Justice Purnendu Singh as part of DB upholds verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in a CCA case from 1991

Supreme Court's decision in Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255) irrelevant in this CCA case? 

Justice Purnendu Singh as part of Division Bench led by Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar authored a 9-page long judgment dated July 1, 2025 wherein, he upheld the verdict by Justice Anil Kumar Sinha in Awadh Tiwari vs. The State of Bihar (2025). Justice Singh who authored the judgement observed:"...the appellant has not been able to show any illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge. The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal. The appeal is dismissed."

In the year 1989 while posted as Junior Engineer in the Minor Distributory Division-IX, Ghatshila Camp, Galudih, as a result of an agreement entered into, M/s Barauni Tiles was required supply PCC tiles which the appellant was to receive. Awadh Tiwari, the appellant received the same, however without waiting for the quality test report of the tiles, payment was made to the contractor, causing financial loss to the government.

By an order contained in Resolution no.1691 dated July 17, 1991, a decision was taken to initiate a departmental proceeding against the appellant under Rule 55 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 which was subsequently converted into a proceeding under Rule 55A of the Rules. The appellant was served with a memo of charge according to which he during his tenure had received substandard tiles for the purpose of lining of canal. The tiles supplied at the ratio 1:2.97 of cement and sand against the specified ratio of 1:2. A sum of Rs.11,73,000/ had been paid to the contractor causing loss to the State exchequer. 

The charge was to the effect that the appellant was negligent and casual in his duty causing financial loss to the State. He had prepared the bill for payment to the contractor without getting the quality of the supplied tiles tested. The appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice and on consideration of the contents thereof, the respondents came out with an order of punishment dated December 11, 1999 according to which there was stoppage of promotion for a period of ten years and further order of recovery of a sum to the tune of Rs.1,46,625.

The appellant had moved to the High Court in CWJC no.1015 of 2000 against the order of punishment which was allowed vide order dated February 17, 2006, the order of punishment quashed and the respondents were directed to refund the recovered amount on the basis of the said order to the appellant forthwith. 

The respondents preferred an appeal (LPA no.790 of 2007) against the order allowing the writ application (CWJC no.1015 of 2000). Though the judgment passed in the writ application was not interfered with and the appeal dismissed, however it was observed that if the law permits, the State of Bihar can proceed against the concerned employee in accordance with law.

The respondents included Secretary, Water Resources Department, Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department, Deputy Secretary, Water Resources Department and Engineer-In-Chief Middle, Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar. 

The respondents came out with an order dated January 18, 2011 stating therein that a decision was taken to proceed against the appellant and two others under Rule 17 of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005. The chargesheet containing the charges was enclosed with the order, to which the appellant filed his reply.

When the appellant retired from service on May 31, 2011, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was converted into a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules.

The enquiry officer submitted his report dated January 12, 2012 not finding the charges to have been proved against the appellant. Disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report, a detailed second show cause contained in Memo no.683 dated June 26, 2012 was issued under the signature of the Engineer-in-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, which was brought on record with the counter affidavit of the respondents in the writ application.

The letter showed that the point of difference of the disciplinary authority with the report of the enquiry officer was two fold. Firstly, that inspite of the ratio of cement and sand in the tiles supplied by the contractor being 1:2.97 in place of the specified 1:2, steps had been taken by the appellant in the measurement book for payment to the contractor, though he should have obtained the directions of the higher authorities with respect to the quality test report and only thereafter should have proceeded to take steps for payment. The second point of difference was to the effect that a direction had been given to the Barauni Tiles i.e. the contractor to replace the tiles but the contractor had not carried out the directions. Inspite of having knowledge of this fact, the appellant proceeded to make entries in the measurement book and recommend for payment of amount to the contractor.

The appellant filed his response to the show cause notice dated June 26, 2012 of the disciplinary authority differing with the contents of the enquiry report. After considering the reply of the appellant, the respondents passed an order contained in Memo no.374 dated March 20, 2013 under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules imposing punishment of 5% pension. Following dismissal of the writ application preferred by the appellant against the order of punishment, the appeal was preferred.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that in the enquiry conducted in the departmental proceeding against the appellant, the enquiry officer in his report dated January 12, 2012 did not find any of the three charges to have been proved. Though the disciplinary authority issued a second show cause notice dated June 26, 2012, however no reason was given therein for differing with the contents of the enquiry report. It merely repeated the charges as contained in the chargesheet issued in the departmental proceeding. It was submitted that the second show cause notice as also the order of punishment are both unsustainable. The counsel for the appellant relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 255). 

