Justice Alok Kumar Sinha dismisses the writ application as not maintainable

In Ramvichar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Alok Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court dismissed the writ application as not maintainable in his 4-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025.

This application was part of the second round of litigation on behalf of the petitioner. Earlier, the petitioner had approached the High Court vide CWJC No. 20495 of 2012. On April 10, 2012, the writ application was dismissed on the ground that the writ application relating to the affair of a private managing committee of an affiliated college was not maintainable in view of the ratio of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Radha Kumari Singh vs. The Governing Body of Mahanth Mahadevanand Mahila Mahavidyalaya, reported in 1977 PLJR.

While dismissing the writ application, the Single Judge had made it clear that if the petitioner so chooses, he can file a civil suit before a court of competent jurisdiction or before designated authority after it comes into place. 

As against this decision of the High Court in CWJC No. 20495 of 2011, the petitioner had filed Letters Patent Appeal, bearing LPA No. 968 of 2012, which was heard and decided on July 18, 2014 , wherein the Division Bench of the High Court, while agreeing to the view expressed by the writ Court, directed the petitioner to either approach the civil court of competent jurisdiction or the Bihar School Examination Board (Higher Secondary), if the Board had framed Guidelines or Rules/Regulations governing removal of Class-IV employees by the managing committee of an affiliated college. Therefore, the liberty granted to the petitioner by the Division Bench of the High Court was to approach Bihar School Examination Board only if the Board has framed the Guidelines. 

The counter affidavit filed by the Bihar School Examination Board clearly stated that no Guidelines or Rules have been framed by the Bihar School Examination Board for governing the service conditions of the employee of private affiliated colleges. Paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit filed by the Bihar School Examination Board reads: “11. That with regard to above, it is pertinent to submit here that in the year 2012, no guidelines, rules & regulations governing the service conditions of the employees of private affiliated Colleges had been framed at the Board, however later in the year 2019, necessary guideline in connection with service conditions of employees of private affiliated Secondary School/ High Secondary School(+2 College) has been framed and under clause 3(1), 3(7), 27 and 31 of chapter 3 and clause 36(II) of chapter 4 of the said guidelines, it is the managing committee/governing body/ad-hoc managing committee, which is competent to take final decision in matters of teaching as well as its non-teaching employees. Thus now the Governing Body/Managing Committee of the College in question is the competent to look into this matter.”

Justice Sinha observed: ''....the writ application filed by the petitioner seeking the nature of relief is clearly not maintainable in law. 6. The judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Smt. Radha Kumar Singh (supra) still governs the field on the issue that the affairs of a private managing committee of an affiliated college cannot be challenged or agitated in writ jurisdiction. Also it is to be noted that although liberty was granted by the Division Bench on 18.07.2014 to either approach the civil court or file representation before Bihar School Examination Board, the petitioner did not approach civil court and even the representation was filed much belatedly on 13.06.2017 before the Bihar School Examination Board, for which no explanation for delay has been given.''

Justice Partha Sarthy dismisses application seeking appointment on compassionate ground on Class IV post under Munger Judgeship

In Ajay Kumar vs. The High Court of Judicature at Patna, through the Registrar General, Patna High Court, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page long judgement dated October 30, 2025 dismissing the application. Justice Jha concluded: ''12. So far as the facts of the instant case is concerned, even taking into consideration the 5% strength to be, as evident from the report of Nazir, there are already 20 persons working as Class-IV employees having been appointed on compassionate ground. 13. In view of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, the Court finds no merit in the instant application and the same is dismissed.'' 

The judgement reads:"From perusal of the records, it transpires that a decision was taken by the Patna High Court on its administrative side and which was communicated to all the District and Sessions Judges of Bihar by letter dated 4.1.2016 of the Registrar (Admn.) I/c which was to the effect that the appointment on compassionate ground is to be considered with a restriction that the total strength of compassionate appointees would not exceed 3% of the sanctioned strength of the cadre in which such appointment is being considered. A perusal of the minutes of the meeting of the Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship held on 7.1.2025 and brought on record as annexure to the reply filed on behalf of the petitioner would show that a report was submitted by the Nazir, Civil Court, Munger stating that the sanctioned post of Class-IV employee in the Judgeship is 170 and 5% thereof would be 8.5. As there are already 20 Class-IV employees who have been appointed on compassionate ground and all of them are working in the Judgeship, no further appointment can be made. It may be mentioned here itself that the report talks about 5% employees working on compassionate ground for the reason that subsequent to the above-mentioned decision of 3%, the same had been increased to 5%."

Justice Partha Sarthy observed:"So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner about the restriction of 3% being prospective and not retrospective is concerned, in the opinion of the Court, the same has been applied in a prospective manner, the father of the petitioner having died on 5.6.2016 subsequent to the said decision having been taken and communicated on 4.1.2016. So far as reliance placed on the judgment dated 9.2.2023 passed in L.P.A. no. 127 of 2022 is concerned, in the opinion of the Court, the same is of no assistance to the petitioner. In the facts of the said case, the application of the petitioner therein was rejected on ground of restriction of 3% taken by the High Court on 4.1.2016...."

He added:"The Court while dealing with the policy of the State Government had observed that as it is the practice of the State of preserving 5% of the total sanctioned strength in a district for compassionate appointment and a new rule i.e. The Bihar Civil Court Officers and Staff (Recruitment, Promotion, Transfer and Other Service Conditions) Rules, 2022 had been promulgated which provided for 5% cap on compassionate appointment, the case of the petitioner may be considered by the High Court Administration taking the same into consideration."

The petitioner had prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari for setting aside the decision of meeting of Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship held on June 11, 2018, whereby and whereunder the appointment of petitioner on compassionate ground was denied. He had also prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus commanding the Respondent authorities directing them to appoint the petitioner on compassionate ground on Class IV post under Munger Judgeship treating the case of petitioner on humanitarian ground.

The case of the petitioner was that the father of the petitioner having died in harness on June 5, 2016 while working in Class-IV post in the Office of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate at Munger, the petitioner applied for appointment on compassionate ground on September 27, 2016 before the District and Sessions Judge, Munger. He submitted the required papers including affidavits of his mother and brother, however,the Appointment Committee of the Munger Judgeship by a decision taken in its meeting held on June 11, 2018 rejected the application of the petitioner for his appointment on compassionate ground. 

The other four Respondents were:Registrar General, Patna High Court, District and Session Judge, Munger cum Chairman of Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship, Additional District Judge, Munger cum Member No.1 of Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship, and Additional District Judge II Munger cum Member No. II of Appointment Committee of Munger Judgeship. 

Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh takes oath as judge of Patna High Court

Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh administers the oath of office to Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh. He was transferred to Patna High Court on October 30, 2025. The President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India had issued an order of transfer on October 14, 2025 from Allahabad High Court to Patna High Court. Some 11 judges from Allahabad High Court accompanied him to witness his oath taking ceremony. The notification dated October 14, 2025 in this regard was issued by Jagannath Srinivasaan, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. The notification reads:''In exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 222 of the Constitution of India, the President, after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, is pleased to transfer Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Singh, Judge, Allahabad High Court, to be a Judge of Patna High Court and to direct him to assume charge of his office in the Patna High Court.' Justice Singh enrolled as an Advocate on May 9, 1993 in Bar Council, U.P. and practiced in the Allahabad High Court. He was appointed as Additional Judge on November 22,2018 in the Allahabad High Court. He took oath as Permanent Judge on November 20, 2020. He will retire on January 20, 2031.

