Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Murder convict suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia, "cannot be kept in jail for all times to come": Supreme Court

In Md. Shafeeque vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardowala and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it recorded that counsel appearing for the State brought to it the Court's notice that the State Government has declined to grant remission to the petitioner-convict. 

The order reads:"2. We are informed that the convict is not in a stable state of mind. He seems to be suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia. 3. We are further informed that the convict is being treated for the ailment in the jail hospital. 4. We are mindful of the fact that he is undergoing sentence past almost 21 years. 5. We want some material to be brought on record in the form of medical certificates, etc. so as to understand the exact nature of the ailment with which the petitioner is suffering and what is the way out. 6. Assuming for the moment that the petitioner is suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia, he cannot be kept in jail for all times to come. 7. We need to find some way out to tackle this problem. 8. List immediately after ensuing summer vacations." 

The case arose out of impugned final judgement dated April 4, 2016 by Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra  in Md. Shafeeque vs. The State of Bihar (2016). The judgement reads: "12. On going through the evidence, which we have mentioned above, it appears that occurrence had taken place at 7.00 pm. in the evening at the door of the Informant, who was competent to see the occurrence. The matter was reported soon thereafter at 9.00 pm. at the Police Station, which was 5 kilometers away. The manner of occurrence, described by the Informant, is fully corroborated by the hearsay evidence of P.W.1 Sher Mohammed, P.W. 2 Md. Javed, P.W. 3 Md. Motibul and also the independent witness, Dr. Satyendra Kumar Singh (P.W.6), who found such injuries. No doubt, injury report of Noorsaba (P.W. 4) has not been brought on record but that does not appear of any importance, where the charge of 302 I.P.C. for causing the death of the deceased is concerned. We also take note of the fact that the Investigating Officer has not been examined, but there appears no contradiction of any of the witnesses on any point whatsoever which would have made prosecution case untrustworthy to any extent or of having caused prejudice to the Appellant. 13. In the result, finding no merit in the Appeal, the same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

The appellant was convicted under section 302 of the I.P.C. by a judgment dated February 4, 2015 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Purnea in connection with a Sessions Case of 2007 and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 50000/. The case of the prosecution, is that according to Noorsaba Begam (P.W.4), mother of the deceased child is that on March 29, 2007 when her son Sohail Raza was playing with rest of the children outside, suddenly the Appellant Md. Shafeeque came with the big dagger and cut his neck. Thereafter, she learnt that another child Jilani had also been assaulted by the same Appellant. He was caught by the villagers while fleeing away with dagger.
This information was given on the same day immediately within three hours at the Police Station. During trial, the prosecution examined 7 witnesses, wheres Defence examined three witnesses. The High Court found  no merit in the appeal.

P.W. 1 Sher Mohammed as also P.W. 2 Md. Javed and P.W. 3 Md. Motibul, who is father of P.W. 5 Jilani also injured in the present case are hearsay witnesses, who corroborated the fact of the Appellant suddenly assaulting the deceased Sohail Raza aged about 4 years causing his death and also causing injury to Jilani
(P.W.5). There is nothing in their cross-examination to discredit their evidence in any manner. P.W. 4 Noorsaba is the mother of the deceased, who repeated the facts given in the First Information Report to the Police Station to the extent that on the date of occurrence, while here son aged about 4 years was playing outside, suddenly the appellant came with a dragger and assaulted him on the neck and fled away. Thereafter, she went to the Police Station along with her husband and got recorded the fardbeyan. In cross-examination, she stated that it was night time when she reached the Police Station and the Investigating Officer had come next day to her villager. P.W. 5 Jilani, injured witness, who was aged about
12 years on the date of deposition and capable of understanding, stated that on the date of occurrence while he was playing suddenly he saw the appellant coming with a blood stained knife. Thereafter, he assaulted him on the neck and his hand and ran away. He was treated at Sadar Hospital, Purnia. He confirmed that his son and his father Md. Motibul (P.W. 3) were examined as witness. 

The High Court observed: "There is nothing in the cross-examination which is of note." 

The High Court's judgement recorded that P.W. 6 Dr. Satyendra Kumar Singh found the following injuries on the person of the deceased: On external examination –
(i) Rigor mortis was present in all limbs.
(ii) Sharp cut wound on interior part of neck cutting trachea esophagus and carotid arteries
(iii) 2” x ½” sharp cut wound on the right shoulder
(iv) ½” x ¼” sharp cut wound over left shoulder joint.
On Dissection –
Head - NAD, Neck as mentioned above, chest –heart – all chambers are empty, lungs pale, abdomen– liver/spleen/kidney – pale, stomach contains semidigested food. Small and large intestine – gas and fasces. Urinary bladder –empty.
Time elapsed since death - Within 24 hours. Cause of death was due to hemorrhage and shock due to above mentioned injuries caused by sharp cutting weapon.
10. P.W. 7 Barik and P.W.8 Md. Munshi have not supported the case of the prosecution and have been declared hostile. 
11. D.W. 1 M. Kumar Harijan and D.W. 2 Md. Ameer had stated that the Appellant had not caused the death of the deceased and DW. 3 Himat had stated that the Appellant was mentally unbalanced.

Earlier, by order dated April 20, 2015, the High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice L. Narasimha Reddy and Justice Sudhir Singh had declined to grant bail to the appellant. 

The High Court's order reads:"Though it is represented that the appellant is in prison since last 8 years in connection with Sessions Case No.797 of 2007 arising out of Amour P.S. Case No.29 of 2007, pending in the court of 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Purnea, for the present we are not inclined to grant bail. Prayer for bail is rejected. It is left open to the appellant to renew his request after six months." 

Also read:5 year old mental health act case tagged with "In Court on its own motion Regarding matter relates to the Inspection Report", a Suo Motu PIL

Supreme Court modifies anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Putul Rai @ Putul Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court has deprecated the practice of the High Court to direct the applicant to surrender and apply for regular bail while rejecting the anticipatory bail prayer. 5. In such circumstances, we do not find a good reason to entertain the prayer for anticipatory bail. However, we deem it appropriate to expunge the direction in the impugned order which requires the petitioner to surrender and apply for regular bail though, it goes without saying that if the petitioner has been required by the Complaint Court to appear before it, the petitioner must comply with such a direction. 6. With the aforesaid observations, this special leave petition stands disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026 was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar.  

Justice Kumar's order had rejected the anticipatory bail application and the petitioners were directed to surrender before the Court concerned within a period of two weeks from the date of the order.

Supreme Court observed:"2. It is not stated that the Court where the complaint proceedings are pending has issued coercive processes, such as non-bailable warrant, to secure the presence of the petitioner. In such circumstances there exists no material for the petitioner to apprehend her arrest." 

It recalled it decision in Om Prakash Chhawnika alias Om Prakash Chabnika alias Om Prakash Chawnika vs. State of Jharkhand and Another 2026 SCC OnLine SC 676, wherein, the Court observed:“10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with a Complaint Caseof 2023 instituted under Sections 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code  As per prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner and her husband was that they had entered into agreement for sale and have cheated the complainant of Rs. 14,60,000/.  The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner was innocent and she was the wife of co-accused, Bhushan Rai, who was granted anticipatory bail by the Court below. He submitted that the petitioner also deserves anticipatory bail. Since the petitioner had not taken any amount, she was entitled for grant of bail. It was also submitted that she being the wife of the co-accused was not involved in the crime. 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra

In Suraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 2-page long order dated May 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"5. We are informed that out of nine accused persons, all the four lady accused have been released on bail. The High Court initially had protected the petitioner from any coercive steps being taken against him. 6. In the overall view of the matter, particularly the genesis of the occurrence and the fact that they all are  neighbors, we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favor of the petitioner. 7. We order that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner in connection with the FIR, referred to above, he shall be released on bail by the IO subject to terms and conditions that he may deem fit to impose. 8. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter furnish fresh bonds to the Trial Court." Prior to that the allowed the exemption applications.

