Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya sets aside perverse judgment, decree of 2010 passed by Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara in a Money Suit of 1999

In Priyadarshi Rameshwar Construction Company (P) Ltd. vs.  State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 24-page long judgement dated April 8, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" this Court finds that it is an admitted and undisputed position that the appellant/plaintiff had duly executed and completed the contractual work entrusted to him in the year 2016 within the stipulated time and had thereafter raised the requisite bills in accordance with the terms of the contract. It is further not in dispute that the respondents failed to release the admitted dues within a reasonable period and ultimately made payment only in the year 2023, i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly seven years. The sole defence sought to be advanced by the respondents, both before the court below and in the present proceedings, is that the agreement does not contain any specific clause providing for payment of interest on delayed disbursement. However, such a contention cannot be countenanced in law, inasmuch as it is well settled that the State and its instrumentalities are under a constitutional obligation to act fairly, reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner in all contractual dealings. The failure to release legitimate dues for an unduly prolonged period, without any cogent justification, amounts to arbitrary withholding of money lawfully due and payable, thereby entitling the claimant to reasonable compensation by way of interest." Notably, Rameshwar Tiwary, the Director of the company in question argued the case in person.

Justice Malviya observed: "In the present case, the appellant has discharged his initial burden, whereas the respondents have failed to adduce any evidence in rebuttal. The learned Trial Court has thus erred in law in placing undue emphasis on technical deficiencies while ignoring substantive evidence on record. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are therefore perverse, being based on non-consideration of material evidence and misapplication of legal principles. 25. The appellant, having established execution of work and corresponding liability of the respondents, is also legally entitled to interest on the decretal amount, both on equitable and statutory considerations. It is well settled that where a party is deprived of the use of money lawfully due to him, interest is payable by way of compensation for such deprivation."

This First Appeal was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the judgment and decree dated April 3, 2010 passed by the Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara (Trial Court) in Money Suit No. 04 of 1999 wherein the plaintiff/appellant’s suit for money claim arose out of contract/agreement was dismissed by the Trial Court. The High Court's judgement does not mention the name of the judge of the trial court in question.  

In pursuance of tenders invited by the State Government the plaintiff/appellant, Priyadarshi Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, which registered Companies Act, 1956 was awarded 15 separate works for which independent agreements were executed with the concerned departments. 

The plaintiff/appellant duly executed the works with due diligence and in accordance with contractual stipulations to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, whereupon the works were measured, verified, and recorded in the departmental records and part payments were released from time to time. However, certain works were discontinued midway by the defendants on account of administrative constraints, including non-availability of funds, though the works already executed were duly accepted; nevertheless, despite completion and acceptance of the works, a substantial amount remained outstanding and payable to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding repeated demands and representations, including those made pursuant to directions issued in earlier writ proceedings, the defendants failed and neglected to release the admitted dues and rejected the claims on arbitrary and untenable grounds; consequently, the plaintiff was constrained to serve a statutory notice under Section 80 of the CPC and, upon expiry of the prescribed period without compliance, had instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 17,40,989/- towards the outstanding dues. 

The Trial Court had framed following issues for determination:
I. Whether the suit of plaintiff is maintainable as framed?
II. Have the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit?
III. Whether the plaintiff has served the notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the defendants.
IV. Whether plaintiff is entitle for the decree of of amount claimed by him?
V. Whether the plaintiff is entitle to get the relief and other reliefs as claimed under plaint?

The other eighteen respondents in the High Court were: Secretary/Commissioner, Water Resource Department, Engineer-In-Chief, Water Resource Department, Managing Director, Bihar State Construction Corporation Ltd., Anishabad, Patna, Chief Engineer, Water Resource Department, Dehri-On-Sone, Rohtas, Chief Engineer Water Resource Department, Aurangabad, Superintending Engineer, Sone Canal Circle, Ara, Bhojpur,  Superintending Engineer Flood Control Circle, Buxar, Superintending Engineer, North Koal Canal Circle, Gaya, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division No. 2, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Sone Canal Division, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division, Buxar, Executive Engineer, North Koal Canal Division Goh, Aurangabad, Commissioner/Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department, Patna, Co-Ordinator/Chief Engineer, Tube-Well Project, Patna, 16. Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division, Patna West Bihta, Patna and  Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division Ara, Bhojpur. 