Justice Singh reached Patna after the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court on October 17, 2025. 

In Dhanajay Singh & Anr. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh (2024), Justice Singh delivered a 35-page long order dated April 27, 2024, upon hearing the prayer made to stay the operation and effect of the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 of the appellants and to enlarge them on bail during pendency of the criminal appeal before the Allahabad High Court, he concluded:''the prayer for stay of operation and effect of judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of appellant No.1 is refused and is hereby rejected. 42. Since prayer for stay of impugned judgment of conviction with regard to appellant No.2 (who is not a political person or government servant) has not been pressed during argument, therefore, his case has not been dealt with in this regard.'' 

Coincidentally, his transfer order has been issued in  the aftermath of his order against Dhananjay Singh. This order's mentioning in the Full Court Farewell Reference at Allahabad High Court underlines its significance. Is it similar to the transfer of Justice (Dr.) S. Muralidhar from Delhi High Court?  

This order was passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Application (For Suspension of Sentence) under Section 389 (1) Cr.P.C. The appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. was preferred by the appellants-Dhananjay Singh and Santosh Vikram Singh against the judgment of conviction dated March 5, 2024 and order of sentence dated March 6, 2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-IV/Special Judge, MP/MLA, Jaunpur in Sessions Trial No. 109 of 2020 (State Vs. Dhananjay Singh and another) which arose out of Case Crime No. 142 of 2020, Police Station Line Bazar, District Jaunpur, convicting and sentencing the appellants as under :-
(a) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 364 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment.
(b) Five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 25,000/- for the offence under Section 386 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, three months' additional imprisonment.
(c) One year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence under Section 504 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, one month's additional imprisonment.
(d) Two years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 15,000/- for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, forty five days’ additional imprisonment.
(e) Seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence under Section 120-B I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Justice Singh noted that at present ten cases are still pending against Dhananjay Singh, the appellant No. 1. He drew on Supreme Court's decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584, wherein the Court held that “though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389 (1) of the code, its exercise should be limited to very exception Cases. It was further held that merely because the convicted person files an appeal to challenge his conviction, the court should not suspend the operation of the conviction and the court has a duty to look at all aspect including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.”

Justice referred to Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Atar Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 434, wherein the accused was convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of Prevention of corruption Act. He filed an appeal before the High Court, which has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non-suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service. On appeal, the Court set aside the order of the High Court by holding that the High Court had mechanically passed the order by suspending the conviction and the discretion ought not to have been exercise by the High Court by passing such an order suspending the conviction.

He drew on Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan, (2003)12 SCC 432, which had relied on the decision in K.C. Sareen vs. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584 to reiterate that only in exceptional cases, the Court should exercise the power of stay of conviction.

Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's judgment in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, it was observed: “Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is that requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspect and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.''

He recollected paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ravi Kant S. Patil vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673, wherein the Court held that “it deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case.”

Justice Singh also referred to Supreme Court's decision in Sanjay Dutt vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 5 SCC 787, wherein the petitioner Sanjay Dutt was charged under various sections of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act. He was found guilty of offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 read with Sections 25(IA) and 25(IB) of the Arms Act and was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner has filed appeal against his conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, he was granted bail on February 28, 2007. Thereafter, he had filed application under Section 389 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying that execution of the order of conviction and sentence be suspended pending final hearing of the appeal. In the petition, it was mentioned that he belongs to a family which has been in long public service in the country and that the petitioner is now desirous of contesting election of the House of People from Lucknow Parliament Constituency and in view of Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, he has incurred disqualification from contesting the election for becoming a member of either House of Parliament. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and sentence of the petitioner be suspended to enable him to contest the election. The Court declined his prayer and held that “Despite all these favourable circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar under Section 8(3) ) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court under Section 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. xxxxxxx “ In the present case, no such circumstances are in favour of the petitioner, In view of the serious offence for which he has been convicted by the Special Judge, we are not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge in the present case. “

In the penultimate paragraph of his order, Justice Singh referred to Supreme Court's decision in Shyam Narain Pandey V. State of U.P. (2012) SCC 384. The Court observed: “ In the light of the principles stated above, the contention that the appellant will be deprived of his source of livelihood if the conviction is not stayed cannot be appreciated. For the appellant, it is a matter of deprivation of livelihood but he is convicted for deprivation of life of another person. Until he is otherwise declared innocent in appeal, the stain stands. The High Court has discussed in detail the background of the appellant , the nature of the crime, manner in which it was committed etc and his rightly held that it is not a very rare and exceptional case for staying the conviction.” The appellant Shyam Narain Pandey was a Principal of an institution, who was inter alia, convicted for murder. 

He also referred to Supreme Court's judgement in State of Maharashtra vs. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384, wherein the Court held: “Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.”

Relying on these judgements of the Supreme Court, Justice Singh observed:''40. It is often seen that after conviction of a person who was or is Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament, used to take a general plea for stay of operation and effect of his conviction that he wants to contest election and in case the judgment of his conviction is not stayed, he will be deprived of his right to contest the election which will result in irreparable loss and injury to him, but this Court feels that each and every case has to be decided on its own merit as well as considering all the surrounding circumstances and other attending factors including gravity of offences, nature of previous criminal history etc. No uniform and straight-jacket formula can be laid down for stay of conviction in all the cases. The parameter and legal position for stay of execution of sentence/bail and stay of conviction are different. Now it is the need of hour to have purity in politics, therefore for staying the judgment of conviction, the Courts should exercise its discretionary power sparingly with caution in a rare and appropriate cases. The purpose sought to be achieved by enacting disqualification on conviction for certain offences is to prevent person with criminal background from entering into politics and governance. Persons with criminal background pollute the process of election as they have no reservation from indulging in criminality to win an election. When persons having long criminal history turn into elected representatives and become law maker, they pose a serious threat to the functioning of a democratic system. The very future of our democracy gets imperilled when such offenders masquerade as leaders making a travesty of the entire system. The increasing trend of criminalisation of politics is dangerous and has steadily been eating into the vitals of our democratic polity along with growing corruption of a humongous nature. Considering the facts of this case that the appellant No.1 has secured acquittal in 28 criminal cases due to reasons that witnesses turned hostile as pointed out on behalf of the State, which has not been controverted on behalf of the accused-appellant No.1 and that there is no dispute that at present, 10 criminal cases (as noted in Chart-B) are still pending against him, I do not find any good ground, special reason or exceptional case to stay the operation and effect of impugned judgment of conviction dated 05.03.2024 of the appellant No.1-Dhananjay Singh.'

While at Allahabad High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous bail application, in August 2021, in UP since there was no practice of recording the statement of victim of sexual offenses  by audio video means despite amendment made in the year 2009 in section 161 of CrP.C., Justice Singh issued directions to the state’s director general of police and principal secretary (Home) to issue guidelines to all SSPs on compliance with statutory provisions provided in first and second provisos to CrPC Section 161(3) within two months. He observed  that “in majority of cases”, provisions of CrPC Section 161(3), which make it mandatory for police to have rape or molestation victims’ statements recorded by a woman officer and through audio-video recording, are not being followed. The two provisions under the said CrPC section say that a statement may also be recorded by audio video electronics means and that in cases of rape and molestation, it should be recorded by a woman police officer.

