Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra sets aside orders by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur, underlines criminal breach of trust and cheating have different ingredients

In Ranjeet Kumar Rai @ Bablu Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 17-page long judgement dated July 31, 2026, wherein, it set aside the order dated March 5, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in G.R. No. 739 of 2016 which arose out of V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 and the subsequent order dated September 10, 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur in Trial No. 1019 of 2018/G.R. No. 739 of 2016. The judgement reads:"Consequently, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom, stands quashed. 21. Both the Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are, accordingly, allowed." Justice Mishra observed:"19. In the considered opinion of this Court, even if the allegations contained in the F.I.R are accepted in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the petitioner. The dispute, at its core, is essentially contractual and civil in nature, which has been sought to be given the colour of a criminal prosecution."  

Justice Mishra relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Race Club (1940) & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 wherein, it has distinguished between criminal breach of trust and cheating.  “36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients...."

The trial court had taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the petitioner, and the discharge application preferred by the petitioner was rejected. 

Justice Mishra recorded that in this case, neither entrustment of property nor dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction was discernible from the allegations made in the F.I.R. The dispute, arose out of an alleged breach of contractual obligations relating to sale of a motor vehicle and does not disclose the commission of either offence. A plain reading of the First Information Report did not disclose the essential ingredients of Sections 503 and 504 Indian Penal Code. Except for a bald allegation of abuse and threat, there is no material to indicate intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace as required under Section 504 Indian Penal Code, nor are the allegations sufficient to constitute criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 503 Indian Penal Code punishable under Section 506 Indian Penal Code. The case fell squarely within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not constitute any offence and where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure." 

Justice Mishra also concluded: "Continuation of the criminal proceeding, in the facts of the present case, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and would warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court."

The prosecution case was that Anil Kumar Chaudhary, the opposite party No.2 (informant), being the registered owner of a Bolero Pick-up Van bearing Registration No. BR-09M-4666, alleged that on August 1, 2016 the petitioner had approached him with a proposal to purchase the said vehicle. The sale consideration was settled at Rs.4,21,000/-, whereupon the petitioner allegedly issued a cheque of Rs.2,50,000/- towards part payment and agreed to pay the remaining Rs.1,71,000/- within two weeks, whereafter possession of the vehicle was delivered to him. It is further alleged that when the cheque was presented for encashment on September 30, 2016, the same was dishonoured. Thereafter, on October 5, 2016, when O.P. No.2 approached the petitioner demanding either payment of the amount or return of the vehicle, the petitioner allegedly abused and threatened him with dire consequences and refused either to return the vehicle or to make payment, further stating that he would dispose of the vehicle as scrap. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, a written report was submitted by O.P. No.2 before the SHO, Vidyapatinagar Police Station, Samastipur, pursuant to which F.I.R bearing V. Nagar (Vidyapatinagar) P.S. Case No. 118 of 2016 was registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

In Lalan Kumar v. The State of Bihar (Cr.Misc No. 37503 of 2023), the High Court has held that prosecution under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can only be initiated by filing complaint. It was also submitted that no statutory demand notice, as mandated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was ever issued and, therefore, the very institution of criminal proceedings under the said provision is legally unsustainable. He further submitted that the Magistrate  mechanically took cognizance without due application of judicial mind and that the subsequent rejection of the discharge application also suffers from the same infirmity. It is, thus, submitted that both the impugned orders dated 05.03.2018 and 10.09.2018 be quashed along with the entire criminal proceeding.
 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order of cognizance by CJM, Gopalganj with all its consequential proceedings in a Complaint Case of 2016

In Kishori Devi vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 6-page long judgment dated July 24, 2026 concluded that in view of factual and legal submissions and "by taking note of fact as the effective disputes between the parties, prima-facie appears land dispute being coparcener for which a title suit is already pending between the parties since 2013 i.e., Title Suit No.309/2013, where petitioners are coparcener, accordingly this court is convinced that present criminal case was filed out of oblique motive to settle the land dispute by lodging this criminal prosecution, which is prima-facie un-occasioned and unwarranted. Accordingly, by taking note of legal ratio as mentioned in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) & Rikhab Birani Case (supra), impugned order of cognizance dated 22.11.2017 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named petitioners arising thereof as passed in Complaint Case No. 3727 of 2016, pending before learned CJM, Gopalganj is hereby quashed and set aside. 10. Hence, this application stands allowed."

