Supreme Court re-affirms interim relief to petitioners in a case from Benibad, Muzaffarpur

In Jitendra Kumar Rai & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B.Pardiwala and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated April 20, 2026, wherein, it allowed the exemption applications. The Court observed:"8. It is very unfortunate that the FIR of 2024 is still under investigation. 9. Post this matter after two weeks. 10. On the next date of hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the State shall inform us how well the petitioners have cooperated in the investigation. 11. Interim order earlier granted to continue." 

On February 10, 2026, the Court had passed the following order: “Delay condoned. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there was some dispute between the neighbours in which both sides sustained injuries. Issue notice to the respondents returnable on 20.04.2026. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned Advocate-on-Record accepts notice on behalf of the respondent/State. In the meantime, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Arresting Officer in connection with FIR bearing Case No. 66 of 2024 dated 23.09.2024 registered at Police Station Benibad, District Muzaffarpur. Needless to add that the petitioners shall cooperate with the investigation.”

The counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that they were not called by the investigating officer. She submitted that they are ready and willing to appear before the investigating officer on any day as may be directed for the purpose of recording of their statements and interrogation.

The Court's order reads: "6. We direct the petitioners to appear before the investigating officer on 23rd April, 2026 without fail. 7. On that date, the investigating officer shall record the statements and interrogate the petitioners."The counsel appearing for the State had submitted that "the petitioners have not appeared before the investigating officer for the purpose of their interrogation."   

The case arose out of a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2025 in Phulo Devi & Ors.vs. The State of Bihar (2025) passed by Justice Rajiv Roy of the Patna High Court. The other petitioners were: Jitendra Rai and Kamod Kumar. In the High Court, the counsel for the petitioners were: Late Vaishnavi Singh and Late Ritwik Thakur. 

As per the prosecution story, the informant on September 9, 2024, when the sister-in-law, Shama Devi was out to attend nature’s call, the accused persons intercepted and made comments. As she raised alarm, subsequently informed the family members, allegation is that the accused persons armed variously came and after abuse, the assault. Jitendra Rai and Kamod Kumar assaulted with farsa and rod causing injury on the head and the right hand. Phulo Rai and Ranjeet Kumar assaulted Mithilesh Rai with iron rod on the head while Phulo Devi assaulted the mother of the informant causing injury on the back. Phulo Devi also assaulted his mother. Besides this, there was allegation of taking away the amount, they resorted to dial 112 whereafter they were shifted to SKMCH, Muzaffarpur for treatment. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that there was case and counter case, both being side by side, the accused side had also suffered and subsequent statement before the police during the investigation was of omnibus in nature save and except Jitendra Rai. The petitioners had no criminal antecedent.

Justice Purnendu Singh sets aside judgement by Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi

In Yogendra Sah vs.The State Of Biha (2026), Justice Purnendu Singh of Patna High Court delivered a 17-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, he concluded: "The prosecution case thus rests predominantly on the testimony of official witnesses without any credible independent corroboration, and the non-production of the alleged seized contraband as a material exhibit further creates a serious lacuna in the chain of evidence. In such circumstances, the mere availability of the F.S.L. Report cannot be treated as conclusive proof either of the recovery or of the nature of the substance allegedly seized, and in the absence of reliable evidence establishing the factum of recovery, its evidentiary value stands considerably diminished, thereby creating a serious doubt in the prosecution case, as a result of which this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 21. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. 22. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 12-09-2013 and order of sentence dated 16-09-2013 passed by the learned 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009 is hereby set aside."

The judgement reads:"...the appellant is acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. Since the appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. The fine deposited by the appellant, if any, shall be refunded to him."

The appeal was filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment of conviction dated September 12, 2013 and order of sentence dated September 16, 2013 passed by the 1st. Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Sitamarhi in GR No. 3297 of 2009 / TR No. 07 of 2013, arising out of Sonbarsa P.S. Case No. 136 of 2009, whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 4 (four) years along with a fine of Rs.20,000/. 

Justice Singh relied upon para nos. 6 and 7 of Supreme Court's judgment in Gorakh Nath Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported in (2018) 2 SCC 305, to observe that "the non-production of the seized material is therefore considered fatal to the prosecution case." He added:"17. It is well settled law that although the NDPS Act envisages a reverse burden of proof, it is well settled that the prosecution must, in the first instance, establish the foundational facts by leading cogent and reliable evidence in strict compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions governing search, seizure and recovery. It is only upon such initial burden being duly discharged that the onus shifts upon the accused. Mere registration of a case under the Act does not ipso facto operate to shift the burden at the threshold. Having regard to the stringent nature of the statute, the evidence on record warrants strict scrutiny, and where the prosecution fails to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such doubt must enure to the accused/appellant." 

Justice Singh observed:"18. It appears that, all the prosecution witnesses examined in the present case are official witnesses belonging to the S.S.B., and there is a complete absence of reliable independent evidence with regard to the alleged recovery. It would, therefore, be unsafe to base a conviction solely on their testimony, especially in the absence of corroboration. Significantly, the alleged contraband (ganja) was neither produced before the Trial Court nor marked as a material exhibit, and no plausible explanation has been furnished for such non-production. Consequently, there is no cogent material on record to establish a nexus between the substance allegedly seized and the samples sent for forensic examination. In such circumstances, question arises whether the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, entitling the appellant to the benefit of doubt. 

 

Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Soni Shrivastava set aside verdict by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali in POCSO case

In Md. Alam vs.The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 21-page long judgement dated April 20, 2026 wherein, it conclude that "....the presumption contained under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act would not be attracted." The informant/ victim boy (PW-1) "cannot be put in the category of a sterling witness for the obvious reasons showing huge contradiction in his statement. In a case under the POCSO Act, the presumption of innocence is not lost." For these reasons, the Court set aside the  judgment of conviction dated April 25, 2023 and order of sentence dated May 15, 2023 passed by Additional Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO, Vaishali at Hajipur in POCSO case of 2021 which arose out of Mahua P.S. case of 2021. The appellant was acquitted of the charges giving him benefit of doubt. The appellant was said to be in custody. Justice Parsad authored the judgement. The Court directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case .The appeal was allowed. 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

The appeal was preferred for setting aside the judgment of conviction. The appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 377/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. By the order, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty (20) years with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 377/34 IPC, he was to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.

The prosecution case is based on the written information dated February 26, 2021 submitted by the informant/ victim boy (PW-1). In his written information, he stated that on  February 24, 2021 at about 06:30 AM in the morning, when he was sitting at the shop of Sunny Kumar and Golu Patel situated near Sahara India Office at Mahua Bazar, Samastipur Road, two persons came there and enquired from Sunny Kumar about the victim boy. On which Sunny Kumar told them that he was a good-mannered boy and was in search of some work due to his poor financial condition. Thereafter, these two persons told the victim to accompany them, they will provide him money, food and good clothes. They also said that he has to discharge their household work and assured him that he will be given opportunity for further study. Thereafter, Golu Patel told the victim boy to accompany them as they were known to Golu Patel. Those two accused persons were Ranjeet Patel and Md. Alam (this appellant). The victim boy along with two accused persons came at the house of Md. Alam on their motorcycle. Both of them told him to have food and go to sleep. He was trying to sleep, however, was not able to sleep. In the meantime, he saw that both of them started sipping alcohol from a bottle after pouring in glass and thereafter, he fell asleep. In the late night, he felt that somebody has opened his pants and trying to insert something through his anus which was painful. Thereafter, he woke up and saw that both the accused persons were naked and were doing unnatural sexual offence with him. He tried to prevent them but they threatened him to kill if he raised the alarm. These two accused persons committed unnatural sexual offence with the victim boy one by one by pressing his mouth. Thereafter, they put their clothes on and also told him to wear his clothes and threatened him not to disclose this to anyone, otherwise he will be killed. 

Thereafter, in the morning of  February 25, 2021 at about 09:30AM, both the accused persons left him on their motorcycle at the shop of Golu Patel. He felt the pain for the whole day but in the evening when he could not bear the pain, he disclosed about the said incident to his nearby neighbours and members of his family. He was taken to Mahua Sub-Divisional Hospital for treatment. Later on, he was referred to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur for better treatment. He was told to inform the concerned police station. On the basis of this written information, FIR being Mahua P.S. Case No. 162 of 2021 dated March 5, 2021 was registered
under Section 377 IPC amd Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against (1) Sunny Kumar, (2) Golu Patel, (3) Ranjeet Patel and (4) Md. Alam (this appellant). After investigation, police submitted chargesheet bearing Chargesheet No. 817 of 2021 dated December 10, 2021 against Md. Alam for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. 

