In Aditya Pratap Sinha & Ors. vs. Raj karan Chaudhary & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 27-pag long judgement dated January 28, 2026, whereby, he set aside the Judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Sub-ordinate Judge 1st Sitamarhi, in Title Suit of 2011 whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of petitioner under Order VII rule 11(d) of the CPC was rejected as the same is barred under Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. The High Court heard the First Appeal which was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The appeal was allowed. The application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC was dismissed and the suit was restored. It was one of the five judgements delivered by the High Court on January 28.
The High Court's judgement directed that the "Trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit. Both the parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court in Title Suit No. 196 of 2011. The learned Trial Court shall adjudicate the suit on its own merits in accordance with law and uninfluenced by the observation made by this Court in this judgment. 23. Let the Trial Court Record be returned to the concerned Court forthwith."
Justice Malviya noted that the point of determination which arose before the High Court for consideration in this first appeal was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
The scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC explained in various decisions and the legal principles deducible. The Supreme Court in Kamla & Ors. vs .K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 661 held that for invoking clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the averment in the plaint would be relevant. For this purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. No amount of evidence can be looked into. The issue on merit of the matter would not be within the realm of the Court this stage. The material to be considered for rejecting the plaint has been dealt with in the case of Dahiben vs. Arvind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanusali reported in (2020) SCC OnLine SC 563 The Supreme Court has settled the principle.
Justice Malviya observed: "17. Moreover, from the facts and circumstances of the instant case it appears that there is mixed question of law and fact that requires a full trial for proper adjudication after evidence has been presented. The application of Section 4 of the Act in the present case is a complex issue that requires further examining of evidence. At this stage, adjudicating on the point of benami transaction would be a premature determination of a mixed question of law and fact, which is only suitable for a trial after examination of evidence. Therefore, it cannot be decided merely on assertions made in the application seeking rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 18. In the present case, if the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, it cannot be said that it does not disclose a cause of action and the plaint shall be rejected. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would depend upon the evidence adduced by the appellant/plaintiff. At this stage, the Court is not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the appellant/plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proving this case. Insofar as the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, this court will proceed only that far, to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or suit is barred by law and no further. The genuineness, validity and binding nature of document will have to be adjudicated at the appropriate stage in trial of the case after the parties adduce oral and documentary evidence. 19. At this outset, it is relevant to mention that the court concerned shall not reject the plaint based on a claim of benami transaction at the initial stage. The issue shall be addressed during the trial, after all parties had an opportunity to present their case as well as the evidence in support of their case.
Justice Malviya also observed: "20. So far as the ground of limitation is concerned, it is needless to emphasis that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. The fact regarding the date on which the appellant/plaintiff was acquainted with the knowledge of the essential facts from which cause of action arose, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence, the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. Law is well settled that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC if the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, such as, the date of knowledge of a cause of action, as it requires a full trial and evidence. In view thereof, such issues cannot be decided summarily without allowing the parties to lead evidence on arising of the cause of action.
The case of the plaintiff was that Krishna Devi, the defendant no. 2 is the mameri sister of plaintiff and defendant no.1 is the husband of defendant no. 2. There is very close and cordial relations among the plaintiff and both the defendants no 1, Raj karan Chaudhary and 2 and on account of such close relationship and mutual confidence, the plaintiff purchased in the year 1980 lands measuring 17.5 decimals of Plot No. 262, 9.5 decimals of Plot No. 265 and 14.5 decimals of Plot No. 264 situated at Mauza, Sitamarhi Bazar, the detail of the land was mentioned under schedule 1 of the plaint, through two registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980. However the sale deeds were registered in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff was retired government employee under Road Construction Department of Government of Bihar. It is specific case of the plaintiff that at the relevant time the plaintiff was in Government service and due to certain technical and service-related constraints he could not purchase the lands in his own name as well as in the names of his family members, and therefore, with the consent of the defendant nos. 1 and 2, the sale deeds were obtained in their names, they being merely name-lenders, while the entire consideration was paid by the plaintiff. It was further alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff is the real purchaser of the land, paid the entire consideration money and came in exclusive and peaceful possession over the disputed land since the date of purchase. The defendants were simply name lenders of the plaintiff. The original sale deed was in the custody of the plaintiff and the defendants had no right, title and interest in the disputed land nor have they ever come in the possession of the land in question.
The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint was that the plaintiff constructed a residential house over the disputed land and from roadside he constructed commercial shops and let out to different persons for carrying business for which they are paying rent to the plaintiff and in the residential house the plaintiff is residing along with his family members. It was also alleged that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and have no right, title or interest therein, but taking advantage of the sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 standing in their names, they started creating obstruction and attempted to alienate a portion of the suit land, which gave rise to the cause of action in April 2011, culminating in the filing of the suit seeking declaration that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 are merely name-lenders, declaration of the plaintiff’s title and confirmation of possession, along with consequential injunction. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 in their joint written statement denied the claim of the appellant/plaintiff and stated that the suit was not maintainable in the eyes of law and the suit was barred by estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and also by limitation. It is stated that the plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the suit.
The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had specifically asserted that the suit is hit by the provisions of the Act and was also barred under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 as consolidation operations are applicable in that area. It was also stated that the suit property was grossly undervalued and proper court fee had not been paid, the market value of the land being much higher than what was shown by the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had categorically denied that the plaintiff purchased the suit land or paid the consideration amount, or that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were name-lenders or benamidars. It was asserted that defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 independently purchased the respective portions of the suit land by registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 out of their own funds, came in possession thereof from the date of purchase, got their names mutated, paid rent and municipal dues, and constructed residential houses and shops at their own expense. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had also denied the alleged cordial relationship or fiduciary confidence pleaded by the plaintiff and have stated that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land, and has never constructed any house or shops, and never collected rent from any tenant. It was also stated that the plaintiff was not in custody of the original sale deeds, as only certified copies were filed, which itself falsifies the entire claim. It was, therefore, stated that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the suit land and was not entitled to any relief, declaratory or injunctive.