The quashing petition was preferred for quashing the order dated November 22, 2017 passed in TR No.2525/2017 which arose out of Complaint Case No. 3727/2016 passed by CJM, Gopalganj where cognizance was taken for the offences punishable under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. 

Justice Jha recorded that despite repeated calls Dhrup Narayan Singh, the Opposite Party No. 2, failed to join the present proceedings. 

The prosecution case, as stated in the complaint petition, was that Mahanth Rai had four sons, namely Daroga Singh, Dharmnath Singh, Sipahi Singh and Kapildeo Singh. Kapildeo Singh died leaving behind two sons, Uday Narayan Singh and Dhup Narayan Singh, and two daughters, Radha Devi and Rema Devi,
while the other three sons died issueless. Dhup Narayan Singh had two sons, Krishna Pratap Singh and Chandan Kumar Singh, and three daughters, Kishori Devi, Rekha Kumari and Simple Kumari, of whom Kishori Devi was married to accused no. 5. It was alleged that accused no. 5, in connivance with others, falsely claimed Rakesh Ranjan Singh and his wife to be the son-in-law and daughter of Uday Narayan Singh and started executing sale deeds in respect of valuable ancestral lands without partition, compelling the complainant to institute Partition Suit No. 309/2013 before the Court of the Sub-Judge-XI, Gopalganj. Despite having knowledge of the pending partition suit, petitioner no(s). 1 and 2 allegedly executed a sale deed by falsely representing petitioner no. 1 as the daughter of Uday Narayan Singh, whereas she was in fact the daughter of the complainant. On April 26, 2016, when the complainant came to know about the alleged forgery and demanded return of the forged documents from petitioner no(s). 1 and 2, the accused persons allegedly assaulted him and forcibly snatched Rs.10,000/- and his mobile phone. 

The counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the ingredients for constituting offences under Sections 419, 323 and 504 of the IPC was not made out prima-facie and, therefore, cognizance as taken against the petitioners in the background of land dispute is appearing bad in the eyes of law. It was submitted that for the land dispute complainant preferred a Title Suit No. 309/2013 prior to lodging of this case, pending before the Court of learned Sub Judge-I, Gopalganj. It was also submitted that the accused/petitioners are coparcener and party of the said suit and to create unnecessary pressure or to settle personal vengeance out of oblique motive the present criminal case was lodged, which was completely un-occasioned and unwarranted and, therefore, cognizance order is fit to be quashed/set aside. The counsel submitted that cognizance should not be taken in such a mechanical manner. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied upon the reports of Supreme Court as available through State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335 and Rikhab Birani &  Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2025 SCC OnLine SC 823].

The paragraph no. 102 of the Bhajan Lal Case reads: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused. 
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 

The paragraph no(s). 19 and 20 of the Rikhab Birani Case reads: “19. It is the duty and obligation of the court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing process, particularly when the matter is essentially of civil nature. 13 The prevalent impression that civil remedies, being time-consuming, do not adequately protect the interests of creditors or lenders should be discouraged and rejected as criminal procedure cannot be used to apply pressure. 14 Failure to do so results in the breakdown of the rule of law and amounts to misuse and abuse of the legal process.20. In yet another case, again arising from criminal proceedings initiated in the State of Uttar Pradesh this Court was constrained to note recurring cases being encountered wherein parties repeatedly attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal courts by filing vexatious complaints, camouflaging allegations that are ex facie outrageous or are pure civil claims. These attempts must not be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. Reference was made to a judgment of this Court in Thermax Limited v. K.M. Johny which held that courts should be watchful of the difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though there can be situations where the allegation may constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind on these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating officer etc. to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.”

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

 

 

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Justice Anil Kumar Sinha quashes criminal proceedings under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, holds prosecution to be a “counterblast”

In Ankit Kumar Sharma vs. The State of Bihar Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Anil Kumar Sinha of Patna High Court delivered a 16-page long judgement dated May 16, 2026, wherein, he quashed criminal proceedings under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and IPC provisions, holding that the prosecution appeared to be a “counterblast” to an earlier dowry harassment complaint filed by one of the accused against her husband and in-laws. 