In a criminal appeal he found that the handwritten reports are difficult to be correctly read. Justice Singh' order dated August 30, 2022 directed that all the postmortem and injury reports must be typed out and made legible and practice of handwritten reports be discontinued. During the postmortem examination there should be DNA and fingerprint sampling and necessary software must be developed for the purpose. After the order, all the postmodern and injury reports are being typed throughout the state of UP which is not only beneficial to the advocates but also to the general public.

 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha all set hear Rit Lal Yadav's application seeking interim bail to exercise his fundamental right to seek votes

In Rit Lal Yadav @ Rit Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court is all set to hear the application for provisional bail on October 30, 2025 amidst the Bihar assembly election process. 

Rit Lal Yadav, son of Ramashish Ray has sought provisional/interim bail from October 30, 2025 to November 15, 2025 to enable him to seek votes by participating in the election campaign and to remain present during polling and counting. the petitioner had prayed for of provisional bail/custody parole in three cases-1. Khagaul P.S. Case No. 129 of 2025, 2. Khagaul P.S. Case No. 171 of 2025, and 3. Khagaul P.S. Case No. 206 of 2025 which are pending before the ACJM-1 cum Special Judge MP/MLA, Patna. 

The fact is that Rit Lal Yadav is in custody because of two cases--1. Khagaul P.S. Case No. 171 of 2025, in which a bail petition is pending before the trial court and 2. Khagaul P.S. Case No. 129 of 2025, in which Cr. Misc. No. 61197 of 2025 for which bail is pending before the High Court. The disposal of these bail petitions is likely to take considerable time, and it is quite unlikely that it will e taken up for consideration before November 6, 2025, i.e., the date fixed for polling in the Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections-2025. 

By order dated October 10, 2025, the District & Additional Sessions Judge III-cum-Special Court of MP/MLAs, Patna, had directed that Rit Lal Yadav be produced from Bhagalpur Central Jail before the Returning Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Danapur, on October 16, 2025, for the purpose of filing his nomination papers to contest the Bihar Legislative Assembly Election-2025, Danapur Assembly Segment No. 186.

Rit Lal Yadav was produced before the Returning Officer on October 16, 2025, where his nomination papers were accepted. After that he was returned to Bhagalpur Central Jail by the police escort.

Notably, three criminal cases--Khagaul P.S. Case Nos. 129, 171, and 206 of 2025 were lodged against him in April 2025, after the election was announced by the Election Commission of India. It is apparent that these cases were registered with an ulterior motive to prevent him from seeking votes through campaigning. 

Earlier, upon hearing, he passed a 2-page long order dated October 17, 2025.  It reads: ''It appears from the pleadings that the criminal antecedents of the petitioner have been mentioned in general and vague terms without providing any specific details.'' 

The order recorded the submission of the Advocate General who submitted that ''the present writ petition is not maintainable and for the relief claimed in the petition, the petitioner should have approached the trial court seeking provisional/regular bail.'' He also submitted that ''the criminal antecedents of the petitioner have not been disclosed and the authorities/rulings relied on by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner do not support the case of the petitioner.'' The fact is that Rit Lal Yadav, the petitioner has a total of 39 criminal antecedents but in most of the cases he has been acquitted. He has not been convicted in any case. 

In his 12-page long affidavit dated October 16, 2025, Rit Lal Rai has submitted to the Election Commission of India, he has declared that there are 11 cases which are pending against him. At page no. 4, of the affidavit there is a column for declaration of all the pending cases. In front of this column it is stated that the details of the pending cases are-अलग से पृथक पृष्ठ पर समलग्न हैं (enclosed separately on a separate page) besides these 12 pages.   

Justice Jha directed the State/respondents to file their counter affidavit on or before October 30, 2025. At the request of senior counsel for the petitioner, case was listed for hearing on October 30, 2025. The case was filed in the High Court on October 15, 2025 and registered on October 16, 2025. 

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SUCI (C)'s MLA candidates are Bihar's poorest, only 9% women are MLA candidates, 40% are crorepatis, around 32% candidates have criminal cases

Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and Bihar Election Watch have analysed the self-sworn affidavits of 1303 out of 1314 candidates, who are contesting in the Bihar Assembly Elections Phase I. 

Candidates with Criminal Cases

Out of 1303 candidates analyzed, 423 (32%) candidates have declared criminal cases against themselves. 354 (27%) have declared serious criminal cases against themselves.

33 candidates have declared cases of to murder (IPC Section-302, 303) and (BNS Section-103(1)).

86 candidates have declared cases of attempt to murder (IPC Section-307) and (BNS Section-109).

42 candidates have declared cases related to crimes against women. Out of 42 candidates, 2 candidates have declared cases related to rape (IPC Section-376). 

50(44%) out of 114 candidates analysed from Jan Suraaj Party, 18(20%) out of 89 candidates analysed from BSP, 53 (76%) out of 70 candidates analysed from RJD, 22 (39%) out of 57 candidates analysed from JD(U), 31(65%) out of 48 candidates analysed from BJP, 12(27%) out of 44 candidates analysed from AAP, 15(65%) out of 23 candidates analysed from INC, 13 (93%) out of 14 candidates analysed from CPI(ML)(L), 7(54%) out of 13 candidates analysed from Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas), 5(100%) out of 5 candidates analysed from CPI and 3 (100%) out of 3 candidates analysed from CPI(M) have declared criminal cases against themselves in their affidavits. 

Among the major parties,49(43%) out of 114 candidates analysed from Jan Suraaj Party, 16(18%) out of 89 candidates analysed from BSP, 42 (60%) out of 70 candidates analysed from RJD, 15 (26%) out of 57 candidates analysed from JD(U),27(56%) out of 48 candidates analysed from BJP, 9(20%) out of 44 candidates analysed from AAP, 12(52%) out of 23 candidates analysed from INC, 9(64%) out of 14 candidates analysed from CPI(ML)(L), 5(38%) out of 13 candidates analysed from Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas), 4(80%) out of 5 candidates analysed from CPI and 3 (100%) out of 3 candidates analysed from CPI(M) have declared serious criminal cases against themselves in their affidavits.

91(75%) out of 121 constituencies are red alert constituencies. Red alert constituencies are those where 3 or more contesting candidates have declared criminal cases against themselves.

The directions of the Supreme Court have had no effect on the political parties in selection of candidates in the Bihar Assembly Elections 2025 Phase I as they have again followed their old practice of giving tickets to around 32% candidates with criminal cases.  All major parties contesting in Bihar Elections Phase 1 have given tickets from 20 % to 100 % candidates who have declared criminal cases against themselves. The Supreme Court in its directions dated 13th February, 2020 had specifically instructed political parties to give reasons for such selection and why other individuals without criminal antecedents could not be selected as candidates. According to these mandatory guidelines, the reasons for such selection has to be with reference to qualifications, achievements and merit of the candidate concerned. 