The petitioner had approached the Supreme Court through SLP after being denied anticipatory bail by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra of the Patna High Court in connection with the First Information Report of 2025 registered with Singhaul Police Station,  Begusarai for the offence punishable under Sections 191(2), 190, 126(2), 115(2) and 109 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 respectively.

Supreme Court took "notice of the fact that in the FIR, nine persons have been named as accused. Out of nine, four are ladies." It observed: "4. It is evident on plain reading of the FIR, the other materials on record and also the impugned Order passed by the High Court that the accused persons and the prosecution witnesses are neighbors. On the date of the incident, they picked up a fight which ultimately led to an assault. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused persons attempted to commit murder. Whether it is a case of attempt to commit murder or not will be looked into by the Trial Court in the course of trial."

In his order dated February 11, 2026, Justice Mishra had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail. As per prosecution case, on the alleged date of occurrence, the named accused persons including petitioner came to the house of informant Aarti Kumari and started beating her and her husband. The petitioner was alleged to have assaulted the informant’s husband with iron rod on back of his head due to which he fell down and thereafter all the accused persons assaulted him with bricks and stone as a result of which the husband of informant sustained injuries. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to dirty village politics. The informant and the petitioner were agnates. The petitioner had clean antecedent. A.P.P. for the State had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner by contending that there was direct allegation of assault to the husband of informant on his head with iron rod against the petitioner causing head injury. He further submitted that the injury report showed that the injury caused to the injured was found to be grievous in nature. Therefore, the petitioner did not deserve anticipatory bail. In such a backdrop, Justice Mishra was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. 

Supreme Court grants bail in a case of 22 kg of ganja

In Rajadurai vs. The State of Tamil Nadu (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, upon hearing the SLP of the petitioner who was denied regular bail by Madras High Court in connection with the First Information Report for the offence punishable under Sections 8(c) 20(b) (ii) (c) and 29(1) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, concluded:"....we are persuaded to exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioner. 5. We order that the petitioner be released on bail forthwith, if not required in any other case, subject to the terms and conditions that the Trial Court may deem fit to impose."

The contraband involved in the case was 22.950 kgs of ganja. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that her client was in judicial custody past more than one year. 

The Court was informed that although charge was framed by the Trial Court yet till this date not a single witness has been examined. The FIR was registered with Kottampati Police Station, Madurai, Tamil Nadu. 

Supreme Court expresses angusish due to non-compliance of its order by State Legal Services Authorities for Legal aid

"Legal aid, simply put, refers to the provision of free or affordable legal services to individuals who lack the economic or social capacity to access justice through conventional means. It rests on the idea that equality before the law must be real and not symbolic. Legal aid helps ensure that rights are not confined to those who can afford legal representation, but are available to all, including the poor and marginalized. In this sense, it plays a crucial role in making legal protections meaningful. In India, the concept of legal aid is closely tied to the vision expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution, which promises justice be it social, economic, and/or political, along with equality of status and opportunity, and affirms the secular character of the State. Social justice, in this context, requires the State to reduce structural inequalities and protect vulnerable groups from exclusion and exploitation. Legal aid contributes directly to this goal by enabling disadvantaged individuals to assert their rights and seek remedies against injustice. Political justice, on the other hand, is concerned with ensuring meaningful participation in democratic processes and equal access to institutions of governance. Without access to legal advice and representation, many citizens would find it difficult to exercise these rights effectively, whether in matters of voting, representation, or challenging arbitrary state action. The commitment to secularism further strengthens the case for legal aid, as it demands that the legal system remain neutral and accessible to all individuals irrespective of religion, ensuring that justice is administered without discrimination or bias. This commitment was given a clear constitutional expression through the insertion of  Article 39A by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. Article 39A directs the State to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid so that no individual is denied access to justice due to economic or other disadvantages. While the legacy of the 42nd Amendment remains contested because of its enactment during the Emergency period from 1975 to 1977, Article 39A is arguably one of its most constructive and enduring contributions. It firmly situates access to justice within the Directive Principles of State Policy. Over time, the Judiciary has further strengthened this framework by linking legal aid to Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Courts have interpreted this right to include fair legal procedures and access to legal representation, thereby reinforcing the centrality of legal aid in a just legal system. On the whole these developments show that legal aid in India is not merely a matter of policy, but a constitutional responsibility that advances the broader ideals of justice, equality, secularism, and fairness envisioned in the Preamble."

-Supreme Court's order dated April 16, 2026 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2026)

"we consider it appropriate to have views of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) for laying down a step by step procedure for ensuring intimation of an adverse order/judgment to the accused; seeking whether he intends to file an appeal; informing the accused of his right to legal aid, and taking steps to ensure that an appeal is filed. It is also necessary to ensure a monitoring mechanism for following whether due intimation and certification is being done."

-Supreme Court's order dated October 24, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

"We find that there is an usual inordinate delay in this matter in which legal aid is involved. Such delay has been noticed in several cases where the legal aid authorities are involved. It is important to find out where such inordinate delays occur and to issue directions for preventing such delay." 

-Supreme Court's order dated May 5, 2017 in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2017)

In Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar Through Home Department (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Sanjay Karol and N. K. Singh passed an order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it wrote:"For ensuring compliance with the directions issued vide judgment dated 16th April, 2026, Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned senior counsel (Amicus Curiae) would prepare and circulate an implementation format for necessary compliance.
2. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 3. List on 25.05.2026."

Earlier, the same bench had passed a 29-page long order dated April 16, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay. The order wass authored by Justice Sanjay Karol. While dealing with an appeal by the appellant, who had challenged the judgment of conviction and sentence to death awarded to him and confirmed in terms of Criminal Appeal No. 425 of 2002 passed by Patna High Court, as per judgment dated February 20, 2014, the Supreme Court in terms of its order dated May 5, 2017 noticed that inordinate delay was affecting matters in which legal aid was involved. It made an effort to find out the cause for the same and issued necessary directions.

Its order dated January 19, 2021 reads: “We have noticed that in the special leave petitions filed by Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC) on behalf of the convicts, there is an inordinate delay which becomes difficult to condone. Needless to say, the situation brings about a lack of even handedness
in dealing with matters of condonation of delay. We see no reason why these delays should continue to occur particularly with the availability of tools provided by information and communication technology which are easily available. In this matter, Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted a report dated 15.01.2021 in consultation with the SCLSC on measures to curb the delay. Valuable as that report is, we consider it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of certain experts who would examine all the suggestions and responses which may be received by it from the High Courts as well as the other stakeholders. In view of the other suggestions (Annexure B) by NALSA and the response submitted by various High Courts, we find it appropriate to constitute a Committee comprising of Secretary (Ministry of Home Affairs), Government of India, Director General, National Informatics Centre, Member (Process), E-Committee, Supreme Court of India and Member Secretary, NALSA. The Committee shall examine the aforementioned suggestions/responses and submit a report with regard to digitization, translation and electronic transmission of records to facilitate access to justice and timely filing of appeals/SLPs by the convicts, by utilizing the Information and Communication Technology tools, within four weeks. We have also gone through the Module and the Note dated 16.10.2019 as per the report for timely filing of appeals/SLPs of convicts though the Legal Services Institutions. We therefore direct the High Courts to submit their responses to the Committee through their Registrars General within two weeks. The Committee shall submit its report within two weeks’ thereafter. The Secretary General of this Court shall coordinate meetings of the Committee....”

By order dated May 23, 2025, certain questions were put to the Secretary of the SCLSC, and he was required to file an affidavit in that regard. The questions are as follows :-“i. What is the current pendency upto 30.05.2025, i.e. out of the total requests received by the SCLSC so far. How many cases have been filed, and how many are under consideration? ii. What has been the year wise average days of delay in filing petitions of applicants under each category of applicants as provided under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after Operation Cleanup in the year 2018? iii. Is there adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC? iv. What are the reasons for delay, and how have those delays been addressed? v. What is the status of online connectivity between the SCLSC with other stakeholders like High Courts, Prisons, Panel Counsels etc?”