Justice Malviya added:"30. This Court is of the considered opinion that the absence of an express stipulation in the contract for payment of interest does not ipso facto disentitle the appellant from claiming the same, particularly where the delay is wholly attributable to the respondents and is neither justified nor explained by any acceptable material. A contractor entering into an agreement with the Government legitimately expects that payments for completed works would be made within a reasonable time, and while some administrative delay may be anticipated, a delay extending to seven years is per se unreasonable, arbitrary, and violative of settled principles of fairness in State action. The appellant cannot be made to suffer for lapses on the part of the authorities, and the retention of his dues for such a prolonged period confers an unjust enrichment upon the respondents. Accordingly, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to be compensated for the delayed payment by way of reasonable interest, notwithstanding the absence of a contractual clause, and the contrary finding, if any, recorded by the learned court below cannot be sustained in the eye of law."

The judgement reads:"31. Accordingly, the point for determination framed by this Court is answered in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants and against the defendants/respondents. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the settled legal position, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to interest on the decretal amount. The impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court, to the extent it denies such interest, is unsustainable in law and is hereby set aside."  

Justice Malviya pointed out that the Appellate Court has the discretionary power to admit the additional evidence, primarily to prevent the miscarriage of justice and when the evidence is crucial for a just judgment. Notably, it is well settled law that a First Appellate Court has wide powers to re-appreciate evidence provided under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC. He noted that the entire Trial Court record it was apparent that the document proposed to include as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 was on record before the Trial Court but the same was not exhibited by the Trial Court. So, the documents are fit to be exhibited as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the CPC.

In this regard, Justice Malviya relied on t he judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 SC 1526. It held: “The Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence, not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment, but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may be cases where the Court finds that it is able to pronounce a judgment on record as it is, and cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that, in the interests of justice, something which remains obscure should be filled up, so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner, Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for only substantial cause under Rule 27.” 

The High Court observed: "19. It is also well settled that once execution of work is established and the same has been accepted by the department, the liability to make payment necessarily follows. It would be unreasonable to deny payment for the work actually done. The State cannot take advantage of its own wrong and refuse to pay for work executed." 

In State of West Bengal vs. B.K. Mondal & Sons, reported in AIR 1962 SC 779 observed:“if a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation”. 

The High Court observed that "the aforesaid principle, embodied under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, clearly applies where the State derives benefit from work executed." 

In A.T. Brij Paul Singh vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1703, the Supreme Court held: “11. Now if it is well-established that the respondent was guilty of breach of contract in as much as the recission of contract by the respondent is held to be unjustified, and the plaintiff-contractor had executed a part of the works contract, the contractor would be entitled to damages by way of loss of profit, Adopting the measure accepted by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case between the same parties and for the same type of work at 15% of the value of the remaining parts of the work contract, the damages for loss of profit can be measured.” 

In State of Rajasthan and Anr. vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2009) 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed that once execution of work is established and accepted, the contractor becomes entitled to payment in accordance with law. In the present case, the M.B. entries, duly verified by competent authorities, clearly establish execution of work and corresponding liability. The respondents, having failed to rebut such evidence, cannot deny payment, as the same would amount to unjust enrichment. In furtherance thereto, it is well settled that though the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case, once prima facie evidence is adduced, the burden shifts upon the defendant.

Justice Malviya referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Ibrahim Uddin and Anr., reported (2012) 8 SCC 148, wherein, it observed that a party cannot succeed on the weakness of the defence; however, once sufficient evidence is produced, the burden shifts on the opposite party to rebut the same. 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa vs. G.C. Roy, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 508  “33. In the case before us, admittedly the contract does not provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price became payable on June 7, 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram which related to an arbitration proceeding, under Sub-section (2) of Section 61, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold. On this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7, 1958 is justified.”

In Alok Shanker Pandey vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1198, the Supreme Court observed: “9. It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B 10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned
interest on it for this period. Hence, equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B. 