But Justice Singh observed:"So far as the judgment in the case of Ram Kishan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same is of no assistance to the appellant herein, the facts of the two cases being distinct and distinguishable.While the instant case relates to steps of payment having been taken by the delinquent/appellant inspite of sub-quality tiles having been supplied by the contractor, the case cited relates to misconduct of the Constable/appellant therein of having facilitate supply of alcohol to an under-trial prisoner and of having abused his superior officer." 

Siya Ram Sahi and Shally Kumari were the counsels for the appellant. 

The appellant was proceeded against departmentally under the CCA Rules while still in service, on his retirement on May 31, 2011, the proceedings were converted into one under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The enquiry officer submitted his report on January 12, 2012 not finding any of the charges levelled against the appellant to have been proved. The disciplinary authority disagreeing with the contents of the enquiry report issued a second show cause notice to the appellant on June 26, 2012 to which the appellant submitted his reply. Not finding the reply to be satisfactory, another show cause notice was issued to the appellant on December 3, 2012 stating therein that it was proposed to impose a punishment on the appellant under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. The appellant was given time of 15 days to submit his reply which was filed by the appellant on December 22, 2012. The reply of the appellant was not found satisfactory and the order of punishment was passed which was challenged unsuccessfully in the writ application before Justice Sinha, the single judge bench. 

The writ application was preferred against the order dated March 20, 2013 bearing Memo No.374 passed by Engineer-In-Chief (Central), Water Resources Department, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby punishment of stoppage of 5% pension was imposed upon the petitioner in a departmental proceeding concluded under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules. 

Before dismissing the writ application, in his 10-page long judgement dated March 14, 2023, Justice Sinha had observed:"...the Court while testing the validity of the order of the punishment is required to see the flaw into decision making process and cannot sit upon the decision itself as an appellate authority. Even assuming the aforesaid instruction of Cabinet (Vigilance) Department dated 06.07.1992 vide Memo No. 1045 is applicable in the case of the petitioner in relation to the permissible limit of difference in ratio up to 25% but the difference of ratio found by the Laboratory in the present case to the extent of 1:2.97 is more than the permissible limit of 25%. The petitioner has not pointed out any procedural infirmity and or violation of principle of natural justice in the departmental proceeding. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I come to the conclusion that the impugned order of punishment does not require any interference by this Court..."

The judgement by the Division Bench which upheld Justice Sinha's judgement appears to be a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court.  

“Don’t act selectively on collegium recommendations" on appointments and transfers of judges:Chief Justice of India

Justice Bhushan R. Gavai, 52nd Chief Justice of India told Union government “Don’t act selectively on collegium recommendations" on appointments and transfer  of judges after presiding over his first collegium meeting on May 26, 2025. The collegium includes Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari, and B.V. Nagarathna besides Justice Gavai.  

A Supreme Court's bench led by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul had said, “selective appointments undermined the element of workable trust essential for the relationship between the judiciary and the executive.” It “sends a wrong signal.” Justice Kaul had made these observations prior to his retirement in December 2023. 

In the aftermath of the judgement declaring the National Democratic Alliance government enacted the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014 to be unconstitutional in 2015, the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) guides the appointment and transfer of judges in constitution. But Union Government has not been complying with it although independence of judiciary is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. 

In January 2025, a bench of the Supreme Court permitted the High Courts to appoint retired judges as ad hoc judges under Article 224A of the Constitution to alleviate the mounting backlog. As ofb July 1, 2025, the High Courts have 371 vacancies out of a sanctioned strength of 1,122. The present working strength stands at 751 judges. Over 63 lakh pending cases in the High Courts, according to the National Judicial Data Grid.

The Supreme Court Collegium, headed by Chief Justice Gavai, has recommended the appointment of 39 individuals as judges across nine High Courts. The recommendations were made on July 1 and 2 after an in-person interactions with candidates from judicial officers and practising advocates. 