Justice Sinha concluded:"24. It is well settled principle that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment and private vendetta. The High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.... The learned Special Court has taken cognizance without appreciating the attending circumstances, and in mechanical manner. 27. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion and the attending circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that a vexatious, frivolous and malicious complaint has been instituted against the appellants with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance which is a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the wife/appellant no. 4 against her husband at Jaipur. The FIR was lodged by the domestic help/caretaker of the husband of appellant no. 4 and the same is in abuse of the process of Court to harass the appellants and the learned Special Court has taken cognizance without due application of judicial mind. Allowing the prosecution to continue will result in miscarriage of justice to the appellants. 28. In the result, the order taking cognizance dated 27.09.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Saran at Chapra and the entire prosecution arising out of Garhka P.S.Case No. 298 of 2020 against the appellants is hereby quashed."

Justice Sinha drew on the analytical framework laid down by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of UP (2025) SCC Online SC 1947, becomes highly relevant. The court delineated four steps to determine the veracity of a prayer gor quashing under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which are as follows:-

Step 1. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?

Step 2. Whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges leveled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?

Step 3. Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant, and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

Step 4. Whether proceedings with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court and would not serve the ends of justice?

Justice Sinha observed: "If the answer to all the steps is in affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.22. In the present matter, it appears that respondent no. 2 has been set up by the husband and mother-in-law of appellant no. 4 to lodge the present FIR in order to take revenge for lodging FIR at Jaipur by appellant no. 4 against her husband and his family members. The informant has admitted in the FIR that she is domestic help/caretaker of the house of Late father of the husband of appellant no. 4. 23. The motive for instituting the FIR against the appellants appears to be at the behest of landlords/masters of the respondent no. 2, i.e., Manish Kumar and Meera Devi, in whose house the respondent no. 2 resides and work for profit. If attending circumstances, emerging from the record of the case, is taken into account and the FIR is read with due care and circumspection, this Court comes to the conclusion that the criminal prosecution has been lodged in order to wreck vengeance on appellant no. 4 and her entire family for instituting a case under Section 498A of the I.P.C against the masters/landlord of respondent no. 2, including the husband of appellant no. 4. The FIR is a counterblast and tool to harass the appellants by way of launching false and malicious prosecution."

The prosecution case, as per the FIR lodged by the informant, namely Kalawati Devi, was that she resides in the house of late Ramji Singh and she was a caretaker of his garmland and house. In June 2019, Manish Kumar, son of late Ramji Singh, was married with Shalini Sharma/appellant no. 4.

Ankit Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma appellant nos. 1 and 3, who are brothers of Shalini Sharma/appellant no.4, visited the house of late Ramji Singh and abused her, addressing her with her caste name and threatened to throw her belongings out of the house. It was alleged that on June 29, 2020, appellants, along with two unknown persons, arrived in a car from their village Baikuntpur, Vaishali. Upon arrival, Shailendra Sharma and Abhinesh Sharma started hurling caste-based abuses and threatened the informant to vacate the house. The informant requested for some time to make alternative arrangements and upon hearing this, appellant nos. 1 to 3 dragged the informant by her hair out on to the road, assaulted her and tore her saree in order to outrage her modesty. When the informant's husband intervened to save her, he was also assaulted by the appellants. The local people gathered at the spot after hearing noise. In the meanwhile, appellant no. 1 took out pistol, pointed it at the informant’s forehead and threatened her to vacate the house failing which she would face dire consequences.

Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey accepts unconditional apology from Advocate P.R. Singh for inadvertent mistake, recalls 2018 order by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi

In Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 30-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"43. From perusal of record, it is evident that occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. The appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Hence, to put the appellant in jail for remaining period is too harsh as appellant is aged about 90 years. Hence, the court is of the view that if sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone that would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. 44. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant appeal stands partly allowed. 45. The interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. 46. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of the concerned jail for compliance and for record. 47. The records of this case be also returned to the concerned trial court forthwith." 

Justice Pandey observed: "42. So far as sentence of appellant under Section-324 of I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged about 90 years, he is a first offender and appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. Hence, if the appellant is sentenced to the period undergone, that would meet the ends of justice." 

An  Interlocutory Application was filed on behalf of the appellant for recalling the order dated November 27, 2018, wherein it was submitted that appellant of the appeal namely, Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh was still alive. It was also submitted that due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication, counsel for the appellant inadvertently informed the Court that the appellant had expired, whereas in fact, it was the father of the appellant who had died and not the appellant. It was also submitted that the incorrect statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and no benefit could have accrued to the appellant by making such a submission. However, an unconditional apology was also  tendered on behalf of the appellant for the inadvertent mistake. Prabhat Ranjan Singh was the counsel for the appellant who had made the inadvertent mistake. The Court was satisfied that the incorrect statement was made due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication. 

