Liberty granted to file appropriate application for compensation before appropriate forum: Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy

In Binod Kumar vs. The State Of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Energy Department, Government of Bihar, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice G. Anupama Chakravarthy delivered a 4-page long judgement dated September 3, 2025 granted "liberty to the petitioner to seek necessary compensation by approaching the concerned District Judge and in case, any such petition is filed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, the same shall be examined and considered on merits by the appropriate forum and shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible." 

The petitioner prayed for direction to the the Power Grid Corporation of India, Respondent no. 7 and the Executive Director, ER-I, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., Respondent no. 8 not to unauthorizedly occupy the land of the petitioner situate in Mauza-Sarari, Khata no.120, Plot no.1249 measuring 26 Decimils equivalent to about 08 kathas bounded in the north by Madho Singh, South-Jagannath Singh, East-Devlal Bhagat & West-Jagdev Singh and remove the encroachment upon the land. Alternatively, he sought direction to the Respondent no. 7 and 8 to provide compensation of Rs. 80.00 lakhs @Rs.10.00 lakhs/katha for the loss suffered by the petitioner by the unauthorized occupation of the land for erection of Tower. 

The counsel for the respondents contended that since the matter was squarely covered under the order dated June 26, 2024 passed in CWJC No. 17625 of 2016 Lalmuni Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by the High Court in which the High Court had passed the order in light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in The Power Grid Corporation of India Limited vs. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd & Ors. reported in 2017(2) PLJR (SC) 152, the writ petition may also be disposed of on the same terms and conditions.

After perusal of the judgment, the counsel for the petitioner sought liberty to file appropriate application for compensation before the appropriate forum.

The writ petition was disposed of in terms of the aforesaid judgment passed in CWJC No. 17625 of 2016 (supra) in light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of The Power Grid Corporation of India Limited case "with liberty to the petitioner to seek necessary compensation by approaching the concerned District Judge and in case, any such petition is filed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, the same shall be examined and considered on merits by the appropriate forum and shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible."

Supreme Court sets aside bail rejection order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of criminal misconduct by a public servant

In Rajni Priya vs. The State Through Central Bureau of Investigation, Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed the criminal appeal. The Court's 3-page long order reads: "The order dated 20.06.2025 of the High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant is set aside. The appellant shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Trial Court concerned may deem fit and proper to impose in the facts and circumstances of the case."  

The appeal arises from a 4-page long order dated June 20, 2025 passed by Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court rejecting the bail prayer of the appellant in connection with RC Case No.14(A)/2017 corresponding Special Case no.12/2020. The contention of the counsel for the appellant was that the prosecution case was in respect of fraudulent transfer from account of the organization. It was contended that appellant acted as a co-signatory for a very short duration when allegedly there were limited unlawful transactions. Moreover, the other co-signatory had been granted bail. It was also contended that since appellant had already suffered over two years of incarceration; she being a lady was entitled to be released on bail pending trial. 

The counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer for bail of the appellant but could not dispute that co-signatory has been granted bail and that appellant had already suffered more than two years of incarceration pending trial. 

The High Court had heard the criminal miscellaneous application filed under Sections 483 and 484 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for grant of regular bail to the petitioner who was in custody in connection with R.C. Case No.14(A)/2017 corresponding to Special Case No.12 of 2020, under Sections 409/420/467/468/471/34/120B of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13(2)/13(1)(c)/(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI-II, Patna. 3. Earlier prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court vide order dated 22.02.2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No.11113 of 2024. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that charge was already framed against the petitioner in this case and he was in custody since August 11, 2023. He submitted that no purpose would be solved keeping the petitioner in custody and petitioner was being unnecessarily harassed.

Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 deals with the criminal misconduct by a public servant. Section 13 [(1) reads: "A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-(a)if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or any property under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or(b)if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.Explanation 1. - A person shall be presumed to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for.Explanation 2. - The expression 'known sources of income' means income received from any lawful sources.]" Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads:"Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine."

In his order, Justice Dr. Anshuman had concluded:"After going through the report of the stage of the Trial it transpires that there are total 26 accused persons in this case and charge has been framed on 28.02.2025, total 64 witnesses and 226 documents are on the record, which are the basis of the Trial. The Court of CBI has indicated that the Trial is likely to be concluded approximately within one and half years. 7. In the light of the submissions made by the parties, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the accused at present. Hence, the prayer for bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected. 8. It is directed to the CBI to adduce evidence of the material witnesses at the earliest preferably within six months."  