During the recent Delhi Assembly elections held in february 2025, it was observed that political parties gave unfounded and baseless reasons like popularity of the person, does good social work, cases are politically motivated etc. These are not sound and cogent reasons for fielding candidates with tainted backgrounds. This data clearly shows that political parties have no interest in reforming the electoral system and our democracy will continue to suffer at the hands of lawbreakers who become lawmakers.

Crorepati Candidates

Out of the 1303 candidates, 519 (40%) are crorepatis.

Party wise Crorepati Candidates: All major political parties give tickets to wealthy candidates. Among the major parties 81(71%) out of 114 candidates analysed from Jan Suraaj Party, 68(97%) out of 70 candidates analysed from RJD, 52(91%) out of 57 candidates analysed from JD(U), 44(92%) out of 48 candidates analysed from BJP, 27(30%) out of 89 candidates analysed from BSP, 18(78%) out of 23 candidates analysed from INC, 13(30%) out of 44 candidates analysed from AAP, 10(77%) out of 13 candidates analysed from Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas), 3(60%) out of 5 candidates analysed from CPI, 2(67%) out of 3 candidates analysed from CPI(M)  and 2(14%) out of 14 candidates analysed from CPI(ML)(L) have declared assets valued more than Rs 1 crore.

The average of assets per candidate contesting in the Bihar Assembly Elections 2025 Phase I is Rs 3.26 Crore.  

Party wise average assets

Among major parties, the average assets per candidate for 114 Jan Suraaj Party candidates analysed is Rs. 5.72 Crores, 89 BSP candidates analysed is Rs 1.77 Crore, 70 RJD candidates have average assets of Rs 10.37 Crores, 57 JD(U) candidates have average assets of Rs 8.75 Crores, 48 BJP candidates have average assets of Rs 11.30 Crores, 44 AAP candidates have average assets of Rs 1.57 Crore, 23 INC candidates have average assets of Rs 5.85 Crores, 14 CPI(ML)(L) candidates have average assets of Rs 81.57 Lakhs, 13 Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) candidates have average assets of Rs 10.88 Crores, 5 CPI candidates have average assets of Rs 4.83 Crores and 3 CPI(M) candidates have average assets worth Rs. 1.73 Crore.

High asset candidates

Kumar Pranay, a BJP candidate  from Munger, Raj Kishor Gupta, an independent candidate from Maharajganj, Siwan and Anant Kumar Singh, the JD(U) from Mokama, Patna are the three candidates with highest declared assets. 

Low asset candidates

Mojahid Alam, a SUCI(C) candidate from Darbhanga, Shatrudhan Varma, a Peoples Party of India (Democratic) candidate from Barh and Shiv Kumar Yadav, a SUCI(C) candidate from Minapur, Muzaffarpur are the candidates with declared lowest assets. 

Education details of candidates

519 (40%) candidates have declared their educational qualifications to be between 5th and 12th standard while 651(50%) candidates have declared having an educational qualification of graduate or above. 19 candidates are Diploma holders. 105 candidates have declared themselves to be just literate and 8 candidates are Illiterates. 1 candidate has not given his educational details in the affidavit.

Age of candidates 

463(36%) candidates have declared their age to be between 25 to 40 years while 669 (51%) candidates have declared their age to be between 41 to 60 years.  There are 169(13%) candidates who have declared their age to be between 61 to 80 years. There are 2 candidates who have declared their age to be above 80 years.

Gender details of candidates

Only 121 (9%) female candidates are contesting in the Bihar assembly election 2025 Phase I. 

 ADR's Recommendations

To remedy the existing problem of criminalization is to immediately act upon the plausible solutions offered by various committees, civil society and citizens. The Supreme Court of India being the ultimate custodian of “Justice and Rule of Law” should reprimand political parties and politicians for their complete lack of will, reprehensible predilection and absence of required laws. 

Permanent disqualification of candidates convicted for heinous crimes like murder, rape, smuggling, dacoity, kidnapping etc.

Disqualification of persons from contesting elections to the public offices against whom charges have been framed for having committed serious criminal offences punishable by imprisonment of at least 5 years, and the case is filed at least 6 months prior to the election in question.

Cancellation of tax exemptions given to the political parties who field such tainted candidates.

Bringing political parties under the Right to Information Act.  

De-register and de-recognise any political party if it knowingly puts up a candidate with a tainted background.

Political parties should annually file the information on criminal antecedents of their Office Bearers and make such records available to the public, including NIL records.

Disqualification of candidates furnishing false information in the election affidavit (Form 26).  

Ensure trial of cases in which the politicians are accused to be concluded in a time bound manner.

Implementation of SC judgment dated 23rd September, 2013 (i.e provision of NOTA buttons on the EVMs) in its letter and spirit by ensuring a) if NOTA gets more votes than any of the candidates, none of the candidates should be declared elected, and a fresh election should be held; b) in the fresh election, none of the candidates in the earlier election, in which NOTA got the highest number of votes, should be allowed to contest.

Implementation of the 25th September, 2018 and 13th February, 2020 SC orders on 'publication of criminal cases against candidates selected by political parties along with reasons for such selection' in its letter and spirit by directing the Election Commission of India a) to list out names of such tainted candidates selected by the political parties along with such reasons for such selection C8 including diligent publication of reasons in newspapers, T.V channels, party website etc, b) strict and constant reminders by ROs to the defaulters, c) list needs to be religiously prepared and submitted to the Supreme Court after every election, d) uploading of this list on ECI’s website for public inspection, e) a suitably heavy financial penalty levied on political parties for making insufficient disclosures, invalid and common reasons, selection of candidates based on winnability and f) Officer in-charge of a political party pertaining to submission of a compliance report should also be held accountable for such a breach. 

The Election Commission of India and all State Election Commissions should make it mandatory in all elections; Parliamentary, Assembly and Local Body elections to carry display boards outside each and every polling booth showing a summarised version of candidates’ affidavits. The polling booths should essentially display details of candidate’s criminal records, assets and liabilities and education qualification.  

The Election Commission of India under its ‘Systematic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation’ (SVEEP) as well as through other national campaigns on voter awareness held before every election should inform and aware the voters that (i) taking and giving cash or gifts/freebies for votes is a criminal offense, (ii) such instances should be brought to the notice of the ECI through its web application, (iii) inform voters that information on criminal records of candidates is available on the ECI website, outside polling booths and other sources that the ECI may use.

Political parties in India should be required to announce/publish the list of candidates contesting elections at least 3 months prior to elections.

Role of money and muscle power is evident from the fact that all major political parties in Bihar Assembly Elections 2025 Phase I have fielded 14% to 97% candidates who are crorepatis and 18% to 100 % candidates who have declared criminal cases against themselves. This close and alarming nexus between money power and muscle power has got so ingrained in our electoral system that the citizens are left hostage to the current situation.  Money and muscle power hurt the principles of 'free and fair elections', 'participatory democracy' and 'level playing field'.  The present circumstances therefore demand an extensive deliberation by the voters so that sanctity of elections is not ridiculed by tenacious entry of tainted candidates and candidates with abnormal multiplication of assets.

