Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya sets aside perverse judgment, decree of 2010 passed by Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara in a Money Suit of 1999

In Priyadarshi Rameshwar Construction Company (P) Ltd. vs.  State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 24-page long judgement dated April 8, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" this Court finds that it is an admitted and undisputed position that the appellant/plaintiff had duly executed and completed the contractual work entrusted to him in the year 2016 within the stipulated time and had thereafter raised the requisite bills in accordance with the terms of the contract. It is further not in dispute that the respondents failed to release the admitted dues within a reasonable period and ultimately made payment only in the year 2023, i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly seven years. The sole defence sought to be advanced by the respondents, both before the court below and in the present proceedings, is that the agreement does not contain any specific clause providing for payment of interest on delayed disbursement. However, such a contention cannot be countenanced in law, inasmuch as it is well settled that the State and its instrumentalities are under a constitutional obligation to act fairly, reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner in all contractual dealings. The failure to release legitimate dues for an unduly prolonged period, without any cogent justification, amounts to arbitrary withholding of money lawfully due and payable, thereby entitling the claimant to reasonable compensation by way of interest." Notably, Rameshwar Tiwary, the Director of the company in question argued the case in person.

Justice Malviya observed: "In the present case, the appellant has discharged his initial burden, whereas the respondents have failed to adduce any evidence in rebuttal. The learned Trial Court has thus erred in law in placing undue emphasis on technical deficiencies while ignoring substantive evidence on record. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are therefore perverse, being based on non-consideration of material evidence and misapplication of legal principles. 25. The appellant, having established execution of work and corresponding liability of the respondents, is also legally entitled to interest on the decretal amount, both on equitable and statutory considerations. It is well settled that where a party is deprived of the use of money lawfully due to him, interest is payable by way of compensation for such deprivation."

This First Appeal was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the judgment and decree dated April 3, 2010 passed by the Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara (Trial Court) in Money Suit No. 04 of 1999 wherein the plaintiff/appellant’s suit for money claim arose out of contract/agreement was dismissed by the Trial Court. The High Court's judgement does not mention the name of the judge of the trial court in question.  

In pursuance of tenders invited by the State Government the plaintiff/appellant, Priyadarshi Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, which registered Companies Act, 1956 was awarded 15 separate works for which independent agreements were executed with the concerned departments. 

The plaintiff/appellant duly executed the works with due diligence and in accordance with contractual stipulations to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, whereupon the works were measured, verified, and recorded in the departmental records and part payments were released from time to time. However, certain works were discontinued midway by the defendants on account of administrative constraints, including non-availability of funds, though the works already executed were duly accepted; nevertheless, despite completion and acceptance of the works, a substantial amount remained outstanding and payable to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding repeated demands and representations, including those made pursuant to directions issued in earlier writ proceedings, the defendants failed and neglected to release the admitted dues and rejected the claims on arbitrary and untenable grounds; consequently, the plaintiff was constrained to serve a statutory notice under Section 80 of the CPC and, upon expiry of the prescribed period without compliance, had instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 17,40,989/- towards the outstanding dues. 

The Trial Court had framed following issues for determination:
I. Whether the suit of plaintiff is maintainable as framed?
II. Have the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit?
III. Whether the plaintiff has served the notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the defendants.
IV. Whether plaintiff is entitle for the decree of of amount claimed by him?
V. Whether the plaintiff is entitle to get the relief and other reliefs as claimed under plaint?

The other eighteen respondents in the High Court were: Secretary/Commissioner, Water Resource Department, Engineer-In-Chief, Water Resource Department, Managing Director, Bihar State Construction Corporation Ltd., Anishabad, Patna, Chief Engineer, Water Resource Department, Dehri-On-Sone, Rohtas, Chief Engineer Water Resource Department, Aurangabad, Superintending Engineer, Sone Canal Circle, Ara, Bhojpur,  Superintending Engineer Flood Control Circle, Buxar, Superintending Engineer, North Koal Canal Circle, Gaya, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division No. 2, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Sone Canal Division, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division, Buxar, Executive Engineer, North Koal Canal Division Goh, Aurangabad, Commissioner/Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department, Patna, Co-Ordinator/Chief Engineer, Tube-Well Project, Patna, 16. Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division, Patna West Bihta, Patna and  Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division Ara, Bhojpur. 

Justice Malviya added:"30. This Court is of the considered opinion that the absence of an express stipulation in the contract for payment of interest does not ipso facto disentitle the appellant from claiming the same, particularly where the delay is wholly attributable to the respondents and is neither justified nor explained by any acceptable material. A contractor entering into an agreement with the Government legitimately expects that payments for completed works would be made within a reasonable time, and while some administrative delay may be anticipated, a delay extending to seven years is per se unreasonable, arbitrary, and violative of settled principles of fairness in State action. The appellant cannot be made to suffer for lapses on the part of the authorities, and the retention of his dues for such a prolonged period confers an unjust enrichment upon the respondents. Accordingly, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to be compensated for the delayed payment by way of reasonable interest, notwithstanding the absence of a contractual clause, and the contrary finding, if any, recorded by the learned court below cannot be sustained in the eye of law."