Reversing Justice Dr. Anshuman's order, the Supreme Court observed:"...without expressing any opinion on the merits of the prosecution case, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to be released on bail pending trial at this stage." 

Justice Arun Kumar Jha sets aside judgment by 1st Additional Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge, Katihar in a case from 2010

A decision can be considered to be perverse only when there is some conscious violation of a rule of law or of procedure.

– In Kristamma Naidu vs. Chapa Naidu, 1894 ILR 17 Mad 410.

“It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.”

-In H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority vs. Gopi Nath, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 

“A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse."

– Justice R.F. Nariman referred to the decision in Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49.

In Md Amir Hussain vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), a criminal revision petition, Patna High Court's Justice Arun Kumar Jha delivered a 5-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025, wherein, he concluded: " For bringing a conviction, in a complaint case, it is settled proposition of law that the averment made in the complaint petition and the evidence of the complainant witnesses are to be read together. However, it is the evidence which would prove the case against the accused persons. Though the complaint petition is not expected to be encyclopedic in nature, not mentioning the name of the petitioner in the complaint petition and the complainant himself not naming the petitioner for any assault upon him, throws the whole issue open. Though this Court is not expected to go into the contentious issues and re-appreciation of the facts and evidence, still complete absence of the name of the petitioner in the complaint petition for participating in the occurrence dated 02.12.2010 and subsequent omission of the name of the petitioner in the evidence of the complainant, who deposed as C.W. 3, this Court is inclined to entertain the criminal revision petition as perversity is apparent on the face of record. Hence, the judgment and the order of conviction dated 08.03.2022 passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge, Katihar in Complaint Case No. 3427 of 2010 are set aside as against the petitioner. 7. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition stands allowed." It was one of the 15 judgements delivered on September 1, 2025. 

The criminal revision petition was filed by the petitioner for setting aside the judgment and order of conviction, both dated March 8, 2022 passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge, Katihar in Complaint Case No. 3427 of 2010, CIS No. 3427 of 2010, whereby and whereunder the petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and acquitted from other charges and the petitioner was released after due admonition under the provisions of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The petitioner's counsel submitted that the petitioner faced the trial arising out of a complaint case of 2010 wherein the petitioner was made accused along with four other co-accused persons for the offences punishable under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1) (ii)(x)(xiv) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. He also submitted that the allegation against the petitioner and other co-accused persons was that they abused the complainant by taking his caste name and also assaulted him. There are two dates of occurrence, December 2, 2010 and December 11, 2010, respectively. In the first occurrence, the complainant had named Rafique Alam @ Kalu and Mustaque Alam, who abused the complainant and put him down on the earth and started pressing his neck. This occurrence took place on December 2, 2010. There was no mention of the name of the petitioner for abusing the complainant or for assaulting him. In the second alleged occurrence dated December 11, 2010, the complainant made averment that while a panchayati was being held, the complainant and other persons were assaulted by the petitioner and other co-accused persons. But the trial court disbelieved the second occurrence which was apparent from the impugned judgment but convicted the accused persons for the offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code only. But the finding was perverse since the complainant did not name the petitioner for being involved in the occurrence of assault dated December 2, 2010 either in his complaint petition or in his deposition. 

The counsel further submitted that the trial court disbelieved the story of commission of offence under Sections 3(1)(ii)(x)(xiv) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The evidence of the two witnesses was against the version of the complainant and the same could not be relied on for convicting the petitioner under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code. There was no further corroborative evidence rather these witnesses were not eye witnesses and from perusal of their evidence it would appear that they were tutored witnesses of the employer of the complainant. 

The counsel pointed out that even from the evidence of the witnesses of the complainant, it came on record that the petitioner was only involved in 'panchayati' for bringing out an amicable settlement. Since the trial court disbelieved the story of assault during 'panchayati', nothing remained in the matter against the petitioner and considering the facts and circumstances, it was apparent that the impugned judgment by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge suffered from infirmity and the same could not be sustained against the petitioner. Justice Jha found the submission of the counsel convincing.

