Wednesday, February 4, 2026

Supreme Court hears petition of West Bengal Chief Minister against Election Commission of India, challenging Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

In Mamata Banerjee vs. Election Commission of India (2026), Supreme Court's 3-judge bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul M Pancholi heard the writ petition filed by Mamata Banerjee, the longest serving woman Chief Minister of Bengal challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the electoral rolls in the State. The Court directed the ECI to file its response by February 9, 2026. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, has questioned the legality, timing, and manner of implementation of the SIR.

Mamata Banerjee is one of the senior most chief Ministers of country who has been a senior union minister in the past. 

Notably, SIR became controversial ahead of the assembly elections in Bihar. Although assembly election in Bihar were concluded in November 2025, the cases against SIR in Bihar filed in the Supreme Court has not been concluded as yet. 

Significantly, ECI has claimed that no appeals were filed from Meghalaya, Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, Chandigarh and Uttar Pradesh after the completion of the Special Summary Revision (SSR) exercise as of 6-10 January 2025

Can SSR process be compared with SIR process?

The Constitutional and legal provisions regarding eligibility to be registered as a voter and disqualifications for registration in an electoral roll are laid down in Article 326 of the Constitution of India and Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 respectively. The preparation of electoral rolls and elections are conducted in accordance with the Representation of People Act 1950, 1951, Registration of Electors Rules 1960, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. 

In accordance with Section 23 of the Representation of People Act 1950, the eligibility conditions to enrol as an elector are verified by the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) to his/her satisfaction.

Ahead of the upcoming assembly elections in Bengal, Mamata Banerjee is seeking following reliefs from the Court: 

A.Set aside ECI's SIR notification of June 24, 2025 and October 27, 2025. 

B. Direct ECI to conduct the forthcoming 18th Legislative Assembly elections in the State of West Bengal in the year 2026, on the basis of the existing Electoral Rolls, 2025 

C. Direct ECI to issue written instructions to all DEOs, EROs, AEROs and BLOs that cases involving name mismatches / spelling variations falling under the "Logical Discrepancy" category shall not be called for hearing, and that all such name corrections may be carried out suo motu on the basis of available records 

D.Direct ECI to upload all names of 'unmapped' and Logical Discrepancy cases online on the CEO and DEO websites 

E. Direct ECI to withdraw all hearing notices already issued in the past under the 'Logical Discrepancy category where the only issue is a name mismatch or spelling variation, and intimate the concerned electors accordingly. 

F. Direct the ECI to ensure that no voter marked under the Logical Discrepancy' category is deleted, and that while any anomalies may be duly rectified, no legitimate voter who has been successfully mapped to the 2002 electoral rolls and has submitted all requisite documents is disenfranchised 

G. Direct ECI to accept Aadhar Cards as proof of identity especially in cases of 'Logical Discrepancy' without insisting on any other documents 

H. Direct ECI to publish online names of all voters in respect of whom Form-7 has been received and to not allow any further bulk submission of Form-7 

I. Direct ECI to allow ERO/AERO to dispose of the cases locally where inter-state documents pending with DEO for verification beyond 5 [five] days 

J. Direct ECI to withdraw all Micro-Observers from the State of West Bengal 

K. In the alternative to prayer (j) above, direct ECI to ensure that Micro-Observers do not exercise any statutory power such as participation in hearings/verification of work done by ERO/AERO in any manner whatsoever with immediate effect 

L. Direct ECI to accept all documents issued by competent authorities of the State during the verification process 

M. Direct ECI to follow the procedure for disposal of cases by local inquiry/field inquiry in terms of point 5(a) and 5(b) of ECI's order dated 24.06.2025 and make necessary changes to the ERO/AERO portal/application to facilitate the same; 

N.All complainants submitting Form-7 be directed to remain present at the time of hearing;

West Bengal Chief Minister has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court against the Election Commission of India (ECI), challenging the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process ongoing in the State. 

West Bengal Chief Minister informed the Court that "Only they have targeted Bengal on the eve of elections. Why, after 24 years, what was the hurry to do in two months what will take two years? When the festival season is there, when the harvest season is there, when people are in no mood to be in the city, they are troubling people issuing notices. More than 100 people have died. BLOs have died writing letters, because of the harassment of ECI. Many are hospitalised. Bengal is targeted. Sir, tell me,why not Assam? Why not North East?" She added:"58 lakh people are deleted. Living people are declared dead. They are targeting Bengal, only for Bengal they have appointed micro-observers. They want to bulldoze the people of Bengal".

She asserted:"The problem is, always our lawyers fight for the case and we are fighting from the beginning. But when everything is finished, when we are not getting justice, when justice is crying behind the door - then we thought, we are not getting justice anywhere. I have written letters to the Election Commission including all details, but no reply. I am a bonded labour. I am a very less important person, I am from a common family, I am not fighting for my party."

Her senior counsel submitted that only 11 days are left for the publication of the final list but over 1.36 crore persons included in the 'Logical Discrepancy(LD)' list are yet to be heard. 