Notably, the collegium has recommended names of two advocates Ajit Kumar, and Praveen Kumar as judges of the Patna High Court. The High Court has a sanctioned strength of total 53 judges, which includes 40 permanent, and 13 additional judges. At present, the High Court is functioning with 36 permanent judges only. 

The Supreme Court Collegium had initially recommended five names for appointment as judges in February 2025. However, the Union government cleared only three names. The appointment of the other two recommended advocates, Ritesh Kumar and Anshul Raj, is still pending.

The question is: who should be held accountable for delay in appointment of 17 judges in the Patna High Court including these two names. In this regard, the silence of advocates' association, lawyers association and bar association is deafening. 

Why is the the Collegium issuing only statements listing the names of recommended candidates and their High Courts, sans details about timeline and process? Why has it discontinued the practice of regularly publishing detailed minutes of Collegium meetings and basic information regarding the dates on which High Courts send their recommendations and the timeline of the Collegium’s deliberations on Supreme Court's website. 

Justice Purnendu Singh quashes termination order for violating principle of natural justice

In Smt. Archana Kumari vs. The State of Bihar through its Secretary Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, New Secretariat, Patna & Ors. (2025), Justice Purnendu Singh delivered a 6-page long judgement dated June 16, 2025 wherein, he concluded:"I also find that there has been gross violation of principle of natural justice. It is admitted that before termination order dated 15.11.2022 has been passed, no opportunity has been given to the petitioner. On this ground also, the order contained in Memo No.669 dated 15.11.2022 is fit to be set aside and quashed...." There were six other respondents including The Director Primary Education, Education Department, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, District Magistrate, Vaishali, District Education Officer, Vaishali, District Programme Officer, (Establishment), Vaishali, Block Development Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali and Block Education Officer, Bhagwanpur, Vaishali.

The petitioner had prayed quashing "the memo no.669 dated 15.11.2022 issued by the Executive Officer cum Block Panchayati Raj Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Bhagwanpur (Vaishali) whereby and whereunder the petitioner was terminated from service with immediate effect on the ground she was working on the basis of Madhyama Visharad certificate issued from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelo Allahabad. She also sought direction from the Court to the respondent authority to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 

According to the State that the main issue involved in the present writ petition was the validity of the Madhmya Visharad degree obtained by the petitioner from Hindi Sahitaya Sammelan, Allahabad.  

Justice Singh recorded that there was violation of Section 14 of Bihar State School Teachers and Employees Disputes Redressal Rules, 2015 by District Education Officer, Vaishali who acted in a mechanical manner.

Justice P.N. Bhagwati has defined it as "fair play in action". The right to hearing encompasses the following concepts within its ambit:

1. Right to notice
2. Right to present case and evidence
3. Right to rebut adverse evidence
1. Right to cross-examination
2. Right to legal representation
4. Disclosure of evidence to the party
5. Showing the report of enquiry to the other party
6. Reasoned decisions or speaking orders

Therefore, pre-decisional hearing is one of the standard and essential rules of Audi Alteram Partem. But, it would be wrong to disregard the status of the post-decisional hearing. Post-decisional hearing is also a justiciable rule as it affords the hearing opportunity to the aggrieved person and is a better option than no hearing (I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Eastern Book Company 2022).. However, it is pertinent to note that a post-decisional hearing must be considered an exception rather than a rule.

 

Justice Vipul Pancholi led bench dismisses Bihar Govt's appeal of 1999 against judgment of acquittal in 1987 case

The High Court's website does provide details about what happened in this case in the High Court during August 1999-April 2025. Its silence regarding such delay in adjudication is intriguing and inexplicable. 

In The State of Bihar vs. SK. Manso @ Mansoor & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench led by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi delivered his 22nd 25-page long judgement dated June 25, 2025 upholding the judgment of acquittal dated May 17, 1999 passed by the Court of 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Banka in Sessions Trial of 1992, whereby the Trial Court had acquitted SK. Manso @Mansoor, SK. Jahir, SK. Tahir and Md. Gulam Rasool, all the 4 respondents/accused of all the charges levelled against them. The cause list showed name of Ganesh Prasad Jayaswal as the petitioner's counsel and Nageshwar Prasad as the APP. But the judgement shows name of Dilip Kumar Sinha as the APP but does not show any name of the counsel on behalf of the respondents.   He concluded: "we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while passing the impugned judgment. We are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment." 

