Supreme Court reverses Justice Sandeep Kumar's bail denying order

In Amit Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 7-page long order dated February 13, 2026 reversing the order dated October 17, 2025 by Justices Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court against order of rejection of regular bail by the High Court and to seek bail. Justices Maheshwari and Chandurkar concluded:"....we direct to release the petitioner on bail on furnishing the suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the trial Court." 

Supreme Court noted that "....the maximum sentence as prescribed for the offence is up to three years and the petitioner has already served about eight months, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on bail." 

The petitioner had approached the High Court for regular bail in connection with a P.S. Case of 2024 registered for the offence under Sections 304(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner is accused of chain snatching. The face of the petitioner was captured in the CCTV footage and the informant had identified the petitioner as one of the accused. The petitioner was in custody since April 5, 2025 and had 13 criminal antecedents. 

Justice Kumar had observed: "5. Considering the gravity of the offence and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, this Court is not inclined to grant regular bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, this application for regular bail stands rejected."

Trial court records withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court takes note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case, sets aside judgements by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated 25.01.2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 shall stand restored on the file of the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto. As we are informed that the appellants were on bail, prior to their conviction and sentencing, they would be entitled to the same relief pending the fresh exercise to be undertaken by the trial court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed in the aforestated terms. The appellants shall be released on bail on such appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the trial court, pending the exercise to be undertaken by the trial court pursuant to this order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The Appellant no. 2 was Awadhesh Kumar Gupta @Awadhesh Sah. The private Respondents were: Ram Sevak Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and  Srilal Sah. The tagged matters included Ram Sevak Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Mahanth Sah vs. The State of Bihar.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter."

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station – Adapur, District – East Champaran, Bihar). The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgements of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. In the former Sanjay Sah, Awadhesh Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and Srilal Sah were the appellants besides Ram Sevak Shah. In the latter Inar Sah, Vijay Sah Son, Ajay Sah, Mahanth Sah and Ramekbal Sah were the appellants besides Laxman Sah.   

In the penultimate paragraph of his judgement in both Ram Sevak Shah case and Laxman Sah case, Justice Shah had concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence, which has been brought on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellants beyond pale of any reasonable doubt as well as considering the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecution, which has not been discredited during the course of cross-examination coupled with the postmortem report and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find that there is no reason to create any doubt in our minds. We have examined the materials available on record and do not find any apparent error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, hence, the same does not require any interference." 

The order reads: "We find from the material placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellants that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731, was brief to the point of being cryptic and was limited to just three questions. The first question was as to whether the accused had heard the statement of the witnesses. The second question was as follows:- “There is an allegation against you that on 24th February 2007 at 06.30 A.M., in village Harpur, police station Harpur, district East 1 For short “the Code”Champaran, you along with other accused for the fulfillment of a common purpose, killed Shivnath Shah, brother of Suresh Prasad, the complainant in this Case, by hitting with sticks, what do you have to say in this regard?” The third question was as to whether the accused had something to say in his defence. The aforestated three questions were posed to one of the accused/appellants, namely, Mahanth Sah. However, the same format was adopted for examination of the remaining accused. This is not in dispute. Needless to state, the aforestated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again." 

The Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused. 

The Court recollected its earlier decision by a 3-Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra”(1973) 2 SCC 793, wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 

 

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Supreme Court sets aside part of conditional bail order by Justice Purnendu Singh

In Mithilesh Kumar Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 3-page long order dated February 13, 2026 wherein, it concluded:".....we set aside that part of the order of the High Court by which the High Court has directed the petitioner to appear before the District Mediation Centre for the purpose of mediation. 9. The rest of the part of the order granting anticipatory bail is not touched." 

The Supreme Court recorded that "there are some civil litigations also pending between the parties." Justice Singh too had observed:"4. Considering the nature of dispute to be purely civil in nature and the parties are contesting Civil Suit No. 135 of 2024 for specific performance of contract since 17.03.2025, at
the same time, I find that the parties can resolve their dispute outside the Court amicably by way of mediation. 5. The petitioner is directed to appear before the learned District Court on 25.09.2025 at 10.30 am." As per the allegation made in the FIR, petitioner and his son had committed forgery with the informant by receiving Rs. 55 lacs for executing a piece of land appertaining to Khata No. 130, Khesra Nos. 220 measuring total area two Bigha.

Notably, Justice Purnendu Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated September 10, 2025, wherein, he had concluded: "6. Learned District Court is directed to take necessary action to refer the matter before the learned mediator of the District Mediation Center. 7. Learned Mediator of the District Mediation Center concerned shall make his/her best efforts to settle the dispute amicably between the parties and thereafter submit his/her report before the concerned learned District Court, well within a period of three months, till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner in connection with the aforesaid case.8. In case of failure on the part of the petitioner to appear on 25.09.2025 at 10.30 am. before the learned District Court or on any date fixed by the learned Mediator, the interim protection granted to the petitioner shall automatically lose its force. 9. In case, the parties fail to reconcile, then in that case, parties may avail appropriate remedy. 10. Accordingly, the present bail application stands disposed of."

Supreme Court observed:"6. The High Court thought fit to grant anticipatory bail but at the same time directed the petitioner to go for mediation. 7. We are of the view that once the High Court was convinced that a case was made out for grant of anticipatory bail, then the Court should not have asked the petitioner-accused to go for mediation." 

The petitioner, an aged person, had prayed for anticipatory bail before the High Court in connection with a Khanpur Police Station case of 2025 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 308(1), 308(5) and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, respectively.  Prima facie, the allegations against the petitioner was one of forgery and cheating. 

 

 

Supreme Court asserts "court's permission needed to arrest accused for offence added post grant of bail"

In Sumit vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan concluded:“In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” It held that an accused who is already on bail cannot be automatically re-arrested by the investigating agency merely because a new cognizable and non-bailable offence has been added in the charge sheet.

The Court observed that the investigating agency cannot automatically arrest the accused only because new offences have been added. The  agency must first obtain an appropriate order from the court that granted bail before proceeding with the arrest in respect of the newly added offence.

It examined what the legal position would be in such circumstances and whether the  agency could directly arrest the accused based on the newly added offences alone.

Drawing on its decision in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi, the recollected the following principles:

(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.

(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody.

(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.

(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal in a dowry death case against the Allahabad High Court's order granting a limited benefit of an anticipatory bail to the Appellant, the brother-in-law of the deceased victim. The High Court had ordered that the anticipatory bail order would be in operation till the filing of the charge sheet. 

Following High Court's denial of the extension of the anticipatory bail pursuant to the filing of the charge sheet, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.

Referring to 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2020) 5 SCC 1, the Court set aside the High Court's order. It observed: “once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry.”, and “the filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded.”

Consequently, the Court granted the benefit of the anticipatory bail to the Appellant. 

"preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations": Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court

In Huzaif Ahmad Dar vs. Union Territory of J&K & Ors. (2026), Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Arun Palli and Justice Rajnesh Oswal delivered a 6-page long judgement dated January 29, 2026, wherein it concluded:"....we are of the considered view that the judgment impugned in this appeal is not sustainable in the eyes of law and accordingly, the same is set aside. Resultantly, order of detention bearing Order No. 09/DMA/PSA/DET/2024 dated 20.04.2024, issued by the District Magistrate, Anantnag (respondent No. 2) under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, being unsustainable in law is, accordingly, quashed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case."  The judgement was authored by Justice Oswal. 

The High Court observed: "It is a well-settled principle of law that preventive detention cannot be sustained on the basis of stale, vague, or indefinite allegations. The detaining authority is under a mandated constitutional obligation to furnish clear, precise, and proximate grounds. This requirement is a prerequisite to enabling the detenu to exercise his/her right to make an 'effective representation,' a fundamental safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India." 

