In Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K Vinod Chandran delivered a 30-page long judgement dated May 12, 2026, wherein, it reversed 9-page long judgement of remand dated July 4, 2025 passed by Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran.
Justice Chandran observed: "35. The
prosecution has failed to establish the constant demands of dowry, a
bitter matrimony or any other circumstance which could lead to a
conclusion that the family of the husband or the husband alone had
instigated or perpetrated the crime of dowry death or subjected her to
cruelty leading to the death. Sadly, the prosecution has completely
failed to bring forth the nature of the burn injuries suffered by the
victim, which could have, on analysis by a forensic expert, garnered an
expert opinion as to whether it was a homicide, a case of fatal
self-harm or as argued by the defence, purely accidental. We have to
emphasise in this context the absence of the postmortem and
unsatisfactory explanation offered on that count. 36. The case set up by
the defence of the husband having declined the entreaties of the family
of the wife to marry her sister assumes relevance, especially in the
context of the delayed FIR registered at the home town of the deceased
while her marital home, where the incident occurred was at Mirzapur and
she succumbed at a hospital in Allahabad. The defence evidence led, also
indicate a happy marriage and a caring husband; which has not been
controverted effectively by the prosecution in cross examination. In the
circumstances of the valid defence evidence, we could also rely on the
dying declaration, exculpating the accused, as a corroborative piece of
evidence, making believable the version of accidental burn injuries. 37.
The defence evidence was given a complete go by without any valid
reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and credible documents
produced, remaining uncontroverted. The prosecution has failed to
establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and the attendant
circumstances coupled with the defence evidence brings forth a probable
hypothesis of innocence. The trial courts would do well to bestow equal
attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the prosecution
evidence. There is no cause to approach the defence evidence with
distrust, suspicion or even scepticism."
He
pointed out that "The accused is not obliged to prove his/her innocence
and if a reasonable doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory
evidence led by the prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence
its benefit should inure to the accused; which is the reasonable
hypothesis of innocence as laid down" in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116.
Justice
Chandran observed: "A valid defence plea, substantiated through
testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this case,
tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the prosecution
ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution especially when the
standard of proof is that of proof beyond reasonable doubt." It has
been held in Swaran Singh vs. State of Punjab (1957) 1 SCR 953 in
travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the
distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable
evidence’.
In the penultimate paragraph, the judgement reads: "38. Before leaving
the matter, we are constrained to notice the clear travesty of justice
which has occurred in the above case, putting on the dock seventeen
persons for reason only of having marital ties with the victim who, in
all probability, sustained burn injuries in an accidental fire at her
matrimonial home. The High Court also should have bestowed better care
in disposing of a criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence
alleged to have been committed a quarter century back. The casual
approach is evident from the remand order made for reason only of lack
of opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses, which testimonies
were inconsequential and the impugned order of the Sessions Court having
considered only those witnesses led in the trial of the accused,
appellant herein." It concluded: "39. We allow the appeal and acquit the
appellant/accused reversing the order of conviction passed by the
Sessions Court and the order of remand passed by the High Court. We had
released the accused on bail, which if carried out, the bail bonds shall
stand cancelled. It goes without saying that if the accused is still in
custody, he shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other
case."
Granting leave, the Justice Chandran observed:" Leave granted. 2. A serious procedural deviation, resulting in a graver travesty of justice is alleged; of two trials, from two final reports on the same First Information Report, having been proceeded with against seventeen persons leading to conviction of only one of them in the second trial, despite the further investigation having unearthed no evidence against the fifteen accused. The appellant, the hapless husband of a woman who succumbed to burn injuries in her matrimonial home, has been in the dock for a quarter of a century on the accusation of marital cruelty and dowry death. The prosecution is also blamed of having failed to bring in material evidence; adduced by the defense, which the investigators ought to have detected before the charge sheet was filed. 3. The two cases were clubbed together after considerable evidence was led in both separately. Later, after further evidence was adduced jointly, they were de-tagged and adjudicated individually. In the first case the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, the two accused arrayed, were acquitted. Fourteen family members of the husband were acquitted in the second case wherein the husband alone stood convicted. The impugned order remanded the matter to the trial court on the premise of the convicted accused not being present when the witnesses were examined in the other case, before clubbing. The appeal is filed by the sole accused who stood convicted."