In response to these queries, the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, submitted in affidavit dated July 14, 2025. In response to direction (i) i.e., “what is the current pendency, upto May 30, 2025, for the total requests received by the SCLSC, how many cases have been filed and how many cases are under consideration”, the data taken from the SCLSC website portal revealed that a total of 4062 legal aid applications/requests were received in 2024, out of which 1972 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 906 cases legal aid was refused/closed. There was no legal aid application pending with SCLSC. During January 1, 2025-May 30, 2025, a total of 3305 legal aid applications/requests were received. Out of which 1819 cases were assigned to Panel Advocates and in 476 cases legal aid was refused/closed There were 688 cases in which legal aid application were pending with SCLSC. The data of total cases assigned to the Panel Advocates for the period between Jnauary 1, 2025 to May 30, 2025 is as per the information available on the SCLSC website portal and manual record as the data of newly increased panel advocates was yet to be updated. As per information available on the SCLSC website portal is 745 and manual record is 1074. The updated data of the actual cases filed/pending before the Supreme Court was not available on the SCLSC website portal as there was no official intimation or updating on the login IDs by the panel advocates post assignment. 

 In response to directions/query (ii), i.e. the average year wise delay in filing petitions of applicants under the categories enumerated under Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, after the Operation Cleanup in the year 2018, it was submitted that the feature providing for the information regarding the delay caused in the filing of petition is not available on the SCLSC website portal. 

The procedure for grant of legal aid was brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Court which is as under:
(a) The SCLSC has made provisions for receiving the applications from the persons seeking legal aid services, both in physical form and through the SCLSC online portal (sclsc.gov.in).
(b) The legal aid application can also be submitted through:
(i) the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee (HCLSC) or;
(ii) the district legal aid authorities or;
(iii) jail authorities or;
(iv) NALSA Portal or;
(v) Directly from the litigant.

There is a mandatory check list of documents which are necessary for the purpose of consideration of grant of legal aid before approaching the Supreme Court. The persons seeking legal aid can seek assistance of the HCLSC for completion of documents. On completion of documents, the cases are then referred to the screening committees, consisting of Senior Advocates, to render an opinion on the merits of
the applications. The cases of applicants under judicial custody are directly assigned to the panel advocates.

On November 29, 2014, under the Chairmanship of Justice T. S. Thakur, Judge, Supreme Court of India & Executive Chairman, NALSA a resolution was passed which reads: “3. All matters that are required to be filed before the Supreme Court be processed and prepared by the High Court Legal Services Committee, including translations of documents and that SLSAs transfer adequate funds to High Court Legal Services Committees for preparation and translation of documents before dispatch to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for filing.”

In terms of the circular dated April 13, 2015 issued by the SCLSC adopting the circular issued by NALSA dated February 19, 2015), all legal aid cases which are to be filed before the Supreme Court, are to be prepared and processed by the HCLSC, before they are dispatched to SCLSC for filing.

On completion of documents the matters which are civil in nature or criminal in nature confined to the cases pertaining to the complainant, quashing, transfer, etc. are referred to the Screening Committee consisting of Senior Advocates to render opinion on the merits of legal aid applications. The cases recommended by the Screening Committee are processed further. The cases of persons under judicial custody/prison are directly assigned to the panel advocate for filing the matter before the Supreme Court. The assignment letter assigning the case to the panel advocates specifically stipulates to file the case within 15 days. There is a Login ID of each Panel Advocate and the legal aid applications along with documents which are scanned and indexed are also available in the respective Login IDs immediately on assignment. The panel advocates and the legal aid applicant can communicate directly on the address and
contact number of both given in the assignment letter. However, there is no timely official communication by the panel advocate regarding the filing of the case before the Supreme Court or the orders passed by the Supreme Court till the submission of bill and return of documents by Panel Advocate to SCLSC after disposal of the matter. 

In response to directions (iii), i.e., availability of adequate infrastructure and staff to deal with the load of SCLSC, it was submitted that SCLSC is well equipped with infrastructure and staff.

In response to directions (iv), i.e., the reasons for delay, and how have those been addressed, it is submitted that the reasons for delay are broadly identified as under:
(a) Submission of legal aid application after delay by the legal aid applicant;
(b) submission of incomplete documents by the legal aid applicant;
(c) delay caused by the panel lawyers in filing the petitioner after assignments of the matter.
(d) Translations of vernacular documents, custody certificate to be obtained from jailors, retrieving records from the high court in case of appeals, collating information from the litigant/ or next friend in case of death of parties are some of the causes for delay.

There are various methods adopted by SCLSC to curb the delays which are as under:-
There was a massive campaign initiated in January  2025 (Mission Mode). vide letter dated January 10, 2025, the Director General of Prisons and Member Secretaries of High Court Legal Services Committees and the State Legal Services Authorities were communicated with the decisions of the Chairman, SCLSC requesting to collect the data with respect to: 
▪ Matters in which High Court has upheld the conviction but inmate has not yet filed appeal.
▪ Matters is which the prisoners have remain in jail for half/more than half of sentence period and bail prayer rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved to Supreme Court.
▪ Prisoners whose remission/pre-mature release has been rejected by the state sentence review board and writ against that order has also been rejected by the High Court but inmate has not yet moved Supreme Court. 

It was requested to send the details of prison inmates covered under aforesaid three categories and willing to avail legal services of Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Thereafter, reminders were sent on February 6, 2025 and February 19, 2025 to the authorities for furnishing the requisite data in pursuance of the MISSION MODE. Further, a letter dated March 5, 2025 was sent to the Authorities to provide complete documents with respect to the inmates whose names were mentioned in the data collected and who were willing to avail legal aid services.

A video conference chaired by Justice Suryakant, the then Chairman of SCLSC was held on April 1, 2025 with the Chairpersons of all the State Legal Services Authorities and High Court Legal Services Committees regarding MISSION MODE. The letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities requesting to expedite furnishing of the documents. Then another letter dated April 5, 2025 was sent to all the Concerned Authorities in pursuance of the Video Conferencing dated April 1, 2025 to constitute a team of 5 Panel Advocates for visiting the jails to create awareness among the inmates and submit a stage wise report to SCLSC. The letter dated May 3, 2025 was sent to the Registrar Generals of all the High Court communicating the virtual interaction scheduled on May 5, 2025 at 5.30 P.M. of the then Chairman, SCLSC with the Chief Justices of High Courts, Executive Chairperson of SLSAs and HCLSCs. 

It was submitted that, after the successful implementation of Mission Mode, SCLSC is now receiving legal aid applications along with documents from the various Legal Services Authorities to provide legal aid to the jail inmates. The panel of Advocates in the category of AOR, Non-AOR and Arguing Counsel was reconstituted by expanding the panel and additional advocates have been taken on the panel and the number is increased. An additional category of Assisting Counsels was introduced who will provide assistance to the AORs, Non AORs and Arguing Counsels to ensure timely filing and assistance in preparation of the cases. The number of the Screening Committee increased for expeditious grant of legal aid. In response to directions (v), i.e. the status of online connectivity between SCLSC is as under:
• The facility of online connectivity through video conferencing and intercommunication with the High Court Legal Services Committee, Prisons, Panel Counsel, etc. is available on the SCLSC web portal i.e.,
sclsc.gov.in.
• Separate Login IDs are allotted to the HCLSCs, SLSAs, DLSAs, TLSAs, Prisons, Panel Counsels and any communication is immediately is shown in the respective Login IDs.
• The stakeholders including the legal aid applicants can apply for counseling/meeting through video conferencing and on receipt of such application a date and time is given on which the said counseling/meeting can be facilitated.
The status of the legal aid applications submitted by the legal aid applicant can be checked on the SCLSC web portal.”