Justice Oswal relied upon the judgment of the Supreme court in Jahangirkhan Fazalkhan Pathan vs. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad & Anr, (1989) 3 SCC 590, wherein it has been held that the order of detention passed on vague grounds deprives the petitioner of his right to make an effective representation against the order of detention." He also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Saeed Zakir Hussain Malik vs. State of Maharashtra’ (2012) 8 SCC 233, wherein the Court held: “27. As regards the second contention, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the delay in passing the detention order, namely, after 15 months vitiates the detention itself. The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Though there is no hard and fast rule and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf, however, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, it is incumbent on the part of the court to scrutinize whether the Detaining Authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned. 28. It is also the duty of the court to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstance of each case. We are satisfied that in the absence of proper explanation for a period of 15 months in issuing the order of detention, the same has to be set aside. Since, we are in agreement with the contentions relating to delay in passing the Detention Order and serving the same on detenue, there is no need to go into the factual details.”

Drawing on these decisions, Justice Oswal observed: ".....the impugned detention order, founded on vague, stale, and unsupported material, cannot be sustained. 14.We have carefully examined the judgment rendered by the learned Writ Court and are of the considered view that the issues noticed and discussed hereinabove have not been adequately addressed and, in fact, have escaped the attention of the learned Writ Court.

Patna High Court delivered 17 judgments on Feb. 3

Patna High Court delivered 17 judgments on February 3, 2026 in Md. Pappu @ Md. Saba Uddin vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Janam Prasad vs. The State of Bihar, Arun Kumar @ Arun Kumar Bhagat vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Bilas Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Anubhuti Srivastava vs. The State of Bihar, Vikas Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rajiv Kumar Ranjan vs. The State of Bihar, Manju Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Prawin Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Anmol Kumar Sowarnkar @ Anmol Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Hari Shankar Kashyap vs. The State of Bihar, Arun Kumar Roy vs. The State of Bihar, Anupam Dvivedi vs. The State of Bihar, Vishalakshi vs. The State of Bihar, Mithun Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Atendra Thakur vs. The State of Bihar and Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited vs. M/s Tirhut Food Products.

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on Feb. 4

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on February 4, 2026 in Pramod Kumar Premi vs. The State of Bihar, Kanhaiya Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Apollo Trauma Centre, Represented through Dr. Rajat Kumar, The New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Krishna City Hospital Represented through Dr. Manoj Kumar Jayaswal, The Managing Director, Bihar State Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. vs. M/s Guptaji brothers Rice Mill Pvt.

Patna High Court delivered 13 judgements on Feb. 5

Patna High Court delivered 13 judgements on February 5, 2026 in The Oriental Insurance Company Limited. vs. Mustari Khatoon, Shubham Kumar vs. The Bihar State Sunni Waqf Board, Guddu Miyan @ Haider Ali @ Guddu Khan vs. The State of Bihar, Dharmendra Kumar @ Dharmendra Kumar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Shashikant Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sunil Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Mukesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Ram Bahadur Prasad, vs. State of Bihar, Lok Prakash Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Seraj Anwar vs. The State of Bihar, Garbhu Sah vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Government of Bihar, Sipahi Mahto @ Anil Kumar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna and Sonu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar.

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on Feb. 6

Patna High Court delivered seven judgements on February 6, 2026 in  Vishal Gupta vs. Nandita, Sanjeev Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Somnath Patel vs. The State of Bihar, Rajeev Ranjan vs. The State of Bihar, Satpal Kumar Sahu vs. The State of Bihar, Arvind Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar and Sugriw Ray vs. The State of Bihar.

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha sets aside the order by Director of Industries, Bihar, directs reimbursement of interest subsidy

In M/s Responce Renewable Energy Limited vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Department of Industry, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court delivered a-19-page long judgement dated February 9, wherein, he concluded:"51. The rejection of the claim of the petitioners on the ground that the 2014 Amendment Policy/resolution applies rrospectively is not tenable in the facts of the case, particularly when the petitioners’ units fulfilled the criteria of Board’s approval as well as commencement of the commercial production, dates of which are after coming into force of the 2014 Amendment Policy. 52. The respondents have erred in treating the dates of Board’s approval as the disqualifying factor when the condition of approval itself was that the approval would be considered from the date of power purchase agreement and the power purchase agreement is subsequent to the coming into force of the 2014 Amendment Policy. 53. Accordingly, this Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioners fulfilled all the criteria as mentioned in the resolution, dated 11.06.2015 for applying the 2014 Amendment Policy for grant of interest subsidy. 54. Considering the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the petitioners have fulfilled eligibility conditions including
valid project approval and are entitled for grant of 2 per cent interest subsidy on the amount of term loan from the date of commencement of the commercial production, i.e. 30.03.2017 and 28.02.2017, respectively for a period of seven years. 55. Accordingly, the impugned orders, dated 12.09.2022 and 26.09.2022, are set aside. The respondents are directed to calculate the amount of subsidy on interest as per the claim raised by petitioners in their respective applications within a period of one month from today and pay the said amount within a maximum period of four months from today." 

Justice Sinha examined the question as to whether the petitioners companies were entitled for grant of 2 per cent interest subsidy under the Bihar Industrial Incentive Policy, 2011, and Industrial Incentive (Amendment) Policy, 2014. 

The other four Respondents were: Principal Secretary, Department of Industry, Government of Bihar, Director of Industries, Department of Industry, Government of Bihar, Deputy Director (Technical), Department of Industries, Government of Bihar and General Manager, District Industry Centre, Patna. Thwe writ was heard along with Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 16335 of 2022 M/s. Glatt Solution (P) Limited. The petitioners were the companies engaged in the generation of solar power who had filed the writ applications for quashing of the orders, dated September 12, 2022 and September 26, 2022, respectively, by the respondent-Director of Industries, Bihar and for a direction to the respondents to reimburse the interest subsidy of 2 per cent on the term loan of rupees 49.92 crores and 16.50 crores, respectively. 

The petitioners had prayed for a declaration that the companies are entitled for the interest subsidy from the date of commercial production, i.e. March 30, 2017 and February 28, 2017 respectively till seven years, as provided under the Industrial Incentive (Amendment) Policy, 2014. I. A. No. 1 of 2025 was filed in both the writ applications for amendment in the prayer for a direction to the respondent-State to disburse the amount of Rs. 5,57,84,700/- and Rs. 1,90,66,231/- respectively towards the interest subsidy for a period of 7 years from April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2024 and March 1, 2017 to March 1, 2024 respectively, and also to pay interest at the rate of 2 per cent upon the entire calculated amount. With a view to promote industrial development within the State of Bihar, the Government of Bihar formulated and notified the Bihar Industrial Incentive Policy, 2011, promising various fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to attract industrial investment. The 2011 Policy was approved by the State Cabinet and notified in the Official Gazetteon June 9, 2011, issued by the Department of Industries and published on June 10, 2011.

