Showing posts with label Sections 363. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sections 363. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2026

Justice Soni Shrivastava as part of Division Bench sets aside judegment of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur

In Md Quarban vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"42. All these inconsistencies and conflicting versions of the prosecution case which is apparent from the deposition of the prosecution witness render the prosecution case considerably doubtful. The failure of the prosecution to prove the foundational facts with regard to age and sexual assault makes the entire edifice of the prosecution crumble against the weight of evidence." The judgement was authored by Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

Justice Shrivastava added: "43. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on account of all the foregoing reasons, including the consideration of several missing links and loopholes in the case of the prosecution, we come to a clear finding that the circumstances and evidence on which the conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, has not been fully established and the appellant is entitled to be extended benefit of doubt, inasmuch as, the prosecution hasmiserably failed to prove its case by adducing credible and trustworthy evidence. 44. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances and also taking into account the overall perspective and the entire conspectus, it would be extremely unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant, as such, the finding of conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable and requires interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 18.03.2023 and the order of sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No.35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No.361 of 2018, is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. 45. The appellant, who is said to be in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case."  

The appeal was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated March 18, 2023 and the order of sentence dated March 22, 2023 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No. 35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No. 361 of 2018. 3. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted and was sentenced for the offences punishable under Section 363, IPC for rigorous Imprisonment for seven years along with fine of Rs. 50,000/, Section 341 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year or fine of Rs. 500/, Section 323 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/, Section 504 IPC for rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/ and Section 4 of POCSO Act for rigorous imprisonment for 20 years along with fine of Rs. 1 lakh.

The prosecution case based on the written report of the informant alleged that the minor daughter (aged about 14 years) of the informant had gone for her tuition classes 15 days back, but did not return. He frantically searched for his daughter but did not get to know of her whereabouts. When he could not find out anything even from his relatives, he gave the written application on December 28, 2018 before police.
Based on the written application, a Sabour P.S. Case was registered against unknown for the offences punishable under sections 363 and 365 of IPC. After investigation supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the present appellant under sections 366A, 376, 341, 323, 504, 506, 427/34 of the IPC and section 6/8 of POCSO Act, whereafter cognizance was also taken under these provisions by the Special Court POCSO, Bhagalpur. 

The trial Court on August 10, 2021, framed the charges against the appellant under sections 341, 323, 376, 366 A, 427 of IPC and 4 and 8 of POCSO Act and the same were explained to him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case examined as many as five witnesses and exhibited some documents on its behalf. The trial court decided the primary issue relating to the minority of the victim and recorded the fact that while the victim’s age was disclosed as 14 years in both the FIR and the statement of the victim under section 164 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate had assessed her age as 15 years. The medical report indicated her age to be between 16 to 18 years. The date of birth of the victim as per her Registration Card in the Bihar School Examination Board was recorded as January 25, 2004. It reached the conclusion that the victim was undoubtedly a minor on the basis of the document.

The trial court has thus concluded that the solitary evidence of the victim itself was sufficient for proving the guilt of the accused and since there are no apparent contradictions in the prosecution evidence to doubt the veracity of the same, the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts. However, while holding that the case was proved under sections 323, 341, 376, 504 of the IPC along with section 4 of the POCSO Act and additionally finding the case to be proved under section 363 IPC also (under which no charge was framed), the accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges under Section 427, 506, 366 A of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act as the same was held to be not proved beyond reasonable doubt

Justice Shrivastava observed: "28. After having analysed the trend of evidence as disclosed by the victim (PW3), it would be difficult to place her in the category of ‘sterling witness’ whose evidence would be complete and sufficient in itself to base a conviction, as such, the evidence of victim (PW3) must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well-settled legal principles as established by law in a catena of decisions." 

She drew on Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein, it said “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

This view was further reiterated by a 3-Judgebench of the Supreme Court in Nirmal Prem Kumar & Anr. vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2024 INSC 193) Cr. Appeal No. 1098 of 2024 disposed off on March 11, 2024.

The High Court's judgment took note of the inordinate delay of 15 days in lodging the FIR. 