The order reads: The Supreme Court Legal Service Committee, sought directions from this Court in the following terms as recorded in order dated September 1, 2025. There appears to be some laxity on part of the authorities to furnish affidavits in terms of our order which anguish us (order dt 16.09.2025 to be picked) and as such we had requested the Learned Amicus Curiae to interact with the Chairpersons of the Legal Service Authorities and furnish the requisite information in tabular form."

The order dated September 1, 2025 reads: 
“I. For High Court Legal Services Committee (HCLSC) a. In cases where the applicant has directly approached the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC), the HCLSC must transmit the complete Paperbook filed before the High Court and the Courts below within seven days of the requisition from SCLSC. 
b. In cases where application for legal aid is forwarded from the HCLSC to SCLSC when the applicant has approached the HCLSC, the HCLSC should ensure that the complete Paperbook of the High Court and Courts below is accompanied along with the forwarding letter.
c. In cases where the matter referred to is not a criminal matter and/or the applicant is not in judicial custody, the HCLSC must forward the duly signed/identified vakalatnama and attested affidavit within seven days of receipt of the same from the SCLSC.
d. The HCLSC shall also send the soft scanned copies of all the documents to SCLSC.

In cases where the legal aid applicant is in judicial custody and approaches SCLSC through HCLSC, the Vakalatnama and custody certificate (with complete particulars) duly attested and signed by the Jail Authority/Jail Superintendent must be sent (digital and hard copy) to HCLSC within three days from the receipt of request received from the Prison in mate. The HCLSC shall send the Paperbook, true copy of order passed by the High Court and the lower courts records, alongwith documents received from the Jail (Vakalatnama, Custody Certificate and duly attested affidavit hard as well as scanned copy) to SCLSC within seven days from the date of receipt of request from SCLSC.

As and when the Advocate or the SCLSC sends a request for any additional document, the same must be sent to the SCLSC within seven days from the request received in this regard.

Order dated September 16, 2025 reads: “We express our anguish in the manner in which the statutory authorities have not chosen to respond to the orders passed by this Court. 2. Under these circumstances, we request Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned amicus curiae, to personally get in touch with the Chairman
of all the State Legal Services Authorities with a further request to them, ensuring necessary compliance of the order before the next date of hearing.”

Supreme Court's order underlined that the development of the concept of legal aid through judicial pronouncements is important to note for the purposes of the directions issued in this Judgment. At the outset, it be noted that in Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration 2 (1978) 4 SCC 494 held that prisoners do not surrender their fundamental rights at the prison gate. In that context, let us proceed further. The most recognizable name in the line of cases of this Court, furthering the Directive Principles of State Policy as mentioned in Article 39A of the Constitution of India, is Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, in which the Court held that the speedy trial to be a facet of Article 21 and free legal aid is an essential component of fair, just and reasonable procedure in law. It was emphasized that the State had an obligation to ensure access to justice and that the Court was required to take steps to provide legal representation and expedite criminal trials. Even before this, in the year 1978, this Court in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot vs. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 held that the right to counsel was a fundamental right traceable to Article 21. We take note of another case from the same year i.e., Khatri (II) vs. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627 in which it was held that free legal aid is a fundamental right and that it attaches from the moment the accused is first produced before a Magistrate and not only at the commencement of the trial. Further, it was held that the right to legal aid does not depend on a request to that effect from the accused, thereby placing a positive obligation on the State to provide the same. Most recently, this Court in Suhas Chakma vs. Union of India 2024 INSC 813 speaking through K.V. Viswanathan, J. extensively dealt with this issue of systemic deficiency in access to free legal aid for prisoners, particularly the under trials. 

Supreme Court concluded: "10. We have given careful consideration to the SOP and the proposed directions. We are of the considered view that this SOP is a result of in depth deliberations conducted by the “stakeholders” or “major players in the game”, that being the case the same deserves consideration by all the High Courts on the administrative side, so that, necessary changes to the procedure in place, can be
adopted in furtherance of the aims of the SOP. As such, it is directed that a copy of this order be placed before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court, for necessary consideration and appropriate action at their end.
11. While implementation of the entire breadth of the SOP is left to the wisdom of the High Courts, we do hereby direct that the timelines mentioned under Heading 5 of the SOP shall be treated as binding. This is for the purposes of streamlining the filing of appeals in cases where the respective Legal Services Committees are required to take lead. This, it is our hope, will go a long way in addressing the structural gaps that had prompted this Court to take forward the present proceedings apart from dealing with the death reference from which they emanated.
12. Regarding the issue of translators, while we do not issue any directions, we may only observe that the poor quality of translation has engaged the attention of this Court, recently, on quite of few occasions, indicating that some sort of structural change is necessitated in this regard. The respective High Court may
seriously examine and take decision on paragraph 6 of the SOP within a time bound period, i.e., not more than four weeks.
13. The aspect of monitoring and accountability as delineated in paragraph 8 of the SOP ensures that there is effective monitoring and ‘keeping tabs’ on the functioning and processes to be undertaken by the Legal Services Committees of the respective High Courts. Let the necessary constitution of the committee be carried out at the earliest. The Standing Committee/Administrative Committee, may appoint the members either by itself or after consulting the Full Court, as may be warranted. The Member Secretary of HCLSC shall be an ex-officio member. In so far as the constitution of the committee for this Court is concerned, the Member Secretary, SCLSC is directed to bring this order to the notice of the learned Executive Chairman, SCLSC and solicit orders thereon as may be deemed suitable by such authority.
14. On the aspect of coordination with jail authorities and inter-agency communication, the suggestions made in the SOP (para 9) shall be implemented forthwith as far as practicable. The last aspect delineated upon therein i.e., delay explanation (para 13-SOP), in our view, is a necessary change that will enable the tabling of the actual time taken in the process of filing the appeal. It is as such directed that the said format shall be incorporated forthwith into the necessary documentation. We hereby grant two weeks from the date of this order for it to be incorporated after which any appeal filed by HCLSC shall necessarily contain the same.
15. Suggestions ‘b’ and ‘d’ of the learned amicus curiae reproduced in paragraph 9 of this order shall be read as directions issued by this Court.
16. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to circulate a copy of this order to the Registrars General of all the High Courts, who shall ensure a copy of the same is placed before the Learned Chief Justices and the Executive Chairpersons of the State Legal Service Committees, for necessary follow up action and requisite changes as may be required.

In its order Court had directed that the status report/compliance report be filed by all concerned institutions including the National Informatics Centre, by April 30, 2026. The matter was fixed for further consideration on May 4, 2026.

Earlier, in Shankar Mahto vs. The State of Bihar (2014), Justice Akhilesh Chandra of Patna High Court had delivered a 4-page long judgement dated February 20, 2014, wherein, he concluded:"6. In such type of incident with a female, the statement of the victim itself is sufficient to establish the guilt even  without any corroboration unless and until anything strongly otherwise is shown, but as stated, in the case in hand, there appears nothing to disbelieve her. Consequently, finding no reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as recorded by the trial court, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 7. The solitary appellant is required to serve the remaining period of sentence and the appellant is on bail, hence, his bail bond is cancelled. 8. The learned trial court will take due steps for taking the appellant into custody." 

The solitary appellant had preferred the appeal against his conviction for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/, as awarded by Sessions Judge, Begusarai vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence respectively dated 20th & 23rd Day of July, 2002 in Sessions Case No. 169 of 1991 arising out of Sahebpur Kamal P.S.

The prosecution case was based on the Fardbeyan of P.W.1 recorded on 22nd September, 1990 at 10.30 hours is that in the previous evening at about 6.00 p.m. while she was visiting her field found the appellant getting crops grazing by his animals, which was object, but bluntly refused by the appellant to get the animals out from there. However, while the prosecutrix was returning she was got hold from behind by him (appellant), who not only slapped her but also subjected to rape. She could be released only when on alarm raised other co-villager were found coming. She on return intimated the incident to her husband (P.W.6) and, thereafter, on the following day got the case was instituted. 