The judgement reads: "In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that no interference is required in the impugned judgment rendered by the Trial Court." The High Court dismissed the State government's appeal of the year 1999 which was filed on August 18, 1999 and registered on the same day. It was listed for hearing before Justice Pancholi bench since April 21, 2025.    

The informant Mosmat Bibi Jaibunissa stated in her fardbeyan recorded on August 14, 1987 at around 10:00 a.m. at Government Hospital, Ghoraiya that, in the morning of that day at around 07:00 a.m., her son Sheikh Mansoor and Sheikh Nasir along with ploughman Sheikh Ramjani were ploughing her field situated at the south-west corner of village. Then, at that time, Sheikh Manso of her village came with a gandasa, Sheikh Jahoor with spear, Sheikh Rasool with a bana and Sheikh Tahir with a lathi in their hands to the field abusing and told them to stop ploughing, else they won’t let them go alive. The above mentioned four accused persons surrounded them and started assaulting. Her ploughman Sheikh Ramjani was hit with a spear by Sheikh Jahir and by gandasa wielded by Sheikh Mansi. Sheikh Rasool hit her on her head with bana and when her son tried to save her, he was hit on his head by Sheikh Tahir with a lathi. When Ramjani fell down, all the four accused persons started hitting him due to which he fell unconscious there. Besides this, her two sons, Sheikh Ramjani and the ploughmen were beaten and injured by them. When they raised alarm, nearby residents, namely Sheikh Haviv, Sheikh Badruddin, Sheikh Nazimuddin etc. came running and all the four accused persons ran away. Thereafter, she along with her other companions brought Sheikh Ramjani on a cot to the Government Hospital, Dhoraiya since Ramjani’s condition was very bad. The above mentioned persons had beaten him with an intention to kill him. Manso told in an abusive tone that he should not be spared alive. She took Ramjani to Hospital where she was advised to take him to B.M.C.H., Bhagalpur. She got him seated in a Maxi and then took him to Bhagalpur. After that, she along with other injured namely Md. Kalimuddin, Md. Shamim and her two sons went for treatment where she gave her statement. The reason for the incident is that the above mentioned accused persons claim the field which she was ploughing to be theirs.  

Justice Pancholi observed:"it is also required to be observed that the informant and the prosecution witnesses have suppressed the manner in which the occurrence took place. From the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, it has been revealed that in the incident in question, the accused persons have also sustained injury and, in fact, the counter-case has been filed by the accused side against the informant and the other injured witnesses. However, it is required to be observed at this stage that the prosecution has failed to bring on record the nature of injuries sustained by the accused persons in the incident in question. It is well settled that it is the duty of the prosecution to explain the injury sustained by the accused.

He noted: "....the prosecution has failed to examine the Investigating Officer, who has carried out the investigation. The Trial Court has specifically observed in the impugned judgment that because of the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, in the present case, serious prejudice has been caused to the defence. We are of the view that the Trial Court is right in observing the said aspect. As observed hereinabove, from the deposition of the prosecution witnesses, it transpires that the accused persons have sustained injury in the incident in question and, therefore, counter-case has been filed. Some of the prosecution witnesses were arrested in connection with the counter-case. Thus, because of the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, in the present case, the defence has lost the opportunity to cross-examine the Investigating Officer. We are also of the view that serious prejudice has been caused to the defence because of the non-examination of the Investigating Officer and which can be considered as fatal." He pointed out that...the prosecution has failed to examine the Doctor, who had given the treatment to the injured witnesses...." 

Justice Pancholi underlined that "....there is no recovery or discovery of the weapons which have been allegedly used in commission of the crime. Thus, there is no recovery or discovery from the accused." 

Justice Pancholi relied on Para-42 of the Supreme Court's decision in he decision in Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. The Court has laid down the principle regarding the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. The Court observed:“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 

Justice Pancholi also relied on Para-22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605.  The Court observed: “22. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing on these decisions, Justice Pancholi concluded:"it can be said that Appellant Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding recorded by the Trial Court." It is the 22nd judgement of the year authored by Justice Pancholi. 

