Supreme Court sets aside Justice Yashwant Varma's judgement, disables treaty shopping for tax evasion by companies setting up shell companies

In The Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) & Ors. vs. Tiger Global International Iii Holdings (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered a j15-page long judgement dated January 15, 2026, wherein it concluded:”50. In our view, once it is factually found that the unlisted equity shares, on the sale of which the assessees derived capital gains, were transferred pursuant to an arrangement impermissible under law, the assessees are not entitled to claim exemption under Article 13(4) of the DTAA. The Revenue has proved that the transactions in the instant case are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, and the evidence prima facie establishes that they do not qualify as lawful. Consequently, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. The applications preferred by the assessees relate to a transaction designed prima facie for tax avoidance and were rightly rejected as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar to maintainability, as enshrined in proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) [of the Income-tax Act]. Accordingly, capital gains arising from the transfers effected after the cut-off date, i.e., 01.04.2017, are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the applicable provisions of the DTAA. The judgment of the High Court therefore deserves to be set aside. 51. In the result, all the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.” 52. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” 

Notably,  India has Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) with 82 countries. Justice Mahadevan wrote the leading judgement. Justice Pardiwala the concurring judgement.   

The appeals arose from a 224-page long final judgment and common order dated August 28, 2024 delivered by the High Court's Division Bench of Justices Yashwant Varma and Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav in a writ of 2020. Supreme Court disposed of the appeal against the High Court's verdict by the common judgment. The judgement by High Court was authored by Justice Varma.

The respondents–assessees viz., Tiger Global International II Holdings, Tiger Global International III Holdings, and Tiger Global International IV Holdings, are private companies limited by shares, incorporated under the laws of Mauritius. They were set up with the primary objective of undertaking investment activities with the intention of earning long-term capital appreciation and investment income. The assessees are regulated by the Financial Services Commission in Mauritius and have been granted a Category I Global Business License4 under Section 72(6) of the Financial Services Act, 2007, enacted by the Parliament of Mauritius.

The business of the assessees, according to them, is wholly controlled and managed by their Board of Directors in Mauritius. The assessees claim to have satisfied all the requirements laid down by the FSC in Section 3 of Chapter 4 of the Guide to Global Business, thereby establishing commercial substance in Mauritius. The assessees had three Directors on the Board of Directors, of whom two are Mauritian residents and one is a resident of the United States. They have maintained, and continue to maintain, their principal bank account and accounting records in Mauritius. They have caused their statutory financial statements to be prepared and audited in Mauritius and continue to do so. They have held and continue to hold, office premises in Mauritius since incorporation and have two employees at the same. Further, the assessees hold valid Tax Residency Certificates issued by the Mauritius Revenue Authority, certifying them to be tax residents in Mauritius for the income tax purposes. On the basis of the same, they claim to be tax residents of Mauritius under the laws of Mauritius and under the DTAA between India and Mauritius for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion.

The assessees engaged Tiger Global Management7, LLC, a company incorporated in the United States of America, to provide services in relation to their investment activities. All services provided by TGM, including but not limited to investment sourcing, portfolio stewardship, and observership services, are subject to review and final approval by the Board of Directors of the assessees. TGM does not have the right to contract on behalf of, or bind, the assesses, or take any decisions on their behalf without the approval of the Board of Directors. The assessees also hold valid Permanent Account Numbers issued by the Indian income tax authorities.. The assessees held shares of Flipkart Private Limited8, a private company limited by shares, incorporated under the laws of Singapore. 

Thereafter, Singapore Co. invested in multiple companies in India, and the value of its shares was derived substantially from assets located in India. The assessees transferred shares of Singapore Co. ("Sale Shares") held by them to Fit Holdings S.A.R.L ("Buyer"), a company incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg. These transfers were undertaken as part of a broader transaction involving the majority acquisition of Singapore Co. by Walmart Inc., a company incorporated in the United States of America, from several shareholders, including the assessees.  Thereafter, the assessees approached the Indian tax authorities by filing applications under Section 197 of the Income Tax Act, 19619, seeking certification of nil withholding prior to consummation of the transfer. By notices dated 17.08.2018, the tax authorities informed that the assessees would not be eligible to avail the benefits under the DTAA on the ground that they were not independent in their decision-making and that control over the decision- making relating to the purchase and sale of shares did not lie with them. The tax authorities, accordingly, issued certificates dated August 17, 2018. 

In The Authority for Advance Rulings (Income Tax) & Ors. vs. Tiger Global International Iii Holdings (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered a j15-page long udgement dated January 15, 2026, wherein it concluded:”50. In our view, once it is factually found that the unlisted equity shares, on the sale of which the assessees derived capital gains, were transferred pursuant to an arrangement impermissible under law, the assessees are not entitled to claim exemption under Article 13(4) of the133 that the transactions in the instant case are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, and the evidence prima facie establishes that they do not qualify as lawful. Consequently, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. The applications preferred by the assessees relate to a transaction designed prima facie for tax avoidance and were rightly rejected as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar to maintainability, as enshrined in proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2). Accordingly, capital gains arising from the transfers effected after the cut-off date, i.e., 01.04.2017, are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the applicable provisions of the DTAA. The judgment of the High Court therefore deserves to be set aside. 51. In the result, all the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.” 52. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

The respondents – assessees viz., Tiger Global International II Holdings, Tiger Global International III Holdings, and Tiger Global International IV Holdings, are private companies limited by shares, incorporated under the laws of Mauritius. They were set up with the primary objective of undertaking investment activities with the intention of earning long-term capital appreciation and investment income. The assessees are regulated by the Financial Services Commission in Mauritius and have been granted a Category I Global Business License4 under Section 72(6) of the Financial Services Act, 2007, enacted by the Parliament of Mauritius.

The business of the assessees, according to them, is wholly controlled and managed by their Board of Directors in Mauritius. The assessees claim to have satisfied all the requirements laid down by the FSC in Section 3 of Chapter 4 of the Guide to Global Business, thereby establishing commercial substance in Mauritius. The assessees had three Directors on the Board of Directors, of whom two are Mauritian residents and one is a resident of the United States. They have maintained, and continue to maintain, their principal bank account and accounting records in Mauritius. They have caused their statutory financial statements to be prepared and audited in Mauritius and continue to do so. They have held and continue to hold, office premises in Mauritius since incorporation and have two employees at the same. Further, the assessees hold valid Tax Residency Certificates issued by the Mauritius Revenue Authority, certifying them to be tax residents in Mauritius for the income tax purposes. On the basis of the same, they claim to be tax residents of Mauritius under the laws of Mauritius and under the DTAA between India and Mauritius for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion.

