Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad set aside conviction of 5 in Ara Civil Court bomb blast case, upholds escape charges for 2

In The State of Bihar vs. Lamboo Sharma (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad delivered a-176 page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, in the penultimate paragraph, it concluded: "....we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish any of the charges against the appellants Shyam Vinay Sharma, Rinku Yadav, Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Anshu Kumar. The impugned judgment and order of conviction of these appellants is hereby set aside and they are acquitted of all the charges. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other cases. The conviction of the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay of all the charges except under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, are hereby set aside. The sentence imposed by the learned trial Court on these two appellants for the offence under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code is upheld. Since both the appellants are in jail, they are to be set at liberty if they have already undergone the sentence imposed for the offence under section 224 of I.P.C. and their detention is not required in any other cases."

Chief Justice Sahoo authored a 162-page long leading judgment and Justice Prasad authored a 14-page long concurring judgement. 

The High Court concluded: "In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1150 of 2019 filed by appellant Shyam Vinay Sharma, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1162 of 2019 filed by appellant Rinku Yadav, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1185 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Naim Miya @ Naim Miya, Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1246 of 2019 filed by appellant Md. Chand Miya @ Chand Miyan and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1271 of 2019 filed by appellant Anshu Kumar are allowed. Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1210 of 2019 filed by appellant Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1290 of 2019 filed by appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay are allowed in part.  The death sentence reference is answered in negative." 

Ravindra Kumar was the Advocate for the appellant and Shashi Bala Verma and Ajay Mishra were was the Additional Public Prosecutors for State of Bihar. Pratik Mishra was the Amicus Curiae. Ravindra Kumar, was also the Amicus Curiae to represent the case of Rinku Yadav.

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the Death Reference No.01 of 2024, the reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to section 407 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 submitted to the High Court by the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial Case No.35 of 2016 for confirmation of death sentence imposed on Lamboo Sharma @ Munna Sharma @ Sachidanand Sharma vide judgment and order dated April 5, 2023 so also the judgment and order dated August 17, 2019 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2016. 

As per the first information report lodged by Sub-Inspector Gauri Shankar Pathak before the Inspector Satyendra Kumar Shahi, S.H.O., Ara Town Police Station at Civil Court premises, Ara on January 23, 2025 at 1:35 p.m., approximately at about 11:25 a.m., a prisoner van carrying prisoners from the District Jail, Ara, arrived near the Court hazat (lock-up) for their appearance in the Court. After the van stopped, a female prisoner was first disembarked, followed by the other prisoners. A total number of 37 prisoners, including one female prisoner, were in the van. After the female prisoner was taken to the hazat, when three male prisoners were being escorted towards the Court hazat, Nagina Devi, a woman standing on the road, south to the prison van, detonated a bomb. The bomb blast caused severe injuries to Constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) of the armed forces, who was on duty to bring the prisoners from the jail to the Court so also to Havildar Shivji Prasad Singh and Constable Dwarika Prasad Pathak, both posted at Sadar Court, Ara and fifteen to sixteen persons present in Court also suffered severe injuries. The woman who detonated the bomb and was approximately 30 years old also suffered severe injuries on her face and the other parts of her body got mutilated. Smoke from the bomb spread everywhere, causing stampede and people started running hither and thither and taking advantage of such chaos, two prisoners i.e. appellant Lamboo Sharma and appellant Akhilesh Upadhyay, who were the two male prisoners amongst the three male prisoners disembarked from the prisoner van, escaped. The unknown woman who detonated the bomb died at the spot and the injured constable Amit Kumar (the deceased) who was sent to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment, was also declared dead by the doctor. All the other injured persons were immediately shifted to Sadar Hospital, Ara for treatment. It is further stated in the F.I.R that the name of the woman, who died in the bomb blast, was not known to the informant. The woman used to come to the Court previously when appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay were coming to the Court for their Court appearances and she used to meet those two appellants. The informant believed that the woman carried out the bomb blast to help the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from the judicial custody, in which she herself was also killed. The bomb blast occurrence was the result of criminal conspiracy carried out by the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhya and the deceased unknown woman and other unknown accused persons helped the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay in escaping from judicial custody. Prior to this bomb blast incident, in the year 2009, appellant Lamboo Sharma with the help of other accused persons, had also detonated a bomb in the Ara Court premises in which one Advocate was killed and many others got injured. In the 2009 bomb blast occurrence committed in the Ara Court premises, appellant Lamboo Sharma was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court and some other cases were also pending against him for trial before the Court. 

Notably, as per prosecution case, the appellant Lamboo Sharma was inside the jail and on the date of occurrence, he was produced along with others in a prisoner van from jail in the campus of Civil Court, Ara and after bomb blast, he escaped from judicial custody. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed that the F.I.R. story that the deceased unknown woman was previously coming to the Court and meeting the two appellants cannot be accepted. in the case of Utpal Das and others vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 6 Supreme Court Cases 493 that the first information report does not constitute substantive evidence. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker or for contradicting him and in such a case, the previous statement cannot be used unless the attention of the witness has first been drawn to those parts by which it is proposed to contradict the witness. 

In his judgement, Chief Justice Sahoo pointed out that the prosecution did not succeed by adducing cogent evidence in establishing any previous meeting between the deceased woman and appellants either in jail or in Court complex. 

He noted that vital incriminating circumstance was not put in accused statement. The circumstance as deposed to by P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 that the deceased woman was trying to handover the bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma or Akhilesh Upadhyay was not put to any of them in their accused statements recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C.

In Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406, it has been held that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused under section 313 of Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him and the Court must take note of such explanation. It is further held that the circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and it must be excluded from consideration.

In Indrakunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1364, it has been held that the object of section 313 of Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused and this process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict, which is not a matter of procedural formality but based on cardinal principle of natural justice. It is also held that the circumstances that are not put to the accused while recording the statement under the section 313 of Cr.P.C. are to be excluded from consideration and the Court is obligated to put, in the form the questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence. Non-compliance with the section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision.

In Ganesh Gogoi vs. State of Assam reported in (2009) 7 SCC 404, relying upon the earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2000) 8 SCC 740, it was held that the provisions of section 313 of Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem’ has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under section 313 of Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.

In Shaikh Maqsood Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2009) 6 SCC 583 and Ranvir Yadav vs. State of Bihar reported in (2009) 6 SCC 595, theSupreme Court has held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning under section 313 of Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction. 

Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the humble view that since the prosecution is utilizing the evidence of these three witnesses i.e. P.W.10, P.W.15 and P.W.26 regarding the attempt made by the unknown woman to hand over a bag to the appellants Lamboo Sharma and Akhilesh Upadhyay against these two appellants, which is a vital circumstance, the learned trial Court was required to put this circumstance, in the form of questions to these two appellants seeking for their explanation. Since the same has not been done, we are of the view that it has actually and materially prejudiced them and has resulted in the failure of justice as it has deprived them in giving their explanation. Thus, in view of the settled law, we are not able to use such particular circumstance against any of them and it must be excluded from consideration."

The judgement of the High Court took note of the withholding of statement of the daughter of the deceased namely Soni Devi, whose statement was recorded both under sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., who could have thrown light on the use of mobile no.8083172236 by her mother by the prosecution and non-examination in the trial court. It reads: "Law is well settled that the statement of a witness recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is one which is given by witness in Court on oath in presence of the accused. Statement of a witness under section 164 of the Code is recorded in absence of accused and as such it is not substantive evidence. The statement of a witness under section 164 Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. During course of trial, if the witness does not support the prosecution case and declared hostile by the prosecution then the prosecution with the permission of the Court can confront his previous statement made before the Magistrate to him. A statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used either for corroboration of the testimony of a witness under section 157 of the Evidence Act or for contradiction thereof under section 145 of the Evidence Act." 

