Saturday, February 28, 2026

Supreme Court takes note of allegations "against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner" in a matrimonial case from Naugachhiya, Bhagalpur

In Amit Kumar Hari @ Amit Kumar Abhimanyu vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed a 3-page long order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, it observed:".....we notice that certain allegations have been made against some of the police officers of trying to coerce the petitioner even after the order dated 25.11.2025 passed by this Court extending the interim protection granted by the High Court to the petitioner, due to which, the petitioner has filed a complaint bearing M.P. No.264 of 2026 against those police officers before the learned CJM, Purnia. We further note that the said Court has also issued notice in the said petition. The said Court has also asked for a report from the concerned police, which is awaited. 4. Be that as it may, let the concerned Superintendent of Police applied with the aforesaid order of the learned CJM, Purnia without any delay. Thereafter, the learned CJM, Purnia shall take a call in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1-State of Bihar shall communicate the present order to the Trial Court. 6. A copy of this order be also sent to the learned CJM, Purnia." The Respondent no. 2 is Palak Kumari @ Pallawi Kumari. 

Prior to this order, the Supreme Court had passed an order dated November 25, 2025, when the parties were sent to mediation initially, there was lack of cooperation on the side of the petitioner. However, later on, he did participate, but the mediation ultimately failed. The Court went into the merits of the matter. The Court found that no case for anticipatory bail was made out. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. The order of the Court dated November 25, 2025 for continuation of the interim protection granted to the petitioner by the High Court vide the impugned order dated September 24, 2025 stands vacated. 

The case arose out of impugned final 4-page long order dated September 24, 2025 passed by Justice Purnendu Singh of the Patna High Court. The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Naugachhiya P.S. Case No. 33 of 2025 registered under Sections 85,115(2),126(2),352,3(5) of the BNS and Sections 3,4 of the DP Act. As per the allegation made in the FIR, the petitioner along with other family members had assaulted the informant due to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. 

Justice Singh had recorded and observed that "the parties have failed to settle the matrimonial dispute, the Court till last minute must strive to give opportunity to the parties to settle the dispute between the husband and wife amicably. The matrimonial dispute is not an offense against the society rather a matrimonial dispute is a private conflict between spouses and does not inherently constitute an offence against society. However, a false case can have a disastrous consequence in absence of any criminal content. The personal dispute cannot call for a criminal offence. Continuation of the proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law leading to vexatious proceeding against the petitioner."

Justice Singh drew on Supreme Court's decision in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, reported in, (2003) 4 SCC 675, in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 wherein it held as under:-
“ 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.


Dr. Krishna Nandan Singh's term as Additional Solicitor General of India ends on June 30

Dr. Krishna Nandan Singh was re-appointed Additional Solicitor General of India for Patna High Court  on July 1, 2023. He was initially appointed on July 1, 2020. He has been re-appointed for a period of three years i.e. till June 30, 2026 or until further orders, whichever is earlier.

Supreme Court Collegium approves proposals for appointment nine Advocates as Judges of Patna High Court

The Supreme Court Collegium in its meeting held on February 26, 2026 approved the proposals for appointment of the following Advocates as Judges of the Patna High Court:
(i) Md. Nadim Seraj,
(ii) Ranjan Kumar Jha,
(iii) Kumar Manish,
(iv) Sanjeev Kumar,
(v) Girijish Kumar,
(vi) Alok Kumar,
(vii) Raj Kumar,
(viii) Rana Vikram Singh, and
(ix) Vikash Kumar


Friday, February 27, 2026

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Gaya trial Court failed to ascribe reasons for imposing maximum punishment: Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Awadh Singh & Anr vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 17-page long judgement dated February 27, 2026, wherein, he observed that "trial Court had failed to ascribe any reasons for imposing the maximum punishment as permissible under the statute."  

The appeal was filed under section 374(2) read with section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.11.2003 passed by the7th Additional Session Judge, Gaya, in connection with Sessions Trial No.75 of 1999, whereby the appellants Awadh Singh and Naro Singh @ Narendra Singh (since deceased) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellant- Awadh Singh was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences, imposed upon the appellants were directed to run concurrently. Whereas, appellant- Birju Singh was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under section 325 of the I.P.C. No separate sentence was imposed upon the convicted-appellants under section 149 of the I.P.C. 

Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal, (2018) 18 SCC 535 Justice Kumar concluded:"it is abundantly clear that the trial court must impose appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate sentence upon the convict. In the present case, though the trial court had convicted the appellants but no specific, separate and cogent reasons have been assigned for imposing the maximum punishment. From the perusal of the injuries sustained on the informant, it is clear that the appellant Naro Singh @ Narendra Singh had inflicted Garasa blow to the informant causing grievous injuries. Pertinently, the aforesaid appellant has already died during the pendency of this appeal. Further, the appellant-Birju Singh had inflicted lathi blow causing simple injuries and the appellant-Awadh Singh had fired upon the informant but the same did not hit the informant. Moreover, it appears from the report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya, that both the surving appellants are in their advanced age approaching approximately 80 years and they are in a senile condition. 25. In view of the aforesaid facts and in the interest of justice, this Court deems it appropriate to sustain the judgment of conviction but modify the impugned order of sentence. Accordingly, this Court modifies the impugned order of sentence to the period already undergone by the appellants and further imposes a fine of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) each on the appellants herein, which shall be paid to the informant or his surviving legal heirs and in default of payment of fine, the appellants herein shall undergo simple imprisonment of one month." 

The judgement reads: "26. The present order shall be communicated to the concerned trial court for necessary execution. 27. The records reveal that the appellants herein are on bail, therefore, the bail bonds of the appellants shall stand cancelled after the execution of the modified sentence. The trial court is directed to ensure the recovery of the fine imposed from the appellants herein and pay the same to the informant or his surviving legal heirs. 28. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed with the modification in the impugned order of sentence, as indicated above."

The High Court drew on Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Mohan Lal, (2018) 18 SCC 535 which held as under:-
“10. Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelines that have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary. However, the courts have framed certain guidelines in the matter of imposition of sentence. A Judge has wide discretion in awarding the sentence within the statutory limits. Since in many offences only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences the minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises his discretion accordingly. There cannot, therefore, be any uniformity. However, this Court has repeatedly held that the courts will have to take into account certain principles while exercising their discretion in sentencing, such as proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the commensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness of an offence depends, apart
from other things, also upon its harmfulness. 11. This Court in Soman v. State of Kerala (2013) 11 SCC 382 observed thus: (SCC p. 393, para 27) “27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various different rationales — most prominent amongst proportionality and deterrence. 27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence standpoint. 27.3.Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence must be  commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the offence. 27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of the offence is the consequences resulting from it. 27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable. In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor."

Supreme Court recalled that the similar verdict was delivered in Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 wherein it is observed thus: (SCC p. 674, para 84) “84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances. 13. From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that the principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing the sentence. The court cannot afford to be casual while imposing the sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal are equally important in the sentencing process. The courts must see that the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system. Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance.”

Justice Kumar observed:"21. Pertinently, the informant was cultivating the land which was given to him lawfully by a competent court, as on the date of occurrence. Therefore, the very presence of the appellants at the place of occurrence with deadly weapons and having caused grievous injuries on the informant clearly establishes the ingredients of section 324 of the I.P.C. 22. In view of the above, this Court does not find any error in the impugned judgment of conviction and therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment of conviction."