Justice Shrivastava  observed: "This fact compels this court to take a view that there is something more in this case that meets the eye, as no father whose daughter went missing or was kidnapped would wait for fifteen days for lodging an FIR. Further, the medical examination of the victim conducted by the medical officer (PW4) reveals that there was no physical or chemical injury on her body including her private parts and upon pathological investigation no spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal swab, however the urine pregnancy test was found positive. 31. Her age was assessed between 16 to 18 years but no evidence of any recent sexual assault has been noted by the doctor, thereby making it abundantly clear that even the medical report (Ext. P1)does not stand in support of the contentions of the victim. Merely because the pregnancy test was found to be positive, it would not lead us to the irresistible conclusion that the entire prosecution story narrated against the appellant has an element of truth and there could be other reasons, including one of consensual sexual relation, leading to the pregnancy of the victim. 32. The issue of a consensual sexual relation brings us to the crucial question as to whether the victim was actually a minor and whether her age determination was done in consonance with the procedure laid down under Section 94 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. With regard to the minority of the victim, the only document which has been brought on record is the Registration Card (Exhibit- P4) issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 25.01.2004. This document has been proved and marked as Exhibit P4 by the victim herself and no other evidence has been adduced in support of the said document. Neither the school admission register has been produced nor the headmaster of the concerned school has been brought forward for examination in order to lend support to the case of the victim that she was a minor at the relevant period. Further, the fact that all the witnesses including the I.O., have maintained a curious and suspicious silence on the aspect of age of the alleged rape victim, is very intriguing and raises considerable doubt in the mind of this court with regard to the minority of the victim. None of the victim’s family members i.e. her sister or her father, have mentioned a word about the age of the victim in their deposition made in the Court. The victim too has remained effectively silent on the said aspect and only on recall for recording further examination-in-chief after about 10 months of her cross-examination, she produced the above-mentioned Registration Card which was marked as Exhibit-P4. Such evidence may be
admissible but its evidentiary value, in the entire scenario, gets lost, especially in absence of any supporting evidence and non-examination of the maker of the said document to vouchsafe of the contents thereof. Exhibit-4 did not form part of the charge-sheet and the police papers supplied to the accused."

She added, " Since the determination of age has not been done in accordance with law and there is no other evidence, much less clinching, to establish the minority of the victim, this court would go on to consider the medical evidence whereby the doctor has assessed her age to be between 16 and 18 year

In Ram Suresh Singh versus Prabhat Singh and Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681 and Om Prakash versus the State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 201, the Supreme Court took a view that radiological examination for purpose of age determination was not very reliable and there was always a possibility of an error of plus and minus two years. 

In Rajak Mohammad vs. H.P, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, the court laid down that the age determination on the basis of radiological examination may not be accurate determination and thus sufficient margin on either side has to be allowed. The judgment reads: “9. While it is correct that the age determined on the basis of a radiological examination may not be an accurate determination and sufficient margin either way has to be allowed, yet the totality of the facts stated above read with the report of the radiological examination leaves room for ample doubt with regard to the correct age of the prosecutrix. The benefit of the aforesaid doubt, naturally, must go in favour of the accused.”

In Santosh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, the Court held that solitary version of prosecutrix in a case under Section 376 of the IPC, was not to be taken as gospel truth in absence of any other supporting or corroborative evidence. It had also considered the factum of delay in lodging of the First Information Report as also the fact that the medical report of the victim did not support the allegations made by her and considering all these facts cumulatively, the accused was acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt.

Justice Shrivastava observed: "40. Similarly, in the present case in view of the fact that the victim has been giving vacillating statements with regard to the manner of occurrence and these inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative significantly undermines the credibility of the prosecution version and takes away the veracity of the evidence of the victim. We also take into consideration the fact that there is total want of evidence on record to corroborate the case of the victim and it appears that for the reasons best known to the prosecution, material witnesses who could have shed some light on correct facts have also been withheld. 41. The cloud of doubt upon the entire prosecution case starts form the very inception as the informant (PW2) did not lodge an FIR upto fifteen days of her daughter being allegedly kidnapped which is not a normal phenomenon. Moving further, the factum of non-raising of alarm by victim while being forcibly taken away on a motorcycle points towards a probability of a consensual act with no resistance offered at the end of the victim. The age of the appellant at the relevant period being about 19 years i.e., of the same age group as the victim, further contributes to such a probability. The evidence of both the father and the sister of the victim during trial failed to lend support to the case of the prosecution. PW1, the sister of the victim, rather stands out as she has deposed no incident happened in her presence which is absolutely contradictory to the story as propounded by the victim." Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the appeal.

