Supreme Court sets aside "utterly misconceived" order by Patna High Court, restores criminal application Dharmendra Kumar from Shiv Nagar, Karpi, Arwal

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) , Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva passed a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2026, wherein, it restored Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025 "to the file of the High Court for consideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law." It observed:" 4. The learned Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the appellant had sought cancellation of the anticipatory bail and had cited grounds therefor. It was not a case of the grant of bail itself being subjected to challenge, by way of a petition for cancellation. 5. This aspect of the matter required to be examined independently to ascertain whether any of the alleged grounds cited by the appellant were established and warranted cancellation of the bail earlier granted. Such an exercise did not entail the learned Judge sitting in appeal over the grant of anticipatory bail by a coordinate Bench. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, utterly misconceived and is liable to be set aside. 6. As all the parties are before this Court, there is no reason as to why this appeal should be kept pending. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, setting aside the order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the High Court." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had rejected this application by his order dated July 29, 2026 as he did not find "sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order" dated December 20, 024 passed by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court. Justice Kumar had passed his 2-page long order dated July 29, 2026 in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025. The application before the High Court was filed for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the Mukesh Kumar, the opposite party nos.2 and Shivam Kuma, opposite no. 3 by Justice Sharan of a Co-ordinate Bench.

Justice Kumar perused the F.I.R. He recorded: "It appears that the petitioner, who is the informant of the case, had appeared before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and opposed the prayer of the opposite party nos.2 and 3 for grant of bail and after considering the submissions of the parties, the Co-ordinate Bench had granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party nos.2 and 3." He observed:"If the petitioner was/is aggrieved by the order of the Co-ordinate Bench, he could have moved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the Co-ordinate Bench. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting anticipatory bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. Therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order."

Dharmendra Kumar, the appellant had submitted that he had approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 with sufficient grounds for such cancellation. 

Supreme Court recorded: "3. By the impugned order dated 29.07.2026, a learned Judge of the High Court opined that he could not sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion by the coordinate Bench in granting anticipatory bail to respondent Nos. 2 and 3." 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court reverses bail denial order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh in SC/ST Act case from Nawada

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 3-page long order dated June 19, 2026, wherein, it condoned the delay, issued notice returnable on August 24. The order reads: "By way of an ad interim order, in the event of arrest, the petitioners shall be released on bail in connection with Excl. Spl. SC/St Case No. 37/22 arising out of complaint case no. 37/2022 pending before Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Nawadah, Bihar, subject to their executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) each, with one or more sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. However, the Petitioners are directed to cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so. List again on 24th August, 2026." 

In Madan Mohan Prasad Verma & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh had passed a 2-page long order dated April 2, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" 4. In view of the aforesaid submissions and pronouncement of law rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachu Das (supra), appellants’ prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail is rejected and this appeal stands dismissed. " 

In this case reliance was placed upon the decision dated February 3, 2014 by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471, wherein, the Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice of India P. Sathasivam and Ranjan Gogoi considered the offence under Section 3(1), as well as the bar provided under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act and, it concluded: "Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no court shall entertain an application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 

The Special P.P. appearing on behalf of the State and counsel for Ram Binita Devi, the complainant/Respondent No. 2 submitted before the High Court that the prayer for grant of pre-arrest bail to the appellants is not maintainable, as cognizance had already been taken by the trial court for the offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 

The appeal in the Patna High Court was filed for setting aside order dated September 25, 2024 passed by the Special Judge, Exclusive Special Court SC/ST (POA) Act, Nawada in A.B.P. No. 2442 of 2024, which arose out of a complaint case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504, 506, 354B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(i)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, whereby the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants was rejected. Now the order by the trial court and by Justice Singh of the High Court has been reversed by the Supreme Court. 