For full reports in English and Hindi  visit: https://adrindia.org/content/Bihar-Candidates-Report-Phase-I-2025

Justice Sudhir Singh appointed Acting Chief Justice, Patna High Court awaits appointment of 19 judges

The Appointments Division, Department of Justice, Union Ministry of Law and Justice issued a notification dated October 21, 2025 whereby it appointed Justice Sudhir Singh as the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court. The notification reads: ''In exercise of the power conferred by Article 223 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Sudhir Singh, Judge of the Patna High Court, to perform the duties of office of the Chief Justice of that High Court with effect from 23.10.2025 consequent upon the retirement of Shri Justice Pavankumar Bhimappa Bajanthri, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court on 22.10.2025.'' Justice Sing is the son of Justice N.P. Singh,  former judge of the Supreme Court. Justice Singh will retire on December 10, 2027. 

A copy of the notification has been sent to Justice Singh through the Registrar General, Patna High Court, Secretary to Governor, Bihar, Secretary to Chief Minister, Secretary to the Chief Justice, Patna High Court, Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Registrar General, Patna High Court, Accountant General, Bihar, President's Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi, PS to the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office, New Delhi, Registrar (Conf), Supreme Court of India and others. 

During July 22, 2025-October 18, 2025, Justice Singh headed bench has delivered 130 judgements. In his previous tenure, he was part of a bench which had delivered 1576 judgements during April 15, 2015-October 16, 2023. 

Justice returned to the High Court and took oath as a judge of the High Court on July 22, 2025. He was administered the oath of office by the 45th Chief Justice Vipul M Pancholi. In October 2023, he was transferred from Patna High Court to the Punjab and Haryana High Court following the recommendation by the Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice Surya Kant During the tenure of Justice Krishnan Vinod Chandran, the 44th Chief Justice of India.  Justice Singh was sworn in as a Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on November 2, 2023. 

Reversing the recommendation of the previous Collegium, the current Supreme Court Collegium of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari and B.V. Nagarathna in its meeting held on May 26, 2025 recommended repatriation of Justice Singh to the parent High Court. These recommendations were made keeping in mind  the idea of 'better administration of justice'. 

Justice Singh was elevated from the bar to be an additional judge of the Patna High Court on April 15, 2015 during the tenure of Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, the 38th Chief Justice. On the first day as a judge he sat with Justice Reddy as part of the High Court's Division Bench on April 15, 2015. The first case he heard as part of the Division Bench was Dhiraj Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Human Resources Department, Patna & Ors. (2015), wherein, the 6-page long order dated March 7, 2014 by Justice Shivaji Pandey was upheld by the Division Bench's 3-page long order dated April 15, 2015.  Justice Pandey had quashed the order dated August 22, 2011 passed by the Appellate Authority in a case of 2009. He had remanded the matter back to the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority, Begusarai who was directed to decide the case within six months. The Division Bench's order was authored by Chief Justice Narasimha Reddy.

After more than a month of his appointment as an additional judge, as part of the Division Bench which included Chief Justice Reddy, Justice Singh authored his first 9-page long judgement dated June 26, 2015 in Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025). He concluded:''In our endeavour to ensure that none of the relevant facts miss our attention, we have gone through the entire record carefully. What we find from them is that there is hardly any consistency between the version presented in the fardbeyan and the evidence adduced in the trial. Viewed from any angle, we find that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4 herein. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence ordered by the trial court. Since the appellant no. 1 Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, appellant no. 3. Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah and appellant no. 4 Krishna Koiri are already on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled.'' 

The case arose from Dinara, Rohtas. The appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 25, 1992 and order of sentence dated April 27, 1992, passed by Ram Nath, Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram, in Sessions Trial No. 273/9 of 1989/1990, by which all the five appellants, namely, Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, Ram Nath Sah @ Ram Nath Kanu, Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah, Krishna Koiri and Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh were found guilty of committing the offence under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life, whereas the appellant no. 1 Baban Ram @ Baban Dusadh @ Bababan Dusadh, appellant no. 3 Suresh Kanu @ Suresh Sah and appellant no. 5 Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh were also found guilty of committing the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act and were sentenced to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. Out of the aforesaid five appellants, appellant no. 2 Ram Nath Sah @ Ram Nath Kanu and appellant no. 5 Babu Ram @ Babu Ram Dusadh died during pendency of the present appeal. Hence, the appeal in so far as they are concerned were treated as abated vide orders dated December 10, 2014 and January 30, 2015 respectively passed by the High Court.

Justice Singh was made a permanent judge on April 20, 2016 during the tenure of Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, the 39th Chief Justice of the High Court. As a permanent judge, he delivered his first 6-page long judgement dated January 11, 2017 in Ravi Dyal Shah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2017). He concluded:'' 11. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court should not assume the role of a trial court and embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability of evidence and sustainability of accusation on a reasonable appreciation of such evidence. 12. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no merit in the present case. The same is dismissed. 13. The interim stay granted to the petitioners vide order dated 24.10.2013, stands vacated.''

The judgement was delivered upon hearing the  application which was filed by the petitioners for quashing the order dated September 13, 2013, passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Samastipur, in connection with a complaint case of 2013 whereby after taking cognizance under Sections 364 and 120(B) of the I.P.C., the process was issued against the petitioners. The prosecution case was that on the alleged date and time of occurrence, the son of the informant, namely, Amit Kumar, went with the petitioners but he did not return. The informant started search him. Some people told the informant that on April 26, 2011 at about 9.00 A.M., his son was seen in the company of accused persons. The informant went at the house of petitioner no. 1, where he was informed that his son went to Delhi with the petitioners for doing some job. The informant insisted to talk with his son but the petitioners did not make such arrangements. On August 1, 2011, when the petitioners returned back and his son did not return back than the informant enquired from the petitioners but they told him that his son went somewhere. The informant apprehended that the petitioners might have killed his son. It was also alleged that there was some monetary dispute between the petitioners and his son, Amit Kumar. The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that it was a malafide prosecution. There was no substantive evidence to suggest their implication in the case. Prior to institution of the present complaint case, a police case was also instituted where the final form was submitted by the police. The court below had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint case as death of the victim had taken place at Delhi. 5. It was submitted on behalf of the complainant and the State that prima-facie the offence was made out under Sections 364 and 120(B) of the I.P.C., against the petitioners. The victim was abducted within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Hence, the question of jurisdiction did not arise in the case.

The application was filed in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which envisages three circumstances in which inherent powers can be exercised.
(i) to give effect to any order passed or made under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; and
(iii) to secure the ends of justice.
Thus, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised to quash criminal proceedings in an appropriate case either to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, Criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person, must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage.

Drawing on the judgement dated November 21, 1990 by Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices S.R. Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Justice Singh observed: ''8. It is, however, not possible or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction but by way of illustrations, some categories of cases, may be indicated, where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the criminal proceedings:
(1)Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)Where the allegations in the F.I.R and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out case against the accused.(4)Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5)Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievances of the aggrieved party.
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly accompanied with malafides and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to personal and private grudge.''

Justice Singh relied on the observations of Justice Pandian in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, which lay down the limitations of inherent power of this Court, saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His judgement reads:“9. It is worth quoting, the observations of PANDIAN, J. in State of Haryana Vs Bhajanlal, which lay down the limitations of inherent power of this Court, saved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 'The Power of Quashing a Criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the Complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to it’s whim or Caprice.'”