The trial court by its order dated December 16, 2021 took cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 4/8 of the POCSO Act against Md. Alam. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant in Hindi to which he denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges were framed vide order dated January 24, 2022 for the offences punishable under Section 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses and got exhibited certain documents.  Thereafter, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. In this 313 CrPC statement, he pleaded innocence and stated that Prem Shankar and Uday Shankar had already registered case against him and they again implicated him in the this case. The Defence produced three witnesses and exhibited some documentary evidences. 

The trial court having examined the entire prosecution evidences found that the emphasis of defence regarding false implication due to previous enmity cannot be a ground to discard the witnesses' evidence if such evidence is found to be reliable while upholding conviction of an accused.

On the point of alibi taken by the defence, trial court took note of the argument of the defence counsel that at the time of occurrence, the accused being an Advocate was busy in court for preparing the filing of the bail bond and on the other hand, the learned counsel submitted that the accused was at the High Court, Patna at Mazar to join the tajposhi from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm. The trial court observed that it was highly
unbelievable that a person who is an Advocate was present at three places of surroundings of 20-30 kms at the same time. 

The High Court observed that the trial court negated the submission of defence counsel regarding contradiction on the point of age of the victim boy by referring the fact that no documentary evidence was brought on record regarding the education of the victim boy as the victim boy is from very poor family and is not a school going student and his mother is rustic. The trial court took note of injury report of the victim which suggested that the victim boy was minor and concerned medical expert being PW-2 found
the case of sexual assault. The trial court found that since the accused facing trial was accused in another case also, there was no reason of false implication of the accused by another person of poor and from a Scheduled Caste family of the vicinity.

The trial court observed that on the ground of minor contradictions, the evidences of prosecution witnesses cannot be ignored, the version of the occurrence as alleged and the medical examination with the opinion of suspected case of sexual assault cannot be put outside on the ground of minor contradictions or on the ground of previous enmity. Accordingly, the trial court found that the prosecution has successfully proved the case against the accused under Sections 377/34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The High Court noted that there is a delay of 9 days in lodging of the FIR. The application gave rise to the present FIR was signed by the victim boy, but it is his admission that the application was written by a person who met him in the Sadar Hospital at Hajipur and to whom he had explained the whole occurrence. According to the victim boy, the person was a general person and he could not give the name of the person who wrote the application. A perusal of the deposition of the victim boy (PW-1) showed that he claimed to have posted the application in the post office, but in paragraph ‘26’ of his deposition, PW-1 claimed that he had complained in the police station on 26th. In paragraph ‘21’, he claimed that he had alone gone to the police station. This statement of PW-1 created doubt as to who wrote the written application. The doubt goes deeper when the High Court found that his mother (PW-3) claimed that she had taken her victim boy to the police station at Mahua and she also said that the application was written by Darogaji. She also stated that Darogaji had recorded her statement 8 days after lodgment of the case. If the statement of PW-3 is examined, it was found that she claims to have come to know about the occurrence from her son on the next day of the occurrence in the morning, but the victim (PW-1) stated that on February 25, 2021, he had alone gone to Mahua hospital. PW-2 recorded the time of examination of PW-1 as 7.25 pm. His parents were not with him, therefore, the statement of PW-3 that she had come to know about the occurrence on the next day in the morning was not a reliable statement. PW-3 stated that she had taken the victim boy to Government Hospital, Manjhaul, whereas the victim boy says that he had alone gone to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Mahua. 

The High Court's judgement reads: "In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are not only contradicting each other, they are contradicting themselves also on various aspects. 25. This Court further finds that the learned trial court has itself recorded in its finding that “if the submissions of learned defence counsel is evaluated, the evidences on the point of age of the victim boy is contradictory….” Despite this, the learned trial court did not think it just and proper to determine the age of the victim in accordance with the scheme of Section 94 of the Act of 2015. 26. We have noticed hereinabove in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that how the age of the victim boy has not been disclosed by the prosecution in course of trial and the I.O. (PW-5) himself stated that he had not conducted
any verification on the age of the victim. In section 164 CrPC Statement, the victim is said to be studying in Class VIII but in course of trial, he has stated that he has studied up to Class IV....27. This Court further finds that the victim had gone to Mahua Hospital with 6-7 persons. PW-2 has stated so but the victim claims that he had gone alone. It is, thus, evident that the victim has been tutored not to disclose names of those 6-7 persons who were with him in the Mahua Hospital. Those 6-7 persons had said to PW-2 that they were from the neighbourhood of the victim and they cannot give consent. This makes the whole case
suspicious.  28. PW-2 has stated that he had not examined the source of the blood stain. He had referred the victim boy to Sadar Hospital, Hajipur but the victim had not received treatment in Sadar Hospital, Hajipur. The age of injury has been mentioned as within 6 hours and the doctor has noticed fresh blood but in course of his cross-examination, PW-2 has clearly stated that the blood would clot if the injury is on the upper part, within 3-4 minutes, he had not found any bruise around the anus. PW-2 has clearly stated that he had not made any statement before police. He had not examined the source of the blood stain, therefore, in our opinion,'

The judgement  recorded: "30. We have further noticed that in this case, the police officer Krishnanand Jha, who had drawn the formal FIR, has not been examined." 

Justice Prasad observed:"The prosecution has not disclosed the date of birth of the victim boy recorded in his first school admission register. No ossification and dental test of the victim has been conducted to assess his age. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in this case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the victim would come within the definition of the word “child” as envisaged under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act." 

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section challenges orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas

Rohtas District's In-Charge, Legal Section has challenged the order by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas, directing attachment of Office of the Collector, Rohtas in the Patna High Court and other orders. The case Shashi Shankar vs. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary & Anr. is listed for April 21, 2026. The Respondents no. 2 is Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petition raises following question of law and facts as to i) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can impose personal liability upon a government officer who is not a party to the proceedings?; ii) Whether recovery of an award can be directed to Collector without issuance of certificate by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas to Collector under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act?; ii) Whether a  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can direct salary deduction and service-book entry against a government officer who is not party to proceeding?; iv) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal can order salary deduction and service-book entry of officer who is not party to proceeding?; v) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded against a person without giving him an opportunity of hearing; vi) Whether adverse remarks can be recorded without hearing the affected officer?; vii) Whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has any supervisory or disciplinary jurisdiction over a District Collector or petitioner?; viii) Whether recovery under Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be initiated without issuance of a statutory recovery certificate?; ix) Whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas can impose fine or penalty on an executive authority in absence of express statutory power?; x) Whether such action violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers?; xi) Whether order passed by respondent is arbitrary, illegal, ultra vires,void ab initio and unconstitutional?; xii) Whether collector can be compelled to recover award amount even though details of assets of decree debtor has not been provided to collector?; and xiii) Whether collector can be coerced to deposit  fine/penalty/cost from her salary?

 

The petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders dated 22.01.2026 and 17.02.2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas in Execution Case No. 01/2014, expunging all adverse remarks recorded against the petitioner in the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petition prays for setting aside of the direction imposing ₹10,000 penalty, salary deduction, entry in service book and registration of criminal miscellaneous case. It prays for removal of the observations contained in the orders which may affect the service career of the petitioner and for declaring that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner. It seeks a writ of certiorari quashing the show-cause notice issued by  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. 

 

The petitioner prays for quashing the order dated February 17, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas imposing fine of ₹10,000/- as adjournment cost upon the petitioner and directing deduction of fine from salary, directing entry in service book and directing registration of criminal miscellaneous case;  It prays for quashing the order dated December 23, 2025 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas  imposing fine of ₹10,000/- upon the Collector, Rohtas. It seeks quashing the order dated January 22, 2026 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas passing adverse remarks against the petitioner. The petitioner declares that the  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to issue show-cause notice or impose penalty upon the petitioner.  

 

The petition seeks a declaration that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas has no authority to attach office of the Collector and direct department proceeding and disciplinary action against Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas and seeks imposition of cost on Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas. The petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining  Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas from taking any coercive action against the petitioner and the Collector. The petition seeks interim stay of the orders by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohtas during pendency of the writ petition. 

 

The writ petition was filed by Dr. Gopal Krishna, the advocate for the petitioner in the High Court on March 31, 2026. It was registered on April 20, 2026.  

Justice S. B. Pd. Singh reverses impleadment rejection order by 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj, grants limited impleadment

In Lal Babu Giri & Ors. vs. Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri & Ors. (2026), Justice S. B. Pd. Singh delivered a  5-page long judgement dated April 9, 2026, wherein he concluded that considering the facts of the case "it seems essential that intervenor be impleaded in the appeal to protect his interest with respect to his purchased property but he will be confined to the pleadings and evidence of the vendor only during the course of his argument. 7. Accordingly, the present application stands allowed." The judgement by Justice Singh was uploaded on April 17, 2026.  The judgment was reserved on March 13, 2026.