Upon mid-term review of the 2011 Policy, the State Government decided to introduce certain amendments in the 2011 Policy. Accordingly, the Department of Industries issued the Industrial Incentive (Amendment) Policy, 2014 (2014 Amendment Policy) dated January 5, 2015, which was made effective from the date of its notification. The 2014 Amendment Policy was framed by introducing specific amendments to the 2011 Policy, and Clause 8 thereof inserted sub-paragraph (vi) in Paragraph 4 of the 2011 Policy, thereby providing for grant of interest subsidy at the rate of 2 per cent on the interest charged on term loans availed from the banks or financial institutions, payable for a maximum period of seven years from the date of commencement of commercial production. In furtherance of the promises made under the 2014 Amendment Policy, the Department of Industries, Government of Bihar, issued a notification dated June 11, 2015, laying down the procedure for grant of interest subsidy and specifying the date from which the amendment would take effect. The petitioner company had applied for approval of the proposal for establishment of 25 MW power generation solar unit, initially proposed to be set up at Madhubani, Buxar, or Chapra. However, due to certain practical difficulties, the proposed location of the unit was subsequently changed to Nawada, which was approved by the State Investment Promotion Board (SIPB) in its meeting held on March 26, 2012 from the date of power purchase agreement. Thereafter, the proposal of the petitioner company for establishment of the solar power generation unit at Nawada was approved by the State Cabinet on July 2, 2013 and the said approval was duly communicated to the petitioner company July 11, 2013. For the purpose of implementation of the project, the petitioner applied for a term loan, amounting to Rs. 49.92 crores, from the State Bank of India for its 10 MW power generation project at Nawada, and the Bank sanctioned the term loan dated February 7, 2017. The petitioner company commenced its commercial production with effect from March 30, 2017 and obtained the commissioning certificate dated July 14, 2017. After commencement of commercial production, the petitioner company applied for and was granted incentive under the 2011 Policy, and the Department of Industries issued sanction order, dated October 16, 2017, sanctioning capital subsidy of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- in favour of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner, vide application, dated September 14, 2018, applied before the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nawada, seeking grant of interest subsidy at the rate of 2 per cent on the term loan availed by it, in terms of the 2014 Amendment Policy.  Pursuant to the said application, the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nawada, conducted site inspections of the industrial unit of the petitioner on November 16, 2018 and November 22, 2018, and found the unit to be functional and operational and recommended for grant of interest subsidy to the Department of Industries dated November 28, 2018. 

Despite the the recommendation, no decision was taken by the respondents on the petitioner’s claim for interest subsidy, compelling the petitioner to approach the High Court by filing CWJC No. 3578 of 2020, which was disposed of by the High Court, vide order, dated Juy 12, 2021, with a direction to the respondents to consider and dispose the representation of the petitioner. The petitioner communicated the High Court's order, dated July 12, 2021, to the respondents by way of representations, dated July 16, 2021 and March 14, 2022; however, when the respondents failed to comply with the directions of this Court within the stipulated reasonable time, the petitioner was constrained to file contempt petition, bearing MJC No. 1188 of 2022, and the High Court, vide order, dated August 31, 2022, directed the respondents to comply with the earlier order passed in CWJC No. 5932 of 2020. Thereafter, the respondents passed the impugned order, vide Memo dated September 12, 2022.

The petitioner company established 3 MW solar power generation unit at Nawada by availing a term loan of Rs. 16.50 crores from the State Bank of India. The proposal of the petitioner company for establishment of the solar power generation unit at Nawada was approved by the SIPB from the date of power purchase agreement, in its meeting, dated May 24, 2013. The petitioner entered into the Power Purchase Agreement with BSPHCL on September 14, 2016. The petitioner submitted the proposal for extension of the date of the commercial production, which was taken up by the SIPB and approved it in the meeting held on January 13, 2017, which was communicated to the petitioner, vide letter dated February 3, 2017. The petitioner, vide application, dated September 14, 2018, applied before the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Nawada, seeking grant of interest subsidy at the rate of 2 per cent on the term loan availed by it, in terms of the 2014 Amendment Policy.

It was pointed out by the petitioners' counsel that in a Division Bench decision of the High Court, in the case of M/s Sunny Stars Hotels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2020 (2) PLJR 327, dated July 29, 2019, wherein the Division Bench, while interpreting the 2011 Policy, held that it is exhaustive in itself and contains all requirement while no dependence on any other document and also that the denial of the benefit under the 2011 Policy on the ground of non-approval by the Chief Minister was held to be bad.

On the point of prospective and/or retrospective application of the 2014 Amendment Act, Justice Sinha quoted paragraphs 189 and 190 of the decision of the Supreme Court, in M. Rajendran and others vs. M/s KPK Oils and Proteins India Pvt. Ltd. and Others, reported in 2025 SCC ONLINE 2036. It reads: “189. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory Rule or a statutory Notification, may physically consist of words printed on papers but conceptually, it would be a great deal more than ordinary prose. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation should be interpreted, the one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have retrospective operation and the idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. 190. If legislation confers a benefit on some persons without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public generally, and such conferment appears to have been the legislators object, then the presumption would be that such legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant a retrospective effect.”

Supreme Court requests Patna High Court to register a writ petition under Article 32 in Supreme Court as a Writ Petition under Article 226

In Shankar Prasad Sharma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe passed a 3-page long order dated February 3, 2026, wherein, it concluded: "2. We are not inclined to entertain this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. However, as the Writ Petition was pending before this Court for sometime, we deem it appropriate to transfer the Writ Petition to the High Court of Judicature at Patna for registering it as a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The Registry is directed to transmit the entire records of the writ petition to the High Court expeditiously. 4. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. The parties will be entitled to raise all contentions and objections before the High Court and it is for the High Court to consider the case on its own merits and dispose it of. 5. In view of the fact that the petition has been pending for sometime, we request the High Court to take up and dispose of the Writ Petition as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of five months from today. 6. In view of above, the Writ Petition is disposed of." 

Besides the State Of Bihar, the other Respondents were: Principal Secretary, Higher Education, Special Secretary, Higher Education and Director, Higher Education. The Petitioners were: 1. Shankar Prasad Sharma, 2. Dr. Dinesh Kumar Mahto, 3. Dr. Arun Kumar Choudhary, 4. Dr. Alok Kumar Singh, 5. Dr. Arun Kumar Singh, 6 Dr. Md. Aasaduzaman, 7. Dr. Meena Kumari, 8. Dr Sashi Ranjan, 9. Dr. Awadhesh Kr. Singh, 10. Dr Dinesh Prasad Sinha, 11. Dr. Balbodh Yadav, 12. Dr. Prahlad Kumar, 13. Dr. Naresh Chandra Vidyarthi, 14. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Bariar, 15. Dr. Nand Kishore Singh, 16. Surendra Kumar, 17. Banke Bihari Singh, 18. Ashok Kumar Jha, 19. Kishori Sah, 20 Arun Kumar Ghosh, 21. Prabhuranjan Prasad Singh, 22. Krishna Sevak Pd. Singh, 23. S.M. Imran Ahmad, 24. Manoj Kumar Singh, 25. Ratish Kumar, 26. Ratnanshu Thakur., 27 Awadh Kishor Saha, 28 Arun Kumar, 29. Pratima Kumari, 30. Himanshu Shekhar Mishra, 31. Kaushal Kishore Singh, 32 Devendra Prasad Sharma, 33. Ira Singh, 34. Sunil Kumar Mandal, 35. Poonam Kumari, 36. Subodh Kumar Singh, 37. Devashish Laheri, 38. Poonam Kumari Gupta, 39. Minakshi Kumari, 40. Seema Gupta, 41. Balram Prasad Singh, 42. Sunil Kumar Bhakta, 43. Kanta Devi, 44. Dr. Ravindra Kumar, 45. Parvin Kumar, 46 Satyendra Rai, 47. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 48 Ram Kumar Singh, 49. Satendra Kumar, 50. Arbind Prasad Sinha, 51. Subodh Kumar Mondal, 52. Umesh Chandra Tiwari, 53. Satyasheel Kumar Mishra, 54. Tarapati Singh, 55. Mohsin Ahmad, 56. Shyamal Biswas, 57. Birendra Thakur, 58. Mohammad Altaful Haque, 59. Krishna Murari Acharya, 60. Madan Kumar Jha, 61 Dheera Choudhary, 62 Syed Mohammad Sayeed Akhter, 63. Shankar Prasad, 64 Ashok Kumar, 65 Siya Ram Singh, 66. Chandeswar Pd. Singh, 67. Ramasharya Prasad, 68. Dr. Narendra Tiwari, 69. Surendra Kumar Singh, 70. Dr. Raish Singh, 71. Mahesh Prasad, 72. Ashok Kumar, 73. Kundan Kumar Singh, 74. Dr. Sharad Kumar, 75. Vipendra Kumar Sinha, 76. Dr. Sheo Kumar Yadav, 77. Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, 78. Dr. Ram Sewak Singh, 79. Anil Kumar, 80. Md. Shabbir, 81 Baban Singh, 82. Paras Nath Kumar, 83. Haridwar Singh, 84. Arun Kumar Singh, 85. Ashok Kumar Singh, 86. Dr Vijay Kumar Sinha, 87. Dr. Binay Kumar Singh, 88. Dr. Raadhe Shayam Pd. Sinha, 89. Dr. Arun Kumar Singh, 90. Abdus Salam, 91. Ashok Kumar Mahto, 92. Abhay Kumar Chowdhari, 93. Prafulla Kumar, 94. Ashok Kumar Singh, 95. Dharmshila Kumari, and 96. Bishwendra Pratap Singh.