Justice Pancholi's 21st judgment of 2025 set aside judgment by Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nawada

His 34-page long 21st judgement dated June 18, 2025 was delivered in Madhav Kumar @ Madhav Singh vs. The State Of Bihar (2025), wherein the he quashed and set aside the impugned common judgment of conviction dated May 29, 2018 and order of sentence dated June 5, 2018, passed in a Sessions Trial No. of 2016 by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-II, Nawada. The case had arisen out of Pakribarawan P.S. case of 2016.  

The Trial Court had convicted appellants Gopal Singh and Madhav Kumar for committing the offence punishable under Sections- 302 of I.P.C. The appellants Bhopal Singh and Chandan Singh were also been convicted for committing the offence punishable under Section-341 and 302/34 of I.P.C. The appellants Gopal Singh and Madhav Kumar were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section-302 of I.P.C. The appellants Bhopal Singh and Chandan Singh were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section-302/34 of I.P.C. and a fine of Rs. 500/- each for the offence punishable under Section-341 of I.P.C. 

The P.W. 3 Ramendra Prasad Singh, the informant gave his written report to S.H.O wherein he stated that at about 05:45 p.m. on March 24, 2016, the Holi festival day., exchange of abuses took place between his son Rahul Kumar on one side and his full brother Gopal Singh and nephew Madhav Singh on the other. Thereafter, at about 06:45 p.m., his son was coming to the lane from the southern side. As soon as he reached near the house of Haridwar Singh, accused Gopal Singh, Madhav Singh, armed with a spear and Bhopal Singh and Chandan Kumar came in front of the house of Haridwar Singh and Bhopal Singh and Chandan Singh caught hold of his son and Gopal Singh and Madhav Kumar assaulted him with Bhala (spear) and injured him grievously. On commotion, his daughter Sonam Kumari shouted upon which his wife and village people came there and seeing them the miscreants fled away. When they went nearer, they saw grievous injuries on both the sides of chest, navel and scrotum of his son, caused by spear out of which profuse blood was oozing and his son was writhing in pain. By the time they could manage a vehicle to rush him to the hospital, he succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. 

As the appeals arose out of the common judgment and order, advocates appearing for the parties had jointly prayed that all these appeals be heard together and be disposed of by a common judgment.

Justice Pancholi recorded that from the written report, it transpired that the informant was not an eye-witness to the occurrence in question and daughter of the informant, namely, Sonam Kumari, PW2 was projected as an eye-witness. The case of the prosecution rested mainly upon her deposition. She is sister of the deceased and is an interested and related witness. The formal F.I.R. was registered at 18.45 hours on March 24, 2016 and the F.I.R. was received by the concerned Magistrate Court on March 30, 2016. "Thus, there is a gross delay in sending the F.I.R. to the concerned Magistrate Court for which the prosecution has failed to give any reasonable explanation." Notably, at another place, the judgement recorded that the formal F.I.R. was registered on march 24, 2016 at 23:30 hours. 

Justice Pancholi also noted that from the deposition given by P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, who were near relatives of the deceased, it transpires that there were major contradictions and improvement in their version. All the these witnesses had deposed before the Court that all the four accused together flung the deceased on the ground. However, no such allegation was levelled against the accused in the written report given by P.W. 3, informant. 

He recorded that as per the case of P.Ws. 1 to 3, the deceased sustained grievous spear injuries on both sides of his chest. He also sustained injuries on his navel and scrotum. But the deposition of P.W. 6, Dr. Bipin Kumar Chaudhary, who had conducted the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased, it emerged that injury Nos. 1 and 2 are incised wound injuries, whereas injury Nos. 3 and 4 are bruises. During cross-examination, this witness specifically stated that, except these two injuries mentioned by him in the examination-in-chief, he did not find any other injury either on the navel or the scrotum of the dead body. Thus, we are of the view that the medical evidence does not support the version given by the prosecution-witnesses, namely P.Ws. 1 to 3. PW2, Sonam Kumari's deposition also does not match with the medical report which revealed that no such injuries were found on the navel or scrotum of the dead body as was claimed by her. He also recorded that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses. He took note of the fact that from the version of the prosecution-witness, i.e. the I.O., it was revealed that Bhopal and Chandan, the two accused, although they were not present at the scene, they were falsely implicated. The P.W. 3, informant, who is the father of the deceased drafted the written report
immediately at the place of occurrence. During cross-examination, he stated that he had arranged the paper for preparing the report from a shop, but he does not want to disclose the name of the person who brought the paper from the shop. Justice Pancholi observed that if P.W. 3, informant, had already disclosed the names of the assailants and the manner in which the occurrence took place to the police on telephone, there was no question of giving the written report to the police. He pointed out from the record that there was discrepancy with regard to the time of preparing the inquest report. The counsel for the appellants stated that there is overwriting in Column Nos. 1 and 3 of the inquest report from which it can be said that prosecution has not come with clean hands and has suppressed the correct version. 