The judgement reads:"31. Accordingly, the point for determination framed by this Court is answered in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants and against the defendants/respondents. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the settled legal position, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to interest on the decretal amount. The impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court, to the extent it denies such interest, is unsustainable in law and is hereby set aside."  

Justice Malviya pointed out that the Appellate Court has the discretionary power to admit the additional evidence, primarily to prevent the miscarriage of justice and when the evidence is crucial for a just judgment. Notably, it is well settled law that a First Appellate Court has wide powers to re-appreciate evidence provided under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC. He noted that the entire Trial Court record it was apparent that the document proposed to include as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 was on record before the Trial Court but the same was not exhibited by the Trial Court. So, the documents are fit to be exhibited as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the CPC.

In this regard, Justice Malviya relied on t he judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 SC 1526. It held: “The Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence, not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment, but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may be cases where the Court finds that it is able to pronounce a judgment on record as it is, and cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that, in the interests of justice, something which remains obscure should be filled up, so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner, Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for only substantial cause under Rule 27.” 

The High Court observed: "19. It is also well settled that once execution of work is established and the same has been accepted by the department, the liability to make payment necessarily follows. It would be unreasonable to deny payment for the work actually done. The State cannot take advantage of its own wrong and refuse to pay for work executed." 

In State of West Bengal vs. B.K. Mondal & Sons, reported in AIR 1962 SC 779 observed:“if a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation”. 

The High Court observed that "the aforesaid principle, embodied under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, clearly applies where the State derives benefit from work executed." 

In A.T. Brij Paul Singh vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1703, the Supreme Court held: “11. Now if it is well-established that the respondent was guilty of breach of contract in as much as the recission of contract by the respondent is held to be unjustified, and the plaintiff-contractor had executed a part of the works contract, the contractor would be entitled to damages by way of loss of profit, Adopting the measure accepted by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case between the same parties and for the same type of work at 15% of the value of the remaining parts of the work contract, the damages for loss of profit can be measured.” 

In State of Rajasthan and Anr. vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2009) 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed that once execution of work is established and accepted, the contractor becomes entitled to payment in accordance with law. In the present case, the M.B. entries, duly verified by competent authorities, clearly establish execution of work and corresponding liability. The respondents, having failed to rebut such evidence, cannot deny payment, as the same would amount to unjust enrichment. In furtherance thereto, it is well settled that though the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case, once prima facie evidence is adduced, the burden shifts upon the defendant.

Justice Malviya referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Ibrahim Uddin and Anr., reported (2012) 8 SCC 148, wherein, it observed that a party cannot succeed on the weakness of the defence; however, once sufficient evidence is produced, the burden shifts on the opposite party to rebut the same. 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa vs. G.C. Roy, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 508  “33. In the case before us, admittedly the contract does not provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price became payable on June 7, 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram which related to an arbitration proceeding, under Sub-section (2) of Section 61, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold. On this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7, 1958 is justified.”

In Alok Shanker Pandey vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1198, the Supreme Court observed: “9. It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B 10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned
interest on it for this period. Hence, equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B. 

Justice Malviya observed: "28. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the appellant had executed the work and the same was duly recorded in official documents; however, despite such execution and acknowledgment, the respondents failed to release the admitted dues, thereby unjustly retaining the amount and depriving the appellant of its lawful use. Such retention of money by the State amounts to unjust enrichment and warrants compensation by way of interest. Further, under Section 34 of the CPC, the Court is empowered to award reasonable interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of institution of the suit till realization. The grant of interest, therefore, is not only equitable but also statutorily recognized." 

Justice Jitendra Kumar quashes order by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Naugachhia, Bhagalpur

In Lalan Prasad Singh vs. The State Of Bihar through The Principal Secretary., Food And Civil Supply (2026), Justice Jitendra Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated April, 7, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"41. . Hence, I find that learned Executive Magistrate has initiated the proceeding without any jurisdiction. There was no occasion for the Executive Magistrate to initiate proceeding against the petitioner under Section 107 Cr.PC. Learned Executive Magistrate, under the guise of acting within its authority/jurisdiction has transcended his authority/jurisdiction. The petitioner should have been prosecuted for the substantive offence alleged committed by him. 42. Initiation of proceeding under Section 107 Cr.PC against the petitioner is nothing but infringement/curtailment of fundamental right of liberty of the petitioner as granted and granting by the Constitution under Article 21. The life and liberty of a citizen cannot be allowed to be curtailed or restricted in a manner as done by the Executive Magistrate. Therefore, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is duty bound to entertain the writ petition and quash the proceeding. 43. Hence, by resort to writ of certiorari, the entire proceeding initiated under Section 107 Cr.PC vide order dated 03.04.2021, passed by learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Naugachhia, Bhagalpur in Case No. 437 of 2021 is quashed. The present petition stands allowed, accordingly."

The judgment reads: "Learned Registrar General is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court of learned Executive Magistrate concerned. Learned Registrar General is also directed to send a copy of this order to Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar for circulating this order amongst the Executive Magistrates for their information."