In State of Delhi vs. Shri Ram reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 490, it is held that the statements recorded under section 164 of the Code are not substantive evidence in a case and cannot be made use of except to corroborate or contradict the witness. An admission by a witness that a statement of his was recorded under section 164 of the Code and that what he had stated there was true would not make the entire statement admissible, much less could any part of it be used as substantive evidence.

In Baij Nath Sah vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 6 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a statement under section 164 can be only utilized as a previous statement and nothing more.

Chief Justice Sahoo recorded that the evidence on record clearly indicated that when the bomb blast took place, there was darkness and nothing was visible in the darkness for about ten to fifteen minutes and the people were running hither and thither to save their lives. In such a scenario, merely because the Micromax mobile phone set was lying nearer to the body of the deceased intact, it is very difficult to accept that the deceased woman was the user of such mobile phone. When material witnesses who could have thrown light that the deceased had got any link with such Micromax mobile have been withheld, adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution. 

In Takhaji Hiraji vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 145,  it has been held that it is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined, it would not have supported the prosecution case. The Court of facts must ask itself as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer be positive, then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. 

There is no evidence on record that Savitri Devi in whose name the mobile number was registered which was lying near the deceased woman or the three mobile subscribers namely Sanjay Kumar, Musa Nut and Vijay Prasad were not available to be examined. Had they been examined, Savitri Devi could have thrown light as to how her mobile phone set was lying nearer to the deceased woman at the spot and whether she had handed over the same for the use of the deceased. Similarly, the three mobile subscribers would have thrown light as to in whose possession mobile SIM cards were there for its use. 

Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "We are of the view that an essential part of the prosecution case, which could have been proved by adducing the evidence of the aforesaid four witnesses has not been done. The examination of such witnesses was very crucial to establish the link between the deceased woman and the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, we are constrained to draw adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding such important witnesses."

With regard to the electronic evidence in the form of call detail records (CDR) and tower location data of the mobile numbers which were produced by the prosecution, Amicus Curiae submitted these were not admissible in evidence in absence of requisite certificate under section 65(4) of Evidence Act. The certificate under section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act which is a pre-requisite for admissibility of electronic evidence has not been brought on record and therefore, the electronic documents brought on record by the prosecution by way of exhibits are completely inadmissible.

The  judgement noted that the I.O. has stated in the cross-examination that the CDR does not bear the signature of any official and that no statement was recorded from the person from whom the CDR was obtained. Neither any Nodal Officer of the telecom (service provider) nor any person occupying responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device has been examined in this case. 

Notably, Section 59 of the Evidence Act states that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. As per section 3 of the Evidence Act, the expression ‘electronic records’ shall have the meaning as assigned in the Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 2(ta) of 2000 Act defines ‘electronic record’ which means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro form or computer generated micro fiche. Section 61
of the Evidence Act states that the contents of documents may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Section 62 of the Evidence Act defines ‘primary evidence’ as meaning the documents itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 of the Evidence Act speaks of the kind or types of ‘secondary evidence’ by which documents may be proved. Section 65 of the important and it states that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in certain cases which have been enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) of such section. Whereas ‘existence’ goes to ‘admissibility’ of a document, ‘contents’ of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence. 

Section 65A of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. Section 65B of the Evidence Act speaks of ‘admissibility’ of electronic records which deals with ‘existence’ and ‘contents’ of electronic records being proved once admissible into evidence. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, if the conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof of production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that ‘document’ as defined by section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include ‘electronic records’. 

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act refers must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2) (a) to 65(2)(d) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively.

The judgement reads:"....we are of the view that mere absconding of the two appellants from judicial custody may not be alone sufficient to hold that they in connivance with others caused the bomb blast in the Ara Civil Court complex on the date of occurrence...." 

Notably, Lamboo Sharma, the appellant was lawfully detained for commission of various offences and he escaped from judicial custody and section 224 of I.P.C, inter alia, provides for punishment if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, therefore, Chief Justice Sahoo observed: "we are of the humble view that the learned trial Court has rightly found him guilty under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code." 

In his concurring judgement, Justice Prasad made observations with regard to appointment of Amicus Curiae wherein he drew on Supreme Court's judgement in Bhola Mahto vs. The State of Jharkhand reported in 2026 INSC 257 which had referred to the decision of the Court in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2019) 20 SCC 196. He concluded:"11. I believe that the procedure followed in the present case in the matter of appointment of Amicus Curiae and securing the presence of the convicts particularly condemned prisoner and giving them an opportunity to interact will set a precedent."

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha dismisses a civil writ, terms it "a textbook case of delay and laches where the petitioner has chosen to wake up from the slumber after nearly two decades"

In Surjeet Singh Sahni vs. State of U.P. and Others, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 536, Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices M.R Shah and B.V. Nagarathna has held that mere filing representation does not extend the period of limitation and if it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file representation and /or directing the authority to decide the representation. Patna High Court relied on this decision to dismiss a civil writ on April 1, 2026. 

In its 6-page long judgement dated February 28, 2022, Supreme Court's Division Bench concluded:"The High Court has rightly refused to grant any relief which as such was in the form of specific performance of the contract. No writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall be maintainable and/or entertainable for specific performance of the contract and that too after a period of 10 years by which time even the suit for specific performance would have been barred by limitation. 7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the present special leave petition and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed." 

The petition had approached the Supreme Court through a special leave petition because he was aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment  and order dated September 9, 2021 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ C No.40336 of 2017 by which the High Court had dismissed the said writ petition. The petitioner entered into a Sale Deed with the respondent –NOIDA vide Sale Deed dated 19.09.2001 whereby the petitioner sold a Plot No. 163 of Khata No. 254 to the NOIDA under the provisions of Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and in terms of the Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA. According to the petitioner, Clause No. 12 of the Sale Deed clearly provided that a plot of 10% area (to be calculated of the total land sold) shall be allotted to the petitioner on payment of 10% of the amount as being paid under the Sale Deed. In addition, it clearly recorded that "Original Farmer" shall also be entitled to "Rehabilitation Bonus". After a period of 10 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed, the petitioner made a representation to NOIDA vide representation dated March 10, 2010 requesting to allot a plot as agreed in terms of the Sale Deed. That thereafter the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.5599 of 2011 before the High Court inter alia praying that directions to the NOIDA to allot 10% of the land of the acquired area of the land of the petitioner for Abadi purposes in terms of Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per Resolution in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board held on January 7, 1998. Though the writ petition was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed and though the writ petition was barred by delay and laches, the High Court entertained the writ petition, however, disposed of the writ petition vide order dated April 7, 2017 directing the NOIDA to decide the representation of the petitioner expeditiously and preferably within a period of six weeks. NOIDA rejected the representation. 

Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the NOIDA dated May 23, 2017 rejecting the representation, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.40336 of 2017 by which the petitioner again prayed to allot 10% plot to him as provided under Clause 12 of the Sale Deed dated September 19, 2001 and as per the Resolution passed in 102nd meeting of NOIDA Board on January 7, 1998. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order dismissed the writ petition inter alia holding firstly, that Writ Petition arising out of contract between parties is not maintainable and petitioner should have filed a Suit for specific performance; secondly, Writ Petition has been filed after a delay of 16 years and delay is fatal for challenge to acquisition or for any claim arising out of it; thirdly, Clause 12 of Sale Deed provided for allotment of land to original Khatedar and as the petitioner had purchased land in 1970 therefore it's clear that petitioner was not original agriculturist; and the establishment of NOIDA in 1976 shall have no bearing on the matter. 