Justice Malviya observed: "28. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the appellant had executed the work and the same was duly recorded in official documents; however, despite such execution and acknowledgment, the respondents failed to release the admitted dues, thereby unjustly retaining the amount and depriving the appellant of its lawful use. Such retention of money by the State amounts to unjust enrichment and warrants compensation by way of interest. Further, under Section 34 of the CPC, the Court is empowered to award reasonable interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of institution of the suit till realization. The grant of interest, therefore, is not only equitable but also statutorily recognized." 

Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya set aside Judgment, decree of 2012 by Subordinate Judge 1st, Sitamarhi in a Title Suit of 2011

In Aditya Pratap Sinha & Ors. vs. Raj karan Chaudhary & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 27-pag long judgement dated January 28, 2026, whereby, he set aside the Judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Sub-ordinate Judge 1st Sitamarhi, in Title Suit of 2011 whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of petitioner under Order VII rule 11(d) of the CPC was rejected as the same is barred under Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. The High Court heard the First Appeal which was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The appeal was allowed. The application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC was dismissed and the suit was  restored. It was one of the five judgements delivered by the High Court on January 28. 

The High Court's judgement directed that the "Trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the suit. Both the parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court in Title Suit No. 196 of 2011. The learned Trial Court shall adjudicate the suit on its own merits in accordance with law and uninfluenced by the observation made by this Court in this judgment. 23. Let the Trial Court Record be returned to the concerned Court forthwith." 

Justice Malviya noted that the point of determination which arose before the High Court for consideration in this first appeal was whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC. 

The scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC explained in various decisions and the legal principles deducible. The Supreme Court in Kamla & Ors. vs .K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors. reported in (2008) 12 SCC 661 held that for invoking clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the averment in the plaint would be relevant. For this purpose, there cannot be any addition or subtraction. No amount of evidence can be looked into. The issue on merit of the matter would not be within the realm of the Court this stage. The material to be considered for rejecting the plaint has been dealt with in the case of Dahiben vs. Arvind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanusali reported in (2020) SCC OnLine SC 563 The Supreme Court has settled the principle.

Justice Malviya observed: "17. Moreover, from the facts and circumstances of the instant case it appears that there is mixed question of law and fact that requires a full trial for proper adjudication after evidence has been presented. The application of Section 4 of the Act in the present case is a complex issue that requires further examining of evidence. At this stage, adjudicating on the point of benami transaction would be a premature determination of a mixed question of law and fact, which is only suitable for a trial after examination of evidence. Therefore, it cannot be decided merely on assertions made in the application seeking rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 18. In the present case, if the statements in the plaint are taken to be true, it cannot be said that it does not disclose a cause of action and the plaint shall be rejected. This is a matter of trial, the result of which would depend upon the evidence adduced by the appellant/plaintiff. At this stage, the Court is not concerned with the correctness of the averments, except to state that the appellant/plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proving this case. Insofar as the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, this court will proceed only that far, to examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action or suit is barred by law and no further. The genuineness, validity and binding nature of document will have to be adjudicated at the appropriate stage in trial of the case after the parties adduce oral and documentary evidence. 19. At this outset, it is relevant to mention that the court concerned shall not reject the plaint based on a claim of benami transaction at the initial stage. The issue shall be addressed during the trial, after all parties had an opportunity to present their case as well as the evidence in support of their case.

Justice Malviya also observed: "20. So far as the ground of limitation is concerned, it is needless to emphasis that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. The fact regarding the date on which the appellant/plaintiff was acquainted with the knowledge of the essential facts from which cause of action arose, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence, the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. Law is well settled that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC if the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, such as, the date of knowledge of a cause of action, as it requires a full trial and evidence. In view thereof, such issues cannot be decided summarily without allowing the parties to lead evidence on arising of the cause of action.