The judgement recorded that the appellant had tried his best to obstruct smooth proceeding of the trial on 3 - 4 occasions and he misused the privilege of bail for substantial period. However, the prosecution could be able to examine altogether eight witnesses and produced documentary evidence like Injury Report, F.I.R. and Case diary of S. Kamal 103/90. Out of the total eight prosecution witnesses examined, three prosecution witness, P.W.2, Umesh Sao, P.W.3, Sone Lal Sah and P.W.4, Prabhu Sah, were declared hostile, out of whom, P.W.3 and P.W.4 could be examined three years after examination of P.W.1 & P.W.2. P.W.5, Sita Ram Yadav, at whose field the offence was committed, had come to state about the condition of crops subsequent to incident. He had heard about the incident and is not an eye-witness, but whatever he said about the physical features that remain intact. 

P.W.6, namely, Rajendra Sao, was the husband of the prosecutrix, not an eye-witness, got such information through his wife (P.W.1) and denied the suggestion of false implication at the instance of one Sitaram Yadav with whom the appellant was at inimical terms. P.W.7, Dr. Baidehi Kumari, examined the prosecutrix but found no injury, proved her report, Exhibit.1. P.W.8, Bhuneshwar Yadav, was a formal witness, proved Exhibits 2 and 3.  

The solitary witness, the Prosecutrix, P.W.1, namely, Soni Devi, who stated the prosecution version and from her entire statement nothing appeared to disbelieve her. Her statement, stating the miseries faced by her at the hands of appellant remained intact.

Supreme Court directs Sub-Judge-I, Patna to dispose of a Title Suit of 2018 within one year

In Usha Sinha vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's  Division Bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and S.V.N Bhatti passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it wrote: "....we direct that Title Suit No.41 of 2018 pending on the file of learned Sub-Judge-I, Patna be disposed of within a period of one year from today." 

The case was instituted by the petitioner. The petitioner’s complaint to the Station House Officer was registered as non-FIR No.20/2013. Based on the Police Report, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, initiated proceedings under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, qua the land. On 13.06.2013, the SDM, Sadar converted the Section 144, Cr.P.C. proceedings to Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. and transferred the same to the Court of Executive Magistrate, Sadar. The Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar vide order dated 2nd December, 2014 passed the final order declaring respondent No.7 to be in possession over the disputed land. Against the said order, the petitioner filed Criminal Revision before the Sessions Judge but was unsuccessful. Further a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court which is resulted in the impugned order.

By the impugned 12-page long order dated September 10, 2024, Justice Bibek Chaudhury of the High Court after noticing the pendency of the Civil Suit, namely, Title Suit No.41 of 2018 before the Sub-Judge-I, Patna filed by the petitioner herein and while dismissing the petition filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C., relegated the claim of ownership to be decided by the Civil Court. 

Justice Chaudhuri had concluded: "25. It is needless to say that the object 145 of the Cr.P.C. is merely to maintain law and order and to prevent breach of peace by maintaining one or either of the parties in possession, which the Court finds they had immediately before the dispute, until the actual right of the parties has been determined by the Civil Court. 26. Therefore, the Civil Court is the appropriate forum for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession of any property. The issue as to whether any person has the right to possess the property or not cannot be decided by the Criminal Court. The Criminal Court under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. shall protect the existing possession, be it lawful or unlawful. In order to evict a person/persons from possession of a particular piece of land, decree of a Civil Court is required. 27. It is ascertained from the record that the petitioner did not appear to contest the case before the learned Executive Magistrate and the order under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. was passed ex parte. The order in Criminal Revision No. 32 of 2015 was also passed ex parte. 28. The petitioner has not come up with a case that the impugned order suffer from abuse of the process of the Court or the impugned order is required to be set aside to secure ends of justice. Both the parties are claiming ownership over the property on the basis of certain documents, veracity of which can only be decided by the Civil Court. 29. Under the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of the discussions made hereinabove, I do not find any ground to invoke the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 30. The instant Criminal Miscellaneous Case is thus, dismissed, on contest. 

The Criminal Miscellaneous Case had arise out of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, filed by the petitioner, praying for quashing of an order dated July 16, 2015, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, VI Court at Patna, in Criminal Revision of 2015, whereby and whereunder, the Judge had dismissed the Revision filed by the petitioner against the order, dated December 2, 2014, passed by the Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar in Case No. 520 (M) of 2013 under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner had submitted that the land in question originally belonged to one Babu Jodhan Prasad Singh and subsequently by successive transfer, the land was owned by the vendor of the petitioner. 

The case of the petitioner is that for land of Tauzi No. 131 of Mauza – Jaganpura, Babu Shiv Narayan Chaudhary and Jodhan Prasad filed a Rent Suit No. 11 of 1910 and thereafter in Executive Case No. 1015 of 1913, whole Tauzi including Plot No. 1200, measuring 96 decimals came into their possession. The petitioner has narrated the entire story of devolution of interest in the said property by his vendor, Pramod Kumar Sinha. Further case of the petitioner is that the Respondents on the basis of fake and forged document tried to disturbed the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the said land and as such she was constrained to file a Land Dispute Case No. 27 of 2013-14 in the Court of DCLR, Patna Sadar under the provisions of Bihar Land Dispute Resolution Act, 2009. In the said proceeding, the Respondents appeared before the DCLR in pursuance of notice and filed written statement therein. After hearing the parties, the DCLR held that the petitioners have title and possession over the land by its order dated 5th of October, 2013. An order of declaration of title and possession of the petitioner was also passed by the DCLR. It was further directed that the petitioner has been forcibly and illegally dispossessed and she may be given possession of the land in question. On the basis of police report, given in Case No. 20 of 2013, dated 12th of April, 2013, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar Patna, initiated a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. and thereafter 2013, the Executive Magistrate converted the said proceeding to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the said proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., the petitioner was the first party and Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 10 were the second party. 

The Executive Magistrate, Patna Sadar vide order, dated 2nd of December, 2014, passed the final order declaring the possession of the Respondents over the disputed land. Against the said order, the petitioner filed Cr. Revision before the Sessions Judge, Patna bearing Cr. Revisional No. 32 of 2015. The said Revision was subsequently transferred to the Additional Sessions Judge – VI Court at Patna for hearing and disposal. The petitioner was informed by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions – VI, Patna that the date of hearing of the Revision would be fixed on 21st of July, 2015. However, on that date, the petitioner came to know that the Revision Application was finally disposed of by the Court of Revision vide order dated 16th of July, 2015. It is contended by the petitioner that when the petitioner’s ownership and possession was decided and declared by the DCLR under the Bihar Land Dispute Resolution Act, the said order is binding upon the learned Executive Magistrate. The learned Executive Magistrate as well as the Revisional Court did not consider the said fact and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. By filing a supplementary affidavit, dated 3rd of February, 2016 that the Cr. Revision No. 32 of 2015 was disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge – VI, without giving any opportunity to the petitioner of hearing. On 6th of August, 2024, the petitioner filed 3rd supplementary affidavit, stating, inter alia, that after purchase of the land in question, the husband of the petitioner Sunil Kumar (HUF), mutated his name in respect of the said land and has been paying malguzari to the Government of Bihar. The HUF of Sunil Kumar was a partner in M/s Satyendra Kumar & Company and the said land was mortgaged to Indian Overseas Bank on 3rd of November, 2006 till 24th of July, 2015. The Executive Magistrate passed order dated 26th of April, 2014 in the absence of the petitioner and the case was posted for evidence of the 1st party. On 30th of August, 2014, the case was posted for ex parte hearing against the petitioner. 

The Advocate of the petitioner, who are entrusted to look after the case, did not take any action and accordingly the case was fixed for evidence of the second party on 22nd of November, 2014 and final order has been passed on 2nd of December, 2014. It is alleged that there was over-writing on the dates
fixed for hearing of the proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The petitioner and her son filed Title Suit No. 41 of 2018 in the Court of the Sub-Judge-I, Patna for declaration of title and permanent injunction, restraining the defendants / second party from interfering with the possession of the petitioner. The said suit is still pending before the learned Sessions Judge, XIV Court, Patna, for consideration of the petition under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, filed by the petitioner.