The November 2018 order reads:"It has been submitted at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that sole appellant Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh is dead. It has further been submitted that as fine has also been inflicted apart from substantial sentence whereupon, the siblings of appellant (since deceased) intent to proceed with instant appeal and so, substitution is needed and for that an adjournment of four weeks be granted. List accordingly. During midst thereof, the concerned should take proper step." Notably, it was the father of the appellant who had died, not the appellant. 

Accordingly, the 1-page long order dated November 27, 2018 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi was recalled by Justice Pandey. The Criminal Appeal was restored to its original file and number. and I.A. No. 3 of 2018 was allowed. 

The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated January 15, 2009 and order of sentence dated January 17, 2009 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-IV, Jehanabad in Sessions Trial No. 566 of 2006/138 of 2006, arising out of Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 (G.R. Case No. 413 of 2005) whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 341 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 307 of IPC and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month in each Sections 447 and 341 of IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

As per prosecution case, the informant Bharteshwar Prasad (PW-6), while undergoing treatment at the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar, gave his fardbeyan before A.S.I. Balmiki Singh of Islampur Police Station on March 21, 2005 at about 10:30 A.M., stating inter alia that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house at village Keur from Islampur Bazaar. As soon as he opened his door, his co-villager Akhilesh Prasad (appellant), armed with a farsa, came to his door along with two unknown persons and abused him in filthy language. Upon protest by the informant, the accused persons disclosed that the informant used to demand the outstanding rent from the wife and sister of the appellant, who had been residing in the informant’s house at Islampur without paying rent for the last two and a half years. On this issue, the accused/appellant allegedly threatened the informant that he would teach the informant and his son Arun such a lesson that they would forget to demand the rent. After a brief altercation, the appellant Akhilesh Kumar, who was having a farsa in his hand, assaulted the informant by giving a farsa blow on his head with an intention to kill him. Due to the assault, the informant sustained bleeding injuries and he became unconscious. He raised alarm for help upon which the local residents assembled at the place of occurrence. After seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The informant was taken to the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar at Islampur by the neighbours for treatment. During the course of treatment, he gained consciousness. On the basis of fardbeyan given by the informant/PW-6, Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 dated March 23, 2005 was registered for the offence under Sections 447, 504, 341, 323, 324 and 34 of the I.P.C. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 326, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance under the aforementioned Sections of the IPC. The case was committed to the court of sessions after following due procedure. The  trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined all together seven witnesses. 

Justice Pandey observed:"The presence of injured witness/informant at the place of occurrence cannot be discarded as he is sufferer of crime and has supported the story of prosecution on the point of place of  occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence. As such, even if the Investigating Officer of
this case has not been examined, the whole prosecution story cannot be thrown out in a case where the place of occurrence is otherwise proved. Even if some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies are found in the evidence of prosecution-witnesses regarding manner of appearance of some of the witnesses, the whole story of prosecution cannot be thrown out when crux of the prosecution story is quite intact and
supportive of manner of occurrence, time of occurrence and how the injured/informant suffered injuries. 

Justice Pandey relied on para 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2011 SC 280, which reads: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to
discredit an injured witness."

He drew on para 30 of the Court's judgment in Mano Dutt & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79, which observed as follows:-"30... Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit."

In State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view was reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. 

Justice Pandey considered as to whether the act of the appellant would attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code or not. "36. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 307 IPC, intention or knowledge to cause death is the essential ingredient. Mere causing of grievous injury by a sharp cutting weapon is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, unless intention or knowledge to cause death is clearly established." 

The judgement reads:"37. It has rightly been admitted by P.W. 6/informant that there was no intention on the part of appellant regarding causing death as despite having full opportunity, the appellant did not commit any act of assault repeatedly. The very act of appellant clarifies that the intention was not to kill the informant/victim and, at best, inference can be drawn with regard to causing injury to informant. Considering the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, there was no repetition of assault and there is absence of clear evidence regarding intention or knowledge to cause death, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of given facts and circumstances of the case that from the materials on record, only offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. can be made out and, as such, conviction of appellant under Section-307 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. 38. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the impugned judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of appellant stands modified to that under Section-324 of I.P.C. 