The judgement reads:"....on scrutiny of the alleged facts and circumstances against the petitioner, it clearly transpires that at most the petitioner has committed substantive offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code and hence, he should have been prosecuted for such offences. There was no allegation of any overt-act which could give apprehension of breach of public peace and tranquility. It has been already found that Section 107 Cr.PC is preventive in nature and not punitive. If the petitioner or accused had committed any offence, he could have been prosecuted, but on the basis of the offence committed, the learned Executive Magistrate had no occasion to initiate proceeding under Section 107 Cr.PC which confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the Executive Magistrate for taking preventive measure to maintain public peace and it has been already shown that public peace is much wider concept. For application of the provisions under Section 107 Cr.PC, there must be allegation of overt-act which may lead to breach of public peace affecting the public at large. Only on account of the fear under which some individuals may be living due to threat being extended by the petitioner does not mean that would lead to breach of public peace. 

The other 10 respondents were:  Director, Food and Civil Supply Department, Government of Bihar,  Information and Technology Department, Government of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Bhagalpur, District Food Supply Officer, Bhagalpur, Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Rural), Naugachchiya Bhagalpur, Sub-Divisional Officer-cum- Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Naugachchia, Bhagalpur, Officer-in-charge, Naugachchia, lock Marketing Officer, Naugachchia, Bhagalpur and  Assistant District Supply Officer, Naugachchia, Bhagalpur. 

The criminal writ petition was preferred by the petitioner to seek quashing of the entire proceeding in Case No. 437 of 2021 initiated vide order dated April 3, 2021 passed by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Naugachhia, Bhagalpur under Section 107 Cr.PC.

Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava condones delay of 753 days in NDPS case against Nav Kumar Ojha

In Nav Kumar Ojha vs. The Union of India through the Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Patna, Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava passed a 2-page long order dated March 31, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay of 753 days. The order reads:"5. This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 753 days in filing the present appeal. 6. It is stated in the application that the delay has occurred because of long custody of the appellant in jail, he had lost his entire source of earning and his wife was ill. 7. Having regard to the reasons shown and there being no opposition to the application for condonation of delay, we condone the delay. 8. I.A. No.1 of 2025 is allowed." 

Dr. Gopal Krishna, the Advocate of the petitioner had informed the court that the three convicts, namely, Nav Kumar Ojha, Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda were convicted in the same NDPS case by the trial court. The case of Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda (Cr. App. (DB) 629 of 2023) and that of Nav Kumar Ojha Cr. App. (DB) 1014 of 2025 are before the same bench of the High Court. In this regard, the Court's order reads: "9. It is informed that the present appeal is connected with Cr. Appeal (DB) No.629 of 2023, which is an admitted matter and listed under the heading ‘For Hearing’ in the today’s cause list. 10.  Taking note of the above information, we admit this appeal and direct to tag the present appeal with Cr. Appeal (DB) No.629 of 2023. This appeal shall be listed simultaneously with the said appeal under the same heading."

The FIR in this case was filed on February 2, 2021. On an earlier occasion the Court was informed Pritam Lakra, the petitioner "has clean antecedent and he has falsely been implicated in the present case. He further submits that it appears from the F.I.R. as well as seizure list that nothing has been recovered from conscious possession of the petitioner rather the recovery has been made from the truck in question. He further submits that the petitioner is the cleaner of the truck in question and he has no concern at all with the alleged recovery of contraband." This aspect is recorded in the High Court's 3-page long order dated June 20, 2023.  

The NDPS Case No. 6/2021 State of Bihar vs. Shankar Yadav, Pritam Lakda, Bijendra Kumar Ray and Navkumar Ojha was filed and registered on February 3, 2021 with CNR No. BRBJ010020032021 before the District and Sessions Judge Division. Initially,  the case was transferred from Court No. 1 of Principal District and Sessions Judge to Court No. 5 of District and Additional Sessions Judge-II on January 10, 2022 and subsequently, it was transferred from to Court No. 8 of Additional Sessions Judge-III on March 26, 2022 and finally it was transferred to Court No.11 of Additional Sessions Judge-VIII on August 29, 2022. It was Court No.11 of Additional Sessions Judge-VIII which delivered the judgement dated May 9, 2023 and order dated May 17, 2023.   

The first hearing in the case took place on  April 3, 2021, which recorded that final form/Chargesheet is awaited. It waited for it on May 31, 2021 and July 3, 2021 as well. The order dated September 4, 2021 recorded that Charge sheet was received. The case was taken up for hearing on September 23, 2021. Upon hearing, the order dated October 27, 2021 and November 24, 2021 recorded that "PO has been transferred." The order dated December 23, 2021 recorded that "PO is on C.L." The order dated January 10, 2022 recorded "cognizance is taken". The order dated January 20, 2022 recorded: "Charge Framed".  The order dated February 4, 2022 recorded:"Witness Examined". The order dated February 9, 2022 recorded:"Paramhansh Kumar Witness Examined". The order dated February 14, 2022 recorded: "Witness Examined." During April 2, 2022-February 3, 2023 hearing was conducted for evidence. The arguments were submitted during February 6, 2023-March 28, 2023.  The proceedings for judgement conducted on April 5, 2023, April 19, 2023 and May 1, 2023. The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2023 and the sentencing order was passed on May 17, 2023.

The bail application of Bijendra Kumar Rai and Pritam Lakda was rejected by Court of Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara on November 1, 2021. It is not clear from  the records as to whether Bijendra Kumar Rai had appealed in the High Court against the order of the Court of Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara. His case was argued by Bhuneshwar Tiwari and Sudhir Ji Sahaye. The Rana Pratap Singh was the public prosecutor. Pritam Lakra had appealed in the High Court against the order of the Court of Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara without success.        

