Justice Partha Sarthy restores job of Anganwadi Sevika, sets aside orders by District Programme Officer, Nalanda, DM, Nalanda and Commissioner, Patna Division

In Pratima Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Bihar, Patna, Justice Partha Sarthy of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page long judgement dated December 23, 2025 wherein. he restored the job of Pratima Kumari, Anganwadi Sevika and sets aside orders by District Programme Officer (D.P.O.), Nalanda, DM, Nalanda and Commissioner, Patna Division. The petitioner had filed the application for quashing the order of 2011 passed by the D.P.O., Nalanda whereby the petitioner’s service as an Anganwadi Sevika at Centre no.95, Mahadev Bigha, block- Noorsarai in the district of Nalanda was terminated. She had also prayed for quashing the order dated May 10, 012 passed in Miscellaneous Anganwadi Case no.50 of 2011 whereby the District Magistrate, Nalanda was had rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner and for quashing the order by the Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna who had dismissed the appeal/revision filed by the petitioner.

The petitioner being fully eligible, she was appointed as an Anganwadi Sevika in 1992. She performed her duties to the satisfaction of all concerned and there was no complaint against her. It was the case of the petitioner that on August 16, 2011, as a result of certain medical exigency of having felt severe stomach pain, the petitioner sent an application for leave to the concerned Ward Member and proceeded for treatment. On her return it transpired that the Child Development Project Officer (C.D.P.O.), Noorsarai, Nalanda had come to her Centre for inspection. The absence of the petitioner was reported by the C.D.P.O. to the D.P.O., Nalanda. The report also incorrectly stated that the distribution of Take Home Ration (THR) was not taking place in a regular manner nor was the Anganwadi Centre being run properly.

A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner to which she replied and also appeared in person and explained that the Take Home Ration had been distributed to the beneficiaries. But the D.P.O., Nalanda removed the petitioner from the post of Anganwadi Sevika.

Justice Sarthy observed that the show-cause notice which mentions about the allegations/charges was quite vague. There was no statement naming the witnesses who were said to have made the complaint against the petitioner. There was merely an allegation of the Centre not being run properly nor Take Home Ration being distributed in a regular manner without proof of any sort. The order by D.P.O., Nalanda was also absolutely vague, cryptic and lacked in material details as to what was found or what allegations proved against the petitioner. Neither the contents of the enquiry report was dealt with, nor were there details as to who conducted the said enquiry or as to who all were examined and what statement they gave against the petitioner. The order by the District Magistrate, Nalanda and the Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna was also vague. The Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna proceeded on the premise that even if the petitioner fell ill, she should have subsequently got her leave for the day sanctioned by sending an application in the Office of the C.D.P.O. The action of the authorities terminating the service of the petitioner as an Anganwadi Sevika for her absence on a single date can only be said to be disproportionate. 

He noted that it was under similar circumstances that the relief was granted by order dated October 11, 2017 to the petitioner therein in CWJC no.5539 of 2014.

Justice Sarthy concluded:"14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in the opinion of this Court, the orders impugned are not sustainable. 15. The order dated 22.9.2011 (Annexure-7) of the D.P.O., Nalanda, order dated 10.5.2012 (Annexure-9) of the District Magistrate, Nalanda and the order  dated 18.4.2013/31.7.2013 (Annexure-10) of the Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna are all set aside. 16. The petitioner will be restored to her position as an Anganwadi Sevika within a period of three months, however as in the meantime the respondent no.7 was working in the said capacity at the said Anganwadi Centre, the petitioner will not be entitled for the arrears of salary. 17. The writ application stands allowed."

The six other respondents were: Director, Integrated Child Development Services (Social Welfare Department), Bihar, Patna, Commissioner, Patna Division, District Magistrate, Nalanda, District Programme Officer, Nalanda, Child Development Project Officer, Noorsarai, Nalanda and Mamta Kumari posted on Anganwari Centre, Mahadev Bigha, Panchayat Nadiauna, Block Noor Sarai, District- Nalanda.

... ... 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey sets aside judgment of conviction for abetment of suicide by by District and Additional Sessions Judge-III, Rohtas

In Nanhak Rai vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 24-page long judgement dated December 22, 2025 setting aside judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the concerned court. The judgement reads:"23. On all counts from the analysis of evidence of prosecution witnesses as well as material available on record, I find that appellant has not committed any positive act amounting to instigation or intentionally aiding in commission of suicide. In this way, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the concerned court are not justified and legal and same is fit to be set aside. 24. In the result, in my view, prosecution case suffers from several infirmities, as noticed above, and it was not a fit case where conviction could have been recorded. The learned trial court fell in error of law as well as appreciation of facts of the case in view of settled criminal jurisprudence. Hence, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are hereby set aside and this appeal stands allowed. Appellant is in custody, he is directed to be released forthwith, if not warranted in any other case. stands disposed of." 

This appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated July 31, 2025 and order of sentence dated August 12, 2025 passed by District and Additional Sessions Judge-III, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 2024, which arose out of Chenari P.S. case of 2023 whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and six months along with fine of Rs. 5,000/- under the said section. 

According to written statement given by the informant/PW-2, informant solemnized the marriage of his daughter Neha Kumari four years ago with Nanhak Rai-appellant according to Hindu rites and rituals. It was alleged that after some days, appellant-husband and informant’s daughter-wife started quarreling on the issue of dowry which was being informed by informant's daughter. The informant had pacified the dispute on one or two occasions. It was alleged that on June 16, 2023 on the issue of going outside in connection with livelihood, informant's daughter has been killed by the appellant and others at about 10 PM regarding which he got information on June 17, 2023 at 6 AM. He reached the house of his son-in-law where he found that his daughter was lying dead. On the basis of written statement given by the informant/PW-2, Chenari P.S. case dated June 17, 2023 was registered under Sections 304(B)/34 of the IPC. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet has been submitted against the appellant under Section 304(B) of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance. The trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 304(B)/34 and 302/34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home guilt of accused person/appellant, prosecution examined altogether four witnesses.  

Justice Pandey relied on judgment of Supreme Court passed in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2013) 10 SCC 48 in which at para 25 of the said judgment reference of Section 113-
A has been given which reads as under:-
"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman-when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section, meaning as in Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860."

In para 26 of the said judgment, it observed:"26. Section 113-A only deals with a presumption which the court may draw in a particular fact situation which may arise when necessary Ingredients in order to attract that provision are established. Criminal law amendment and the rule of procedure was necessitated so as to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives, demanding dowry. Legislative mandate of the section is that when a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty as per the terms defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide has been abetted by the husband or such person. Though, a presumption could be drawn, the burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been committed by the accused under Section 498-A IPC is on the prosecution. On facts, we have already found that the prosecution has not discharged the burden that A-1 had instigated conspired or intentionally aided so as to drive the wife to commit suicide or that the alleged extramarital affair was of such a degree which was likely to drive the wife to commit suicide."

Justice Pandey observed: "19. On the facts, I have already found that prosecution has not discharged the burden in the present case." 