This civil miscellaneous application was filed for setting aside the order dated May 15, 2019 passed in T.A. No. 35 pf 2000 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj whereby and whereunder the application filed by the petitioner under Order I Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. for adding the petitioner as respondent in the instant title appeal, was rejected without assigning any reason. The case was filed in the High Court on August 29, 2019 and registered on December 9, 2019.

Respondent-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari had filed Title Suit No. 473 of 1993 against Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri which was decreed by the Court of Sub-Judge Gopalganj. Against the judgment and decree, the defendant/appellant Matku Giri preferred an appeal i.e. Title Appeal No. 35 of 2000. During the pendency of this appeal petitioner/proposed intervenor purchased the same suit land from the respondent-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari on May 7, 2015, then he filed a petition for his impleadment in the appeal which was rejected by the impugned order that was under challenge in the present civil miscellaneous application.

The petitioner's counsel submitted that petitioner was a bona fide purchaser of the suit plot and without the knowledge of this litigation and he had apprehension that respondent namely, Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari may leave the pairwi and may gained over by the appellant in future. Therefore, in order to protect his right and interest, it was essential for him to be impleaded in the appeal. 

The counsel for the petitioner relied on Supreme Court's  the case of Yogesh Goyanka vs. Govind and Ors. reported in (2024) 7 Supreme Court Cases 524 in which it held: “20. In the particular facts and circumstances of this case, Mr. Sundaram has been able to satisfy this Court on the possibility of collusion between the Respondents. It is a fact that the Plaintiffs and Defendants are relatives. More importantly, Plaintiffs approached the court in the Underlying Suit after a substantial delay of 11 years whereas admittedly, the revenue records were mutated to reflect the name of Respondent No. 21 since 2007. It is also curious that the claim of non-payment of consideration by the Appellant was made for the first time before this Court. 21. On the other hand, the Appellant has a registered sale deed in his favor and has therefore seemingly acquired an interest in the Subject Land. Whether or not the consideration was paid, is a disputed question of fact that shall be determined by the Trial Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, including the fact that the trial has not progressed significantly, the Appellant herein, in the interest of justice, is entitled to impleadment in the Underlying Suit in order to protect his interests, if any, in the Subject Land. 22. In light of the aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed. The Impugned Order and the order of the ADJ dated 10.10.2019 are set aside and the Appellant is directed to be added as a party defendant in the Underlying Suit.”

The counsel for the respondent/appellant submitted that petitioner had purchased the suit property during the pendency of the appeal which was hit by the rule of lis pendens and petitioner had derived his right title from the vendor-Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari who was still contesting the appeal.

The provision of order XXII Rule 10 of C.P.C. reads: “10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.–(1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).”

Justice Singh observed that in the light of these facts it is essential that intervenor be impleaded in the appeal to protect his interest with respect to his purchased property but he will be confined to the pleadings and evidence of the vendor only during the course of his argument.

Earlier, Justice Arun Kumar Jha had stayed the judicial proceeding of Title Appeal No. 35 of 2000 pending before the court of 1st Additional District Judge, Gopalganj by his 2-page long order dated April 30, 2024 in Bindeshwari Giri (now deceased) vs. Matuki Giri @ Dharam Nath Giri & Anr. (2024) till the  next date hearing. The counsel for the petitioner had submitted  that the petitioner has purchased the land after the title appeal was dismissed in default though it was subsequently restored. The appellate court had rejected the application on the ground of lis pendens and it was also the fact that petitioner was not the party in the original suit or in the appeal but there was no lis pendens. This was the second order in the case which was filed in August 2019. 

Notably, in subsequent order, the respondent no.2, namely Surendra Tiwari @ Lallan Tiwari, who died on September 19, 2020, during the pendency of this petition, from the records, he was substituted with his legal heirs/representatives. The petitioner was permitted to take necessary steps for substituted service of notice through paper publication in two local daily newspapers, namely ‘Times of India’ and ‘Hindustan’, having its circulation in the area of residence of the respondents within four weeks. After publication, the petitioner will file a supplementary affidavit bringing on record copies of newspaper cuttings.

Justice Jha's order dated July 3, 2025 heard the interlocutory application filed on behalf of the petitioner for substitution of heirs/legal representatives of sole petitioner, Bindeshwari Giri. The counsel appearing on behalf of heirs/legal representatives submits that the sole petitioner died on May 13, 2025 leaving behind his heirs/legal representatives. The interlocutory application as well as submission made on behalf of heirs/legal representatives of the sole petitioner was allowed. The order reads:"4. Let the name of sole petitioner be deleted from the record and be substituted with his heirs/legal representatives..."

The first order was passed by Justice Vikash Jain December 16, 2019, wherein none had appeared on behalf of the petitioner when the matter was called. 

Dr. Gopal Krishna, a practicing advocate pointed out that Supreme Court's decision in Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum, reported in AIR 1958 SC 886 wherein, it held that in a suit relating to property in order that a third party may be impleaded, he/she should have a direct or legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation as distinguished from a commercial interest. Legal interest so interpreted means that the result of the suit would affect the third party legally. In a decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces vs. Mt. Atiqu Begum and others reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 wherein, it was held that a person would be a necessary party if a person ought to have been joined, that is to say, in whose absence no effective decree can be passed at all. The person would be a proper party to be impleaded if his/her presence is necessary for an effectual or complete adjudication and in the given facts and circumstances of the present case, the intervener petitioner is necessary party because no effective decree can be passed at all as the intervener petitioner is having right, title and possession over the suit land. The Supreme Court in P.C. Varghese vs. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and others reported in (2005) 8 SCC 486 stressed the point that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the plaintiff is allowed to claim a decree for possession and/or partition in a suit for specific performance. The High Court in Smt.Baby Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors reported in 2024 (2) BLJ 763 had allowed the application of the petitioner filed under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 of the Code and in the case, the petitioner was only claiming her right, title and interest over a portion of the suit land. 
 

Marriage between Manish Kumar and Ruchi Sinha stands dissolved: Supreme Court

In Manish Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 11-page long order dated April 8, 2026, wherein it recorded that the terms of the settlement have been acknowledged . The complainant-wife (Ruchi Sinha) submitted that she does not want to continue with any of the cases filed, either civil  or criminal, and want divorce by mutual consent since the amount as referred to in the settlement agreement has been received by her. The appellant-Manish Kumar also agreed to by the terms of the settlement and submitted that in view of those terms, all criminal and civil cases pending between the parties may be quashed/disposed of and decree of divorce by mutual consent may be ordered.

The judgement reads: "In view of the above, we are inclined to accept the settlement agreement and to dispose of this criminal appeal and I. A. No. 94649 of 2026 with the following directions: (a) As submitted, the appellant-husband has paid Rs.4,00,000/-(Rupees Four Lakhs) as agreed to in the settlement agreement, the receipt whereof is acknowledged by the complainant/respondent No.2- wife towards full and final settlement of all her claims including alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, maintenance
(past, present, future). (b) All criminal and civil cases as mentioned in the settlement agreement be treated as quashed/ disposed of and be consigned to the record. (c) Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed, the bail bonds of the appellant shall stand discharged. (d) Accepting the terms of the settlement and as consented to by the parties, on their request, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we grant decree of divorce by mutual consent. Consequently, the marriage between the appellant-husband(Manish Kumar) and respondent No.2-wife (Ruchi Sinha) shall stand dissolved. By an outcome of the dissolution of marriage, the parties are set free to lead their lives separately as per their own will. 8) The settlement agreement be treated as part of this Order."

The appellant had assailed the order dated October 16, 2023 passed by the High Court rejecting his application for grant of anticipatory bail. The appellant had preferred the appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 106 of 2022 dated August 25, 2022 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, registered at Police Station Mahila, Sub-Division Sadar, District Patna, Bihar. Vide order dated August 28, 2025, at the request made by the counsel for the parties, the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre. In mediation, the parties have settled their differences and disputes amicably and settlement agreement dated February 27, 2026 has been entered into which is received vide communication dated March 10, 2026 from the Mediation Centre. The parties had also filed Interlocutory Application No. 94649 of 2026 seeking dissolution of marriage in view of the said settlement.

The terms of the settlement as decided are as under:

“1. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: The Parties have mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage. They jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, thereby dissolving the marriage solemnized between them.
ALIMONY / MAINTENANCE (FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT): The Second Party/Husband has agreed to pay a total sum of 4,00,000/-(Rupees four Lakhs Only) to the First Party/Wife as a full and final settlement against all the claims of First Party/Wife, including but not limited to past, present, and future maintenance, alimony, stridhan, dowry articles, and any other claims whatsoever arising out of the matrimonial relationship.

