Bar Council of India (BCI) withdraws its invalid circular issued under unconstitutional, illegal Clause 28 of Schedule III of BCI Rules of Legal Education, 2008

In Rishabh Duggal & Anr. The Bar Council of India Through its Chairman (2026), Supreme Court's 3-Judge Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana passed a 2-page long order dated November 6, 2026, which reads:"1. Learned counsel for the Bar Council of India has produced a resolution dated 05.11.2026, whereby the earlier passed impugned circular dated 17.09.2016 has been withdrawn. The new resolution dated 05.11.2026 is taken on record. 2. In view of the new resolution dated 05.11.2026, the instant petition is disposed of as having become infructuous. 3. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of." The petitioners had questioned the constitutional and legal basis for determining the maximum age for admission. Under Clause 28 of Schedule III of the BCI Rules of Legal Education, 2008, BCI had prescribed maximum age limits for candidates seeking admission to law programmes. The BCI had withdrawn the provision in 2013 but restored the restrictions through a circular issued in September 2016. Clause 28 had fixed admission to the five-year integrated course at 20 years for general category candidates and 22 years for candidates from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward communities. 

The petitioner had drawn the attention of the Supreme Court towards the decision of the Punjab and Haryana and Bombay High Court which has held the specific clause of BCI Rules to be ultra vires the Advocates Act, 1961. The petitioner had relied on the decision in Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice vs. Bar Council of India, wherein, the Supreme Court struck down a BCI's rule barring enrolment of persons above 45. It is evident that BCI had not read this judgement of the Court. Earlier too, in March 2017, the Supreme Court had stayed the BCI's decision to fix upper age limits for the five-year and three-year courses, the latter at 45 years. It is apparent that BCI erred.  

Prior to this, the Court had passed a 2-page long order dated August 21, 2026, which reads:"1. Ms. Radhika Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent(s)-Bar Council of India seeks and is granted time to have instructions with regard to withdrawal of impugned circular."

Earlier, Court's Division Bench of Justices S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao had passed an order dated March 3, 2017, wherein, it wrote: "....we direct that there shall be stay of the Notification No.BCI:D:1519 (LE:Cir.-6) dated 17.9.2016, issued by the Bar Council of India and all consequential actions taken in pursuance thereof, pending decision of this writ petition." 

In its order dated March 12, 2019, the Division Bench of Justice Bobde and Justice S.K Kaul wrote:"We consider it appropriate in the interest of justice to permit the Bar Council of India to reconsider the age limit after hearing the various stakeholders, including the petitioner."  

The petitioner's challenge stands vindicated. The BCI's upper age limit rules violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution and exceed the BCI's statutory authority under the Advocates Act, 1961. The BCI did not have power to prescribe an upper age limit under the Advocates Act. The Advocates Act, 1961 empowers the BCI to prescribe minimum qualifications and regulate standards of legal education, that power could not automatically be extended to imposing a maximum age for admission. 

The BCI's resolution states that the restriction was withdrawn after a reasoned order by Justice (Retd.) Rajendra Menon, the Co-Chairman of the Legal Education Committee pursuant to a resolution of the Standing Committee on Legal Education. In the light of the Supreme Court's hearing of September 25, 2026, wherein, the Court asked the BCI to ascertain whether it was willing to withdraw the circular which had fixed the age-limit. BCI has realized that an absolute maximum age restriction lacked justification. Existing requirements on qualifications, attendance, teaching hours, examinations and professional training, it said, safeguard standards "without excluding otherwise eligible candidates merely on account of age". 

The Advocates Act, 1961 makes the BCI the regulator of legal education. Section 7(1)(h) directs it to promote legal education and lay down standards, in consultation with universities and State Bar Councils. Section 7(1)(i) allows it to recognise the universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment as an advocate, and inspect them. Section 49(1) is the rule-making power. Clause (d) covers the standards of legal education universities must follow, and clause (af), inserted in 1973, covers the minimum qualifications required for admission to a course of degree in law in any recognised university. The text of the bare Act has provision for minimum qualifications but not for age. 

Notably, withdrawal of the BCI's circular dated September 17, 2016 implies that Clause 28 of Schedule III of the BCI Rules of Legal Education, 2008 is invalid. BCI is under legal obligation to make necessary amendment in its Rules to settle the law for good. Madras High Court which had upheld the circular fixing the age for admission to law courses issued under the Rules ought to set the record straight at the earliest. 

On September 25, 2026, the Court had asked the Bar Council of India (BCI) as to whether it was willing to reconsider or withdraw its resolution prescribing an upper age limit for admission to law degree courses. 

 

 

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside judgment by Patna High Court's Justice Vinod Chandran led Division Bench, quashes 2019 Amendment Notification

In Samiullah vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Joymalya Baghci delivered a 34-page long judgement dated November 7, 2025, wherein it set aside the 21-page long judgement dated February 9, 2024 in Amod Bihari Sinha vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Registration Excise and Prohibition Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2024) by Patna High Court's Division of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and Rajiv Roy and quashed the Notification of 2019. The Court's judgement was authored by Justice Vinod Chandran. 

The High Court had heard the case of Amod Bihari Sinha along with the cases of Samiullah, Umesh Kumar, Rakesh Kumar, Deepak Kumar Singh and Avinash. The petitioners in the High Court filed the writ petitions to challenge the addition of sub-rule (xvii) and (xviii) to Rule 19 of the Bihar Registration Rules, 2008. It was argued that the same was ultra vires the Registration Act, 1908, and beyond the scope of clauses (a) and (aa) of sub-section (1) of Section 69. Justice Vinod Chandran had concluded: "25. We find absolutely no reason to interfere with the amendment incorporated. We reject the writ petitions."

Reversing High Court's judgement, the Supreme Court has concluded:"....we have no hesitation in concluding that the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 or any other provisions of the Act", the Registration Act, 1908. It observed: "...Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), as referred to and relied on by the Government to frame the impugned sub-rules. These provisions only relate to the power of Inspector General of Registration to frame rules for “safe custody of books, papers and documents” and also for “providing the manner in which and safeguards subject to which books may be kept in …. electronic form.” Equally, Section 69(1)(j) also does not legitimize making of the impugned sub-rules, as it only enables making of rules for “generally regulating the proceedings of registrars and sub-registrars”. 

The judgement reads:"23. A detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the Act, coupled with Sections 21 and 22 and also Section 69(1)(h) read with Sections 55(3), do not indicate anything as assumed by the High Court. At the same time a detailed examination of Sections 21, 22 and 55(3) only evidences the requirement of sufficient description to property. All these requirements are intended only to identify the property and for this purpose the provisions enable reference to maps, plans or surveys, if practicable. The reality is that, none of these provisions require reference to or production of proof of mutation in the name of the owner. That is to say, the provision does not relate to the right of disposition of the executant in respect of a property which is otherwise physically identifiable. The power to make the impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) cannot be traced to these provisions."

Supreme Court observed:"17. Interestingly, while the notification introducing impugned sub-rules 19 (xvii) and (xviii) sources the power of making it to Section 69(1)(a) and (aa), the High Court came to the conclusion that the power to introduce sub-rules (xvii) and (xviii) of Rule 19 is not relatable to 69(1)(a) and (aa). High Court, however, traced the power to make the impugned sub-rules to Section 69(1)(h) and Section 55 (3), read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, or in the alternative to the Inspector General’s general rule-making power under Section 69(1)(j). We will now refer to these provisions and at the same time consider other provisions of the Act to examine the legality and authority of sub-rules 19(xvii) and (xviii)."