Supreme Court inquires whether clerk of an advocate had proven the post-mortem report

In Naresh Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it recorded:"4. Perusal of the special leave petition reveals that the High Court to have had passed an order affirming the conviction way back on 26.04.2022 and the present special leave petition stands filed only on 17.11.2025, and that too without placing on record the testimonies of the witnesses. From the synopsis of the SLP (Pages H & I), it is apparent that it was only on 12.04.2025 that the petitioner made a request for providing a legal-aid counsel for the purpose of filing the special leave petition. Record does not reveal as to whether the petitioner/convict was informed of his statutory rights of getting assistance of a legal-aid counsel; whether he had chosen to prefer any special leave petition and requested for a legal-aid counsel; or that he had ever expressed his desire or was informed of his right of filing the special leave petition. Perusal of the grounds of the special leave petition reveals that it was a clerk of an advocate who had proven the post-mortem report. Whether this is factually correct or not is what needs to be ascertained." 

The petitioner has challenged the 20-page long judgment dated April 26, 2022 in Naresh Sahni vs. State of Bihar (2022) delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sunil Kumar Panwar. Supreme Court has condoned the delay. The petitioner has been convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. He is under incarceration since March 3, 2010. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "10. Let a Report, complete in all respects, dealing with the facts as have emerged from the special leave petition, be called for from the Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 11. The Registrar (Judl.) concerned is directed to communicate the order during the course of the day. 12. Records of the Courts below be immediately called for. A copy thereof, in digital form, be supplied to all concerned. 13. Perhaps on the next date of hearing the matter be considered on merits itself." The case arose from a Sessions Trial of 2011, which arose out of Mithanpura P.S. Case No. 34 of 2010 from the court of learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur. 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Harish Kumar Bench sets aside order by Justice Purnendu Singh in 94738 Guest teachers case, Supreme Court's word awaited

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs.  Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar Bench delivered a 34-page judgement dated May 5, 2026 upon hearing a Letters Patent Appeal, wherein, it set aside 10-page long order dated January 27, 2025 by Justice Purnendu Singh of the High Court. The judgement of the Division Bencg was authored by Justice Kumar. The judgement concluded: "33. After having discussed the aforenoted facts and circumstances and the position obtaining in law, we are of the humble view that the order/judgment of the learned Single Judge suffers from perversity in directing the respondent State authorities-appellant herein to rectify their action forthwith and pass reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law. 34. Accordingly, the impugned order/judgment dated 27.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside and the writ petition, bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025 stands dismissed. 35. The Letters Patent Appeal stands allowed."

The intra court appeal was preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent under Patna High Court Rules, 1916 against the judgment/order dated January 27, 2025 passed by Justice Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court Court, whereby the Court had allowed the writ petition. Justice Singh's judgement reads: “11. The petitioners can not be terminated by any executive order, as such, the directives contained in Letter No.352 dated 30.03.2024 cannot override the government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar. Accordingly, the impugned letter no.325 dated 30.03.2024 cannot be sustained in the eye of law.12. The competent authorities are directed to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law.” 

Justice Singh had observed:"9. I find that the notification has been issued by the State Government in exercise of power conferred under Article 166/162 of the Constitution of India and the State Government being author of the said notification now cannot terminate the petitioners that too without giving them due opportunity of hearing." He had allowed the writ petition by concluding that "11. The petitioners can not be terminated by any executive order, as such, the directives contained in Letter No.352 dated 30.03.2024 cannot override the government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar. Accordingly, the impugned letter no.325 dated 30.03.2024 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 12. The competent authorities are directed to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law." Justice Singh had referred to Supreme Court's decisions in Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors.in Civil Appeal No. of 2024, wherein, after the case of the temporary employees, contractual employees and the employees like present one, who have been appointed by the State Government was considered.  He had observed: "I find it proper to refer Paragraph Nos.20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 27 of the case of Jaggo Vs. Union of India & Ors. (SLP (C) No. 5580 of 2024), in which taking note of the judgment passed in Vinod Kumar and Ors. Etc. Vs. Union of India & Ors. case, reported in (2024) 1 S.C.R. 1230, the Hon’ble Apex Court." 