The petition was filed on January 28, 2026 stating that the ongoing process will result in "large-scale disenfranchisement" in Bengal in particular. Several other States from South India are also wary about the SIR. 

Election Commission of India is yet to realize that sunlight of transparency is the best disinfectant. 

Tuesday, February 3, 2026

Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra quashes order by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna because "second attempt to re-agitate the same allegations,...is clearly barred in criminal jurisprudence"

In Om Prakash Sharma @ Om Prakash vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Rudra Prakash Mishra delivered a 6-page judgement dated February 2, 2026 concluded:"The order dated 09.02.2018, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, in Complaint Case No. 3016(C) of 2017, and the entire criminal proceeding arising there from, is hereby quashed." 

The application was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order dated February 9, 2018, passed by the  Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, whereby cognizance was taken for the offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the petitioner in Complaint case of 2017, instituted by Opposite Party No. 2, namely, Rekha Kumari. Notice was issued to Opposite Party No.2/complainant, which was duly served and she appeared before the High Court.

Rekha Devi's case was that in the year 2015 she had taken a shop situated at A.G. Colony, Patna, on rent from the petitioner after allegedly paying a sum of Rs. 1.5 lakhs on two different dates and advance rent of Rs. 24,000/-. It is alleged that after carrying out false ceiling and rack work and keeping garments worth about Rs. 10 lakhs in the said shop, a dispute arose between the parties, whereafter both the parties put their own locks on the shop. It is further alleged that the petitioner subsequently broke open the lock and committed theft of the articles kept therein. On the alleged inaction of the police, the present complaint was filed on August 7, 2017 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire complaint case was false, concocted and an abuse of the process of law. It was submitted that the complainant herself stated in the complaint petition that the police did not register her case, whereas Shastri Nagar P.S. Case No. 355 of 2015 had already been registered on the basis of information given by the Rekha Devi for the same set of facts and cause of action.

In the police case case, the petitioner had filed a discharge application under Section 239 Cr.P.C. which was rejected vide order dated March 17, 2018 by the  Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna.

The said order was challenged before the High Court in Cr. Misc. No.28532 of 2018, and the Court, vide order dated May 4, 2023, allowed the application and quashed the proceedings. Despite the same, the complainant has again initiated the complaint case on identical facts, which is impermissible in law.

The counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature, arose out of a landlord-tenant relationship. The petitioner was the undisputed owner of the shop and the criminal colour was deliberately given to the dispute only to harass the petitioner. It was contended that the complaint petition did not disclose any material to prima-facie constitute the offence of theft under Section 379 IPC.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2 as well as APP for the State opposed the application and supported the impugned order.

The counsel for the complainant submitted that the petitioner, without any prior information or consent of the complainant, unlawfully removed the articles kept in the shop and thereby committed theft, for which the present complaint case was instituted.

Justice Mishra observed:"....it emerges that the allegations levelled in the present complaint case are founded on the very same cause of action and identical set of facts which had earlier culminated in registration of an FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings. It further appears that the earlier proceedings, arising out of the same allegations, have already been set aside by this Court. The institution of the present complaint, therefore, amounts to a second prosecution on the same facts, which is impermissible in law....it is manifest that for the same cause of action and identical allegations, an FIR had already been lodged earlier, which ultimately stood quashed by a coordinate Bench of the High Court. The present complaint case is nothing but a second attempt to re-agitate the same allegations, which is clearly barred in criminal jurisprudence."

Justice Mishra relied on Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, categorically held that criminal proceedings can be quashed where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide intention and instituted maliciously with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused. He observed:"In the present case, initiation of a second criminal proceeding on the same facts, after failure in earlier proceedings, clearly falls within the categories laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra). Allowing such prosecution to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and result in harassment of the petitioner. 15. It is a settled principle of law that for the same set of facts and cause of action, a person cannot be subjected to repeated criminal prosecution, particularly when the earlier proceedings have already been adjudicated upon by a competent court. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order taking cognizance cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 17. Accordingly, the present application is allowed."


 


Justice Shailendra Singh upholds judgement by Ad hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Patna in a Sessions Trial of 2012

In Atendra Thakur vs. The State of Bihar  (2026), Patna High Court's Justice Shailendra Singh delivered a 20-page long judgement dated February 3, 2026 concluded:"... this Court finds the trial court’s approach in framing the charge under section 376 read with section 511 of the IPC against the appellant and convicting him for the same, to be correct. Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and there is no merit in this appeal, so, it stands dismissed. 20. The appellant is on bail, so, his bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the trial court within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this Judgment’s copy by the trial court and serve the remaining part of the sentence awarded upon him by the trial court. If the appellant does not surrender within the fixed period then the trial court shall take all necessary legal steps to get him in custody and put him in jail so that he can serve the remaining part of his sentence. 21. Let the judgment’s copy along with the trial court’s record be sent immediately to the trial court for needful compliance."

The criminal appeal was preferred by the appellant, Atendra Kumar, against the judgment of conviction dated April 16, 2014 and the order of sentence dated April 23,2014 passed by the Court of Ad hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Patna, in a Sessions Trial of 2012 arose out of Parsa Bazar P.S. case 2012, G.R. of 2012, whereby and whereunder the appellant was  convicted for the offence under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/. 