In absence of evidence, no offence was made out under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-341 of I.P.C. There was no allegation of criminal trespass against the appellant either in the initial version of the prosecution-story or in the evidence of the prosecution-witnesses, including the informant. The informant’s version in the initial version of the prosecution story as well as in his evidence is that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house and as soon as he was opening the door of his house, the accused Akhilesh Prasad came and assaulted him on his head by means of farsa. Hence, it was evident that the incident of assault took place outside the door of informant’s house. In view of the above, no offence is made out under Section 447 of the IPC. Accordingly, appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-447 of I.P.C.

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha sets aside order by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga

In Md. Reyaz & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated February 25, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... by taking note of guidelines as mentioned in para nos. 1, 5 and 7 of Bhajan Lal (supra), impugned order of discharge along with cognizance order dated 28.04.2022 with all its consequential proceedings, qua, all above named appellants arising thereof as passed in in SC/ST/GR Case No. 33 of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case No. 137 of 2017, pending before learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga is hereby quashed and set aside. 13. Hence, this application stands allowed. 14. TCR (Trial Court Records), if any, be returned to the learned Trial Court alongwith the copy of this judgment." 

The quashing petition was preferred to quash the order dated April 28, 2022 passed in SC/ST/GR Case of 2017 arising out of Sadar P.S. Case of 2017 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Exclusive SC/ST(POA) Act, Darbhanga, where learned Exclusive Special Judge for SC/ST (POA) Act rejected the application of the appellants filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. for not framing the charge against them for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 419, 504, 506 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that at the stage of framing of charge the appellants filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. praying therein that no offence under the SC/ST Act or under the IPC made out against them in the present case, as the core issue is land dispute arising out of oral agreement, where petitioner no. 2 was implicated only for the reason as he was witness of the agreement of sale, petitioner no. 3 was implicated being the wife of Md. Rakib Alam. It was submitted that there is no occasion to implicate petitioner no. 2 namely Md. Mehtab Alam @ Md. Mehtab. It was further submitted that even the abuse in the caste name as per FIR was just to aggravate the allegation as to implicate the appellants for the offences punishable under the Sections 3(i)(s), 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(w) of the
SC/ST Act. He also submitted that as per FIR, only “caste related abuse” was alleged to made during the
occurrence without specifying any caste. It was submitted that the occurrence alleged to be taken place at about 10:00 PM inside the house, therefore, allegation qua abusing in public view was not appears convincing. Neither sale deed was executed nor money was paid hence, no offence under the Indian Penal Code is made out. 

The counsel relied upon Supreme Court's decision in Murarilal Gupta vs. Gopi Singh, [(2005) 13 SCC 699. He also submitted that, in-fact informant himself was the land broker and he lodged this criminal case for putting pressure, against appellants. It was submitted that no money has been transferred in the accounts of any of the three appellants and as such they are not beneficiary out of alleged land deal. 

The counsel drew on the decision of Supreme Court in Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Another, [SLP (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025] and also State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335. He also relied upon the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. [2023 SCC OnLine SC 603]. 

The paragraph no(s). 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Keshaw Mahto Case (supra) for better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
11. This Court in Shajan Skaria vs. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, laid down the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act. It reads thus:-
“55. The basic ingredients to constitute the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are:
a. Accused person must not be a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; b. Accused must intentionally insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. Accused must do so with the intent to humiliate such a person; and
d. Accused must do so at any place within public view.”
12. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation by the accused is
that the person who is subjected to is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In other words, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) cannot stand merely on the fact that the informant/complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless the insult or intimidation is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community.
13. To put it briefly - first, the fact that the complainant belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such person being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
15. Further, for an offence to be made out under Section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough. At the same time, saying caste name would also not constitute an offence.
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse.
9. It would be apposite at this stage to reproduce paragraph no. 34 of the better understanding of the case, which is as under:-
34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a 3-Judge Bench of this Court, in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: “15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 
16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily civil or private where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P.C.”

Justice Jha referred to the paragraph no. 102 of the Supreme Court's decision in Bhajan Lal Case (supra) which reads as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first informant report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of nay offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Justice Jha observed: "11. Coming to the case in hand, it appears that dispute between the parties are civil in nature arising out of agreement related with land deal, where appellants are not the beneficiary and moreover, in view of aforesaid discussions qua making out a case for the offence under SC/ST Act, particularly in view of Keshaw Mahto Case (supra), no case for the aforesaid offence is made out."