The case of the plaintiff was that Krishna Devi, the defendant no. 2 is the mameri sister of plaintiff and defendant no.1 is the husband of defendant no. 2. There is very close and cordial relations among the plaintiff and both the defendants no 1, Raj karan Chaudhary and 2 and on account of such close relationship and mutual confidence, the plaintiff purchased in the year 1980 lands measuring 17.5 decimals of Plot No. 262, 9.5 decimals of Plot No. 265 and 14.5 decimals of Plot No. 264 situated at Mauza, Sitamarhi Bazar, the detail of the land was mentioned under schedule 1 of the plaint, through two registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980. However the sale deeds were registered in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff was retired government employee under Road Construction Department of Government of Bihar. It is specific case of the plaintiff that at the relevant time the plaintiff was in Government service and due to certain technical and service-related constraints he could not purchase the lands in his own name as well as in the names of his family members, and therefore, with the consent of the defendant nos. 1 and 2, the sale deeds were obtained in their names, they being merely name-lenders, while the entire consideration was paid by the plaintiff. It was further alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff is the real purchaser of the land, paid the entire consideration money and came in exclusive and peaceful possession over the disputed land since the date of purchase. The defendants were simply name lenders of the plaintiff. The original sale deed was in the custody of the plaintiff and the defendants had no right, title and interest in the disputed land nor have they ever come in the possession of the land in question. 

The case of the plaintiff as stated in the plaint was that the plaintiff constructed a residential house over the disputed land and from roadside he constructed commercial shops and let out to different persons for carrying business for which they are paying rent to the plaintiff and in the residential house the plaintiff is residing along with his family members. It was also alleged that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and have no right, title or interest therein, but taking advantage of the sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 standing in their names, they started creating obstruction and attempted to alienate a portion of the suit land, which gave rise to the cause of action in April 2011, culminating in the filing of the suit seeking declaration that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 are merely name-lenders, declaration of the plaintiff’s title and confirmation of possession, along with consequential injunction. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 in their joint written statement denied the claim of the appellant/plaintiff and stated that the suit was not maintainable in the eyes of law and the suit was barred by estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and also by limitation. It is stated that the plaintiff has no cause of action or locus standi to file the suit. 

The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had specifically asserted that the suit is hit by the provisions of the Act and was also barred under the provisions of the Bihar Consolidation of Holding and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 as consolidation operations are applicable in that area. It was also stated that the suit property was grossly undervalued and proper court fee had not been paid, the market value of the land being much higher than what was shown by the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had categorically denied that the plaintiff purchased the suit land or paid the consideration amount, or that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were name-lenders or benamidars. It was asserted that defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 independently purchased the respective portions of the suit land by registered sale deeds dated 02.01.1980 out of their own funds, came in possession thereof from the date of purchase, got their names mutated, paid rent and municipal dues, and constructed residential houses and shops at their own expense. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 had also denied the alleged cordial relationship or fiduciary confidence pleaded by the plaintiff and have stated that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land, and has never constructed any house or shops, and never collected rent from any tenant. It was also stated that the plaintiff was not in custody of the original sale deeds, as only certified copies were filed, which itself falsifies the entire claim. It was, therefore, stated that the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the suit land and was not entitled to any relief, declaratory or injunctive. 

On April 23, 2012, an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was filed on behalf of the intervenor, namely Pintu Kumar, praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by law, particularly under Section 4 of the Act, and the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. It was also evident from the record that the said intervenor claimed interest in a portion of the suit land on the basis of subsequent registered sale deed executed in his favour by the defendant no. 1. The Trial Court allowed his prayer for impleadment as a defendant and while considering his application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, proceeded to examine the maintainability of the suit at the threshold. 

After hearing both the parties, upon due consideration of the pleadings, materials available on record, and the settled position of law, the Trial Court found that the core controversy in the present case is crystallized into two determinative issues for adjudication, namely, first, whether the present suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act; and second, if so, whether the provisions of the Act operate as a statutory bar to the maintainability of the suit.  

Based on facts and circumstances of the case and upon consideration of the materials available on record, Trial Court held that although earlier benami transactions were not invalidated retrospectively, the suit was instituted after the coming into force of the Act, was squarely governed by the provisions of the Act. The Trial Court concluded that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were barred by Section 4 of the Act, as the plaintiff sought to enforce rights in respect of property standing in the names of others on the plea of benami. It was further held that, in view of such statutory bar, the suit was not maintainable and fell within the scope of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Trial Court accepted the application filed on behalf of defendant no.3 (intervenor Pintu Kumar) dated April 23, 2012 and dismissed the suit as not maintainable.