Justice Singh observed: ''10. In my view, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code, in cases where there is no express provision empowering this Court to achieve the said object. The power is discretionary and should be exercised for ex debito justitiae. Purpose behind saving of inherent power is that no legislature can foresee all possible contingencies or eventualities that may arise in future and to meet with such situations, inherent power can be invoked by this Court.''

Prior to Justice Singh's transfer to Punjab and Haryana High Court on October 18, 2023, his bench had delivered five (5) judgments during October 3-October 16, 2023 in Khusboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar, Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna vs. The State Of Bihar, Naresh Burnwal @ Naresh Pd. Burnwal vs. The State of Bihar, Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha vs. The State of Bihar, Basant Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Vinay Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Shankar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar, Sukesh Sah vs. The State of Bihar, Davindra Kumar Choudhary vs. The State Of Bihar, Ram Daresh Ray @ Ramdresh Ray @ Tunna Ray vs. The State of Bihar, Rajesh Uraon vs. The State of Bihar, Maksud Khan @ Manu vs. The State of Bihar, Rashid Ansari vs. The State of Bihar, Md. Shakeel @ Md. Shakeel Ahmad & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar, Subhash Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Rishi Mandal vs. The State of Bihar. 

In Shankar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Chandra Prakash Singh delivered a 17-page long judgement dated October 9, 2023, wherein, it concluded:''we are of the considered opinion that the conviction of the appellants in all the appeals is not sustainable in the eyes of law and the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 15. Therefore, all the criminal appeals stand allowed and the judgment of conviction dated 15.02.2017 and order of sentence dated 22.02.2017, passed by Shri Prabhu Nath Singh, Sessions Judge, Rohtas, Sasaram in Sessions Trial No.378 of 2014 arising out of Karakat P.S. case No.242 of 2013, are set aside. 16. Since the appellant Shankar Chaudhary of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.325 of 2017 and appellant Davindra Kumar Choudhary of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.481 of 2017, are in jail custody, they are directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 17. The appellant Sukesh Sah of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.456 of 2017 is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds.''

The criminal appeals arose out of common judgment of conviction dated February 15, 2017 and order of sentence dated February 22, 2017, therefore, was heard together and was disposed of by the common judgment. All the appellants had preferred these appeals against the common judgment of conviction whereby and whereunder the appellants were convicted under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) and have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of Rs.50,000/- each for the offence under Sections 302/34 of the I.P.C. and in default of payment of fine, further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

The prosecution case, as per the written report of informant Vikesh Kumar, was that on October 26, 2013 at around 7.30 P.M. his elder brother Ramesh Kumar Sah went to attend natural call towards road. In the meantime he heard cry of his brother whereupon he run towards the road and he had seen in the torch light, accused persons-appellants Davindra Kumar Choudhary, Sukesh Sah and Shankar Choudhary armed with knife and they were blowing knife repeatedly. The accused persons seeing the informant also asked to do away his life. Then he ran away from there towards village making alarm. The accused persons threw the brother of the informant in the water and fled away. The brother of the informant was taken out from the water with the help of the villagers, then the informant saw the injury on the person of his brother making by knife. His brother told him that Sukesh Sah, Davindra Kumar Choudhary and Shankar Choudhary assaulted him badly by means of knife and further asked him to take him to the Hospital for his treatment. He was rushed to the Hospital, but his brother died on the way to the Hospital. They rushed to the police station along with dead body of his brother. It was claimed by the informant that the accused persons with common intention committed death of his brother by means of knife. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, a case was registered as Karakat P.S. case No.242 of 2013. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge sheet under Sections 302/34 of the I.P.C. and thereafter cognizance was taken by the Jurisdictional Magistrate and thereafter the case was committed to the court of Sessions. Charges were framed against the appellants to which the appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During trial, the prosecution examined altogether nine witnesses.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial suffers from several infirmities that were overlooked by the trial Court and, therefore, the impugned judgement was not sustainable in the eyes of the law. It was contended that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the place and manner of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt, as the material contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the case of the prosecution. To buttress this contention, attention has been drawn to the deposition of the eyewitnesses, asserting that severe discrepancies exist in the ocular testimony of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5. It was pointed out that their testimonies suffer from inconsistencies and deserve rejection. Moreover, PW 5 (Informant), who was alleged to be an eyewitness, doesn't mention the presence of other witnesses as eyewitnesses to the offence. The attention of the High Court was also drawn to the absence of any source of light, and thereby, the possibility of identification made by the deceased in his oral dying declaration regarding the participation of appellants in the alleged crime could be considered as a mistaken identity. Moreover, the testimony of a doctor casts doubt on the oral dying declaration, stating that the patient would have died immediately after sustaining multiple injuries. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer did not seize the light alleged to be the source of identification by PW 5. Additionally, the Investigating Officer testified that there were no cut marks on the clothes of the , despite multiple stab injuries. Therefore, it was argued that there are severe lacunae in the prosecution's case, and the chain of circumstances do not unequivocally point to the guilt of the appellants. Hence, the findings of the ltrial Court are legally flawed, incorrect in terms of facts, lacking in legal reasoning, and devoid of merit, making the judgement of conviction fit to be set aside.

After perusing the record and hearing the arguments advanced by the counsels of the parties, following issues had arisen for consideration in these appeals: -
(I) Whether the oral dying declaration can be relied upon in the absence of a source of identification and considering the testimony of the doctor?
(II) Whether the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses (PW1 to PW4) at the place of occurrence becomes doubtful in the light of the statement made by the Informant (PW5)?
(III) Whether the presence of PW5 at the alleged place of occurrence can be considered admissible in light of the fact that he heard the voice of the deceased from 800 gaj which is equivalent to 0.728Km?
(IV) Whether the absence of cut marks on the clothing of the deceased despite the presence of multiple stab injuries is fatal for the prosecution's case? 
(V) Whether non-examination of the material witnesses (Rahul Paswan, Ghamri Ansari and Sanju Singh), who helped the Informant to take out the deceased from the pond and in front of whom it is alleged that the deceased made oral testimony, has caused prejudice to the appellants?

The order of Justice Singh's transfer by the President of India in consultation with the then Chief Justice of India was issued under Article 222 (1) of the Constitution of India.  

In Khusboo Kumari vs. The State of Bihar (2023), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Sudhir Singh and Chandra Prakash Singh delivered a 28-page long judgement dated October 3, 2023, wherein, it allowed the criminal appeals and set aside the judgment of conviction dated December 10, 2014 and the order of sentence dated December 11, 2014 passed by Krishna Kumar Agrawal, Ad hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge-V, Lakhisarai in Sessions a trial of 2012, in a case which arose out of Halsi P.S. case of 2012. The judgement was authored by Justice Sudhir Singh Singh. He concluded:''Since the appellant Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.39 of 2015, appellant Basant Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.127 of 2015, appellant Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.154 of 2015 and appellant Vinay Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.166 of 2015, are in jail custody, they are directed to be released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case. 20. The appellant Khusboo Kumari of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.944 of 2014, appellant Naresh Burnwal @ Naresh Pd. Burnwal of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.74 of 2015, appellant Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.114 of 2015 and appellant Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh of Criminal Appeal (DB) No.169 of 2015, are on bail, they are discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bonds.'' 