The appeal was filed in a narrow compass. The Government of Bihar in the Department of Education vide its Resolution dated January 25, 2018 on account of non-availability of Assistant Teachers of English, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Zoology and Botany in the Government, Government Aided and Up-graded Secondary School resolved to hire the services of Guest Teachers on a fixed honorarium. In the light of this decision, altogether 4257 vacant posts were advertised for the post of Guest Teachers, having requisite qualification prescribed therein on a fixed honorarium. In the light of the aforenoted resolution, the writ petitioners applied for the post of Guest Teachers and duly appointed against the sanctioned vacant post in different schools. There was never any complaint with regard to the performance of the writ petitioners and in fact it was quite satisfactory, as is evident from the fact that they were allowed to work as a Guest teacher since 2018 to 2024. The nature of work of the writ petitioners was at par with regular teacher. However, notwithstanding these facts, all of a sudden without adopting due process, the respondent State authorities came out with letter dated March 30, 2024, issued by the Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Patna directing all the District Education Officers that the services of Guest Teachers hired in the State Higher Secondary Schools, under the provisions made in the departmental resolution dated 25.01.2018, should not be required from April 1, 2024 under any circumstances.

Being aggrieved, the writ petitioners challenged the letter dated 30.03.2024 before the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025 stating, inter alia, that by the impugned order the services of the writ petitioners along with many other Guest Teachers was unilaterally terminated, despite the petitioners fulfilling all the requisite criteria to be absorbed into the service on permanent basis. It was submitted that though the appointment of the writ petitioners was temporary, but the same was made against the sanctioned post by following the due process and, as such, the unilateral decision of the State Government cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

The Single Judge after hearing the respective parties and taking note of the fact that total 4257 guest teachers were duly appointed after issuance of an advertisement published by the Bihar Public Service Commission and such vacancies of guest teachers were kept reserved only for the guest teachers, as communicated vide letter dated 03.07.2023. Therefore, the writ petitioners cannot be terminated by any executive order by overriding the Government notification dated February 8, 2018, which was issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar under Articles 166/162 of the Constitution of India and thus the State Government being the author of the said notification now cannot terminate the writ petitioners that too without due opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, set aside the impugned letter dated March 30, 2024 and directed the competent authority to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due
opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law. The Single Judge had also referred to the decisions rendered in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 and Vinod Kumar & Ors. Etc. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2024) 9 SCC 327.  

The State of Bihar and its authorities being aggrieved with the order of the Single Judge preferred the Letters Patent Appeal with the interim applications, inter alia, for stay of the operation of the impugned order dated 27.01.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025. The Court vide its order dated August 20, 2025 took note of the fact that only four persons have filed the captioned petition before the Single Judge, despite which general direction was issued to give opportunity of hearing to more than 4000 guest teachers, who were, in fact, not party before the Single Judge, stayed the implementation and operation of the order till final disposal of the appeal. 

The Division Bench recorded that against the order dated 20.08.2025 passed in I.A. No. 02 of 2025 in the L.P.A., the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 moved before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (c) No(s). 34609 of 2025, which came to be dismissed vide order dated November 28, 2025 without prejudice to the right of the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 to apply to the High Court for discharge of the interim order. In the light of the liberty, the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 filed interlocutory application no. 3 of 2025 for impleading them as party respondents. Subsequently, vide order dated December 12, 2025 the High Court directed to implead the intervenor applicant as party respondent nos. 5 to 255 in the appeal. 

Justice Kumar observed: "27. Dispensing with the services, in all the cases, cannot be termed as punitive termination, necessitating the requirement of show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing like any other termination/removal from services causing civil consequences. What is required an information to be given to the concerned, in terms with the stipulation of the scheme/notification, which empowers them to continue with their work as guest teacher. 28. Undisputed stand of the State is that altogether 37847 teachers for Secondary Class and 56891 teachers for Senior Secondary Classes, total 94738 posts were filled up, following due process, against vacant and sanctioned post and accordingly they were posted and now discharging their duties in the different Government, Government Aided and Up-graded Higher Secondary Schools. In such circumstances, the Director, Secondary Education has come out with letter no. 325 dated 30.03.2024 with a clear stipulation that in view of the aforesaid fact of regular appointment having been made in the Higher Secondary Schools, there is no need to retain the guest teachers in services and accordingly directed that the services of guest teachers hired in the State Higher Secondary Schools, under the provisions made in the Departmental Resolution No. 51 dated 25.01.2018, should not be taken from 01.04.2024. Based upon the aforesaid direction, the respective District Education Officers of different districts have dispensed with the hiring of the services of the guest teachers, including the writ petitioners and the intervenor respondents." 