Justice Shah who authored the judgement observed: "The High Court by passing the order dated 07.04.2017 as such did not realise and/or appreciated that the writ petition itself was required to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as the same was filed after a period of 11 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed under which the right was claimed. We have come across number of such orders passed by the High Courts directing the authorities to decide the representation though the representations are made belatedly and thereafter when a decision is taken on such representation, thereafter it can be said on behalf of the petitioner that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Therefore, when such orders are passed by the High Courts either relegating the petitioner to make a representation and/or directing the appropriate authority to decide the representation, the High Courts have to consider whether the writ petition is filed belatedly and/or the same is barred by laches and/or not, so that in future the person who has approached belatedly may not contend that the fresh cause of action has arisen on rejection of the representation. Even in a case where earlier representation is rejected, the High Court shall decide the matter on merits." 

The judgement reads: "5. As observed by this Court in catena of decisions, mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within reasonable time. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court should dismiss it at the threshold and ought not to dispose of the writ petition by relegating the writ petitioner to file a representation and/or directing the authority to decide the representation, once it is found that the original writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. Such order shall not give an opportunity to the petitioner to thereafter contend that rejection of the representation subsequently has given a fresh cause of action."

Relying on this judgement of the Supreme Court, Justice Anil Kumar Sinha dismissed the writ petition in Ram Sewak Thakur vs. Chancellor of the Universities of Bihar Raj Bhawan, Patna & Ors (2026) by its 9-page long order dated April 1, 2026. The other six respondents were:The State of Bihar through the Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Director, Higher Education Department, Government of Bihar, 4. Lalit Narayan Mithila University, through its Registrar, Darbhanga, Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga, Pro Vice Chancellor-cum-Chairman of the Grievance Redressal Cell, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga and Registrar, Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga.

Justice Sinha observed: "10. Delay and laches is a recognized doctrine. “Laches” is derived from french language and means remissness and slackness. The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25, has held that laches involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right and therefore must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." He added: "In paragraph 21 and 22 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
“21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

Justice Sinha referred to the judgment of Chairman, State Bank of India and Another v. M.J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301, wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-“36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case." 

The petitioner had challenged the notification dated June 6, 2004 and December 26, 2009 seeking its modification after inordinate delay. Though the case of the petitioner is that he kept on filing representations on several occasion, but the petitioner has approached this Court after a long gap of nearly about 18 years raising claim of regularization on the post of Assistant. The petitioner retired on February 28, 2023 and woke up from deep slumber and filed this writ application after nearly two decades on a dead cause of action which can be termed as stale claim. 

Justice Sinha  concluded:" Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the writ court should be conscious and alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure and pleasure, the court is under a legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. 14. This court is of the view that this is a textbook case of delay and laches where the petitioner has chosen to wake up from the slumber after nearly two decades. Applying the law case, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is clearly barred by delay and laches. 15. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs." 

Supreme Court allows appeal, sets aside order by Jutice Dr. Anshuman in a kidnapping of minor case

In Nikhil Kumar @ Paras vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 5-page long order dated March 25, 2026, wherein, it allowed appeal, setting aside 2-page long order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court dated August 13, 2025. The order concluded:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 of BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 13.08.2025. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail, subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only) with two like sureties."

An FIR was lodged against two named accused persons, including the appellant, with the allegation that they kidnapped the daughter of the informant. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the alleged victim was recovered and has given her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. before the police and under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate. In her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., she did not make any allegation against anyone, rather, she disclosed that she had left the house of her own will. He also submitted that the criminal antecedent of the petitioner was clean.

Justice Dr. Anshuman had observed: "6. In the present facts and circumstances of the case, and considering that the victim is a minor, this Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail is hereby rejected." 

Apprehending arrest in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR of 2024 dated June 3, 2024 lodged with P.S. Wajirganj, District Gaya in respect of the offence punishable under Section 366A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail in terms of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The application for anticipatory bail was rejected by the High Court vide the impugned order, the instant appeal was preferred. 

Section 366 A of IPC deals with procuration of minor girl. It reads: "Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any minor girl under the age of eighteen years to go from any place or to do any act with intent that such girl may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." Punishment procuration of minor girl 10 years and fine. It cognizable and non-Bailable which is tried by Court of Session.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the offences alleged against him are wholly false inasmuch as there was a consensual relationship between the appellant and the so-called victim who was about 17/18 years of age at the relevant point of time; that in fact there was a marriage between the parties and subsequently owing to a marital dispute a criminal colour has been given to the entire dispute. He submitted that this Court by interim order dated December 3, 2025 had granted protection to the appellant herein subject to his cooperation in the investigation.; that the appellant was cooperating with the investigation. In the circumstances, the interim order may be made absolute. 

Supreme Court's prder is apparently based on the fact that the alleged victim  had gone with the petitioner of her own will. She had also stated that she married the petitioner and that they developed a physical relationship on 1–2 occasions.

Supreme Court sets aside onerous condition imposed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma while granting anticipatory bail

In Vinay Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. K Singh passed a 4-page long order dated March 25, 2026, wherein it concluded: "5. The appeal lies in a narrow compass. While granting anticipatory bail to the appellant, a condition has been imposed by the High Court vide the impugned order to the effect that the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- to the informant. Alleging the said condition to be onerous as the High Court has not considered it in the proper prospective, the present appeal is filed. 6. We find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. When the condition imposed while granting anticipatory bail is onerous, the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law, especially, when we are dealing with a case pertaining to the liberty of a person. 7. In such view of the matter, the impugned condition with respect to the payment of a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- stands set aside and the appeal is allowed, accordingly." The Court allowed the appeal after condoning the delay in case from Siwan pertaining to offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860..

In his 5-page long order dated Jnaury 23, 2025, Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and petitioner has clean antecedent, let the petitioner, above named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000 (Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan in connection with Mairwa P.S. Case No.03 of 2023, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure/Section 482(2) of BNSS,2023 and with other following conditions:-(I) At the time of furnishing bail bond, the petitioner shall deposit Rs.1,50,000/-(Rs.One Lac Fifty Thousand) by way of demand draft in favour of the informant and the learned Trial Court is directed to hand over the said demand  draft to the informant or his representative and petitioner shall pay rest amount of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rs. One Lac Ten Thousand) to the informant in the month of February, 2025. If the petitioner fails to pay the rest amount within the aforesaid period, the informant shall be at liberty to move before the learned court below for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. (II) Petitioner shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly represented on each and every date fixed by the Court and shall remain physically present as directed by the Court and on his/her absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, his/her bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below. (III) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail. (IV) And, further condition that the court below shall verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner and in case at any stage, it is found that the petitioner has concealed his/her criminal antecedent, the court below shall take step for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. However, the acceptance of bail bonds in terms of the above-mentioned order shall not be delayed for purpose of or in the name of verification." 

Now Supreme Court has set aside the onerous condition imposed by Justice Verma.    

Supreme Court waives cost imposed by Patna High Court's Division Bench in a matter of service termination

In Shashi Prakash vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Animal Husbandry Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice  anjay Karol and Augustine George Masih passed a 2-page long order dated March 25, 2026. The petitioner had challenged the order dated January 8, 2024 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.12099/2023 by Justice Mohit K. Shah and 2-page long order dated September 17, 2025 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.229/2024 passed by Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Alok Kumar Sinha of the Patna High Court. Supreme Court's order reads: "4. Petitioner can take recourse to such remedies as are otherwise available in accordance with law and in terms of the liberty already granted by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 08.01.2024. Insofar as the cost imposed by the learned Division Bench is concerned, the same is waived off. If the amount is already deposited, the same shall be refunded forthwith to the petitioner." 