Justice Singh examined the applicability of the offence punishable under section 376 read with section 511 of the IPC in the present matter. As per the story narrated by the victim in her fardbeyan, the accused firstly followed her and thereafter ran behind her in a field and pushed her to the ground and climbed onto her body and started opening her pant but during that course when the victim cried, the appellant tried to escape upon seeing the people who ran to the place of occurrence after hearing the cry of the victim. The victim deposed almost similar story before the trial court in her examination-in-chief and remained firm to her stand in the cross-examination also. By these acts of the appellant as alleged by the victim, it can be deemed that he had crossed the stage of preparation and entered into the stage of attempting to commit the offence of rape. As the appellant’s acts clearly demonstrate the execution of his mens rea to rape the victim and his preparation had come to an end on that very moment when he pushed the victim to the ground on a wheat field and climbed onto her body and tried to open her pant. Though he could not succeed in committing sexual penetration, however, the appellant was about to commit rape upon the victim but could not succeed on account of raising an alarm by the victim and owing to the arrival of nearby people. 

The informant, who was the victim herself alleged that on April 14, 2012 at about 4:10 P.M., she went to the coaching centre run by one Gunjan Master, situated at village- Palanga Bagicha. After attending the coaching, she was returning alone to her home, when she saw the appellant coming from behind on a bicycle. Thereafter, when she reached near a ridge leading to her village, she left the road and chose a shortcut way to reach the village. After that the appellant started following her after leaving his bicycle in a field. The victim further alleged that when the appellant started following her, she, on account of being alone, started running, but the appellant chased and caught hold of her, closed her mouth by placing his hand, and pushed her to the ground of a wheat field with an intention to rape her. The victim further alleged that during the course of committing the occurrence, the appellant fell upon her body and tried to open her pant, but when she cried, some people started arriving at that place.

Thereafter, the appellant tried to flee, but he was caught by those persons. The appellant was assaulted by the people, and thereafter, the police were informed through mobile communication. After that the Station House Officer (SHO) and other police officials arrived there. As per the victim, she recorded her fardbeyan at 06:45 P.M. before the Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI), namely Din Bandhu Ram, of Parsa Bazar Police Station. On that basis, the formal FIR was registered baring Parsa Bazar P.S. Case No. 39 of 2012 for the offence under Section 376 read with Section 511 of IPC, that set the criminal law in motion.


Monday, February 2, 2026

CPI candidate Ram Narayan Yadav challenges election of BJP MLA Nitish Mishra & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey to hear election petition

In Ram Narayan Yadav vs. Nitish Mishra & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey will hear the election petition against Nitish Mishra, the current BJP MLA from Jhanjharpur, Madhubani on February 3, 2026. 

Communist Party of India (CPI) had fielded nine candidates for Bihar Assembly Election 2025 but all of them lost. Advocate Dr. Gopal Krishna has filed an Election Petition on behalf of Ram Narayan Yadav, one of its candidates in the Patna High Court along with Advocate Dr. S.S.P. Yadav. The candidate is one  of 33 seats Left parties contested. Left parties secured only 3 seats. The result of the 2025 Bihar Assembly election was announced on November 14, 2025.

Under Sections 80, 80A and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 there is a provision to challenge the validity of any election, irregularities in counting or violation of rules through election petition. The High Court has accepted the petition.

In exercise of powers under Section 80(A) (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Acting Chief Justice of Patna High Court has nominated Justices S. B. P. Singh and Ashok Kumar Pandey to receive, try and hear the Election Petitions against election of Bihar Legislative Assembly, 2025 under Rule 6 of the Chapter XXI-E of the Patna High Court Rules, 1916.

The 45-day limitation period expired on December 29, 2025. Some 30 election petitions have been filed in the High Court.The filing of these petitions has created uncertainty for the newly elected MLAs. Now it is for the Court to decide their fate.

Also read: Justices S. B. P. Singh, Ashok Kumar Pandey hearing Election Petitions 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."


Findings of Subordinate Judge, Chapra are erroneous and perverse. the judgment and decree of 1990 set aside:Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey

In Deomuni Devi & Ors. vs. Ram Autar Mahto & Ors. (2026), Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 26-page long judgement dated February 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:".... it is clear that Ramjhari Devi was the daughter of Devnarayan Mahto, and as she was the daughter of Devnarayan Mahato, she has executed the sale deeds in favor of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, which is legal and binding. And as far as the claim of the plaintiffs regarding title on the basi of adverse possession is concerned, the same is not properly pleaded and proved. 65. Therefore, the findings of the learned trial court are erroneous and perverse. As such, the judgment and decree of the learned trial court is hereby set aside. 66. In result, this appeal is allowed. 67. Office is directed to draw decree accordingly."

The first appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree dated July 28, 1990 passed by 8th Subordinate Judge, Chapra in a Title Suit of 1985, wherein and whereunder the suit was decreed with cost. The plaintiffs/respondents had filed the Title Suit in  1985 for declaring their title on the disputed land and also for delivery of possession if the Plaintiffs are found dispossessed from any part of the disputed property. 

The case of the plaintiffs/respondents was that they be deemed as a part of the plaint. From perusal of the , it will be clear that Ram Bhajju Mahto was the ancestor of the Plaintiff's family. Ram Bhajju Mahto had two sons: Hitlal Mahto and Sukan Mahto. Hitlal was the elder son. Family was joint. Hitlal Mahto had a son, Dev Narayan Mahto, who died issueless 45 years ago; his wife had predeceased him. It was also submitted that in the RS Survey, all the joint family property along with other co-parceners was entered in Khata Number 96. In that RS Survey, the shares of Hitlal Mahto and Sukan Mahto are jointly shown. Before some time of survey, Hitlal Mahto, who was the Karta of the joint family, some lands were purchased in his name from the nucleus of joint family that is entered in Khata Number 129 of RS in the name of Hitlal Mahto, but the possession of both the brothers was there.

It was also the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents that Hitlal Mahto had separated from his brother in mess and residence, but the lands were not partitioned. Hitlal Mahto was issueless and had love and affection for the Plaintiffs. At the occasion of Dussehra in year 1943, a reunion took place between them. After the death of Hitlal Mahto, all the properties devolved upon Plaintiffs by way of survivorship, and that possession was without any obstruction and the names of Plaintiffs were entered in the records of ex-landlord. And, the Plaintiffs are getting rent receipts after paying the rent. The case of the Plaintiffs was that the title of the Plaintiffs was in continuance since 1950 and was in the knowledge of the Defendants and without their interference; as such, the title of Plaintiffs has been confirmed by way of adverse possession. It was also submitted that the enemies of the Plaintiffs had executed a sale deed in favor of Defendant Numbers 2 and 3, due to which there is some cloud of doubt on the title of the Plaintiff, hence the need for suit. It was further submitted that Defendants had wrongly stated in their written statement that the marriage of Dev Narayan was solemnized with Tetari Devi and Ram Jhari was daughter of Dev Narayan. Dev Narayan was married to one Kailashi Devi, daughter of Dular Chand, resident of Hajipur, who predeceased her husband issueless. Tetari is the daughter of Shivnandan, resident of Basant, and is wife of Kishun Mahto. Ram Jhari is daughter of Kishun Mahto. The case of the Plaintiffs was that the sale deed dated January 2, 1985 executed by Ram Jhari Devi in favor of Triloki Mahto and Dev Muni Devi, Defendant Nos. 2 and 3, was forged and fraudulent and was without consideration. It was also submitted that the deed was not acted upon. Ram Jhari Devi did not have title or possession over the lands of the deed, and the purchasers also did not receive possession of the land at any moment.

At the time of the death of Hitlal Mahto, the Plaintiff had possession over the entire stretch of land, and the sale deed in question is sham and fraudulent.  It was also submitted that Hitlal Mahto, Sukan Mahto, Dev Narayan Mahto and the Plaintiff were members of joint family. There was no partition between them. Hitlal Mahto was the Karta of the joint family. And, after the death of Sukan Mahto and Hitlal Mahto, Ram Avtar became the Karta of the joint family. Dev Narayan died in the lifetime of Hitlal.

The lands of the two sale deeds dated January 2, 1985 was detailed in Schedule 1 and 2 of the plaint which was the disputed land.

The counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Trial Court has decreed the suit without considering the fact that the Plaintiff-Respondent had no cause of action. Plaintiff-Respondent is neither the owner nor has right, title, and interest over the suit land. The Trial Court did not consider that the suit property was the self-acquired property of Ram Narayan, who died leaving behind his daughter Ram Jhari Devi, the Appellant, who is the owner of the suit. Ram Jhari Devi sold the same to the Appellant's ancestors who are the rightful owner of the suit property. The story set up by Plaintiff in the pleading was self-contradictory. As such, cannot be relied upon. Learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that at one place the Plaintiffs-Respondents claim that they are the owner of the disputed land, and in the next para of the plaint, the case of the Plaintiffs is that the title of the Plaintiffs is confirmed by adverse possession. The counsel for the Appellants has submitted that no one can have adverse possession on his own land. Adverse possession is the hostile possession against the real owner. The Appellants' counsel  also submitted that the Plaintiffs/Respondents had nowhere stated as to when their possession was hostile to the interest of Appellants as they had claimed that the land belongs to them. It was also submitted that it was well-settled law of pleadings that a Plaintiff cannot make contradictory claims; however, the defendant was at liberty to make contradictory defenses. He submitted that Trial Court could not consider that the question of title by adverse possession does not arise as there cannot be any question of hostile title or possession in joint family property. 

The Trial Court did not consider the story of partition and reunion as set up by Plaintiff was false as there was no document of reunion. The Trial Court had not considered that Ram Narayan was the son of Hitlal and Ram Jhari Devi was the daughter of Dev Narayan and grand-daughter of Hitlal. The Trial Court had not considered the documentary evidence that was exhibited wherein Plaintiffs admitted that Ram Jhari was the daughter of Ram Narayan and grand-daughter of Hitlal. 

The Trial Court did not consider the admissions by Plaintiff in the Exhibits which completely demolish the case of Plaintiffs. It was submitted that the documentary evidence adduced by the Appellants clearly establish that Ram Jhari Devi is the daughter of Dev Narayan Mahto and grand-daughter of Hitlal. The Trial Court relied on the oral evidences that Ram Jhari gave the document and money to Ram Avtar and the same doe not seem to be true without considering that she in good faith gave the documents and money to her uncle. 

The Trial Court failed to consider that the case of the Plaintiff about adverse possession cannot be accepted with the case of title as well. It was further submitted that the Trial Court should have considered the oral evidences of the Appellant and should have disbelieved the PWs. As such, it has been prayed to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 

The defendant’s case was that the case of the plaintiffs was not maintainable and the plaintiffs have no title and interest in the suit property. It was said Hitlal had a son: Dev Narayan Mahto who was married to Tetri Devi daughter of Shiv Nandan Mahto of village- Aami and Ram Jhari Devi is their daughter. Khata No. 129 was acquired by Hitlal Mahto after the death of Hitlal Mahto and the death of the parents of Ram Jhari Devi in the lifetime of Hitlal Mahto, the properties came in the possession of Ram Jhari Devi. Khata No. 129 was not acquired through the joint family fund and the same was acquired by the personal income of Hitlal Mahto out of his earnings in Assam and as such, Sukan Mahto or the plaintiff Ram Avtar Mahto had no joint possession along with Hitlal Mahto. Ram Jhari Devi used to manage her properties with the help of the persons of his nanihaal and the usurp was enjoyed by her. Ram Jhari Devi was a plain, simple and illiterate lady and as such, if some documents have been forged and prepared against her, the documents are not binding upon her. 

The case of the defendants/appellants was that for meeting her own purposes, the said Ram Jhari Devi executed a sale deed in favour of the defendants and the purchasers/defendants came into possession of the suit property by virtue of the sale deeds executed by Ram Jhari Devi. It was also alleged that the plaintiffs have a larger income than what is shown by them to save the court fee. The case of the defendants was that in case of 685 and 785 under the Ceiling Act, the sale deeds have been accepted by the plaintiffs and a compromise was effected with the defendants. So, the suit was hit by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence.

The counsel for the respondents submitted that the trial court had considered all the documentary and oral evidence of the parties and had rightly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents. He also submitted that at the stage of first appeal, the High Court can reappraise the evidence and in reappraisal of the evidence, if this Court finds that the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs have completed their title by adverse possession is superfluous but otherwise, the suit was liable to be decreed then the same may be accordingly made.

The counsel for the respondents brought to the notice relevant provisions of CPC Order 41 Rule 33. Rule 33 reads: Power of Court to appeal- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection  and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be  exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees]:[Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section 35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to made such order].

After considering the pleadings of the parties, trial court framed the following issues :-
(i) is the suit as framed maintainable?
(ii) have the plaintiffs got cause of action?
(iii) have the plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the suit land ?
(iv) have the defendants right, title, and interest in the suit land?
(v) is the suit barred by law of limitation ?
(vi) any other reliefs or reliefs to which the plaintiffs are entitled to ?
The Same was decreed on contest with cost and it is held and declared that plaintiffs have right title and
interest over the suit land and defendants possesses no right title.

Justice Pandey observed: "During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has admitted that the finding of the trial court regarding completion of adverse possession of respondents/ plaintiffs should not have been made and it has also been argued that the finding is not on merits but that is a superfluous finding, and notwithstanding that the case of the respondents is proved. 35. As against this, the main contention of the appellants is that trial court has not considered the documentary evidences of the appellants and that the finding of the learned trial court regarding adverse possession of plaintiffs/respondents is against the established law."

Justice Pandey examined whether the finding of the trial court regarding adverse possession is sustainable in the eye of the law?

The counsel for the appellants relied on a judgment of Supreme  Court in Kishundeo Rout and Ors. vs. Govind Rao and Ors. in SLP Civil Number 22070 2025. In para 20 of the said judgment reads: “20. The plea of adverse possession is not always a legal pleas. Indeed, it is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved. A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession continued. He must also the nature of his These are show whether his possession was open and undisturbed. all questions of fact and unless they are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them. (Therefore, in normal cases an appellate Court will not allow the plea of adverse possession to be raised before it.) There is no doubt that in some cases, the plea will be allowed for the reason that in some form or the other allegation upon which it can be raised might have been made at the time and the facts necessary to prove the plea were brought before the court and proved.”

Justice Pandey recorded: "54. Admittedly, the disputed land has been sold by Ramjhari Devi to defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3. The sale deeds have been executed by Ramjhari Devi; that much is the admitted position. But the case of the plaintiff is that as Ramjhari Devi is a stranger to the family of the plaintiff, she has got no right and title over the disputed land, and likewise, her transferee also did not get any title out of those transactions."

Sunday, February 1, 2026

Victim cannot appeal against Inadequate sentence u/s 372 CrPC, such remedy lies only with the State:Justice Alok Kumar Pandey

In XXX v. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey of Patna High Court delivered a 42-page long judgment dated January 20, 2026 held that a victim has no statutory right under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to file an appeal on the ground that the sentence imposed is inadequate, and that the power to seek enhancement of sentence is vested exclusively in the State Government under Section 377 CrPC.

Justice Pandey was hearing an appeal filed by the victim seeking enhancement of the sentence and addition of further penal provisions, invoking the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. He observed: “A reading of the proviso makes it clear that so far as the victim’s right of the appeal is concerned, the same is restricted to three eventualities, namely, acquittal of the accused; conviction of the accused for a lesser offence; or for imposing inadequate compensation”.

Justice Pandey also explained that “…while the victim is given the opportunity to prefer appeal in the event of imposing inadequate compensation, at the same time, there is no provision for appeal by the victim for questioning the order of sentence as inadequate, whereas Section 377 Cr.PC gives the power to the State Government to prefer an appeal for enhancement of sentence.”

The appeal was instituted by the victim against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court, in a POCSO case.

The victim sought an enhancement of the sentence and also urged that additional penal provisions ought to have been applied.

The maintainability of the appeal was questioned on the ground that Section 372 CrPC does not permit a victim to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence, and that such power is statutorily reserved for the State Government under Section 377 CrPC.

The High Court interpreted Section 372 CrPC and its proviso. It noted that the main provision creates a general bar on appeals unless specifically provided under the Code or any other law. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, carves out a limited statutory right in favour of the victim to prefer an appeal only in three specified situations, where the accused is acquitted, where the accused is convicted for a lesser offence, or where inadequate compensation is awarded.

It stressed that while the proviso enables a victim to challenge inadequate compensation, it does not create any right in favour of the victim to challenge the sentence as being inadequate.

Justice Pandey contrasted the proviso to Section 372 with Section 377 CrPC, which expressly empowers the State Government to file an appeal seeking enhancement of sentence.

Drawing on precedents, including the decision of the Supreme Court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi (2010), the Court reiterated that the right to seek enhancement of sentence is vested only in the State, and that a victim cannot maintain an appeal on that ground under Section 372 CrPC.

The Court concluded that “…while it is open for the State Government to prefer an appeal for inadequate sentence under Section 377, Cr.PC, but similarly, no appeal can be maintained by the victim under Section 372, Cr.PC on the ground of inadequate sentence”.

The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court were affirmed.

Supreme Court's Justice Dipankar Datta upholds Justice Nitin Jamdar's judgement setting aside Justice A. Badharudeen's direction to Magistrate to recall his own order

In XXX vs. State of Kerala, 2026 SCC OnLine SC, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan delivered a 47-page long judgement dated January 27, 2026, wherein it upheld the 23-page long judgement dated November 13, 2024 by the Kerala High Court's Division Bench of Justices Nitin Jamdar  and S. Manu at Ernakulam which had set aside the 35-page long judgement dated October 18, 2024 by Justice A. Badharudeen, the Single Judge of the High Court. The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Datta and the High Court's Division Bench's judgement was authored by Justice Jamdar. His judgement dealt with the broader issues that relate to the exercise of independent jurisdiction by a Magistrate. 

The High Court's Division Bench concluded: "The impugned judgment dated 18 October 2024 and the order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 24 October 2024 in C.M.P. No.3288/2024 are quashed and set aside. 30. The proceedings in C.M.P. No. 3288/2024 filed by Petitioners be taken to their logical conclusion by the learned Magistrate as per law. We make it clear that regarding the factual issues and the interpretation of Section 175(4) of the BNSS, the learned Magistrate will decide the legal and factual position on its own merits, without being influenced by the observations made in the impugned judgment or this judgment. If any party is aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate, it is open to them to pursue the remedies as available in law." 

The ultimate paragraph of the Supreme Court's judgement noted that the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (JMFC), Ponnani had issued notice to the accused under Section 175(4)(b), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, giving them a chance to state their side of the story. The Court observed: "We leave it open to the appellant to participate in the proceedings before the JMFC and raise such points that are available to her in law, including that the actions of the accused police officers were not in discharge of their official duties and also that without considering the report that has been called for vide the order dated 11th September, 2024, an FIR should be directed to be registered by the jurisdictional police station. It is also clarified that the JMFC must first satisfy himself that the application under Section 175(3), BNSS is accompanied by an affidavit sworn or affirmed in accordance with the terms of Section 333 thereof."

Prior to this Justice Datta grappled with two questions-whether the single judge exceeded his jurisdiction? and whether in the present case, the alleged acts of the public servants were in the discharge of their official duties?  

With regard to the first questionhe observed: "....we find that the appellant had sought directions for registration of an FIR, securing compliance with this Court’s directions in Lalita Kumari (supra), and for a declaration that the acts of the police officials were not in the discharge of official functions and, therefore, not covered by the protection afforded under Section 175(4), BNSS. 50. Should the Single Judge have entertained the writ petition, interpreted Section 175(4) and granted relief to the appellant? We think not. 51. As rightly held by the Division Bench, the Single Judge could not have granted relief that the appellant did not pray. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow (1984) 1 SCC 307, Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar (1991) 1 SCC 441 and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi (2010) 1 SCC 234 where this Court held that the writ court will, normally, grant relief that is prayed; and, though discretion to grant relief under Article 226 is wide, the writ court cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, proceed to grant a relief not even prayed by the petitioner. 52. Having prayed for directions in the writ petition to register an FIR and to secure compliance with the directions made by this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) and that too, at a stage, when the JMFC seized of the application under Section 210 read with sub-section (4) of Section 173, BNSS had called for a report in exercise of power conferred by sub- section (4) of Section 175, there was no occasion for the Single Judge to interpret sub-section (4) and interfere with the proceedings that had been set in motion pursuant to the order of the JMFC. The Single Judge would have been justified in interpreting the law if the order of the JMFC, by which he had called for a report in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS been challenged in a petition under Section 528 thereof or even under Article 227 of the Constitution – which is not the case here. The JMFC having called for a report from the superior police officer by his order, it was a judicial order passed in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 175. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423 has held that a judicial order in a civil matter cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948, the principle has been extended by this Court to judicial orders passed in criminal matters. Notwithstanding that such a judicial order could not have been challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and despite the absence of any challenge to the JMFC’s order, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to pass an order in accordance with the law that such Judge declared. This was plainly impermissible. Nevertheless, as directed by the Single Judge, the JMFC proceeded to direct registration of an FIR against the accused persons. In effect, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to recall his own order – which again constitutes exercise of a power unknown to the law of criminal procedure. 53. We, thus, agree with the Division Bench that the facts before the Single Judge did not call for an interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS." 

With regard to the second question as to whether in the present case, the alleged acts of the public servants were in the discharge of their official duties, Justice Datta observed: "54. The answer to this question should well be avoided having regard to the particular jurisdiction of the High Court, which the appellant had invoked, coupled with the pendency of the appellant’s application before the JMFC. We, thus, refrain from so answering lest any observation prejudicially affects any party to the proceedings before the JMFC. Invocation of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by the appellant was ill-advised. Not only did the appellant approach the writ court when proceedings before the JMFC under Section 175, BNSS were underway and thereby indulged in pursuing parallel remedies, no interference was even merited having regard to the relief claimed. 55. Be that as it may, at the insistence of the parties, we now proceed on a limited examination as to whether the appellant could at all have sought any declaratory relief of the nature claimed before the Single Judge in the writ petition. 56. Although declaratory relief can, inter alia, be sought before a writ court and granted by it upon establishment of a threatened breach or an apprehended breach of a legal right at the instance of a respondent, being a public authority, the nature of declaratory relief prayed by the appellant could not have been granted by the writ court without a challenge being mounted to the order of the JMFC calling for a report. Seeking a declaratory relief that the acts of offence committed by the accused public servants did not arise in the discharge of official duties by them without the order of the JMFC (calling for a report) being challenged would have necessarily required the writ court to embark on a fact-finding exercise in that behalf, as if it were a court of a magistrate. A writ court is a court exercising high prerogative writ jurisdiction; such court could not have been urged by the appellant to convert itself into a court for conducting sort of a magisterial inquiry. The Single Judge overlooked this fundamental flaw. 57. Thus, no relief could have been granted by the High Court to the appellant in exercise of writ jurisdiction." 

Justice A. Badharudeen, the Single Judge erred in granting relief which the appellant did not pray for. He directed the Magistrate to recall his own order –which again constitutes exercise of a power unknown to the law of criminal procedure. 

Sameer Raj to file Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A.) against Justice Harish Kumar's dismissal of his writ seeking direction to appear in CBSE's 10th Board Exam

In Sameer Raj @ Sameer Raj Sinha & Anr. vs. The Union of India through the Secretary (School of Education and Literacy), Ministry of Human Resource Department, Government of India & Ors. (2026), Justice Harish Kumar of Patna High Court delivered a 11-page long judgement dated January 27, 2026. After dismissing the petition in the penultimate paragraph, in the ultimate paragraph, Justice Kumar concluded:"It is made clear that C.B.S.E., who is the best judge to see as to whether the case of the student falls under exceptional circumstances, hence the petitioner no.1, who was admitted in Class-IV at the age of 5 years and 3 months only and he had also been allowed to appear in the Pre-Board Examination of 10th for the Sessions 2024-25 and his performance is outstanding, the claim of the petitioner be considered afresh for the next academic Session in the C.B.S.E. examination, as the petitioner no.1 had made to suffer because of the fault of the school, who allowed the admission despite having minimum age for the appropriate class." 

The Petitioner no. 2 is Advocate Arun Kumar Sinha, father of the Petitioner no. 1. The six other Respondents were: The State of Bihar, through the Additional Chief Secretary, Education Department, Patna, Director, Secondary Education, Education Department, Patna, Chairman, Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, Regional Officer, Central Board of Secondary Education, Regional Office, Patna and B.D. Public School, Buddha Colony, Patna through its Director S.B. Rai.

Sameer Raj, the Petitioner no. 1 and his Petitioner 2. invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court seeking a direction upon the Central Board of Secondary Education to consider his application for registration and appearance in Class X, C.B.S.E. Board Examination, 2026 notwithstanding the shortfall of age as reflected in the C.B.S.E. online portal. 

So far C.B.S.E. has refrained from should give true effect to the import of Rule 6.1(iii) of the Examination Bye-laws, 1995 (as amended up to January, 2013) by recognizing that age determination falls within State Government, which has not fixed any age restrictions.

This was the third round of litigation led by Sameer Raj, the Petitioner no.1 who was duly admitted in B.D. Public School, Buddha Colony, Patna; a school duly affiliated with CBSE on April 13, 2018 at the age of 5 years, 3 months and 25 days, in Class-IV. After having performed well in the successive classes, finally, the petitioner was promoted to Class-IX at the age of ten years and three months and was also allowed to appear in Pre-Mid Term of Class-X as well as Mid-Term and Post Mid-Term Examination of Class-X. However, despite his best efforts and persuasion made to all the authorities regarding his academic excellence and outstanding performance to Scholastic areas, when he had not been allowed to appear in the Board Examination of All India Secondary School Examination and the registration was not done, he approached the High Court through his guardian/father in 2023 seeking a direction to the respondent authorities, specially C.B.S.E. to permit the Petitioner no.1 to appear in the Board Examination of AISSE, 2025 and to direct the C.B.S.E. to allow/accept the registration of the Petitioner no.1, irrespective of his age being less than 15 years.

Patna High Court's attention was drawn towards the decision of Delhi High Court of Delhi in Central Board of Secondary Education vs. Master Tathagat Avtar Tulsi (Minor) as well as the decision rendered by Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Aarav Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. and the decision of Patna High Court in Monark Monalisa through his father Sri Kali Prasad Pal vs. The State of Bihar & Ors

Justice Kumar observed that this Court "is of the view that the minimum cut off age for getting admission and appearing in the Board examination is provided under the Code/By-laws of the C.B.S.E., but in exceptional circumstances meritorious candidate may be allowed to appear in the Board Examination, even if he/she is under age." He added: "15. The object behind prescribing the minimum age for appearing in any examination is required to ensure that the student must possess proven cognitive maturity and foundational knowledge, besides promoting fairness and consistent development align with standard educational progress. 16. The minimum age prescribed for admission in a class and appearing for an examination in no way put an embargo to pursue the education, rather the same is required for holistic development of a student keeping in mind the developmental appropriateness, academic standardization,
regulatory compliance as well as physical and social development." 

In the penultimate paragraph, Justice Kumar observed: 18. The Court cannot delve into the assessment of the merit of a candidate/student, as the same is within the domain of the academician and the teaching experts. Once, the Chairman of the CBSE has come out with the cogent reasons and rejected the prayer of the petitioner no.1, this Court does not find a fresh ground to entertain the writ petition for the same cause of action. 19. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed. However, no order as to cost."

A careful reading of the judgement reveals an inadvertent ambiguity between the premise, the penultimate paragraph and the ultimate paragraph of the judgement. This creates a compelling reason for filing a Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A.). 

Notably, Chief Justice Sangam Kumar Sahoo has observed: "In essence, a Letters Patent Appeal provides an internal check and balance, ensuring judicial oversight and protecting citizens rights by allowing a thorough review of a Single Judge’s decision." He has underlined:"A Letters Patent Appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench."    

A Letters Patent is a common feature in many High Courts in India, offering an internal mechanism for reviewing decisions of a single judge. It was a remedy provided when high courts were first created in India by Letters Patent in 1865. It is the only remedy available against the decision of a single judge of the high court, otherwise the remedy would lie with the Supreme Court. The Law Commission of India in its 163rd Report states: "Quite a few of the writ petitions disposed of by single judges in various high courts involve substantial stakes and have serious consequences both for the state as well as the citizens. Very often, the writ petition is an original proceedings. At any rate, it is an original proceeding in a civil court i.e. high court. There ought to be at least one appeal against the order made by a single judge on applications preferred under Article 226." 

Clause 10 of the Patna Letters Patent refers to three classes of appeals that may be heard by a Division Bench: (1) appeals from the judgment of a single Judge in exercise of his original jurisdiction; (2) appeals from the judgment of a single Judge in first appeals; and (3) appeals from the judgment of a single.  The Patna Letters Patent were granted by the Crown in 1916 and the clauses are almost identical with the clauses of the Letters Patent granted to the three High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay in 1865 in pursuance of the well-known Charter Act of 1861 (24 and 25 Victoria, Chapter 104). Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court provides for an appeal from a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench.

Also readCBSE fails to comply with Patna High Court's orders in Sameer Raj vs. Union of India