The judgment noted that it was not "a case where a set of guest teachers are being replaced by another set of guest teachers, rather their services were subjected to continuation till the regular appointment is made; once the regular appointment against the sanctioned and vacant posts have been made in the different Higher Secondary Schools of the State Government." In no circumstances, this  Court finds any fault in the impugned order dated 30.03.2024 passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, as the same is not contrary to the object and terms of resolution dated 25.01.2018, rather it is in conformity with the same. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners cannot be terminated by any executive order by overriding the Government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar, in the opinion of this Court, with due regard, does not stand in law as well as on facts. The decision not to retain the guest teachers and/or hire their services has been taken bonafidely in view of the subsequent development of mass appointment of regular teachers in Higher Secondary Schools against the vacant and sanctioned post; since not in dispute, we do not find that opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons and passing a reasoned order in each and every case is required. The principle of natural justice can not be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. The Court, time without number has held that in a case where a large number of people are involved, the principle may be excluded; and all the more, in this case, when they had already been put to notice that their services are being hired till the regular appointment is made against those posts, such decision cannot be said to be suffering from the vice of principles of natural justice."

Justice Kumar observed: "30. So far the decisions rendered in the case of Vinod, Jaggo and Bhola Nath (supra) are concerned, again this Court, with due regard to the learned Single Judge, opined are not applicable in the facts of this case. The mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforenoted cases clearly ruled that the essence of employment and its associated rights cannot be determined solely by initial appointment terms when the actual course of employment has evolved significantly over time and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned the authorities of the State regarding misuse of temporary and contractual engagement, in the manner that results in exploitation of employees. The Court criticized the practice of outsourcing informalizing the recruitment as a means to evade the regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working condition while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practice. 31. In the case in hand, the writ petitioners and the intervenors respondents have accepted their offer with an open eye that their services shall be hired till the regular appointment is made. After having worked for about 5-6 years, now regular appointments have been made and the posts, against which their services were hired, have now been filled up through regular appointment by following due process of recruitment. We must keep in mind the mandate of the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Umadevi and Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 where the Court clarified that a contractual appointment would come to an end in terms of the contract, and similarly, an engagement on daily wage or casual basis would cease upon its discontinuation. Mere continuation of a temporary or casual employee beyond the term of appointment would not entitle such employee to absorption or regularization, if the initial appointment itself was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Constitution Bench further clarified and given a window for those irregularly appointed persons as a one time measure, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned post, but not under the cover of orders of the Court or a Tribunal."

The Division Bench concluded: "32. So far the continuation of the writ petitioners or the intervenor respondents or regularization against the posts is concerned, it does not arise in the facts of the present case, since the engagement of the writ petitioners and the intervenor respondents were made on an offer given by the State that they resolved to hire their services as a Guest Teacher only till the regular appointment is made. In the opinion of this Court, it would be a fraud upon the other eligible candidates, who did not apply for the guest teachers knowing very well that such offer is rendered and their services have been hired only till regular appointment is made and, as such, in no circumstances, the guest teachers shall be allowed to continue, even after regular appointments are made against those vacant posts." 

It is apparent that the last word on the legality of the Division Bench's judgement will be uttered by the Supreme Court.    

Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya sets aside order in Title Eviction Suit by Sub Judge-IX, Patna in Title Eviction Suit, remits the matter back to Trial Court

In Rushan Praveen vs. Md. Firoz (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May , 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 12.09.2018 passed by the learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The same is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity to the defendant/petitioner to contest the suit. It is further directed that the learned Trial Court shall proceed expeditiously as per settled law and decide the suit on its own merits after settlement of the issue, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. 18. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision application stands disposed of. 19. Any interim order, if operating, stands vacated."

The civil revision was filed by the petitioner under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act ( BBC Act) for setting aside the order dated September 12, 2018 passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 by the Court of Sub Judge-IX, Patna, whereby the eviction suit filed by the plaintiff/opposite party came to be decreed under the special provisions of Section 14(4) BBC Act on account of non-filing of an affidavit by the defendant/petitioner seeking leave to contest the suit.