The assessees engaged Tiger Global Management7, LLC, a company incorporated in the United States of America, to provide services in relation to their investment activities. All services provided by TGM, including but not limited to investment sourcing, portfolio stewardship, and observership services, are subject to review and final approval by the Board of Directors of the assessees. TGM does not have the right to contract on behalf of, or bind, the assesses, or take any decisions on their behalf without the approval of the Board of Directors. The assessees also hold valid Permanent Account Numbers issued by the Indian income tax authorities.. The assessees held shares of Flipkart Private Limited8, a private company limited by shares, incorporated under the laws of Singapore. 

Thereafter, Singapore Co. invested in multiple companies in India, and the value of its shares was derived substantially from assets located in India. The assessees transferred shares of Singapore Co. ("Sale Shares") held by them to Fit Holdings S.A.R.L ("Buyer"), a company incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg. These transfers were undertaken as part of a broader transaction involving the majority acquisition of Singapore Co. by Walmart Inc., a company incorporated in the United States of America, from several shareholders, including the assessees.  Thereafter, the assessees approached the Indian tax authorities by filing applications under Section 197 of the Income Tax Act, 19619, seeking certification of nil withholding prior to consummation of the transfer. By notices dated 17.08.2018, the tax authorities informed that the assessees would not be eligible to avail the benefits under the DTAA on the ground that they were not independent in their decision-making and that control over the decision- making relating to the purchase and sale of shares did not lie with them. The tax authorities, accordingly, issued certificates dated August 17, 2018. 

On the preliminary objections raised by the Revenue, the High Court had found that the Commissioner of Income Tax, after referring to a detailed examination conducted by the Department during the Section 197 certification process, had concluded that the question of chargeability of capital gains and the identification of the beneficial owner, upon piercing the corporate veil, had already been determined. In light of the same, and in the absence of any change in factual circumstances, the CIT had urged the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) to reject the applications made by the respondents. The High Court observed that the tone and tenor of the observations and findings of the AAR that the respondents were set up only for making investments in order to derive benefits under the DTAA, that the head and brain were not situated in Mauritius, that Mr. Charles P. Coleman exercised control over the respondents, etc., did not appear to be tentative or based on a preliminary or prima facie examination. Rather, they reflected a conclusive determination. It also noted that both the CIT and the AAR had reached definitive findings, the effect of which would constrain subordinate authorities from ignoring or bypassing such conclusions.

The High Court further found error in the AAR’s conclusion that TGM LLC was the holding or parent company of the respondents. It held that neither the CIT nor the AAR had succeeded in rebutting the consistent stance of the respondents that TGM LLC functioned merely as an investment manager and had no equity participation in the respondents. No evidence was presented to show that TGM LLC had contributed any funds or that monies were repatriated to TGM LLC from the respondents. The High Court further held that the respondents could not be dismissed as entities lacking economic substance. They were structured to operate as pooling vehicles for investments and held GBL-I under Mauritian law. Their investor base comprised more than 500 investors from over 30 jurisdictions, and their assets and liabilities reflected significant economic activity, with total liabilities and shareholders’ equity amounting to over USD 1.76 billion, and a net increase in shareholders’ equity from operations exceeding USD 267 million. The High Court also observed that the transfer of shareholding in question took place in 2018 as part of a broader global transaction involving Walmart Inc. The strategy of pooling investments through the respondents was found to be a prudent commercial decision, as it allowed efficient capital deployment rather than requiring each investor to act individually. The High Court concluded that the period of investment in the Flipkart Singapore holding entity exceeded a decade and when viewed in conjunction with the expenditure incurred in Mauritius, these factors collectively dispelled any notion that the respondents lacked economic substance.

On the question of control and decision-making, the High Court observed that while a parent or holding company may exercise supervisory functions over its subsidiaries, including by appointing directors or authorising key decisions, such influence does not render the subsidiary a mere puppet unless there is evidence of fraud, sham, or complete lack of independence. The mere presence of Directors connected with the TG Group, such as Mr. Charles P. Coleman and Mr. Steven Boyd, did not justify an inference of subservience or loss of independent agency. After taking note of the Board resolutions in detail, the High Court found that they reflected decisions taken collectively by the full Board. Though Mr. Coleman was authorised to approve expenditures exceeding USD 250 million, such authority was conferred by a collective decision of the Board and required countersignature by Group C Mauritian-based Directors. The key Directors, such as Mr. Moussa Taujoo, Mr. Mohammad Akshar Maherally, and Mr. Steven Boyd, were also signatories to the constitutional documents, akin to memoranda of association. The High Court further found that the minutes of Board meetings, when read holistically, evidenced deliberative and collective decision-making rather than unilateral action. The fiduciary role of the investment manager was also noted as a legitimate basis for certain Board placements. Thus, the High Court held that the respondents’ Boards could not be said to have been deprived of autonomy or reduced to subservient bodies.

On the issue of beneficial ownership, the High Court reiterated the principle of “substance over form,” holding that beneficial ownership presupposes a scenario where the ostensible recipient or holder of income has no control or discretion over such income and merely acts as a conduit or administrator for another. The High Court further held that in the present case, no evidence had been led by the Revenue to demonstrate that the respondents were contractually or legally obligated to pass on the gains from the share transfer to TGM LLC, or that they acted on its behalf. The argument that the respondents lacked beneficial ownership was therefore found to be baseless, resting solely on conjecture and not supported by material evidence.

The High Court, relying on the decisions of this Court in Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1 and Vodafone reiterated that the mere fact that an entity is located in Mauritius, or that investments were routed through that jurisdiction, cannot by itself lead to an adverse inference. The High Court further found that Mauritius has long been recognised as a favourable investment destination and that “treaty shopping” per se is not impermissible unless it is clearly shown to be a device for tax evasion or contrary to the intent of the treaty. The issuance of a TRC by the Mauritian authorities was held to be sacrosanct and to establish a presumption of legitimate tax residency and beneficial ownership. The High Court held that such certification is to be respected by the Revenue, and any attempt to pierce the corporate veil must be grounded in compelling evidence of tax fraud, sham transactions, or complete absence of economic substance. It is only when the Revenue is able to meet such a threshold that it can disregard the presumption of validity that arises the moment a TRC is produced and the Limitation of Benefits conditions are fulfilled.