The judgement reads: "We have also gone through the inquest report produced before the trial court. It appears that there is overwriting at two places, i.e. Column Nos. 1 and 3. It would further reveal from the evidence that the investigating agency has failed to recover/discover the weapons/spears with which assaults were made. Further, the prosecution did not examine A.S.I. Anil Prasad who has prepared the inquest report. Similarly, prosecution did not examine police officer Ramshankar Dubey who was sent by the S.H.O. (P.W. 5) to the place of occurrence."

Justice Pancholi acquitted the appellants of the charges levelled against them by the Trial Court. The appellant Madhav Kumar@ Madhav Singh and appellant Gopal Singh were in custody. They were directed to be released from jail custody forthwith. The appellants Bhopal Singh and Chandan Singh @Chandan Kumar (in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 784 of 2018) were on bail. They were discharged from the liabilities of their bail-bonds.

Also read: Justice Pancholi led Division Bench upholds judgment of acquittal by Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya 

Also read: Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024, set aside judgment of 1991  

  

 

Patna High Court judgement of 2015 upholding 2010 order of Additional Sessions Judge-II, Saharsa in rape case of 2007 reaches Supreme Court

In Sanjay Kamat vs. The State of Bihar (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Dharnidhar Jha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a judgement dated July 6, 2015 upholding the judgment of conviction dated February 10, 2010 and order of sentence dated February 15, 2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Saharsa in Sessions Trial of 2008 in a rape offence of 2007. By the impugned judgment, Sanjay Kamat, the appellant was held guilty of committing an offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and he, after being heard under Section 235 Cr.P.C., was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. Justice Jha concluded:"After apprising the evidence of witnesses, we come to the conclusion that the learned trial judge was perfectly justified, in face of the evidence available to him, to hold that the prosecution had succeeded in bringing the charge home to the present appellant and he appears appropriately passing the order of sentence. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed."The appellant filed an appeal against the High Court's judgment in the Supreme Court on April 25, 2025. It was verified on June 23, 2025. It came up for hearing on July on July 2, 2025 but was adjourned. 

The appellant had appealed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence in the High Court. The gist of the allegation was that while playing, a girl child of 6-7 years was lured into visiting the village fair where she could be getting some balloons from the appellant. The grandmother of the victim opposed the taking away of the victim but the appellant succeeded in his act. It was evening and dark and the little child did not come back. The victim was brought to her mother to tell her that it was this appellant who had handed the injured and bleeding little child to them to be handed over to her mother. The incident had occurred at about 5.00 P.M. on October 20, 2007. 

The High Court observed: "In spite of the non-examination of the investigating officer, what we further find from the record is that the investigation was completed and the solitary appellant was sent up for trial which ended in the impugned judgment." It was authored by Justice Jha.

Justice Jha recorded that the trial court judge before proceeding to record the evidence of PW3, the victim of the occurrence, had put certain questions to her in order to judging her competence of appreciating wordly things and thus, her competence to retain facts so as to relate them at a later stage. The judgement reads: "We refrain ourselves from putting those words in this judgment on account of the privacy reasons, but we may note that the victim had indeed narrated the real facts concerning the commission of the offence with her. She had narrated the manner as to how she was ravished and what the appellant had done in that connection. That these two lines we put down only to convey the facts which were stated by PW3 and whatever she had stated or whatever the learned counsel who had appeared during trial on behalf of the appellant had elicited, appear to us quite an unequal a dual between the little child who could be not knowing the crafts of the court and the competence and ingenuity of a counsel in such matters. The questions which were put to the little girl could be as nauseating and disturbing as they could have been, we wish the trial court ought to have prohibited them from being put to the child." Justice Jha observed that those were words which could impart a sense of shame to anyone, "but the counsel was as ruthless in putting those words to the little child during her cross examination". It is apparent from her deposition sheet. He noted: "At any rate, the judges have very limited resources and power to intervene in matters of restraining cross-examination and the answers to those questions further confirm us in our view that it could be the appellant only who had committed the offence." 