He also relied on Supreme Court's judgement passed in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat passed in Criminal Appeal No. ....... of 2024 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7957 of 2024) in which at paragraphs no. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, it has been held as follows:-
16. Section 306 of the IPC provides for punishment for the offence of abetment of suicide. It has to be read with Section 107 of the IPC which defines the act of 'abetment'. The provisions read as follows:
"306. Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." "107. Abetment of a thing.- A person abets the doing of a thing, who- First.- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.- A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 17. Section 306 of the IPC penalizes those who abet the act of suicide by another. For a person to be charged under this section, the prosecution must establish that the accused contributed to the act of suicide by the deceased. This involvement must satisfy one of the three conditions outlined in Section 107 of the IPC. These conditions include the accused instigated or encouraged the individual to commit suicide, conspiring with others to ensure that the act was carried out, or engaging in conduct (or neglecting to act) that directly led to the person taking his/her own life.
18. For a conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, it is a well-established legal principle that the presence of clear mens rea-the intention to abet the act-is essential. Mere harassment, by itself, is not sufficient to find an accused guilty of abetting suicide. The prosecution must demonstrate an active or direct action by the accused that led the deceased to take his/her own life. The element of mens rea cannot simply be presumed or inferred; it must be evident and explicitly discernible. Without this, the foundational requirement for establishing abetment under the law is not satisfied, underscoring the necessity of a deliberate and conspicuous intent to provoke or contribute to the act of suicide. The same position was laid down by this Court in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, wherein it was observed that:
“25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide." 19. To bring a conviction under section 306, IPC it is necessary to establish a clear mens rea to instigate or push the deceased to commit suicide. It requires certain such act, omission, creation of circumstances, or words which would incite or provoke another person to commit suicide. This Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, defined the word "instigate as under:
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."
20. The essential ingredients to be fulfilled in order to bring a case under Section 306, IPC are:
i. the abetment;
ii. the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.
21. Thus, to bring a case under this provision, it is imperative that the accused intended by their act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Thus, in cases of death of a wife, the Court must meticulously circumstances of the case, as well as assess the evidence presented. It is necessary to determine whether the cruelty or harassment inflicted on the victim left them with no other option but to end their life. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be concrete proof of either direct or indirect acts of incitement that led to the suicide. Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient to establish guilt. For a conviction, there must be evidence of a positive act by the accused, closely linked to the time of the incident, that compelled or drove the victim to commit suicide.
22. It is essential to establish that the death was a result of suicide and that the accused actively abetted its commission. This can involve instigating the victim or engaging in specific actions that facilitated the act. The prosecution must prove beyond doubt that the accused played a definitive role in the abetment. Without clear evidence of an active role in provoking or assisting the suicide, a conviction under Section 306 IPC cannot be sustained.
23. The act of abetment must be explicitly demonstrated through actions or behaviors of the accused that directly contributed to the victim's decision to take their own life. Harassment, in itself, does not suffice unless it is accompanied by deliberate acts of incitement or facilitation. Furthermore, these actions must be proximate to the time of the suicide, showcasing a clear connection between the accused's behavior and the tragic establishment of this direct link that a conviction under Section 306 IPC can be justified. The prosecution bears the burden of proving this active involvement to hold the accused accountable for the alleged abetment of suicide. The same position has been laid down by this court in several judgments, such as:
i. M. Mohan v. State;
ii. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal;
iii. Kamalakar v. State of Karnataka.
24. Therefore, for a conviction under Section 306 IPC, there must be clear evidence of direct or indirect acts of incitement to commit suicide. The cause of suicide, especially in the context of abetment, involves complex attributes of human behavior and reactions, requiring the Court to rely on cogent and convincing
proof of the accused's role in instigating the act. Mere allegations of harassment are not enough unless the accused's actions were so compelling that the victim perceived no alternative but to take their own life. Such actions must also be proximate to the time of the suicide. The Court examines whether the accused's
conduct, including provoking, urging, or tarnishing the victim's self-esteem, created an unbearable situation. If the accused's actions were intended only to harass or express anger, they might not meet the
threshold for abetment or investigation. Each case demands a careful evaluation of facts, considering the accused's intent and its impact on the victim

The Court in Ude Singh vs. State of Haryana held that to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the intent or mental state to commit the specific crime must be evident when assessing culpability.

The law on abetment has been crystallised by a plethora of decisions of the Court. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would require the positive act of instigating or intentionally aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such mens rea on the part of the accused person being apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the accused person which left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide."
22. In the present case, there was no evidence that the appellant has instigated, conspired , intentionally aided so as to drive the wife to commit suicide and there was no evidence of direct triggering act that left the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide. Neither informant nor any other witness has stated that appellant was instigating or intentionally aiding in the commission of suicide by the victim/deceased. Merely allegation without any positive act of instigation or intentionally aiding cannot attract Section 306 of the IPC. 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside judgment of conviction, order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-II, Darbhanga in a rape case of 1996

In Kari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Arun Kumar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 18-page long judgement setting aside  judgment of conviction and order of sentence by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-II, Darbhanga in a  Sessions Trial of 1997. The judgement reads:"The appellant was acquitted of the charge by giving him the benefit of doubts. 29. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 30. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed." 

The appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years by the trial court.

The informant had recorded her statement to the effect that while she had been sleeping on the varandah of her house and her daughter had been sleeping inside, on February 24/25, 1996 at about 1.00 A.M., the appellant Kari Yadav came and gagged her mouth and forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. Some scuffle took place and she received injuries on both her legs. Hearing her muffled sound, her daughter woke up and raised alarm and Yogendra Yadav and Madan Yadav reached there and, thereafter, the appellant Kari Yadav fled away from the spot. A formal FIR was instituted under Section 376 IPC. The police investigated the matter and submitted charge sheet under Sections 341, 323, 324 and 376 IPC against the appellant finding the case to be true. After taking cognizance, the case was committed to the court of sessions where charges were framed against the sole accused/appellant for the offence under Sections 323, 341 and 376 IPC, to which, the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. During trial, the prosecution examined altogether six witnesses in support of its case and also exhibited some documents. 

In Rai Sandeep @ Deepu vs. State of NCT of Delh (Criminal Appeal No. 2486 of 2009),  the Supreme Court held that 'sterling witness' should be of a very high quality and caliber whose version should be unassailable. The Court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. The Court further held that the said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence as alleged against him. Applying these principles on the facts before it, the Supreme Court held that the solitary version of the chief-examination of P.W. 4, the prosecutrix, cannot be taken as gospel truth for its face value and in absence of any other supporting evidence, there was scope to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants. 

In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No. 1252 of 2011), the Supreme Court on account of certain shortcomings, irregularities and lacuna on the part of the prosecution did not find it is safe to convict the appellant. 

Justice Jha concluded:"27. Therefore, a reading of the evidence together, I am of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and in this case non-supporting medical examination report, non-examination of investigating officer and the background of family disputes show that the prosecution case has a shadow of doubt all along. Hence, conviction of the appellant on the basis of such evidence could not be sustained and upheld." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar sets aside 2022 orders of punishment by DM, Patnaand Divisional Commissioner, Patna against a Clerk

In Anish Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar  of Patna High Court delivered a 10-page long judgement dated December 22, 2025. The other respondents are:Divisional Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna, District Magistrate, Patna and Additional Collector, Departmental Proceedings-cum-Inquiry Officer, Patna.