The High Court further noted that both Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone were decided before a statutory framework on tax residency had been formally enacted. Circular No. 789 of 2000 had clarified that a TRC issued by Mauritius would suffice for determining both fiscal residence and beneficial ownership, including for capital gains. Noting that a subsequent attempt to dilute this position via the Finance Bill, 2013, by proposing that a TRC would not be sufficient to claim treaty benefits, was abandoned, and that a press release dated 01.03.2013 reaffirmed that tax authorities were not to go behind
the TRC, the High Court held that this reiterated the legal sufficiency of the TRC.

As far as the Limitation of Benefits15 clause introduced in the DTAA is concerned, the High Court held that such clauses are specifically designed to address treaty abuse and are determinative in such inquiries. Once LOB provisions are satisfied, the Revenue cannot erect additional barriers or invoke vague suspicions. Any challenge to treaty benefits in the face of a satisfied LOB clause must meet an extremely high threshold and be based on evidence of fraud, sham, or intent to defeat the Treaty. The High Court further held that the LOB clause had been inserted into the DTAA in the backdrop of the introduction of Chapter XA in the Indian Income Tax Act, and Article 27A of the DTAA expressly grandfathered all transactions relating to shares acquired prior to 01.04.2017. This demonstrated a clear intent by both Contracting States to align treaty protections with domestic legislation while preserving the benefit of grandfathering. The High Court also noted that in Azadi Bachao Andolan, it was held that once the DTAA was recognised as intended to override the provisions of the Act, it would be impermissible for national courts to lift the veil of incorporation.

With regard to Article 13(3A) of the DTAA, the High Court concluded that the said Article represented the intent of the Contracting States to ring-fence and exempt capital gains arising from the sale of shares acquired prior to 01.04.2017. Article 13(3B) introduced separate tax rates for gains arising from shares acquired after that date. The absence of a tax rate for pre-2017 transactions under Article 13(3B) strongly evidenced the intention to exclude such gains from tax, aligning with the Treaty’s overarching purpose. Domestic rules, such as Rule 10U under Chapter XA, could not override or dilute this treaty protection. In particular, the Revenue’s reliance on Rule 10U(2) to defeat grandfathering under Article 13(3A) was rejected. The High Court held that the phrase “without prejudice” in Rule 10U(2) signified that it would apply only in scenarios not already addressed by Rule 10U(1)(d), and thus could not be used to nullify the grandfathering clause.

Lastly, the High Court found the AAR’s interpretation of Article 13(3A) to be legally unsound and held that the AAR had erroneously concluded that the sale of shares in a Singapore company would not fall under Article 13(3A), on the premise that it applied only to shares of Indian companies. The High Court rejected this view, noting that the shares sold derived substantial value from underlying Indian assets, thereby satisfying the test for indirect transfers. Accepting the AAR’s view would nullify the treaty protections and defeat the purpose of the grandfathering clause, especially since the acquisition occurred prior to the critical date. The High Court thus concluded that the respondents’ transactions were grandfathered under the DTAA, and the Revenue could not circumvent these provisions through domestic law or administrative reinterpretation. In effect, the High Court held that the transaction was not designed for avoidance of tax and stood grandfathered by virtue of Article 13(3A) of the DTAA. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents and quashed the AAR’s Order.

The High Court also found that investments emanating from Mauritius are not a recent phenomenon. The first DTAA was signed at Port Louis on 24.08.1982 and came into effect from 01.04.1983 and 01.07.1983 in the two countries, respectively. The last Protocol for amending the provisions of that treaty was signed on 10.05.2016, as could be seen from the data available on the portal of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, which captures foreign direct investment into the country between April 2000 and March 2024. The High Court further found that Circular No. 682 constituted the first significant clarification rendered by the Board in the context of Article 13 of the DTAA and the taxation of capital gains. Paragraph 3 of Circular No. 682 unequivocally declared that gains derived by a resident of Mauritius from the sale or transfer of shares would be taxable only in that country. Circular No. 682 further proclaimed that even if a resident of Mauritius were to derive income from the alienation of shares of Indian companies, such income would be liable to capital gains tax only in Mauritius, in accordance with the tax laws prevalent in that country. Therefore, it was held that such an entity would not face a capital gains tax liability arising or accruing in India.

The High Court also considered that the above Circular was followed by Circular No. 789 which clarified the position of the Revenue with respect to TRCs issued by authorities in Mauritius, such certificates constituting sufficient evidence for the purposes of ascertaining the status of residence as well as the application of principles of beneficial ownership. Circular No. 789 clarified that the test of residence flowing from a TRC would also apply in respect of income from capital gains on the sale of shares. Circular No. 789 reiterated the stand taken in Circular No. 682, holding that a resident of Mauritius would not be subjected to capital gains tax arising in India consequent to the sale of shares under Article 13(4) of the DTAA. Of equal significance were certain proposed amendments to the Act.

After hearing the parties and placing reliance on the judgment in Vodafone, the High Court had held that the order of the AAR dated March 26, 2020 suffered from manifest and patent illegalities. The view taken therein with respect to the transaction in question was found to be wholly untenable and unsustainable. Consequently, its conclusion that the impugned transaction was designed for tax avoidance was held to be arbitrary and incapable of being sustained. In the opinion of the High Court, the transaction stood duly grandfathered by virtue of Article 13(3A) of the DTAA. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petitions, quashed the AAR’s order dated March 26, 2020, and affirmed the assessees’ contention that the transaction was not designed for avoidance of tax, thereby entitling them to all consequential reliefs. 

Supreme Court has set aside Justice Varma's judgement and disabled the treaty shopping for tax evasion by companies setting up shell companies. 

 

 

Supreme Court grants absolute relief to Manoj Manzil till disposal of appeals

In Manoj Manzil vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices  Justices Sanjay Karol andAugustine George Masih passed an order dated January 30, 2026 wherein it made its interim orders absolute till the disposal of the appeals.

Subsequent to High Court's verdict dated October 7, 2025, Manoj Manzil had filed a Special Leave Petition  (Criminal) October 9, 2025 in the Supreme Court. It was verified on October 14, 2025.   It was registered on October 16, 2025. 

On October 15, 2025, Justice R. Mahadevan heard the matter in Chambers and passed an order which reads: "Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the prayer sought for in the application seeking exemption from surrendering is granted till the first date of listing before the regular Court. The Interlocutory Application seeking exemption from surrendering is allowed accordingly. Registry to process the matter for listing before the Court." The SLP arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated October 7, 2025 by the High Court.

Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Karol and N. K. Singh passed an order dated October 27, 2026. It reads:"1. Petitioner challenges the judgment and order dated 07.10.2025 in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.216/2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, titled “Manoj Manzil vs. The State of Bihar”. 2. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, invites our attention to the testimony of the Doctor (PW-06) (at page no.257) as also the post- mortem report (at page no.144). It is argued that, in view thereof, the ocular versions of PW-01, PW-02, PW-03, PW-04 & PW-08 do not correspond with the nature of injury allegedly inflicted by the assailant on the deceased. The alleged eye witnesses are neither reliable nor their testimonies are worthy of credence. It is further submitted that the High Court committed an error in ignoring this aspect while upholding the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 3. Issue notice, returnable on 01.12.2025. 4. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. Let steps for service be taken within two weeks. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to serve the learned standing counsel for the State of Bihar. 6. In the notice itself, let it be mentioned that the respondent is required to file the counter affidavit and reply to the interlocutory application(s), if any, before the next date of listing. 7. Trial Court/Original Records and the case diary be called for. 8. In the Chamber proceedings, vide order dated 15.10.2025 the Interlocutory Application No.261436 of 2025 seeking exemption from surrendering is allowed. Liberty is granted to seek recall of that order."

On December 1, 2025, the same Division Bench passed an order. It reads:"4. Learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to serve the learned standing counsel for the State of Bihar. 5. In the notice itself, let it be mentioned that the respondent is required to file the counter affidavit and reply to the interlocutory application(s), if any, before the next date of listing. 6. In SLP @ Diary Nos.61467/2025 & 61659/2025, the petitioners are exempted from surrendering till the next date of listing. Liberty is granted to the respondents to seek recall of the order, should the need so arise." 

On January 30, 2026, the Division Bench passed an order which reads: "4. Interim order(s) is/are made absolute till the disposal of the appeals."

Also read: High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Ajit Kumar upholds trial court's judgment in murder case against Manoj Manzil & 18 Others 

Mahatma Gandhi Assasination case

On January 30, 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated. The Trial Court judgment in Crown vs Nathuram Vinayak Godse & Ors.

In Mahatma Gandhi assassination case, the accused were:
1. Nathuram V. Godse
2. Narayan D. Apte
3. Vishnu R. Karkare
4. Madanlal K. Pahwa
5. Shankar Kistayya
6. Gopal V. Godse
7. Vinayak D. Savarkar
8. Dattatraya S. Parchure
9. Gangadhar S. Dandawate
10.Gangadhar Jadhav
11.Suryadeo Sharma
12. Digamber R Badge (the accused-approver)
A Special Court was constituted under notification No. 54/1/48-Political, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 4-5-48, u/ss 10 and 11 of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act, 1947, as extended to the Province of Delhi, and the case was made over to the Court for trial, under notification No. 54/1/48-Political, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, May 13, 1948.

Atma Charan, Esq., I.C.S. was appointed Special judge. The Court held its sittings in a hall on the upper storey of a building in the Red Fort. Nathuram V. Godse, Narayan D. Apte, Vishnu R. Karkare, Digambar R. Badge, Madanlal K. Pahwa, Shankar Kistayya, Gopal V.
Godse and Vinayak D. Savarkar, who were present at Bombay, and Dattatraya S. Parchure, who was then at Gwalior, were all brought to Delhi before the commencement of the trial, and were lodged in the Red Fort in a specially selected area, which was declared to be a ‘prison’ under notification No. 54/6/48-Political, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, dated May 15, 1948. The charge-sheet against the accused was submitted to the
Court on May 27, 1948. A summary of the main prosecution evidence was furnished to the defence by the prosecution before the commencement of the trial before the Court. Digambar R. Badge was tendered a pardon on June 21, 1948. The prosecution filed the sanction of the District Magistrate, dated May 18, 1948, u/s 29 of the Indian Arms Act, the sanction of the Central Government, dated May 26, 1948, u/s 7 of the Explosive Substances Act and the sanction of the Central Government, dated June 18, 1948, u/s 188 of the Cr.P.C., on June 22, 1948. The charges were then read out and explained to the accused. The accused pleaded ‘not guilty’ and pleaded to be tried.

C.K.Daphtary, Advocate-General of Bombay, appeared as Chief Public Prosecutor, and was assisted by N.K. Petigara, M.G. Vyavaharkar, J.C. Shah and Jwala Prasad. Savarkar was represented by L.B. Bhopatkar, Jumnadas Mehta, Ganpat Rai, K.L. Bhopatkar, B. Banerji, J.P. Mitter and N.P. Aiyer.

Although u/s 13(2) of the Bombay Public Security Measures Act extended to the Province of Delhi only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence was required to be recorded by the court, but at the request of all the accused and their counsel and with the
approval of the counsel for the prosecution, a complete record of the evidence was maintained in English for the convenience of all concerned. 

The recording of the prosecution evidence began on June 24, 1948 and continued till November 6, 1948. The prosecution produced in all 149 witnesses, and their evidence consists of 720 pages. The prosecution brought on the record of the case 404 documentary exhibits and 80 material exhibits.  The recording of the statements of the accused began on November 8, 1948, and continued till November 22, 1948, and their statements consist of 106 pages. All the accused except Shankar Kistayya filed written statements and their written statements consists of 297 pages. The defence through the prosecution witnesses brought on the record of the case 119 documentary exhibits. The accused were asked whether they meant to adduce evidence in defence. All of them declined to adduce any evidence either in rebuttal of the prosecution evidence or in support of the allegations made by them. 22. Judgment and Penalties: The hearing of the arguments began on December 1, 1948 and continued till December 30, 1948. Judgement was pronounced on February 10, 1949. Nathuram Godse and Narayan Apte were sentenced to be hanged. Vishnu Karkare, Madanlal Pahwa, Gopal Godse, Shankar Kistaiya and Dr. Parchure were to suffer, inter alia, transportation for life. Vinayak Savarkar was acquitted. Digamber Badge was granted pardon and set free for having deposed against his co-accused.

All the seven convicts submitted appeals through the jail authorities to the Punjab High Court. Formerly the High Court functioned at Lahore. Nathuram vs. Godse preferred appeal against his conviction for conspiracy and other charges and not against the death sentence. Criminal Appeals Nos. 66 to 72 of 1949 Punjab High Court, (then at) Simla. Some significant record of the Mahatma Gandhi Murder Case was included in Printed Volume I and II of the case documents in Punjab High Court.