Provisions under Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act suffer from infirmities:Patna High Court

In Mahendra Prasad Singh @ Mahendra Singh vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), in his 29 page long judgement dated September 1, 2025, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justice S. B. Pd. Singh and Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri concluded:"the respondent authorities are directed to release the house of the petitioner henceforth which was seized in connection with Prohibition Case No. 1217 of 2024." The respondent authorities were: The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar, the Excise Commissioner, Bihar Excise, Patna, the Divisional Commissioner, Magadh Division, Patna, the District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Patna, the Superintendent of Excise, Madh Nishedh Bihar, Patna, the S.H.O. of Excise, P.S. Patna and the Investigating Officer, Excise and Prohibition Case no. 1217/2024, namely Devendra Singh, S.I. Excise and Prohibition, P.S. Patna, District Patna. The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The petitioner had sought issuance of writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions in the nature of Mandamus seeking directing the respondents S.I. Madh Nishedh Excise, P.S., Patna, so that to immediately release the seized ground floor building, which was earlier given on rent to respondent no. 8, on rent each month Rs. 1500/- total area 300 sq. feet ground floor building of the petitioner, which was earlier on rent utilized by Randhir Kumar, the respondent no. 8, but the same room was seized by the S.H.O. of Excise P.S., Patna in connection with Prohibition case no. 1217/2024, dated 21.05.2024 registered under Sections 30(A), 32 and 56(B) of Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and (Amendment) Act, 2022, which was illegally seized by the police. He also prayed for directing the respondent to immediately release the ground floor of building house of the Bihar, which was earlier seized by the police in Excise Case but the petitioner is being the house owner of the said premises, which was used by the respondent no. 8 after agreement on rent. It also sought a direction for the respondent to freeze/seize the house of the petitioner which is subject matter of Excise Case which was seized by the S.H.O. of Excise P.S., Patna but that property which was utilised by the tenant that is respondent no. 8, so far, the petitioner was given the said property ground floor house on a rent on the basis of an agreement dated October 1, 2023, and in the said ground floor there is a water logging, because in the said premises the respondent no. 8 have kept some goods items, therefore, in view of the under Section 45 of the Cr. P. C., the said building order for custody and disposal property pending trial in certain cases must be released in favour of the petitioner, because the petitioner has got no knowledge about the said building, which was used by the tenant respondent no. 8 and doing some illegal business having without knowledge of the petitioner.  

The counsel of the petitioner submitted that from bare perusal of the FIR, it was evident that the name of the petitioner transpired in the present case only for the reason that he was the owner of the said building from where the alleged recovery has been made. The premises in question was given on rent is not in dispute. There was not even iota of evidence which could suggest that the petitioner was facilitating the culprit or providing access for storage of incriminating articles. Either directly or indirectly, he did not contravene Section 30 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and for this reason his premises was not liable to be confiscated under Section 56 of the Act. The counsel also submitted that the petitioner had given the said house on rent much prior to the alleged incident and for this reason, no case would be made out against the petitioner as he was not in possession of any incriminating article in contravention of any provisions of the Act and neither he was having any knowledge of running of illegal business by the tenant Dr. Randhir Kumar. When the petitioner was able to satisfy the authorities that the premises in question was let out on rent and nothing came on record suggesting the knowledge of the petitioner about the storage of several types of Homeopathic medicines in the premises in question, seizure of premises of the petitioner appears to be arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal. These authorities did not take into consideration the rights of the petitioner under Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 300 (A) of the Constitution of India, whereunder, the petitioner had a right to own the property and he had also  got right to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The action of the authorities was arbitrary, unreasonable and shows complete non-application of mind when the fact was crystal clear that the premises owned by the petitioner was undisputedly being used by the tenant under a valid deed of agreement. 

Referring to the specific offences under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 under which the petitioner was charged, Justice Singh observed:"....it seems that whenever offence punishable under this Act has been committed, any premises or part thereof used for committing any offence might be seized/confiscated and released upon penalty. It leaves no doubt that a premises can be seized and even confiscated and auctioned merely upon its involvement in any offence under the Act. This is indeed a draconian provision and so it must be used with complete circumspection. The existing provisions of the Act gives unfettered and unguided and arbitrary powers to the authorities. In the absence of any specific guidelines, such powers can be abused or misused and such powers can be exercised arbitrarily insofar as alleged proven charge and commensurate penalty could be seen in the better legislation- like provisions of Criminal Procedure Code read with Indian Penal Code, where the sentence/conviction is proportionate to the proved charges. 12. We have noted some disturbing trends with regard to the aforesaid provisions. Though the Act talks about necessary directions, guidelines, regulations, instructions to be issued by the State Government with respect to mode and manner of search and seizure, destruction and confiscation, we have provisions only under Section 57 B of the Act and Rules 12 B, 13 B and 14 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 to meet such situations. These provisions are clearly insufficient and authorized officers are very likely to misuse the provisions and the decisions are taken arbitrarily."