In the order authored by Justice Bajanthri had observed: "....it is crystal clear that at the behest of learned counsel for the petitioner, both the litigations have been withdrawn. Upon that the appellant has assailed the aforementioned orders in the present LPA. 3. Thus the LPA is not maintainable, accordingly, the present LPA stands dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000/-. Cost shall be remitted in the Lawyers’ Association Welfare Benevolent Fund, Indian Bank...."

Prior to this, in his order as Single Judge, Justice Shah had recorded that in the  writ petition, the petitioner had prayed for issuance of a writ in nature of Certiorari to quash the order dated 31.05.1997 as contained in Memo No. 3177 dated 02.06.1997, passed by Respondent No. 2 communicated to the Respondent No. 4 vide Memo No. 442 dated 24.06.1997, by the Respondents No. 3 for its communicated the petitioner by the Respondent No. 3. Thereafter Memo No. 533 dated 24.06.1996 and Memo No. 7684 dated 29.08.1995 by which the service of the petitioner has been terminated on entirely non est ground. As post has been abolished issued by Respondent No. 3 and petitioner was relieved form his service and for issuance of a consequential writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to allow the petitioner to work on the his post at Gaya and not to interfere with them duties and also to make payment of his salary regularly with entire dues amount and pass order or orders, writ or writs and direction or directions.” Justice Shah had also recorded that the counsel for the petitioner sought not to press the present writ petition, however, seeks liberty on behalf of the petitioner to avail such other alternative remedies as are otherwise available under the law, for redressal of the aforesaid grievances. Liberty, so sought, is granted. 3. The writ petition stands dismissed as not pressed." 

The other three respondents were:Director, Animal Husbandry Department, Regional Animal Husbandry Department,through the Regional Animal Husbandry Director Magadh Range, Area, Gaya and District Animal Husbandry Department,through the District Animal Husbandry Officer Magadh Range, Gaya. 

 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, grants bail in a rape-murder case

In Dheeraj Jha @ Dheeraj Kumar @ Raghav vs. The State of Bihar, Supreme Court's Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 5-page long order dated March 25, 2026 setting aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court noted that upon completion of investigation the appellant was chargesheeted only for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and not other offences. The appellant was the superior of the deceased. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC were not made out and in any case, the deceased committed suicide pursuant to an alleged extra-marital affair with the appellant. Considering the aforesaid submissions made, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant, particularly, by taking note of the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant and the facts governing the case. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court. 

In his 3-page long order dated December 1, 2025, Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh rejected the prayer of the petitioner who sought bail in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 328, 376D and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with another co-accused, namely Dheeraj Jha, committed rape with the wife of informant and thereafter, administered her poison due to which, during course of treatment, she died. The senior counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. Informant was not an eye witness of the occurrence. As a matter of fact, wife of informant and the petitioner used to work at the same Office and on the alleged date and time of occurrence, wife of informant was getting unconscious and therefore, this petitioner, along with co-accused Dheeraj Jha, took her to a hospital and her husband was also informed. Moreover, charge-sheet had already been submitted and petitioner was in custody since November 19, 2024. The petitioner had got no criminal antecedents. A.P.P. for the State and
learned counsel for the informant had submitted that petitioner was named in the F.I.R. with specific accusation that he, along with another accused person, committed rape with the victim and administered her poison. On the way to hospital, the victim herself narrated the whole incident to the informant. Justice Singh had concluded: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, specific and direct nature of accusation and gravity of offence, the prayer for grant bail of to the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, considering the fact that the petitioner is in custody since 19.11.2024, the learned trial court is directed to
expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma in a dowry death case

In Lal Muni Devi vs. The State  of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 12-page long order dated March 25, 2026 wherein, it set aside a 4-page long order dated January 16, 2026 by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma of the Patna High Court. Supreme Court concluded: "12. The impugned order passed by the High Court releasing the accused on bail is wholly unsustainable. In a very serious crime like dowry death, the High Court should have been very careful in exercising its discretion. The High Court in its impugned Order has not discussed anything. All that weighed with the High Court was that the accused was in judicial custody and only two witnesses had been examined till the date the High Court passed the impugned order. 13. The High Court lost sight of many important aspects of the matter, more particularly the post-mortem report indicating number of injuries on the body of the deceased, and the presumption of commission of offence as provided under Section 114 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023." 

In Vikash Kumar vs. The State of Bihar  Cr. Misc. No. 80290 of 2025, in his order dated January 16, 2026, Justice Verma had concluded: "....let the petitioner, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Patna in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 365 of 2024", subject to certain specified conditions given the fact that the trial was not likely to be concluded in the near future and the petitioner was in custody since September 2, 2024.  

Prior to this in a 2-page long order dated May 16, 2025 in Vikash Kumar vs. The State of Bihar  Cr. Misc. No. 24229 of 2025, Justice Verma had concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail in connection with Gopalpur P.S. Case No. 365 of 2024 pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patna." Supreme Court appeared startled by change of the order within seven months. 

Notably, Justice Verma had recorded the submission of counsel for the Informant as well as APP for the State that the petitioner had committed the murder of the deceased and she has been died within one and half years of the marriage and witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution.   

This appeal against the order by Justice Verma had reached the Supreme Court at the instance of the original complainant (mother of the deceased), seeking to challenge the legality and validity of the Order passed by the High Court dated January 16, 2026, releasing the Respondent No.2 - original accused (husband of the deceased), on bail in connection with the First Information Report dated September 1, 2024 registered with the Gopalpur Police station, State of Bihar for the offence punishable under Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. respectively. It appeared from the materials on record that the deceased was married to the accused past 1½ years. On September 1, 2024, the deceased was found dead at her matrimonial home in suspicious circumstances with external and internal injuries all over her body. The mother of the deceased lodged an FIR on the very same day and date. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "18. We are informed that the trial is in progress. On this ground alone, the High Court should have declined bail. 19. We are of the view that the impugned Order deserves to be set aside. The bail granted by the High Court should be cancelled and the Respondent No.2 - accused should be directed to surrender before the jail authorities. We order accordingly. 20. We clarify that our present observations are limited to deciding whether the bail granted by the High Court is liable to be cancelled. The trial court shall proceed on its own assessment of evidence uninfluenced by any of the remarks made herein. 21. The Trial Court shall see to it that the trial is completed within six months from today. 22. We grant one week’s time to the Respondent No.2 to surrender before the jail authority, failing which the trial court shall issue a non-bailable warrant of arrest. 23. The appeal stands disposed of. 24. There is a connected petition filed by the State seeking the very same relief of cancellation of bail. 25. In view of the order passed in the petition filed by the de-facto complainant, we need not pass a separate order in the petition filed by the State. 26. The same is disposed of accordingly. 27. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 28. The Registry shall forward one copy of this order to the Registrar General of the High Court of Patna who shall in turn place it before the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna."

Remembering Asokan edicts on 2331st birth anniversary of Asoka, the Buddhist

In Outline of History (1920), H.G. Wells declared Asoka to be one of the six greatest men of history (the others being Buddha, Socrates, Aristotle, Roger Bacon and Abraham Lincoln), and he wrote about Asoka (in his "") in the following terms: "Asoka (264-227 B.C.) was one of greatest monarchs of history whose dominions extended from Afghanistan what is now the province of Madras. He is the only military monarch on record who abandoned. warfare after victory." 