Justice Malviya's order indicated that before clubbing, in the instant case PW1 to PW6 were examined and after clubbing, PW13 to PW15 and DW1 to DW5 were examined. The trial court had also recorded that the oral testimonies of only those witnesses examined in the presence of the accused in this case would be evaluated to come to a just decision; scrupulously done avoiding any
prejudice to the accused. PW1 to PW6 examined herein are respectively
PWs 1, 11, 3, 2, 12 & 4 in the first case; the first two, associates
of the family, then a cousin, two brothers and the father of the deceased. PW13 proved the sanction order and PW14 &15 testifying in the joint trial were another brother of the deceased and the Investigating Officer (I.O) respectively. PW5 to PW10 examined in the first case were not even cross-examined by the two accused and their testimonies were completely eschewed even in the first case, the order of acquittal in which was produced.
In his order, Justice Malviya had concluded:"10. It is settled principle of law that all evidence taken in a trial or other proceedings is recorded in the presence of the accused. This principle is fundamental to fair trial as it allows that accused to hear the evidence, observe the demeanor of witnesses, and instruct their legal counsel accordingly. Essentially it guarantee accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and to ensure transparency and to allow the accused to understand the case against him and present their defence effectively. Legally, both the cases cannot be disposed off together, so, separate trial is required to be concluded after examining the remaining witnesses within six months in accordance with law. 11. The learned trial court, before clubbing both the sessions trial vide order dated 05.03.2009, should have considered the aforesaid exigency and that being so, the amalgamation happens to be contrary to the spirit of law. Consequent thereupon, the judgment impugned has been passed on the basis of illegal procedure so followed by the learned Trial court and ultimately, leading to illegality which is being found incurable and consequently, it leads to a failure of justice. Hence, the same happens to be against the spirit of law, whereupon, is set aside judgment accordingly conviction and sentence is set aside. 12. The matter is remitted back to the learned Trial Court to proceed with the trial independently right from the stage after examination of PW-6. Learned trial court is directed to complete the trial within six months but, with a caution that there should be proper presence of the witnesses. The appellant is on bail, hence he is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within ten days of the receipt of copy of this judgment by the Trial Court and their bail bonds stand cancelled. Further, Superintendent of Police, Munger is directed to procure attendance of all the witnesses so that, the trial be concluded at an earliest. Learned Trial Court is directed to grant bail to the current appellant after surrendering before the Trial Court within stipulated time. If the appellant did not surrender within stipulated time then the Trial Court is directed to take coercive steps against him." Now the Supreme Court has reversed the judgement of remand by Justice Malviya.
The case in question arose from an incident of the year 2000. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that a remand at this stage would only prolong the matter. The counsel for the accused agreed to a consideration on merits by the Court at the expense of losing one appellate forum, i.e., the High Court, to which the State Counsel also did not object. Therefore, the Division Bench proceeded to consider the matter on its merits.
The allegation arose from an incident where the wife of the appellant was first taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur from her marital home on April 13, 2000 allegedly with 40% burns sustained and then re-admitted to a private nursing home, at Allahabad, where the poor lady succumbed a few days later. The Court wondered as to whether the it was accidental, as contended by the husband and the in-laws or whether it was self-inflicted or induced, the causation being the cruelty which arose from incessant dowry demands, is the moot question arising. The victim died on May 2, 2000 and an FIR was registered at the Kotwali Police Station, Munger, which is situated the parental home of the deceased, on June 1, 2000. It arrayed the husband and his brother; the other family members was the father-in-law and the mother-in-law.
The Court perused the FIR and also the charge sheets in both the cases received from the trial court. The FIR was registered on a complaint dated May 15, 2000 by the father, filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Munger, one under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. FIR No.272 of 2000 dated June 1, 2000 resulted first, in Final Report No.625 of 2000 dated October 31, 2000 leading to Sessions Case No.592 of 2001 and then, Final Report No.215 of 2005 dated May 31, 2005 which led to the instant case numbered as Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006.