Thursday, May 29, 2025

Right to Privacy of Adolescents

In RE: Right to Privacy of Adolescents (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan) observed:"After having read the reports and having interacted with the Committee as well as the victim, we are of the view that if we send the accused to jail, the worst sufferer will be the victim herself. As compared to the situation in 2018, she is better placed today. Now she is comfortable with her small family. She along with the accused, is concentrating on their daughter and the want to ensure that she gets quality education. At the same time, as recorded in the final report, the victim is attending school and is desperate to complete her school education. Though the State has offered to enroll her in some vocational course, she is keen on completing her education, at least up to graduation."

The Criminal Appeal was preferred by the State of West Bengal against the judgment and order dated October 18, 2023, passed ny a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. In Suo Motu Writ Petition, Supreme Court’s attention was drawn to certain objectionable observations made in the High Court's judgement. The  former court took note of the systemic failure of the State to protect the victim, resulting in her fate and wellbeing being ultimately tied up with that of the accused. Accordingly, in this judgement, we are dealing with the issue of sentencing the accused arising out of the criminal appeal and the

In the Suo Motu Writ Petition, the Court dealt with are the issue of rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The Suo Motu writ petition was initiated based on the directions issued by the  Chief Justice of India for challenging the impugned judgment. The State Government had preferred the criminal appeal to challenge the order of acquittal.

The Court considered three issues. The first issue is of sentencing the accused. The second issue is about the rehabilitation of the victim and her child. The third issue is a wider issue about adopting measures for adolescent wellbeing and child protection which goes to the root cause of the problem in our changing society. 

The Court relied on the reports of the Court appointed  3-member Committee of Experts. In its preliminary report, it recorded "the victim’s struggles while tackling the legal system for securing the release of the accused." The final report provided details of all the interviews conducted by the Committee, including those off the victim, the accused, their respective families, teachers and management personnel at the school of the victim, investigating police officers, personnel at the welfare home—Sanlaap Sneha Home, and other relevant stakeholders. It highlighted the inadequate, inefficient implementation of the POCSO Act. It emphasized the “collective failure of the systems that are there to protect a girl child”. It stated that the loopholes were glaring, and that the elopement, the living in/marriage of the victim, the birth of a child—all were preventable. 

The final report had specifically highlighted the failure of the Child Protection Committees at the village level; the inadequate implementation of the State of West Bengal’s “Kanyashree Prakalpa Scheme”;the inaction of the designated Child Welfare Officer at the local police station;lack of provision of free legal aid; lack of sufficient and effective counsellors from both genders in schools and even welfare homes;high frequency of elopements by children in class 8 and above;stigmatisation of girls in similar situations as the adolescent victim in the present case; irregularities and delays in the investigation of such crimes;inadequate accessibility to judicial fora and corruption and financial exploitation by touts, members of the Bar etc.; and lack of awareness and sensitisation among family, and public officials in respect of the POCSO Act and the sexual, emotional, and mental well-being of children.

The final report concluded that "in this particular case, it was not the legal crime which caused trauma on the victim, rather it was the legal battle which ensued consequent to the crime that is taking a toll on the victim."

The final report also concluded that though the incident was seen as a crime in law, the victim did not accept it as one. The Committee records that it was not the legal crime that caused any trauma to the victim, but rather, it was the consequences that followed, which took a toll on her. What she had to face as a consequence was the police, the legal system and the constant battle to save the accused from punishment. At the same time, she took care of her daughter to the best of her abilities, notwithstanding the huge financial burden she carried." 

The final conclusion in the report is an eye opener. It reads:

“In conclusion, a heinous crime causes trauma in the psyche of the victim. In this case, the law saw it as a crime, the victim did not. Hence, the legal crime did not cause any trauma on this particular victim. It was the consequences thereafter – the police personnel, the legal system, the battle to save her husband and do the best for her daughter while having a financial burden, which is taking its toll on her. A young woman, who refuses to be called a “Victim”, fighting for her husband needs all the support that can be made available. It would be in the best interest of the child if the family structure can be restored.”

The judgment noted: "Though the victim did not treat the incident as a heinous crime, she suffered because of it. This was because at an earlier stage, the victim could not make an informed choice due to the shortcomings of our society, our legal system and her family. In fact, she did not get any opportunity to make informed choice. The society judged her, the legal system failed her, and her own family abandoned her. Now, she is at a stage where she is desperate to save her husband. Now, she is emotionally committed to the accused and has become very possessive of her small family."