Justice Kumar quashed and set aside the impugned order of punishment dated January 17, 2022 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna as well as the appellate order dated May 18, 2023 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna.

The petitioner had challenged the order dated January 17, 2022 passed by the District Magistrate, Patna, by which the petitioner has been awarded the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect as well as the appellate order dated May 18, 2022 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Patna, by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of the District Magistrate was dismissed. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as Clerk in the office of the District Magistrate, Patna. The District Magistrate, Patna by his order dated October 10, 2018 had suspended the petitioner in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding on the basis of a report submitted by the inquiry committee, for the charges of committing irregularities in mutation proceedings. Thereafter, vide letter dated January 14, 2019, the District Magistrate, Patna -cum-Disciplinary Authority, framed the memo of charge against the petitioner in which altogether four charges have been levelled against the petitioner. Thereafter, the Additional Collector was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Patna, was appointed as Presenting Officer for conducting the departmental proceeding. The Enquiry Officer had directed the petitioner to file his written statement of defense and in pursuance thereof, he had filed his written statement of defense and thereafter the Presenting Officer gave his comments on the show-cause reply filed by the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer, after enquiry, submitted his enquiry report on September 12, 2019 exonerating the petitioner from all the charges. However, the Enquiry Officer vide order dated January 9, 2020 had recorded that the file is received back for re-enquiry upon the direction/discussion with the disciplinary authority and thereafter, re-enquiry was conducted. Subsequently, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked on February 17, 2020. After re-enquiry, the report dated June 8, 2020 was submitted holding three out of four charges to be partly proved against the petitioner. Thereafter, a second show-cause was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority on December 3, 2020, to which the petitioner replied on February 10, 2021. The District Magistrate, after considering the response of the petitioner, has passed the impugned order dated January 17, 2022 awarding the major punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of punishment, the petitioner preferred an appeal unsuccessfully. 

Justice Kumar agreed with the counsel of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceeding conducted against the petitioner is in complete violation of Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, inasmuch as, no list of witnesses and documents have been supplied to the petitioner along with memo of charge. 

In Nageshwar Dubey  vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), a writ petition was filed on August 6, 2025 in the matter of appointment of public prosecutor, Bhojpur. It was registered on August, 18, 2025. It came up for hearing before Justice A. Abhishek Reddy of Patna High Court on December 22, 2025. 

Notably, Sections 18(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and the law laid down by the Supreme Court contains the stipulations and methodology to ensure that the opinion of the District Judge is given primacy. "Any guideline issued by the State Government that contravenes this requirement or dilutes the primacy of the District Judge's opinion will be contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions.” 

Ungrateful male judges seem anguished by conduct of Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, the current Acting Chief Justice, Sikkim High Court

Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, the current acting chief justice of Sikkim High Court is going to retire in July 2026. She was under consideration for appointment as a full-time chief justice of the same court. 

Under the memorandum of procedure which governs appointments and transfers in the constitutional courts, a judge with less than a year left before retirement may be appointed chief justice of their parent high court, whereas all other such appointments are required to be made from outside. 

The crisis in the Sikkim High Court seem to be linked to a formal complaint from the court’s registrar general and an intervention sought by then chief justice Biswanath Somadder from Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant. 

Supreme Court collegium’s December 18 decision has bypassed justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, the senior-most judge of the High Court. It has recommended Justice A Muhamed Mustaque of the Kerala high court as chief justice of the state. 

Hours before his retirement on December 14, 2025, Justice Somadder reportedly wrote to the CJI on December 13, 2025, a day after the registrar general of the high court, Prajwal Khatiwada, complained of being “humiliated and mistreated” by justice Rai in her chambers. The letter was sent on justice Somadder’s penultimate working day, 

Khatiwada was transferred out of the high court registry and posted as a district and sessions judge by an administrative order dated December 15, the day Justice Rai assumed charge as acting chief justice. The transfer took place after Khatiwada’s complaint dated  December 12, 2025.

After she took charge as acting chief justice on December 15, 2025 it was reported that she ordered withdrawal of security and official facilities, including his vehicles, drivers and residential staff, extended to Justice Somadder who informed the CJI about the registrar general’s complaint dated December 12, 2025.

The registrar general’s complaint recounted that he was summoned to justice Rai’s chambers on December 12, 2025 in connection with arrangements for the full court farewell reference marking Justice Somadder’s superannuation. 

Justice Somadder had also sent confidential communications to the office of the CJI in November 2022,to CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud, and to former CJI BR Gavai in May 2025 copied to Justice Surya Kant. Reportedly, Justice Somadder complained against CJI Chandrachud because he gave no response to him. 

Born to Late Madan Mohan Rasaily, former Home Secretary, Government of Sikkim and Mrs. Rabi Mala Rasaily (nee Moktan), former Teacher, Baha'i School, Gangtok, East Sikkim on July 12,1964, Justice Rai began her schooling at Tathangchen School, Gangtok, where, after completing her “Infants Class”, she joined Dowhill School at Kurseong, West Bengal as a boarder in the year 1970, from where she completed her Class X in the year 1980. In 1981, she entered Tashi Namgyal Academy, Gangtok and completed her Class XII in March, 1983. She pursued Political Science (Honours) in Lady Shriram College, Delhi University, on a Merit Scholarship from the Government of Sikkim, which she completed in 1986 and proceeded to join the Campus Law Centre, Delhi University, from where she did her three year LLB course till 1989. She was enrolled in the Bar Association of Delhi in the year 1990 and worked in the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court of India under an Advocate on Record.

She was appointed as Judicial Magistrate 1st Class –cum- Civil Judge (East) District at Gangtok, Sikkim on 11.12.1990 in the cadre of Sikkim Judicial Service, being the first lady from Sikkim to be appointed to the said post. She was promoted to the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge (East & North) Districts of Sikkim at Gangtok on 20.04.2000, which post she continued to hold till 01.08.2004. On 02.08.2004, she was promoted as District & Sessions Judge (Special Division-II) at Gangtok in the cadre of the Sikkim Superior Judicial Service and subsequently, on 23.11.2004 transferred and posted as Registrar, High Court of Sikkim. On 26.10.2006, she was posted as Registrar General, High Court of Sikkim.

While posted as Registrar and Registrar General, she held additional charge of :

(a) District & Sessions Judge (Special Division-I)

(b) Judge, Family Court of Sikkim

(c) Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee

(d) Member Secretary, Sikkim State Legal Services Authority

(e) Central Project Coordinator (e-Committee)

On 27.10.2008, she was transferred and posted as District & Sessions Judge (East & North) Sikkim at Gangtok till 14.04.2009, where she held additional charge of District & Sessions Judge (Special Division-I) at Gangtok and various assignments under Special Acts during her said posting, as follows:-

(a)Special Judge, NDPS Act, 1985 and Special Judge, Sikkim Anti-drugs Act, 2006 for East and North Sikkim.

(b)Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

(c)Single Member, MACT for East and North Sikkim.

(d)Judge, Family Court for the whole of Sikkim.

(e)Special Judge, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

(f)President, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (East & North) Districts of Sikkim.