 

 

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey accepts unconditional apology from Advocate P.R. Singh for inadvertent mistake, recalls 2018 order by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi

In Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 30-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"43. From perusal of record, it is evident that occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. The appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Hence, to put the appellant in jail for remaining period is too harsh as appellant is aged about 90 years. Hence, the court is of the view that if sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone that would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. 44. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant appeal stands partly allowed. 45. The interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. 46. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of the concerned jail for compliance and for record. 47. The records of this case be also returned to the concerned trial court forthwith." 

Justice Pandey observed: "42. So far as sentence of appellant under Section-324 of I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged about 90 years, he is a first offender and appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. Hence, if the appellant is sentenced to the period undergone, that would meet the ends of justice." 

An  Interlocutory Application was filed on behalf of the appellant for recalling the order dated November 27, 2018, wherein it was submitted that appellant of the appeal namely, Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh was still alive. It was also submitted that due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication, counsel for the appellant inadvertently informed the Court that the appellant had expired, whereas in fact, it was the father of the appellant who had died and not the appellant. It was also submitted that the incorrect statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and no benefit could have accrued to the appellant by making such a submission. However, an unconditional apology was also  tendered on behalf of the appellant for the inadvertent mistake. Prabhat Ranjan Singh was the counsel for the appellant who had made the inadvertent mistake. The Court was satisfied that the incorrect statement was made due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication. 

The November 2018 order reads:"It has been submitted at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that sole appellant Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh is dead. It has further been submitted that as fine has also been inflicted apart from substantial sentence whereupon, the siblings of appellant (since deceased) intent to proceed with instant appeal and so, substitution is needed and for that an adjournment of four weeks be granted. List accordingly. During midst thereof, the concerned should take proper step." Notably, it was the father of the appellant who had died, not the appellant. 

Accordingly, the 1-page long order dated November 27, 2018 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi was recalled by Justice Pandey. The Criminal Appeal was restored to its original file and number. and I.A. No. 3 of 2018 was allowed. 

The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated January 15, 2009 and order of sentence dated January 17, 2009 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-IV, Jehanabad in Sessions Trial No. 566 of 2006/138 of 2006, arising out of Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 (G.R. Case No. 413 of 2005) whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 341 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 307 of IPC and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month in each Sections 447 and 341 of IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

As per prosecution case, the informant Bharteshwar Prasad (PW-6), while undergoing treatment at the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar, gave his fardbeyan before A.S.I. Balmiki Singh of Islampur Police Station on March 21, 2005 at about 10:30 A.M., stating inter alia that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house at village Keur from Islampur Bazaar. As soon as he opened his door, his co-villager Akhilesh Prasad (appellant), armed with a farsa, came to his door along with two unknown persons and abused him in filthy language. Upon protest by the informant, the accused persons disclosed that the informant used to demand the outstanding rent from the wife and sister of the appellant, who had been residing in the informant’s house at Islampur without paying rent for the last two and a half years. On this issue, the accused/appellant allegedly threatened the informant that he would teach the informant and his son Arun such a lesson that they would forget to demand the rent. After a brief altercation, the appellant Akhilesh Kumar, who was having a farsa in his hand, assaulted the informant by giving a farsa blow on his head with an intention to kill him. Due to the assault, the informant sustained bleeding injuries and he became unconscious. He raised alarm for help upon which the local residents assembled at the place of occurrence. After seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The informant was taken to the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar at Islampur by the neighbours for treatment. During the course of treatment, he gained consciousness. On the basis of fardbeyan given by the informant/PW-6, Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 dated March 23, 2005 was registered for the offence under Sections 447, 504, 341, 323, 324 and 34 of the I.P.C. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 326, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance under the aforementioned Sections of the IPC. The case was committed to the court of sessions after following due procedure. The  trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined all together seven witnesses. 