The complaint spoke of the marriage and the continued demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/- despite sufficient gifts having been given by the bride’s family and the frequent complaints made by the deceased when she came to her parental home. Even during the pregnancy of the victim, she is said to have been harassed which resulted in the childbirth occurring in the parental home of the mother. The misdeeds continued even after the son was born and there was also an allegation of forced abortion, eventually leading to the death at the marital home. It was also alleged that since the marital family was very influential the entire incident was hushed up. In addition to the husband, his relatives, including immediate in-laws, were arrayed only for reason of the marital home having housed a joint family.
In the Final Report of October 31, 2000 after a brief narration of the complaint of constant demands of dowry pursuant to the marriage of the daughter of the complainant with Brijesh Kumar, it was categorically stated that on investigation, the allegation of offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 appeared to be true. It was noticed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law were in judicial custody and that the Superintendent of Police (S.P) had directed charge-sheet to be filed against the said accused considering the investigation against them as completed and directed investigation against the other 15 persons in the FIR to be continued. The charge-sheet first filed against the two accused gave rise to Sessions Case No.592/2001, which ended in acquittal of both the accused by judgment dated 17.12.2012. On the very same day, judgment dated December 17, 2012 was passed in Sessions Case No.504/2006 wherein the first accused alone was convicted, and the other 14 accused acquitted. Sessions Case No.504 of 2006 arose from a final report filed by a different I.O after further investigation finding no further evidence against the 15 accused remaining.
Issue arose of the trial court having taken cognizance based on a closure report filed by the I.O finding no evidence against the 15 persons who were not charged at the first instance; urged, placing reliance on Mariam Fasihuddin vs. State by Adugodi Police Station 2024 SCC OnLine SC 58 and two trials having been proceeded with on the very same allegation of dowry death of the wife of the appellant. The first charge sheet filed; despite finding the offences made out against all the 17, charged only the two who were in judicial custody on the directions of the S.P who also directed further investigation against the others; such directions being clearly impermissible. The second final report stated that no evidence was found available on the record against all the others and there was no cause to raise a supplementary charge against the 15 accused, by another officer who was not examined before the trial court.
Justice Chandran observed: " 10. We are quite conscious of Section 158 of the CrPC which provides that a report be sent to the Magistrate through a superior officer of police, if the State Government by general or special order so directs. Apposite would be reference to Section 173 (3) which provides in such circumstances that the report should be submitted through that superior officer to the Magistrate and pending orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the police station to make further investigation. Pertinently, the facts of the present case reveal that the report itself was filed by the officer-in-charge of the police station which makes it clear that there was no special or general order passed by the State Government under Section 158. Further, pertinent is the fact that the FIR was registered on the complaint forwarded under Section 156(3) on the directions of the CJM. The order of the S.P hence was clearly without any authority."
He noted that the decision in Mariam Fasihuddin case frowned upon a supplementary charge sheet filed without any new material unearthed by the investigating agency; wherein the further investigation directed
was with respect to the dropping of two offences under the IPC. However, here the first charge sheet finds material against the other accused also which makes it imperative that we dwell upon the primacy of the Court which takes cognizance.
In H.N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi (1954) 2 SCC 934, the Court was concerned with an investigation carried out under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, which could have been carried out only with the order of a Magistrate. It was held that investigation is the first step, followed by cognizance and then the trial itself. But an invalid investigation does not nullify the cognizance or the trial based thereon, since a defect or illegality in investigation has no bearing on the cognizance taken or the trial. Though a police report under Section 190 of the CrPC is the material on which cognizance is taken, a valid or legal police report is not the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the trial cannot be set aside merely on that ground, unless the illegality in the investigation is shown to have brought about miscarriage of justice as provided under Section 537 of the CrPC of 1898 (Section 465 of CrPC of 1973). Finding also that the invalidity of an investigation is not to be completely ignored by the court during trial, it was held that if the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.