(g)Member Secretary, Sikkim State Legal Services Authority

(h)Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee

She was transferred back as Registrar General, High Court of Sikkim on 09.04.2009 and joined the post on 15.04.2009. She held additional charge of Member Secretary, Sikkim State Legal Services Authority from January 2005 till January 2010. She was Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee from 28.03.2007 till 27.03.2009.

On 30.06.2010 she was transferred and posted as District and Sessions Judge, South & West Sikkim at Namchi till 15.07.2012 and held various assignments under Special Acts during her said posting, as follows:-

(a)Special Judge, NDPS Act, 1985 and Special Judge, Sikkim Anti-drugs Act, 2006 for South & West Sikkim.

(b)Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for South & West Sikkim.

(c)Single Member, MACT for South & West Sikkim.

(d)Judge, Family Court for South & West Sikkim.

(e)Special Judge, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 for South and West Sikkim.

(f)President, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (South & West) Districts of Sikkim.

(g)Chairperson, District Legal Services Authority, South & West Sikkim

On 16.07.2012, she was transferred and posted as District & Sessions Judge (East & North) Districts of Sikkim at Gangtok and held additional charge of District & Sessions Judge (Special Division-I) at Gangtok and various assignments as before.

On 29.07.2013, she was designated as Principal District & Sessions (East) District at Gangtok. She was elevated as Judge, High Court of Sikkim on 15.04.2015, being the first lady from Sikkim to be elevated to the post and assumed charge of the Office of the Judge, High Court of Sikkim in the forenoon of the same date.

Her Ladyship presently holds the following assignment;

1. Executive Chairperson, Sikkim State Legal Services Authority since December 11, 2015.

Appointed as Acting Chief Justice w.e.f. 01.07.2018 to 29.10.2018

                                                                17.09.2019 to 14.10.2019

                                                                15.07.2020 to 06.08.2020

                                                                01.09.2021 to 11.10.2021

                                                                15.12.2025 till date

Is it fair to imply that Justice Rai did not have the right to reshuffle the high court registry, especially Khatiwada and district judiciary after assuming charge as acting chief justice on December 15? 

Is it a case of collaboration between patriarchy and male ego against a woman judge? 

The current Registrar General is Karma Wangchuk Bhutia. 

Can it be said that Khatiwada is better than Bhutia? 

Unlike male judges, Justice Rai mentions her mother Rabi Mala Rasaily (nee Moktan), former Teacher, Baha'i School, Gangtok, East Sikkim in her profile. 

None of male judges deem fit to remember their mothers in their profile. Why are they ungrateful towards their own mothers? 

What an election petition entails

An election petition is a procedure for inquiring into the validity of the election results of Parliamentary or local government elections. In other words, it is a means under law to challenge the election of a candidate in a Parliamentary, Assembly or local election.

Election petitions are filed in the High Court of the particular state in which the election was conducted.

Therefore, only the High Courts have the original jurisdiction on deciding on election petitions. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by the Single Judge of the High Court and Chief Justice shall from time to time assign one or more Judges for that purpose.

An election petition can be filed by any candidate, or an elector relating to the election personally, to the authorized officer of the High Court. An elector is a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he/she has voted at such election or not. 

An election petition calling in question an election shall be filed within the time period of forty-five days from the date of declaration of results.

The petitioner shall have to deposit a sum of Rs. 2000/= in accordance with rules of the concerned High Court. However, the fees may vary according to the individual rules of a particular High Court.

An election petition should consist of –

a) A concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies

b) Full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and date and place of the commission of each such practice in the form of an affidavit.

c) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified.

d) The petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice (Form 25, http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/election/volume%202/conduct%20of%20election%20rules,%201961.pdf). 

A petitioner may, in addition to claiming that the election of a particular candidate is void, can also claim that he/she himself/herself has been duly elected.

The election of a particular candidate can be declared void under section 100 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, if the High Court is of the opinion that -

a) On the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat.

b) Any corrupt practice (as explained below) has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent.

c) By improper acceptance of any nomination.

d) By any improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void.

e) By any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or RPA or any rules or orders made under this act.

Under Section 123 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, following are considered corrupt practices:

a) Bribery (any gift, offer, promise or gratification of any sort by the candidate or his/her agent to the voter or to another candidate contesting elections)

b) Undue influence: direct or indirect influence exercised by the candidate or his/her agent; includes threats, attempts to induce voters or other candidates, declaration of public policy or action or the mere exercise of a legal right etc.

c) Use of Force/coercion

d) Appeal by a candidate or his election agent to refrain from voting on grounds of religion, race, caste, community or language. This also includes the promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to improve prospects of the election of that candidate or for affecting the election of any other candidate.

e) Use of national symbols, national emblem, national flag to further the prospect of the election of the candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any other candidate.

f) Publication by the candidate or his election agent of any false statement of fact which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any other candidate, or in relation to his/her candidature. Such a statement can also include a statement which is reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election.

g) Use of/hiring/permanent fixing of vehicles by a candidate or his election agent prohibited under Section 25 and 29(1) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.

h) Making false statements relating to elections expenditure.

i) Abetting or attempting to obtain the service of government servants for the furtherance of the prospects of elections. These government servants can be gazetted officers, magistrates, members of the armed forces, police officers, excise officers, revenue officers other than the village revenue officers e.g lambardars, deshmukhs etc.

j) Booth capturing by a candidate or his/her election agent.

(For the detailed list of corrupt practices please see section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act:http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/election/volume%201/representation%20of%20the%20people%20act,%201951.pdf)

Where more election petitions than one are presented to the High Court in respect of the same election, all of them shall be referred for trial to the same judge who may, in his discretion, try them separately or in one or more groups.

The Representation of Peoples Act recommends every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and as far as practicable for the interests of justice. Every endeavor, its suggests, should be made on the part of the High Court to conclude a trial for an election petition within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial.

When the election of a candidate is declared void, any of his acts or proceedings in which that candidate has participated as a Member of Parliament or State Legislature, shall not be invalidated by reason of that order, nor shall such candidate be subjected to any liability or penalty on the ground of such participation.

Any election petition may be withdrawn only by leave of the High Court. Where an application for withdrawal is made, notice thereof fixing a date for the hearing of the application shall be given to all other parties to the petition and shall be published in the official gazette.

An election petition can abate only on the death of the sole petitioner or of several petitions. The High Court shall, thereafter, publish the same in such a manner as it may deem fit.

The High Court shall as soon as after the conclusion of the trial of an election petition, intimate the substance of the decision to the Election Commission of India and the Speaker of the House or Chairman of the State Legislature as the case may be. The High Court shall also send an authenticated copy of the decision to the ECI.

An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law and fact) from every order made by a High Court.

Every appeal shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the High Court. Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is  satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.

An election petition usually stands infructuous by reasons of efflux of time, expiry of the membership of the concerned candidate, death of the party related to the petition.

Examples of election petitions that have been filed.

- An election petition was filed against Ashok Chavan and Madhu Koda for understating his election expenses on newspaper advertisements during the 2009 elections. Now as per the Supreme Court ruling dated 5th of May, 2013 in the matter of both Mr. Ashok Chavan and Mr. Madhu Koda, the Election Commission has been ordered to conduct an enquiry and decide on the matters within a period of 45 days.

- Election Commission of India had disqualified Umlesh Yadav (woman MLA from Uttar Pradesh) for filing an incorrect amount of expenses incurred by her during the elections.