Asoka had invaded Kalinga in 225 B. C. After the conquest, he declared that he would no longer seek conquest by war, but by religion, and the rest of his life was devoted to the spreading of Buddhism throughout the world. 

About Asoaka, Wells wrote: "He seems to have ruled his vast empire in peace and with great ability. He was no mere religious fanatic. But in the year of his one and only war he joined the Buddhist community as a layman, and some years later he became a full member of the Order, and devoted himself to the attainment of Nirvana by the Eightfold Path" including Right Aspiration, Right Effort and Right Livelihood. 

He set up long inscriptions rehearsing the teaching of Buddha. About thirty-five of his inscriptions survive even today. These are available at Serial nomination for Ashokan Edict sites along the Mauryan Routes.  These edicts can be seen at https://www.pbs.org/thestoryofindia/gallery/photos/6.html

The Asokan edicts hold the distinction of being the first written inscriptions in India following the decline of the ancient city of Harappa. Most of these edicts remain visible at their original locations due to being carved into immovable rocks and boulders. 

Through these inscriptions on stones and pillars, Asoka shared pivotal moments from his royal life. His words offer a glimpse into how he reshaped his own journey while attempting to transform the lives of people within his empire and even beyond its borders. 

The Asokan edicts convey a wide range of emotions, including sincerity and sentiment, discussions of death and devastation and authoritative commands. The remarkable preservation of these rock edicts is notable. 

Despite being over 2,200 years old, many of them appear almost exactly as they did when they were originally created. The survival of such ancient documents in their original form and locations is quite unusual. All of these rock edict sites are protected by Archaeological Survey of India.

The first known edict, sometimes classified as a Minor Rock Edict, is the Kandahar Bilingual Rock Inscription, in Greek and in Aramaic, written in the 10th year of his reign (260 BCE) at the border of his empire with the Hellenistic world, in the city of Old Jandahar in modern Afghanistan.

Asoka then made the first edicts in the Indian language, written in the Brahmi script, from the 11th year of his reign (according to his own inscription, "two and a half years after becoming a secular Buddhist", i.e. two and a half years at least after returning from the Kalinga conquest of the eighth year of his reign, which is the starting point for his remorse towards the horrors of the war, and his gradual conversion to Buddhism). The texts of the inscriptions are rather short, the technical quality of the engraving of the inscriptions is generally very poor, and generally very inferior to the pillar edicts dated to the years 26 and 27 of Asoka's reign.

There are several slight variations in the content of these edicts, depending on location, but a common designation is usually used, with Minor Rock Edict N°1 (MRE1) and a Minor Rock Edict N°2 (MRE2, which does not appear alone but always in combination with Edict N°1), the different versions being generally aggregated in most translations. 

The Maski version of Minor Rock Edict No.1 is historically particularly important in that it confirmed the association of the title "Devanampriya" with the name "Asoka", thereby clarifying the historical author of all these inscriptions. In the Gujarra version of Minor Rock Edict No.1 also, the name of Ashoka is used together with his full title: Devanampiya Piyadasi Asokaraja.

There is also a unique Minor Rock Edict No.3, discovered next to Bairat Temple, for the Buddhist clergy, which gives a list of Buddhist scriptures (most of them unknown now) which the clergy should study regularly.

His edicts (Dhamma Lipi) incised on pillars and rocks, in both condensed and elaborate versions are found all over the Indian sub-continent, from Shahbazgarhi now in Pakistan to Lauriya Nanadagarh in Bihar and from Girnar in Gujarat to Dhauli In Orissa and further south up to Yerragudi in Andhra Pradesh.

The Girnar edicts represented here by a metal cast of the inscribed rock are fourteen in umber, like those found at Yerragudi, Kalsi, Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra.

1. No living being may be slaughtered for sacrifice.

2. In and outside his dominions, Priyadarshi Ashoka has arranged for the medical treatment of man and beast.

3. Priyadarshi Ashoka ordered tours by his officers every five years to inspect and preach Dhamma (moral and social code of conduct) in his dominions, in addition to their regular duties and to teach his people to obey parents, be liberal to friends, relatives, Brahmanas and Sramanas (Monks), to abstain from killing animals.

4. Priyadarshi promotes Dhamma and expects his descendants like wise to continue to promote it.

5. Dhamma Mahamatras have been appointed for establishing and promoting Dhamma in his land even among the Yavanas, Kambojas, Gandharas, Rashtrikas and others.

6. Reports of affairs in his kingdom could be brought to his notice anytime, as he considered it his duty constantly and speedily to attend to the welfare of his subjects.

7. Priyadarshi wishes that all religious sects in his dominion should like in peace and amity and stresses self-control and purity of mind.

8. Priyadarshi who visited Sambodhi (Bodh Gaya, Bihar) started on pilgrimage of Dhamma making gift to Brahmanas and Sramanas, contacting the people of the countryside and exhorting them to follow the path of Dhamma.

9. Ceremonies associated with Dhamma produce great results. These are courtesy to slaves and servants, reverence to elders, restraint and liberality to Brahmanas and Sramanas. By this practice heaven is won.

10. Priyadarshi does not consider glory in this life or fame after death as of any consequences except the glory of his being able to induce his people to practice Dhamma.

11. There is no gift like the gift of Dhamma, there is no distribution like the distribution of Dhamma and no kinship like the kinship of Dhamma.

12. The growth of Dhamma is by the restraint of speech which means no praise of one’s own faith or disparagement of another.

13. The conquest of Kalinga resulting in unprecedented slaughter and carrying away of captives brought remorse to Priyadarshi. He was therefore determined for conquest through Dhamma.

14. This record relating to Dhamma has been inscribed in abridged or expanded form, so that people may act accordingly. 

The individual morality that Asoka propagated respect (//susrusa//) towards parents, elders, teachers, friends, servants, ascetics and brahmins -- behavior that accords with the advice given to Sigala by the Buddha (Digha Nikaya, Discourse No. 31). He encouraged generosity (//dana//) to the poor (//kapana valaka//), to ascetics and brahmins, and to friends and relatives. Not surprisingly, Asoka encouraged harmlessness towards all life (//avihisa bhutanam//). In conformity with the Buddha's advice in the Anguttara Nikaya, II:282, he also considered moderation in spending and moderation in saving to be good (//apa vyayata apa bhadata//). Treating people properly (//samya pratipati//), he suggested, was much more important than performing ceremonies that were supposed to bring good luck. Because it helped promote tolerance and mutual respect, Asoka desired that people should be well-learned (//bahu sruta//) in the good doctrines (//kalanagama//) of other people's religions. The qualities of heart that are recommended by Asoka in the edicts indicate his deep spirituality. They include kindness (//daya//), self-examination (//palikhaya//), truthfulness (//sace//), gratitude (//katamnata//), purity of heart (//bhava sudhi//), enthusiasm (//usahena//), strong loyalty (//dadha bhatita//), self-control (//sayame//) and love of the Dhamma (//Dhamma kamata//). 

NDPS cases of Nav Kumar Ojha, Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakda listed for hearing on March 30

Nav Kumar Ojha's NDPS convicted case has been listed for hearing on March 30 in High Court along with the related case of Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda. The 2-page long order dated March 24, 2026 in Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakra vs. The Union of India through the Intelligence Officer, Narcotices Control Bureau, Bihar (2026) by Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava reads:"This Court has been informed that one of the convicts from the same trial namely, Nav Kumar Ojha has filed Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025 which is pending before this Bench. 2. It is submitted that since the said Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025 arises out of the same impugned judgment and order, it would be appropriate to hear the present appeal together with Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025. 3. We agree with the submissions. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent is present. 5. List this matter together with Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025 under the heading for hearing immediately after Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025 is admitted. 6. The said appeal is likely to be listed under appropriate heading on 30.03.2026. Let this case be tagged with the said appeal and listed simultaneously with Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1014 of 2025 under appropriate heading." Notably, the seller of the Ganja have not been prosecuted and the buyer of the Ganja has been acquitted. The State has not challenged the acquittal.    