The case arose from the proceeding, wherein, the plaintiff/opposite party instituted Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 before the Court of learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna, asserting himself to be the landlord of the suit premises and alleging that the defendant had been inducted as a tenant therein on monthly rent of Rs.1,500/. The eviction of the defendant was sought on the ground of personal necessity as well as under the special summary procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act. It was alleged in the plaint that despite requests, the defendant failed to vacate the premises, necessitating institution of the suit. The suit was thus registered and proceeded under the special provisions applicable to eviction on the ground of personal requirement.

The defendant/petitioner entered appearance in the suit and filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the claim of the plaintiff/opposite party in toto. It was stated that the suit was non-maintainable on the grounds of limitation, estoppel,waiver, and misjoinder/non-joinder of necessary parties, and also the defendant/petitioner specifically denied the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further stated that the defendant/petitioner was the absolute  owner in possession of the disputed land and house, having purchased the same through a registered sale deed dated October 13, 2003 from one Md. Jawed, who was the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself had signed the said sale deed as a attesting witness at the time of its execution. It was stated that after such purchase, the opposite party/plaintiff constructed a pucca house over the land, got her name duly mutated in the government records, and was regularly paying rent, holding tax, and electricity charges, besides having obtained a possession certificate from the competent authority. It was also stated that the land of the opposite party was situated towards the north of the defendant’s/petitioner’s land and remains vacant, whereas the defendant was residing in her own constructed house along with her family members. It was stated that the plaintiff/opposite party, in collusion with a builder who was constructing an apartment in the vicinity, instituted the eviction suit with a view to grab the property of the defendant/petitioner and to compel her to sell the same. The defendant/petitioner, therefore prayed for dismissal of the eviction suit, stating that the provisions of the BBC Act are not applicable in the absence of any landlord-tenant relationship and that the plaintiff has no cause of action to institute the suit. 

Upon consideration of the materials available on record and the procedural compliance under the special provisions of Section 14 of the BBC Act, the Trial Court held that although the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed written statement, she failed to file the mandatory affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit as required under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. The Trial Court also observed that in view of such non-compliance, the statements and grounds taken by the plaintiff/opposite party in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted by the defendant. The Trial Court vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 allowed the petition filed by the plaintiff under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act and held the plaintiff entitled to a decree of eviction. Accordingly, the Trial Court directed the defendant/ petitioner to vacate the suit premises and hand over peaceful and vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff/opposite party within a period of two months from the date of the impugned order, failing which the plaintiff/opposite party was given liberty to seek eviction of the defendant/petitioner through process of law.

Being aggrieved by this order of eviction controversy must be tested on the said vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 passed by the Trial Court in the Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013, the petitioner had filed the present Civil Revision petition before the Court.

The counsel for the petitioner assailed the order dated September 12, 2018 on the ground which was passed in a mechanical and summary manner without proper appreciation of the pleadings and materials available on record. It was submitted that although the petitioner had entered appearance promptly after service of summons and had filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the suit on merits, the Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit solely on the technical ground of non-filing of affidavit under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. It was further submitted that such an approach defeats the principles of natural justice, particularly when the matter was already posted for settlement of issues and the defence of the petitioner was available on record.

The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the very foundation of the eviction suit, namely the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, is wholly absent in the case. It was submitted that the petitioner claimed to be the absolute owner in possession of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated December 16, 2003 executed by Md. Jawed, who was none other than the full brother of the plaintiff, and significantly, the plaintiff himself was an attesting witness to the sale deed. It was also submitted that subsequent mutation in government records, grant of land possession certificate, payment of electricity bill and holding tax, and construction of a pucca house over the purchased land clearly establish the independent right, title, and possession of the petitioner over the property. The counsel submitted that in such circumstances, the provisions of the BBC Act, which presuppose existence of tenancy, are not attracted at all.

The counsel also submitted that even otherwise, the Trial Court has failed to satisfy itself regarding the existence of bona fide requirement or any legally sustainable ground for eviction, as no documentary or oral evidence was adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case. It was submitted that neither any rent receipt nor any lease deed was brought on record, nor was the plaintiff examined as a witness to prove the pleadings. The counsel also placed reliance on settled principles of law and submitted that mere pleadings
cannot be treated as proof and even in a proceeding under Section 14, the Court is under an obligation to scrutinize the genuineness and bona fides of the claim. In order to support his averments he relied on the judgment of the Cordinate Bench of the High Court in Abhimanyu Prasad Sah vs. Murlidhar Bhawsinghka 1998 (1) PLJR. It was submitted that the impugned order, having been passed without such judicial scrutiny and in disregard of the materials on record, was unsustainable in law and fit to be set aside. 