The case was filed in the Supreme Court on March 6, 2024, It was verified n April 10, 2024 and registered on September 24, 2024. 

 

Executivisation of Judiciary

"In republics, it is plain that as many formalities at least are necessary as in monarchies. In both governments they increase in proportion to the value which is set on the honor, fortune, liberty, and life of the subject. In republican governments, men are all equal; equal they are also in despotic governments: in the former, because they are everything; in the latter, because they are nothing."

-Montesquieu, Chapter 17 on Constitutional Government, The Spirit of Laws (1748) 

Section 20 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) reads:"Directorate of Prosecution. (1) The State Government may establish,—(a) a Directorate of Prosecution in the State consisting of a Director of Prosecution and as many Deputy Directors of Prosecution as it thinks fit; and (b) a District Directorate of Prosecution in every district consisting of as many Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors of Prosecution, as it thinks fit. (2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed,—(a) as a Director of Prosecution or a Deputy Director of Prosecution, if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than fifteen years or is or has been a Sessions Judge;(b) as an Assistant Director of Prosecution, if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years or has been a Magistrate of the first class. (3) The Directorate of Prosecution shall be headed by the Director of Prosecution, who shall function under the administrative control of the Home Department in the State.(4) Every Deputy Director of Prosecution or Assistant Director of Prosecution shall be subordinate to the Director of Prosecution; and every Assistant Director of Prosecution shall be subordinate to the Deputy Director of Prosecution. (5) Every Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor and Special Public Prosecutor appointed by the State Government under sub-section (1) or sub-section (8) of section 18 to conduct cases in the High Court shall be subordinate to the Director of Prosecution. (6) Every Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor and Special Public Prosecutor appointed by the State Government under sub-section (3) or sub-section (8) of section 18 to conduct cases in District Courts and every Assistant Public Prosecutor appointed under sub-section (1) of section 19 shall be subordinate to the Deputy Director of Prosecution or the Assistant Director of Prosecution.(7) The powers and functions of the Director of Prosecution shall be to monitor cases in which offences are punishable for ten years or more, or with life imprisonment, or with death; to expedite the proceedings and to give opinion on filing of appeals.(8) The powers and functions of the Deputy Director of Prosecution shall be to examine and scrutinise police report and monitor the cases in which offences are punishable for seven years or more, but less than ten years, for ensuring their expeditious disposal.(9) The functions of the Assistant Director of Prosecution shall be to monitor cases in which offences are punishable for less than seven years.(10) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (7), (8) and (9), the Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director of Prosecution shall have the power to deal with and be responsible for all proceedings under this Sanhita.(11) The other powers and functions of the Director of Prosecution, Deputy Directors of Prosecution and Assistant Directors of Prosecution and the areas for which each of the Deputy Directors of Prosecution or Assistant Directors of Prosecution have been appointed shall be such as the State Government may, by notification, specify.(12) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the Advocate General for the State while performing the functions of a Public Prosecutor."

Section 20(2)(a) and Section 20(2)(b) of the BNSS permit Sessions Judges, Magistrates and retired judicial officers to be appointed as Directors, Deputy Directors, and Assistant Directors of Prosecution in State-run prosecution departments.

This arrangement allows judges to function within an executive-controlled prosecutorial hierarchy, which, according to him, strikes at the core of judicial independence and violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Such a provision existed in the pre-independence Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 though it was done away with in the CrPC of 1973, the plea points out.

The CrPC of 1973 represented a crucial moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence as it institutionalised the understanding that investigation, prosecution, and adjudication must operate as distinct yet complementary functions, each insulated from the other’s coercive influence.

The BNSS of 2023, instead of building upon this framework disrupted it by centralising authority in the executive through the Directorate of Prosecution.

Under Section 20 of the BNSS, every State may establish a Directorate of Prosecution headed by a Director of Prosecution. The law places this Directorate under the administrative control of the State Home Department. All public prosecutors and assistant public prosecutors are made subordinate to this Directorate.

The provisions make serving or retired judicial officers eligible to occupy senior positions within the specified structure.

Supreme Court hears petition of West Bengal Chief Minister against Election Commission of India, challenging Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

In Mamata Banerjee vs. Election Commission of India (2026), Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul M Pancholi heard the writ petition filed by Mamata Banerjee, the longest serving woman Chief Minister of Bengal challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls in the State. The Court directed the ECI to file its response by February 9, 2026. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, has questioned the legality, timing, and manner of implementation of the SIR.

Mamata Banerjee is one of the senior most chief Ministers of country who has been a senior union minister in the past. 

Notably, SIR became controversial ahead of the assembly elections in Bihar. Although assembly election in Bihar were concluded in November 2025, the cases against SIR in Bihar filed in the Supreme Court has not been concluded as yet. 

Significantly, ECI has claimed that no appeals were filed from Meghalaya, Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, Chandigarh and Uttar Pradesh after the completion of the Special Summary Revision (SSR) exercise as of 6-10 January 2025. 

Can SSR process be compared with SIR process?

The Constitutional and legal provisions regarding eligibility to be registered as a voter and disqualifications for registration in an electoral roll are laid down in Article 326 of the Constitution of India and Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 respectively. The preparation of electoral rolls and elections are conducted in accordance with the Representation of People Act 1950, 1951, Registration of Electors Rules 1960, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. 

In accordance with Section 23 of the Representation of People Act 1950, the eligibility conditions to enrol as an elector are verified by the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) to his/her satisfaction.

Ahead of the upcoming assembly elections in Bengal, Mamata Banerjee is seeking following reliefs from the Court: 

A.Set aside ECI's SIR notification of June 24, 2025 and October 27, 2025. 

B. Direct ECI to conduct the forthcoming 18th Legislative Assembly elections in the State of West Bengal in the year 2026, on the basis of the existing Electoral Rolls, 2025 

C. Direct ECI to issue written instructions to all DEOs, EROs, AEROs and BLOs that cases involving name mismatches / spelling variations falling under the "Logical Discrepancy" category shall not be called for hearing, and that all such name corrections may be carried out suo motu on the basis of available records 

D.Direct ECI to upload all names of 'unmapped' and Logical Discrepancy cases online on the CEO and DEO websites 

E. Direct ECI to withdraw all hearing notices already issued in the past under the 'Logical Discrepancy category where the only issue is a name mismatch or spelling variation, and intimate the concerned electors accordingly. 