In such a backdrop, the Supreme Court has observed: "4. We find no good ground to interfere with the impugned order."

Supreme Court inquires whether clerk of an advocate had proven the post-mortem report

In Naresh Sahni vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it recorded:"4. Perusal of the special leave petition reveals that the High Court to have had passed an order affirming the conviction way back on 26.04.2022 and the present special leave petition stands filed only on 17.11.2025, and that too without placing on record the testimonies of the witnesses. From the synopsis of the SLP (Pages H & I), it is apparent that it was only on 12.04.2025 that the petitioner made a request for providing a legal-aid counsel for the purpose of filing the special leave petition. Record does not reveal as to whether the petitioner/convict was informed of his statutory rights of getting assistance of a legal-aid counsel; whether he had chosen to prefer any special leave petition and requested for a legal-aid counsel; or that he had ever expressed his desire or was informed of his right of filing the special leave petition. Perusal of the grounds of the special leave petition reveals that it was a clerk of an advocate who had proven the post-mortem report. Whether this is factually correct or not is what needs to be ascertained." 

The petitioner has challenged the 20-page long judgment dated April 26, 2022 in Naresh Sahni vs. State of Bihar (2022) delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices A. M. Badar and Sunil Kumar Panwar. Supreme Court has condoned the delay. The petitioner has been convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. He is under incarceration since March 3, 2010. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "10. Let a Report, complete in all respects, dealing with the facts as have emerged from the special leave petition, be called for from the Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Let the needful be done within a period of one week from today. 11. The Registrar (Judl.) concerned is directed to communicate the order during the course of the day. 12. Records of the Courts below be immediately called for. A copy thereof, in digital form, be supplied to all concerned. 13. Perhaps on the next date of hearing the matter be considered on merits itself." The case arose from a Sessions Trial of 2011, which arose out of Mithanpura P.S. Case No. 34 of 2010 from the court of learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur. 

Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, Justice Harish Kumar Bench sets aside order by Justice Purnendu Singh in 94738 Guest teachers case, Supreme Court's word awaited

In The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Education Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. vs.  Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo and Justice Harish Kumar Bench delivered a 34-page judgement dated May 5, 2026 upon hearing a Letters Patent Appeal, wherein, it set aside 10-page long order dated January 27, 2025 by Justice Purnendu Singh of the High Court. The judgement of the Division Bencg was authored by Justice Kumar. The judgement concluded: "33. After having discussed the aforenoted facts and circumstances and the position obtaining in law, we are of the humble view that the order/judgment of the learned Single Judge suffers from perversity in directing the respondent State authorities-appellant herein to rectify their action forthwith and pass reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law. 34. Accordingly, the impugned order/judgment dated 27.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside and the writ petition, bearing C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025 stands dismissed. 35. The Letters Patent Appeal stands allowed."

The intra court appeal was preferred under Clause X of the Letters Patent under Patna High Court Rules, 1916 against the judgment/order dated January 27, 2025 passed by Justice Singh, the Single Judge of the High Court Court, whereby the Court had allowed the writ petition. Justice Singh's judgement reads: “11. The petitioners can not be terminated by any executive order, as such, the directives contained in Letter No.352 dated 30.03.2024 cannot override the government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar. Accordingly, the impugned letter no.325 dated 30.03.2024 cannot be sustained in the eye of law.12. The competent authorities are directed to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law.” 

Justice Singh had observed:"9. I find that the notification has been issued by the State Government in exercise of power conferred under Article 166/162 of the Constitution of India and the State Government being author of the said notification now cannot terminate the petitioners that too without giving them due opportunity of hearing." He had allowed the writ petition by concluding that "11. The petitioners can not be terminated by any executive order, as such, the directives contained in Letter No.352 dated 30.03.2024 cannot override the government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar. Accordingly, the impugned letter no.325 dated 30.03.2024 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 12. The competent authorities are directed to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law." Justice Singh had referred to Supreme Court's decisions in Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors.in Civil Appeal No. of 2024, wherein, after the case of the temporary employees, contractual employees and the employees like present one, who have been appointed by the State Government was considered.  He had observed: "I find it proper to refer Paragraph Nos.20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 27 of the case of Jaggo Vs. Union of India & Ors. (SLP (C) No. 5580 of 2024), in which taking note of the judgment passed in Vinod Kumar and Ors. Etc. Vs. Union of India & Ors. case, reported in (2024) 1 S.C.R. 1230, the Hon’ble Apex Court." 

The appeal was filed in a narrow compass. The Government of Bihar in the Department of Education vide its Resolution dated January 25, 2018 on account of non-availability of Assistant Teachers of English, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Zoology and Botany in the Government, Government Aided and Up-graded Secondary School resolved to hire the services of Guest Teachers on a fixed honorarium. In the light of this decision, altogether 4257 vacant posts were advertised for the post of Guest Teachers, having requisite qualification prescribed therein on a fixed honorarium. In the light of the aforenoted resolution, the writ petitioners applied for the post of Guest Teachers and duly appointed against the sanctioned vacant post in different schools. There was never any complaint with regard to the performance of the writ petitioners and in fact it was quite satisfactory, as is evident from the fact that they were allowed to work as a Guest teacher since 2018 to 2024. The nature of work of the writ petitioners was at par with regular teacher. However, notwithstanding these facts, all of a sudden without adopting due process, the respondent State authorities came out with letter dated March 30, 2024, issued by the Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, Government of Bihar, Patna directing all the District Education Officers that the services of Guest Teachers hired in the State Higher Secondary Schools, under the provisions made in the departmental resolution dated 25.01.2018, should not be required from April 1, 2024 under any circumstances.

Being aggrieved, the writ petitioners challenged the letter dated 30.03.2024 before the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025 stating, inter alia, that by the impugned order the services of the writ petitioners along with many other Guest Teachers was unilaterally terminated, despite the petitioners fulfilling all the requisite criteria to be absorbed into the service on permanent basis. It was submitted that though the appointment of the writ petitioners was temporary, but the same was made against the sanctioned post by following the due process and, as such, the unilateral decision of the State Government cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

The Single Judge after hearing the respective parties and taking note of the fact that total 4257 guest teachers were duly appointed after issuance of an advertisement published by the Bihar Public Service Commission and such vacancies of guest teachers were kept reserved only for the guest teachers, as communicated vide letter dated 03.07.2023. Therefore, the writ petitioners cannot be terminated by any executive order by overriding the Government notification dated February 8, 2018, which was issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar under Articles 166/162 of the Constitution of India and thus the State Government being the author of the said notification now cannot terminate the writ petitioners that too without due opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, set aside the impugned letter dated March 30, 2024 and directed the competent authority to rectify their action forthwith and pass a reasoned order after giving due
opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons in accordance with law. The Single Judge had also referred to the decisions rendered in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 and Vinod Kumar & Ors. Etc. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2024) 9 SCC 327.  

The State of Bihar and its authorities being aggrieved with the order of the Single Judge preferred the Letters Patent Appeal with the interim applications, inter alia, for stay of the operation of the impugned order dated 27.01.2025 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1003 of 2025. The Court vide its order dated August 20, 2025 took note of the fact that only four persons have filed the captioned petition before the Single Judge, despite which general direction was issued to give opportunity of hearing to more than 4000 guest teachers, who were, in fact, not party before the Single Judge, stayed the implementation and operation of the order till final disposal of the appeal. 

The Division Bench recorded that against the order dated 20.08.2025 passed in I.A. No. 02 of 2025 in the L.P.A., the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 moved before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (c) No(s). 34609 of 2025, which came to be dismissed vide order dated November 28, 2025 without prejudice to the right of the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 to apply to the High Court for discharge of the interim order. In the light of the liberty, the intervenor respondent nos. 5 to 255 filed interlocutory application no. 3 of 2025 for impleading them as party respondents. Subsequently, vide order dated December 12, 2025 the High Court directed to implead the intervenor applicant as party respondent nos. 5 to 255 in the appeal. 