According to the F.I.R., the prosecution case was that on the evening of March 25, 2012, Suman Barnwal, the wife of Naresh Barnwal (informant-cum-appellant) along with her husband and family members was travelling from Rajgir to Jamui, in between 8-9 pm, she was shot dead near Lakhisarai road and thereby, formal first information report (Exhibit 6) was registered. The prosecution, in course of trial, contended that the murder was committed by the appellant Naresh Barnwal in conspiracy with the appellants Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh, Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna, Ram Pravesh Singh @ Burbha, Basant Singh, Vinay Singh, Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @ Ganesh Singh and Khusboo Kumari. Adhoc Additional District and Sessions Judge-V, Lakhisarai, after the trial, by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, all the appellants were convicted for the offences under Section 302/120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each. Appellants Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna and Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh were convicted under Section 379 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three-three years. Appellants Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Kumar @ Suraj Singh, Basant Singh and Ranjay Singh @ Debu Singh @Ganesh Singh were convicted for the offence under Section 411 of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three-three years. Appellants Vikky Singh @ Ravi @ Guddu Singh @ Munna and Jitu Singh @ Jitendra Singh @ Amarjeet Singh @ Suraj Singh have also been convicted for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five-five years and a fine of Rs. 500/- each. All the sentences so imposed on the appellants were to run concurrently. 

The first information report registered on the statement of appellant Naresh Barnwal, narrated the facts. He along with his wife Suman Devi (deceased), brother-in-law Rajesh Baranwal @ Pappu, Bhabhi of his wife with her children were going from his Zen Maruti Car bearing No. JH-10A-9329 from Gaya to Jamui via Rajgir, Biharsharif and Sheikhpura and in the night of March 25, 2012 at about 8 p.m., when they reached near Tarhari village within Halsi Police Station of Lakhisarai district, subsequently 8-10 unknown persons by flashing torch directed them to stop the vehicle. 

As soon as the vehicle came to a halt, two of the unknown individuals brandishing pistols, one in the front seat and the other in the rear, forcibly entered the car. The rest of the assailants warned against raising an alarm. Those who boarded the vehicle instructed Naresh to drive, and after ten steps, they ordered a left turn. Approximately a kilometre later, they forced the vehicle to stop again. They dragged Suman Devi out of the car and threw her onto the road, after which they shot her. The two assailants also looted jewellery, mobile phones, money, and clothes, etc. and fled away. With the assistance of his brother-in-law, Naresh rushed his injured wife to Sikandara Hospital and then to Sadar Hospital in Jamui. Unfortunately, Suman Devi succumbed to her injuries during treatment. The assailants, who had boarded the vehicle, verbally abused and physically assaulted the other occupants, hitting them with the butt of their guns. Naresh claimed that he couldn't identify the culprits as their faces were covered, but he believed he could recognize them by their voices. He also noted that the place where the incident occurred was marshy. This incident took place near Tarhari village, within the jurisdiction of Halsi Police Station, Lakhisarai district, approximately one kilometre away from the road, on the evening of March 25, 2012, between 8 and 9 p.m. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, a Halsi P.S. case was registered under Section 396 of the I.P.C. Later, on the request of the Investigating Officer, statements of some of the witnesses were taken under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and thereafter the informant of the case was made accused in the case. The police after investigation submitted a charge-sheet under Sections 302, 379, 411, 120B of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The cognizance of the offence was taken by the jurisdictional Magistrate and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Charges were framed under Sections 302, 379, 120B, 411 of the I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act against all the appellants herein, on which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the trial, in order to substantiate the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses

Justice Sudhir Singh relied on the decision of 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Gurucharan Singh versus State of Punjab reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 42, wherein the Court held: ''“…Where the direct evidence is not satisfactory or disinterested or where the injuries are alleged to have been caused with a gun and they prima facie appear to have been inflicted by a rifle, undoubtedly the apparent inconsistency can be cured or the oral evidence can be corroborated by leading the evidence of a ballistic expert. In what cases the examination of a ballistic expert is essential for the proof of the prosecution case, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case.” 

He also relied on Supreme Court decision in Pritinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2023) 7 SCC 727, wherein it observed that in view of the circumstances, non- examination by ballistic expert has created a significant doubt to the case of the prosecution. Thus, in light of the above discussions and in view of the serious doubt with regard to the identification of the appellants upon thorough application of the above-settled law on the facts of the present case, we hold that it is difficult for the court to ascertain whether the recovered weapon has been used by the appellant in the commission of the present offence and thereby, failure to examine the recovered weapon has caused serious infirmity to the prosecution case.

Justice Singh noted decision of the Supreme Court in Dudh Nath Pandey vs. State of U.P. reported in (1981) 2 SCC 166, wherein it observed that: “.. Evidence of recovery of the pistol at the instance of the appellant cannot by itself prove that he who pointed out the weapon wielded it in offence. The statement accompanying the discovery is woefully vague to identify the authorship of concealment, with the result that the pointing out of the weapon may at best prove the appellant's knowledge as to where the weapon was kept. The evidence of the ballistic expert carries the proof of the charge a significant step ahead, but not near enough, because at the highest, it shows that the shot which killed Pappoo was fired from the pistol which was pointed out by the appellant...”

He recollected Supreme Court's decision in A. Shankar vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2011) 6 SCC 279 wherein it has been held that the non-production of the FSL report by the prosecution is fatal, as in the absence of such report, it was difficult for the court to reach to a definite conclusion. 

He referred to para no. 4 of Supreme Court's decision in Surinder vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 365, wherein, it was held that in cases where the articles are not sealed then it will cast serious doubt on the prosecution. In light of the discussions made above, we are of the considered opinion that the seizure made for the articles, in the absence of the sealing of these materials, casts serious doubt on the prosecution. 

Justice Singh took note of the decision of Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ghudan reported in (2003) 12 SCC 485 wherein it was observed that if any source of light was present at the place of occurrence, then the investigating agency would have mentioned or shown the existence of such source and the benefit of such omission should be given to the accused. 

He relied on para no. 9 of the decision of the Supreme Court, in Tamilselvan versus State, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 755, wherein, the Court observed: “9. Since it was the accused who allegedly carried torches, we find it difficult to believe how the prosecution witnesses could have identified the assailants. The position would have been different if the forest guards had been carrying torches and had been pointing them at the assailants, but here the position is just the reverse. In fact due to the torches of the assailants the prosecution witnesses would have been partially blinded by the light of the torchlight, and would not have been able to identify anybody.”

Justice Singh referred to judgement in Ravinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2022) 7 SCC 581, wherein the Court observed: “21. Lastly, this appeal also raised an important substantive question of law that whether the call records produced by the prosecution would be admissible under Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, given the fact that the requirement of certification of electronic evidence has not been complied with as contemplated under the Act. The uncertainty of whether Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473] occupies the field in this area of law or whether Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801] lays down the correct law in this regard has now been conclusively settled by this Court by a judgment dated 14-7-2020 in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587] wherein the Court has held that : (Arjun Panditrao Khotkar [Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 1: (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 587] , SCC pp. 56 & 62, paras 61 & 73) “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , and incorrectly “clarified”  in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] . Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426] , which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.
73.1. Anvar P.V. [Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108] , as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno [Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] , being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 865] and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704] , do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled.
73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4).  
22. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such a certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.” 