In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107, the Court emphasized the prerogative of the I.O while carrying out an investigation into an offence reported, as juxtaposed with the powers of the jurisdictional court in taking cognizance. The Judges dealt with Sections 154 to 176 of the CrPC of 1898 under the heading ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate’ together with Section 190, relating to the jurisdiction of the criminal court in inquiries and trials; which are almost in pari materia with CrPC of 1973. Finding very elaborate provisions made for securing an investigation into a reported offence, without causing any harassment to the accused and at the same time completion without unnecessary or undue delay, it was held that the manner and method of conducting the investigation are left entirely to the police and the Magistrate has no power to interfere with the same. After investigation, if the officer finds no sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying forwarding the accused to the Magistrate, Section 169 provides that the accused shall be released on his executing a bond to appear before the Magistrate.
On the other hand, if sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds are found to make out an offence, then the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate under Section 170 if the offence is bailable or otherwise released on bond requiring his appearance before the Magistrate. However, be it invocation of Section 169 or Section 170 the police officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate under Section 173, either a closure report; finding no offence made out or a charge sheet; with material allegations based on valid evidence leading to the offence. It was categorically held relying on King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 71 IA 203, 212 that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping, leaving each to exercise its own functions, subject only to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case. When the jurisdictional court has no right to interfere less said the better about the interference made by a superior officer, herein the S.P, especially when the I.O forms an opinion that a case for trial is made out.
It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation. If a closure report is filed; finding no case made out, it is not open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. It was also clarified that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless since the Magistrate is competent to proceed to take cognizance of the offence, on the materials revealed in the investigation, under Section 190 which imports a judicial discretion on the Magistrate to receive such report under Section 173. The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in the report.
In Ram Naresh Prasad vs. State of Jharkhand (2009) 11 SCC 299 held that when the police file a report, colloquially termed a ‘closure report’; finding no sustainable case made out, the Court cannot direct a charge sheet to be filed, but could always take cognizance on the basis of the material in the report or direct further investigation. H.S. Bains v. State (U.T. of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631 & Ramswaroop Soni vs.State of M.P. (2020) 18 SCC 327 reiterated that when a closure report is filed finding no offence made out, the Court has three options; (i) to accept the same and close the proceedings or (ii) take cognizance of the matter on the materials in the report or (iii) direct further investigation. It is thus open to the Magistrate on submission of a closure report to look into the material facts disclosed in the report and form an opinion as to whether it constitutes an offence and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b). To buttress this position, Abhinandan Jha3 made reference to Section 169 of the Code which provides that even if the police officer finds on investigation that there is no reasonable ground or sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial, the officer while releasing the accused has to take a bond for appearance before the Magistrate, if required. The primacy of the Court to take cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very provisions of the CrPC.
In the instant case the first charge sheet was filed only against the two accused and investigation was continued against the other 15 accused arrayed in the FIR, on instructions of the S.P, which should have been left to the Court taking cognizance, especially when the charge sheet found a trial enabled against all the accused. On submission of the first charge sheet and if there is felt a need for further investigation, ideally it should have been done with the orders of the Court and the commencement of trial ought to have awaited the completion of such investigation. But the cognizance taken by the Court against the fifteen accused, on the basis of the subsequent final report cannot be faulted since though the report on further investigation found no fresh material, the first report found the offence made out against all the accused, which was also before Court when the closure report was considered.
There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of, which we will now deal with. Useful reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Banwari v. State of U.P.1962 SCC OnLine SC 98, wherein the two accused were convicted under charges of Sections 302 & 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Magistrate committed three cases to the Sessions Court two with respect to the two murders and the other for attempt to murder, all by gunshot injuries. The Sessions Court modified the charges and consolidated the three cases, permitting evidence to be adduced in the first case and relied on that evidence in the other two cases. The incidents occurred in quick succession and this Court held that though Section 235 is not applicable, joint trial was justified under Sections 234 & 239 of the Code. When separate commitments are made of distinct offences not coming within the exception to Section 233, they cannot be tried at one trial. But, if there are separate commitment orders; (i) of persons who could be tried together or (ii) of the same person for offences which could be tried together, the accused could still be tried at one trial. Persons accused of committing a particular offence or offences jointly or in the course of the same transaction are not put up for trial at the same time, oftener than ever for reason of some being not available. When they are later made available and subsequently committed, the Sessions Judge is not bound to have two separate trials, one with respect to each commitment, if the trial in the first instance has not commenced.
A committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognizance over the trial of the persons committed and is not the basis of the cognizance taken for trial. If there is no prejudice to the accused, multiple committal orders can be consolidated to try the accused at one trial, provided it is justified under Sections 233 to 239 of the CrPC of 1898 (Sections 218 to 223 of the CrPC of 1973). It was held that ‘…the validity of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge is dependent on the fact whether the provisions of the Code justify one joint trial or not’ (para 25). The above discussion makes it crystal clear that the opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive discretion of the Court.
Herein, though triable together, before the report of further investigation was filed, the first trial commenced. Despite the futile exercise of a joint trial in between, the cases were separated before final adjudication. The relevant witnesses led on behalf of the prosecution and the defence were identical and no prejudice is caused to the accused, which persuades us to consider the matter on its merits.
Supreme Court observed: "21. It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound certificate produced. A person who sustained serious burn injuries having been admitted to the hospital, intimation would have gone to the jurisdictional police station; both at Mirzapur and Allahabad but not produced or even enquired into. It is also pertinent that the witnesses examined to prove the allegations are the friend of the father of the deceased (PW1), the father-in-law of one of the brothers of the deceased (PW2), her brothers (PWs 3 to 5 & 14) and her father (PW6). The testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses indicate that though the incident occurred on 13.04.2000 they were informed only on 21.04.2000; effectively controverted in the defense evidence.
PW1 says that the information was passed on to PW6 on April 22, 2000 and he along with PW6 went to see the victim at the hospital on April 22, 2000. PW2 deposed that his son-in-law i.e. PW14, the brother of the deceased went to the hospital at Allahabad on 26.04.2000 and met the victim. PW14 however deposed that on April 22, 2000 he saw his sister, completely burned, at Allahabad and on April 30, 2000 his father returned to Munger for arranging money for the treatment of his sister. It is also the testimony of the brothers and the father of the deceased that on May 2, 2000 when the victim died, a hasty cremation was conducted, to avoid a postmortem. It is very unlikely that having reached the hospital long before the death, the family members of the victim would have abandoned the victim in the company of her in-laws against whom allegations are raised of dowry demands. What is more disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what transpired after the victim sustained the burns especially since the incident occurred at Mirzapur, where she was first admitted to the District Hospital and then later taken to a hospital at Allahabad where she succumbed after a few days’ hospitalization. The explanation of the relatives of the deceased is only that the accused are very influential in Allahabad which however does not
prevent an I.O from inquiring in the neighboring State while carrying out an investigation, bringing to light the facts as they existed.
All the witnesses confined themselves with a bland refrain about the demand of a dowry of Rs.50,000/- commenced from the date of marriage till her death. Admittedly, a son was born to the couple in the meanwhile, and the son was kept with the father after the death of the mother.
PW15 was the I.O who does not speak anything worthwhile as to the investigation carried out. His deposition, as found from the impugned order marks the FIR and describes the marital home of the deceased and records that there is no incident reported at the police station at Mirzapur where the marital home is situated. The statement of the doctor at the hospital at Allahabad in which the victim was treated is said to have been recorded but the said person was not summoned as a witness for the prosecution. It was also stated that on enquiries made at the police station having jurisdiction over the location in which the hospital is located, he was informed that a statement of the victim was recorded before the Magistrate. It is further deposed that it was not produced since it was not provided; clearly a lackadaisical approach. What assumes significance is that the I.O. categorically deposes that but for the family members of the complainant, none in the neighborhood came forward to speak of an acrimonious marriage, quite relevant in the context of the defense set up by the accused.
Supreme Court's judgement reads:" 28. We would, for the moment, not reckon the dying declaration which absolves the accused in toto. It is trite that a dying declaration though delicate, is a crucial piece of evidence if found to be trustworthy from the overall circumstances, enabling a conviction on that basis alone. However, when the dying declaration is exculpatory in nature, then necessarily the entire evidence would have to be analysed and if the other circumstances form a complete chain, the exculpatory statement of the deceased will have to be treated with some circumspection or at times eschewed completely.'
In the present case, from the evidence at least it is clear that when the dying declaration was recorded, the deceased was admitted to the hospital and looked after by her husband and in-laws. The statements made in the above circumstances, presumably when the injured victim was looked after entirely by the accused will have to be treated with some circumspection and hence, we do not place any reliance on the same, at this point.