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

Supreme Court sets aside Patna High Court's order passed without considering charge-sheet etc

In Naveen Kumar Sah vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 6-page long order dated January 19, 2026, wherein, it concluded: ".....we are of the view that since the High Court was not apprised of the charge-sheet submitted after investigation, and the impugned order came to be passed without considering the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and the matter requires reconsideration by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.07.2025 is set aside. The writ petition of the petitioner (respondent no.7 herein), namely, Criminal Writ Case No.531 of 2024, shall stand restored on the file of the High Court to be dealt with afresh in accordance with law. 8. We clarify that parties shall bring on record of the High Court the charge-sheet and the materials submitted in support thereof. 9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order in Bijay Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025) was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar. Naveen Kumar Sah was the Respondent No. 7 in the High Court.

The Court granted leave and allowed the appeal. The appeal impugned judgment and order of the Patna High Court of Judicature at Patna dated July 14, 2025 by which the High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, quashed the first information report (FIR) under Sections 341, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (Arms Act).

The submission of the counsel for the appellant (complainant) was that prior to the date the order of the High Court was passed, the Investigating Agency had already submitted a charge-sheet indicting the accused of offences punishable, inter alia, under Sections 188, 290, 341, 323, 504 of the IPC; Section 26(1) of the Arms Act and Section 67 of I.T. Act, 2000. It was submitted that the High Court failed to consider the charge-sheet and the materials collected in support thereof before exercising its writ jurisdiction to quash the FIR.

In Mamta Shailesh Chandra vs. State of  Uttarakhand and others1 it was held that even if charge sheet had been filed, the Court could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the FIR, charge-sheet and other documents. Likewise, in Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.2, this Court held:

“19. No doubt, a petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173(2) of the CrPC, but when a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on investigation, the Court must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before taking a call whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not. ..”

Justice Kumar had concluded:". It appears that the land of the petitioner was forcibly being used as informant and others as the informant has not been able to show any order of any authority declaring the land of the petitioner as aam rasta (common passage). If the land of the petitioner was being used as aam rasta (common passage) by the informant and others forcibly then the petitioner has a right of private defence and he has not exceeded that right. 8. In view of the above, I am of the view that the present F.I.R. is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Accordingly, this criminal writ application is allowed and the F.I.R. vide Mojahidpur P.S. Case No.246 of 2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed." 

Supreme Court observed that the counsel for respondent no.7, though could not dispute that charge-sheet was submitted before the impugned order was passed, submitted that the allegations were false and malicious. Moreover, there was a dispute regarding a passage which the accused claims to be his own. Otherwise also, the allegations were only regarding a shot being fired in air. As the shot was allegedly fired from a weapon licensed to the accused, no offence was committed by the accused.

It noted:"Be that as it may, as it has been brought on record that before the date of the order of the High Court, a charge-sheet was submitted by the Investigating Agency, the same ought to have been brought to the notice of the High Court."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court sets aside judgement authored by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi in a morder case from Rohtas

In Rajesh Upadhayay vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan, N.V. Anjaria delivered a 24-page long judgement dated December 18, 2025, wherein it set aside the 6-page order dated August 28, 2024 authored by Justice Vipul M.Pancholi as part of Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sheo Narayan Mahto @ Sheo Narayan Singh @ Shiv Narayan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024).   

This appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 3, 2024 and order of sentence dated April 9, 2024 rendered by the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge 19th, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 2022, which arose out of Baghaila P.S. case of 2021where-under and whereby, the Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offences under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offences under Sections 342/149 of the IPC, To undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 147 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offences under Sections 504/149 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of two year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 148 of the IPC. The appellant was also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.  