Justice Jha observed: "The examination of the investigating officer  could have given only one evidence as to what was the place of occurrence. His non-examination or the non-examination of the persons of the neighbourhood to us do not appear material inasmuch as when a little child of 6-7 years was giving evidence forthrightly in court to the incident, it was immaterial for the court to look for any other evidence." 

Supreme Court issues notice, grants relief to co-accused who was denied pre-arrest bail by Justice Harish Kumar

In Abhay Kumar @Yogi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and N. K. Singh passed an order dated July 3, 2025 granting relief to the appellant. The order reads:"if the petitioner is arrested in connection with FIR No.897/2023, he shall be released on personal bond of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) subject to undertaking that he will cooperate in the investigation/trial and shall not tamper with the evidences or threaten the witnesses." The Court issued notice returnable within four weeks. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that that the other co-accused persons, who have been ascribed similar role, has been granted the benefit of anticipatory bail by the High Court whereas the petitioner has been denied the benefit only on the ground that he has criminal antecedents. It is stated that the criminal antecedents was of 2019. Insofar as the present case was concerned, there was a cross version of the incident and the petitioner also suffered injuries. The Court opined: "The matter requires consideration."

In Vikash Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court passed an order dated May 5, 2025 denying bail to Abhay Kumar, one of the four petitioners saying, "So far the petitioner no. 2 is concerned, considering his criminal antecedent, this Court is not inclined to accord the privilege of anticipatory bail. Let the petitioner no. 2 be surrendered before the Court below preferably within a period of four weeks from today. In case the petitioner no. 2 abide by the order of this Court, the learned Court below shall consider the prayer for bail of the petitioner no. 2, without being prejudice by the present order." But it granted pre-arrest bail to the three other petitioners. 

The petitioners including Abhay Kumar apprehend their arrest in connection with Maner P.S. case of 2023, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 307, 379, 504 and 506. All the petitioners had caught hold the grandson of the informant and brutally assaulted him and snatched Rs. 15,000. 

The counsel for the State had opposed the pre-arrest bail application of Abhay Kumar and others. He submitted that so far the compromise between the parties is concerned, the offence is not compoundable in view of the fact that FIR has been instituted under Section 307 and other allied sections of the Indian Penal Code.  

An offence that is "not compoundable" means it cannot be settled or resolved through a compromise or agreement between the parties involved. These are generally serious offenses that are considered harmful to society as a whole, and therefore require a full legal process for resolution. Compoundable Offences are offenses where the victim and the accused can reach a compromise or settlement, often with the court's permission. The legal proceedings may be discontinued if the victim withdraws their complaint. The examples include certain types of assault, wrongful confinement, and defamation. 

Non-compoundable offences are offenses where a compromise or settlement is not permitted by law. The case must go through a full trial, and the court will ultimately decide the outcome. These are typically serious offenses like murder, rape, and kidnapping.  The examples of non-compoundable offences include  murder (Section 302), rape (Section 376), kidnapping (Section 363, voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons (Section 326) and criminal breach of trust by a public servant (Section 409).

Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra denies bail for cyber offences at Digital Online Examination Center, Purnia under Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024

In Dharmveer Kumar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's bench of Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra passed an order dated April 15, 2025 denying bail to the residents of Nalanda in connection with Purnea Cyber P.S. case of 2024 instituted for the offences under Sections 318(4), 319(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 61(2), 111 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 65, 66(C), 66(D) of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 and Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024. Digital Online Examination Center at Hansda Road, Gulabbag, Purnia. The order of Justice Mishra has been challenged in the Supreme Court passed an order dated July 2025 issuing notice to the respondents returnable within three weeks in  Dharmveer Kumar vs. The State of Bihar  & Anr. (2025). 