An application for regular bail of Shankar Yadav was filed on August 2-August, 2022 in the High Court. It was registered on August 23, 2022. It was dismissed as withdrawn. Prior to this Justice Arun Kumar Jha had passed an order dated December 20, 2022. The order reads: "Call for a report regarding the present stage of trial as well as time likely to be taken up in conclusion of the trial from the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Bhojpur(Ara), in connection with N.D.P.S. Case No. 06 of 2021 arising out of N.C.B. Case No. 01 of 2021, so as to reach this Court within a period of four weeks. List this case after receipt of the report." Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar passed an order dated February 13, 2023 reads: "In view of the report of the trial court, charge has been framed and the case has been put for evidence. On the above ground, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this application. Permission is accorded. This application stands dismissed as withdrawn."  The bail application of both Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda was filed separately. Both were rejected by the High Court. Nav Kumar Ojha did file for bail application in the Court of Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara. For 753 days, Ojha did not file any appeal in the High Court against his conviction because he is in custody since February 2, 2021, he lost his entire source of earning and his wife was extremely unwell.

Notably, the Court of Sessions Judge Bhojpur, Ara had passed a 1-page long order September 7, 2022 in Bijendra Kumar Ray vs. State of Bihar Criminal Miscellaneous No. 54 of 2022 reads: "None turned up on call. Perused the record. This is a criminal miscellaneous petition filed for transfer of NDPS Case No. 06 of 2021 from the court of Addl. Sess. Judge-3rd, Ara to any other court of the competent jurisdiction on the ground that the court of ADJ- 3rd is lying vacant and the accused petitioner is in jail! custody. On perusal of the CIS entry with respect to the said NDPS case goes to show that the said case has already been transferred from the said court to the court of ADJ-8th, Ara. Thus, this miscellaneous petition has become infructuous. now Hence this criminal miscellaneous petition stands dismissed on being infructuous." Bijendra Kumar Ray's Advocate was Viswanath Pathak had filed the case under Section 408 of Criminal Procedure Code. The case was filed on August 8, 2022 with CNR No. BRBJ010099342022 The first hearing happened on August 16, 2022, wherein it was heard for the purpose of admission. The court called for Lower Court Record. The counsel for the petitioner sought adjournment August 22, 2022. The date of decision was September 7, 2022. The case was disposed of uncontested as dismissed. This criminal miscellaneous is was dismissed as infructuous.

The cover page of paper book prepared by the High Court's Registry refers to 4-page complaint petition filed on July 28, 2021 against Bijendra Kumar Ray, Nav Kumar Ojha, Shankar Yadav and Pritam Lakda. The list of exhibits provided in the judgment of the trial court states that the compliant petition is 26-page long. The trial court's front page states that FIR was registered on February 2, 2021. The paper book does not have the copy of the FIR. The complaint petition provided as part of the annexures to the exibits does not refer to the FIR. for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 20(b) (ii) (c), 25 and 29 of NDPS Act. The N.C.B. Case No. NCB/PZU/V/01/2021 was registered on February 2, 2021, the date of the seizure of the truck at Koilwar-Chapra More, Bhojpur. The Annexure No. II of the complaint petition which has the list of witnesses seems to be missing. The front page of trial court's judgment refers to complaint petition i.e. pariwad patra  as "aarop patra". On its front page of the judgement, the date of judgement is rightly mentioned as May 9, 2023 but it incorrectly mentioned the date of sentencing order as May 17, 2022. The latter has been rectified in compliance with the order dated March 13, 2026 by the High Court's Division Bench.      

The application for regular bail filed by Pritam Lakda on November 2, 2022 and registered on November 29, 2022. Drawing on Supreme Court's decisions in State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Rajesh & Ors, reported in 2020 (12) SCC 122, and Narcotic Control Bureau vs. Mohit Aggarwal, reported in AIR 2022 SC 3444 and Union of India vs. Ajay Kumar Singh @ Pappu SLP (CRL) No.2351 of 2023 dated March 28, 2023, Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had rejected the bail by his 3-page long order dated June 20, 2023, under the wrong assumption that "N.D.P.S Case No.6/2021, arising out of N.C.B. Case No. NCB/PZU/V/01/2021 pending in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Bhojpur, Ara." Justice remained oblivious of the fact that the judgement was delivered on May 9, 2023 and the sentencing order was passed on May 17, 2023.   

Notably, Bijendra Kumar Ray, the recipient of the Ganja in question has been acquitted by the trial court. No case has been registered against Sundar Rao and Damu, the suppliers of Ganja from Koraput, Odisha. Their names are mentioned in the complaint petition. The complaint petition mentions the name of Narad from Uttar Pradesh but does not explain his role.  All the four have been acquitted of charges under Section  29 of NDPS Act, which pertains to criminal conspiracy by the trial court vide its 84-page judgement and order dated May 9 and May 17, 2023 respectively.    