The accused were put on trial at Peterhoff, Shimla, which housed the Punjab High Court at Simla. Vinayak Savarkar was acquitted and set free due to lack of evidence. The appellant and other sources stated that two accused namely Dattatraya Parchure, and Shankar Kistaiya were acquitted. As per the records available, Shankar Kistaiya and Dattatraya
Parchure were sentenced to transportation for life. However, Bombay High Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The Union of India & Ors., decided on 6 August, 1969, AIR 1971 Bom 56, (1970) mentioned that: “In appeal, the Punjab High Court acquitted two more --Dr. Parchure and Shankar Kistayya. The conviction and sentence of the five others was confirmed. Nathuram had appealed against his conviction on the charge of conspiracy only. He neither challenged his conviction for murder nor the sentence of death passed on him. The statement made by him in Trial Court under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was proscribed by the Government of India…Nathuram and Apte were executed
in the Ambala Jail on the November 15, 1949. Gopal Godse and another accused called Karkare were transferred from the Ambala Jail to Nasik Road Central Prison in Maharashtra on the May 19, 1950. Gopal Godse was thereafter transferred to the Aurangabad Central Prison. Gopal Godse filed several petitions in the Supreme Court praying that he be directed to be released. He was sentenced by the Trial Court on February 10, 1949 and his contention was that taking into consideration the remissions earned by him he was entitled
to be released. He was eventually released from jail on October 13, 1964, during the pendency of one of such petitions, in which he was directed to be produced before the Supreme Court on the 1October 19, 1964. He was arrested again on the November 25, 1964 under the Defence of India Act. He was released from detention on the 30th November, 1965”. The records pertaining to charge-sheet show that three accused were
absconding as pointed out by the appellant. 

Patna High Court's Division Bench refuses to intefere with dismissal of Rakesh Kumar Roy Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Darbhanga in June 2019

In Rakesh Kumar Roy vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar, & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Ansul @ Anshul Raj delivered a 12-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein it concluded:"In view of the limited scope in interference of this Court with such order, in view of the settled law as decided in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. Vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava (supra) we are not inclined to grant any relief sought for in this writ petition. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed." 

In para 23 of its judgement in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors.  vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava (2021) 2 SCC 612, the Supreme Court has held that: “23. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional Courts Under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan 1994(6) SCC 302.…” 

Roy was dismissed from the post of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class-cum-Additional Munsif, Dharbhanga June 4, 2019. The six other Respondents were: Principal Secretary, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar, Under Secretary, General Administration Department, Govt. of Bihar, High Court of Judicature at Patna through its Registrar General, Patna, Registrar General, Patna High Court, Registrar (Vigilance) cum Inquiry Officer, Patna High Court and Officer on Special Duty cum Presenting Officer, Patna High Court. 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other writ, order or direction for quashing the Notification of the General Administration Department, Government of Bihar dated June 4, 2019 whereby and whereunder in terms of the recommendation of the Patna High Court the Petitioner was dismissed from the Post of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-cum-Additional Munsif, Darbhanga. He had also prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction for quashing the resolution dated March 10, 2019 taken by the Standing Committee of the Patna High Court whereby and whereunder the Full Court dismissed the Petitioner from services and directed the Registrar General to lodge an F.I.R under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He further prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction for quashing the entire disciplinary proceeding which arose out of Departmental Enquiry No. 01/2016 (including the inquiry report, and consequential orders passed pursuant thereto, etc.). iv. The had prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of  certiorari or any other writ, order or direction for quashing the F.I.R. and consequential criminal proceedings arising out of Complaint filed by the Registrar General pursuant to the impugned order of dismissal. He also prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other writ order or direction commanding reinstatement of the Petitioner and for grant of all consequential benefits to which the Petitioner would be entitled to.

The High Court had initiated a departmental proceeding against the Petitioner, who was then posted as Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Darbhanga and the articles of charge were served upon the petitioner vide Memo No. 6262/2016/Legal Cell, dated 28.01.2016, issued by Court, which are as follows:

i. Charge No.1 is connected with S.B.Account No. 30319819595 in the name of delinquent regarding 58 entries of total amount valued of Rs.50,91,214/- [(fifty lacs ninety one thousand two hundred forteen)

ii. Charge No. 2 is connected with Account No. 10157028842 in the name of Lal Bahadur Rai, father of delinquent regarding six entries of total amount valued thousand six hundred) 

iii. Charge No. 3 is connected with Account No. 30582059004 in the name of Rajbala Rashmi, W/O the delinquent, regarding 281 entries of total amount valued of Rs.65,28,306/- [(sixty five lacs
twenty eight thousand three hundred six)

iv. Charge No. 4 is that of amount of Rs.2,40,000/- was debited from the account of the wife of the delinquent on the same day i.e. 29.8.2012 with an intention to cover up the illegal monetary gains deposited in the account of the wife of the delinquent and also concocted a story of sale of his car for Rs.1,00,000/- to one Sanjay Kumar.

v. Charge No. 5 is that Ram Dayal Paswan, father-in-law of the delinquent had deposited amount regularly in the Saving Bank Account of State Bank of India of the delinquent and his wife which is not a usual practice in the normal social life and is highly unbelievable.

vi. Charge No. 6 is that the delinquent has tried to cover up his judicial mistakes by taking a plea that his Peons have regularly made deposits in his account as well as in the account of his wife of State Bank of
India, which is unusual and gives an impression of acceptance of illegal money through Peons.