Patna High Court delivered 21 judgements on Feb. 26

Patna High Court delivered 21 judgements on February 26, 2026 in Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Kashinath Mishra vs. The State of Bihar, The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Vs. Janardan Prasad Singh, Janardan Prasad Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Arun Prasad @ Arun Patel vs. The State of Bihar, Mayank Tiwari vs. The State of Bihar, Brishan Patel @ Brishin Patel vs. The State of Bihar, Rakesh Maini vs. The State of Bihar, Saurav Raj vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Nandan Prasad Sinha (R.N.P. Sinha) vs. The Union of India, Ministry of Power, Radha Krishna Dwarika Mandir Samiti vs. The State of Bihar, Sushma Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Kamlesh Paswan vs. The State of Bihar, Anand Legal Aid Forum Trust vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Dhiraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rinkoo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Govind Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Tinku Kumar vs. Bihar Nurses Registration Council, Patna, Surya Prakash vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Jahangir Alam vs. The State of Bihar, Ravi Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and Dharmraj Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar.


Thursday, February 26, 2026

Justice Sandeep Kumar passes conditional no coercive order

In Pradeep Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated February 20, 2026 wherein, he directed the petitioner to pay a maintenance amount of Rs. 25,000/- from the month of February, 2026 to the informant and the maintenance for the month of February, 2026 shall be paid to the informant before 25.02.2026 and thereafter the maintenance amount from the month of March, 2026 shall be paid to the informant every month before the 10th day of the month, as a condition of ordering that no coercive action in connection with Noorsarai P.S. Case of 2024 pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Nalanda at Biharsharif.

The counsels for the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 submitted that both the parties were ready to explore the possibility of settlement.

Justice Kumar observed:"Considering the aforesaid submissions, let this matter be referred to Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Patna High Court and both the parties are directed to be personally present in Mediation and Conciliation Centre after one week for settlement of the disputes."

The order reads:"3. List this matter after three months along with the report of the Mediation and Conciliation Centre. 4. In the meantime, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with Noorsarai P.S. Case of 2024 pending in the Court of S.D.J.M., Nalanda at Biharsharif."

Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."


Justice Ansul modifies order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in an attempt to murder case from Nawada

In Bijali Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"16. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 17. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and the Appellant is facing prosecution for last about eighteen years. Therefore, taking a holistic view to meet the ends of justice to be served upon the appellant, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

This appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated December 8, 2010 and December 14, 2010 respectively passed by Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Nawada in a case which arose out of Akbarpur P.S. Case of 2008, whereby the Trial Court had convicted the appellant and sentenced under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code with R.I. for one year, under Section 307/34 IPC with R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10,000/- (in default of payment of fine he will further go R.I. of six months) and under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs. 5,000/.

As per fardbeyan, the prosecution case is that an informant, namely, Rambalak Yadav (P.W.-6) on the night of July 7, 2008 in when he was sleeping at Verandah alongwith his son Indradeo Prasad (P.W. 1) at about 11.30. P.M. he heard a sound of crying to shoot upon which he awakened and saw in the light of lantern that his villagers Dinesh Chaudhary and Bijali Chaudhary were standing armed with pistol with intention to kill him and they opened fire twice out of which one bullet was shot at left side neck and second shot did not hit him. Thereafter, they sought for rescue and on hearing the shouting his wife, Sugiya Devi and other neigbours Sarjug Mahto, Sanjay Mahto, Rambachan Yadav and others came there and they saw the accused persons fleeing in light of torch, thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet on December 31, 2008 under Sections 447, 324, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the learned Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant framed the charges under Sections 324 and 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 

Justice Ansul observed: "12. It appears from perusal of record that altogether eight witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Indradeo Prasad, who is son of the informant has deposed that the accused persons fired indiscriminately and one bullet hit on the neck of his father and the other was misfired. P.W.-2, Ram Sugia Devi, who is the wife of the informant has stated that the accused persons had shot fire to her husband, Rambalak Yadav when he was sleeping at Verandah along with his son and he sustained injury. P.W.-3, Sanjay Yadav has stated that the accused persons have shot fire causing injury to the informant and her wife was rushing out from the house. P.W-4, Ganesh Yadav has stated that on hearing the sound of firing he went to Dalan of Rambalak Yadav where he saw gun-shot injury on his neck. P.W-5, Sanjay Mahto has stated that he had not seen the occurrence and came at the place of occurrence after hearing sound of firing and found the informant in injured condition. P.W. 6, Rambalak Yadav is the informant of the case and has supported the case as narrated in the fardbeyan. P.W. 7, Narendra Sharma who is the Doctor of the case and has stated that he was posted at Sadar Hospital, Nawadah and on 08.07.2008 at 2.10 A.M. he examined the informant, Rambalak Yadav and found 1/2 CM circular wound on the right side of the neck and injury was caused by firearm and, thereafter, he referred the informant to PMCH in serious condition. P.W. 8, Dhananjay Jha, the Investigating Officer has investigated the case and he proved the fardbeyan of the informant. 13. It also appears that there is an admitted land dispute between the parties. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version. 14. In context of evidence of P.W. 3, the presence of the wife of the informant P.W. 2 Sugiya Devi appears to be doubtful. She claimed to be eye-witness of the occurrence while P.W. 3 stated that he rushed from his house after shot fire at a distance of half kilometer away and he saw the wife of the informant rushing towards the place of occurrence. 15. There is also no clarity as to who fired upon the injured the injured exactly." 


Conviction under Section 306 IPC impermissible, in absence of proof of suicide, abetment within meaning of Sections 306, 107

In Ajay Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhary and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 20-page long judgment dated February 25, 2026 wherein, it concluded:"...there is no reliable evidence on record to establish that the deceased committed suicide or that the appellant abetted the commission of suicide. In absence of proof of suicide and abetment within the meaning of Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code, conviction under Section 306 IPC would also be impermissible in law. 80. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt. The prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally caused disappearance of evidence with the object of screening himself from legal punishment. The conviction under Section 201 IPC therefore cannot be sustained."

It added: "81. In view of the discussions and findings recorded. 82. The conviction of the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside. 83. The conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code are also set aside .84. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges. 85.If the appellant is in custody, he shall be released forthwith, unless required in any other case. 86. If on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged."


Law is settled that if an order has been passed without taking note of relevant submissions, liberty is always to approach same Court

In The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs. Jyoti Kumar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice (Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha delivered a 8-page long judgement dated February 9, 2026, wherein, it observed:"5. The law is well settled that if an order has been passed without taking note of the relevant submissions of the parties, the liberty is always to approach the same Court. Also if any wrong noting has been made, it is open to the parties to approach the same Court while the matter is still fresh in its mind. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the petitioners which is stated to have been placed but not considered by the learned Single Judge may be agitated in a civil review petition or by taking such other recourse as may be available in law. Liberty is accordingly granted to the appellants to seek appropriate remedy available in law." 