Justice Kumar observed: "27. Dispensing with the services, in all the cases, cannot be termed as punitive termination, necessitating the requirement of show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing like any other termination/removal from services causing civil consequences. What is required an information to be given to the concerned, in terms with the stipulation of the scheme/notification, which empowers them to continue with their work as guest teacher. 28. Undisputed stand of the State is that altogether 37847 teachers for Secondary Class and 56891 teachers for Senior Secondary Classes, total 94738 posts were filled up, following due process, against vacant and sanctioned post and accordingly they were posted and now discharging their duties in the different Government, Government Aided and Up-graded Higher Secondary Schools. In such circumstances, the Director, Secondary Education has come out with letter no. 325 dated 30.03.2024 with a clear stipulation that in view of the aforesaid fact of regular appointment having been made in the Higher Secondary Schools, there is no need to retain the guest teachers in services and accordingly directed that the services of guest teachers hired in the State Higher Secondary Schools, under the provisions made in the Departmental Resolution No. 51 dated 25.01.2018, should not be taken from 01.04.2024. Based upon the aforesaid direction, the respective District Education Officers of different districts have dispensed with the hiring of the services of the guest teachers, including the writ petitioners and the intervenor respondents." 

The judgment noted that it was not "a case where a set of guest teachers are being replaced by another set of guest teachers, rather their services were subjected to continuation till the regular appointment is made; once the regular appointment against the sanctioned and vacant posts have been made in the different Higher Secondary Schools of the State Government." In no circumstances, this  Court finds any fault in the impugned order dated 30.03.2024 passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, as the same is not contrary to the object and terms of resolution dated 25.01.2018, rather it is in conformity with the same. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioners cannot be terminated by any executive order by overriding the Government notification dated 08.02.2018, which has been issued after approval of the Governor of Bihar, in the opinion of this Court, with due regard, does not stand in law as well as on facts. The decision not to retain the guest teachers and/or hire their services has been taken bonafidely in view of the subsequent development of mass appointment of regular teachers in Higher Secondary Schools against the vacant and sanctioned post; since not in dispute, we do not find that opportunity of hearing to all the affected persons and passing a reasoned order in each and every case is required. The principle of natural justice can not be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. The Court, time without number has held that in a case where a large number of people are involved, the principle may be excluded; and all the more, in this case, when they had already been put to notice that their services are being hired till the regular appointment is made against those posts, such decision cannot be said to be suffering from the vice of principles of natural justice."

Justice Kumar observed: "30. So far the decisions rendered in the case of Vinod, Jaggo and Bhola Nath (supra) are concerned, again this Court, with due regard to the learned Single Judge, opined are not applicable in the facts of this case. The mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforenoted cases clearly ruled that the essence of employment and its associated rights cannot be determined solely by initial appointment terms when the actual course of employment has evolved significantly over time and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned the authorities of the State regarding misuse of temporary and contractual engagement, in the manner that results in exploitation of employees. The Court criticized the practice of outsourcing informalizing the recruitment as a means to evade the regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working condition while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practice. 31. In the case in hand, the writ petitioners and the intervenors respondents have accepted their offer with an open eye that their services shall be hired till the regular appointment is made. After having worked for about 5-6 years, now regular appointments have been made and the posts, against which their services were hired, have now been filled up through regular appointment by following due process of recruitment. We must keep in mind the mandate of the Constitution Bench in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. Umadevi and Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 where the Court clarified that a contractual appointment would come to an end in terms of the contract, and similarly, an engagement on daily wage or casual basis would cease upon its discontinuation. Mere continuation of a temporary or casual employee beyond the term of appointment would not entitle such employee to absorption or regularization, if the initial appointment itself was not made in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Constitution Bench further clarified and given a window for those irregularly appointed persons as a one time measure, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned post, but not under the cover of orders of the Court or a Tribunal."

The Division Bench concluded: "32. So far the continuation of the writ petitioners or the intervenor respondents or regularization against the posts is concerned, it does not arise in the facts of the present case, since the engagement of the writ petitioners and the intervenor respondents were made on an offer given by the State that they resolved to hire their services as a Guest Teacher only till the regular appointment is made. In the opinion of this Court, it would be a fraud upon the other eligible candidates, who did not apply for the guest teachers knowing very well that such offer is rendered and their services have been hired only till regular appointment is made and, as such, in no circumstances, the guest teachers shall be allowed to continue, even after regular appointments are made against those vacant posts." 

It is apparent that the last word on the legality of the Division Bench's judgement will be uttered by the Supreme Court.    

Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya sets aside order in Title Eviction Suit by Sub Judge-IX, Patna in Title Eviction Suit, remits the matter back to Trial Court

In Rushan Praveen vs. Md. Firoz (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May , 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 12.09.2018 passed by the learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The same is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity to the defendant/petitioner to contest the suit. It is further directed that the learned Trial Court shall proceed expeditiously as per settled law and decide the suit on its own merits after settlement of the issue, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. 18. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision application stands disposed of. 19. Any interim order, if operating, stands vacated."

The civil revision was filed by the petitioner under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act ( BBC Act) for setting aside the order dated September 12, 2018 passed in Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 by the Court of Sub Judge-IX, Patna, whereby the eviction suit filed by the plaintiff/opposite party came to be decreed under the special provisions of Section 14(4) BBC Act on account of non-filing of an affidavit by the defendant/petitioner seeking leave to contest the suit.

The case arose from the proceeding, wherein, the plaintiff/opposite party instituted Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013 before the Court of learned Sub Judge-IX, Patna, asserting himself to be the landlord of the suit premises and alleging that the defendant had been inducted as a tenant therein on monthly rent of Rs.1,500/. The eviction of the defendant was sought on the ground of personal necessity as well as under the special summary procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act. It was alleged in the plaint that despite requests, the defendant failed to vacate the premises, necessitating institution of the suit. The suit was thus registered and proceeded under the special provisions applicable to eviction on the ground of personal requirement.

The defendant/petitioner entered appearance in the suit and filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the claim of the plaintiff/opposite party in toto. It was stated that the suit was non-maintainable on the grounds of limitation, estoppel,waiver, and misjoinder/non-joinder of necessary parties, and also the defendant/petitioner specifically denied the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was further stated that the defendant/petitioner was the absolute  owner in possession of the disputed land and house, having purchased the same through a registered sale deed dated October 13, 2003 from one Md. Jawed, who was the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself had signed the said sale deed as a attesting witness at the time of its execution. It was stated that after such purchase, the opposite party/plaintiff constructed a pucca house over the land, got her name duly mutated in the government records, and was regularly paying rent, holding tax, and electricity charges, besides having obtained a possession certificate from the competent authority. It was also stated that the land of the opposite party was situated towards the north of the defendant’s/petitioner’s land and remains vacant, whereas the defendant was residing in her own constructed house along with her family members. It was stated that the plaintiff/opposite party, in collusion with a builder who was constructing an apartment in the vicinity, instituted the eviction suit with a view to grab the property of the defendant/petitioner and to compel her to sell the same. The defendant/petitioner, therefore prayed for dismissal of the eviction suit, stating that the provisions of the BBC Act are not applicable in the absence of any landlord-tenant relationship and that the plaintiff has no cause of action to institute the suit. 

Upon consideration of the materials available on record and the procedural compliance under the special provisions of Section 14 of the BBC Act, the Trial Court held that although the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed written statement, she failed to file the mandatory affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit as required under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. The Trial Court also observed that in view of such non-compliance, the statements and grounds taken by the plaintiff/opposite party in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted by the defendant. The Trial Court vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 allowed the petition filed by the plaintiff under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act and held the plaintiff entitled to a decree of eviction. Accordingly, the Trial Court directed the defendant/ petitioner to vacate the suit premises and hand over peaceful and vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff/opposite party within a period of two months from the date of the impugned order, failing which the plaintiff/opposite party was given liberty to seek eviction of the defendant/petitioner through process of law.