Justice Singh added: "....there is no subjective assessment under Section 56 of the Act regarding involvement of the premises and the hardship which will be faced by the persons apparently without any fault of their own. Let us take certain examples to make issue clear. As in the present case, the premises was given on rent and apart from the tenant/lessee, the owner has been made accused. We can take another example of the joint family owned premises. Suppose a person of the joint family keeps a bottle of liquor in the premises without knowledge to other inmates, will that premises be seized and sealed and confiscation proceeding will be started ousting all the inmates of joint family property simply on the ground that the law provides so? Third example could be taken of a government quarter. If any recovery is made from a government quarter, will the State come forward and seize/seal/confiscate and auction the property? Then another issue which is to be considered is that there is no subjective relationship between the quantity of liquor seized and the premises sealed or the penalty imposed as we could decipher from the aforesaid provisions. Even the Rules, though provide for taking status of the individual, nature of his involvement in the crime, location of the premises and quantum of intoxicant recovered while deciding the quantum of the tine, yet the Rules also provide that the fine shall not be less than Rs. one lakh. This is simply absurd as to whether there is recovery of 100 ml. of intoxicant or 1,00,000 liters, minimum fine shall be Rs. one lakh. The provisions of law discussed here-in-before even give complete discretion to the confiscating authorities with regard to imposition of penalty since no guidelines have been provided. This may create anomalous situation as the jurisdictional authority in one area, in similar circumstances, may impose a lesser penalty, whereas for the same act, the jurisdictional authority in another area may impose higher penalty. 14. Enactment of law and rules in such manner may make such laws and rules arbitrary and the same goes against the spirit of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution...."

Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India reads: "Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— 
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service,
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise”.

Justice Singh recalled the decision of the Supreme court in Romesh Thappar vs. State of Madras, reported in 1950 SCC 436, considered the possibility of law concerned being applied in unconstitutional manner and held such law be declared void.

He also referred to paragraph 85 of the Court's decision in E .P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another, reported in AIR 1974 SC 555. It reads: “85. ...Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action an ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of Power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice : in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Arts. 14 and 16. It is also necessary to point out that the ambit and reach of Articles 14 and 16 are not limited to cases where the public servant affected has a right to a post. Even if a public servant is in an officiating position, he can complain of violation of Arts. 14 and 16 if he has been arbitrarily or unfairly treated or subjected to mala fide exercise of power by the State machine. It is, therefore, no answer to the charge of infringement of Articles 14 and 16 to say that the petitioner had no right to the post of Chief Secretary but was merely officiating in that post. That might have some relevance to Art. 311 but not to Articles 14 and 16. We must, therefore, proceed to consider whether the transfer of the petitioner first to the post of Deputy Chairman and then to the post of Officer on Special Duty was arbitrary, hostile and in mala fide exercise of power. What was the operative reason for such transfer: was it the exigencies of public administration or extra administrative considerations having no relevance to the question of transfer? Was the transfer to the post of Deputy Chairman or Officer on Special Duty so irrational or unjust that it could not have been made by any reasonable administration except for colaterial reasons? These are the questions which call for our consideration”.

Justice Singh noted that although these observations were made in a different context, yet the underlying principle remain the same. There cannot be any arbitrariness in the matter of state policy and principles. 

Justice Singh also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Menka Gandhi vs. Union of India, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248, wherein it was held that that every law has to be just, fair and reasonable; otherwise it will be considered unconstitutional. 

Justice Singh observed that the provisions of law as framed under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act "does not appear to be perfect law and suffers from a number of infirmities. However, since the provisions of Act or the Rules framed therein are not in challenge, we refrain ourself from making any further comments on the provisions under the Act."

With regard to the case before him, he noted that it was undisputed that the premises in question was let out on rent. The said lease deed was prepared for 11 months between the parties which was effective from October 1, 2023 to August 30, 2024 and this period covered the alleged date of occurrence, pertaining to this case. He underlined in the penultimate paragraph of his judgement that in such a situation, "the petitioner could not be made to suffer for being the landlord/owner of the premises in question if recovery of some intoxicant materials have been made without his knowledge or intention."

As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh authored all judgments dated September 2

Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh delivered seven judgements on September 2, 2025.All the judgements dated September 2 by this bench were authored by Justice Singh. 