In pursuance of the disciplinary proceedings which arose out of departmental enquiry no. 01/2016 conducted, the Enquiry Officer reached at the following findings:
1. Regarding charge no. 1, the Enquiry Officer found that the delinquent failed to satisfactorily explain the source of 18 cash deposits made in S.B.Account No. 30319819595. The evidence establishes that deposits were made on consecutive or alternative dates, which is uncommon to prudent banking practices and suggests irregular monetary transactions. The Enquiry Officer further opined that the delinquent failed to satisfactorily explain the source of his cash deposits and therefore, he held that charge stands proved as the delinquent failed to maintain absolute integrity as a member of Judicial Services, amounting to gross misconduct within the ambit of Bihar Government Servant Conduct Rules; 2. Regarding charge no. 2, the Enquiry Officer found that transactions in the account of the delinquent's father i.e. S.B. Account No. 10157028842 were made in normal and natural course of affairs between a father and son, therefore, it may not be categorized as financial irregularity;
3. Regarding charge no. 3, the Enquiry Officer found that 87 cash deposits in the wife's account remained unexplained and indicate financial impropriety. The pattern of deposits on consecutive dates factored with self-deposit which were termed as savings is shoddy and mischievous. The Enquiry Officer has further opined that the delinquent has further told white lies regarding the deposits in his wife’s account by him, his father-in-law and his sister as self-deposits;
4. Regarding charge no. 4, the Enquiry Officer found the sale of the cars to be genuine. However, concerning the transaction of Rs. 2,40,000/- for alleged land purchase, the delinquent failed to produce any agreement of sale or supporting documentation despite the substantial amount involved, which the enquiry officer found to be peculiar and unheard of and created a strong inference of financial irregularity;
5. Regarding charge no. 5, the Enquiry Officer found that deposits made by Ram Gyan Paswan, father-in-law of the delinquent, in the accounts of the delinquent and his wife were highly suspicious and disproportionate to his known income. The evidence establishes that Ram Gyan Paswan deposited Rs. 1,75,000/- in the year 2010 to his daughter and son-in-law despite his monthly salary being only Rs. 24,000/-, making such generosity financially impossible from legitimate sources. The inability to explain the source of such disproportionate payments creates a strong circumstance indicating lack of maintenance of financial probity. 
6. Regarding charge no. 6, the Enquiry officer found that unexplained cash deposits were made in the savings bank accounts of the delinquent officer and his wife through the office peon, as evidenced by the testimony of witnesses and the failure of the delinquent to disclose the source of the said amounts was treated as a material circumstance indicating that the funds were routed by the delinquent into the said accounts.

A copy of these findings of the Enquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings were supplied to the petitioner on December 6, 2018. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a comprehensive representation against the findings on January 17, 2019. Upon a detailed perusal of the enquiry report and the petitioner’s representation, the petitioner was dismissed. 

In its judgment, the High Court recorded: "When we made a query to the counsel for the petitioner as to what explanation has been offered by the petitioner for explaining the delay in approaching this Court challenging the dismissal order dated 04.06.2019 after more than six and half years, there was no satisfactory answer to that effect. No explanation has been furnished in the writ petition. However, the learned counsel submits that delay and laches cannot be the sole ground not to entertain the writ petition. He also submits that it is a case of no evidence." 

The High Court observed:"6. With respect to the issue of delay and laches, the issue is no more res integra...." because of Supreme Court's decision. It recollected that in the case of Mrinmov Maitv vs. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, the  Supreme Court has held that: “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court….”

The High Court noted:" 7. On perusal of the charges framed against the petitioner so also the inquiry report, we find that there is no illegality or infirmity in the same. Principle of natural justice has been followed and the petitioner has been provided with due opportunity to place his case and it cannot be said that the finding is not sustainable in the eyes of law....8. In view of the charges framed and the findings arrived at in the departmental enquiry, it appears that the integrity of the petitioner is doubtful."

In C. Ravichandran Iyer vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Others 1995(5) SCC 457, the Supreme Court underlined the level of integrity requisite in a Judicial Officer by stating in para 21 that: “ 21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would generate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a layman and also higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.…”

Notably, the Bihar Vigilance Investigation Bureau moved in the first week of January 2026 to confiscate assets worth Rs 41.12 lakh belonging to Rakesh Kumar Roy, former judicial magistrate of Darbhanga, against whom a case was filed in July 2019. 

Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra dismisses civil review at the stage of admission in a case under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

In Radha Krishna Prasad vs. Ram Bilash Prasad & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 10-page long judgement dated January 30, 2026.  The review application was filed under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the judgment dated October 21, 2024 passed by the High Court in a First Appeal of 2008 whereby the appeal preferred by the review petitioner/appellant was dismissed affirming the judgment and decree dated November 29, 2007 passed by the Trial Court in a Title Suit of 2004 filed by the review petitioner/appellant. 

Justice Mishra judgement concluded:"13. This Court also finds no merit in the submission that the impugned judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. The findings returned in the First Appeal are reasoned findings based on appreciation of evidence and application of settled legal principles governing suits for specific performance. An alleged erroneous conclusion or a possible alternative view does not constitute an error apparent warranting review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that none of the grounds urged in the review application satisfies the statutory parameters laid down under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. The petitioner has failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason warranting interference with the judgment under review. Consequently, the review petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 15. Accordingly, the instant civil review is dismissed at the stage of admission. 16. There shall be no order as to costs."

The Court recorded that it was apparent from the record that the review petitioner/appellant had filed the suit for specific performance of contract for sale on the basis of agreement for sale dated January 25,  2002 claiming that defendants/respondents failed to comply the terms of the said contract and avoided the execution and registration of sale deed, while the plaintiff (petitioner/appellant) was always willing and ready to perform his part of contract to pay the balance consideration of money. As per the defendants, defendant no.1 had received Rs.60,000/- as advance from plaintiff and executed an agreement for sale dated 18.09.2001 in his favour for a total sum of Rs.2,70,000/-. The said agreement was prepared in duplicate, one copy remained with plaintiff and one copy with defendant. The case of the defendant was that he signed the document dated January 25, 2002 for extension of period believing the words of plaintiff and he had not received any amount of Rs.60,000/- as advance from the plaintiff. The Trial Court dismissed the Title Suit of 2004 on contest filed by petitioner/appellant/plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated November 29, 2007 wherein it was held that the agreement for sale of the suit land between the parties was executed on September 18, 2001 after receiving Rs.60,000/- as advance amount, for consideration amount of Rs.2,70,000/- for two kattha i.e. at the rate of Rs.1,35,000/- per kattha and alleged agreement of sale dated January 25, 2002 was indirectly extension of time period of the agreement of sale dated September 18, 2001 which was done taking trust under the circumstances whereby inserting the less rate of agreed consideration amount and accordingly, the agreement of sale dated January 25, 2002 was not a valid and legal document.  