F. Direct the ECI to ensure that no voter marked under the Logical Discrepancy' category is deleted, and that while any anomalies may be duly rectified, no legitimate voter who has been successfully mapped to the 2002 electoral rolls and has submitted all requisite documents is disenfranchised 

G. Direct ECI to accept Aadhar Cards as proof of identity especially in cases of 'Logical Discrepancy' without insisting on any other documents 

H. Direct ECI to publish online names of all voters in respect of whom Form-7 has been received and to not allow any further bulk submission of Form-7 

I. Direct ECI to allow ERO/AERO to dispose of the cases locally where inter-state documents pending with DEO for verification beyond 5 [five] days 

J. Direct ECI to withdraw all Micro-Observers from the State of West Bengal 

K. In the alternative to prayer (j) above, direct ECI to ensure that Micro-Observers do not exercise any statutory power such as participation in hearings/verification of work done by ERO/AERO in any manner whatsoever with immediate effect 

L. Direct ECI to accept all documents issued by competent authorities of the State during the verification process 

M. Direct ECI to follow the procedure for disposal of cases by local inquiry/field inquiry in terms of point 5(a) and 5(b) of ECI's order dated 24.06.2025 and make necessary changes to the ERO/AERO portal/application to facilitate the same; 

N.All complainants submitting Form-7 be directed to remain present at the time of hearing;

West Bengal Chief Minister has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court against the Election Commission of India (ECI), challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process ongoing in the State. 

West Bengal Chief Minister informed the Court that "Only they have targeted Bengal on the eve of elections. Why, after 24 years, what was the hurry to do in two months what will take two years? When the festival season is there, when the harvest season is there, when people are in no mood to be in the city, they are troubling people issuing notices. More than 100 people have died. BLOs have died writing letters, because of the harassment of ECI. Many are hospitalised. Bengal is targeted. Sir, tell me,why not Assam? Why not North East?" She added:"58 lakh people are deleted. Living people are declared dead. They are targeting Bengal, only for Bengal they have appointed micro-observers. They want to bulldoze the people of Bengal".

She asserted:"The problem is, always our lawyers fight for the case and we are fighting from the beginning. But when everything is finished, when we are not getting justice, when justice is crying behind the door - then we thought, we are not getting justice anywhere. I have written letters to the Election Commission including all details, but no reply. I am a bonded labour. I am a very less important person, I am from a common family, I am not fighting for my party."

Her senior counsel submitted that only 11 days are left for the publication of the final list but over 1.36 crore persons included in the 'Logical Discrepancy(LD)' list are yet to be heard. 

The petition was filed on January 28, 2026 stating that the ongoing process will result in "large-scale disenfranchisement" in Bengal in particular. Several other States from South India are also wary about the SIR. 

Election Commission of India is yet to realize that sunlight of transparency is the best disinfectant. 

Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra quashes order by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna because "second attempt to re-agitate the same allegations,...is clearly barred in criminal jurisprudence"

In Om Prakash Sharma @ Om Prakash vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra delivered a 6-page judgement dated February 2, 2026 concluded:"The order dated 09.02.2018, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, in Complaint Case No. 3016(C) of 2017, and the entire criminal proceeding arising there from, is hereby quashed." 

The application was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order dated February 9, 2018, passed by the  Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, whereby cognizance was taken for the offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the petitioner in Complaint case of 2017, instituted by Opposite Party No. 2, namely, Rekha Kumari. Notice was issued to Opposite Party No.2/complainant, which was duly served and she appeared before the High Court.

Rekha Devi's case was that in the year 2015 she had taken a shop situated at A.G. Colony, Patna, on rent from the petitioner after allegedly paying a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on two different dates and advance rent of Rs. 24,000/-. It is alleged that after carrying out false ceiling and rack work and keeping garments worth about Rs. 10 lakhs in the said shop, a dispute arose between the parties, whereafter both the parties put their own locks on the shop. It is further alleged that the petitioner subsequently broke open the lock and committed theft of the articles kept therein. On the alleged inaction of the police, the present complaint was filed on August 7, 2017 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire complaint case was false, concocted and an abuse of the process of law. It was submitted that the complainant herself stated in the complaint petition that the police did not register her case, whereas Shastri Nagar P.S. Case No. 355 of 2015 had already been registered on the basis of information given by the Rekha Devi for the same set of facts and cause of action.

In the police case case, the petitioner had filed a discharge application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. which was rejected vide order dated March 17, 2018 by the  Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna.

The said order was challenged before the High Court in Cr. Misc. No.28532 of 2018, and the Court, vide order dated May 4, 2023, allowed the application and quashed the proceedings. Despite the same, the complainant has again initiated the complaint case on identical facts, which is impermissible in law.

The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature, arose out of a landlord-tenant relationship. The petitioner was the undisputed owner of the shop and the criminal colour was deliberately given to the dispute only to harass the petitioner. It was contended that the complaint petition did not disclose any material to prima-facie constitute the offence of theft under Section 379 IPC.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 as well as APP for the State opposed the application and supported the impugned order.

The counsel for the complainant submitted that the petitioner, without any prior information or consent of the complainant, unlawfully removed the articles kept in the shop and thereby committed theft, for which the present complaint case was instituted.

Justice Mishra observed:"....it emerges that the allegations levelled in the present complaint case are founded on the very same cause of action and identical set of facts which had earlier culminated in registration of an FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings. It further appears that the earlier proceedings, arising out of the same allegations, have already been set aside by this Court. The institution of the present complaint, therefore, amounts to a second prosecution on the same facts, which is impermissible in law....it is manifest that for the same cause of action and identical allegations, an FIR had already been lodged earlier, which ultimately stood quashed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court. The present complaint case is nothing but a second attempt to re-agitate the same allegations, which is clearly barred in criminal jurisprudence."

Justice Mishra relied on Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, categorically held that criminal proceedings can be quashed where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide intention and instituted maliciously with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused. He observed:"In the present case, initiation of a second criminal proceeding on the same facts, after failure in earlier proceedings, clearly falls within the categories laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra). Allowing such prosecution to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and result in harassment of the petitioner. 15. It is a settled principle of law that for the same set of facts and cause of action, a person cannot be subjected to repeated criminal prosecution, particularly when the earlier proceedings have already been adjudicated upon by a competent court. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order taking cognizance cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 17. Accordingly, the present application is allowed."

 

Justice Shailendra Singh upholds judgement by Ad hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Patna in a Sessions Trial of 2012

In Atendra Thakur vs. The State of Bihar  (2026), Patna High Court's Justice Shailendra Singh delivered a 20-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026 concluded:"... this Court finds the trial court’s approach in framing the charge under section 376 read with section 511 of the IPC against the appellant and convicting him for the same, to be correct. Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and there is no merit in this appeal, so, it stands dismissed. 20. The appellant is on bail, so, his bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the trial court within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this Judgment’s copy by the trial court and serve the remaining part of the sentence awarded upon him by the trial court. If the appellant does not surrender within the fixed period then the trial court shall take all necessary legal steps to get him in custody and put him in jail so that he can serve the remaining part of his sentence. 21. Let the judgment’s copy along with the trial court’s record be sent immediately to the trial court for needful compliance."

The criminal appeal was preferred by the appellant, Atendra Kumar, against the judgment of conviction dated April 16, 2014 and the order of sentence dated April 23,2014 passed by the Court of Ad hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Patna, in a Sessions Trial of 2012 arose out of Parsa Bazar P.S. case 2012, G.R. of 2012, whereby and whereunder the appellant was  convicted for the offence under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/. 

Justice Singh examined the applicability of the offence punishable under section 376 read with section 511 of the IPC in the present matter. As per the story narrated by the victim in her fardbeyan, the accused firstly followed her and thereafter ran behind her in a field and pushed her to the ground and climbed onto her body and started opening her pant but during that course when the victim cried, the appellant tried to escape upon seeing the people who ran to the place of occurrence after hearing the cry of the victim. The victim deposed almost similar story before the trial court in her examination-in-chief and remained firm to her stand in the cross-examination also. By these acts of the appellant as alleged by the victim, it can be deemed that he had crossed the stage of preparation and entered into the stage of attempting to commit the offence of rape. As the appellant’s acts clearly demonstrate the execution of his mens rea to rape the victim and his preparation had come to an end on that very moment when he pushed the victim to the ground on a wheat field and climbed onto her body and tried to open her pant. Though he could not succeed in committing sexual penetration, however, the appellant was about to commit rape upon the victim but could not succeed on account of raising an alarm by the victim and owing to the arrival of nearby people. 