- An election petition had been filed against Indira Gandhi for corrupt electoral practices and she was disqualified from contesting elections for a period of six years.

- An election petition had been filed against Chidambaram on the grounds of corrupt practices and manipulation of votes. 

Several kinds of petitions filed in Supreme Court

In India, there are several kinds of petitions are mainly filed in the Supreme Court:

1. Arbitration Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such a petition are in Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

2. Civil (Appeal) Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Article 132, 133, and 136 of the Indian Constitution read with Rules of the Supreme Court. Similarly, they can also be filed under appropriate provisions of the Central Excise Act, Consumer Protection Act, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, Advocates Act, 1961, Contempt of Courts Act, etc.

3. Contempt Petition (Civil)

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, read with Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution.

4. Contempt Petition (Criminal)

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, read with Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution.

5. Criminal Appeal Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Article 134 and 136 of the Indian Constitution, read with the Supreme Court Rules. A criminal appeal petition can be filed under appropriate sections of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, Section 374 and Section 380 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, etc. Know more about Criminal Appeal Petition in India

6. Election Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Elections Act, 1952 (31 of 1952) read with Article 71 of the Constitution and Order XLVI of the Rules relating to doubts and disputes about a President's election as Vice-President.

7. Original Suit

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such a petition are in Article 131 of the Indian Constitution. The Petition may be about any dispute:

i. between the Government of India and one or more States; or

ii. between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or

iii. between two or more States.

8. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition is under Article 136 of the Constitution from an order of the High Court refusing to grant a certificate under Article 134A of the Constitution or in any other case from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order passed or made by any Court or Tribunal, except relating to armed forces. It may be either civil SLP or criminal SLP.

9. Transferred Case Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Article 139A(1) of the Constitution read with Order XL of the Rules upon being transferred by the High Court to the Supreme Court.

10. Writ Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court and High Courts of India. The statutory provisions for such Petitions are in Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution to file in the Supreme Court and High Courts, respectively. The Court may issue writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto, and prohibition. Know more about Writ petition.

11. Review Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 2013 is a Review Petition. It may be either civil or criminal.

12. Curative Petition

These petitions are filed in the Supreme Court of India. The statutory provisions for such Petition are in Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules 2013 shall be Curative Petition. It may be either civil or criminal.

Show cause notice issued to trial court judge, public prosecutor

In Ravi Kol vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2025), Madhya Pradesh High Court's Justice Vivek Agarwal passed an order dated December 17,2025, wherein, he wrote:"We propose to issue a show cause notice to the concerned Special Judge as well as the Public Prosecutor for such a major lapse in doing injustice to the accused and putting him behind bar for over three years overlooking the fact that victim was a consulting adult, therefore, conviction could not have been made. This is a sign of intellectual dishonesty on the part of the Special Judge. Registry is requested to issue a show cause notice to the concerned Special Judge and the Public Prosecutor calling for their explanation."

The High Court observed:"6. As far as merits are concerned, law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lallusingh S/o Jagdishsingh Samgar vs. State of M.P., 1996 MPLJ 452 is that despite the absence of formal proof of document of dying declaration, the same can be made use of by the accused in his defence, accused can take the advantage of the document even without proof of the same. Similarly, the medical certificate showing the injuries on the body of the accused can also be made use of by the accused despite absence of formal proof. Para-6 of the said judgement reads as under :

"6. We deprecate the method of prosecution of withholding the evidence collected during the prosecution should be fair enough to produce all the evidence collected during investigation and it should be left to the Court to come to its own conclusion on the facts proved before him or the Court concerned. But, despite the absence of formal proof of document of dying declaration, the same can be made use of by the accused in his defence, accused can take the advantage of the document even without proof of the same. Similarly, the medical certificate showing the injuries on the body of the accused can also be made use of by the accused despite absence of formal proof.7. In the present case, admittedly, prosecution had produced the x-ray report which is available on record as discussed above and that x-report categorically mentioned a fact that victim was above 18 years of age. Therefore, when these facts are taken into consideration, then there appears to be no need to discuss any other evidence except the evidence of the victim (PW-1) to find out as to whether she was a consenting party or not. 8. In her examination-in-chief, victim (PW-1) deposed that appellant-Ravi Kol is known to her. He is residing in the village of her Mausi i.e. Village Tilghawan, therefore, he is known to her. 6-7 months prior she had gone with Ravi to village Semariya. Thereafter he had  performed marriage with her at a temple. She had stayed with the appellant for about two months. During this period, they had established physical relationship. Victim (PW-1) also deposed that she was apprehended from Village Tilghawan by the Police authorities. 9. In cross-examination, this witness deposed that she is the only child of her parents. Her parents are illiterate. Her father is working as a labourer. She met appellant-Ravi Kol in his village i.e. Tilghawan. Tilghawan is at a distance about two hours from her place of residence. Since her Mausi is residing at Tilghawan, she had met Ravi at Tilghawan. House of Ravi is situated at a distance of half km. from the house of her Mausi. This witness (victim) admitted that she had became a friendship with Ravi at the place of another friend 'R'. 'R' is also residing at Tilghawan in front of house of her Mausi. This witness admitted that her friendship with 'R' is about 3-4 years old. Thereafter victim deposed that she had met Ravi at the Hanuman Temple. Victim admitted that she had performed marriage at Hanumantal, Jabalpur temple in front of Jain temple. Victim also deposed that her parents have no knowledge about that marriage. Then in para-5, victim (PW-1) deposed that she had performed marriage on her own volition with the appellant and appellant had not forced her or coerced her for performing marriage. 10. When these facts are taken into consideration, then a consensual relationship between two consenting adults is not an offence. Thus, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. Trial Court has committed a grave error in conducting the trial. 11. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges. Appellant is in jail, he be released immediately, if not required in any other case.

Justice Agarwal concluded:"13. Explanation of the concerned Special Judge and the Public Prosecutor who conducted trial be called for and be placed in Chamber for our perusal and directing further action in accordance with law."

Patna High Court delivered three judgements on Dec. 19

Patna High Court delivered three judgements on December 19, 2025 in Anushree Srivastava vs. The State of Bihar, Raj Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Bihar and Ramjee Prasad Kamkar vs. The State of Bihar. 

Justices S. B. P. Singh, Ashok Kumar Pandey hearing 26 Election Petitions

In exercise of powers under Section 80(A) (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Justice Sudhir Singh, the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court has nominated Justices S. B. P. Singh and Ashok Kumar Pandey to receive, try and hear the Election Petitions likely to be filed against recently held election of Bihar Legislative Assembly, 2025 under Rule 6 of the Chapter XXI-E of the Patna High Court Rules, 1916.

Many election petitions have been filed in the High Court before the expiry of the 45-day limitation period on December 29, 2025. The filing of these petitions has created uncertainty for the newly elected MLAs. Now it for the Court to decide their fate. The result of the 2025 Bihar Assembly election was announced on November 14, 2025. 

JDU-led NDA secured 202 seats, including 89 seats won by BJP, 85 by JDU, 19 by Lok Janshakti Party Ram Vilas, 5 won by Jitan Ram Manjhi-led Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM), and 4 seats won by Upendra Kushwaha-led Rashtriya Lok Morcha (RLM).

Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) led Grand Alliance won only 35 seats in the state assembly.

The RJD, Hindustani Awam Morcha- Secular (HAM-S) and Rashtriya Lok Janshakti Party (RLJP) have filed separate election petitions in the High Court to challenge the results of the 2025 Bihar Assembly elections.

1. Manish Yadav, the RJD candidate from Narpatganj is contesting the victory of Devyanti Yadav, the BJP MLA. A single-judge bench of Justice Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh issued notice for her reply.

2. Ganesh Kumar Maharan, the RLJP candidate from Madhubani is contesting the election of Madhav Anand, the Rashtriya Lok Morcha (RLM). Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey issued notice to the RLM legislator for his response. 

3. Dr, Anil Kumar, the HAM candidate from Tekari constituency had filed a petition against the victory of Ajay Kumar, the RJD MLA. 

4. Dr. Ejya Yadav, RJD’s candidate from Mohiuddin Nagar has approached the High Court to dispute the election of Rajesh Kumar Singh, the BJP MLA. 

5.   Pawan Kumar Jaiswal against Faisal Rahman from Dhaka Assembly Constituency, East Champaran. Rahman from RJD defeated Jaiswal from BJP who was the sitting MLA. Rahman got 112,727 votes. Jaiswal got 112,549 votes. The margin of victory is 178 votes. 

6.  Rakesh Kumar Singh against Rituraj Kumar in Ghosi Assembly Constituency, Jehanabad

7. Umakant Singh, the BJP candidate and former MLA of Chanpatia Assembly of West Champaran challenged the victory of Abhishek Ranjan, the current MLA from Indian National Congress on December 17, 2025. 

8.  Vidya Sagar Keshari against Manoj Biswas in Forbesganj State Assembly Constituency, Araria.

9. Satyendra Kumar against Kaushal Kishore in 173, Rajgir State Assembly Constituency, Nalanda.

10. Anand Kumar against Sandeep Saurabh in Paliganj Assembly Constituency, Patna.

11. Sunil Kumar against Sandeep Saurav in Paliganj Assembly Constituency, Patna.

12. Rakesh Paswan against Dr. Sunil Kumar in 172, Bihar Sharif State Assembly Constituency, Nalanda. 

13. Himanshu Kumar Paswan against Jitendra Kumar in 171, Asthawan State Assembly Constituency, Nalanda.

14.  Doctor Sanjeev Kumar @ Sanjeev Kumar against Babulal Shaurya in 151, Parbatta Assembly Constituency, Khagaria.

15. Rani Kumari @ Rani Devi, the candidate of Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) has filed an election petition against the election of Subedar Das of RJD from Makhdumpur, Jehanabad.

16. Alok Ranjan against Indrajeet Prasad Gupta in 75, Saharsa Assembly Constituency, Saharsa. 

17. Ashok Kumar Singh against Satish Kumar Singh Yadav in 203, Ramgarh State Assembly Constituency, Mohania, Kaimur.

18. Sweta Suman against Sangita Kumari in 204, Mohania (Reserve) Assembly Constituency, Kaimur at Bhabhua.

19. Amod Kumar Singh against Chetan Anand in 221 Nabinagar assembly constituency, PS Nabinagar, Aurangabad. 

20. Anil Kumar against the election of Kaviat Devi, the BJP candidate from Korha assembly constituency, Katihar.

21. Pintu Paswan against Hari Narayan Singh in 177, Harnaut State Assembly Constituency, Nalanda.

22. Shukesh Kumar against Krishna Murari Sharan @ Prem Mukhiya in 175, Hilsa State Assembly Constituency, Nalanda.

23. Md. Irfan Alam against Nitesh Kumar Singh in 58-Kasba Assembly Constituency, Purnea.

24. Avadhesh Kumar Singh @ Awdhesh Kumar Singh against Nitesh Kumar Singh 58-Kasba Assembly Constituency, Purnea.

25. Dr. Ranvijay Kumar against Amrendra Kumar in 219 Goh Assembly Constituency, Aurangabad.

26. Sushil Kumar against Abhishek Anand in 141, Cheriya Bariyarpur Assembly Constituency, Begusarai. 

Under Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 there is a provision to challenge the validity of any election, irregularities in counting or violation of rules through election petition. The High Court has accepted the petition.

Notably, 63 were directly impacted by the Jan Suraaj Party, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). 

Jan Suraj Party (JSP) had contested elections on 238 seats but could not win any seat but his party had a significant impact on results in several seats for both the NDA and the Mahagathbandhan (MGB). In 33 constituencies, JSP's vote share was higher than the margin of victory. Out of these 33 seats, the NDA won 18 and the MGB 13. JSP secured 3.4% of the total vote share.  Out of 238 seats, it finished second in one seat, third in 129 seats, fourth in 73 seats, fifth in 24 seats, and between the sixth and ninth position in 12 seats. Notably, 236 of its 238 candidates lost their deposits. Candidates must secure at least one-sixth of the valid votes in their constituency to retain this deposit. It got over 16.77 lakh votes out of more than 5 crore votes cast in the Assembly elections. It finished third in 129 constituencies, which is over 54% of the seats it contested. Significantly, JSP stood in second in Marhaura Assembly seat of Saran district, with 58,190 votes. The RJD won this seat with the help its alliance partners. JSP has emerged as significant player in Chanpatiya, Jokihat, Cheria-Bariarpur, Belsand, Sherghati, Kargahar, and Saharsa. In Chanpatiya, JSP's candidate, YouTuber Manish Kashyap's 37,000 votes led to defeat to the BJP candidate. The Congress' Abhishek Rajan won the seat, his election has been challenged in the High Court. 

BSP contested 181 seats, won one and finished second in another. In 20 seats, BSP polled more votes than the margin of victory. Out of these seats, 18 seats were won by the NDA and only two seats by the MGB. BSP's presence benefited NDA in 90% of the relevant seats.  

AIMIM won five seats, out of 28 seats it contested. It finished second in one seat. It impacted results in nine constituencies, where it secured more votes than the victory margin. Out of these, 67% seats were won by the NDA and 33% by the MGB. Its presence benefits NDA more.

The Left parties secured only 3 out of 33 seats they contested.  

Communist Party of India (CPI) had fielded nine candidates for Bihar Assembly Election 2025 but all of them lost but none of its candidates have filed any election petition as yet. 

In Bachhwara, its votes dwindled from 54,254 to 21,588 as the Congress candidate came second with 84,502 votes. The margin of victory for the BJP in this seat is 15,841.

Ram Ratan Singh from Teghra got 77,406 votes which is 36.4% vote share. 

Suryakant Paswan from Bakhri (SC) got 81,193 votes which is 39.29% of vote share. 

Sanjay Kumar from Banka got 71,824 votes which is 37.25% of vote share. 

Notably, CPI candidates, namely, Rakesh Kumar Pandey from Harlakhi got 49,250 votes which is 26.85% of the vote share and Ram Narayan Yadav from Jhanjharpur got 53,109 votes which is 27.5% of the vote share. CPI which contested 9 seats got total 491689 votes which is 2.08765% of the total votes. 