MODE AND TIME OF PAYMENT: The aforesaid amount of 4,00,000/- (Rupees four Lakhs Only) shall be paid by the Second Party/Husband to the First Party/Wife drawn in the name of " RUCHI SINHA" by way of account payee cheque bearing Cheque No. "000024" dated January 27, 2026. The said account payee cheque shall be handed over to the First Party/Wife after she will execute/sign the present agreement. The agreement shall be considered complete and binding upon the parties after the parties shall execute this agreement and the money shall be credited in the bank account of First party/Wife. If the cheque shall be dishonored then the agreement shall become null and void.

WITHDRAWAL/QUASHING OF PENDING LITIGATION: The Parties jointly pray before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India to quash the followings things by mutual consent by exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, these are:- (1) to quash the FIR bearing FIR No. 106/2022 registered at Mahila P.S., District-Patna under section 498A /506/34 IPC and u/s 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, (2) to quash the chargesheet u/s 498A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the Second party/Husband and his three relatives who are named in the FIR namely Kamla Devi Verma (the mother of Second Party/Husband), Poonam Kumari(the elder sister of Second Party/Husband) and Mithlesh Kumar (the husband of elder sister of Second party/Husband), (3) to quash the cognizance order and entire case pending before the Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patna who took cognizance u/s 498 A, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition against the Second party/Husband and his above three stated relatives. 

The Parties mutually agree that the case pending before the Hon'ble FAMILY COURTS, Patna Bihar and other courts of India alongwith all cases, complaints, and proceedings (civil and criminal) filed by them against each other and/or their family members and relatives, if any, shall be withdrawn, compounded, or quashed. The Parties undertake to fully cooperate with each other and file necessary joint applications, petitions, and affidavits and make requisite statements before the concerned courts/authorities for the purpose of withdrawing/quashing all the cases.

NO FUTURE CLAIMS OR LITIGATION: The Parties solemnly undertake that upon the complete execution of the terms of this Agreement, they shall have no further claims or demands of any nature whatsoever against each other or their respective family members, relatives, heirs, and assigns, relating, to their marriage. They further undertake not to initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against each other or their family members in the future with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

6. RETURN OF BELONGINGS: The Parties confirm that there are no pending claims against each other regarding any movables. immovables, jewelry, stridhan, dowry articles, or personal belongings, and all such issues have been amicably resolved.

7. MUTUAL UNDERTAKING OF NON-INTERFERENCE: Both Parties undertake not to interfere in
the personal, social or professional life of the other Party in any manner whatsoever. They shall not communicate witheach other through any medium (electronic or otherwise) and shall not make any defamatory or derogatory statements against each other or their families.

8. MUTUAL RELEASE OF LEGAL CLAIMS, LIABILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER: Both the parties hereby agreed and acknowledged that they shall not, at any point and anywhere, initiate or pursue any legal claim, demand, or action against each other, and that neither shall hold any liability towards the other. Each party shall be free to submit, at their own discretion, the documents pertaining to their divorce or decree before the authority concerned, if any, in order to maintain proper record and to avoid any future complications or misunderstandings among them with respect to this matrimonial alliance.

9. VOLUNTARY AND BINDING AGREEMENT: The parties declare that they have entered into this Settlement Agreement after fully understanding its terms and implications. They confirm that this agreement is the result of then-own free will and consent and is not vitiated by any coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their legal heirs, executors, and assigns.

10. VOLUNTARILY CHANGE THE NAME OF MANISH KUMAR AS HER HUSBAND BY THE FIRST PARTY-The first party/Wife shall change all her documents where she has mentioned her husband name as Manish Kumar like Aadhar card, Voter Id, PAN card, Bank details, ration cards, passports, driving licence, etc.

11. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between the Parties and supersedes all prior discussions and agreements. No modification of this Agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by both Parties.

Can co-traveller of an escort to Ganja carrying truck be denied regular bail?

In Thakur Shanni Pratap Singh @ Shanni vs. The Union of India NCB New Delhi (2026), Dr. Gopal Krishna appeared on April 10, 2026 for the petitioner before Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra to submit that this is the second attempt for regular bail in a case related to recovery of 544 kg of Ganja from a truck. 

This is an application for regular bail in connection with NCB Case No. 14 of 2023 instituted for offence under Sections of the Penal Code and under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.

Dr Krishna submitted that the petitioner is in custody since November 4, 2023. He has no role in the offence. There was no recovery from the petitioner. The car on which was traveling has been released. He was sitting in the back of the car. He is not the owner of Ganja or the truck. e is not related to the truck in any manner. Nothing incriminating recovered from him. He was arrested on a mere confession of the driver of the car to the police officer. 

Dr. Krishna also pointed out the Petitioner, in stark contrast to the other accused, does not have any identifiable role. There is absence of any independent evidence establishing his active role, and given that he was merely a back-seat passenger unnamed in the original intelligence, there are clearly reasonable grounds for believing that the Petitioner is not guilty of the offences charged. The Petitioner has absolutely no criminal antecedent. 

The matter is listed for April 17.

    

Justice Rajiv Roy directs State respondents to file affidavit in a case seeking return of land acquired for unambiguous public purpose as per Agreement between Bihar Government and Rohtas Industries Limited

In Kumar Mirtunjay vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Rajiv Roy heard a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents-to-act under the ambit of unambiguous public purpose of the land acquisition law and desist from selling public purpose land and unacquired land for private purpose by selling it to private purpose entities with specific reference to sale of Khesra/Plot no. 723, which was acquired for the unambiguous public purpose of building houses of the company's workers but it was not built contrary to the clause in the Agreement between Bihar Government and M/S Rohtas Industries Limited under the land acquisition law. Dr. Gopal Krishna, the petitioner's counsel has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to fix appropriate rate commensurate with the rate fixed by the State Government known as Circle Rate and upon payment at the same rate the land be directed to be returned to the Khatiyani Raiyat or their legal heirs. The 4-page long order dated April 7, 2026 by Justice Roy reads: "3. Let the State respondents file affidavit in the matter." The matter will come up for listing on June 23, 2026.

The petitioner had prayed for for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to stay the sale proceeding till the claims of the Petitioner is adjudicated by the High Court. The petition prays for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus or appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the Respondents to hand over the unutilized plots of land to the Khatiyani Raiyat or legal successor on circle rate since the unambiguous public purpose for which the land was acquired by the State, and given to the company in question for utilization remains unutilized and is being sold to private purpose entities, which creates a logical and legal compulsion for the Respondents to return the land in question to the legal heirs of the original owner.  

On an earlier occasion, it is apparent that a co-ordinate bench of the Court which was seized with a matter concerning Plot no. 723 was misled by the Official Liquidator citing an order dated September 6, 2012, stating that petitioner's father, namely, Keshwar Singh along with 27 other petitioners, had come before the High Court in Item No.4, I.A.No. 5326/2012 filed by Nihora Singh & Ors.for similar relief. It is not clear as to whether Keshwar Singh was among the 27 other petitioners.  

The fact remains the writ is not confined to Plot no. 723. It seeks relief  with regard to the unacquired land, acquired, used and unused land situated in Village Rattu Bigha, Mauja. Mathuri, Thana No. 159, Tauji No 5335, Anchal-Dehri, District-Rohtas, Bihar which was acquired by the Government of Bihar for the purpose of welfare of construction of quarters for staff and labour of Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. Land Details: The details of the acquired land are as follows:Khata No. 148: Khesra/Plot Nos.  703, 704, 709, 723, 733, 788, 796, 798, 809, 892, 901, 902 and 903, total area in decimal “746”. Khata No. 149: Khesra/Plot No. 739, 743, 797 and 816 total area decimal “102”. Khata No. 150: Khesra/Plot No. 872 total area decimal “52”

Details of Land Survey (L.S.) Khata No. 148: (i)Plot No. 703: Total 55 decimal of land, out of which 52.75 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, but 1.25 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Uday Pratap Singh. Register 2 rent is fixed in the name of Rohtas Industries in account number 146, it is shown in my account number 148, which is my land. The remaining 2.25 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (ii)Plot No. 709: Total 55 decimal of land, out of which 38.5 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, the remaining 16.5 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (iii)Plot No 733: Total 49 decimal of land, out of which 29 decimal of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, but Register 2 rent is fixed in the name of Rohtas Industries in only 17 decimals. The remaining 32 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (iv)Plot No 798: Total 124 decimal of land, acquired for Rohtas Industries, but 11.72 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Satyendra Narayan Singh. (v)Plot No 809: Total 83 decimal of land, out of which 30 decimals of land was acquired for Rohtas Industries Limited, the remaining 53 decimal of land has been taken without acquisition under land acquisition law. (vi)Plot No 892: Total 63 decimal of land, acquired for Rohtas Industries, but 18.77 decimal of the land was illegitimately sold for Model School, a private school. (vii)Plot No.s 704, 723, 788, 796, 901, 902, 903: My land in these plots-04 decimal in Plot no. 704, 34 decimal in Plot no. 723, 25 decimal in Plot no. 788, 17 decimal in Plot no. 796, 15 decimal in Plot no. 901, 2.15 decimal in Plot no. 902 and 7 decimal in Plot no. 903 was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. As to the acquired land in Plot no. 723, a notice has been published a “sale notice” on February 4, 2026 In Hindustan newspaper, Patna edition at page no. 3 fixing 20.02.2026 as a date for opening the sealed tender contrary to the clause in the Agreement between Bihar Government and M/S Rohtas Industries Limited. Details of L.S. Khata No. 149: Plot No 739, 743, 797 and 816: My land in these plots-16 decimal in Plot no. 739, 45 decimal in Plot no. 743, 12 decimal in Plot no. 797, and 29 decimal in Plot no. 816 was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar. Details of L.S. Khata No. 150, Plot No 872: Total 52 decimal of my land was totally acquired for Rohtas Industries Ltd, Dalmianagar.  