The Letters Patent Appeal was filed by the State of Bihar and others challenging the order dated January 17, 2025 passed by the Single Judge in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 8049 of 2023. There were twenty three petitioners in the said writ petition. They had prayed for issuance of a writ/writs in the nature of certiorari to set aside an order dated December 22, 2022 issued by Director, Land Records and Survey, Revenue and Land Reform Department, Bihar Government (Respondent No 4) by which he has been pleased to hold that certificates of Diploma in Civil Engineering produced by the petitioners are forged one and their appointments on the posts of Special Survey Amin has been further cancelled. They prayed also for holding that Certificates of Diploma in Civil Engineering obtained by petitioners as genuine and bona fide. 

After issuance of notice, respondent no. 5, Dr. Momita Goswami, the Registrar of C.M.J University, filed
counter affidavit, supplementary counter affidavit, and second supplementary counter affidavit. The Single Judge in his judgment and order dated June 17, 2025, was pleased to hold as follows:-
“5. On perusal of the pleadings, the
supplementary affidavit dated 23.11.2024 of respondent No 5 and the documents annexed therein, it is clear that on the basis of an FIR registered against Respondent No 5, the State of Meghalaya vide its order dated 31.03.2014 passed the order of dissolution of the CMG University
(Respondent No 5) which has been challenged by the
University before the Meghalaya High Court and a
learned Single Judge of the Meghalaya High Court in
Writ Petition No 177 of 2014, on ground of non-
compliance of principles of natural justice, set aside the
order dated 31.03.2014 vide its judgment dated
16.07.2015 (Annexure F). The above order has been
challenged by the State of Meghalaya by filing Writ
Appeal No 14 of 2017 which was decided on 06.05.2021
and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated
16.07.2015 has been set aside and the matter was
remitted back to the learned Single Judge for
adjudication on merit. Respondent No 5 approached the
Supreme Court challenging the order dated 06.05.2021
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Meghalaya and vide order dated 01.06.2021, Hon’ble the
Supreme Court directed the parties to maintain status quo
as to the functioning of the University in SLP (C) No
7081 of 2021. A categorical stand has been taken by
Respondent No 5 that after passing of the order dated
16.07.2015 by the learned Single Judge of the Meghalaya
High Court, the State of Meghalaya allowed the
University to function for 9 academic years without any
complaint and Respondent No 5 continuously functioned
from 2015 till date without any demur. Categorical
pleading has been taken by the University that the State
Government/UGC had allowed the University to function
smoothly from the academic year, 2015-2016 to 2023-
2024. The above stand taken by the University has not
been rebutted by the other respondents in their counter
affidavit. Thus, it is quite clear that the University
(Respondent No 5) was functioning from academic year,
2015-2016 to 2023-2024.

The second supplementary counter affidavit of Respondent No 5 dated 20.01.2025 further shows that
again the University has taken the stand that the degree of the petitioners has been verified by the University and it was found that all the petitioners herein have passed
their examination in the year, 2018 which is also
mentioned in the document with the supplementary counter affidavit dated 20.01.2025.
7. As contained in the documen, it is quite clear that all the petitioners herein have passed their examination from the CMG University
(Respondent No 5) in the year, 2018, i e, prior to their
recruitment which has not been disputed by the counsel
for the other respondents, i e, the State of Bihar.
Therefore, on this ground alone, both the orders
impugned are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, both the orders impugned dated 22.12.2022 and 23.11.2023 are set aside.

The matter is remitted back to the concerned respondents to take a decision afresh in the light of the
stand taken by Respondent No 5 in this petition.
9. Needless to say that the concerned respondents will pass a reasoned order as early as possible preferably within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”
3. The grounds taken by the learned counsel for the appellants in the present Letters Patent Appeal in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15, reads as follows:-
“13. That on completion of pleadings, the
matter was heard and during hearing of the writ petition,
the copy of judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 9690 of
2024, (C.M.J. Foundation and other Versus State of
Meghalaya and others) dated 13.02.2025 was referred
before the Hon'ble Single Bench. The said appeal was
filed challenging the judgment and order dated 6th May,
2021 passed by the Division Bench of Meghalaya at
Shilong.in Writ Petition No. 14/17 whereby the
judgment and order dated 16.07.2017 passed by the
Hon'ble Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court in Writ
Petition (C) No. 177/14 was quashed and the matter was
remitted back to the Hon'ble Single Judge to take
appropriate decision regarding the validity of the order
passed by this Hon'ble Court dissolving C.M.J.
University. During hearing of the said Civil Appeal by
the said Hon'ble Supreme Court 3 issued were framed
determination and they are as follows:-
(i) Whether the appointment of Chancellor of
the C.M.J. University was made with due
adherence of the procedure as mandated by
law?
(ii) Whether the dissolution order dated
31;03.2014 was passed with due adherence to
the procedure provided under section 48 of the
C.M.J. University Act, 2009 and in compliance
of the direction issued by this Hon'ble High
Court vide order dated 13.09.2013 in Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 1967/13 titled as C.M.J.
Foundation and others Versus the State of
Meghalaya and others?
(iii) Whether the Division Bench of the Hon'ble
High Court of Meghalaya was justified in
remitting back to the Hon'ble Single Judge for
reconsideration of matter while allowing the
writ Appeal No. 14/17.
14. That after a detailed hearing, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the appointment of Chancellor
of C.M.J. University was nonest and void ab initio, the
dissolution order dated 31.03.2014 has been passed in
strict adherence to the procedural requirement of section
48 of the C.M.J. University Act, 2009. The Division
Bench of Meghalaya High Court was not justified in
remitting the matter back to the Hon'ble Single Judge for
consideration of merit and the decision of the State
Government dated 31st March, 2014 for dissolving the
C.M.J. University, Meghalaya 1st Set 1st Set was
affirmed.
15. That in spite of the above stated judgment being referred at the time of hearing of C.W.J.C. No.
8049 of 2023 the Single Judge passed the impugned judgment in contravention of the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding the dissolution of C.M.J. University to be proper and legal
and thus the Hon’ble Single Judge has committed an error.”

The appellants's counsel submitted that, even though the judgment pronounced in Civil Appeal No. 9690 of 2024 (C.M.J. Foundation and Ors vs. State of Meghalaya and Ors) was placed before the learned Single Judge, the same was not considered and therefore, the impugned order was passed remitting the matter back to the concerned respondents for taking a fresh decision in light of the stand taken by the
respondent no.5 in the writ petition. When a pertinent question was put to the learned counsel for the appellants as to whether any material was placed on record showing that the said decision referred to in paragraph nos. 13, 14 and 15 i.e. C.A. No.9690 of 2024, was placed before the Single Judge, the answer was in negative. However, he submits that the decision was placed and, if it had been taken into account, the result could have been otherwise.

The judgement was authored by Chief Justice Sahoo. He concluded: "6. It is made clear that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the case. 7. It is stated by learned counsel for the appellants that a contempt petition has already been filed by the respondents for non-compliance of the impugned order. In view of such submission, it is open to the appellants to take appropriate measure in its interest, as per law. 8. With the aforesaid observation, the LPA stands disposed of. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of."

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Dr. Anshuman set aside judgement, order in rape, murder case

In Shatrughan Ram @ Shatrudhan Das Vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman delivered a 16-page long judgement, wherein, it set aside the judgement of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 2nd Court at Patna on February 16, 2019, whereby and whereunder, the Trial Judge had held the appellant guilty for committing offence under Sections 376/302 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for life till the end of his natural life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It directed the appellant to be released at once.

On the basis of an oral statement made by one Jawahar Kumar Ray of village Mohaddipur, which was reduced to writing by Sub-Inspector, K. N. Paswan on December 17, 2007, S.K. Puri P.S Case of 2007 for the offence punishable under Sections 376 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered. It was alleged by the informant that at the relevant point when the alleged incident took place, he used to reside at New Punaichak, Jhuggi-Jhopadpatti by the side of the railway line within Police Station-S. K. Puri. On December 16, 2007 in the evening, the wife of the informant, namely, Kachan Devi sent her daughter, since deceased, aged about 8 years, to collect waste papers. At that place, the appellant was also present. His child also went to collect papers. When the informant returned at about 08:30 P.M. on December 16, 2006, after pulling rickshaw, he did not find his minor daughter at home. He and his wife conducted a search for their daughter at nearby area and asked the local people about her whereabouts but the local people failed to give any reply to them. Then they suspected that his daughter might be in the room of the appellant. He went to the house of the appellant to find out his daughter but found that the house 3/16 and the entrance gate of the appellant were locked and dark inside. 

On the following morning at about 07:00. A.M., the informant again conducted search of his daughter. 

During search, he peeped through the closed door of the room of the appellant and found that her daughter lying dead inside the room of the appellant. With the help of local people, the lock of the entrance gate and the door of the room were broken. The informant and others saw the dead body of her daughter having injuries and scratch marks all over her body. Her undergarment and pant were found open and blood was found near her buttock. He suspected that the appellant who was also residing at the relevant point of time at New Punaichak, Jhuggi-Jhopadpatti committed rape upon his daughter and thereafter murdered her by throttling.

The S.H.O., S.K. Puri, Police Station instructed S.I. K. N. Paswan to take up the investigation of the case. During investigation, he recovered the dead body of the daughter of the informant; held inquest over the dead body of the deceased at the place of occurrence; seized blood-stained earth from the place of occurrence; and one photocopy of voter identity card from the room of the appellant. He also examined available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Thereafter, he sent the dead body of the deceased for post-mortem examination to P.M.C.H. He also obtained forensic report of the seized blood- stained earth and wearing apparels of the victim.

On conclusion of investigation, he submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant under Sections 376 and 302 of the IPC before the learned C.J.M., Patna on October 29, 2011. The Sessions Judge, Patna received the case record after commitment on January 4, 2012 and transferred the case to the 10th Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Patna.

The Additional Sessions, 10th Court at Patna, received the case records and framed charge against the accused/appellant on May 9, 2012, punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. When the charge, so framed, was written over and explained to the appellant, he pleaded not guilty. Accordingly trial of the case commenced.

Justice Chaudhuri observed:"10. At the outset, we like to record that after commencement of trial, no sessions trial case can be transferred from one Trial Court to another by issuing administrative order by the learned Principle Sessions Judge, Patna. However, the said procedural wrong was committed by the learned Principle Sessions Judge by issuing memo no. 3052-3054 dated 4th of March, 2017, directing the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 10th Court at Patna to transfer the case to the 2nd Fast Track Court at Patna. 11. However, when the trial of the case was concluded by the learned 2nd Fast Track Court at Patna by passing judgement of conviction and sentence, we treat the above-mentioned anomaly as procedural irregularity and proceed with the hearing of the instant appeal.

During trial, in order to bring home the charge against the accused, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses. 

20. The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the sole ground of recovery of dead body from the house of the appellant on the basis of presumption that since the dead body of the victim girl was found in the room of the appellant, he had special knowledge about what had happened to the deceased after she left her home in the evening of 16th of December, 2007. It was held by the Trial Court that the incident that took place with the victim after she departed her home to bring waste papers was within the special knowledge of the appellant and he failed to discharge his burden as to how the deceased was ravished and subsequently murdered.

Notably, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act discusses the burden of proof on a person who has knowledge of a specific fact, such as being the last person known to have been with the victim.

Justice Chaudhary observed: "23. It is needless to say that in order to convict someone on the basis of circumstantial evidence invoking the last seen theory, the prosecution is under primary obligation to prove the circumstance beyond any shadow of doubt, the chain of which must lead to the inescapable conclusion of that person committing the crime. 24. In criminal cases, where direct evidences are hard to found, the entire case depends on the circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidences imply when all the evidences are clubbed together to form a complete chain of events in such a way that the accused may be convicted. The chain of events, so formed, must be without any reasonable doubt. Each circumstances and the evidences from which the chain is formed should be individually proved as direct evidences. The circumstantial evidence is always direct and primary which means the fact from which the existence of the fact in issue to be inferred must be proved by direct evidence. In case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances should be vested by absolute evidences and should form a complete chain to bring home the guilt of the accused without giving any alternative chance to any other hypothesis." 

He added:"25. In the instant case, there is absolutely no direct evidence against the appellant in support of the charge. Thus, the Trial Court bases its judgement of conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 26. The only circumstance appearing against the appellant is that the dead body of the victim was found in his room in the morning of 17th of December, 2007. The victim was missing from the evening of 16th of December, 2007. Nobody saw the appellant enticing the victim to his house after her departure from her own house to bring some waste papers. 27. It is unfortunate to note that the incident took place on 16th of December, 2007. The appellant was arrested and produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on the strength of warrant of arrest on 7th of August, 2011. Charge- sheet was filed on 29th of October, 2011. Charge was framed against the accused on 9th of May, 2012...."

The Court concluded: "29. After hearing the appeal, we are unfortunately note that the appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life on consideration of inadmissible evidence. The prosecution hopelessly failed to bring home the circumstances which were necessarily established beyond any shadow of doubt in order to come to a finding in support of hypothesis of guilt against the appellant. 30. This is a case where the appellant remained in custody for about 15 years though prosecution failed to produce any kind of evidence whatsoever against him during trial. However, we do not find any alternative but to lament for the unfortunate state of justice delivery system in our country and pray that timely justice shall be delivered both to the prosecution and defence in future. 31. In view of the above discussions, the instant Criminal Appeal is allowed on contest. 32. However, there shall be no order as to costs."

The transferee Court had received the record on March 10, 2017 and continued with the trial which was commenced before the 10th Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Patna. From the date of arrest/production before the Court till date, he was in custody. The Trial Court delivered the impugned judgement on February 16, 2019. 

The appeal was filed before the High Court on May 22, 2019. The appeal was admitted for hearing by a Coordinate Bench of the High Court after a lapse of six years on March 28, 2025. Thereafter, date was fixed for production of lower court records on August 1, 2025. 28. Subsequently, a Coordinate Bench passed an order for substitute service of notice upon Respondent/informant by paper publication. The Coordinate Bench vide order, dated December 19, 2025 had refused the prayer for suspension of sentence and bail. 

Monday, February 23, 2026

Supreme Court grants liberty to Jan Suraaj Party to approach High Court for seeking fresh free and fair elections for Bihar Assembly

In Jan Suraaj Party v. The Election Commission of India & Ors. W.P.(C) No. 107/2026, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi passed an order dated February 6, 2026, granting liberty to it to approach the jurisdictional High Court. The writ petition was dismissed, as withdrawn, with the aforesaid liberty. Jan Suraaj Party had moved the Court seeking fresh free and fair elections for Bihar Assembly. The petition had sought declaration of the result of Assembly Election 2025, as null and void.It had challenged the state-wide scheme for women known as Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana, wherein the Government of Bihar decided to provide financial help, through Direct Benefit Transfer, to one woman in every family by paying Rs.10,000/- to start self- employment. It had prayed for the direction in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus to declare deployment of 1.80 lakh women beneficiaries hailing from the self-help group JEEVIKA on the polling booth in both phases of polling as illegal and unfair.  

A writ petition is filed by the Party under Article 32 of the Constitution seeking the issuance of writ of issue writ of Mandamus, declaring the fresh addition of beneficiaries in the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana, and payment to them in course of election as illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to Articles 14, 21, 112, 202 and 324 of the Constitution of India. It had sought directions to the Election Commission of India to take appropriate action under Article 324 of Constitution of India and Section 123 of Representation of Peoples Act on Direct Benefit Transfer of Rs. 10,000 to 25-35 lakhs women voters during subsistence of M.C.C and in course of elections and thereafter as gratification/bribery/corrupt practices to benefit party in power in the State. 

In August 2025, the Government of Bihar, on the eve of the general assembly elections 2025, launched Mukhayamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana. The main objective was to provide financial support to one woman per family in Bihar to start a self-employment activity. The scheme stated that Rs 10,000 as the first instalment will be provided to all eligible women applicants who are members of Jeevika Self Help Groups, and further, additional assistance of Rs 2 lakh each will be provided by the government post assessment, however, after 6 months. The scheme benefits were to be given to women who were already registered with JEEVIKA; however, fresh applications for joining the self-help group were also invited. 

The petition reads: "The petitioner most respectfully submits that the then Government of Bihar resorted to corrupt practices to induce and allure the electors to vote in its favour by extending the benefit of Rs. 10,000/- each to be followed by Rs.2,00,000/- to new beneficiaries added post announcement of MCC and in course of elections; and the ECI failed miserably to put a check on such corrupt practices being adopted by the ruling party in the course of election schedule because of which it is humbly submitted that the election was vitiated as the other contestants/parties to the elections were deprived of level playing field which is a sheer violation of MCC, the Representation of People’s Act (RPA), 1951 and Articles 14 21 and 324 of the Constitution of India." 

It alleged: "It is most respectfully submitted that in course of elections and subsistence of M.C.C, new beneficiaries were added in the JEEVIKA and payments of Rs 10,000 were made to them. That the fresh addition to the DBT Scheme of estimated 25-35 lacs women voters during elections and same violates the principle of free and fair elections and principle of level playing field. The action of the State Government is an act actuated with malice to damage electoral prospects of the other parties and contenders and that the ECI failed miserably to put a check upon such corrupt practices being resorted to by the ruling government and has not followed guidelines issued by this Hon’ble Court and also its own guidelines dated 07.01.07 in compendium of Instructions Vol-III."

It also submitted that about 1.80 lac women members (beneficiaries) of the self-help group i.e JEEVIKA were deputed on polling booths as Volunteers in both phases of polling which has no basis, as JEEVIKA members (beneficiaries) are a non-government group and that most of them were beneficiaries of the DBT scheme, thus, their deputation on the polling booth can’t be called natural, fair and reasonable but were deputed for obvious reasons. 

The petition reads: "This action alone may shock the conscience of any common man to assume that such volunteers who had recently received the benefits under a Scheme, would be obviously biased in favour of the ruling Party, thereby influencing the election process and making it unfair".  It submitted "That the ECI failed to check that the instalment of DBT scheme were rolled out even on the date of proclamation of the M.C.C and announcement of election schedule in Bihar and even thereafter, during the course of election. DBT transfers were made even on days prior to polling, further, the ECI also failed to check that under the scheme in issue new beneficiaries were added during election process and the newly added beneficiaries number around 25-35 lacs (estimated) were added and paid Rs 10,000 each after proclamation of M.C.C and thereafter, which purely amounts to Bribery and thus, is a corrupt practice as envisaged under Section 123 of the R.P.A." Now if Jan Suraj approaches the High Court, it will decide the fate of the result of Assembly Election 2025. 

Also read:Patna High Court dismisses PIL on bribery of voters during recent Bihar Legislative Assembly Election

Justice Ansul quashes, sets aside judgment of conviction, order of sentence by 1st Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge Excise, Jamui, modifies order by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur

In Aneesh Manjhi vs. The State of Bihar  (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page judgement dated January 27, 2026 wherein, he quashed and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated June 30, 2021 passed1st Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge Excise, Jamui in a case of 2018. He took oath as a judge of the High Court on January 27, 2026, taking total number of working judges in the High Court to 38. The court has 53 sanctioned posts, which means that even after his joining, 15 posts still remain vacant. 

In his first judgement as judge, Justice Ansul observed:"....it appears that there is no independent witness to support the prosecution case and all the witnesses are official witnesses and the breath analyzer machine has not been produced to substantiate the charge under Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and also there is nothing on record to suggest that whether breath analyzer machine was capable to give correct report. Again no blood test of accused seems to have been conducted which is a major flaw. The procedure for search and seizure has not been followed, therefore, it creates a serious doubt and thus the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him." 

The trial court had convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 37(b) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and awarded sentence to a fine of Rs. 50,000/- and on default of payment of fine the appellant will have to suffer imprisonment for three months. The High Court noted that the appellant had already suffered prior to conviction, the same shall be adjusted against three months sentence. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted from the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from his liabilities of bail bonds and sureties.

As per fardbeyan of informant, namely, Kamlesh Kumar Singh, ASI, Malaypur Police Station, the case of the prosecution was that he had lodged a written report stating that on August 20, 2018 at about 14.30 o'clock when he along with his patrolling party proceeded he got an information on mobile that the appellant was in inebriated condition and creating nuisance in the locality. In order to verify his intoxicating condition, he was examined by breath analyzer machine and it was found that he has consumed 0.19 Ml alcohol, thereafter, on the basis of the written report the case, i.e., Malaypur P.S. Case was registered for the offences under Section 290 of the IPC and 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant took cognizance on February 28, 2019 under Section 290 IPC and Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, thereafter, the charges were framed on May 4, 2019 under Section 290 IPC and Section 37(b) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses.

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Sentencing order by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur modified  

In Jitendra Singh @ Jitendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of Patna High Court delivered a 7-page judgement dated January 27, 2026 wherein, he concluded:"13. Having carefully considered the witnesses', testimony and the medical evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the appellant's conviction. 14. However, the matter arises out of a land dispute and no previous conviction has been proved against the appellant. He has remained in custody for six years six months and is facing prosecution for last nine years and is in his 30's. Taking a holistic view, ends of justice would be saved if he is sentenced to period already undergone. Accordingly, the sentence awarded to the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence."

The appeal was preferred by the appellant for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated July 9, 2021 and July 31, 2021 respectively passed by 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bhojpur at Arrah in a case of 2019 which arose out of a P.S. Case of 2017, whereby the concerned Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs. 50,000/- only and for the offences under Section 504/34 IPC one year and six months R.I. and fine of Rs. 10,000/- only. 

The prosecution case, as per fardbeyan of informant, namely, Harendra Singh (P.W.-2) was that the appellant who was the cousin of the informant Harendra Singh came to his native village on April 24, 2017. On the same day, due to a domestic dispute, the appellant, appellant's brother namely, Krishna Singh and his mother Parvati Devi were abusing the informant at around 02:00 P.M. and when the informant and his mother stopped them from abusing, the accused suddenly came out of the room with a pistol in his hand and fired a shot at the informant, which hit him on his back and he fell down. After falling down, the accused fired another shot. Upon the informant's shouting the accused left the house with the pistol in his hand and said that whoever comes in his way will be shot. The informant's father and a villager Yogendra Singh took the injured to the police station and then to Sadar Hospital Arrah for treatment where after primary treatment by the doctor, he was referred to P.M.C.H., Patna where he was treated from April 24, 2017 to April 29, 2017. During this period no statement was recorded by any police officer. Due to this, the informant gave a written application to Arrah Mufassil on May 1, 2017. Based on the written application of the informant, Arrah Mufassil P.S. Case was registered under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307 read with 34 of the IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant and other co-accused persons namely Krishna Singh and Parvati Devi. 

After completion of investigation and on the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer of this case submitted charge-sheet dated April 30, 2018 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellant before the Trial Court. The trial court after perusal of materials collected during investigation and hearing the accused/appellant took cognizance on May 16, 2018 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, thereafter, the charges were framed on August 9, 2019 under Sections 341, 323, 504, 307 and 34 of the IPC against the appellant, which was explained to the appellant, to which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined altogether five witnesses. On the basis of evidences/circumstances which emerged during the trial, the trial court examined the appellant/accused under Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein, he completely denied the evidences during the trial and claimed his complete innocence. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced him. 

Justice Ansul observed: "11. It appears from perusal of record that altogether five witnesses have been examined during trial. P.W.-1, Sunaina Devi, who is mother of the informant has deposed that the appellant has shot two bullets which hit on the back of the informant. Thereafter, he was taken to the hospital. She has further deposed that due to partition of land in the family the present occurrence has taken place. P.W.-2, Harendra Singh, the informant of this case has supported the prosecution case as narrated above. P.W.-3, Rekha Devi has been declared hostile during trial. P.W-4, Dr. Ashok Kumar Pandey, who is the doctor and had examined the informant, has deposed that oval shaped wound injury below the neck, i.e., 0.6 cm X 0.4 cm was found on the informant. P.W-5, Sambhunath Panday, the Investigating Officer of this case has supported the case of the prosecution. 12. It also appears that there is delay of six days in lodging the FIR. The delay is sought to be explained by treatment at PMCH. It seems that neither the treatment record at PMCH nor the version provided at PMCH has been brought on record thus making the initial version unavailable. This casts shadow of doubt on the prosecution version in view of Hon'ble Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of Thulia Kali vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393." Being aggrieved with the trial court's judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant had preferred the appeal before the High Court. 
 


Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh

In Pravin Kumar Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated February 18, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "....we are of the considered view that prima facie the complaint seems to be with a flavour of civil dispute. That apart, investigation, if any, is to be done by the authorities, which would mainly revolve around the documentary evidence. As such, appellant is entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail. 7. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. Appellant is ordered to be released on anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as the jurisdictional Investigating Officer (IO) may deem fit to impose and also on the condition that appellant would appear before the jurisdictional court on all dates of hearing except when exempted for any specific reason." 

With this it reversed the 5-page long order by Justice Chandra Prakash Singh of Patna High Court who had concluded: "Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as the seriousness of allegation against the petitioners. It is not fit case for anticipatory bail of the petitioners. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is hereby rejected and the petitioners are directed to surrender before the Court below concerned within ten weeks from the date of this order and pray for regular bail, the learned Court below may consider the prayer for regular bail of the petitioners in accordance with law and on its own merits without being prejudiced by this order." 

The appellant was arraigned as an accused in FIR of 2023 for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The gist of the prosecution case was that appellant was a builder and Director of a company called City Green Infrastructure and had put up construction of apartments. One of the flats which was agreed to be sold to one of its customers, with whom the project proponent had a dispute, was not delivered the possession of the flat as agreed under the agreement and the amount paid as consideration was also not refunded; as such the issue regarding the same was pending before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority of Bihar established  under section 20 (1) of  the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. In the meanwhile, the purchaser initiated the criminal prosecution, which resulted in the FIR being registered against the appellant. 

As per the prosecution case, the petitioner no.2 (Arvind Sharma) Infrastructure along with his two partners namely Pravin Kumar (petitioner no.1) and Saurabh Kumar was developing an apartment on the land measuring 34 katha 12 dhur of Ishri Lal Yadav and Mishri Lal Yadav situated in front of Malti Kunj Apartment. It was also alleged that in the said apartment, the informant purchased flat no. 201 with parking in the ‘B’ Block in the year 2016 for total consideration of Rs. 26 lakhs, on February 23, 2018, a registered agreement was executed by the builder. On May 16, 2019, the informant paid 90% of the amount through bank and further on December 10, 2020, the informant paid Rs. 1,18,000/- as GST amount. On June 24, 2022, Rs. 1,36,800/- was paid as GST amount i.e. in total Rs. 2,54,800/- has been paid as GST. It is further alleged that the amount of Rs. 1,36,800/- was wrongly demanded by the builder which was more than the actual amount of the GST. As per the agreement, the ownership was to be transferred till September 30 2020 but till date neither the registration nor the work of the apartment has been completed and due to these acts, the informant was facing financial and mental hardship and alleged that the breach of trust was committed against him by the manager and his two partners. 

The appellant had approached the Supreme  Court for anticipatory bail because Justice Singh of the High Court did not grant him relief. 

Patna High Court detects error in sentencing order by Birendra Kumar Choubey as Additional Sessions Judge, NDPS, asks trial court to rectify its defect within one week

In Nav Kumar Ojha vs. The Union of India through the Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, Patna (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Praveen Kumar passed an order dated February 18, 2026. The order reads: "Let the certified copy of the impugned judgment be sent down to the learned trial court pointing out the defect. On receipt of the same, the learned trial court shall look into the same and send a duly corrected copy of the impugned judgment to this Court within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the communication....3. List this case on 12.03.2026 under appropriate heading." The order was authored by Justice Prasad. Dr. Gopal Krishna is the counsel for the appellant. Out of the four accused persons in the N.C.B Case No. 01 of 2021, Nav Kumar Ojha, a resident of Bokaro, Jharkhand is the third person who was convicted by Birendra Kumar Choubey, 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara, in N.D.P.S. Case No.- 06 of 2021. The four named accused persons were: 1. Shankar Yadav, 2. Pritam Lakda, 3. Bijendra Kumar Rai and 4. Nav Kumar OjhaBijendra Kumar Rai, the third accused was acquitted by the trial court.  

Nav Kumar Ojha, the appellant in question was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 20 (B)(ii)(C) and section 25 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. The appellant has preferred the appeal against the judgment of conviction dated May 9, 2023 and order of sentence dated May 17, 2023 passed by 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara. 

The Registry of the High Court has pointed out that "Year of sentence at last page of I.O is not matching with 1st page (below chart)". The year of sentence on last page of the impugned order (I.O.), the trial court's sentencing order is 2023 but the year of sentencing order on the 1st page is 2022. 

Significantly, the decision of the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII, Ara, Bhojpur did not find sufficient evidence of criminal conspiracy against the three accused persons including Nav Kumar Ojha. Therefore, he exonerated them of offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.  

Section 29 of the Act deals with "Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy" It reads:—(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence. (2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which—(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or (b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India. 

It is evident from the joint reading of the trial court's judgement and Section 29 that Nav Kumar Ojha is not involved in any criminal conspiracy. It is also crystal clear that he is neither an abettor nor a party.   

Granting benefit of doubt with regard to accusations under Section 20 (B) (ii), (C) and Sections 25 and 29 of NDPS Act, he acquitted Bijendra Kumar Rai, the main accused and released him from judicial custody. 

In the concluding sentence of his 84 page long judgement dated May 9, 2023, Virendra Kumar Choubey, Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII fixed May 17, 2023 for hearing on the point of sentencing, eight days after his date of posting-May 9, 2023-as Additional District and Sessions Judge-I, Madhepura.  

In the sentencing order dated May 17, 2023, Virendra Kumar Choubey, Additional District and Sessions Judge-VIII sentenced Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakra and Nav Kumar Ojha of 15 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1 lakh. In case the fine is not submitted, the convicts will have to remain in prison for another six months.      

Notably, as per High Court's website, the judge in question was posted as District and Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura on May 9, 2023, i.e. the date on which he delivered the judgment of conviction dated May 9, 2023 as 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara, in N.D.P.S. Case No.- 06 of 2021. He passed the order of sentence on May 17, 2023. 

It is apparent that there is another error which has escaped High Court's attention. Is it possible for a judge remain posted at Bhojpur and Madhepura at the same time?. Is it possible for a judge to pass an order of sentence as 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Cum, Special Judge for NDPS Cases at Bhojpur, Ara and be posted at Madhepura District and Additional Sessions Judge, Madhepura on May 17, 2023?

Also readCriminal appeal of Jharkhand residents in NDPS case related to 9 quintals of ganja is before the High Court  

Patna High Court seized with NDPS case of 2021, driver Shankar Yadav was to get Rs 15,000, Pritam Lakra worked pro bono 

 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra

In Amarjit Yadav @ Amarjit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page long order dated February 20, 2026. The order reads: "....we do not find any good ground to deny the prayer sought for by the appellant. Hence, appeal is allowed and appellant is ordered to be enlarged on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer...." It reversed the 3-page long order dated June 27, 2025 by Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra of the Patna High Court. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court apprehending his arrest in the FIR registered on May 13, 2025 under Sections 30(a), 32(c) and 41(1)(2) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2022 after denial of anticipatory bail by the High Court. 

The gist of the prosecution case is that appellant was a prospective purchaser of 260.250 liters of Indian made Foreign Liquor, which was being transported in a truck from Haryana to Bihar and the driver of the truck Sunil Paswan in his statement had disclosed the name of appellant as the potential buyer.

The Court observed: "It is an admitted fact that the contraband has not been seized from the possession of appellant and it is based on the co-accused statement, the appellant has been roped in as an accused. The courts-below had rejected the prayer of the appellant on the ground of his criminal antecedents, however none of the offences alleged are under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise (Amendment) Act, 2022. Be that as it may, pursuant to our interim order, appellant has appeared before the Investigating Officer and has cooperated with the investigation which is also fairly admitted by the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent."

Before the High Court, the counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. The petitioner had no concern with the alleged recovery of liquor. He also submitted that the petitioner was not present at the place of occurrence. It was submitted that the petitioner was neither owner nor driver of the truck in question. Name of the petitioner transpired in this case on the basis of confessional statement made by co-accused person as the petitioner was receiver of the seized items and the same has got no evidentiary value. He submitted that similarly situated co-accused was granted regular bail by this Court vide order dated April 2, 2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 19754 of 2025. There is no compliance of Section 103 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

In his order Justice Mishra had concluded: "6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 7. The prayer is rejected. However, the petitioner is directed to surrender in the Court below and pray for regular bail. If any such application is filed, the Court below shall consider and dispose of the same on its own merit without being prejudiced by this order." 

 

Denied opportunity to appear in CBSE's Xth Exam, Sameer Raj withdraws his appeal from Patna High Court

In Sameer Raj @ Sameer Raj & Anr. vs. Union of India through the Secretary (School of Education and Literacy), Ministry of Human Resource Department & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Rajesh Kumar Verma passed an order dated February 18, 2026. It reads: "Learned counsel for the appellants seeks permission to withdraw the present appeal. 2. Permission, as prayed for, is granted. 3. The appeal stands dismissed as withdrawn." This L.P.A was filed and registered on February 12, 2026. The counsels of the petitioner were: Dr. Gopal Krishna, Priyanka Singh,  Eashita Raj, Khalid Faizan Khurshid and Adarsh Singh.  

The present Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against the judgment and order dated January 27, 2026 passed by Justice Harish Kumar in C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025, whereby the writ petition was dismissed. The reliefs prayed by the petitioner despite admitting in the ultimate and final paragraph of the Impugned Judgement and Order that the student had already appeared in the Practical Examination of Class 10 of CBSE and also without considering that even after the disposal of SLP, material changes in circumstances and new judicial developments have occurred. 

The facts of the case are that the appellant no. 1 was a minor student admitted in a CBSE-affiliated school in the year 2018 and had continuously progressed on the basis of merit up to Class-X. The appellant-student had consistently secured excellent grades in scholastic and co-scholastic areas and has already appeared in Internal, Pre-Board and Practical examinations of CBSE’s Class X examination. The difficulty arose when the CBSE online system blocked the registration of the appellant on account of an age-related software restriction, though no statutory provision prescribes such absolute bar. The appellants challenged the arbitrary denial by non-human software and sought permission to appear in AISSE 2026 by filing C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025. Although the Single Judge dismissed the writ petition in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned judgement, however in the ultimate and final paragraph-20 of the impugned judgment, the Court expressly recorded that “……….. the petitioner no. 1, who was admitted in Class IV at the age of 5 years and 3 months only and has also been allowed to appear in the Pre-Board Examination of 10th for the session 2024-25 ……….” 

While dismissing the writ petition, the single Judge himself acknowledged that the claim of the appellant remained open for reconsideration as it has been concluded that “ ….. the claim of the petitioner be considered a fresh ………”. The Single Judge failed to appreciate that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be curtailed merely on the ground that an administrative authority claims exclusive jurisdiction over a subject. Even in matters relating to education, courts are duty bound to examine whether the decision-making process is fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary and in conformity with constitutional principles. The Single Judge committed a serious error of law in holding that the respondent-CBSE is the "best judge" of considering the exceptional merit and CBSE’s decision is beyond judicial scrutiny. Such an approach is contrary to settled principles of administrative law, which mandate that no public authority can be permitted to exercise unfettered and unguided discretion immune from judicial review. He failed to consider that the respondent-CBSE has not prescribed any transparent, uniform or objective mechanism for assessing exceptional merit, nor constituted any expert   committee for such purpose. In absence of such safeguards, deference to CBSE's decision  amounts to approval of arbitrariness.

He also erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of finality of earlier litigation, without appreciating that the present case involved continuing violation of fundamental rights of a minor student and fresh circumstances relating to his academic progression and maturity. Having recorded in paragraph-20 of the impugned judgment that the appellant-student has outstanding performance and has suffered due to the fault of the CBSE controlled school, the Single Judge acted inconsistently and unreasonably in denying effective relief to the appellants, thereby defeating the very object of doing complete justice. The impugned judgment reflects excessive judicial restraint and misplaced deference to administrative authority, resulting in failure to balance regulatory discipline with constitutional protection of merit, equality and right to education, and is therefore bad in law and liable to be interfered with by the High Court.

The Single Judge decided the case of the Petitioners/ Appellants in a very mechanical manner without considering consequence of the last paragraph of his own judgement.  He is right in appreciating the admitted position that the appellant no.1 (student) was duly admitted in class-IV (i.e. in primary class) when he was at the age of 5 years 3 months and having allowed him to continue his studies up to Class-X, but erred in rectifying the error of the respondents, who hold that the appellant no.1  was not eligible for admission in that class. He failed to appreciate that subsequent to the disposal of SLP (C) no. 8849/ 2025 a fresh and highly material judicial development has occurred on 19.08.2025 in the case of Aarav Singh vs. Union of India & ors. Writ Petition no. 13186/ 2025 decided by the  High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in which Court, after considering expert material including IQ/ Psychometric assessment and noting the extraordinary academic performances of the student the Court adopted a just and reasonable approach to consider an exceptional case and has held that Clause 4.1 of the National Education Policy, 2020 is directory and not mandatory, and further observed that exceptionally meritorious students cannot be debarred on the basis of age-related norms; hence, the said judgment squarely supports the case of the Appellant no. 1 and constitutes a vital change in the circumstances after the dismissal of the said SLP. He failed to consider the subsequent and material development, that the appellant no. 1 was referred to IQ assessment at AIIMS, Patna (Dept. of Psychiatry/ Clinical Psychology) (one of the best institute of India) on 13.10.2025 and thereafter the scientific assessment was duly conducted and final result was recorded on 04.11.2025, wherein it has been conclusively opined that the appellant no. 1 possesses Superior Intellectual Functioning with recorded scores of IQ=127.

The Single Judge failed to consider direct the CBSE to permit the appellant no. 1 (student) to appear in AISSE 2026 on the basis of (i) his consistent outstanding academic record his IQ assessment of the level of Superior Intellectual Functioning having IQ=127, his outstanding performances in Co-Scholastic Areas, Co-Curricular and extra- Curricular activities -and he was permitted to appear and accordingly he appeared in Practical Examinations of class-X, which is part of CBSE examination.  

In compliance with the directions contained in the impugned judgement, the appellants submitted a detailed representation before the respondent CBSE and also personally approached the office of CBSE at New Delhi and requested for an opportunity of personal hearing, including via virtual mode for effective consideration of their case. Despite repeated requests, the respondent-CBSE did not grant any opportunity of hearing nor fixed any date for consideration of the appellant’s representations, instead the appellants were orally informed that since their earlier representation had already been rejected by order dated 20.05.2024, the CBSE authorities were not inclined to take different view left with no alternative remedy, the appellants have been constrained to prefer the present Letters Patent Appeal.

The earlier order dated 20.05.2024 was passed in very mechanical manner, without proper application of mind and without exercising jurisdiction in accordance with law, particularly because the CBSE examines the academic performances only and not extra co-curricular activities and the CBSE’s order was passed arbitrarily, unreasonably and contrary to harass the appellants. TSingle Judge failed to appreciate the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh vs Sanjay Gulati [AIR 1983 SC 580 = 1983 SCC (3) 517], wherein it has been categorically held that when authorities themselves commit an errors by ignoring the prescribed norms, the consequences of such lapses cannot not be imposed upon deserving students. The Supreme Court also held that:-“………Those who infringe the rules must pay for their lapse and the wrong done to the deserving students who ought to have been admitted has to be rectified.”   

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 27.01.2026, passed by Justice Harish Kumar in C.W.J.C. No. 18381 of 2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed, the appellants preferred the LPA on following grounds:(i) Because theSingle Judge erred in law in treating the previous litigation as an absolute bar, ignoring material changes occurred after disposal of SLP (C) no. 8849/ 2025 and also ignoring the continuing nature of violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.  (ii) Because the Single Judge failed to appreciate that principles of res-judicata are applied with flexibility in writ jurisdiction, particularly where the constitutional rights of a minor, exceptionally meritorious student are involved. (iii) Because the impugned judgement fails to examine whether CBSE has any objective, transparent and expert based mechanism and tool to assess the exceptional merit of the student. (iv) Because the impugned judgment is inconsistent and legally unsustainable in as much as failed to consider that the school is duly affiliated to the CBSE and for all workings of the school, related to the education, the CBSE is fully responsible. (v) Because the impugned judgement failed to consider that the  appellant no. 1 (student) was admitted in class IV at the age of 5 years 3 months, and continuously studied up to class X and was also allowed to appear in examinations of Pre-Board of Class X and Practical Examination of class X (which is a part of CBSE Board Examination) and as such he cannot be restrained from appearing other papers of CBSE Class X examination, in the light of Judgement/ Order passed in Tathagat Avtar Tulsi vs. Central Board of Secondary Education and another, Writ Petition (Civil) no. 4386 of 1996,. passed by High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. 

(vi) Because the impugned judgement failed to consider that the Hon’ble Patna High Court has hold in Judgement/ Order dated 23.01.2009 in Monark Monalisa and ors. vs. The State of Bihar and others, Writ Petition no. 10357/ 2008 that “This Court finds the rule, as contained in Article 291 (presently Article: 259) of the Bihar Education Code restricting the age is not an absolute rule……..”  and also about letter dated 23.08.1989 of the Secretary, Dr. Brij Kishore Giri of the Bihar School Examination Board that “  …. The policy decision is in furtherance to Article 291 (presently Article: 259) of the Bihar Education Code because under no statute that has been brought in my notice, there any such mandatory restriction. The policy decision itself, thus, is discretionary, as noted above.” (vii) Because the impugned judgment fails to examine whether CBSE has any objective, transparent and expert-based mechanism to assess exceptional merit of the student as CBSE itself states that “there is no such established mechanism or scientific tool to assess and declare a candidate as prodigy or exceptionally meritorious in an academic matter” and in such situation the CBSE should rely upon the results of IQ assessment by AIIMS (one of the best institute of India) that the student possesses the “Superior Intellectual Functioning” beyond age i.e. the student is “exceptionally meritorious”, beyond age i.e. the student is child prodigy and has exceptional merit and  in such situation it was just and proper to direct the CBSE to allow the student to appear in AISSE examination. 

(viii) Because the Court wrongly declined to test the action of CBSE on the anvil of arbitrariness, proportionality, and reasonableness, particularly when the CBSE itself has duly accepted that “the result of the past academic performance of the petitioner perused and found that same is satisfactory”. (ix) Because denial of registration based on a non-human software-generated age restriction, without statutory backing, is per se arbitrary and unconstitutional. (x) Because the impugned order places excessive deference on administrative discretion and undermines judicial review. (xi) Because the impugned judgment is bad in fact and law and liable to be set aside.

Also read:Sameer Raj to file Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A.) against Justice Harish Kumar's dismissal of his writ seeking direction to appear in CBSE's 10th Board Exam 

CBSE fails to comply with Patna High Court's orders in Sameer Raj vs. Union of India