The First Appeal No.15 of 2008 was filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the High Court vide a 25-page long judgment dated October 21, 2024 by Justice Mishra. He had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Aloka Bose vs. Parmatma Devi & Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC 1527 wherein it was noted that all agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by both. The vendor agreeing to sell and purchaser agreeing to purchase. It cannot be said that unless agreement is signed both by vendor and purchaser, it is not a valid contract. Even an oral agreement of sale is valid. If so, a written agreement signed by one of the parties, if its evidences such as oral agreement will also be valid. Moreover, in India, an agreement of sale signed by vendor alone and delivered to the purchaser and accepted by the purchaser has always been considered to be a valid contract and in the event of breach by the vendor, it can be specifically enforced by the purchaser. He had observed: "23. The law is now well settled that even where the agreement of sale is not registered, the document can be received as evidence for considering the relief of specific performance and the inadmissibility will confine only to the protection sought under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hemlata Vs. Kashturi reported in 2023 SCC OnLine 381 observed that unregistered agreement to sell in question shall be admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance and the proviso is exception to the first part of Section 49. In K.B. Saha and Sons Pvt. Limited Vs. Development Consultant Limited reported in (2008) 8 SCC 564, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a document is required to be registered, but if unregistered can still be admitted in evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance." 

In P. Ravindranath & Anr. vs. Sasikala & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749, teh Supreme Court observed: “Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balance which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(c) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory.”  

The law is well settled that relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the part of contract. It has been held in U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) thr. LRs. Vs. A.M. Krishnamurthy (2022) SCC OnLine SC 840. 

Supreme Court in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji Vs. Sita Ram Thapar reported in (1996) 4 SCC 526 has made a distinction between ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ and the manner in which the said parameters are to be scrutinized in deciding a suit for specific performance. It is observed therein that by readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price for determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has been properly scrutinized. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff’s part of contract is to be adjudged with respect to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances where the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Both readiness as well as willingness have to be established by the plaintiff on whom the burden is cast in a suit for specific performance of an agreement. Therefore, the question would arise as to “whether the plaintiff discharged such burden in the instant case”. The plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff never agreed to pay the remaining consideration amount i.e. Rs.2,10,000/- as per the agreement of sale dated 18.09.2001.

Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam & Ors. vs. Vairavan reported in (1997) 3 SCC 1 has held that every suit for specific performance need not be decreed because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the time limits stipulated in the agreement. The Court will also “frown” upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three-year period is intended to assist the purchasers in special cases as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in part performance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser. These observations were reiterated in Saradamani Kandappan vs. S. Rajalakshmi and Ors. reported in (2011) 12 SCC Justice Mishra noted: "32. In my view, the conduct of plaintiff was not reflective of his readiness as well as willingness on his part to pursue the agreement of sale of the suit land, in terms of Section 16(c) of the Act." 

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness and willingness” on part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. The Courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was ready and willing to perform his part of contract.

The Supreme Court in Basavaraj vs. Padmavathi & Anr. reported in (2023) 4 SCC 239 referred to the judgment in  Ramrati Kuer vs. Dwarika Prasad Singh reported in AIR 1967 SC 1134 : 1967 (1) SCR 153, Indira Kaur & Ors. vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor reported in (1988) 2 SCC 488 and subsequent decision in Beemaneni Mahalakshmi vs. Gangumalla Appa Rao (since dead) by LRs. reported in (2019) 6 SCC 233 (para-14) on the aspect of readiness and willingness on the part of buyer. It was observed and held that unless the plaintiff was called upon to produce the passbook, accounts or documentary evidence either by the defendant or the Court orders him to do so, no adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff as to whether he had the means to pay the balance consideration. 

Upon perusal of judgment of the Trial Court, considering facts and circumstances of the case and materials available on record, the High Court had upheld the judgment of the Trial Court that the agreement of sale (Bai Beyana) with respect to suit land was executed by defendant in favour of the plaintiff on September 18, 2001 in which consideration amount with respect to the suit land was Rs.1,35,000/- per kattha. It was observed by this Court that the petitioner herein was not entitled to get the decree of specific performance on the basis of alleged agreement of sale dated January 25, 2002 and accordingly, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned judgment suffered from error apparent on the face of the record and was passed with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. The counsel assailed the finding recorded by the High Court in the First Appeal to the effect that the  Trial Court had rightly held the agreement for sale dated September 18, 2001, fixing the consideration at Rs.1,35,000/- per kattha and that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance on the basis of the agreement dated January 25, 2002. It was submitted that the said finding suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as this Court proceeded on the erroneous premise that the agreement for sale dated January 25, 2002 on which the plaintiff case is based is not a valid and enforceable document and the original agreement for sale dated September 18, 2001 was a valid document. 

A supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of petitioner in the Review Application to bring on record a copy of “List of Document produced by the accused (defendant/respondent no.1) on September 16, 2004 in Complaint Case of 2003” to show that original copy of Bai Beyana deed dated September 18, 2001 was in custody of defendant no.1 and falsify the case of defendant no.1 that he executed Bai Beyana deed on September 18, 2001 in favour of plaintiff and handed over the original copy of the same to the plaintiff. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the original copy of alleged Bai Beyana deed dated September 18, 2001 was never given to the plaintiff and the same is false and fabricated by defendant no.1 and the plaintiff did not conceal the fact regarding the previous agreement to sell. He also submitted that the finding in para 36 of the judgment with respect to concealment of fact regarding the previous agreement to sell was apparently an error on the face of record. He further submitted that non-consideration of this crucial circumstance materially affected the finding recorded in the impugned judgment and, therefore, the present case squarely falls within the permissible parameters of review.

The settled legal position is that the scope of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the C.P.C. is extremely limited, and that a review court does not sit in appeal over its own judgment, nor can it re-appreciate evidence or correct an alleged erroneous decision on merits, unless the error complained of is manifest, patent, and apparent on the face of the record. A judgment may be reviewed only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason analogous thereto.

In Malleeswari vs. K. Suguna & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927, the Supreme Court  enumerated the scope of civil review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the C.P.C. as herein under:
“15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts. The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions:
15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.
15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.
15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. 
15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.
15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors. 
16. To wit, through a review application, an apparent error of fact or law is intimated to the court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken to explain the said error. The intimation of error at the first blush enables the court to correct apparent errors instead of the higher court correcting such errors. At both the above stages,
detailed reasoning is not warranted.
17. Having noticed the distinction between the power of review and appellate power, we restate the power and scope of review jurisdiction. Review grounds are summed up as follows:
17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence, this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.
17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record. Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.
17.3 Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other sufficient reason’ means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.”
10. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and has carefully examined the supplementary affidavit, perused the materials on record and considered the settled principles governing the scope of review jurisdiction.