The informant, who was the victim herself alleged that on April 14, 2012 at about 4:10 P.M., she went to the coaching centre run by one Gunjan Master, situated at village- Palanga Bagicha. After attending the coaching, she was returning alone to her home, when she saw the appellant coming from behind on a bicycle. Thereafter, when she reached near a ridge leading to her village, she left the road and chose a shortcut way to reach the village. After that the appellant started following her after leaving his bicycle in a field. The victim further alleged that when the appellant started following her, she, on account of being alone, started running, but the appellant chased and caught hold of her, closed her mouth by placing his hand, and pushed her to the ground of a wheat field with an intention to rape her. The victim further alleged that during the course of committing the occurrence, the appellant fell upon her body and tried to open her pant, but when she cried, some people started arriving at that place.

Thereafter, the appellant tried to flee, but he was caught by those persons. The appellant was assaulted by the people, and thereafter, the police were informed through mobile communication. After that the Station House Officer (SHO) and other police officials arrived there. As per the victim, she recorded her fardbeyan at 06:45 P.M. before the Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI), namely Din Bandhu Ram, of Parsa Bazar Police Station. On that basis, the formal FIR was registered baring Parsa Bazar P.S. Case No. 39 of 2012 for the offence under Section 376 read with Section 511 of IPC, that set the criminal law in motion.

CPI candidate Ram Narayan Yadav challenges election of BJP MLA Nitish Mishra & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey to hear election petition

In Ram Narayan Yadav vs. Nitish Mishra & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey will hear the election petition against Nitish Mishra, the current BJP MLA from Jhanjharpur, Madhubani on February 3, 2026. 

Communist Party of India (CPI) had fielded nine candidates for Bihar Assembly Election 2025 but all of them lost. Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna has filed an Election Petition on behalf of Ram Narayan Yadav, one of its candidates in the Patna High Court along with Advocate Dr. S.S.P. Yadav. The candidate is one  of 33 seats Left parties contested. Left parties secured only 3 seats. The result of the 2025 Bihar Assembly election was announced on November 14, 2025.

Under Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 there is a provision to challenge the validity of any election, irregularities in counting or violation of rules through election petition. The High Court has accepted the petition.

In exercise of powers under Section 80(A) (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court has nominated Justices S. B. P. Singh and Ashok Kumar Pandey to receive, try and hear the Election Petitions against election of Bihar Legislative Assembly, 2025 under Rule 6 of the Chapter XXI-E of the Patna High Court Rules, 1916.

The 45-day limitation period expired on December 29, 2025. Some 30 election petitions have been filed in the High Court.The filing of these petitions has created uncertainty for the newly elected MLAs. Now it is for the Court to decide their fate.

Also read: Justices S. B. P. Singh, Ashok Kumar Pandey hearing Election Petitions 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

Findings of Subordinate Judge, Chapra are erroneous and perverse. the judgment and decree of 1990 set aside:Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey

In Deomuni Devi & Ors. vs. Ram Autar Mahto & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 26-page long judgement dated February 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... it is clear that Ramjhari Devi was the daughter of Devnarayan Mahto, and as she was the daughter of Devnarayan Mahato, she has executed the sale deeds in favor of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, which is legal and binding. And as far as the claim of the plaintiffs regarding title on the basi of adverse possession is concerned, the same is not properly pleaded and proved. 65. Therefore, the findings of the learned trial court are erroneous and perverse. As such, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court is hereby set aside. 66. In result, this appeal is allowed. 67. Office is directed to draw decree accordingly."

The first appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree dated July 28, 1990 passed by 8th Subordinate Judge, Chapra in a Title Suit of 1985, wherein and whereunder the suit was decreed with cost. The plaintiffs/respondents had filed the Title Suit in  1985 for declaring their title on the disputed land and also for delivery of possession if the Plaintiffs are found dispossessed from any part of the disputed property. 

The case of the plaintiffs/respondents was that they be deemed as a part of the plaint. From perusal of the , it will be clear that Ram Bhajju Mahto was the ancestor of the Plaintiff's family. Ram Bhajju Mahto had two sons: Hitlal Mahto and Sukan Mahto. Hitlal was the elder son. Family was joint. Hitlal Mahto had a son, Dev Narayan Mahto, who died issueless 45 years ago; his wife had predeceased him. It was also submitted that in the RS Survey, all the joint family property along with other co-parceners was entered in Khata Number 96. In that RS Survey, the shares of Hitlal Mahto and Sukan Mahto are jointly shown. Before some time of survey, Hitlal Mahto, who was the Karta of the joint family, some lands were purchased in his name from the nucleus of joint family that is entered in Khata Number 129 of RS in the name of Hitlal Mahto, but the possession of both the brothers was there.

It was also the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents that Hitlal Mahto had separated from his brother in mess and residence, but the lands were not partitioned. Hitlal Mahto was issueless and had love and affection for the Plaintiffs. At the occasion of Dussehra in year 1943, a reunion took place between them. After the death of Hitlal Mahto, all the properties devolved upon Plaintiffs by way of survivorship, and that possession was without any obstruction and the names of Plaintiffs were entered in the records of ex-landlord. And, the Plaintiffs are getting rent receipts after paying the rent. The case of the Plaintiffs was that the title of the Plaintiffs was in continuance since 1950 and was in the knowledge of the Defendants and without their interference; as such, the title of Plaintiffs has been confirmed by way of adverse possession. It was also submitted that the enemies of the Plaintiffs had executed a sale deed in favor of Defendant Numbers 2 and 3, due to which there is some cloud of doubt on the title of the Plaintiff, hence the need for suit. It was further submitted that Defendants had wrongly stated in their written statement that the marriage of Dev Narayan was solemnized with Tetari Devi and Ram Jhari was daughter of Dev Narayan. Dev Narayan was married to one Kailashi Devi, daughter of Dular Chand, resident of Hajipur, who predeceased her husband issueless. Tetari is the daughter of Shivnandan, resident of Basant, and is wife of Kishun Mahto. Ram Jhari is daughter of Kishun Mahto. The case of the Plaintiffs was that the sale deed dated January 2, 1985 executed by Ram Jhari Devi in favor of Triloki Mahto and Dev Muni Devi, Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, was forged and fraudulent and was without consideration. It was also submitted that the deed was not acted upon. Ram Jhari Devi did not have title or possession over the lands of the deed, and the purchasers also did not receive possession of the land at any moment.

At the time of the death of Hitlal Mahto, the Plaintiff had possession over the entire stretch of land, and the sale deed in question is sham and fraudulent.  It was also submitted that Hitlal Mahto, Sukan Mahto, Dev Narayan Mahto and the Plaintiff were members of joint family. There was no partition between them. Hitlal Mahto was the Karta of the joint family. And, after the death of Sukan Mahto and Hitlal Mahto, Ram Avtar became the Karta of the joint family. Dev Narayan died in the lifetime of Hitlal.

The lands of the two sale deeds dated January 2, 1985 was detailed in Schedule 1 and 2 of the plaint which was the disputed land.

The counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Trial Court has decreed the suit without considering the fact that the Plaintiff-Respondent had no cause of action. Plaintiff-Respondent is neither the owner nor has right, title, and interest over the suit land. The Trial Court did not consider that the suit property was the self-acquired property of Ram Narayan, who died leaving behind his daughter Ram Jhari Devi, the Appellant, who is the owner of the suit. Ram Jhari Devi sold the same to the Appellant's ancestors who are the rightful owner of the suit property. The story set up by Plaintiff in the pleading was self-contradictory. As such, cannot be relied upon. Learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that at one place the Plaintiffs-Respondents claim that they are the owner of the disputed land, and in the next para of the plaint, the case of the Plaintiffs is that the title of the Plaintiffs is confirmed by adverse possession. The counsel for the Appellants has submitted that no one can have adverse possession on his own land. Adverse possession is the hostile possession against the real owner. The Appellants' counsel  also submitted that the Plaintiffs/Respondents had nowhere stated as to when their possession was hostile to the interest of Appellants as they had claimed that the land belongs to them. It was also submitted that it was well-settled law of pleadings that a Plaintiff cannot make contradictory claims; however, the defendant was at liberty to make contradictory defenses. He submitted that Trial Court could not consider that the question of title by adverse possession does not arise as there cannot be any question of hostile title or possession in joint family property. 

The Trial Court did not consider the story of partition and reunion as set up by Plaintiff was false as there was no document of reunion. The Trial Court had not considered that Ram Narayan was the son of Hitlal and Ram Jhari Devi was the daughter of Dev Narayan and grand-daughter of Hitlal. The Trial Court had not considered the documentary evidence that was exhibited wherein Plaintiffs admitted that Ram Jhari was the daughter of Ram Narayan and grand-daughter of Hitlal. 

The Trial Court did not consider the admissions by Plaintiff in the Exhibits which completely demolish the case of Plaintiffs. It was submitted that the documentary evidence adduced by the Appellants clearly establish that Ram Jhari Devi is the daughter of Dev Narayan Mahto and grand-daughter of Hitlal. The Trial Court relied on the oral evidences that Ram Jhari gave the document and money to Ram Avtar and the same doe not seem to be true without considering that she in good faith gave the documents and money to her uncle. 

The Trial Court failed to consider that the case of the Plaintiff about adverse possession cannot be accepted with the case of title as well. It was further submitted that the Trial Court should have considered the oral evidences of the Appellant and should have disbelieved the PWs. As such, it has been prayed to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 

The defendant’s case was that the case of the plaintiffs was not maintainable and the plaintiffs have no title and interest in the suit property. It was said Hitlal had a son: Dev Narayan Mahto who was married to Tetri Devi daughter of Shiv Nandan Mahto of village- Aami and Ram Jhari Devi is their daughter. Khata No. 129 was acquired by Hitlal Mahto after the death of Hitlal Mahto and the death of the parents of Ram Jhari Devi in the lifetime of Hitlal Mahto, the properties came in the possession of Ram Jhari Devi. Khata No. 129 was not acquired through the joint family fund and the same was acquired by the personal income of Hitlal Mahto out of his earnings in Assam and as such, Sukan Mahto or the plaintiff Ram Avtar Mahto had no joint possession along with Hitlal Mahto. Ram Jhari Devi used to manage her properties with the help of the persons of his nanihaal and the usurp was enjoyed by her. Ram Jhari Devi was a plain, simple and illiterate lady and as such, if some documents have been forged and prepared against her, the documents are not binding upon her. 

The case of the defendants/appellants was that for meeting her own purposes, the said Ram Jhari Devi executed a sale deed in favour of the defendants and the purchasers/defendants came into possession of the suit property by virtue of the sale deeds executed by Ram Jhari Devi. It was also alleged that the plaintiffs have a larger income than what is shown by them to save the court fee. The case of the defendants was that in case of 685 and 785 under the Ceiling Act, the sale deeds have been accepted by the plaintiffs and a compromise was effected with the defendants. So, the suit was hit by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence.

The counsel for the respondents submitted that the trial court had considered all the documentary and oral evidence of the parties and had rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents. He also submitted that at the stage of first appeal, the High Court can reappraise the evidence and in reappraisal of the evidence, if this Court finds that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs have completed their title by adverse possession is superfluous but otherwise, the suit was liable to be decreed then the same may be accordingly made.

The counsel for the respondents brought to the notice relevant provisions of CPC Order 41 Rule 33. Rule 33 reads: Power of Court to appeal- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection  and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be  exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees]:[Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to made such order].

After considering the pleadings of the parties, trial court framed the following issues :-
(i) is the suit as framed maintainable?
(ii) have the plaintiffs got cause of action?
(iii) have the plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the suit land ?
(iv) have the defendants right, title, and interest in the suit land?
(v) is the suit barred by law of limitation ?
(vi) any other reliefs or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are entitled to ?
The Same was decreed on contest with cost and it is held and declared that plaintiffs have right title and
interest over the suit land and defendants possesses no right title.

Justice Pandey observed: "During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has admitted that the finding of the trial court regarding completion of adverse possession of respondents/ plaintiffs should not have been made and it has also been argued that the finding is not on merits but that is a superfluous finding, and notwithstanding that the case of the respondents is proved. 35. As against this, the main contention of the appellants is that trial court has not considered the documentary evidences of the appellants and that the finding of the learned trial court regarding adverse possession of plaintiffs/respondents is against the established law."

Justice Pandey examined whether the finding of the trial court regarding adverse possession is sustainable in the eye of the law?

The counsel for the appellants relied on a judgment of Supreme  Court in Kishundeo Rout and Ors. vs. Govind Rao and Ors. in SLP Civil Number 22070 2025. In para 20 of the said judgment reads: “20. The plea of adverse possession is not always a legal pleas. Indeed, it is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved. A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued. He must also the nature of his These are show whether his possession was open and undisturbed. all questions of fact and unless they are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them. (Therefore, in normal cases an appellate Court will not allow the plea of adverse possession to be raised before it.) There is no doubt that in some cases, the plea will be allowed for the reason that in some form or the other allegation upon which it can be raised might have been made at the time and the facts necessary to prove the plea were brought before the court and proved.”

Justice Pandey recorded: "54. Admittedly, the disputed land has been sold by Ramjhari Devi to defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3. The sale deeds have been executed by Ramjhari Devi; that much is the admitted position. But the case of the plaintiff is that as Ramjhari Devi is a stranger to the family of the plaintiff, she has got no right and title over the disputed land, and likewise, her transferee also did not get any title out of those transactions."

Deomuni Devi case was one of the 18 judgements in which judgements were delivered February 2, 2026. The other 17 judgements were delivered in St. Pauls International School vs. The State of Bihar, The State of Bihar vs. Dileep Kumar, Birendra Prasad Mehra vs. The State of Bihar, The Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank vs. Rai Yatish Chandra Sharma, Jivachh Ray vs. The State of Bihar, Rai Yatish Chandra Sharma vs. The Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank through its Chairman, Om Prakash Sharma @ Om Prakash vs. The State of Bihar, Priynashu Mishra @ Priynashu Kumar Mishra @ Ashutosh Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar, Anshu Devi vs. The State of Bihar, Mukesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Amar Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Badri Narayan Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Lakshuman Tiwary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., Pawan Singh @ Paban Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Pawan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar, Rakesh Kumar Bishwas vs. The State of Bihar and Kumar Patel vs. The State of Bihar.

Victim cannot appeal against Inadequate sentence u/s 372 CrPC, such remedy lies only with the State:Justice Alok Kumar Pandey

In XXX v. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 42-page long judgment dated January 20, 2026 held that a victim has no statutory right under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to file an appeal on the ground that the sentence imposed is inadequate, and that the power to seek enhancement of sentence is vested exclusively in the State Government under Section 377 CrPC.

Justice Pandey was hearing an appeal filed by the victim seeking enhancement of the sentence and addition of further penal provisions, invoking the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. He observed: “A reading of the proviso makes it clear that so far as the victim’s right of the appeal is concerned, the same is restricted to three eventualities, namely, acquittal of the accused; conviction of the accused for a lesser offence; or for imposing inadequate compensation”.