Policy Brief makes a case for UN Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Reactors after entry into force of UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to prevent ecocide

Amid ongoing war which has disrupted the global supply chain and an imminent assault on nuclear reactors, the policy brief focuses on multiple notions of water security in the context of Himalayan nuclear ecosystem. It explores the question as to whether time has come to adopt a UN treaty on the prohibition of nuclear reactors as well now that the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has come into force. The water footprint of 12, 241 nuclear weapons, 2, 000 nuclear tests including underwater testing and 495 nuclear reactors assumes significance for ensuring comprehensive water security in general and in the Himalayan region in particular.

Out of the nine nuclear weapon owning countries, three are in this region. Among these three countries, China has 600, India has 180 and Pakistan has 170 nuclear warheads in their inventory. As of 2024, 31 countries worldwide are operating 417 nuclear reactors for electricity generation and 62 nuclear power reactors are under construction. India has 21 nuclear reactors, reactors are under construction and 4 reactors are in status suspended operation. In Bihar, under the Nuclear Power Mission announced in the Union Budget 2025-26, one nuclear reactor has been proposed at Rajauli in Nawada district. Besides the one proposed in Bihar, the nuclear plant in Narora, Bulandsahar, Uttar Pradesh and the upcoming two units of nuclear plants in Rooppur, Pabna, Bangladesh have grave implications for water security and health security in the Ganga river basin. There are six operating nuclear power plants in Pakistan and one under construction. Two nuclear power reactors are under construction in Bangladesh. China has 57 nuclear power reactors and 29 are under construction. The top three producers of nuclear electricity in 2023 were the US, China and France. 

The policy brief makes a case for tracking environmental and occupational exposure in civilian and non-civilian nuclear sites. It draws on the definition of “nuclear material” and “nuclear damage” in India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 and water and waste related provisions under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which have been repealed by The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025. It is essential for effective preventive policy interventions to factor in water footprint of civilian and non-civilian nuclear activities to ensure comprehensive water security of human and non-human beings beyond anthropocentric national security narrative around it. 

This policy brief makes a case for preventing any nuclear incident which may induce point source non-point source of radioactive contamination in surface, ground water bodies, and other water resources. It makes a case for study of the impact of nuclear contaminated water on human beings, animals, plants and crops. It stresses the necessity for legal remedy based on independent assessment factoring in World Health Organisation (WHO), agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this backdrop, the policy brief provides an outline for Himalayan river basin security which is essential for ensuring complete justice from the perspective of environmental security, food security, epidemiological security, and security of life. The policy brief is available at: http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Security_Studies_2025/Policy_Brief_Gopal_Krishna.pdf

Justice Soni Shrivastava as part of Division Bench sets aside judegment of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur

In Md Quarban vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"42. All these inconsistencies and conflicting versions of the prosecution case which is apparent from the deposition of the prosecution witness render the prosecution case considerably doubtful. The failure of the prosecution to prove the foundational facts with regard to age and sexual assault makes the entire edifice of the prosecution crumble against the weight of evidence." The judgement was authored by Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

Justice Shrivastava added: "43. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on account of all the foregoing reasons, including the consideration of several missing links and loopholes in the case of the prosecution, we come to a clear finding that the circumstances and evidence on which the conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, has not been fully established and the appellant is entitled to be extended benefit of doubt, inasmuch as, the prosecution hasmiserably failed to prove its case by adducing credible and trustworthy evidence. 44. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances and also taking into account the overall perspective and the entire conspectus, it would be extremely unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant, as such, the finding of conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable and requires interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 18.03.2023 and the order of sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No.35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No.361 of 2018, is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. 45. The appellant, who is said to be in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case."  

The appeal was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated March 18, 2023 and the order of sentence dated March 22, 2023 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No. 35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No. 361 of 2018. 3. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted and was sentenced for the offences punishable under Section 363, IPC for rigorous Imprisonment for seven years along with fine of Rs. 50,000/, Section 341 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year or fine of Rs. 500/, Section 323 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/, Section 504 IPC for rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/ and Section 4 of POCSO Act for rigorous imprisonment for 20 years along with fine of Rs. 1 lakh.

The prosecution case based on the written report of the informant alleged that the minor daughter (aged about 14 years) of the informant had gone for her tuition classes 15 days back, but did not return. He frantically searched for his daughter but did not get to know of her whereabouts. When he could not find out anything even from his relatives, he gave the written application on December 28, 2018 before police.
Based on the written application, a Sabour P.S. Case was registered against unknown for the offences punishable under sections 363 and 365 of IPC. After investigation supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the present appellant under sections 366A, 376, 341, 323, 504, 506, 427/34 of the IPC and section 6/8 of POCSO Act, whereafter cognizance was also taken under these provisions by the Special Court POCSO, Bhagalpur. 

The trial Court on August 10, 2021, framed the charges against the appellant under sections 341, 323, 376, 366 A, 427 of IPC and 4 and 8 of POCSO Act and the same were explained to him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case examined as many as five witnesses and exhibited some documents on its behalf. The trial court decided the primary issue relating to the minority of the victim and recorded the fact that while the victim’s age was disclosed as 14 years in both the FIR and the statement of the victim under section 164 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate had assessed her age as 15 years. The medical report indicated her age to be between 16 to 18 years. The date of birth of the victim as per her Registration Card in the Bihar School Examination Board was recorded as January 25, 2004. It reached the conclusion that the victim was undoubtedly a minor on the basis of the document.