On April 23, 2012, an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was filed on behalf of the intervenor, namely Pintu Kumar, praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by law, particularly under Section 4 of the Act, and the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. It was also evident from the record that the said intervenor claimed interest in a portion of the suit land on the basis of subsequent registered sale deed executed in his favour by the defendant no. 1. The Trial Court allowed his prayer for impleadment as a defendant and while considering his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, proceeded to examine the maintainability of the suit at the threshold.
After hearing both the parties, upon due consideration of the pleadings, materials available on record, and the settled position of law, the Trial Court found that the core controversy in the present case is crystallized into two determinative issues for adjudication, namely, first, whether the present suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act; and second, if so, whether the provisions of the Act operate as a statutory bar to the maintainability of the suit.
Based on facts and circumstances of the case and upon consideration of the materials available on record, Trial Court held that although earlier benami transactions were not invalidated retrospectively, the suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act, was squarely governed by the provisions of the Act. The Trial Court concluded that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were barred by Section 4 of the Act, as the plaintiff sought to enforce rights in respect of property standing in the names of others on the plea of benami. It was further held that, in view of such statutory bar, the suit was not maintainable and fell within the scope of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Trial Court accepted the application filed on behalf of defendant no.3 (intervenor Pintu Kumar) dated April 23, 2012 and dismissed the suit as not maintainable.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Trial Court, whereby the plaint was rejected by allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the suit was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of statutory bar under the Act. It was in this backdrop that the first appeal was filed in the High Court.
The counsel on the behalf of the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the pleadings and evidence on record in their correct legal perspective and committed a grave error in rejecting the plaint. He submits that the appellant/plaintiff had specifically pleaded and proved that the entire consideration amount for purchase of the suit land was paid by him in the year 1980 and that the sale deeds were obtained in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2 only on account of close familial relationship and due to technical constraints arising out of the appellant/plaintiff being in government service at the relevant time. He also submitted that the appellant/plaintiff had been in exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession of the suit land since the date of purchase and he had constructed a residential house and commercial shops thereon. Moreover, he was residing with his family members and had inducted tenants, and had been paying municipal taxes and electricity charges, all of which clearly establish his possession and enjoyment of the suit property as the real owner. He submitted that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and had not produced any evidence to show exercise of ownership rights. The Trial Court failed to draw the correct inference from long, uninterrupted possession coupled with payment of consideration and custody of original sale deeds by the appellant/plaintiff. He also submitted that the cause of action clearly arose when the defendant nos. 1 and 2, taking advantage of the sale deeds standing in their names, attempted to create third-party interest, necessitating the filing of the suit. He also submitted that the two sale deeds in question were registered on January 2, 1980 and the Act came into force on September 5, 1988.
There was reference made to Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal & Ors. vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan reported in AIR 1996 SC 238 and held that the provision of Section 4 of the Act would not have retrospective effect and hence the suit in question would not be barred by Section 4 of the Act. The heading of Section 4 of the Act i.e., “Prohibition of the right to recover property held Benami” suggests that it prohibits right to recover property held Benami, but in the instant case there was no case for “recovery of property” from benamidar, in as much as, the property in suit was not in possession of benamidar. The specific case of the appellant/plaintiff was that he had been coming in possession of the suit land since its purchase on January 2, 1980 and he had constructed his residential house over the land where he was residing along with his family and he had constructed some shops over the suit land, which had been let out to different persons and a holding was created in the name of the appellant/plaintiff and electric connection in the house was taken in the name of his father and the entire premise was in one compact block within boundary wall and hence in the facts of the case the appellant/plaintiff was entitled for confirmation of his possession over the suit land, but the Trial Court had failed to take into consideration these aspect of the case and was illegally rejected the plaint on the basis of provision of Section 4 of the Act. He submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument, though not accepting, that the suit was barred by Section 4 of the Act, the benamidar's right to property under suit was extinguished by operation of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the question as to whether ownership and possession can be pleaded alternatively was required to be considered at trial and it would not make the plaint barred by the provision of Section 4 of the Act. Moreover rejection of plaint must be on the basis of averments in plaint, for this he placed reliance on the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram vs. Janak Singh and Ors. reported in (2012) 8 SCC 701 and Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 706.
He also submitted that from bare perusal of the plaint it would appear that complicated pleas and factual aspects were involved in the case and the same could be denied only at the time of trial and these aspects of the suit/case remained untouched by the Trial Court while deciding application for rejection of plaint as held by the Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 759 and hence, rejection of plaint at the threshold of the proceeding was wholly illegal and unjustified. He further contended that the law is well-settled on the point that the power of rejection of plaint should be exercised sparingly and cautiously, as the provision related to rejection of the plaint, as envisaged under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are aimed at preventing vexatious and frivolous litigation, but the learned Trial Court had passed the impugned judgment and decree without taking into consideration these important aspects of the case. He submitted that for the aforesaid grounds, the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law and on facts and are liable to be set aside and the suit of the appellant/plaintiff deserves to be decreed as prayed for.
The High Court delivered five judgements in Birendra Kumar Sinha vs. Raj Karan Chaudhary & Ors., Ram Shankar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sitbiya Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, the Department of Home, Government of Bihar, Anar Devi vs. The State of Bihar, through the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar and Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. on January 28.
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