In Priyanka Kumari & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Justices Rajesh Bindal and Manmohan passed a 2-page long order dated July 22, 2025, wherein it recorded:"The matter was taken up twice but no one has put in appearance for State of Bihar....Let the date of hearing of the present petitions be notified to the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar." Now the matter is listed for hearing on August 12, 2025. The case arose out of 9-page long judgment dated April 11, 2019 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice Amreshwar Pratap Sahi and Justice Anjana Mishra. The judgement was authored by Justice Sahi which affirmed 20 page long judgement dated February 22, 2018 by Justice Anil Kumar Upadhyay who had relied on Supreme Court's "principle of useless formality theory in the matter of compliance of natural justice".
Justice Upadhyay drew on para 17 of the judgment of the Court in the case of Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy: (2005) 6 SCC 321 which reads: “17. What is known as `useless formality theory' has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, [1999] 6 SCC 237. It was observed as under: 22. "Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of `real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn., [1971] 2 All ER 1278, HL (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University, [1971] 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, [1980] 2 All ER 368, CA and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates. Court, ex p. Fannaran, (1996) 8 Admn. LR 351, 358) See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be `demonstrable beyond doubt. that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, CA has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant, (1959) NZLR 1014 however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is `real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice.' On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40: [1963] 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees, [1969] 2 All ER 274 stating that there are always `open and shut cases. and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the `useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that `convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms' More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the `useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article `Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the `useless formality theory. has been made much earlier in `Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a `real likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their `discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, [1996] 3 SCC 364 and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P., [1996] 5 SCC 460 that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. 23.We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the `useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us,`admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
The appellants had questioned the correctness of the dismissal judgment of the Single Judge dated 22nd February, 2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 6827 of 2016 before the High Court's Division Bench in their appeal. The Single Judge had declined the claim of the appellants and their effort to save their employment on the strength of a degree awarded by the University of Technology and Science, Chhattisgarh.
The Single Judge relied on Supreme Court's decision in the case of Prof. Yashpal and another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 420 which had arrived at the conclusion that the appellants are not entitled to the academic benefits of the said University which has been declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Court and therefore their employment on the basis of any degree by the University was rightly terminated.
The counsel for the appellants had urged that the very same judgment in para 64 and 65 indicated that the students’ career instead of being jeopardized should be revisited by the State Government in order to extend any benefit of affiliation or otherwise in order to sustain the career of such students who had been admitted in such Institutions. He submitted that this was a University created under an Act of the State Legislature, namely, Section 5 of the Chhatisgarh Viniyaman) Adhiniyam 2002 and therefore its existence cannot be doubted. The contention was that so far as the appellants were concerned, the legality of the establishment of the University or otherwise cannot be attributed to them for the purpose of virtually recalling the degrees already conferred on them by such University, inasmuch as, they had bona fidely pursued their studies and were awarded degrees which in the present case are degrees relating to Library Science on the basis whereof they were granted employment. It was their employment which was terminated on the ground of their degrees being invalid. It was submitted that the declaration of law by the Supreme Court itself extended protection and issued directions to the State of Chhattisgarh for protecting the interest of students and their career. The contention, was that the appellants stand on a better footing, inasmuch as, they are students who had already been awarded degrees by the time the University was declared to be non-existent under the judgment of the Apex Court. Consequently, any form of default on the part of the appellants who have pursued their academic career in this University cannot be a cause for recall of the employment which the appellants had been offered on the basis of a degree which otherwise was valid when it was granted.
The Single Judge had recorded the findings and concluded that even assuming for the sake of arguments that the termination orders emanated without following any procedure of law and were in violation of principles of natural justice, relegating the matter back to the authorities for a decision afresh would be a useless formality, inasmuch as, on the admitted facts the degree on the basis of which the appellants had obtained employment was invalid and consequently all the appellants holding a degree, which was a nullity, cannot claim continuance in employment on the strength thereof.
The counsel for the appellants had urged that the aspect with regard to any protection being given to such students who had already obtained degrees does not appear to have been negated by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) nor has the State Government of Chhatisgarh denied any such benefit. It is also submitted that even the learned Single Judge has not considered this aspect and, therefore, in the above background the termination of the employment of the appellants without following the due procedure of law cannot be justified.
The counsel for the State of Bihar, had contended that an employment extended to the appellants on the basis of an academic degree which is a nullity cannot be sustained and any continuance thereof would be contrary to law. He submitted that it is in this background that the action was taken by the authorities and after having verified the status of the Institution the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 was issued informing the authorities to take appropriate action in relation to the engagement of the appellants as well as such other similarly situate employees who had obtained degrees from such Institutions.
The counsel for the appellants had urged that the said document indicated the name of the University which was not a correct name, and even otherwise there is an indication that the University is closed from 2005. It was submitted that the closure of the University was on account of the judgment of the Supreme Court and such a closure, therefore, does not eclipse or abrogate the degree obtained by the appellants from the University when it was in existence prior to that. Consequently, the said directions issued by the Deputy Director (Education) would not be applicable in a retrospective manner so as to take away any impact of a valid degree which otherwise was capable of being acknowledged as it had been conferred by the University that was created under a Statute. The University, therefore, was empowered to confer such a degree and consequently, the letter of the Deputy Director (Education) dated 19th May, 2009 does not take away the effect or nullify the effect of a degree already awarded by the University.
The High Court's Division Bench observed: "9. We have considered the entire arguments before us and we find that the Apex Court judgment in the case of Prof. Yashpal (supra) derecognises such Universities by declaring the provisions of the Act under which the University was established to be ultra vires. The birth of the University, therefore, having taken under Statute which was declared to be ultra vires, therefore, cannot allow the acknowledgment of a degree granted by such a University to be valid which has been declared to be non-existent. In our opinion, it would be paradoxical to recognize a degree of a University that has been declared to be non-existent on account of an invalid law under which the University itself was created. If the creation of the University itself was unlawful, then any degree conferred by such a University cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of a lawful employment. 10. We, therefore, do not find any error in the conclusion ultimately drawn by the learned Single Judge in declining to entertain the writ petition for grant of any such benefit. 11. There is, however, one argument which deserves mention, namely, the Apex Court in the judgment of Prof. Yashpal (supra) did not specifically declare any such degrees already conferred to be a nullity. To that extent, the appellants could have raised their grievances before the State of Chhattisgarh for extending such benefits, but in the present case what we find that neither the University Grants Commission nor the State of Chhattisgarh have been made party respondents on the basis whereof any such determination can be attempted by this Court in order to gather as to whether the appellants would be entitled to any such benefit or not. There is no indication in any of the documents filed that the State of Chhattisgarh had taken any steps for recognition of such degrees which virtually by operation of law and the declaration of law by the Supreme Court stood lapsed without there being any further action for reviving or acknowledging them as to be surviving for the purpose of any employment under the State."
The Division Bench of the High Court had concluded: "....we are unable to further probe on the issue so raised by the appellants with regard to the validity or otherwise of their degree and we leave it open to the appellants to claim any such benefit, if permissible in law, inasmuch as, the question of recognition of such a degree would not be open to be examined by us in view of what has been stated hereinabove. 13. The appeal, therefore, is accordingly consigned to records with the said observations."
