayed, which amply demonstrates that the Jalkars were settled for the period 2024-2025 and the petitioners were not even aware. It was submitted that since the State did not file any appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit of 1965, as such, they cannot even touch the Jalkars of the petitioners and they should be directed not to interfere with the private rights of the petitioners over the Jalkars. The counter affidavit stating that the State was contemplating to file an appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit 1965 amply demonstrated that the State indulges in leisure litigation and does not even feel embarrassed in taking such a stand before the High Court. 

The counsel appearing on behalf of Meera Devi, the private respondent no. 6 submitted that he haf appeared in the case on January 15, 2025 and the Jalkars in dispute in the instant writ application were not the same Jalkars which finds mention in the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit  of 1965. 

This submission was vehemently rebutted by the counsel of the petitioners. It was submitted that the Jalkars are the same and there is an order passed by a competent court of civil jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. The High Court's Division Bench has vindicated Justice Verma's judgement.  

In Saroj Kumar Rakshit @ Nanu Da @ Saroj Rakshit @ Nanu Baba vs. The State of Bihar through Additional Chief Secretary, Land and Revenue Department, Government of Bihar (2026), Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey passed a 2-page long order, wherein he concluded:"The petitioner, if so advised, may raise his grievance before the Bihar Land Tribunal under Section 9 of the B.L.T. Act, 2009. If the petitioner seeks the alternative remedy within a period of four weeks, the Bihar Land Tribunal shall decide the matter on merit within a period of six months." In view of Section 9(x) of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act 2009, since the petitioner had got an alternative remedy, he was advised to approach the Tribunal. Section 9(x) of the Bihar Land Tribunal Act, 2009 reads: “9. Powers of the Tribunal.-(1) The Tribunal shall have the power to entertain any application against the final order passed by the Appropriate Authorities under the Acts/Manuals, mentioned below, within 90 days of such an order provided no other forum of appeal or revision against the order passed is provided in that Act/Manuals: (i) xx xx xx (ii) xx xx xx (x) Bihar Land Disputes Resolution Act, 2009. 7. 

Endorsing Justice Pandey's order, in its 4-page long judgement, the Division Bench led by Chief Justice Sahoo concluded:"In view of the settled position of law that when the alternative efficacious remedy is available, the Writ Court should not entertain the writ petition and in view of specific provision available, we find no illegality in the impugned order. Therefore, in view of the limited scope of this Letters Patent Appeal, we are not inclined to entertain the same. Accordingly, the Appeal stands dismissed....9. If the appellant is so advised, he can approach the learned Tribunal and if any limitation application is filed for condoning the delay, the same shall be considered by the learned Tribunal in accordance with law, taking into account that the appellant has not only approached the Writ Court but also filed this letter patent appeal."

 

 

Patna High Court delivered 13 judgements on Dec. 23, Justice Alok Kumar Sinha sets aside unsustainable orders by District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, Buxar, State Appellate Tribunal, Bihar in 2016, 2017

Patna High Court delivered 13 judgements on December 23, 2025 in Chhathu Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Bajrang Pathak vs. The State of Bihar, Rishu Ranjan vs. The Examination controller of Bihar Combined Entrance Competitive Exam Board, Madhwi Jha and Ors vs. The Patna University & Ors., Shailja Sinha vs. The Union of India, Kumari Bandana & Anr. vs. The State Of Bihar & Ors., Chandan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Indu Kumari @ Indu Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Pratima Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Madhwi Jha & Ors. vs. The Patna University & Ors., Uday Shankar Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Ishwar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and Bhola Mochi vs. Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank & Ors.

In Kumari Bandana & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Alok Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court delivered a 14-page long judgement dated December 23, 2025 wherein, he concluded:"...the impugned order dated 25.01.2016 passed by District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, Buxar in Case no. 04/2013 and order dated 24.08.2017 passed by State Appellate Tribunal, Bihar in Appeal no. 83 of 2017 cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. 32. The respondents are directed to accept the joining of both the petitioners as per the order dated 09.10.2014 passed by the District Teacher Appellate Authority, Buxar, and pursuant to their appointments, the respondents are further directed to grant all consequential benefits to which the petitioners would be legally entitled to with effect from the date of issuance of their appointment letters. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of fifteen days from the date of passing of this judgment.

The writ application was filed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Order dated 24.08.2017 passed in Appeal No. 83 of 2017 passed by the learned State Appellate Authority, Bihar, Patna whereby the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners have been rejected on baseless grounds which were never in issue without application of judicious mind. 