In Bibek Kumar Jaiswal @ Vivek Kumar Jaiswal vs. Shabnam Jaiswal @ Sabnam Jaiswal (2025), a case from Supaul, Justice Singh held that Family Court rightly dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Nilu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar (2025), a case from Hajipur, Justice Singh set  aside the judgement and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Vaishali. 

In Shashi Bhushan Poddar vs. Gyan Bharti @ Rekha Poddar & Anr. (2025), a case from Bhagalpur, Justice Singh upheld Family Court's judgement and decree which dismissed the matrimonial case of the appellant seeking divorce. 

In Arun Kumar vs. Sushmita Kumari (2025), a case from Begusarai, Justice Singh set aside judgment and decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai, which had dismissed the divorce case. 

In Md. Naushad Hussain vs. Shahida Khaton & Anr. (2025), a case from Darbhanga, Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the fact that Talaq has already been performed between the parties and in the entire evidence, the appellant-husband has not denied the aforesaid assertion of the respondent and the respondent herself does not want to continue matrimonial relationship with the appellant-husband, we are not inclined to interference with the impugned judgment. The Family Court has rightly dismissed the Matrimonial Case No. 209 of 2012 filed on behalf of the appellant husband."   

In Pramod Pasi vs. The State of Bihar through Secretary Excise and Prohibition Department Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gopalganj, the Court recorded that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 7.8 litres which is a meager quantity. Justice Singh concluded:"Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 10,000/-(Ten Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He observed: "We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 7.8 litres of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

In Yogendra Yadav vs, The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Bihar Prohibition and Excise Department, Bihar & Ors. (2025), a case from Gaya, Justice Singh took note of the fact that the recovery of illicit liquor was only 1 litre which is a meager quantity. He observed: "Considering the small quantity of liquor, the concerned authority is hereby directed to collect fine of Rs. 5,000/-(Five Thousands) from the petitioner and release the motorcycle in his favour within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order, for which petitioner has no objection." He added: We are conscious of the fact that alleged recovery is meager quantity and the aforesaid order has been passed while invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reasons that unnecessarily petitioner shall not be subjected to various proceedings like Rule of 12A of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Rules, 2021 read with amended sub Rule 2 of Rule 12A in the year 2022 and 2023, Sections 58, 92 and 93 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, for an issue of 1 litre of illicit liquor and such order is required to prevent the multiplicity of proceeding in the interest of justice."

Notably, a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 by the same Division Bench had set aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj. This judgement too was authored by Justice Singh.  

 

As part of Division Bench Justice S. B. Pd. Singh sets aside judgment, decree by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj

"The essential ingredients in an offence of adultery are that: (i) There should be an act of sexual intercourse outside the marriage, and (ii) that such intercourse should be voluntary."

In Kiran Devi vs. Akhilesh Mishra & Anr. (2025), a miscellaneous appeal, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice S. B. Pd. Singh passed a 17-page long judgement dated September 1, 2025 setting aside the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj in M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 M.M. Case No. 176 of 2011 stands and dismissed the case. The judgement was authored by Justice Singh. 

The appeal was filed under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 impugning the judgment and decree dated February 25, 2019 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gopalganj, whereby the matrimonial suit, preferred by Akhilesh Mishra, the respondent No. 1, for a decree of divorce, on dissolution of marriage, was allowed subject to payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- as permanent alimony for life support of the appellant. The case of the respondent No. 1 as per petition filed before the Family Court was that the marriage of the appellant was solemnized with respondent No.1 in the month of May, 2005 as per the Hindu Rites and Custom. After the marriage, the appellant came to her matrimonial house and stayed there for few months and thereafter, she went to her parents’ house and stayed there for a year. The respondent-husband and his father made several attempts to take the appellant to her matrimonial house, but all the efforts went in vein. At last in June, 2006 the respondent No. 1 went to his Sasural along with some relatives on promise of his father-in-law and brother-in-law to sent the appellant with him but she did not come with the respondent No. 1. Subsequently, the respondent-husband came to know that appellant has illicit relationship with Ashok Sharma, the respondent No. 2 who often used to visit the house of the appellant. The respondent-husband also came to know that appellant was pregnant and a female child was born who died just after the birth. The respondent-husband made several attempts to reconcile the matter with the appellant but all his efforts went in vein. The appellant, thereafter filed complaint case in 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. case of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the this case, the respondent-husband and his father were rotting in jail for 6-7 months and ultimately after some time, on the intervention of relatives, a compromise was filed in the said case and appellant came to her Sasural but after sometime, the appellant went away from her Sasural with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband also alleged that appellant and respondent-husband never cohabited since their marriage and appellant had completely deserted the matrimonial life of the respondent-husband. The respondent-husband, therefore, prayed that the marriage between the appellant and respondent No. 1 be declared dissolved and a decree of divorce be passed in his favour. 