Justice Sudhir Singh observed: ''the intent behind the provisions contained in Section 65B is to sanctify secondary evidence in electronic form as these are more susceptible to tampering. So, in order to ensure the source and authenticity of the electronic record produced before a court, Section 65B (4) mandates a certificate from the person responsible for the operation of the relevant device because failure to do so could result in a miscarriage of justice.''

He recollected Supreme Court's decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1, wherein three judge bench of the Court observed: “84. But Section 65-B(1) starts with a non obstante clause excluding the application of the other provisions and it makes the certification, a precondition for admissibility. While doing so, it does not talk about relevancy. In a way, Sections 65-A and 65-B, if read together, mix up both proof and admissibility, but not talk about relevancy. Section 65-A refers to the procedure prescribed in Section 65-B, for the purpose of proving the contents of electronic records, but Section 65-B speaks entirely about the preconditions for admissibility. As a result, Section 65-B places admissibility as the first or the outermost checkpost, capable of turning away even at the border, any electronic evidence, without any enquiry, if the conditions stest identification paradeulated therein are not fulfilled.”

Justice Sudhir Singh referred the Supreme Court's decision in Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer reported in (2014) 10 SCC 473, wherein three judge bench of the Court observed: “22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65-A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu case [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715], does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65- B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., certificate in terms of Section 65-B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible.”

Justice Singh has taken charge as the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court at a time when it is currently functioning only with 34 judges although High Court's approved judge strength is 53. As of October 2025, the High Court is functioning without its 19 judges. 

Will someone be held accountable for not appointing so many judges? 

Will Justice Singh succeed in getting these vacancies filled in the larger interest of justice? 

Also read: Amid vacancy of 17 judges, Justice Sudhir Singh rejoins Patna High Court as second seniormost judge

 Justice Sudhir Singh upholds judgement of District and Sessions Judge Acquitting 11 Murder Accused  

Division Bench led by Justice Sudhir Singh delivered 50 judgements in September 2025 

Justice Sudhir Singh led bench upholds verdict by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan, resusing to interfere with State govt's policy decision

 

 

 

 

Shashi Kant Ojha, Additional Sessions Judge I, Gaya convicts 5 persons for attempt to murder and murder in May 2020

Shashi Kant Ojha, Additional Sessions Judge I, Gaya delivered a judgement on October 9, 2025 and passed the sentencing order on October 14, 2025. The judgment was reserved on September 25, 2025. The judgement convicted Rakesh Kumar, Anil Yadav, Rambalak Yadav, Raj Kumar Verma and Sanjeev Kumar for committing offence of attempt to murder and murder by using illegal fire arms punishable under section U/s 147, 148, 307/149, 302/149, 341/149, 326/149, 506 and 504 of the I.P.C. and under section 27/35 of Arms Act. The incident took place on May 6, 2020. The F.IR. was lodged on the same day. The date of charge-sheet was August 6, 2020. The charges were framed on September 24, 2021. The date of commencement evidence was October 23, 2021. The date of statement was May 27, 2024.   

At the outset, all together six accused persons were facing trials namely 1. Rakesh Kumar, 2. Anil Yadav, 3. Rambalak Yadav, 4. Raj Kumar Verma, 5. Sanjeev Kumar and 6. Vimlesh Yadav.  

But in the course of trial case record of accused Vimlesh Kumar was split up vide order dated July 19, 2022 as Sessions Triai No. 307/2022 and thereafter only five accused persons namely 1. Rakesh Kumar, 2. Anil Yadav, 3. Rambalak Yadav, 4. Raj Kumar Verma and 5. Sanjeev Kumar  faced trial. 

The case of prosecution as per written application of informant Abhiram Sharma stating therein that on May 6, 2020 at about 12:00 O'clock in the noon, he was sitting at his shop in the village Sinduari. 

In the mean time villagers Uday Sharma Kaushik, S/o- Baikunth Sharma, Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, S/o- Vamdeo Singh, Srinath Kumar, S/o-Brajesh Kumar Kaushik, Birenra Kumar, S/o- Late Jagdish Singh came at his cement shop for purchasing goods and he was selling goods to them in sequence. 

In the mean while co-villager Rakesh Yadav, Vimlesh Yadav, Anil Yadav, Rambalak Yadav, Raj Kumar Verma and Sanjeev Kumar came out from their house having armed with rifal and started abusing. Rakesh Yadav ordered to kill them by saying they are Bhumihar

All accused persons started firing. Rakesh Yadav fired upon Uday Sharma Kaushik, which hit on his head. Vimlesh Yadav fired upon Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, which hit his stomach and due to that he fled down. Anil Yadav fired upon Girjesh Sharma, which hit his chest. Raj Kumar Verma shot fire upon Srinath, which hit his stomach, due to which he fled down. Rambalak Yadav shot fire upon Birendra Kumar, which hit his leg. Sanjeev Kumar ran away towards the informant and started firing, anyhow he fled towards village making noise. There were other persons also present with the Sanjeev Kumar. He claimed to identify after seeing them. 

On hearing his noise villagers came at the place of occurrence and after seeing the villagers all accused persons fled away giving threat to kill them by saying deprive the village of Bhumihar. The villagers took injured person to Hospital but injured Uday Sharma Kaushik died on the way and injured Girjesh Sharma Kaushik, Srinath Sharma and Virendra Kumar brought to Jai Prakash Hospital, Gaya but for the better treatment they were referred to Patna Medical College Hospital, Patna but Girjesh Sharma Kaushik died on the way of Patna. The main reason of this incident was that a quarrel took place near Bank at Konch in between Manjeet Yadav, S/o- Ajay Yadav and a boy of Bhumihar and due to which this occurrence took place. 

From Archive:E-publishing of Government of India Gazette

Office Memorandum under Section 8 of The Information Technology Act, 2000

No. O-17022/1/2015-PSP-I

Government of India

Ministry of Urban Development

(PSP Division)

Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi

Dated : 30th September, 2015

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject : E-publishing of Government of India Gazette

Notification Discontinuing of the practice of physical printing.

In compliance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, it has been decided in consultation with Department of Legal Affairs to switch over to exclusive e-publishing of the Government of India Gazette Notification on its official website with effect from 01.10.2015 and to do away with the physical printing of Gazette Notification. The date of publishing shall be the date of e-publication on official website by way of electronic gazette in respect of Gazette Notifications. The Gazette Notification can be accessed and downloaded/printed from the official e-Gazette website i.e. www.egazette.nic.in free of cost.

All the Ministries and Departments are requested to give wide publicity to bring this to the notice of all attached & subordinate offices, PSU, etc., as well as various stakeholders including all private users.

This issues with the approval of competent authority.

(Kailash Choudhary)

Under Secretary to the Govt. of India

P.S.:Section 8, The Information Technology Act, 2000 reads: ''Where any law provides that any  rule, regulation, order, bye-law, notification or any other matter shall be published in the Official Gazette, then, such requirement shall be deemed to have been satisfied if such rule, regulation, order, bye-law, notification or any other matter is published in the Official Gazette or Electronic Gazette: Provided that where any rule, regulation, order, by-law, notification or any other matter is published in the Official Gazette or Electronic Gazette, the date of publication shall be deemed to be the date of the Gazette which was first published in any form.''