The trial court has thus concluded that the solitary evidence of the victim itself was sufficient for proving the guilt of the accused and since there are no apparent contradictions in the prosecution evidence to doubt the veracity of the same, the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts. However, while holding that the case was proved under sections 323, 341, 376, 504 of the IPC along with section 4 of the POCSO Act and additionally finding the case to be proved under section 363 IPC also (under which no charge was framed), the accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges under Section 427, 506, 366 A of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act as the same was held to be not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "28. After having analysed the trend of evidence as disclosed by the victim (PW3), it would be difficult to place her in the category of ‘sterling witness’ whose evidence would be complete and sufficient in itself to base a conviction, as such, the evidence of victim (PW3) must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well-settled legal principles as established by law in a catena of decisions." 

She drew on Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein, it said “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

This view was further reiterated by a 3-Judgebench of the Supreme Court in Nirmal Prem Kumar & Anr. vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2024 INSC 193) Cr. Appeal No. 1098 of 2024 disposed off on March 11, 2024.

The High Court's judgment took note of the inordinate delay of 15 days in lodging the FIR. 

Justice Shrivastava  observed: "This fact compels this court to take a view that there is something more in this case that meets the eye, as no father whose daughter went missing or was kidnapped would wait for fifteen days for lodging an FIR. Further, the medical examination of the victim conducted by the medical officer (PW4) reveals that there was no physical or chemical injury on her body including her private parts and upon pathological investigation no spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal swab, however the urine pregnancy test was found positive. 31. Her age was assessed between 16 to 18 years but no evidence of any recent sexual assault has been noted by the doctor, thereby making it abundantly clear that even the medical report (Ext. P1)does not stand in support of the contentions of the victim. Merely because the pregnancy test was found to be positive, it would not lead us to the irresistible conclusion that the entire prosecution story narrated against the appellant has an element of truth and there could be other reasons, including one of consensual sexual relation, leading to the pregnancy of the victim. 32. The issue of a consensual sexual relation brings us to the crucial question as to whether the victim was actually a minor and whether her age determination was done in consonance with the procedure laid down under Section 94 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. With regard to the minority of the victim, the only document which has been brought on record is the Registration Card (Exhibit- P4) issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 25.01.2004. This document has been proved and marked as Exhibit P4 by the victim herself and no other evidence has been adduced in support of the said document. Neither the school admission register has been produced nor the headmaster of the concerned school has been brought forward for examination in order to lend support to the case of the victim that she was a minor at the relevant period. Further, the fact that all the witnesses including the I.O., have maintained a curious and suspicious silence on the aspect of age of the alleged rape victim, is very intriguing and raises considerable doubt in the mind of this court with regard to the minority of the victim. None of the victim’s family members i.e. her sister or her father, have mentioned a word about the age of the victim in their deposition made in the Court. The victim too has remained effectively silent on the said aspect and only on recall for recording further examination-in-chief after about 10 months of her cross-examination, she produced the above-mentioned Registration Card which was marked as Exhibit-P4. Such evidence may be
admissible but its evidentiary value, in the entire scenario, gets lost, especially in absence of any supporting evidence and non-examination of the maker of the said document to vouchsafe of the contents thereof. Exhibit-4 did not form part of the charge-sheet and the police papers supplied to the accused."

She added, " Since the determination of age has not been done in accordance with law and there is no other evidence, much less clinching, to establish the minority of the victim, this court would go on to consider the medical evidence whereby the doctor has assessed her age to be between 16 and 18 year

In Ram Suresh Singh versus Prabhat Singh and Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681 and Om Prakash versus the State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 201, the Supreme Court took a view that radiological examination for purpose of age determination was not very reliable and there was always a possibility of an error of plus and minus two years. 

In Rajak Mohammad vs. H.P, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, the court laid down that the age determination on the basis of radiological examination may not be accurate determination and thus sufficient margin on either side has to be allowed. The judgment reads: “9. While it is correct that the age determined on the basis of a radiological examination may not be an accurate determination and sufficient margin either way has to be allowed, yet the totality of the facts stated above read with the report of the radiological examination leaves room for ample doubt with regard to the correct age of the prosecutrix. The benefit of the aforesaid doubt, naturally, must go in favour of the accused.”

In Santosh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, the Court held that solitary version of prosecutrix in a case under Section 376 of the IPC, was not to be taken as gospel truth in absence of any other supporting or corroborative evidence. It had also considered the factum of delay in lodging of the First Information Report as also the fact that the medical report of the victim did not support the allegations made by her and considering all these facts cumulatively, the accused was acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt.

Justice Shrivastava observed: "40. Similarly, in the present case in view of the fact that the victim has been giving vacillating statements with regard to the manner of occurrence and these inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative significantly undermines the credibility of the prosecution version and takes away the veracity of the evidence of the victim. We also take into consideration the fact that there is total want of evidence on record to corroborate the case of the victim and it appears that for the reasons best known to the prosecution, material witnesses who could have shed some light on correct facts have also been withheld. 41. The cloud of doubt upon the entire prosecution case starts form the very inception as the informant (PW2) did not lodge an FIR upto fifteen days of her daughter being allegedly kidnapped which is not a normal phenomenon. Moving further, the factum of non-raising of alarm by victim while being forcibly taken away on a motorcycle points towards a probability of a consensual act with no resistance offered at the end of the victim. The age of the appellant at the relevant period being about 19 years i.e., of the same age group as the victim, further contributes to such a probability. The evidence of both the father and the sister of the victim during trial failed to lend support to the case of the prosecution. PW1, the sister of the victim, rather stands out as she has deposed no incident happened in her presence which is absolutely contradictory to the story as propounded by the victim." Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the appeal.