In response to the summon/notice issued by the Court, appellant/O.P No. 1 appeared and filed her reply/written statement. In her written statement/reply, the respondent No. 1 had stated all the allegations levelled by the appellant against her is false, concocted and without any basis. She also stated that after the marriage in the year 2005, she went to the house of respondent-husband and started living in her matrimonial house but after sometimes, her in-laws family members started demanding dowry and torture
was inflicted for non-fulfillment of dowry demand. The appellant, in the meanwhile, conceived and a female child was born who died after birth. Thereafter, the respondent- husband and other family members started pressurizing the appellant for motorcycle and colour T.V. and ultimately, on April 20, 2009 they badly assaulted and ousted her from the matrimonial house. The father of the appellant and other relatives made several attempts and requested the respondent-husband and other in-laws to keep her at her matrimonial house but they denied to keep her at her matrimonial house. The appellant, thereafter filed Complaint Case No. 2761 of 2009 against the respondent-husband and other family members which was registered as Bhore P.S. Case No. 2 of 2010 under Sections 498(A), 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent-husband, thereafter filed a divorce case in 2009. In this case, a compromise took place and the respondent-husband was directed to keep the appellant with full dignity and honour. The appellant went to her matrimonial house and started living there but in the meantime, the respondent-husband got a job in Dubai and again appellant was tortured for demand of dowry. The respondent-husband again filed a divorce case in 2011 on the same very facts.

The issues which were framed by the Trial Court are:-
1. Whether the case as framed is maintainable?
2. Whether the appellant has cause of action to file this case?
4. Whether the applicant is entitled to get decree for dissolution of marriage against the O.P ?
5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any other relief or reliefs?

The High Court considered the following points for determination in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought for in his petition/appeal.
(ii) Whether the impugned judgment of Principal Judge, Family Court, Patna is just, proper and sustainable/tenable in the eyes of law.

Justice Singh observed:"we find that respondent-husband has deposed in his evidence that appellant-wife always used to make quarrel with him and his family members but no any specific instance of date has been mentioned in the plaint as well as in his evidence. He has also admitted in his evidence that prior to filing of this divorce case, there were no relationship between the appellant and respondent No. 1. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any proof regarding illicit relationship of appellant with respondent No. 2. The respondent-husband has also not brought on record any cogent and reliable evidence which could show that appellant and respondent No. 2 are living in adultery. The respondent-husband has also not filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights which would reflect that he was interested to resume conjugal life with the appellant. The respondent-husband has also not explained as to why he has filed second divorce petition with same allegation as records show that before filing of the present divorce petition, the respondent-husband has also filed M.M Case No. 62 of 2009 which was compromised. So far as allegation of adultery is concerned, the record clearly suggests that only in order to make a legal ground in the divorce case, these baseless allegations have been levelled by the respondent-husband."

The High Court in relied on Supreme Court's decision in Samar Ghose vs. Jaya Ghose reported in 2007 (4) SCC 511 that a sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. More trivial irritations, quarrel, normal wear and tear of the married live which happens in day-to-day live would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in case of Narain Ganesh Dastane vs. Sucheta Naraih Dastane reported in, AIR 1975, SC, 1534. The relevant paragraph reads: 
"One other matter which needs to be clarified is that though under Section 10(1) (b), the apprehension of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious to live with the other party has to be reasonable, it is wrong, except in the context of such apprehension, to import the concept of a reasonable man as known to the law of negligence of judging of matrimonial relations. Spouses are undoubtedly supposed and expected to conduct their joint venture as best as they might but it is no function of a court inquring into a charge of cruelty to philosophise on the modalities of married life. Some one may want to keep late hours of finish the day's work and some one may want to get up early for a morning round of golf. The court cannot apply to the habits or hobbies of these the test whether a reasonable man situated similarly will behave in a similar fashion. 'The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an Individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances". The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to draw their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures."