In Nav Kumar Ojha vs. The Union of India (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava had passed an order dated March 13, 2026, wherein it sent a reminder to the trial court, Bhojpur to send the corrected copy of the impugned judgment to the High Court within one week. 

The order reads: "If the corrected copy is not received within the given period,  the record shall be placed before the learned Registrar General who will call upon the learned Principal District Judge, Bhojpur and ensure compliance with the order....4. List this matter on 30.03.2026 under appropriate heading." This  order was passed upon hearing Dr. Gopal Krishna, the counsel for the appellant who pointed out that the Court's previous order for rectifying the error in the trail court's order, has not been complied with as yet. The order by the trial court was authored by Birendra Kumar Choubey as Additional Sessions Judge, NDPS, Bhojpur.

At present, the High Court's website shows that a letter in this regard was sent on March 11, 2026 to District and Additional Session Judge VIII  and it was received on March  17, 2026. This is recorded on the case status page of the website. 

The appellant is in custody since February 2021 in connection with N.D.P.S Case No.6/2021, arising out of N.C.B. Case No. NCB/PZU/V/01/2021 dated 02.02.2021, for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 20(b) (ii) (C) and 25 NDPS Act. According to prosecution case, altogether 909.2 Kg ganja has been recovered from the truck in question, in which the petitioner along with other person was sitting, which was to be delivered to one Bijendra Kumar Ray. The fact is that the appellant was not on the truck in question. It is crystal clear from the F.I.R. as well as seizure list that nothing incriminating was recovered from his conscious possession. He was arrested and convicted on the basis of a confession of Shankar Yadav, the truck driver and Pritam Lakda, the helper made to the officer of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). In their confession in police custody it was stated that the appellant had escorted the truck by his Mahindra Scorpio till Aurangabad after that he had left for Chapra. The appellant has been exonerated from charges under Section 29 of the NDPS Act by the trial court.   

The related case Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda vs. Union of India is listed for hearing on March 23, 2026 before the same Division Bench. The trial court, Bhojpur had convicted Shankar Yadav (truck driver), Pritam Lakda (khalasi-helper) and Nav Kumar Ojha (truck owner) by its judgement and order dated May 9, 2023 and May 17, 2023. But had acquitted Birendar Kumar Ray, the recipient/buyer of the Ganja in question. It is significant that No case was pursued against the seller of the Ganja in question. Notably, the state did not file its appeal against the acquittal of Ray. The prosecution has failed to explain the chain of custody of the Ganja in question. In its 84-page long judgement by Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur with reference to four persons namely, 1) Bijendra Kumar Rai (Bihar), Nav Kumar Ojha (Jharkhand), Shankar Yadav  (Jharkhand) and Pritam Lakda (Jharkhand), all the four accused were acquitted of conspiracy charges (Section 29 of  Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985) by the trial court. But Bijendra Kumar Ray (Bihar), the kingpin was given the benefit of doubt, and acquitted by the trial court, and the remaining three-truck owner, driver and khalasi were convicted.

The last order dated May 9, 2024 in this case by High Court's Division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Jitendra Kumar recorded that the Advocates for Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakra and Nav Kumar Ojha, the Appellants submitted that "the informant is the Investigator of this case which vitiates the entire  prosecution case. It has further been submitted that none of the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act has been complied with." The argument was submitted by Dr. Gopal Krishna, the counsel for the second appellant. The High Court's order reads: "We have also been informed that the wife of another co-convict is mentally ill and, therefore, no appeal has been preferred on his behalf as yet. Apart from this, this Court has been informed that the main accused of this case has been acquitted on a specious plea which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Though, taking into account the quantity of narcotics recovered from a vehicle of which the appellants are driver and cleaner respectively, we are not inclined to suspend their sentence presently. The prayer is rejected. However, we direct the registry to prepare the paper book urgently and get this case listed for final hearing in the second week of August commencing from 5th of August, 2024. We have said so for the reason that one of the co-convicts has still not preferred an appeal and the appellant No. 2 is a tribal student who is barely in his teens." 

Pritam Lakda, the second appellant, a resident of Jharkhand is in Buxer jail. Shankar Yadav, the first appellant is in Ara jail and is represented by Advocate Ravindra Kumar. Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna  represents the second appellant. He also represents Nav Kumar Ojha, the third convict. The third convict, a resident of Jharkhand is in Buxer jail as well.

Section 20 of the NDPS Act deals with punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plants and cannabis. It states that "Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,—(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable..."  Section 20 (ii) b of the NDPS Act states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. Section 20 (ii) (C) states that where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b), and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.

 

The judgement of the the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur reveals that Pritam Lakra, khalasi (helper) of the truck is not covered under the ambit of Section 20 (ii) (b) (C) of the NDPS Act because there is nothing on record to show that he is a cultivator of any cannabis plant or producer, manufacturer, possessor, seller, purchaser, transporter, inter-State importer, inter-State exporter or user of cannabis. It is apparent that the Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Bhojpur committed an error in convicting him under Section 20 (ii) (b) (C) of the NDPS Act after exonerating him of charges under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

As to Section 25 of NDPS Act which deals with the punishment for allowing premises, etc., to be used for commission of an offence, it states that "Whoever, being the owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence." It is apparent that Pritam Lakda, the khalasi (helper) does not fall within the ambit of Section 25. 

Also read: Patna High Court detects error in sentencing order by Birendra Kumar Choubey as Additional Sessions Judge, NDPS, asks trial court to rectify its defect within one week 

Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Alok Kumar Sinha, Sangam Kumar Sahoo sets aside judgement by Justice Harish Kumar

In The Patna High Court through its Registrar General, Patna High Court & Ors. vs. Chandan Kumar & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Alok Kumar Sinha and Sangam Kumar Sahoo delivered a 33-page long judgement dated March 24, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the same proceeds on an erroneous application of legal principles, extends the benefit of earlier judgments beyond their intended scope, and overlooks material aspects relating to delay, laches and the statutory framework governing the field. The reasoning so adopted does not stand to judicial scrutiny and has resulted in an unwarranted direction for consideration of the writ petitioner’s case. 61. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed; the impugned judgment and order is set aside, and the writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." The other Appellants in this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) were Registrar General, Patna High Court and. The Convenor, Co-ordination Committee-cum- District and Sessions Judge, Patna, District- Patna. The other Respondents were:The State of Bihar, through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar and the Law Secretary, Law Department, Government of Bihar. The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

In his 18 page-long judgement dated July 9, 2025, Justice Harish Kumar, the Single Judge had observed: "25. This Court thus, hereby, held that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered with those of the decision rendered by the learned Division Bench in LPA No. 650 of 2022 with other analogous cases and LPA No. 727 of 2023 as well as LPA No. 261 of 2020. 26. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. 27. The concerned respondent is hereby directed to consider the case of the petitioner, in view of the discussions made hereinabove and if the petitioner is otherwise eligible, issue necessary order in accordance with law and accord the similar treatment, as has been extended to the similarly situated candidates. The entire exercise must be completed preferably within a period of eight weeks, from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

The L.P.A. was preferred by the appellants assailing the judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 passed by the Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 10521 of 2022, whereby the Single Judge, had held that the case of the Chandan Kumar, writ petitioner–respondent No. 1 was squarely covered by the judgments and orders dated April 19, 2023 passed in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases, dated January 18, 2024 passed in L.P.A. No. 727 of 2023, and dated December 16, 2024 passed in L.P.A. No. 261 of 2024, was pleased to allow the writ petition with a direction to the appellants to consider the case of the said respondent No. 1 and, if found otherwise eligible, to issue necessary orders of appointment and posting on the post of Clerk in the Civil Courts of Bihar, in accordance with law, by extending similar treatment as granted to other similarly situated candidates, and to complete the entire exercise preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the said judgment; the appellants, being aggrieved thereby, preferred the LPA praying for setting aside the impugned judgment and order as being unsustainable in law.