The police officials reached at Digital Online Examination Center at Hansda Road, Gulabbag, Purnia and during verification caught 12 fake candidates including Dharmveer Kumar and Deepu Kumar, a resident of Nalanda, the petitioners were found using forged admit cards, Aadhaar cards and other documents and were arrested. On query, they confessed of appearing in the examination in place of actual students in exchange of money. They also disclosed that the original students were present in a nearby flat where their e-admit cards were being verified for ‘bio-metric In-Out’ access. Later on, the police raided the said flat and recovered e-devices and other incriminating materials. It was revealed that before the entry of the fake candidates, the owner of the lab Vivek Kumar, his partner Roshan Kumar S/o Suryadeo Mandal, Rahul Raj and other accomplices used to prepare the documents at the Purnia Digital Center. Subsequently, seven Purnia Digital staff members who are alleged to have helped in organizing the cheating process, were also arrested. The police also arrested two persons, namely Roshan Kumar s/o Ajay Singh and Kunal Kumar who were fleeing from the Center, in front of the Purnia Digital Examination Center on the road. From the place of location, connecting network wire and other technical items were recovered. From the flat of Suresh Chandra Saha, 14 original examinees, were also arrested and, on search, various documents including fake admit cards, Aadhaar cards, original IDs of the students etc. were recovered. From outside the flat, the police also seized Tata Harrier car with a cheque of Rs. 60,000/- and Rs. 4,20,400/- in cash. The police also recovered several incriminating articles from the Hotel Shine. Two motorcycles and one scooter were also seized.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners submitted that there is a non-compliance of Section 103 of the  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita B.N.S.S., 2023 (Section 100 from Cr.PC) which creates a serious doubt in the prosecution case. The petitioners had no criminal antecedent and were languishing in judicial custody since November 14, .2024. Charge-sheet has been submitted in the case. 

Section 103 in BNSS reads: "103. Persons in charge of closed place to allow search. (1)Whenever any place liable to search or inspection under this Chapter is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, such place, shall, on demand of the officer or other person executing the warrant, and on production of the warrant, allow him free ingress thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein. 

(2)If ingress into such place cannot be so obtained, the officer or other person executing the warrant may proceed in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 44.

(3)Where any person in or about such place is reasonably suspected of concealing about his person any article for which search should be made, such person may be searched and if such person is a woman, the search shall be made by another woman with strict regard to decency.

 

(4)Before making a search under this Chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate or of any other locality if no such inhabitant of the said locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the search, to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do.

 

(5)The search shall be made in their presence, and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found shall be prepared by such officer or other person and signed by such witnesses; but no person witnessing a search under this section shall be required to attend the Court as a witness of the search unless specially summoned by it.

 

(6)The occupant of the place searched, or some person in his behalf, shall, in every instance, be permitted to attend during the search, and a copy of the list prepared under this section, signed by the said witnesses, shall be delivered to such occupant or person.

 

(7)When any person is searched under sub-section (3), a list of all things taken possession of shall be prepared, and a copy thereof shall be delivered to such person.

 

(8)Any person who, without reasonable cause, refuses or neglects to attend and witness a search under this section, when called upon to do so by an order in writing delivered or tendered to him, shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 222 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023."

Justice Mishra observed: "In the opinion of this Court, public examinations play a crucial role in shaping the educational and professional futures of individuals. The credibility and fairness of these examinations are fundamental to ensure equal opportunities for all candidates. In this case, it is alleged that the petitioners along with the other co-accused persons in connivance with criminal conspiracy and in organized way committed the offence of cheating, cheating by impersonation, forgery of valuable
security and fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine any document or electronic record which they know or have reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record. They have also committed an offence under the I.T. Act as well as the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 recently passed by the Parliament. Such type of offence undermines the principles of meritocracy, equal
opportunities, integrity of system and ultimately impacting the credibility of qualifications and the over all social fabric."

He concluded:"Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and after going through the entire records of this case as also taking into account the nature and gravity of the offence, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners at this stage". He made it clear that if the trial is not concluded within the period of six months, the petitioners will be at liberty to renew their prayer for bail before the court below which will be disposed of on its own merit without being prejudiced by this order."