The Court noted that it cannot but opine that the testimonies were in the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-, having been made right from the inception of the marital life till the death occurred. The defense produced certificates of investments made in the joint names of the husband and the wife; far exceeding the demand alleged. DW1, the accused himself mounted the box to speak of an idyllic marriage and narrated the incident, the medical certificate indicating that his left hand was also scorched in the episode, while trying to save his wife. The accused also testified of informing his father-in-law on April 14, .2000 at 9:18 am through telephone, the call receipt evidencing the same. He had also sent telegrams on the same day at 08:35 am. The Kisan Vikas Patra and National Saving Certificates taken out in the joint name of himself and his wife, as also the LIC policy in his name, with his wife as the nominee were produced. The documents relating to the treatment of the deceased and the receipts with respect to the expenses incurred. The prescriptions during the treatment were also exhibited, belying the very contention of PW6 having returned to his village to arrange finance for his daughter’s treatment.
The Court recorded that the trial court found that the entire documents from the hospital were not produced and it is not clear as to what medicines were administered to the patient, which in fact ought to have been procured and produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was rejected on the ground that the same was not forwarded through the jurisdictional CJM, the same having been received at the trial court, as directly forwarded from the office of the ADM. The efficacy of the dying declaration was further doubted since DW5 had not recorded it in the question-and-answer form. As to the demand of dowry, the trial court relied on the testimony of the witnesses regarding the demand made of Rs.50,000/- from 1995 till 1999. It was found that the time when the victim was taken to the hospital is 1:00 am on 14.04.2000 and there is discrepancy between the time of incident and the time claimed by the defense.
It also noted that the enquiries carried out at the police station having jurisdiction over the hospital, where the death occurred, clearly indicates a dying declaration having been made which was not produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and the doctor of the hospital, in which the victim was admitted, certified her fitness to make such a declaration. There is no hard and fast rule that a dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form. The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other circumstances. The family of the victim reached the hospital long before her death and it is very unlikely that they left their child alone when they were arranging money for her treatment.
The Court noted:" 34. Neither was a postmortem conducted nor was there an immediate FIR registered, at least in the hometown of the victim. The exact time when the fire occurred is discernible only from the statement in the dying declaration that it was around 10:45 pm. The time stated could only be an approximation and there would have been some time taken in arranging a transport and taking her to the hospital, first to the District Hospital at Mirzapur where the Doctor deposes, the victim was brought at 1 am. There was no attempt by the prosecution to bring forth the distance between the marital house of the deceased and the hospital. The victim was transferred to a higher medical center at Allahabad on the very same day for better treatment; all of which was carried out by the husband, as is indicated from the documents produced. The oral evidence led by the prosecution fails to prove the case set up of a demand of dowry or the animosity the husband is alleged to have been harboring against the wife. The hollow statement made of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of suspicion regarding the entire story set up.
Advocates of gathered at Gate No. 4 of Patna High Court amid heavy
police presence to express their solidarity with the fast and peaceful
demonstration by students and youth at New Delhi's Jantar Mantar who
were attacked by the police in the heart of the national capital. The
advocates termed the police attack as an attack on the fundamental right
to speech and public protest which is recognised under Articles
19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of India i.e., the fundamental
rights to free speech and expression, and to assemble peacefully.
Significantly, the violent assault on students and youth was ordered by
the Union Executive in the proximity of Parliament. The monsoon session
of the Parliament is underway since July 20, 2026. Both Lok Sabha and
Rajya Sabha witnessed uproar and sloganeering with Opposition demanding
discussions on the NEET paper ‘leak’ issue and the police crackdown.
Ahead of the day’s parliament session, Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi
along with some Opposition MPs had met Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla
demanding a discussion in the Lok Sabha on the “brutality unleashed” on
students and the government’s “complete lack of accountability” for the
nation-wide examination disaster. Photo:Yogesh Chandra Verma, Octogenarian Senior Advocate and President, Advocates Association, the oldest and largest organisation of Bihar protesting against the assault on the students and youth at Jantar Mantar in the national capital. 