Justice Pandey also explained that “…while the victim is given the opportunity to prefer appeal in the event of imposing inadequate compensation, at the same time, there is no provision for appeal by the victim for questioning the order of sentence as inadequate, whereas Section 377 Cr.PC gives the power to the State Government to prefer an appeal for enhancement of sentence.”

The appeal was instituted by the victim against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court, in a POCSO case.

The victim sought an enhancement of the sentence and also urged that additional penal provisions ought to have been applied.

The maintainability of the appeal was questioned on the ground that Section 372 CrPC does not permit a victim to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence, and that such power is statutorily reserved for the State Government under Section 377 CrPC.

The High Court interpreted Section 372 CrPC and its proviso. It noted that the main provision creates a general bar on appeals unless specifically provided under the Code or any other law. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, carves out a limited statutory right in favour of the victim to prefer an appeal only in three specified situations, where the accused is acquitted, where the accused is convicted for a lesser offence, or where inadequate compensation is awarded.

It stressed that while the proviso enables a victim to challenge inadequate compensation, it does not create any right in favour of the victim to challenge the sentence as being inadequate.

Justice Pandey contrasted the proviso to Section 372 with Section 377 CrPC, which expressly empowers the State Government to file an appeal seeking enhancement of sentence.

Drawing on precedents, including the decision of the Supreme Court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi (2010), the Court reiterated that the right to seek enhancement of sentence is vested only in the State, and that a victim cannot maintain an appeal on that ground under Section 372 CrPC.

The Court concluded that “…while it is open for the State Government to prefer an appeal for inadequate sentence under Section 377, Cr.PC, but similarly, no appeal can be maintained by the victim under Section 372, Cr.PC on the ground of inadequate sentence”.

The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court were affirmed.

Supreme Court's Justice Dipankar Datta upholds Justice Nitin Jamdar's judgement setting aside Justice A. Badharudeen's direction to Magistrate to recall his own order

In XXX vs. State of Kerala, 2026 SCC OnLine SC, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan delivered a 47-page long judgement dated January 27, 2026, wherein it upheld the 23-page long judgement dated November 13, 2024 by the Kerala High Court's Division Bench of Justices Nitin Jamdar  and S. Manu at Ernakulam which had set aside the 35-page long judgement dated October 18, 2024 by Justice A. Badharudeen, the Single Judge of the High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Datta and the High Court's Division Bench's judgement was authored by Justice Jamdar. His judgement dealt with the broader issues that relate to the exercise of independent jurisdiction by a Magistrate. 

The High Court's Division Bench concluded: "The impugned judgment dated 18 October 2024 and the order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 24 October 2024 in C.M.P. No.3288/2024 are quashed and set aside. 30. The proceedings in C.M.P. No. 3288/2024 filed by Petitioners be taken to their logical conclusion by the learned Magistrate as per law. We make it clear that regarding the factual issues and the interpretation of Section 175(4) of the BNSS, the learned Magistrate will decide the legal and factual position on its own merits, without being influenced by the observations made in the impugned judgment or this judgment. If any party is aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate, it is open to them to pursue the remedies as available in law." 

The ultimate paragraph of the Supreme Court's judgement noted that the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (JMFC), Ponnani had issued notice to the accused under Section 175(4)(b), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, giving them a chance to state their side of the story. The Court observed: "We leave it open to the appellant to participate in the proceedings before the JMFC and raise such points that are available to her in law, including that the actions of the accused police officers were not in discharge of their official duties and also that without considering the report that has been called for vide the order dated 11th September, 2024, an FIR should be directed to be registered by the jurisdictional police station. It is also clarified that the JMFC must first satisfy himself that the application under Section 175(3), BNSS is accompanied by an affidavit sworn or affirmed in accordance with the terms of Section 333 thereof."

Prior to this Justice Datta grappled with two questions-whether the single judge exceeded his jurisdiction? and whether in the present case, the alleged acts of the public servants were in the discharge of their official duties?  

With regard to the first question, he observed: "....we find that the appellant had sought directions for registration of an FIR, securing compliance with this Court’s directions in Lalita Kumari (supra), and for a declaration that the acts of the police officials were not in the discharge of official functions and, therefore, not covered by the protection afforded under Section 175(4), BNSS. 50. Should the Single Judge have entertained the writ petition, interpreted Section 175(4) and granted relief to the appellant? We think not. 51. As rightly held by the Division Bench, the Single Judge could not have granted relief that the appellant did not pray. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow (1984) 1 SCC 307, Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar (1991) 1 SCC 441 and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi (2010) 1 SCC 234 where this Court held that the writ court will, normally, grant relief that is prayed; and, though discretion to grant relief under Article 226 is wide, the writ court cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, proceed to grant a relief not even prayed by the petitioner. 52. Having prayed for directions in the writ petition to register an FIR and to secure compliance with the directions made by this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) and that too, at a stage, when the JMFC seized of the application under Section 210 read with sub-section (4) of Section 173, BNSS had called for a report in exercise of power conferred by sub- section (4) of Section 175, there was no occasion for the Single Judge to interpret sub-section (4) and interfere with the proceedings that had been set in motion pursuant to the order of the JMFC. The Single Judge would have been justified in interpreting the law if the order of the JMFC, by which he had called for a report in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS been challenged in a petition under Section 528 thereof or even under Article 227 of the Constitution – which is not the case here. The JMFC having called for a report from the superior police officer by his order, it was a judicial order passed in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 175. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423 has held that a judicial order in a civil matter cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948, the principle has been extended by this Court to judicial orders passed in criminal matters. Notwithstanding that such a judicial order could not have been challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and despite the absence of any challenge to the JMFC’s order, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to pass an order in accordance with the law that such Judge declared. This was plainly impermissible. Nevertheless, as directed by the Single Judge, the JMFC proceeded to direct registration of an FIR against the accused persons. In effect, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to recall his own order – which again constitutes exercise of a power unknown to the law of criminal procedure. 53. We, thus, agree with the Division Bench that the facts before the Single Judge did not call for an interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS." 

With regard to the second question as to whether in the present case, the alleged acts of the public servants were in the discharge of their official duties, Justice Datta observed: "54. The answer to this question should well be avoided having regard to the particular jurisdiction of the High Court, which the appellant had invoked, coupled with the pendency of the appellant’s application before the JMFC. We, thus, refrain from so answering lest any observation prejudicially affects any party to the proceedings before the JMFC. Invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by the appellant was ill-advised. Not only did the appellant approach the writ court when proceedings before the JMFC under Section 175, BNSS were underway and thereby indulged in pursuing parallel remedies, no interference was even merited having regard to the relief claimed. 55. Be that as it may, at the insistence of the parties, we now proceed on a limited examination as to whether the appellant could at all have sought any declaratory relief of the nature claimed before the Single Judge in the writ petition. 56. Although declaratory relief can, inter alia, be sought before a writ court and granted by it upon establishment of a threatened breach or an apprehended breach of a legal right at the instance of a respondent, being a public authority, the nature of declaratory relief prayed by the appellant could not have been granted by the writ court without a challenge being mounted to the order of the JMFC calling for a report. Seeking a declaratory relief that the acts of offence committed by the accused public servants did not arise in the discharge of official duties by them without the order of the JMFC (calling for a report) being challenged would have necessarily required the writ court to embark on a fact-finding exercise in that behalf, as if it were a court of a magistrate. A writ court is a court exercising high prerogative writ jurisdiction; such court could not have been urged by the appellant to convert itself into a court for conducting sort of a magisterial inquiry. The Single Judge overlooked this fundamental flaw. 57. Thus, no relief could have been granted by the High Court to the appellant in exercise of writ jurisdiction." 

Justice A. Badharudeen, the Single Judge erred in granting relief which the appellant did not pray for. He directed the Magistrate to recall his own order –which again constitutes exercise of a power unknown to the law of criminal procedure.