Justice Pandey observed:"The presence of injured witness/informant at the place of occurrence cannot be discarded as he is sufferer of crime and has supported the story of prosecution on the point of place of  occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence. As such, even if the Investigating Officer of
this case has not been examined, the whole prosecution story cannot be thrown out in a case where the place of occurrence is otherwise proved. Even if some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies are found in the evidence of prosecution-witnesses regarding manner of appearance of some of the witnesses, the whole story of prosecution cannot be thrown out when crux of the prosecution story is quite intact and
supportive of manner of occurrence, time of occurrence and how the injured/informant suffered injuries. 

Justice Pandey relied on para 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2011 SC 280, which reads: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to
discredit an injured witness."

He drew on para 30 of the Court's judgment in Mano Dutt & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79, which observed as follows:-"30... Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit."

In State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view was reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. 

Justice Pandey considered as to whether the act of the appellant would attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code or not. "36. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 307 IPC, intention or knowledge to cause death is the essential ingredient. Mere causing of grievous injury by a sharp cutting weapon is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, unless intention or knowledge to cause death is clearly established." 

The judgement reads:"37. It has rightly been admitted by P.W. 6/informant that there was no intention on the part of appellant regarding causing death as despite having full opportunity, the appellant did not commit any act of assault repeatedly. The very act of appellant clarifies that the intention was not to kill the informant/victim and, at best, inference can be drawn with regard to causing injury to informant. Considering the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, there was no repetition of assault and there is absence of clear evidence regarding intention or knowledge to cause death, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of given facts and circumstances of the case that from the materials on record, only offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. can be made out and, as such, conviction of appellant under Section-307 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. 38. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the impugned judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of appellant stands modified to that under Section-324 of I.P.C. 

In absence of evidence, no offence was made out under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-341 of I.P.C. There was no allegation of criminal trespass against the appellant either in the initial version of the prosecution-story or in the evidence of the prosecution-witnesses, including the informant. The informant’s version in the initial version of the prosecution story as well as in his evidence is that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house and as soon as he was opening the door of his house, the accused Akhilesh Prasad came and assaulted him on his head by means of farsa. Hence, it was evident that the incident of assault took place outside the door of informant’s house. In view of the above, no offence is made out under Section 447 of the IPC. Accordingly, appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-447 of I.P.C.

Justice Soni Shrivastava as part of Division Bench sets aside judegment of Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur

In Md Quarban vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Soni Shrivastava delivered a 26-page long judgement dated April 6, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"42. All these inconsistencies and conflicting versions of the prosecution case which is apparent from the deposition of the prosecution witness render the prosecution case considerably doubtful. The failure of the prosecution to prove the foundational facts with regard to age and sexual assault makes the entire edifice of the prosecution crumble against the weight of evidence." The judgement was authored by Justice Soni Shrivastava. 

Justice Shrivastava added: "43. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and on account of all the foregoing reasons, including the consideration of several missing links and loopholes in the case of the prosecution, we come to a clear finding that the circumstances and evidence on which the conclusion of guilt has to be drawn, has not been fully established and the appellant is entitled to be extended benefit of doubt, inasmuch as, the prosecution hasmiserably failed to prove its case by adducing credible and trustworthy evidence. 44. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances and also taking into account the overall perspective and the entire conspectus, it would be extremely unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant, as such, the finding of conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable and requires interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 18.03.2023 and the order of sentence dated 22.03.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No.35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No.361 of 2018, is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. 45. The appellant, who is said to be in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case."  

The appeal was preferred against the judgment of conviction dated March 18, 2023 and the order of sentence dated March 22, 2023 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge-VI-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhagalpur in POCSO Case No. 35 of 2020, arising out of Sabour P.S. Case No. 361 of 2018. 3. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted and was sentenced for the offences punishable under Section 363, IPC for rigorous Imprisonment for seven years along with fine of Rs. 50,000/, Section 341 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year or fine of Rs. 500/, Section 323 IPC for simple Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1000/, Section 504 IPC for rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/ and Section 4 of POCSO Act for rigorous imprisonment for 20 years along with fine of Rs. 1 lakh.