She had also prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of the Order dated 25.01.2016 passed by the Member, District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority, Buxar in Case No. 4 of 2013 whereby the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners have been rejected reviewing its final Order dated 09.10.2014 by which the Petitioners joining was directed to be accepted by the Respondents at the Schools in which they were appointed. She also issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondents to accept the joining of both the Petitioners as per the Orders passed by the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority, Buxar dated October 9, 2014. The petitioner further prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondents to grant/accord the consequential benefits to the Petitioners for which they are legally entitled to from the date of issuance of their appointment letters by the Competent Authority and for issuance of the writ in the nature of declaration holding that the appointment of the Petitioners were legal and there was no flaw in the procedure and further hold that the District Teachers Appointment Appellate Authority, Buxar have no jurisdiction to review its own Order available in the law.

The petitioners were appointed as Panchayat Teachers pursuant to the selection process conducted under the Bihar Panchayat Primary Teacher (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2006. The appointments were made against sanctioned and vacant posts after due process of selection, counselling and verification, as would be evident from the appointment letters annexed with the writ petition. A dispute subsequently arose with regard to the legality of the alleged appointments. The matter was taken before the District Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, Buxar, which by order dated 09.10.2014 allowed the claim of the petitioners. Thereafter, the very same District Appellate Authority, by order dated 25.01.2016, reviewed and recalled its earlier order dated 09.10.2014, holding that the earlier order suffered from error. The petitioners assailed the order dated 25.01.2016 before the State Teachers Employment Appellate Authority, Bihar, which by order dated 24.08.2017 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the District Appellate Authority. The petitioners approached the High Court by filing the writ application. 

Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi bench grants liberty to dismissed Mukhiya to file fresh petition

In Ravi Kumar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Vipul M. Pancholi and Justice Partha Sarthy delivered a 4-page long judgement dated July 24, 2025. In his 5th judgement as Chief Justice, Justice Pancholi observed:"We permit the appellant herein to withdraw the aforesaid petition. We also at the same time permit the appellant to withdraw the present appeal by granting liberty to the appellant/petitioner to challenge the aforesaid two orders passed by the concerned respondent authorities. It is further observed that as and when the fresh petition/proceeding is filed by the appellant/petitioner challenging the aforesaid orders, the same shall be examined on its own merits without being influenced by the orders passed in I.A. Nos. 1 of 2024, 2 of 2025 and 3 of 2025 in the main writ petition. 8. It is always open for the appellant/petitioner to challenge the by-election held for the post of Mukhiya, which the appellant/petitioner was holding before his removal. As and when any proceeding is taken by the appellant/petitioner, the same shall be examined on its own merits. We have not gone into the merits of the matter." Notably, on July 28, 2025, Justice Pancholi passed a 2-apge long order wherein liberty was granted "to file a fresh petition."

The Letters Patent Appeal was filed under provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court Rules challenging the 5-page long order dated July 7, 2025 passed by Single Judge in I.A. No. 03 of 2025, filed in CWJC No. 1789 of 2024, whereby Justice Alok Kumar Sinha, the Single Judge had rejected I.A. No. 03 of 2025. The appellant had filed CWJC No. 1789 of 2024 in which the appellant/petitioner had prayed for setting aside the letter dated December 11, 2023, issued under the signature of Sub Divisional Officer, Mahua, Vaishali at Hajipur, whereby and whereunder the said authority had recommended the District Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur to take action against the petitioner under Section 18 (5) of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. Petitioner has also challenged letter dated December 19, 2023, issued under the signature of District Magistrate, Vaishali at Hajipur whereby he had recommended the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur for taking action against the petitioner under the provision. The petitioner had also prayed for stay of notification dated June 9, 2025 issued by the State Election Commission for holding by-election to the post of Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat,, stay of order dated August August 7,  2024 passed by Additional Chief Secretary by which the petitioner had been removed from the post of Mukhiya, for impleading the State Election Commission, which was rejected on June 30, 2025.

The High Court did not grant any interim relief in favour of the petitioner in the main writ petition, the concerned respondent authority proceeded with the matter and ultimately Lok Prahari recommended for removal of the petitioner from the post of Mukhiya on April 13, 2024 and on the basis of the recommendation made by Lok Prahari now order dated August 7, 2024 was passed by the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj, Government of Bihar, the Respondent No. 2 whereby the appellant/original petitioner was removed from his post.

The appellant/petitioner had filed I.A.s. in the main writ petition and had tried to bring on record the subsequent development which had taken place during the pendency of the writ petition. The Single Judge had passed orders in the said Interlocutory Applications filed by the appellant/petitioner. 