Drawing on these parameters, Justice Mishra observed:"....this Court finds that the document filed and relied upon by the petitioner herein in this review application, i.e., ‘List of Document produced by defendant in Complaint Case No.291(C) of 2003’ to show that the original Bai Beyana dated 18.09.2001 was in custody of defendant no.1, does not conclusively establish that the agreement for sale dated 18.09.2001 was not executed or that it was fabricated, nor does it, by itself, dislodge the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by this Court in the First Appeal. The mere fact that the original Bai Beyana deed was produced from the custody of the opposite party no.1/defendant at a later point of time or was summoned from another court does not necessarily negate its execution or invalidate the findings arrived at on the basis of oral and documentary evidence already considered. Such a contention, in substance, seeks a re-evaluation of evidence and reassessment of factual conclusions, which is impermissible within the limited scope of review jurisdiction. 12. Furthermore, this Court is of the considered view that the said document filed on behalf of petitioner in this Review Application by way of supplementary affidavit does not have such determinative evidentiary value as would have inevitably altered the conclusion reached in the First Appeal. The findings recorded therein were based on a holistic appreciation of pleadings, evidence and surrounding circumstances, and not solely on the aspect of custody of the original agreement dated 18.09.2001." 

Justice Dr. Anshuman sets aside disciplinary order by Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order

In Bishwajeet Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary cum Home Commissioner, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Dr. Anshuman of Patna High Court allowed the writ petition. He delivered a 5-page long judgement dated January 30, 2026, wherein, he sets aside the disciplinary order dated May 31, 2020 by the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and the appellate order dated July 7, 2020. The matter was remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority, who is required to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, considering points mentioned in reply to 2nd show-cause notice, within a period of 90 days from the date of production of a copy of this order. The four other Respondents were: Director General cum Inspector General of Police, Patna, Inspector General of Police, Patna Zone, Patna, Superintendent of Police, Nalanda and Sri Prakash Kumar Sharan, Inspector of Police, the then Bihar Police Station (Campt), Nalanda Bihar Police Station.

The petitioner had prayed for directing the concerned respondents to forbear from giving any effect to the order dated dated May 31, 2020 issued in a Departmental Proceeding of 2020 which was  affirmed by the
order dated June 30, 2020 by the Inspector General of Police, Patna, against the order of awarding punishment in the Appeal filed by the Petitioner, communicated by the S.P. Nalanda. The petitioner had filed memorial application before the Director General of Police which was also rejected and affirmed by the order passed by the above both authority on August 10, 2021. It was submitted that the orders were illegal, void and arbitrary manner. The orders were also contrary to Rule 824 read with Appendix 49 of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order was essentially one wherein the second show-cause reply was not considered at all, except for a cryptic one-line observation stating that the reply was “not found satisfactory.” He submitted that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, the submissions of both sides are required to be duly considered, and a mere one-line statement that the reply was unsatisfactory amounts to a gross violation of the settled principles of law. He also submitted that in the order-sheet, particularly in the first and fifteenth lines, interpolations were apparently made by using whitener and inserting other words, without any initials or authentication. He submitted that the enquiry report itself was not prepared in accordance with law. It was also submitted that the petitioner had filed a detailed second show-cause reply in defence, which was not considered at all. Therefore, he submitted that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in complete violation of the settled principles of service jurisprudence. He pointed out that the Appellate Authority had failed to consider these aspects of the matter and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal vide order dated July 7, 2020.
 

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Harish Kumar's order which denied anticipatory bail to one of the four accused

In Jhuna Dubey @ Ratnakar Dwivedi @ Jhunu Dubey vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 5-page long order dated January 28, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 4-page long order dated August 20, 2025 by Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court which had rejected the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. The appellant figures as an accused in FIR dated September 17, 2024 registered with Police Station Kundwa Chainpur, Motihari. It was alleged in the FIR that the appellant committed offences punishable under Section(s) 189(2), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 76, 303(2), 324(2), 352, 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 

Justice Datta observed:"....the State is silent as to whether the appellant was called upon to join investigation in terms of the notice issuing order dated 8th December, 2025, we are of the view that the appeal should be accepted." 

Supreme Court directed that "in the event of the appellant being arrested in connection with proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR, he shall be released on bail by the arresting/investigating officer/trial court on terms and conditions to be fixed by the trial court. 8. It is made clear that in the event the appellant breaches any of the terms and conditions imposed by it, the trial court shall be at liberty to cancel the bail of the appellant. 9. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to any police officer or to the court. 10. Also, since the investigation is yet to conclude, we direct that if the investigating officer calls upon the appellant to join the investigation, he shall do so by attending the police station. 11. We clarify that the observations made in this order and grant of bail will not be treated as findings on the merits of the case."

In Jhuna Dubey @ Ratnakar Dwivedi @ Jhunu Dubey vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Kumar had heard the criminal miscellaneous petition of 1. Jhuna Dubey @ Ratnakar Dwivedi @ Jhunu Dubey, 2. Guddu Dubey @ Pushpakar Dwivedi, 3. Shravan Kumar @ Shravan Kumar Dubey and 4. Gopal Dubey who had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in connection with Kundwa Chain Pur P.S. Case No. 138 of 2024 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 76, 303(2), 324(2), 352, 351(2) of the BNS, 2023. On the date of the alleged incident, all the accused persons named in the FIR, including the petitioners armed with various weapons had surrounded the informant and her husband over pending land dispute and started abusing and assaulting them. On objection raised by the informant and her husband, petitioner no.2 caught hold the hair of the informant; whereupon petitioner no.1 assaulted her by means of knife. It was further alleged that when the husband of the informant tried to pacify the matter, thereupon petitioner no.4 and co-accused Ashok Dubey also assaulted him by means of iron rod over his head due to which he sustained serious injury.

The petitioners' counsel had submitted that from perusal of the FIR, it appeared that there was a long-standing dispute between the parties and, in fact, on account of such reason, both the parties were entered into a free fight. So far as petitioners no.2, 3 and 4 are concerned, the omnibus nature of allegation and the injury sustained by the husband of the informant, was found to be simple in nature.

Justice Kumar concluded: "7. Having considered the submissions set forth by the learned Advocate for the respective parties and taking note of the allegation as well as the injury report, this Court is inclined to enlarge the petitioners no.2, 3 and 4 on pre-arrest bail. They are directed to be released on bail, in the event of their arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of four weeks from today, on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned J.M.1st Class, Sikrahana at Dhaka, East Champaran, Motihari....8. So far petitioner no.1 is concerned, taking note of the specific allegation and his criminal antecedent, his prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail stands rejected. 9. In case, petitioner no.1 surrenders before the learned Court below within a period of four weeks from today and seeks regular bail, the same shall be considered on its own merit(s) without being prejudiced in any manner by the present order."