The Division Bench framed the following issued for consideration:
(i) Whether the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence, particularly in view of the expiry of the panel/wait-list dated September 26, 2018 under Rule 7 of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009?
(ii) Whether the respondent–writ petitioner can be treated as a “fence-sitter” disentitled to relief, or whether he had approached the Court with sufficient diligence so as to claim consideration?
(iii) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing consideration of the respondent’s case for
appointment, in light of Rule 7 of the 2009 Rules and the admitted position that candidates with lower merit have already been appointed pursuant to judicial orders?
(iv) Whether the impugned judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 suffers from any legal infirmity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction? 

With regard to Issue no.(i), the The Division Bench observed: "17. At the outset, it needs to be examined whether the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was maintainable in the teeth of the settled principles governing delay, laches and acquiescence, particularly when the select panel/wait- list dated 26.09.2018 had admittedly exhausted its statutory life on September 26, 2020 under Rule 7(13) of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009. 18. From the undisputed facts on record, it emerges that the respondent–writ petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition only on 22.07.2022. Even if his earlier attempt by way of filing I.A. No. 04 of 2022 on 09.05.2022 is taken into account, the same was also after the expiry of the two-year validity period of the panel, which came to an end on 26.09.2020. Thus, there is a clear and unexplained delay of more than one and a half years in invoking the writ jurisdiction. 19. It is well settled that though no rigid period of limitation applies to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, the principles of delay and laches are nonetheless applicable with full force." 

The Division Bench relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. vs. Harish Chandra reported in (1996) 9 SCC 309, while dealing with a claim arising out of an expired select list, categorically held that no mandamus can be issued for appointment once the select list has lapsed. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, it has been observed that: “10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution, a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provision of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, it any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4.4.87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ Petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not.” 

The Division Bench observed: "20. Therefore, it can be inferred that even if certain appointments were made beyond the life of the select list, such illegal acts would not confer any enforceable right upon others to seek similar relief through Court."

The Division Bench relied on the decision in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Ram Gopal reported in (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein, the Supreme Court reiterated that a candidate who approaches the Court after expiry of the validity of a select list cannot claim appointment merely because others with lesser merit, who were vigilant and approached the Court in time, have been granted relief. The Court emphasized that delay defeats equity and that stale claims ought not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction. 

Justice Sinha observed: "22. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent–writ petitioner did not assert his rights within the subsistence of the panel. In contrast,
the writ petitioners in C.W.J.C. Nos. 21219 of 2018 and 6259 of 2019 had approached the Court during the validity of the panel itself, i.e., within the two-year period. It is this distinguishing factor which weighed with the Division Bench while granting relief to them in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022. Thus, the foundation of the relief granted in those cases was timely assertion of rights, which is conspicuously absent in the case of the present respondent. 23. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that he had filed an interlocutory application in the year 2022 while earlier writ petitions were pending does not improve his case. The cause of action, if any, had arisen when the panel was in force and vacancies allegedly remained unfilled. The respondent, however, chose not to approach the Court during that period and remained indolent. The mere pendency of other litigations cannot extend the life of a statutory panel nor can it revive a stale cause of action."

Justice Sinha observed: "24. The reliance placed by the respondent on State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (Supra), is also misplaced. While paragraph 22.2 of the said judgment does lay down that similarly situated persons should ordinarily be treated alike, it equally carves out a clear exception in cases of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that: '22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier
in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.' 25. Therefore, those people cannot claim parity and are liable to be treated as fence-sitters. The present case, in the considered view of this Court, falls squarely within the said exception."

Justice Sinha recollected that coordinate Benches of the High Court, in C.W.J.C. No. 1063 of 2024 and C.W.J.C. No. 4175 of 2024, rejected identical claims raised by similarly situated candidates on the ground of delay and laches. The Division Bench judgement reads: "The respondent’s case stands on no better footing and, in fact, suffers from the same infirmity. The submission that the authorities themselves were at fault in not operating the panel in terms of Rule 7 does not entitle the respondent to seek relief after the expiry of the panel. Even assuming there was an illegality on the part of the authorities, the law is well settled that such illegality must be challenged within a reasonable time. A litigant cannot be permitted to sleep over his rights and thereafter seek equitable relief at his convenience. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the respondent–writ petitioner was clearly barred by delay, laches and acquiescence, having been instituted after the expiry of the statutory period of validity of the panel/wait-list dated 26.09.2018. The learned Single Judge, with respect, erred in overlooking this fundamental aspect and in entertaining the writ petition despite the respondent’s belated approach. 29. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the appellant."

With regard to Issue no.(ii) the Division Bench considered whether the respondent–writ petitioner can be treated as a “fence-sitter” and thereby disentitled to relief, or whether he had approached the Court with due diligence so as to claim consideration. The concept of a “fence-sitter” has been consistently explained by the Supreme Court to denote those persons who, despite having a cause of action, choose not to assert their rights within a reasonable time and approach the Court only after others have succeeded in similar litigation. Such persons are ordinarily denied relief on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence.

Justice Sinha relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347, wherein, while laying down the principle of parity, carved out a clear exception in paragraph 22, observing that those who do not challenge the wrongful action in time and wake up only after seeing the success of others, cannot claim the benefit of such judgments. The Court held that such persons are to be treated as “fence-sitters” and their claims can be legitimately rejected on the ground of delay and acquiescence.

He also drew on Supreme Court's decision in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 471, wherein the Court reiterated that a person who sleeps over his rights and allows the situation to settle cannot be permitted to disturb the same at a belated stage. The Court cautioned that stale claims should not be entertained, particularly where rights of others have crystallized in the meantime. Justice Sinha observed:"34. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is evident that the respondent–writ petitioner did not approach the Court during the subsistence of the panel/wait-list, which remained valid till 26.09.2020. On the contrary, the candidates who were granted relief in earlier rounds of litigation had approached the Court in the years 2018–2019 itself, i.e., within the validity period of the panel, asserting their rights in a timely manner. 35. The respondent, however, chose not to take recourse to legal remedy during this crucial period. His first attempt to intervene was made only on 09.05.2022 by filing I.A. No. 04 of 2022, which too was subsequently withdrawn. Thereafter, the writ petition came to be filed on 22.07.2022. By this time, not only had the panel expired nearly two years earlier, but even the earlier writ petitions had already been heard and were on the verge of being decided. 36. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondent that he cannot be treated as a fence-sitter because he approached the Court before the decision in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 does not merit acceptance. The relevant consideration is not whether he approached the Court before or after the appellate judgment, but whether he asserted his rights within the period when the cause of action was alive. In the present case, the cause of action arose during the validity of the panel, yet the respondent failed to act within that period. The distinction between vigilant litigants and fence-sitters is thus clearly borne out from the record. The earlier writ petitioners were vigilant and approached the Court at the appropriate time, whereas the respondent remained passive
and approached the Court only after a considerable lapse of time. The fact that he filed the writ petition before the appellate decision does not erase the delay which had already occurred.