Patna High Court sets aside Bihar State Election Commission's order cancelling election of Spana Devi, Mukhiya of Bijubigha, Meskaur, Nawada

In Sapna Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary/Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department (2025), Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of Patna High Court set aside the order  dated February 19, 2024 passed by the Bihar State Election Commission because it was "not sustainable in the eye of law". The  by which the election of the petitioner against the post of Mukhiya of Bijubigha in Meskaur Block in the district of Nawada has been cancelled". The judgement was delivered on March 21, 2025.

Sapna Devi, the petitioner had filed a writ petition seeking issuance of a direction, order or writ, including writ in the nature of certiorari quashing of the order dated February 19, 2024 contained in тето по. 695 passed by the State Election Commissioner, Bihar, Patna, by which her election against the post of Mukhiya of Bijubigha in Meskaur Block in the district of Nawada was cancelled in terms of the provisions contained under Section 136(1) (D) read with Section 136 (2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 while holding the petitioner to be disqualified to contest the election. She had also prayed for issuance of a direction, order or writ, including writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the concerned respondent authorities to refrain from giving effect the order dated February 19, 2024 passed by the Commissioner, State Bihar, Election Patna and allow her to continue in the capacity of Mukhiya Bijubigha in Meskaur Block in the district of Nawada following her election in the said capacity in accordance with law. She had sought issuance of a declaration holding that in terms of the provisions contained under Section 136(1) of the Bihar Panchayati Raj Act, 2006, the petitioner was duly qualified for being elected as the of the concerned Gram Panchayat and as such, she did not suffer any disqualification.

Spana Devi had resigned from the post of the Community Mobiliser on September 29, 2021 and the same was accepted by the authority on the same day and after resigning from the post of Community Mobiliser, she contested the election of Mukhiya and she was elected. Subsequently, Abdul Rashid Khan, the respondent No. 9 had filed a complaint before the State Election Commission, Bihar. After hearing the party and from perusal of the record, the State Election Commission had come to the conclusion that on the relevant date the petitioner was serving as the Community Mobiliser and as such, she was receiving payment and thus was not eligible for filing her nomination/elected as Mukhiya. The post was declared vacant under Section 136(1)(d) read with Section 136 (2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. The Commission issued direction for fresh election on the post. The High Court was informed that she had resigned from the post in question on September 29, 2021 and the same was received on the same day in the office of the concerned respondent. Her counsel submitted that the payment of Community Mobiliser which suggests that the monthly payment of the Community Mobiliser is on the basis of honorarium based
on their performance, which suggests that the Community Mobiliser is not holding a civil post and the petitioner is neither the holder of any civil post nor she is a Government Servant or any organization in which she has been appointed on the honorarium basis. 

Notably, District Project Manager under District Project Coordination Unit of BRLPS at Nawada had communicated that the Community Mobiliser is not a regular employee and Community Mobiliser are only part time staff of the village organization and even selection of the Community Mobiliser are done by the village organization. 

The fact is that the post of Community Coordinator by voluntary organization (Jeevika) under Bihar Rural
Livelihood Promotion Society which receives fund by the World Bank as well as Government of Bihar to implement welfare schemes.

It was pointed out that Section 136(1)(d) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 does not come into picture inasmuch as the payment to the petitioner was completely through Self Help contributions and not from any finance provided by the State Government or from any Government agency. 

Relying on the judgment dated May 15, 2014 passed in CWJC No. 15345 of 2013 in Veena Devi vs. The State Election Commission & Ors. (2014) wherein the communication issued by the Election Commission vide letter no. 1499 dated March 6, 2011 giving instruction to all the District Magistrate and District Election Officers (Panchayat) to hold that ‘the ASHA’ workers are not eligible to contest the Panchayat Election was interfered with.

The other respondents were State Election Commission through its Secretary. Commissioner, State Election Commission, Secretary, State Election Commission, District Magistrate, Nawada, Sub Divisional Officer, Rajaul, Nawada, District Panchayat Raj Officer, Nawada, Block Development Officer, Meskaur, Nawada, Abdul Rashid Khan, Medhkuri, Sirdalla, Nawada and Bihar Rural Livelihood Promotiion Society (BRLPS), Patna through its Chief Executive Officer. 

After undertaking a joint reading of the terms of the provisions contained under Section 136 (1) (Gha), Section 136(2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006, the order dated May 15, 2014 passed in Veena Devi vs. The State Election Commission & Ors., and office order dated February 20, 2015 of the Jeevika makes it crystal clear that Spna Devi was not holding a civil post on the date of filing of her nomination paper for the post of Mukhiya. Ignoring this fact the State Election Commission passed its order dated February 19, 2024. From the perusal of the Section 136 (1) (Gha) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006, the High Court's judgement underlined that institution receiving aid from Central or State Government or any local authority” and it appears from the office order dated February 20, 2015 of the Jeevika suggest that the Community Mobiliser is not a civil post and she was paid on the honorarium basis and the Bihar Rural Livelihood Promotion Society which receives fund from the World Bank to implement the welfare schemes. 

Patna High Court grants liberty for filing Civil Review petition to recall High Court's order in a food adulteration case

Patna High Court's bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Alok Kumar Pandey disposed of Md. Islam v. State of Bihar (2024) Miscellaneous Jurisdiction Case (MJC) No.1538 of 2022 as not maintainable but granted liberty to file Civil Review Petition for recall of High Court's order by Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar bench in a food adulteration case. The was filed on August 18, 2022 and registered on August 22, 2022. The case arose out of Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case/3332/2022 which was filed on February 22, 2022, registered on February 25, 2022 and disposed on April 25, 2022. 

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of appropriate writ/direction/order for release of the Tata LPT 2515 Model Truck bearing Registration No. NL01D3907 Chasis No. 426031GTZ128632 and ENGINE No. 60G62495487, which was seized in connection with Sahebganj P.S. Case No. 444 of 2018, Muzaffarpur for the offences punishable under sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), pending in the Court of A.D.J. -2nd cum Special Judge (Excise Act) Muzaffarpur, which was sent to the Collector cum District magistrate, Sitamarhi for its confiscation. 

The section 272 of the IPC deals with “Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale". It states that "whoever adulterates any article of food or drink, so as to make such article noxious as food or drink intending to sell such article as food or drink, or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” 

The section 273 of the IPC deals with "Sale of noxious food or drink". It reads: "whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink, any article which has been rendered or has become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food or drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both”.

The bare perusal of the Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006 demonstrates that all laws prevailing in the country related to to food, their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import, to ensure availability of safe and wholesome food for human consumption and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto was expressly and impliedly repealed. It is crystal clear that sections 272 and 273 of the IPC are repealed provisions of the IPC. Therefore, seizure for the offences punishable under sections 272 and 273 of the IPC in connection with Sahebganj P.S. Case No. 444 of 2018, Muzaffarpur is legally questionable.   

The section 89 of the Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006 gives it an overriding effect over all other food related laws. It reads: "Section— 89 “Overriding effect of this Act over all other food related laws.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.” Notably, the Parliament in its wisdom has used the word ‘all food related laws ‘to avoid ambiguity and to declare that the Special Statute would prevail when it is in conflict with any other laws relating to food. In such circumstance, although the legislature did not amend Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC, by virtue of the overriding effect of the Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006, these provisions of IPC can be considered as impliedly repealed. The use the word ‘over all other related laws’ is not superfluous. The use of the term ‘over all other related laws’ describes the intent of the Parliament to avoid conflict of laws by consolidating of food related laws into a single law having jurisdiction over the whole of India. 

It is also noteworthy that Section 97 (2) of the Food Safety and Standards Act provides that- “if there is any other law for the time being in force in any State, corresponding to this Act, the same shall upon the commencement of this Act, stand repealed and in such case, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply as if such provisions of the State law had been repealed”.  It is eminently apparent that the action of the police under sections 272 and 273 of IPC in connection with Sahebganj P.S. Case No. 444 of 2018, Muzaffarpur is unwarranted. The police not being Food Safety Officer under Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 are not empowered to investigate into the offences mentioned specially in the 2006 law.

The State had submitted before the High Court that during the pendency of this writ petition, final order of confiscation has been passed by the Confiscating Authority on November 30, 2021, for which notices were issued to the owner of the vehicle in question. The petitioner's counsel disputed this submission saying, "no notices were issued to the petitioner of the initiation of confiscation proceedings and same has been passed without any notice to him". But the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy under the Excise Act against the order passed by the Confiscating Authority. Justice S. Kumar had authored the judgement in CWJC No. 3332 of 2022.

The judgement in Miscellaneous Jurisdiction Case No.1538 of 2022 was authored by Justice Bajanthri. It reads:"the present M.J.C. is filed for modification of order dated 25.04.2022 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3332 of 2022. Petitioner in his writ petition has prayed for certain relief relating to release of the subject matter of seized vehicle with reference to order of the learned Additional District Judge-II-cum-Special Judge (Excise Act), Muzaffarpur. It is stated in the relief column “which has been sent to the learned Collector cum District Magistrate, Sitamarhi for its confiscation.” Such typographical error has been crept in petitioner’s writ petition. As long as petitioner’s writ petition is not rectified, it is not appropriate to rectify the order of the Co-ordinate Bench dated 25.04.2022 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3332 of 2022." The judgement reserved liberty to the petitioner "to file Civil Review petition to recall the order dated April 25, 2022 passed in CWJC No. 3332 of 2022."