Justice Singh observed:"....it is crystal clear that respondent-husband has failed to prove the cruel behaviour of the appellant towards him and his family members by the strength of cogent, relevant and reliable evidence, while burden of proof of cruelty rests upon the respondent-husband. Not even single incident with reference to specific date of alleged cruelty has been urged in the plaint before the Family Court. Moreover, wife (appellant) is still ready to live with the respondent-husband. Furthermore, alleged certain flimsy act or omission or using some threatening and harsh words may occasionally happen in the day-to-day conjugal life of a husband and wife to retaliate the other spouse but that cannot be a justified/sustainable ground for taking divorce. Some trifling utterance or remarks or mere threatening of one spouse to other cannot be construed as such decree of cruelty, which is legally required to a decree of divorce. The austerity of temper and behaviour, petulance of manner and harshness of language may vary from man to man born and brought up in different family background, living in different standard of life, having their quality of educational qualification and their status in society in which they live. 23. Thus, considering the above entire aspects of this case and evidence adduced on behalf of both the parties, we find that respondent-husband has failed to prove the allegation of cruelty, much less, the decree of cruel behaviour of appellant which is legally required for grant of decree of divorce under section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act." 

The High Court's judgement reads: "24. So far as ground of adultery is concerned, adultery may be defined as the act of a married person having sexual intercourse with a person of opposite gender other than the wife or husband of the person. Under the present Hindu Marriage Act, adultery is laid down as one of the grounds for divorce or judicial separation.....26. The respondent-husband has not brought on record any proof to show that appellant was having illicit relationship with the respondent No. 2 nor he has proved that they were living in adultery and only in order to make a valid ground in the divorce petition, these allegations were levelled against the appellant without any supporting material evidence.

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in a case of murder, criminal conspiracy, disappearance of evidence case

In Vishal Kumar @ Vishal Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria passed a 4-page order dated August 26, 2025, wherein, it set aside the impugned order dated February 28, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court and granted anticipatory bail in a murder case. 

The appellant who has been arraigned as accused in connection with FIR No.437/2023 dated October 19, 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 120B of Indian Penal Code, (IPC) is seeking anticipatory bail. The gist of the prosecution case is that on October 1, 2022 the complainant’s five year old son who was playing in front of the house had been killed by accused person(s) and in the mele the complainant and his wife were also injured. Though the incident occurred on October 1. 2022, the complaint came to be lodged before the jurisdictional court on August 31, 2023 which resulted in registration of the FIR on October 19, 2023. It was not in dispute that there was no post-mortem carried out. As to the complicity of the appellant in the death of the complainant’s son, was an issue which was required to be examined after the prosecution witnesses were examined, namely, as to the actual role played by the appellant, if any.

Section 201 of IPC reads:"Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.—Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false, if a capital offence.—shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment for life.—and if the offence is punishable with 1[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment.—and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both." 

Section 120B of IPC reads: "Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, 1[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.]" 

The Supreme Court observed:"....any examination of the material gathered during the course of investigation by evaluating the same by this court at this stage, would affect the trial. Hence, we do not propose to go into those aspects at this stage and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail.  6. Hence, the appeal stands allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 28.02.2025 and appellant is directed to be enlarged on anticipatory bail." 

In Vishal Kumar @ Vishal Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Singh had passed an order dated February 28, 2025, which reads: "Considering the nature of accusation and other circumstances of the case , prayer for pre – arrest bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected." The petitioner had apprehended his arrest in a case registered for the offence punishable under sections 302, 201 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The prosecution's case is that on the alleged date and time occurrence, while the informant and her five years old son were playing in front of their house, in the meanwhile, all the accused persons including the petitioner came there and co-accused Priyanshu Kumar and the petitioner assaulted son of informant as a result of which he died. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was innocent and had committed no offence. 

On August 18, 2023 one Kunkun Singh, Murari Singh and Niwas Singh came to the house of petitioner and made fire upon Vishal Kumar, the petitioner and his wife due to which they sustained fire arm injury and were taken to Patna medical College Hospital for treatment and thereafter, on August 19, 2023, Khaira PS case of 2023 was lodged by the petitioner against accused persons of the case in which one Mithilesh Singh alias Kunkum Singh was arrested and only in retaliation wife of Mithilesh Singh alias Kunkun Singh lodged the case against petitioner. The counsel for the State and the informant opposed the bail petition and submitted that petitioner was named in the F.I.R., with specific accusation that the petitioner along with other co-accused persons assaulted son of informant as a result of which he died.