Justice Sandeep Kumar sets aside orders by Collectors of Rohtas, Bhojpur, directs them to pass speaking order after considering fresh sand replenishment study reports

In Bimal Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Commissioner-Cum-Principal Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 29-page long judgement dated April 16, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"....the  impugned orders contained in memo no.758 dated 11.05.2024 passed by the Collector, Rohtas and memo no.1919 dated 29.04.2024 passed by the Collector, Bhojpur are hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the Collectors of Bhojpur and Rohtas districts for passing a reasoned and speaking order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and after considering the fresh replenishment study reports, which would be conducted in compliance of the aforesaid directions, for the respective sand ghats. 47. The writ petitions are allowed to the above extent." Both the cases demonstrate the poor environmental health of the Sone river in Bhojpur and Rohtas. 

Justice Kumar relied on High Court's decision in Manjeet Chawla vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported as 2026 SCC OnLine Pat 535 has already held that replenishment study is sine qua non for sand mining projects.

Justice Kumar observed: "43. The mining over river beds cannot be permitted contrary to the replenishment rate of sand and that a replenishment study must be undertaken since it forms the very basis on which the quantity of permissible mining is determined and subsequently the environmental clearance is granted. This Court has noted that under Clause-5 of the Enforcement & Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining, 2020 issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change, the need for replenishment study is paramount in order to nullify the adverse impact arising due to excessive and aggressive sand extraction. Thus, the replenishment study is not merely to ascertain the permissible quantity of sand for extraction but also is necessary to minimize the adverse impact therefrom and strike a balance between sand extraction / mining and preservation of riparian habitat. 44. It is equally settled that the State holds all natural resources including the minerals as a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent with the nature of such a trust. What is clearly crystallized, therefore, is that the annual extractable quantity must be less than the annual replenishment rate in order to align strictly with sustainable mining practices."

The judgement reads:"45. For the foregoing reasons, in order to strike a fair balance and keeping in view the sustainable mining practice, this Court deems it appropriate and in the interest of justice to direct the concerned respondent authorities to conduct a fresh replenishment study for the Rohtas Sand Ghat No.13 and Bhojpur Sand Ghat No. 01 by a competent authority / institution to ascertain the present and true quantity of sand available in the sand ghats and its replenishment rate, which have been allotted to the petitioners. The aforesaid exercise must be completed within eight weeks from today. The cost of the aforesaid replenishment studies shall be borne by the petitioners themselves.

The four other respondents were:Principal Secretary-cum-Commissioner Mines, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar, Director, Mines and Geology Department, Government of Bihar, District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Rohtas, Sasaram and Mineral Development Officer, Rohtas, Sasaram. The case was heard along with Nagendra Kumar vs. State of Bihar through the Commissioner-Cum-Principal Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Bihar & Ors. The four other respondents were: Principal Secretary, Cum Commissioner Mines, Department of Bihar, Director, Mines and Geology Department, Government of Bihar, District Magistrate-Cum-Collector, Bhojpur and Mineral Development Officer, Bhojpur. 

The petitioners had challenged the orders passed by the respective District Magistrate-cum-Collector, by which the security deposit of the petitioners for settlement of sand ghats have been forfeited under Rule 28(1) of the Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2019 and the in-principal work orders have been revoked on the ground that the petitioners have not deposited their respective first installment of the royalty.

Notably, in-principle work orders were issued in favour of the petitioners by the concerned authorities and both the petitioners submitted the required mining plans, which were approved by the competent authority.
After approval of the Mining Plans, both petitioners approached the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) for issuance of Terms of Reference and further environmental clearance, which were granted to them. 

The petitioners had submitted that since the mineral potential of the sand ghats had reduced considerably
considering the fact that there was no replenishment of sand during the monsoon season of the year 2023, the petitioners were reluctant to commence mining operations at their respective sand ghats, as according to the petitioners, the same would have caused heavy financial losses to the petitioners. After the monsoon season of 2023, there was no sufficient replenishment of sand, resulting in substantial reduction in the mineral potential of the respective sand ghats. Further, no replenishment study was conducted after the monsoon season of 2023, although such exercise is mandatory under the Enforcement & Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining, 2020 (EMGSM, 2020), particularly for assessing actual replenishment and sustainable extraction. 

The petitioner - Nagendra Kumar, upon learning about the reduced availability of sand, addressed a representation dated September 22, 2023 to the Member Secretary, SEAC, requesting that the environmental clearance be granted only after physical verification of the sand ghat but despite the aforesaid representation, the environmental clearance was granted to the petitioners without proper consideration of the issue of non-replenishment and reduced mineral potential.

The petitioners submitted that at the time of participating in the auction, they had inspected the respective
sand ghats and found sufficient sand availability but the depletion in mineral potential occurred only thereafter, during the period which was consumed in obtaining approvals and clearances and such depletion may have occurred due to lack of replenishment during monsoon and/or illegal or excessive mining by prior operators or third parties. It was the case of the petitioners that they, under pressure, from the mining authorities proceeded further and applied for Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO) from Bihar State Pollution Control Board. The petitioners did not commence mining operations even after obtaining necessary permissions since their consistent stand was that the actual mineral potential had been seriously reduced due to absence of post-monsoon replenishment. Further, the petitioners received several letters from the respondent authorities for making the payment of first installment in lieu of mining lease granted in their favour but they did not pay the required payment and ultimately, vide impugned orders the security deposits of the petitioners have been forfeited by the respondents under Rule 28(1) of the Bihar Minerals (Concession, Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2019 on the ground that the petitioners did not deposit the first installment of royalty and had not commenced operation of the sand ghats.

The petitioners submitted that the impugned orders forfeiting the security deposits of the petitioners were illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law in view of the fact that there had been no adequate replenishment of sand after monsoon 2023 and no fresh replenishment study of the respective sand ghats had been conducted in terms of the guidelines of the E.M.G.S.M., 2020. He further submits that the actual mineral potential of the respective sand ghats had materially reduced after the auction and before the petitioners could even commence the operation of mining on the sand ghats. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners had already undertaken all required compliance and were not responsible for the depletion of the availability of sand in the sand ghats.The petitioners were proceeded against merely on the allegation that they did not deposit the first installment of royalty/settlement amount and did not commence operation of the respective sand ghats. On this ground alone, the respondents invoked Rule 28(1) of the 2019 Rules, along with certain clauses of the tender document, and proceeded to forfeit the security deposits of the petitioners.

It was also submitted that Rule 28(1) of the 2019 Rules will not apply in the present case since the said provision forms part of Chapter IV of the Rules, which governs the procedure for grant of mining lease ‘except sand’. Sand settlement, on the other hand, is specifically governed by Chapter V, namely Rules 29A to 30, which constitutes a distinct and self-contained Code in relation to the settlement, operation and obligations pertaining to sand ghats. Once the Rules themselves maintain this legislative distinction, the respondents could not have lawfully borrowed Rule 28(1) from a different chapter and applied it to sand settlees.The action of the respondents in forfeiting the security deposits of the petitioners cannot be justified unless there exists a clear and specific statutory authority. Further, the respondents could not have compelled the petitioners to proceed with the settlement and commence mining operations without first resolving the foundational issue of actual mineral availability in the concerned sand ghats. It is the contention of the petitioners that the actual mineral potential of the respective sand ghats materially changed after the auction and before the commencement of operation, and yet the respondents proceeded
as though the originally assumed reserve of sand remained intact. It is argued that such conduct is arbitrary and reflects complete non-application of mind and therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that no post-monsoonal replenishment study for the year 2023 was conducted in respect of the concerned sand ghats, though such study is integral to the sustainable sand mining practice. The EMGSM, 2020 expressly recognises replenishment assessment as an essential component of sustainable sand mining. The purpose of such study is to ascertain the quantity replenished after monsoon, determine actual mineable quantity, prevent ecological over-exploitation, and regulate extraction on a scientific basis. In the absence of such a study, the respondents could not have lawfully presumed that the original mineral potential remained unchanged.