Justice Malviya observed:"....this Court finds that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, particularly under Section 14(8) of the B.B.C Act, is limited. It is well settled that this Court, while exercising revisional powers, does not act as an Appellate Court to reappreciate evidence but is required to examine whether the impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, interference is warranted only when the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to law or have resulted in manifest injustice. The revisional power is supervisory in nature and cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction; interference is permissible only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity in the exercise of such jurisdiction. 10. Upon consideration of the records, it is not in dispute that the eviction suit was instituted under the special procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act and that the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed her written statement within time. It is equally admitted that no separate affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit, as mandated under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, was filed by the defendant....11. Moreover, it is clear that for the applicability of the Section14(4) of the BBC Act, tenancy must be undisputed and the relationship of the landlord and tenant is established but in the instant case tenancy has denied."

The judgement reads:"...it is implied that tenancy is neither admitted not established in the present case so the requirement of section 14 (4) of the BBC Act is not applicable in the fact and circumstances of the instant case. The learned Trial Court has proceeded on the technical aspect of the Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, while allowing the petition of the plaintiff and decreeing the suit. 13. Moreover, this Court finds that the matter does not rest merely on technical non-compliance. From the written statement and materials brought on record, a serious dispute has been raised with regard to the very existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The specific stand of the defendant is that she is the purchaser of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed executed by the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself is an attesting witness to the said transaction. The defendant/petitioner has further asserted her independent title and possession over the property supported by mutation, possession certificate, and payment of government dues. Such pleadings, going to the root of the maintainability of the eviction suit under the BBC Act, could not have been lightly brushed aside without judicial scrutiny." 

Justice Malviya drew on the legal position in this regard stands conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh reported in (2014) 9 SCC, wherein, it held: “The revisional court does not have the power to re-appreciate evidence. The jurisdiction is confined to examine whether the findings of fact recorded by the court below are according to law and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error.”

Justice Malviya observed that it is well settled that "even in a proceeding under Section 14 of the BBC Act, though summary in nature, the Court is not absolved of its duty to satisfy itself regarding the existence of essential ingredients for eviction, particularly the relationship of landlord and tenant and the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff/opposite party. The deeming provision under Section 14(4) of the B.B.C. Act cannot be stretched to the extent of permitting a decree in cases where foundational facts themselves are seriously disputed and are not supported by any evidence. In the present case, it appears that no documentary evidence, such as rent receipts or lease agreement, was produced by the plaintiff/opposite party, nor was any oral evidence led to substantiate the claim of tenancy or personal necessity.  15. It is also pertinent to note procedural aspect of section 14(4) of the BBC Act are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it, and that Courts should ordinarily lean in favour of deciding matters on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice on technical grounds. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, was required to adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach while passing the impugned order. Position of law is well settled that courts should ordinarily lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than dismissal on technicalities." 

The High Court drew on the legal principle laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Aroush Motors, reported in 2025 INSC 1202, which held: “The object of the procedural rules is to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it and when the rigid adherence to technicalities of procedure causes injustice, courts have to come to the rescue by adopting a liberal approach. The courts cannot countenance a situation where substantial justice is sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. Where substantial justice is at stake, technicalities must give way to ensure that the litigant is afforded sufficient opportunity to defend. The present controversy must be tested on the said principle.” 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a cheque bounce case

In Dhananjay Kumar @ Dhananjay Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 6-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 of the BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 09.02.2026. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only) with two like sureties. It is directed that the appellant shall extend 3complete cooperation in the ensuing investigation/trial. The appellant shall not misuse his liberty and shall not in any way influence the witnesses or tamper with the material on record. With the aforesaid directions, the Criminal Appeal is allowed."

The appeal challenged rejection of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh's order dated February 9, 2026. The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending arrest in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR of 2022 dated November 17, 2022 lodged with Police Station-Belsaganj, Sub-Division Sadar, District-Gaya in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail in terms of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

By order dated April 2, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed the order saying, "Till the next date of hearing, no coercive steps shall be taken as against the petitioner...." 

The senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the dispute between the parties was with regard to the bouncing of a cheque and filing of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act; that the main accused was granted the anticipatory bail by the High Court by order dated August 1, 2023 however such a relief was not granted to the appellant herein. This Court, by virtue of the interim order dated April 2, 2026, was granted protection. In the circumstances, by following the principle of parity, the appellant may also be granted the relief of anticipatory bail subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by making the interim order absolute. 

The counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the complaint was made under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and bearing in mind the facts of this case, the appropriate order may be made in the appeal.  

In Dhananjay Kumar @ Dhananjay Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026. The petitioner had apprehended his arrest in a case registered for the offence. It was a case of cheque bounce. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with co-accused Ajit Kumar, took Rs. 70,00,000/ from the informant as consideration money in lieu of executing a land in his favour and later on, refused to execute the land. Thereafter, when the informant asked for his money back, the accused persons issued cheques in his favour which got bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Thus, the accused persons cheated the informant and extorted money from him. The respondent no. was Satyendra Yadav.   

Supreme Court grants pre-arrest bail, Justice Ansul of Patna High Court had rejected anticipatory bail application

In Babita Devi @ Babita Kumari vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and S.V.N. Bhatti passed a 2-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, concluded:"Till the next date of hearing, in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No.58/2026 registered with Bharahi/Bharrahi Police Station, District Madhepura, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 352 and 351(2) & (3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, subject to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer....6. However, we also make it clear that being the dispute between the mother-in-law on the one side and son and daughter-in-law on the other side, an attempt should be made to amicably resolve the matter." The matter will be called again on May 25, 2026. 

The Court observed: "2. Considering that the dispute is within the family where the complainant is the mother-in-law and the accused persons are son and daughter-in-law, we are inclined to consider the matter."

Prior to this in Navin Kumar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul of the Patna High Court had heard the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner who had approached the High Court apprehending their arrest in Bharrahi P.S. Case. The petitioner no. 2 was Babita Devi @ Babita Kumari 2. The mother had alleged that the son had manipulated signatures of parties and had got the land registered in his wife’s name. In his order dated April 22, 2026, Justice Ansul had observed:"4. Considering such inhuman conduct of the petitioners, this Court is not inclined to grant the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners. 5. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail is rejected."

Supreme Court reverses Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh's order in a POCSO case, grants protection from arrest

In Nitish Singh @ Nitish Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria passed a 2-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it issued notice and directed that in the meanwhile, "petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with FIR No. 141/2025 registered with Police Station-Isuapur, District-Saran, Patna subject to petitioner diligently co-operating with the investigation/ trial." The respondent no. 2 is Pooja Devi, wife of Ajay Dubey, Nawada, Isuapur, Saran. The petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner’s mother had lodged a complaint against the opposite party on June 12, 2025 and thereafter, as a counter blast, the present FIR was lodged on July 23, 2025 alleging sexual assault but, there is no allegation of penetrative sexual assault.

Earlier, Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court had passed an order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"5 . Considering the nature of accusation , statement of the victim recorded under section 183 BNSS and gravity of offence , prayer for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is rejected."upon hearing the application of the petitioner who apprehended arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under section Section 115 (2), 126 (2), 65 (2), 351 (2), 352, 3 (5) of BNS,  4/8, POCSO Act. As per F.I.R. petitioner was alleged to have misbehaved with the minor daughter of informant and had also touched her private parts. The victim in her statement recorded under Section 183 of BNSS supported the prosecution case.

Supreme Court finds second anticipatory bail petition maintainable, reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

 

In Digvijay Narayan vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 4, 2025, wherein, it reversed the order dated February 9, 2026 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. While issuing notice on April 7, 2026, by way of interim relief, the Supreme Court had issued direction for not taking coercive steps subject to cooperation in the investigation. 

The Court's order reads:"....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail....we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the Station House Officer of the concerned police station." 

Justice Singh's order had dismissed the second anticipatory bail petition as not maintainable, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in of G.R. Ananda Babu vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 176.  The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a FIR dated November 29, 2024 registered at Police Station Industrial Area, District Vaishali, for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Justice Singh's order dated August 27, 2025 with respect to the first anticipatory bail application had rejected it. It recorded the prosecution case, wherein, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with other accused persons, had fraudulently mutated the land of informant in the name of others on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. The counsel of petitioner had submitted that petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case merely because at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as Revenue Clerk. The order had noted that the petitioner had two criminal antecedents. The order reads: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, nature of accusation and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner is rejected."

Supreme Court's order has directed the petitioner to join the investigation as and when required and co-operate in the same abiding all the conditions as specified under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C./Section 482 of BNSS.