CPI's increase in votes was 22,969 votes or 6.5% – from 3.49 lakh votes in six seats to 3.72 lakh in nine seats. In four seats, it contested against its ally Congress in friendly fights. While it contested Banka instead of Rupauli this time, the party also fielded candidates in Raja Pakar (12,990 votes), Biharsharif (2,736) and Kargahar (2,362).

CPI(M), which contested four seats like last time, increased its votes from 2.74 lakh to 3.02 lakh or a 10.51% increase. It contested Hayaghat (65,383 votes) this time instead of Matihari (60,599 in 2020). Besides Manjhi seat where its votes marginally declined, it fared well in Pipra clocking an increase of around 19,000 votes and around 5,000 votes in Bibhutipur, the only seat it won this time. So far none of it's candidates who lost have filed any election petition. 

CPI(ML)(L)) which contested 20 seats, ot a total of 559126 votes which is 2.37398 % of total votes. CPI(ML)L statistics showed that it polled 13.33 lakh votes in 19 seats five years ago while it rose to 14.25 lakh, up by 6.4%. This time, the party contested two new seats compared to last time’s seats while repeating 18 constituencies. In ten seats, it increased its votes in a range of 838 (Digha) and 19,977 (Tarari). While in Paliganj where it won, its votes increased from 67,917 to 81,105. But in Karakat, which it has retained, the votes came down to 74,157 from 82,700. In Paliganj, its sitting MLA  Sandeep Saurav has retained it. In Karakat, its sitting MLA Arun Singh  retained it. Its tally is down to 2, from 12 seats in the previous election. 

In Aurai, which it contested last time but gave to ally VIP this time, the votes for the Grand Alliance candidate rose from 42,613 to 46,879 though the candidate could not pull through this time as well.

So far CPI(ML)L's candidates who lost have not filed any election petition although the party lost Agiaon seat by just 95 votes.  In Balrampur, Mahboob Alam, the 3-time MLA lost by 1318 votes because of Sangita Devi Lok of Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) who won by 389 votes and Mohammad Adil Hasan of AIMIM who got 80070 votes. In Dumraon and Ziradei, the margins of defeat was around 3,000 votes. In Dumraon, Dr Ajit Kumar Singh was defeated by Rahul Kumar Singh of  Janata Dal (United) who won by 2105 votes.  CPI-ML lost Arwal and Ghosi seats.In Arwal, it was defeated by the BJP, and in Ghosi, it lost to the JD(U). In Ghosi, Rituraj Kumar of the JD(U) defeated CPI-ML candidate Ram Bali Yadav. In Ziradei, Bhism Pratap Singh of Janata Dal (United) won by 2626 votes defeating Amarjeet Kushwaha of CPIML. 

Prior to the filing of these 26 election petitions in the High Court, a PIL was filed in the High Court contending that the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana (MMR)Yojana was used to influence voters by making payments after the Model Code of Conduct (MMC( for the 2025 Assembly Elections was already in force.  The PIL alleges that the state distributed ₹ 2,500 crores in cash grants to ₹ 25 lakh women after MCC came into effect. The State of Bihar, the Election Commission of India (ECI), the Chief Electoral Officer of Bihar, the Department of Rural Development, and the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (JEEVIKA) are the respondents. The MMRY scheme was given Cabinet approval on August 29, 2025, to provide a non-refundable grant of 10,000 rupees to one woman per family for self-employment. 

The petition submitted that despite the MCC coming into force on October 6, 2025, the state continued to execute the disbursement in a “staggered manner”. The Direct Benefit Transfer timeline reveals that after MCC came into effect, fund transfers were initiated on October 17, October 24, and October 31, 2025. The timeline indicates that a disbursement was done on November 7, 2025 as well. The scheme’s guidelines arbitrarily delegated the core executive function of ground-level beneficiary verification to “non-governmental” and “non-statutory” functionaries known as “Community Mobilisers”.  The PIL had prayed for stoppage of further payments, enforcement of the MCC and a direction for the state to file a “detailed Compliance Affidavit” providing all original administrative records, including a complete list of beneficiaries sanctioned before the MCC was enforced on October 6, 2025 and a separate list of all beneficiaries who received payments after that date.

Chronology 

September 20, 2025–The Rural Development Department (RDD) issued a letter confirming a “high-profile online launch” for the first instalment transfer, scheduled for September 26, 2025, with the presence of the Hon’ble Prime Minister and Chief Minister.

September 29, 2025–JEEVIKA issued an office order scheduling a “single, massive Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) of 2500 Crore” to 25 lakh beneficiaries on October 3, 2025. 

October 6, 2025–The Election Commission of India announced the schedule for the Bihar Assembly Elections, 2025, bringing the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) into “immediate effect”. The MCC, Part VII, Clause (v), prohibits ministers and authorities from sanctioning “grants/payments out of discretionary funds” after elections are announced.

. 

 

Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo to take charge as Chief Justice, Patna High Court

Patna High Court has been functioning without a Chief Justice from October 22, 2025. Now Supreme Court Collegium in its meeting held on December 18, 2025 has recommended elevation of Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo, a judge of Odisha High Court as the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. 

Justice Sahoo was elevated as Judge of the Orissa High Court on July 2, 2014. At present, he is the second senior most judge of the Odisha High Court. 

Prior to his arrival in Patna High Court, Justice Sahoo adjudicated the case in Jatia Hembram vs. State of Odisha (2025), as part of the Division Bench which included Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra. The bench passed a 9-page long order dated November 26, 2025. Jatia Hembram, the appellant preferred the appeal to challenge the judgment and order dated January 30, 2013 of the Additional Sessions Judge, Baripada in a S.T. case of 2011 whereby he was convicted for offence under section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 

Justice Sahoo led bench observed:"A right of appeal is an invaluable right, particularly for an accused who cannot be condemned eternally by a trial Judge, without having a right to seek a re-look of the trial Court's judgment by a Superior or Appellate Court. The right to prefer an appeal by an accused against the conviction is not merely a statutory right but can also be construed to be a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. When a convict is in judicial custody and not having the financial capacity to challenge the conviction order by way of an appeal making his own arrangement, it becomes the sacrosanct duty of authorities concerned to provide legal aid to him and to ensure that the appeal is filed with promptitude and information in that respect with up to date status of the appeal is provided to the convict regularly. Sometimes, the convicts are unaware of their legal rights or appeal process and sometimes, they expressed unwillingness and are reluctant to file appeals for various reasons. If any convict does not choose to prefer appeal against his conviction in spite of proper guidance and proper advice being aware of his fundamental and statutory rights, the same should be obtained in writing from him by the Secretary of the D.L.S.A. and be forwarded to the Member Secretary of Odisha State Legal Services Authority for future reference and a copy of the same shall also be kept with the jail authorities. The convict should be guided properly and provided suitable advice regarding the statutory and constitutional rights to prefer the appeals, if necessary by taking the help of their family members so that appeals can be instituted with their consent."

He relied on Supreme Court's decision in Kamaljit Kaur vs. State of Punjab reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1035 that the appeal filed without the convict’s consent amounted to a misuse of process of law. Therefore, it is necessary that the convict’s refusal to give his consent to prefer an appeal should be obtained in writing. Since the legal system provides a robust right to appeal, the convicts, who are unable to make their own arrangement in preferring the appeals against the conviction, should receive free and effective legal aid as part of their right to access justice. 