The prosecution case based on the written report of the informant alleged that the minor daughter (aged about 14 years) of the informant had gone for her tuition classes 15 days back, but did not return. He frantically searched for his daughter but did not get to know of her whereabouts. When he could not find out anything even from his relatives, he gave the written application on December 28, 2018 before police.
Based on the written application, a Sabour P.S. Case was registered against unknown for the offences punishable under sections 363 and 365 of IPC. After investigation supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the present appellant under sections 366A, 376, 341, 323, 504, 506, 427/34 of the IPC and section 6/8 of POCSO Act, whereafter cognizance was also taken under these provisions by the Special Court POCSO, Bhagalpur. 

The trial Court on August 10, 2021, framed the charges against the appellant under sections 341, 323, 376, 366 A, 427 of IPC and 4 and 8 of POCSO Act and the same were explained to him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case examined as many as five witnesses and exhibited some documents on its behalf. The trial court decided the primary issue relating to the minority of the victim and recorded the fact that while the victim’s age was disclosed as 14 years in both the FIR and the statement of the victim under section 164 Cr.P.C, the Magistrate had assessed her age as 15 years. The medical report indicated her age to be between 16 to 18 years. The date of birth of the victim as per her Registration Card in the Bihar School Examination Board was recorded as January 25, 2004. It reached the conclusion that the victim was undoubtedly a minor on the basis of the document.

The trial court has thus concluded that the solitary evidence of the victim itself was sufficient for proving the guilt of the accused and since there are no apparent contradictions in the prosecution evidence to doubt the veracity of the same, the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts. However, while holding that the case was proved under sections 323, 341, 376, 504 of the IPC along with section 4 of the POCSO Act and additionally finding the case to be proved under section 363 IPC also (under which no charge was framed), the accused/appellant was acquitted of the charges under Section 427, 506, 366 A of the IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act as the same was held to be not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

Justice Shrivastava observed: "28. After having analysed the trend of evidence as disclosed by the victim (PW3), it would be difficult to place her in the category of ‘sterling witness’ whose evidence would be complete and sufficient in itself to base a conviction, as such, the evidence of victim (PW3) must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well-settled legal principles as established by law in a catena of decisions." 

She drew on Supreme Court's decision in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, wherein, it said “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

This view was further reiterated by a 3-Judgebench of the Supreme Court in Nirmal Prem Kumar & Anr. vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2024 INSC 193) Cr. Appeal No. 1098 of 2024 disposed off on March 11, 2024.

The High Court's judgment took note of the inordinate delay of 15 days in lodging the FIR. 

Justice Shrivastava  observed: "This fact compels this court to take a view that there is something more in this case that meets the eye, as no father whose daughter went missing or was kidnapped would wait for fifteen days for lodging an FIR. Further, the medical examination of the victim conducted by the medical officer (PW4) reveals that there was no physical or chemical injury on her body including her private parts and upon pathological investigation no spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal swab, however the urine pregnancy test was found positive. 31. Her age was assessed between 16 to 18 years but no evidence of any recent sexual assault has been noted by the doctor, thereby making it abundantly clear that even the medical report (Ext. P1)does not stand in support of the contentions of the victim. Merely because the pregnancy test was found to be positive, it would not lead us to the irresistible conclusion that the entire prosecution story narrated against the appellant has an element of truth and there could be other reasons, including one of consensual sexual relation, leading to the pregnancy of the victim. 32. The issue of a consensual sexual relation brings us to the crucial question as to whether the victim was actually a minor and whether her age determination was done in consonance with the procedure laid down under Section 94 of Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. With regard to the minority of the victim, the only document which has been brought on record is the Registration Card (Exhibit- P4) issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 25.01.2004. This document has been proved and marked as Exhibit P4 by the victim herself and no other evidence has been adduced in support of the said document. Neither the school admission register has been produced nor the headmaster of the concerned school has been brought forward for examination in order to lend support to the case of the victim that she was a minor at the relevant period. Further, the fact that all the witnesses including the I.O., have maintained a curious and suspicious silence on the aspect of age of the alleged rape victim, is very intriguing and raises considerable doubt in the mind of this court with regard to the minority of the victim. None of the victim’s family members i.e. her sister or her father, have mentioned a word about the age of the victim in their deposition made in the Court. The victim too has remained effectively silent on the said aspect and only on recall for recording further examination-in-chief after about 10 months of her cross-examination, she produced the above-mentioned Registration Card which was marked as Exhibit-P4. Such evidence may be
admissible but its evidentiary value, in the entire scenario, gets lost, especially in absence of any supporting evidence and non-examination of the maker of the said document to vouchsafe of the contents thereof. Exhibit-4 did not form part of the charge-sheet and the police papers supplied to the accused."