Show Cause Notice can be challenged directly in High Court in exceptional cases: Supreme Court

In J. Sri Nisha  vs. The Special Director, Adjudicating Authority, Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 1, 2026, wherein, it concluded:”....the Adjudicating Authority has undone the order of the Competent Authority even while the appeal against the said order is pending. Such a course of action, in the opinion of this Court, tantamounts to abdicating the powers of the Appellate Authority, even when the order of the Competent Authority was still under challenge in appeal at the instance of the department." The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta.

It added: "39. In wake of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 23rd July, 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court and so also the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 30th November, 2023, rejecting the writ petition preferred by the appellants and as a consequence, the final order dated 26th August, 2024 passed by the Adjudicating Authority imposing penalty and ordering confiscation of the property held by appellants are declared to be arbitrary and contrary to law. The same are hereby set aside. The proceedings are revived from the stage of the SCN." 

The Division Bench concluded: "40. As an upshot, we provide that the Appellate Authority shall first decide the appeal preferred by the Department against the order of the Competent Authority under Section 37A(5) of FEMA after hearing the parties and by passing a reasoned order within a period of two months from today. Pursuant to the disposal of the appeal pending before the Appellate Authority, the proceedings arising out of the SCN may be commenced and shall be taken to their logical conclusion without being prejudiced by any of the observations made hereinabove or in the orders passed by the High Court. 41. The appeals are disposed of in these terms."

These appeals arose out of the common judgment and final order dated July 23, 2024 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The appellants had approached the Single Judge of the High Court, assailing the order/show cause notice (SCN) dated December 22, 2021 issued by the Adjudicating Authority under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999, and the consequential corrigendum dated March 13, 2023. The writ petitions instituted by the appellants assailing the said SCN and corrigendum came to be dismissed by the Single Judge vide common final order dated 30th November, 2023. The intra-Court appeals preferred against the said order was also rejected by the impugned judgment dated July 23, 2024. The appellants approached the Supreme Court.  

The controversy in the present cases is more appropriately examined within the framework of sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 37A. A plain reading of Section 37A(1) indicates that the power of seizure was predicated upon the existence of a “reason to believe” that foreign exchange, foreign security or immovable property situated outside India was suspected to have been held in contravention of Section 4. Such satisfaction by the Authorised Officer at the stage of preliminary seizure under Sub-section (1) is only tentative and is expressly subject to scrutiny under Sub-sections (2) and (3), wherein the Competent Authority is required to independently examine whether the reasons recorded justify continuation of the seizure. The exercise undertaken by the Competent Authority was thus not an empty formality, but a substantive evaluation of whether the material on record was sufficient to sustain even a prima facie inference of contravention in relation to foreign exchange. In the present case, upon such evaluation, the Competent Authority declined to confirm the seizure by a well-reasoned order, thereby indicating that the material did not meet even this preliminary threshold. The refusal to confirm the seizure, therefore, reflects a considered finding that the foundational requirement of a “reason to believe” was not satisfied on the material available.

The Supreme Court observed: "....a prima facie satisfaction was recorded by the Competent Authority that there was no evidence of the appellants being involved in foreign security transactions having any value. Consequently, it has to be taken that there did not exist the “reasons to believe” referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 37A. These findings definitely support the cause of the appellants herein. It is not in dispute that the appeal preferred by the Department against the order dated 3rd February, 2021, is still pending consideration. The Division Bench of the High Court, while deciding the writ appeal, observed that the writ petition against the SCN is not entertainable. We feel that the said observation may not be correct in every situation. This Court has consistently held that although ordinarily a writ petition against an SCN may not be entertained, however, the said proposition is not an inviolable rule. Interference at the stage of SCN is permissible in exceptional circumstances, such as where the notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, is issued with a pre-determined or premeditated approach, amounts to an abuse of the process of law, or results in a violation of the principles of natural justice. In such situations, the High Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to prevent manifest injustice." 

The Court relied to its earlier decision in Union of India vs. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270 : 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1420. The relevant pragraph reads:"“31. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice by the authorities. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the authorities concerned and to satisfy the authorities concerned about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show-cause notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice in order to relegate the parties to the proceedings before the authorities concerned is the normal rule. However, the said rule is not without exceptions. Where a show-cause notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in an abuse of process of law, certainly in that case, the writ court would not hesitate to interfere even
at the stage of issuance of show-cause notice. The interference at the show-cause notice stage should be rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse of process of law would not suffice. It should be prima facie established to be so. Where factual adjudication would be necessary, interference is ruled out.”

Justice Mehta observed: "33. Thus, the rejection of challenge laid by the appellants to the SCN on the ground of non-maintainability was not justified in the peculiar facts of the case at hand."