Justice Sinha pointed out that in the judgment in Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India (Supra), the Court extended the benefit to similarly situated persons in the absence of delay attributable to them. However, the said judgment itself recognizes that in exceptional cases, particularly where delay and acquiescence are present, the benefit may be denied. The present case clearly falls within such exception. He observed: "39. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conduct of the respondent reflects that he chose to remain on the sidelines and did not assert his rights when the opportunity was available. It is only after considerable delay that he approached the Court seeking parity with those who had been vigilant. Such conduct squarely attracts the doctrine of fence-sitting as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 40. Accordingly, this Court holds that the respondent–writ petitioner is liable to be treated as a “fence-sitter” and is not entitled to claim relief on the basis of parity with those candidates who had approached the Court with due diligence. This issue is, therefore, answered in favour of the appellant.

With regard to the Issue no.(iii), the High Court considered whether the learned Single Judge was justified in directing consideration of the respondent–writ petitioner for appointment in the light of Rule 7 of the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class-III & IV) Rules, 2009, particularly when it is an admitted position that certain candidates, securing marks lower than that of the writ petitioner, have already been appointed pursuant to judicial orders. 

The Division Bench noted that Rule 7(12), (13) and (14) of the Rules, 2009 clearly envisage preparation of a common merit panel and its operation for a period of two years for the purpose of filling not only existing vacancies but also anticipated vacancies arising on account of non-joining, resignation, etc. The Division Bench, while deciding L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases (order dated 19.04.2023), has
already interpreted these provisions and returned a categorical finding that the authorities were under a statutory obligation to operate the panel for the said period and consider eligible candidates in order of merit.

The crucial question was not the existence of vacancies or the merit position alone, but whether such a direction for consideration can be extended to every candidate irrespective of the nature and scope of the earlier judgment. The Division Bench noted that "it is evident that the benefit flowing from the judgment dated 19.04.2023 was extended only to those candidates who were parties to the earlier litigation or who had asserted their rights within a reasonable time. The appellants have consistently contended that the said judgment is one in personam and not in rem. This distinction is of considerable importance. Even if it is accepted that certain candidates with lower marks have been appointed pursuant to orders passed in earlier rounds of litigation, although they came to the court within stipulated time frame, such appointments cannot automatically confer an enforceable right upon the present writ petitioner. The doctrine of equality enshrined under Article 14 is a positive concept and does not envisage repetition of an illegality."

In Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel vs. Union of India (Supra),  while the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that
similarly situated persons should not be driven to litigation repeatedly, the same was in the context where the earlier judgment was not restricted in its operation. In the present case, however, there was nothing to indicate that the Division Bench intended its judgment in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 to operate universally for all candidates irrespective of their conduct or delay. It is also important to bear in mind that the direction issued by the Division Bench was for “consideration” of the cases of the appellants therein against vacancies arising within the validity period of the panel. Such a direction was clearly confined to those who had approached the Court and cannot be stretched to revive a lapsed panel for all candidates at large.

The Single Judge was primarily influenced by the fact that candidates with lesser marks had already been appointed. However, such reasoning overlooks the settled legal position that parity cannot be claimed in illegality or irregularity, and that each case must be tested on its own merits, including the conduct of the claimant and the scope of the earlier judicial directions. The Division Bench was of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge was not justified in issuing a direction for consideration of the writ petitioner solely on the ground that persons with lower merit had been appointed. The direction fails to appreciate the limited and person-specific nature of the earlier judgments, as well as the settled principle that Article 14 does not envisage negative equality. "48. Accordingly, the issue is answered in favour of the appellants, holding that the impugned direction for consideration of the respondent–writ petitioner for appointment is unsustainable in law.

With regard to Issue no.(iv), teh Division Bench considered whether the impugned judgment and order dated July 9, 2025 passed by the Single Judge suffers from any legal infirmity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant interference in exercise of the Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction.

As part of the Division Bench Justice Sinha observed: "50. At the outset, it is well settled that the scope of
interference in an intra-court appeal is not as narrow as that under Article 226 against administrative action, yet the Appellate Court would ordinarily interfere where the judgment under appeal is found to be contrary to settled legal principles, based on misapplication of law, or resulting in manifest injustice. A finding can be said to be perverse when it is either based on no evidence, ignores material evidence, or applies incorrect legal standards. 51. Examining the impugned judgment on the touchstone of the above principles, it appears that the learned Single Judge proceeded on two principal considerations: first, that the writ petitioner was similarly situated to those candidates who had succeeded in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 and analogous cases; and second, that candidates having lower marks had already been appointed and, therefore, denial of similar benefit to the writ petitioner would be discriminatory. 52. However, in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the learned Single Judge has failed to properly appreciate certain crucial aspects which go to the root of the matter. 53. Firstly, the learned Single Judge has treated the judgment rendered in L.P.A. No. 650 of 2022 as having a general or universal application, without examining whether the said judgment was intended to operate in rem or was confined to the parties before the Court. As has already been discussed, the direction issued therein was clearly for consideration of the cases of the appellants in those appeals. There is no indication that the Division Bench intended to extend the benefit automatically to all candidates forming part of the wait-list irrespective of their conduct or delay. The failure to draw this distinction has resulted in an erroneous extension of the benefit to the present writ petitioner. 54. Secondly, the learned Single Judge has placed substantial reliance on the fact that certain candidates with lower marks were appointed pursuant to judicial orders. While this factual position may not be in dispute, the legal inference drawn therefrom is flawed. The learned Single Judge, by directing consideration of the writ petitioner on the ground that persons with lesser marks have been appointed, has effectively applied the doctrine of negative equality, which is impermissible in law. This, in the considered opinion of this Court, constitutes a clear error in application of settled legal principles. 55. Thirdly, the issue of delay and laches, though noticed, has not been adequately appreciated in its proper legal perspective. The appellants had specifically contended that the writ petitioner approached the Court after a considerable lapse of time and, therefore, could not claim parity with those who had been vigilant in asserting their rights. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (Supra) has clearly held that though similarly situated persons are ordinarily entitled to equal treatment, this principle is subject to exceptions, particularly in cases involving delay, laches and acquiescence. Persons who wake up after long delay cannot claim the same relief as those who approached the Court in time. 56. The impugned judgment, however, proceeds to hold that the writ petitioner is not a fence-sitter without adequately reconciling this finding with the admitted timeline of events and the conduct of the petitioner. Such a conclusion, without proper analysis of the legal standards governing delay and acquiescence, renders the finding vulnerable. 57. Fourthly, the learned Single Judge has also not given due weight to the fact that the panel/wait-list in question had a statutory life of two years under Rule 7 of the Rules, 2009. Once the panel had lapsed, any direction for consideration would have to be strictly in accordance with law and cannot be issued in a routine manner, particularly when such direction has the effect of unsettling subsequent recruitment processes."

In the penultimate paragraphs, the Justice Sinha observed:" 58. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that the impugned judgment suffers from misapplication of law, particularly in relation to (i) the scope and applicability of the earlier Division Bench judgment, (ii) the impermissible reliance on negative equality, and (iii) inadequate consideration of delay and laches. These errors go to the root of the matter and cannot be said to be mere errors of appreciation. 59. Accordingly, it is held that the impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2025 does suffer from legal infirmity and error apparent on the face of the record, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction.