"preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations": Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

In Huzaif Ahmad Dar vs. Union Territory of J&K & Ors. (2026), Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal delivered a 6-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered view that the judgment impugned in this appeal is not sustainable in the eyes of law and accordingly, the same is set aside. Resultantly, order of detention bearing Order No. 09/DMA/PSA/DET/2024 dated 20.04.2024, issued by the District Magistrate, Anantnag (respondent No. 2) under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, being unsustainable in law is, accordingly, quashed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case."  The judgement was authored by Justice Oswal. 

The High Court observed: "It is a well-settled principle of law that preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations. The detaining authority is under a mandated constitutional obligation to furnish clear, precise, and proximate grounds. This requirement is a prerequisite to enabling the detenu to exercise his/her right to make an 'effective representation,' a fundamental safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Oswal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme court in Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan vs. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr, (1989) 3 SCC 590, wherein it has been held that the order of detention passed on vague grounds deprives the petitioner of his right to make an effective representation against the order of detention." He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik vs. State of Maharashtra’ (2012) 8 SCC 233, wherein the Court held: “27. As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf, however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. 28. It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on detenue, there is no need to go into the factual details.”

Drawing on these decisions, Justice Oswal observed: ".....the impugned detention order, founded on vague, stale, and unsupported material, cannot be sustained. 14.We have carefully examined the judgment rendered by the learned Writ Court and are of the considered view that the issues noticed and discussed hereinabove have not been adequately addressed and, in fact, have escaped the attention of the learned Writ Court.