Being aggrieved by this order of eviction controversy must be tested on the said vide the impugned order dated September 12, 2018 passed by the Trial Court in the Title Eviction Suit No. 55 of 2013, the petitioner had filed the present Civil Revision petition before the Court.

The counsel for the petitioner assailed the order dated September 12, 2018 on the ground which was passed in a mechanical and summary manner without proper appreciation of the pleadings and materials available on record. It was submitted that although the petitioner had entered appearance promptly after service of summons and had filed her written statement on December 2, 2013 contesting the suit on merits, the Trial Court proceeded to decree the suit solely on the technical ground of non-filing of affidavit under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act. It was further submitted that such an approach defeats the principles of natural justice, particularly when the matter was already posted for settlement of issues and the defence of the petitioner was available on record.

The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the very foundation of the eviction suit, namely the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, is wholly absent in the case. It was submitted that the petitioner claimed to be the absolute owner in possession of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated December 16, 2003 executed by Md. Jawed, who was none other than the full brother of the plaintiff, and significantly, the plaintiff himself was an attesting witness to the sale deed. It was also submitted that subsequent mutation in government records, grant of land possession certificate, payment of electricity bill and holding tax, and construction of a pucca house over the purchased land clearly establish the independent right, title, and possession of the petitioner over the property. The counsel submitted that in such circumstances, the provisions of the BBC Act, which presuppose existence of tenancy, are not attracted at all.

The counsel also submitted that even otherwise, the Trial Court has failed to satisfy itself regarding the existence of bona fide requirement or any legally sustainable ground for eviction, as no documentary or oral evidence was adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case. It was submitted that neither any rent receipt nor any lease deed was brought on record, nor was the plaintiff examined as a witness to prove the pleadings. The counsel also placed reliance on settled principles of law and submitted that mere pleadings
cannot be treated as proof and even in a proceeding under Section 14, the Court is under an obligation to scrutinize the genuineness and bona fides of the claim. In order to support his averments he relied on the judgment of the Cordinate Bench of the High Court in Abhimanyu Prasad Sah vs. Murlidhar Bhawsinghka 1998 (1) PLJR. It was submitted that the impugned order, having been passed without such judicial scrutiny and in disregard of the materials on record, was unsustainable in law and fit to be set aside. 

Justice Malviya observed:"....this Court finds that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, particularly under Section 14(8) of the B.B.C Act, is limited. It is well settled that this Court, while exercising revisional powers, does not act as an Appellate Court to reappreciate evidence but is required to examine whether the impugned order suffers from any jurisdictional error, illegality, material irregularity, or perversity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, interference is warranted only when the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are contrary to law or have resulted in manifest injustice. The revisional power is supervisory in nature and cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction; interference is permissible only where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or with material irregularity in the exercise of such jurisdiction. 10. Upon consideration of the records, it is not in dispute that the eviction suit was instituted under the special procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the BBC Act and that the defendant/petitioner had entered appearance and filed her written statement within time. It is equally admitted that no separate affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit, as mandated under Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, was filed by the defendant....11. Moreover, it is clear that for the applicability of the Section14(4) of the BBC Act, tenancy must be undisputed and the relationship of the landlord and tenant is established but in the instant case tenancy has denied."

The judgement reads:"...it is implied that tenancy is neither admitted not established in the present case so the requirement of section 14 (4) of the BBC Act is not applicable in the fact and circumstances of the instant case. The learned Trial Court has proceeded on the technical aspect of the Section 14(4) of the BBC Act, while allowing the petition of the plaintiff and decreeing the suit. 13. Moreover, this Court finds that the matter does not rest merely on technical non-compliance. From the written statement and materials brought on record, a serious dispute has been raised with regard to the very existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The specific stand of the defendant is that she is the purchaser of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed executed by the brother of the plaintiff/opposite party, and that the plaintiff himself is an attesting witness to the said transaction. The defendant/petitioner has further asserted her independent title and possession over the property supported by mutation, possession certificate, and payment of government dues. Such pleadings, going to the root of the maintainability of the eviction suit under the BBC Act, could not have been lightly brushed aside without judicial scrutiny." 

Justice Malviya drew on the legal position in this regard stands conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh reported in (2014) 9 SCC, wherein, it held: “The revisional court does not have the power to re-appreciate evidence. The jurisdiction is confined to examine whether the findings of fact recorded by the court below are according to law and do not suffer from perversity or jurisdictional error.”

Justice Malviya observed that it is well settled that "even in a proceeding under Section 14 of the BBC Act, though summary in nature, the Court is not absolved of its duty to satisfy itself regarding the existence of essential ingredients for eviction, particularly the relationship of landlord and tenant and the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff/opposite party. The deeming provision under Section 14(4) of the B.B.C. Act cannot be stretched to the extent of permitting a decree in cases where foundational facts themselves are seriously disputed and are not supported by any evidence. In the present case, it appears that no documentary evidence, such as rent receipts or lease agreement, was produced by the plaintiff/opposite party, nor was any oral evidence led to substantiate the claim of tenancy or personal necessity.  15. It is also pertinent to note procedural aspect of section 14(4) of the BBC Act are meant to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it, and that Courts should ordinarily lean in favour of deciding matters on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice on technical grounds. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, was required to adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach while passing the impugned order. Position of law is well settled that courts should ordinarily lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than dismissal on technicalities." 

The High Court drew on the legal principle laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s Aroush Motors, reported in 2025 INSC 1202, which held: “The object of the procedural rules is to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it and when the rigid adherence to technicalities of procedure causes injustice, courts have to come to the rescue by adopting a liberal approach. The courts cannot countenance a situation where substantial justice is sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. Where substantial justice is at stake, technicalities must give way to ensure that the litigant is afforded sufficient opportunity to defend. The present controversy must be tested on the said principle.” 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a cheque bounce case

In Dhananjay Kumar @ Dhananjay Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan passed a 6-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"Considering the circumstances on record, in our view, the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed under Section 482 of the BNSS. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated 09.02.2026. We direct that in the event of arrest of the appellant, the Arresting Officer shall release the appellant on bail subject to furnishing cash security in the sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Five Thousand only) with two like sureties. It is directed that the appellant shall extend 3complete cooperation in the ensuing investigation/trial. The appellant shall not misuse his liberty and shall not in any way influence the witnesses or tamper with the material on record. With the aforesaid directions, the Criminal Appeal is allowed."

The appeal challenged rejection of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh's order dated February 9, 2026. The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending arrest in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR of 2022 dated November 17, 2022 lodged with Police Station-Belsaganj, Sub-Division Sadar, District-Gaya in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the appellant preferred an application before the High Court seeking anticipatory bail in terms of Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

By order dated April 2, 2026, the Supreme Court had passed the order saying, "Till the next date of hearing, no coercive steps shall be taken as against the petitioner...." 

The senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the dispute between the parties was with regard to the bouncing of a cheque and filing of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act; that the main accused was granted the anticipatory bail by the High Court by order dated August 1, 2023 however such a relief was not granted to the appellant herein. This Court, by virtue of the interim order dated April 2, 2026, was granted protection. In the circumstances, by following the principle of parity, the appellant may also be granted the relief of anticipatory bail subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by making the interim order absolute. 

The counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the complaint was made under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and bearing in mind the facts of this case, the appropriate order may be made in the appeal.  

In Dhananjay Kumar @ Dhananjay Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026. The petitioner had apprehended his arrest in a case registered for the offence. It was a case of cheque bounce. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with co-accused Ajit Kumar, took Rs. 70,00,000/ from the informant as consideration money in lieu of executing a land in his favour and later on, refused to execute the land. Thereafter, when the informant asked for his money back, the accused persons issued cheques in his favour which got bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Thus, the accused persons cheated the informant and extorted money from him. The respondent no. was Satyendra Yadav.