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri in DTDC Express Ltd Excise Act case

In The State of Bihar vs. DTDC Express Ltd. Courier Company (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Alok Aradhe passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, it sets aside the 7-page long judgement dated July 2, 2025 by Justices P. B. Bajanthri and S. B. Pd. Singh.  Supreme Court order reads: "1. This Court vide order dated 17.10.2025 had issued limited notice confined to imposition of costs. 2. We are informed that the confiscated material has already been released. In the facts and circumstances of the case, when the prohibited as well as normal goods were being transported together, the circumstances under which the State has taken action does not require imposition of costs. 3. In view of aforesaid, the impugned order to the extent of imposition of costs of Rs. 50,000/- is set aside. 4. With these observations, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of." 

In DTDC Express Ltd. (Courier Company) vs. The Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Government of Bihar, & Others (2025), the High Court had concluded:"It is a case for imposing cost, in view of the fact that petitioner has been unnecessarily harassed for about one year and he had filed multiple litigations before this Court and Criminal Jurisdictional Court. In this regard, we have taken note of principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Judgment, namely, UFLEX Ltd. Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (2022) 1 SCC 165. Therefore, the respondents are hereby directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner towards litigations cost. The cost shall be paid by the respondents within eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 11. Accordingly, writ petition stands disposed of. 12. Copy of this order be communicated to the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar, DGP, State of Bihar and Commissioner of Excise Department, State of Bihar." 

The other four respondents were: District Magistrate-Cum-Collector, Buxar, Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM) Buxar, Excise Superintendent, Buxar, and SHO, Buxar Excise Police Station, Buxar.

The petitioner had prayed for the following reliefs: (A) A writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the goods seized in connection with Buxar Excise P.S. Case No. 240 / 24 dated June 29, 2024. The goods prayed to be released were mentioned in the list to the writ petition. The goods were not prohibited. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024 passed by the SDM Buxar P.S. Case No. 240 2024 whereby and whereunder the SDM (respondent no.4) declined to release the good items which are not forbidden/prohibited under the law. Also the two orders by the SDM Buxar Sadar was unreasonable and did not address the main issue. 

The petitioner – DTDC Express Ltd. who is in courier business had booked the truck-container bearing no. HR55A-H-7501 for the purpose of transportation of goods from Gurugram to Patna. During the transit, the vehicle was seized at New Ganga Bridge, Excise Checkpost, Buxar Industrial Area, Distt. Buxar on June 29, 2024. The driver of the truck was not only carrying the goods of the petitioner, he was carrying 360 litres of liquor. Thus, the Excise / Police officials proceeded to initiate action against the driver of the truck while seizing the subject matter of the vehicle along with the goods. For the release of goods other than liquor, the petitioner who is owner of the goods, had filed criminal petition before the jurisdictional court on July 3, 2024 and it was rejected on July 29, 2024. He had approached the Authorities on September 7, 2024 for release of the goods. It was not materialized resultantly, he had invoked remedy before the High Court in filing CWJC No. 15630 of 2024 and it was disposed of on October 8, 2024 while directing the official-respondents to consider the petitioner’s grievance within a period of three weeks. Thereafter, the Authorities rejected on two occasions namely, December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024, which are the subject matter of the present litigation. Simultaneously, petitioner had filed one more criminal petition before the jurisdictional court and it was rejected on January 6, 2025. Therefore, the writ petition was filed.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that he was only an agent and who was into courier business, he had booked the subject matter of truck container for the purpose of transporting goods other than the excise material. The container/truck should have been seized along with the liquor only, for the reasons that perusal of the FIR, offences for the seizure of the container/truck was only to the extent that possession of the vehicle had violated offences under the Excise Act. The seizure memo was not in respect  to excise material. Therefore, in all fairness, the seizure authority should not have seized. Assuming that it was seized, which should have been released in favour of the concerned person after due verification of the records. It was also submitted that unnecessarily petitioner was harassed. He was compelled to invoke number of remedies before the criminal jurisdictional court and before the High Court. Overall on four occasions, he invoked the remedy before court of law. Therefore, seizure ofcwas without authority of law. In  particular, those items do not fall under the offence of the Excise Act.

Undisputed fact was that on June 29, 2024, vehicle no. HR55A-H-7501 was seized along with the 360 litres of liquor and goods narrated in the Seizure Memo. It was also not disputed that the petitioner had invoked criminal jurisdictional court on two occasions and before the High Court, this was the second round litigation. Despite these multiple limitations, the petitioner was not extended the relief for which he is entitled to. In other words, seizure of the goods was not part and parcel of excise material so as to invoke offences under the Excise Act. It was to be noted that the concerned authority was not registered any offences under the Sales Tax etc. for illegally transporting under any specific provision of law. At the best, the seizing authority should have sought for certain documents relating to ownership of items and released the same within a reasonable period of time from the date of seizure, the same was not done. Thus, the petitioner was harassed unnecessarily for more than one year. Hence, the petitioner made out a case so as to grant relief. Accordingly, the impugned decision of the respondent dated December 6, 2024 and December 27, 2024 were set aside. Justices Bajanthri who authored the judgement of the High Court had observed: "9. The concerned authority is hereby directed to release the goods within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this order after due verification of the fact that petitioner is connected with the seized goods at item no. 1 to 33. 10. The petitioner shall cooperate in producing necessary material to connect the goods, which are narrated in Annexure-1." This judgement has been set aside.