It was submitted that the petitioners had specifically requested the authority that environmental clearance be granted only after physical verification of the sand ghats since the mineral availability had materially reduced, which clearly shows that the issue of non-availability of sand in the sand ghats has been raised at the initial stage. It was also submitted that though the petitioner - Bimal Kumar could not furnish separate detailed replies to each departmental communications during the relevant period, as he was unwell, such circumstance cannot defeat the petitioners’ substantive case.

The petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India, reported as (2015) 7 SCC 728, to contend that judicial review remains available where State action in the contractual field is arbitrary, unfair, unsupported by law, or violative of public law
obligations.

It was argued that a replenishment study conducted in the year 2022 cannot conclusively determine the actual mineral availability after subsequent extraction. A full monsoon cycle and the admitted absence of any updated replenishment study for the year 2023 also cast doubt on the earlier replenishment study conducted in the year 2022. It was also argued that once the petitioners raised grievance regarding non-availability of sand, the respondent authorities ought to have conducted a replenishment study to ascertain the actual availability of sand and its replenishment rate.

Justice Kumar observed:"....it is required to be noted that it is settled that the mining activities cannot be permitted beyond the annual replenishment rate since that would endanger the environment and if the geological processes that naturally replenish the availability of sand cannot match the rate at which the mining occurs then over the period of time aggressive and continued mining activity would result in long term environmental damage. Therefore, sustainable development is sine qua non to strike a balance between developmental activities and the conservation of environment."

The Court's order is pro-environment but it missed the opportunity of directing all the Collectors to ensure sand replenishment study of all the ghats in the State.    

Justice Sourendra Pandey directs the State to examine representation on release of petitioner’s land, declared surplus land in Ceiling Case of 1973-1974 without any notice

In Rajendra Mandal @ Rejendra Mandar S/o Late Nanulal Mandal @ Late Nanu Mandar vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary Revenue, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 4-page long judgment dated April 15, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"6. In view of the aforesaid submissions and taking into account the earlier order passed by this Court in aforesaid C.W.J.C. No. 14493 of 2002 & analogous cases, the petitioner is directed to make a fresh representation before the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Darbhanga (respondent No. 3), detailing his grievances, within a period of four weeks from today, who, on receipt of such representation, after taking into account the fact that the petitioner had purchased the property way-back in the year 1977 from the land-holder whose land has subsequently been declared to be surplus and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the original land-holder/legal heirs or legal representatives of the land in question apart from the other relevant parties including the petitioner, shall pass a reasoned order in accordance with law within a further period of four months of the receipt of such representation.7. If the claim of the petitioner is found to be tenable, necessary sequel order shall also be passed by the concerned respondent/authority within the aforesaid period. 8. With the aforesaid observation/direction, the writ petition stands disposed of."

The four other respondents were: District Magistrate cum Collector, Darbhanga, Additional Collector Ceiling, Darbhanga, Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Darbhanga and Circle Officer, Biraul, Darbhanga.

The writ application was  filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus for a direction to the respondent authorities to release the petitioner’s land, which has been declared surplus land by Ceiling Case No. 69 of 1973-1974 illegally without any notice upon him and without proper enquiry under Section 5(i) (ii) by avoiding Section 9(2) of the Ceiling Act.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that his grievances shall be redressed if the present writ application be disposed of with a direction to the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Darbhanga (respondent No. 3) in terms of the order passed by the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 14493 of 2002 and analogous cases, disposed of on April 21, 2005. He submitted that he is then purchaser of the land in question, which was  declared to be surplus by the authorities concerned. It was submitted that the case of the petitioner was exactly similar to the case of one Yamun Mandal & Ors., which was also the subject matter in the batch of writ petitions, i.e., C.W.J.C. Nos. 768 of 2003.

The standing counsel submitted that the petitioner, being the purchaser, cannot be given the opportunity of being heard at such a belated stage and passage of time upon the disposal of the writ application. It was submitted that the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Darbhanga (respondent No. 3) can look into the matter, if the original land-holder from whom the petitioner purchased the said land is heard before passing any order.

Trial Courts "shall record the offer made to the accused" of their right to legal representation, their entitlement to be represented by legal aid counsel if they cannot afford counsel

Patna High Court's Registrar General issued a circular order no. 01/2026 dated April 15, 2026 on the subject of 5-page long order dated February 5, 2026 passed by the Supreme Court's Division Bench Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran in Reginamary Chellamani vs. State Rep by Superintendent of Customs) SLP (Crl.) No. 18886/2025. 

The Court observed as follows: "It is incumbent upon the trial Courts dealing with criminal proceedings, faced with such situations, to inform the accused of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to be represented by legal aid counsel in the event they cannot afford a counsel. The trial Courts shall record the offer made to the accused in this regard, the response of the accused to such offer and also the action taken thereupon in their orders, before commencing examination of the witnesses. This procedure requires to be adopted and put in practice scrupulously. This order shall be communicated to the Chief Justices of all the High Courts to enable suitable instructions being issued in this regard to all the concerned trial Courts within the State." The case arose from the order dated July 24, 2025 by Justice M. Nirmal Kumar of Madras High Court. 

The circular reads: "In order to ensure uniform compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court, the following instructions, the High Court has issued for strict adherence by all criminal courts in the State: 
1. Informing the Accused of Right to Counsel: Before the commencement of examination of witnesses, the trial court shall inform the accused clearly and specifically that: 

(a) He/ She has a right to be represented by an advocate of his/ her choice, and
(b) If the accused cannot afford to engage a private counsel, he/she is entitled to free legal aid through Legal Services Authorities.
2. Offer of Legal Aid: Where the accused states that he/ she does not have legal representation or is unable to engage counsel, the court shall:
(a) Inform the accused of the availability of free legal aid, and
(b) Take necessary steps to provide legal aid counsel through the concerned District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) without delay.
3. Recording in Order Sheet: (i) The Presiding Officer shall specifically record in the order sheet:
(a) That the offer of legal representation/ legal aid was made to the accused.
(b) The response of the accused to such offer.
(c) The action taken by the court in consequence of such response.
(ii) The learned Trial Court, while recording the offer to provide legal representation to the accused shall also take the signature/ LTI of the accused in the margin of the order-sheet.
4. Condition Precedent for Witness Examination: The examination of prosecution witnesses shall not ordinarily commence unless:
(a) The above procedure has been followed, and
(b) The same has been duly recorded in the order sheet.
5. Strict Compliance: All trial courts shall scrupulously follow the above procedure in every criminal trial to safeguard the right to fair trial and effective legal representation. 

The Principal District and Sessions Judges shall circulate these instructions to all criminal courts under their jurisdiction, and ensure strict compliance with directions contained herein."

Notably, the appellant, Reginamary Chellamani, was aggrieved by the denial of regular bail by the Madras High Court in relation to the order of the Principal Special Judge under EC and NDPS Act Cases for the offences punishable under Section 8(c) read with Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 read with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. Supreme Court had observed:"We, however, find that the appellant, Reginamary Chellamani, has been in custody for 4 years 1 month and 28 days as on date. Given the length of incarceration that the appellant has already suffered and as an identically situated accused person, who was travelling along with the appellant, Reginamary Chellamani, on the same flight, has been granted bail by this Court, we are inclined to grant the same relief to the appellant at this stage. The appeal is accordingly allowed, setting aside the impugned order dated 24.07.2025. The appellant, Reginamary Chellamani, is directed to be released on bail in connection with the aforestated NDPS case, on stringent terms and conditions to be fixed by the trial Court."

The Supreme Court's order reads: "We may also note at this stage that the appellant did not cross examine the witnesses at the initial stage and it was only after she engaged her own counsel and her application for re-examining those witnesses was allowed that she was permitted to do so."

Ram Narayan Yadav challenges election of Nitish Mishra, the MLA from Jhanjharpur, Madhubani

In Ram Narayan Yadav vs. Nitish Mishra & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court passed a 2-page long order upon hearing Dr. Gopal Krishna, the counsel of the petitioner, wherein, the Court permitted deletion of the respondent no. 2, the Election Commission of India through the Chief Election Commissioner and respondent no. 5, the Chief Electoral Officer, Office of the CEO, Patna. The prayer was made for its deletion in view of the provision under Section 82 (a) of the the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the pre-Constitution law. 