The appellant-original complainant questioned judgment and order dated August 28, 2024 by the High Court, whereby the High Court had suspended the sentence imposed on respondent No.2 and released him on bail during the pendency of the Appeal. Supreme Court's judgment records that the appellant-informant’s father named Krishna Behari Upadhyay was murdered. As per the prosecution story, on December 11, 2021 at about 4.30 p.m., the appellant along with his father Krishna Behari Upadhyay reached at Mahavir temple of the village to light ‘Diya’ and to do ‘Arti’. At that time, the accused persons and the co-villagers Bashishthha Singh alias Munna Singh, Ajit Singh, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Sheo Narayan Mahto- respondent No.2 herein wielding the arms and weapons reached, at the temple. Hurling abuses, all of them surrounded the appellant and his father, telling said Krishna Behari Upadhyay that he was not performing Puja and was engaging in politics. The prosecution case was that  that Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay tried to close the main gate of the temple, but the accused persons pushed the gate and made a forcible entry inside the temple. Ajit Singh and Raghunandan Kumar caught hold of Krishna Behari Upadhyay and Munna Singh was stated to have fired at him with a revolver. It was stated respondent No.2 also had a country-made pistol with him and that he as well as another Rajesh Mehto alias Rajesh Kumar were instigatively uttering that the Pandit should be killed as he was excessively indulging in politics. Because of gun fire shots, Krishna Behari Upadhyay fell down inside the temple premises and was in a pool of blood. The appellant somehow managed to flee away from the place and informed his family members. Om Prakash Tiwari and Ritesh Mukhia who were the family members, as well as the other co-villagers reached at the place of the offence. They saw Munna Singh, Ajit Kumar, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Rajesh Kumar Mahto alias Rajesh as also respondent No.2-Sheo Narayan Mahto running away in the Eastern direction. Upon being taken to the hospital, Krishna Behari Upadhyay was declared dead. A Fardbeyan was given by the appellant on December 11, 2021, pursuant to which the police registered the First Information Report for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 504, 506, 302 and 120 (B), IPC, and for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the six persons, including respondent No.2. On February 2, 2022, respondent No.2 surrendered before the Trial Court. Chargesheet was filed on March 28, 2022. The Sessions Court convicted and sentenced respondent No.2. In the appeal proceedings before the High Court, respondent No.2 filed an application praying for suspension of sentence, which was allowed by the High Court and during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No.2 was ordered to be released on bail, suspending the sentence imposed on him.

The Supreme Court observed: "The High Court took the view that the role attributed to respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation, therefore, the sentence could be suspended....5. There is no escape from the fact that respondent No.2 is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC and is imposed with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with payment of fine. He is also convicted for the offence under the Arms Act. Respondent No.2 had undergone incarceration so far for three years. His appeal has been awaiting final outcome....5.2. The nature of role played by respondent No.2 was the aspect weighed with the High Court in suspending the sentence awarded to him, the High Court was further persuaded itself to justify the suspension of sentence of respondent No.2 on the ground inter alia that that the FIR was sent to the Magistrate’s court after a gap of three days and that the original copy of the inquest report was not produced. 5.3 At the outset, it may be observed that the High Court was in evident error in resting upon the said two counts. Delay of three days in sending the copy of the FIR to the court of the Magistrate and the non-production of original copy of the inquest report could be said to be illogical considerations applied by the High Court, insofar as those aspects do not have any bearing on the credence of the prosecution’s case which was otherwise established on evidence before the Trial Court. These considerations could not have guided the application of mind of the High Court. 5.4 The High Court was swayed away to observe that the role played by respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation only. It may be true that respondent No.2 was instigator when the deceased Krishna Behari Upadhyay was shot at, however, it is revealed from the record and the evidence, which the High Court has also accepted and observed, that respondent No.2 also had with him a country-made pistol. 5.5 As stated above, respondent No.2 had pistol with him and he along with Rajesh Kumar and other accused persons had been shouting ‘kill him’ (Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay)." 

Justice Anjaria who authored the judgment observed:"Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending appeal and release of appellant on bail. Conceptually, there is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence." 

He relied on the decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Supreme Court had emphasized that "the Appellate Court is expected to record proper reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of sentence or the order appealed, further observed that before suspension of sentence could be ordered, there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects. It was stated that order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as matter of routine." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "It is also the settled principle that the Appellate Court should not reappreciate evidence at stage of Section 389, CrPC and try to pick some lacunae or loopholes here and there in the case of prosecution. The presumption of innocence of the accused which is a principle applied in criminal jurisprudence, holds good only until the accused is tried. Once the accused is convicted at the end of the trial, the presumption of innocence does not continue."

He relied on the decision in Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(2021) 20 SCC 818, the Supreme Court was considering the question of grant of bail during pendency of appeal at the instance of appellant who was convicted under Section, 302/149, 201 read with Section 120-B, IPC. It was observed inter alia that the High Court should be slow in granting bail to an accused convicted under Section 302/149, IPC and that once convicted, the presumption of innocence would vanish. ‘The High Court has not at all appreciated and considered the fact that the learned trial court on appreciation of evidence has convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-BIPC. Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter. Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-B IPC.’ (Para 11).