Justice Sahoo concluded:"Considering the poor financial condition of the appellant, the period of his detention in judicial custody and the circumstances under which the Jail Criminal Appeal could not be filed earlier and since the appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, taking a liberal view, we are inclined to condone the delay in filing the JCRLA. Accordingly, the delay is condoned."

Justice Sahoo did his LL.B. from The Law College, Cuttack. He enrolled as an Advocate on November 26, 1989 under Orissa State Bar Council, Cuttack. He started practice under the guidance of his father Sarat Chandra Sahoo, Advocate who was a renowned criminal law practitioner and Dr. Manoranjan Panda, Advocate, a service and constitutional law expert. 

Justice Sahoo has practiced criminal law and service matter.He has practiced through out Odisha  in the District Courts, High Court, Consumer Forum, SAT and CAT. He as born on June 5, 1964. He did his Matriculation from Nuabazar High School, Cuttack, ISc., B.Sc. from Stewart Science College, Cuttack and M.A. (English) and M.A. (Oriya) from Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.

It may be recalled that in exercise of the powers under Section 113 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the King of the United Kingdom had issued letters of patent dated February 9, 1916to constitute the Patna High Court. Odisha was placed under the jurisdiction of Patna High Court. Although on  May 18,1916, Circuit Court of Patna High Court for Odisha held its first sitting at Cuttack.

On April 1, 1936, Odisha was made a separate province but no separate High Court was provided for it. The Government of India agreed to create a new High Court, and for that purpose the Government of India issued the Odisha High Court Order, 1948, under the Section 229 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, on 30 April 1948. On July 26,1948, Odisha High Court was formally inaugurated prior to adoption of the Constitution of India on November 26, 1949 by which the Government of India Act, 1935 was repealed. 

Justice Saboot comes from a High Court which has a Museum of Justice. During his tenure, Patna High Court may also get a similar Museum. 

Period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate: Patna High Court

In Gupteshwar Prasad vs. Dina Nath Prasad (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Anshuman as part of the Division Bench along with Justice Bibek Chaudhary delivered a 29-page long judgment dated December 18, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable on application for issuance Probate/Letters of Administration and application for revocation of Probate/Letters of Administration. An application for issuance of probate/letters of administration under Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not create any absolute bar; rather it confers a continuous right, which may be exercised at any time after the death of the deceased as long as right to do so survives. But, Article 137 creates a situation wherein a delay beyond three years after death of the deceased give rise to suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. But such delay must be explained in accordance with the provisions laid down in Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But, on the other hand, application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate/letters of administration shall create absolute bar if the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, and the period of limitation shall be counted from the date of grant of probate due to the reason that the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate or Will is granted, such probate is good with respect to parties to the proceeding as well as for the whole world. The reference is hereby answered. 15. After answering the reference it shall be appropriate for this Court to direct the office to place all the first appeals before appropriate Bench for consideration on merit." 

Justice Dr. Anshuman relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Lynette Fernandes vs. Gertie Mathias, (2018) 1 SCC 271 ::2018 (1) BLJ 92 (SC), wherein it dealt with the precise issue of the period of limitation applicable for an application for cancellation of a probate or letters of administration. This court held as follows:
"One must keep in mind that the grant of probate by a Competent Court operates as a judgment in rem and once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceedings, but against the world. If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceedings for revocation of probate. In this matter, as mentioned supra, the Appellant was a minor at the time of grant of probate. She attained majority on 09.09.1965. She got married on 27.10.1965. In our considered opinion, three years limitation as prescribed Under Article 137 runs from the date of the Appellant attaining the age of majority i.e. three years from 09.09.1965. The Appellant did not choose to initiate any proceedings till the year 25.01.1996 i.e., a good 31 years after she attained majority. No explanation worthy of acceptance has been offered by the Appellant to show as to why she did not approach the Court of law within the period of limitation. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the Appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove that the Will was a result of fraud or undue influence. The same Will has remained unchallenged until the date of filing of application for revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the Court for cancellation or revocation of grant of probate.

In paragraph-17 of the said judgment it has been held that the petition for revocation of letters of
administration was time barred. Upon bare reading of the above mentioned discussion of all the decisions, particularly, three Judges Bench, it transpires to us that the following types of petitions are filed under the Succession Act, particularly, relating to issuance of probate/letters of administration:
I. Application for issuance of probate;
II. Application for issuance of letters of administration;
III. Application for revocation of probate;
IV. Application for revocation of letter of administration;

Dr. Anshuman observed:"14. So far as the right to apply for probate accrues on the date of death of testator, the application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an application in law, but is an application for grant of probate or letters of administration for the Court’s permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trusty. It is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed. So far as the restriction casted in the judgment of Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) and Krishna Kumar Sharma (supra), it is only to the extent that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall not create any absolute bar on an application for grant of probate or letters of administration; rather it is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after death of the deceased as long as the right to do so survives. Delay beyond three years after death of the deceased would create suspicion, and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. Such delay must be explained but cannot be equated with an absolute bar of limitation and once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. But Hon’ble three Judges Bench in Ramesh Nivrutti Bhagwat (supra) creates absolute bar in filing of an application for cancellation or revocation for grant of probate. If the concerned party does not approach the court of law within the period of limitation, then, according to law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petition for revocation of letters of administration would be time barred and period for limitation would be counted from the date of grant of probate, as the grant of probate by a competent Court operates as a judgment in rem. Once the probate to the Will is granted, then such probate is good not only in respect of the parties to the proceeding but also against the world at large and if probate is granted, the same operates from the date of grant of probate for the purpose of limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in proceeding for revocation of probate as held in Lynette Fernandes (supra)." 

Notably, the First Appeal was filed in 2001 against the Judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in a Title Suit of 1987. First Appeal was filed against the judgment and decree dated June 22, 2001 passed by the District Judge, Gopalganj, in Probate Case of 1997 and First Appeal of 2003 was filed against the judgment and decree dated May 28, 2003 passed in the Title Suit of 1992, which arose out of Probate case of 1990 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Buxar, by which the suit was allowed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent by granting probate to the defendant-appellant. 

Consequent thereupon, the matter relating to date of reckoning, needs authoritative adjudication in consonance with the event of accrual of cause of action and found plausible in view of Section 211(2) as well as 213 of the Act and for that question was formulated in a 27-page long order dated February 27, 2020 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi, the Single Bench. The formulated question reads:“What would be meaning of accrual of cause of action for the purpose of reckoning the period in the background of intricacies having been referred hereinabove in the context of principle laid down by the Apex Court as referred hereinabove relating to applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 relating to a petition for probate/letter of administration?”.

The question which was framed and the matter was placed before the Division Bench after taking permission of the Chief Justice, these appeals came before the Division Bench for answering those questions of reference, which was acknowledged in order by the Division  Bench of Justices Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Anshuman dated November 17, 2025 that is to say applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as well as relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. This order was authored by Justice Chaudhary, who noted that Justice Trivedi, the Single Bench had referred the matter on the question of applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act relating to the starting point of applicability in a petition for probate/letters of administration under Indian Succession Act. 

The First Appeal was filed and registered in the High Court on August 30, 2001.