The law was enacted on July 17, 1951 ahead of the upcoming first General Elections during November -December 1951. It was introduced in the Parliament by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the then union law minister. The Act was enacted by the provisional parliament under Article 327 of the Constitution of India, just before the first general election.

Section 82 of Representation of the People Act reads:"Parties to the petition.—A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition—(a) where the petitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.]". 

Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act specifies the persons who are required to be joined as respondents to an election petition. Under this provision the returned candidate is a necessary party as a respondent and where relief for a declaration is claimed that the election petitioner, or any other candidate be duly elected, all the contesting candidates are necessary to be impleaded as respondents to the petition.

But Section 87 of the Act  provides the "Procedure before the High Court.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to the trial of suits...." It is evident that the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the trial of an election petition by virtue of section 87 of the Act. Since CPC is applicable, and the Court trying the election petition can act in exercise of the powers of the Code including Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11(a). 

Notably, the Representation of the People Act has been amended 49 times during September 1951-August 2022. The existing provision under Section 82 was substituted by Section 45 of the Representation of the People (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, the post-Constitution amendment with effect from August 28, 1956.  

The petitioner's counsel was permitted by the Court to substitute the affidavit because the term of the Oath Commissioner has expired. The case is listed before the court for April 27, 2026. 

The Delimitation Act, 2026 to be introduced in Parliament

The Delimitation Bill 2026 is a bill to provide for the readjustment of the allocation of seats in the House of the People to the States and Union territories, the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of each State and Union territories having a Legislative Assembly, the division of each State and each Union territory having a Legislative Assembly into territorial constituencies for elections to the House of the People and Legislative Assemblies of the States and Union territories and for matters connected therewith.

Justice Sourendra Pandey sets aside cancellation of long standing Jamabandi by Collector, Bhagalpur

In David Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Sourendra Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 17-page long judgement dated April 10, 2026, wherein he concluded:"38. This Court is unable to comprehend as to the fact that the Collector, Bhagalpur could not assess the facts of the case despite verbatim noting the submissions being made on behalf of the parties and as such, the impugned order can be said to be passed without application of judicious mind because of the fact that when a matter with respect to title has already been settled between the parties way-back in the year 1983 till the stage of the High Court and no further petition being pending before any other Court, cancelling the long standing Jamabandi in favour of the petitioner, cannot be permitted in the eyes of law. 39. In view of the discussions made hereinabove,  the impugned order dated 31.05.2021, referred to above, is set aside. 40. The Circle Officer, Sultanganj is directed to restore Jamabandi No. 71 with respect to the land in question in favour of the petitioner and any other Jamabandi standing in favour of respondent No. 6 or his forefathers should be cancelled with immediate effect. 41. The writ application stands allowed and disposed of accordingly." 

Justice Pandey framed the dispute involved as to whether the order passed by the Collector, Bhagalpur setting aside the order upholding the Jamabandi in favour of the petitioner is beyond jurisdiction; and whether the title needs to be seen prima facie before coming to a finding with regard to cancellation/creation of a Jamabandi.  

The Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011 provides for a summary proceeding for mutation of land records with the sole object of maintaining updated revenue entries. It is a well settled principle that mutation proceeding do not confer title and are only for fiscal purposes. 

Supreme Court has held that mutation entries neither create nor extinguish title and the same has been reiterated in Suraj Bhan vs. Financial Commissioner, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 186.

Justice Pandey observed that the Collector, Bhagalpur dealt with the factual aspect of the matter in detail and noted the factum of creation of Jamabandi in favour of the petitioner and even the reasons of cancellation of Jamabandi, which was created in favour of Nand Kumar Yadav, the respondent No. 6 and, thereafter, came to a conclusion that the dispute between the parties relates to a dispute of title, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Collector and it can only be decided by a competent Civil Court. He pointed out that the Collector, Bhagalpur observed that the Additional Collector, Bhagalpur had decided the matter with regard to the factual aspect of the matter and, therefore, the order passed by the Additional Collector dated May 21, 2018 was set aside and the proceeding was closed. On perusal of the order passed by the Additional Collector in a Jamabandi Cancellation Case of 2017-18,, it was found that the Additional Collector considered the entire facts of the case and taking into consideration the title, which had flown in favour of respondent No. 6 on account of auction purchase and thereby, the order being set aside in a miscellaneous case by the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Bhagalpur and affirmed by the High Court and, therefore, the claim of title of the father of respondent No. 6 was wrong and, thus, he had gone on to hold that Jamabandi No. 71, in favour of the forefathers of the petitioner, was created and was directed to continue. From the order of the Additional Collector, Bhagalpur, it was also evident that he had taken into account the fact that when the amount of Rs. 1500/- was paid by the grandfather of the petitioner to the father of respondent No. 6, the matter was settled for all times to come and, therefore, the very factum of claim over the same by the father of respondent No. 6, came to rest. The Additional Collector, Bhagalpur was that he had also directed for cancellation of Jamabandi No. 189, which also had continued during the said period and had, thus, directed for cancellation of such Jamabandi standing in the name of the father of respondent No. 6.

Justice Pandey took note of the fact that the application for cancellation of Jamabandi No. 71, standing in the name of the forefathers of the petitioner, was made after almost 19 years of the passing of the orders of the Civil Court and, therefore, it is in teeth of the well settled law that a long standing Jamabandi cannot be cancelled without taking recourse before a competent Civil Court. He relied on the High Court's decision in Maya Devi & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2014) 3 PLJR, 584. 

Justice Pandey observed: "....not only the Collector, Bhagalpur has erred in observing that the Addl. Collector, Bhagalpur had not considered the factual background of the case, but has also committed an error that on one hand, he is relegating the parties to approach a competent Civil Court, holding it to be a dispute of title, and on the other hand, he has set aside the order of the Addl. Collector without passing a positive order, either restoring the Jamabandi in favour of respondent No. 6 or cancellation of Jamabandi in favour of the forefathers of the petitioner. 37. This Court, on perusal of the records has found that the said land was a Khatiyani land belonging to the petitioner and the claim over the same was on account of auction purchase by the forefathers of respondent No. 6 and, therefore, once the said auction purchase was set aside and Rs. 1500/- was paid by the forefathers of the petitioner to the forefathers of respondent No. 6, question of title or possession over such land in favour of the forefathers of respondent No. 6 cannot arise." 

The writ application, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, was preferred by the petitioner for setting aside the order dated May 31, 2021 passed by the Collector, Bhagalpur in Jamabandi Cancellation Appeal Case No. 121/2019-20, whereby the order dated May 21, 2018 passed by the Additional Collector, Bhagalpur in Jamabandi Cancellation Case of 2017-18 was set aside.

 

Continued incarceration of first time offenders despite serving 1/3rd of maximum sentence is indefensible

Supreme Court in the case of In Re:-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, [Writ Petition (Civil) 406/2013], issued specific directions: “4. In that view of the matter, it is deemed appropriate to direct immediate implementation of Section 479 of the BNSS by calling upon Superintendents of Jails across the country wherever accused persons are detained as undertrials, to process their applications to the concerned Courts upon their completion of one-half/one-third, as the case may be, of the period mentioned in sub-section (1) of the said provision, for their release on bail. This step will go a long way in easing overcrowding in jails which is the primary focus of this Court in the present petition. 5. The aforesaid steps shall be taken as expeditiously as possible, preferably within two months from today. Reports shall be submitted by the Superintendent Jails to their respective Heads of the Department within the same time line for a comprehensive affidavit to be filed by each State Government/Union Territory through their respective Chief Secretaries. The affidavits shall furnish the details of the number of undertrials who would be entitled to extension of the benefit of Section 479 of the BNSS, the number of applications moved before the concerned Courts for their release and the number of undertrials actually released by the date of filing of the affidavits.” 

 

In such a backdrop, the continued incarceration of the first time offenders inside jail despite serving 1/3rd of the maximum sentence is indefensible. Considering the the mandate of Section 479 BNSS, there is no reason to further deprive liberty to the applicants who have spent more than 1/3rd of the maximum imposable sentence in jail.

Phenothiazine, Promethazine come within the ambit of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, not under NDPS Act: Justices Mohit Kumar Shah, Arun Kumar Jha

In Dharmendra Kumar v. The State of Bihar (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Arun Kumar Jha delivered a 14-page long judgement dated April 9, 2026. It directed the suspension of the order of sentence imposed upon the accused persons booked under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (NDPS) Act, 1985. The judgement was authored by Justice Jha.  The Court has held that Phenothiazine and Promethazine do not come within the ambit of the NDPS Act, and they are covered under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 

The High Court was considering an appeal filed by the appellant convicts seeking the suspension of sentence and grant of bail who were convicted under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act. 

Justice Jha held, “The discussions made hereinbefore clearly shows that the seized articles which have been found to be Phenothiazine and Promethazine do not come within the ambit of any narcotic drug and psychotropic substances for the purposes of NDPS Act. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence qua the appellants for possession of these two substances, prima facie, appears to be against the provisions of the NDPS Act and might not be sustainable, hence we find that the appellants have been able to make out a strong case in their favour for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to them during the pendency of their respective appeals.” 

The police officials had received information that three persons riding two motorcycles were going to a hotel to make a delivery of a consignment of Heroin. The informant reached the spot in front of the named hotel, where the Magistrate and Panther constables also came, and the checking of vehicles started. The police party caught hold of the suspected persons, and they were served with notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. From the motorcycle driven by the appellants Dharmendra Kumar and Ravindra Kumar, recovery of 1.006 Kg of heroin like substance was made, whereas from the motorcycle driven by appellant Vijay Kumar, recovery of 1.012 Kg of heroin like substance was made. On testing the seized articles, prima facie evidence of contraband containing heroin was found. 

On the basis of the written information of the informant, a case was registered under Sections 8, 21(c), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act. Charges were framed, and the Trial Court convicted the appellants. The appellants approached the High Court in appeal on the ground that, as per the result of the report, the seized substances were “Phenothiazine along with Promethazine” and they are neither narcotic drugs nor psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act. Reasoning The Bench, at the outset, explained that Section 2 (xiv) of the NDPS Act defines “narcotic drug” to mean coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium poppy straw and includes all manufactured drugs. Similarly, Section 2 (xxiii) defines “Psychotropic Substance” as any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or material included in the list of psychotropic substances specified in the Schedule. 

Referring to the Schedule attached with the NDPS Act, which provides the list of psychotropic substances under Clause (xxiii) of Section 2, the Bench noted that this list does not contain either Phenothiazine or Promethazine. Similarly, Schedule I of NDPS Rules, 1985, which contains a list of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for which import into and export out of India has been provided for medical, scientific and training purposes, also does not contain the aforementioned two substances, i.e., Phenothiazine and Promethazine. 

Justice Jha found that the substances Phenothiazine and Promethazine find mention under Schedule H and G, respectively, of the Drugs Rules, 1945. The substance “Phenothiazine, derivatives of and salts of its derivatives” has been mentioned as item no.397 in Schedule H and the substance “Promethazine” has been mentioned under the heading ‘Antisthaninic substances, the following, their salts, their derivatives, salts of their derivatives’ in Schedule G of Drugs Rules, 1945. 

The judgement reads: “Further it is also pertinent to take note of the law in this regard to the effect that if any cognizable offence has been committed under Chapter IV of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the police is not empowered to register an FIR”. 

It concluded that the seized articles did not come within the ambit of the NDPS Act. It suspended the order of sentence and directed the release of the appellants on bail during the pendency of the appeals.

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey accepts unconditional apology from Advocate P.R. Singh for inadvertent mistake, recalls 2018 order by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi

In Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 30-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"43. From perusal of record, it is evident that occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. The appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Hence, to put the appellant in jail for remaining period is too harsh as appellant is aged about 90 years. Hence, the court is of the view that if sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone that would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. 44. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant appeal stands partly allowed. 45. The interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. 46. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of the concerned jail for compliance and for record. 47. The records of this case be also returned to the concerned trial court forthwith." 

Justice Pandey observed: "42. So far as sentence of appellant under Section-324 of I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged about 90 years, he is a first offender and appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. Hence, if the appellant is sentenced to the period undergone, that would meet the ends of justice." 

An  Interlocutory Application was filed on behalf of the appellant for recalling the order dated November 27, 2018, wherein it was submitted that appellant of the appeal namely, Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh was still alive. It was also submitted that due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication, counsel for the appellant inadvertently informed the Court that the appellant had expired, whereas in fact, it was the father of the appellant who had died and not the appellant. It was also submitted that the incorrect statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and no benefit could have accrued to the appellant by making such a submission. However, an unconditional apology was also  tendered on behalf of the appellant for the inadvertent mistake. Prabhat Ranjan Singh was the counsel for the appellant who had made the inadvertent mistake. The Court was satisfied that the incorrect statement was made due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication. 

The November 2018 order reads:"It has been submitted at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that sole appellant Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh is dead. It has further been submitted that as fine has also been inflicted apart from substantial sentence whereupon, the siblings of appellant (since deceased) intent to proceed with instant appeal and so, substitution is needed and for that an adjournment of four weeks be granted. List accordingly. During midst thereof, the concerned should take proper step." Notably, it was the father of the appellant who had died, not the appellant. 

Accordingly, the 1-page long order dated November 27, 2018 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi was recalled by Justice Pandey. The Criminal Appeal was restored to its original file and number. and I.A. No. 3 of 2018 was allowed. 

The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated January 15, 2009 and order of sentence dated January 17, 2009 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-IV, Jehanabad in Sessions Trial No. 566 of 2006/138 of 2006, arising out of Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 (G.R. Case No. 413 of 2005) whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 341 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 307 of IPC and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month in each Sections 447 and 341 of IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

As per prosecution case, the informant Bharteshwar Prasad (PW-6), while undergoing treatment at the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar, gave his fardbeyan before A.S.I. Balmiki Singh of Islampur Police Station on March 21, 2005 at about 10:30 A.M., stating inter alia that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house at village Keur from Islampur Bazaar. As soon as he opened his door, his co-villager Akhilesh Prasad (appellant), armed with a farsa, came to his door along with two unknown persons and abused him in filthy language. Upon protest by the informant, the accused persons disclosed that the informant used to demand the outstanding rent from the wife and sister of the appellant, who had been residing in the informant’s house at Islampur without paying rent for the last two and a half years. On this issue, the accused/appellant allegedly threatened the informant that he would teach the informant and his son Arun such a lesson that they would forget to demand the rent. After a brief altercation, the appellant Akhilesh Kumar, who was having a farsa in his hand, assaulted the informant by giving a farsa blow on his head with an intention to kill him. Due to the assault, the informant sustained bleeding injuries and he became unconscious. He raised alarm for help upon which the local residents assembled at the place of occurrence. After seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The informant was taken to the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar at Islampur by the neighbours for treatment. During the course of treatment, he gained consciousness. On the basis of fardbeyan given by the informant/PW-6, Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 dated March 23, 2005 was registered for the offence under Sections 447, 504, 341, 323, 324 and 34 of the I.P.C. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 326, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance under the aforementioned Sections of the IPC. The case was committed to the court of sessions after following due procedure. The  trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined all together seven witnesses. 

Justice Pandey observed:"The presence of injured witness/informant at the place of occurrence cannot be discarded as he is sufferer of crime and has supported the story of prosecution on the point of place of  occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence. As such, even if the Investigating Officer of
this case has not been examined, the whole prosecution story cannot be thrown out in a case where the place of occurrence is otherwise proved. Even if some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies are found in the evidence of prosecution-witnesses regarding manner of appearance of some of the witnesses, the whole story of prosecution cannot be thrown out when crux of the prosecution story is quite intact and
supportive of manner of occurrence, time of occurrence and how the injured/informant suffered injuries. 

Justice Pandey relied on para 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2011 SC 280, which reads: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to
discredit an injured witness."

He drew on para 30 of the Court's judgment in Mano Dutt & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79, which observed as follows:-"30... Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit."

In State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view was reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. 

Justice Pandey considered as to whether the act of the appellant would attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code or not. "36. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 307 IPC, intention or knowledge to cause death is the essential ingredient. Mere causing of grievous injury by a sharp cutting weapon is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, unless intention or knowledge to cause death is clearly established." 

The judgement reads:"37. It has rightly been admitted by P.W. 6/informant that there was no intention on the part of appellant regarding causing death as despite having full opportunity, the appellant did not commit any act of assault repeatedly. The very act of appellant clarifies that the intention was not to kill the informant/victim and, at best, inference can be drawn with regard to causing injury to informant. Considering the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, there was no repetition of assault and there is absence of clear evidence regarding intention or knowledge to cause death, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of given facts and circumstances of the case that from the materials on record, only offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. can be made out and, as such, conviction of appellant under Section-307 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. 38. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the impugned judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of appellant stands modified to that under Section-324 of I.P.C. 

In absence of evidence, no offence was made out under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-341 of I.P.C. There was no allegation of criminal trespass against the appellant either in the initial version of the prosecution-story or in the evidence of the prosecution-witnesses, including the informant. The informant’s version in the initial version of the prosecution story as well as in his evidence is that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house and as soon as he was opening the door of his house, the accused Akhilesh Prasad came and assaulted him on his head by means of farsa. Hence, it was evident that the incident of assault took place outside the door of informant’s house. In view of the above, no offence is made out under Section 447 of the IPC. Accordingly, appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-447 of I.P.C.