Justice Anjaria referred to the decision in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr.(2023) 6 SCC 123, Supreme Court reiterated that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted only in exceptional cases more particularly so in cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC. It was further observed that the court should consider the relevant factors like nature of accusation made against the convict, the manner of commission of crime, the gravity of the offence, etc. Distinction was brought out between grant of relief of suspension of sentence in the cases where fixed term sentence is imposed versus the cases where the convicted person is sentenced to life imprisonment, by relying on its own decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 4 SCC 421, ‘When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach.’ (Para 3)

Even in respect of cases where the sentence awarded is for a fixed term, Supreme Court in Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 421 observed that ‘there is a caveat that if there are exceptional circumstances, then the Court may decline to suspend the sentence even in cases where fixed term of sentence is imposed’. It was specifically observed that in respect of plea of suspension of sentence where the sentence is of life imprisonment, such relief has to informed by a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court. ‘What could be those exceptional circumstances is not something exhaustive. It is for the Court concerned to look into those exceptional circumstances as may be pointed out by the State. However, the only consideration that should weigh with the appellate court while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted.’ (Para 16)

Justice Anjaria underlined that "The dictum that the benefit of suspension of sentence, if at all to be granted in the cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC, it has to be only in exception cases, is well settled in the catena of judgments. In Vijay Kumar vs. Narender & Ors.(2002) 9 SCC 366 it was observed that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC, the court should consider relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which crime is alleged to have been committed and the seriousness of offence. The view was reiterated in Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 281, Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Marashtra8, Gomti v. Thakurdas & Ors.9."

Justice Anjaria observed:"7. Looking to the crime scenario in the instant case, the murder of father of complainant-Pundit Krishna Behari Upadhyay took place inside the temple. The appellant complainant (PW2) in terms deposed that respondent No.2 had pistol in his hand. When all the accused persons came, the father of the appellant got frightened, went inside the temple. Thereupon, as is stated, the accused persons, including respondent No.2, pushed the door of the temple and made a forced entry inside, catching hold of Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay. The victim fell down having received gun shot injury to be in a pool of blood. As per the evidence appreciated by the Trial court leading to conviction of respondent No.2 under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, the firearm was used by Munna Singh whereas respondent No.2 with pistol in his hand was instigating. Munna Singh and respondent No.2 had firearms with them. Respondent No.2 had with him a country-made pistol. 8. It is also to be noted that two of the accused persons are absconding." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "9. In the light of the above highlighted principles applied to the facts of the present case and having regard to the relevant considerations such as nature of accusation, events in the crime and even the attribution of role of the appellant, it has to be held that the High Court should not have suspended the sentence, and releases respondent No.2. A clear error was committed by the High Court. The participation and role played by respondent No.2 in the entire commission of offence has to be viewed as grave and could not have been discounted for its seriousness to suspend his sentence imposed upon conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC. 9.1 It goes without saying that observations in this order are limited to the aspect of suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 and releasing him on bail, not to influence the course of merit of the trial. 10. For foregoing reasons and discussion, impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 28.08.2024 suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 is hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 Sheo Narayan Mahto to is directed to surrender within ten days. The police authorities shall ensure that respondent No.2 is sent behind the bars within the above time permitted for surrendering. 11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed."

P.S.:Subsequent to the order of the High Court dated August 28, 2024, the last order in the case was passed on May 8, 2025 by Justice Pancholi led bench in Re.: I.A. No.01 of 2025. The 3-page long order reads:"The appellant/applicant has filed the present interlocutory application with a request that the Registry be directed to send back the Trial Court Records of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 & 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to the Court of learned ADJ-19th Rohtas, Sasaram....3. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has pointed out that one of the accused has been convicted by the Trial Court whose trial was separated and, therefore, the said accused has filed the criminal appeal before this Court. This Court called for the Trial Court from the concerned Trial Court and the record is with the Registry of this Court. However, trial of other co-accused, whose trial has been separated, is still pending before the Court and, therefore, the original record is required to be transmitted to the Trial Court. 4. In view of the aforesaid request made by the appellant/applicant, office is directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the trial of the other co-accused, which has been separated, can be proceeded further. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has shown willingness to pay the cost of the same. 5. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to transmit the record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram forthwith by special messenger at the cost of the applicant (informant) of this interlocutory application. 6. Registry is also directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the proceedings in the present appeal may proceed further. 7. Accordingly, this interlocutory application, i.e., I.A. No.01 of 2025 stands disposed of."