The Special Judge appointed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) had convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. For the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. For the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, thea accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and five years respectively and was also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-and Rs.5,000/- respectively. Though the Special Judge under the POCSO Act came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed. The accused preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) 14 of 2023 before the Calcutta High Court against the conviction. The High Court by the Impugned Judgement dated October 18, 2023 purported to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to set aside the conviction of the accused for the aforesaid offences. 

By a detailed judgement dated August 20, 2024, the Supreme Court had set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored the verdict of the Special Court to the extent of the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under clause (n) of sub-section 2 and sub-section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. This Court confirmed the acquittal of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC. However, the sentencing was postponed for the reasons recorded in the judgment. In paragraph 2 of the said judgment, the basic facts of the case have been mentioned and in paragraph 3, the findings recorded by the High Court have been mentioned. 

The paragraphs 2 to 5 of the High Court's judgment reads: “2. The victim girl was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. The victim’s mother lodged a First Information Report (FIR) on 29th May 2018. The victim’s mother stated in her complaint that the victim, who was her minor daughter, escaped from her home at 5:30 p.m. on 20th May 2018 without informing anyone. On inquiry, it was found that the accused enticed her to leave her house. The accused did so with the help of his two sisters. The victim’s mother repeatedly visited the house of the accused and requested him to facilitate the return of her daughter. However, the victim did not come back. A female child was born to the victim. Admittedly, the accused is the biological father of the child. There was a gross delay in the investigation, and the accused was arrested on 19th December 2021. The chargesheet was filed on 27th January 2022 against the accused for the offences for which he was convicted. In addition, the accused was charged with the offence punishable under Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. We may note here that as the learned Special Judge under the POCSO Act found that there was no evidence of marriage between the victim and the accused, the charge under Section 9 of the 2006 Act was held as not substantiated."

Significantly, the High Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the accused along with their minor child.

The Supreme Court observed: "In law, we have no option but to sentence the accused and send him to jail for undergoing the minimum punishment prescribed by the Statute. However, in this case, the society, the family of the victim and the legal system have done enough injustice to the victim. She has been subjected to enough trauma and agony. We do not want to add to the injustice done to the victim by sending her husband to jail. We as Judges, cannot shut our eyes to these harsh realities. Now, at this stage, in order to do real justice to the victim, the only option left before us is to ensure that the accused is not separated from the victim. The State and the society must ensure that the family is rehabilitated till the family settles down in all respects."

It opined:"Ultimately, this Court is bestowed with extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 for the sole a position to do substantial justice in its truest sense. In the context of this situation, sadly, true justice lies in not sentencing the accused to undergo imprisonment. This case is not going to be a precedent and should not be a precedent. This case is an illustration of the complete failure of our society and our legal system. All that the system can do for the victim now, is to help her fulfil her desire of completing her education, settling down in life, providing a better education to her daughter and ensuring overall better living conditions for her family. This year we have completed 75 years of the Constitution on 26th January. The Constitution contemplates the State to be a welfare state. The Constitution guaranteed social and economic justice to all the citizens. In this case, there is a failure to provide both social and economic justice to the victim. The facts of the case indicate failure of the concept of welfare state. To remedy the situation in this case, it is the obligation of the State Government to act as the true guardian of the victim and her child and ensure that they settle down in life and lead a happy, healthy and constructive life ahead."

The 44-page long judgement reads: "we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier; b)We direct the State to take following measures: i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child; ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today; iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the we pass the following order: a) We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hold that though the accused stands convicted, he will not undergo sentence for the reasons stated earlier;

b) We direct the State to take following measures:
i) To act as a true guardian of the victim and her child;
ii) To provide a better shelter to the victim and her family within a period of few months from today;
iii) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the victim till Xth standard examination and if she desires to take up education for a degree course, till the completion of degree course. After she passes her Xth standard examination, the State can offer her vocational training, obviously, at the cost of the State;
iv) To bear the entire expenditure of the education of the child up to Xth standard and ensuring that she is educated in a very good school in the vicinity of the place of residence of the victim; and
v) To endeavour to take the assistance of NGOs or public-spirited citizens for the purpose of securing the debts incurred by the victim as a one-time measure."