Aggrieved  by the judgment and decree dated June 4, 2012 passed by the Trial Court, whereby the plaint was rejected by allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the suit was dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of statutory bar under the Act. It was in this backdrop that the first appeal was filed in the High Court. 

The counsel on the behalf of the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the pleadings and evidence on record in their correct legal perspective and committed a grave error in rejecting the plaint. He submits that the appellant/plaintiff had specifically pleaded and proved that the entire consideration amount for purchase of the suit land was paid by him in the year 1980 and that the sale deeds were obtained in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2 only on account of close familial relationship and due to technical constraints arising out of the appellant/plaintiff being in government service at the relevant time. He also submitted that the appellant/plaintiff had been in exclusive, peaceful and continuous possession of the suit land since the date of purchase and he had constructed a residential house and commercial shops thereon. Moreover, he was residing with his family members and had inducted tenants, and had been paying municipal taxes and electricity charges, all of which clearly establish his possession and enjoyment of the suit property as the real owner. He submitted that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 never came in possession of the suit land and had not produced any evidence to show exercise of ownership rights. The Trial Court failed to draw the correct inference from long, uninterrupted possession coupled with payment of consideration and custody of original sale deeds by the appellant/plaintiff. He also submitted that the cause of action clearly arose when the defendant nos. 1 and 2, taking advantage of the sale deeds standing in their names, attempted to create third-party interest, necessitating the filing of the suit. He also submitted that the two sale deeds in question were registered on January 2, 1980 and the Act came into force on September 5, 1988. 

There was reference made to Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal & Ors. vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan reported in AIR 1996 SC 238 and held that the provision of Section 4 of the Act would not have retrospective effect and hence the suit in question would not be barred by Section 4 of the Act. The heading of Section 4 of the Act i.e., “Prohibition of the right to recover property held Benami” suggests that it prohibits right to recover property held Benami, but in the instant case there was no case for “recovery of property” from benamidar, in as much as, the property in suit was not in possession of benamidar. The specific case of the appellant/plaintiff was that he had been coming in possession of the suit land since its purchase on January 2, 1980 and he had constructed his residential house over the land where he was residing along with his family and he had constructed some shops over the suit land, which had been let out to different persons and a holding was created in the name of the appellant/plaintiff and electric connection in the house was taken in the name of his father and the entire premise was in one compact block within boundary wall and hence in the facts of the case the appellant/plaintiff was entitled for confirmation of his possession over the suit land, but the Trial Court had failed to take into consideration these aspect of the case and was illegally rejected the plaint on the basis of provision of Section 4 of the Act. He submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument, though not accepting, that the suit was barred by Section 4 of the Act, the benamidar's right to property under suit was  extinguished by operation of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the question as to whether ownership and possession can be pleaded alternatively was required to be considered at trial and it would not make the plaint barred by the provision of Section 4 of the Act. Moreover rejection of plaint must be on the basis of averments in plaint, for this he placed reliance on the judgement passed by the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram vs. Janak Singh and Ors. reported in (2012) 8 SCC 701 and Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 706.

He also submitted that from bare perusal of the plaint it would appear that complicated pleas and factual aspects were involved in the case and the same could be denied only at the time of trial and these aspects of the suit/case remained untouched by the Trial Court while deciding application for rejection of plaint as held by the  Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in AIR 2003 SC 759 and hence, rejection of plaint at the threshold of the proceeding was wholly illegal and unjustified. He further contended that the law is well-settled on the point that the power of rejection of plaint should be exercised sparingly and cautiously, as the provision related to rejection of the plaint, as envisaged under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are aimed at preventing vexatious and frivolous litigation, but the learned Trial Court had passed the impugned judgment and decree without taking into consideration these important aspects of the case. He submitted that for the aforesaid grounds, the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law and on facts and are liable to be set aside and the suit of the appellant/plaintiff deserves to be decreed as prayed for.

The High Court delivered five judgements in Birendra Kumar Sinha vs. Raj Karan Chaudhary & Ors., Ram Shankar Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sitbiya Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, the Department of Home, Government of Bihar, Anar Devi vs. The State of Bihar, through the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar and Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. on January 28.