She added, " Since the determination of age has not been done in accordance with law and there is no other evidence, much less clinching, to establish the minority of the victim, this court would go on to consider the medical evidence whereby the doctor has assessed her age to be between 16 and 18 year

In Ram Suresh Singh versus Prabhat Singh and Another, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 681 and Om Prakash versus the State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 201, the Supreme Court took a view that radiological examination for purpose of age determination was not very reliable and there was always a possibility of an error of plus and minus two years. 

In Rajak Mohammad vs. H.P, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248, the court laid down that the age determination on the basis of radiological examination may not be accurate determination and thus sufficient margin on either side has to be allowed. The judgment reads: “9. While it is correct that the age determined on the basis of a radiological examination may not be an accurate determination and sufficient margin either way has to be allowed, yet the totality of the facts stated above read with the report of the radiological examination leaves room for ample doubt with regard to the correct age of the prosecutrix. The benefit of the aforesaid doubt, naturally, must go in favour of the accused.”

In Santosh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443, the Court held that solitary version of prosecutrix in a case under Section 376 of the IPC, was not to be taken as gospel truth in absence of any other supporting or corroborative evidence. It had also considered the factum of delay in lodging of the First Information Report as also the fact that the medical report of the victim did not support the allegations made by her and considering all these facts cumulatively, the accused was acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt.

Justice Shrivastava observed: "40. Similarly, in the present case in view of the fact that the victim has been giving vacillating statements with regard to the manner of occurrence and these inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative significantly undermines the credibility of the prosecution version and takes away the veracity of the evidence of the victim. We also take into consideration the fact that there is total want of evidence on record to corroborate the case of the victim and it appears that for the reasons best known to the prosecution, material witnesses who could have shed some light on correct facts have also been withheld. 41. The cloud of doubt upon the entire prosecution case starts form the very inception as the informant (PW2) did not lodge an FIR upto fifteen days of her daughter being allegedly kidnapped which is not a normal phenomenon. Moving further, the factum of non-raising of alarm by victim while being forcibly taken away on a motorcycle points towards a probability of a consensual act with no resistance offered at the end of the victim. The age of the appellant at the relevant period being about 19 years i.e., of the same age group as the victim, further contributes to such a probability. The evidence of both the father and the sister of the victim during trial failed to lend support to the case of the prosecution. PW1, the sister of the victim, rather stands out as she has deposed no incident happened in her presence which is absolutely contradictory to the story as propounded by the victim." Consequently, the Division Bench allowed the appeal.

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Dr. Anshuman in a case of scuffle

In Manjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated November 3, 2025 allowing the criminal appeal. The Court set aside the impugned order by Justice Dr. Anshuman of the Patna High Court. The appellants were granted anticipatory bail, subject to the terms and conditions that may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

The appellants had approached the Supreme Court apprehending their arrest. The Court observed: ''4. Since the appellants have joined the investigation and cooperated with the same, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order, and grant anticipatory bail to the appellants.'' 

In Ramesh Rai @ Ramesh Kumar & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Dr. Anshuman passed a 3-page long order dated November 12, 2024 which stated that petitioner Nos.3 (Sajan Kumar), 4 (Pankaj Kumar) and 5 (Pawan Kumar) shall be released on anticipatory bail as they have clean antecedent, in the event of arrest or surrender before the Court below within a period of 4 weeks from today, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.30,000 each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M.-14, (East), Muzaffarpur in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C. So far as petitioner Nos.1 (Ramesh Rai), 2 (Rajesh Rai) and 6 (Manjay Kumar) was concerned, this Court was not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 as their antecedent was not clean, therefore the bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6 was rejected. Dr. Anhsuman concluded:'' 10. However, Trial Court is directed to consider the regular bail application of the petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 6, if they surrender within 4 weeks from today and pray for regular bail, then Trial Court shall pass order without being prejudice of the present order preferably on the same day.'' 

The petitioners had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable in connection with Bochaha P. S. Case No.131 of 2024 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 323, 324, 307, 353, 354, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

As per the prosecution, the FIR was lodged against 8 named and 15-17 unknown accused persons including the petitioners against whom there is allegation of abusing and scuffling with the informant and police party due to which injury took place.

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have committed no offence. He submitted that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to village politics and land dispute. He further submits that the allegation is general and omnibus in nature. He further submitted that the petitioner due to land dispute, the scuffle took place between both the parties and in this scuffling, police party has also been injured. He also submitted that petitioner Nos.3, 4 and 5 had clean antecedent whereas petitioner No.1, 2 and 6 did not have clean antecedent. 

The APP for the State opposes the prayer for bail and submitted that the petitioners were named in the F.I.R. and direct allegation of assault against them. 

Prior to this he had passed an an order dated June 20, 2024 which reads: ''Perused the order dated 03.02.2025 passed in Special Leave to Appea (Crl) No. 1532 of 2025 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.''

Conviction of Suman Devi under Section 302 IPC altered to one under Section 304 Part-II, IPC: Justice Sourendra Pandey

In Suman Devi vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 25-page long judgement dated October 17, 2025, wherein, it directed: ''50. The appellant, namely, Suman Devi, is directed to be released from jail forthwith, if not required or detained in any other case.'' 

Justice Pandey observed;.''...it would be evident that from the evidence which has been led by the prosecution, we do not find that the death was caused with pre-motivation. We have seen that there was no weapon used by the accused/appellant in committing the crime and even the injuries received by the deceased do not go on to show/prove that they would have ordinarily cause death of a person. The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the injuries, which were found on the body of the deceased, are also not being proved rather the deposition of P.W. 2, the father of the deceased and the husband of the accused/appellant, ratifies the same, wherein, he has stated that his wife on being asked as to why she did it, she stated that it was done accidentally and she had not thought he would die.''

He added:''We have also seen that there was no motive as also any kind of quarrel or dispute between the accused/appellant and her in-laws. This Court has observed that the occurrence had taken place in broad day light in presence of P.W. 6, the mother of the deceased, and the conduct and behaviour of the accused/appellant after the incident, wherein, she had brought the body of the deceased out of the room, laid it on the cot and stayed there and did not make any attempt to flee. 45. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is, thus, altered to one under Section 304 Part-I. 46. It appears from the case records that the appellant is in custody since 03.10.2020 and has, thus, spent about five years in jail by now. Mr. Katriar, learned counsel for the appellant, has stated that the appellant has a young child, who too is with her in jail. 47. We have also given our anxious consideration on the fact that the appellant never intended to cause death; or that she only wanted to secure the well being and happiness of her stepson and as such, the appellant needs to be dealt with leniently. 48. For the reasons afore-noted, this Court deem it appropriate and believe that the interest of justice would be met if the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period of custody which she has already undergone. 

The appeal arose out of the judgment of conviction dated November 3, 2022 and the order of sentence dated November 10, 2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Banka (Bihar) in connection with Sessions Trial No. 249 of 2021, which arose out of Amarpur P.S. Case No. 598 of 2020. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences under Sections 302, 323 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine, to also suffer simple imprisonment of one week for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment of one month each for the offences under Sections 323 and 341 of the IPC. 

The prosecution case was based on the written application dated October 2, 2020 given by the informant (P.W. 2). In his written report, the informant stated that on October 2, 2020 at around 14:00 hours, when he was working at the poultry-farm of his village, one Dhananjay Tanti informed him that his 7 years old son, namely, Sohit Kumar is lying in an unconscious state and is unable to breathe. It is further alleged that when he reached to his home, he found his son dead. Thereafter, the father and the mother of respectively, told the informant that his wife, Suman Devi (appellant), has killed his son by suffocating him. On the basis of the written application, Amarpur P.S. Case No. 598 of 2020, dated October 2, 2020 registered for the offences punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 

Supreme Court recalls order of non-bailable warrant, directs release of Supan Rai, an from the judicial custody

In Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated October 10, 2025. The Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) was filed on September 21, 2024, registered on October 4, 2024 and verified on October 6, 2024. The Court recalled the order of non-bailable warrant and directed release of Supan Rai, the Respondent No. 2 from the judicial custody who is an accused for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Supreme Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings reveals that the Court passed orders on October 10, 2025, September 26, 2025, September 10, 2025, July 31, 2025, May 23, 025, April 28, 2025, March 28, 2025, March 25, 2025, February 21, 2025, February 17, 2025, February 4, 2025, January 2, 2025 and October 15, 2024. The Court's record of the I.A.s and SLPs mention the order dated April 18, 2024 passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors but the same is not there Court's list of order, judgements and record of proceedings.  

On January 2, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order reads:'' 2. Let bailable warrant of Rs.25,000/- be issued against the respondent no.2 for remaining present before this Court on 04.02.2025, either personally or through an Advocate. 3. The bailable warrant be executed through the SHO of the concerned Police Station.'' It recorded: ''Nobody appears for the respondent no.2 though duly served.'' 

On February 4, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. None has filed appearance on behalf of the respondent No.2, though the bailable warrant issued by the Court vide the order dated 02.01.2025 has been served. 2. Hence, let the non-bailable warrant be issued against the respondent No.2, to be executed through the SHO of the Police
Station concerned. 3. List on 21.02.2025.''

On February 17, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 3487/2024 passed by the Patna High Court in Baleshwari Devi vs. The State of Bihar  and Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 2353/2025 which arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 13, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3698/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. It issued notice and tagged both the petitions with SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024.    

On February 21, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 13924/2024. It reads: ''The learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the non-bailable warrant could not be executed as the respondent no.2 is not found at the given address. He seeks more time to get the whereabouts of the respondent no.2 to serve the non-bailable warrant.'' In Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2332/2025 and other connected matters, its order reads:''As per the office report, notice could not be issued to the respondents as the counsel for the petitioner(s) has not filed spare copies. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) shall do the needful in that regard. However, liberty is sought on his behalf to serve the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-State. Liberty, as sought for, is granted. Learned counsel for the respondent-State seeks time to file vakalatnama and counter affidavit.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024 passed by the Patna High Court. 

On March 25, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order which reads: ''1. The matter has been taken up on oral mentioning being done by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – State, though not listed today on the board. 2. According to him, pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 21.02.2025, the respondent No.2 – accused has been arrested and has been brought to this Court. 3. Let the respondent No.2 be taken into judicial custody of the concerned jurisdictional Court. 4. The SLP be listed in normal course.'' The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated August 22, 2024 in CRLA(SJ) No. 3192/2024. 

On March 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma passed an order which reads:'' 1. Let the notice be issued to the respondents. 2. Additionally, liberty is granted to serve notice upon the Standing Counsel for the State of Bihar. 3. Tag alongwith SLP (Crl.) No.13924 of 2024.'' 

On April 28, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order, which reads: "1. It appears that pursuant to the non bailable warrant issued by this Court, respondent no.2 in SLP(Crl.) No. 13924/2024 was arrested and now, he is in judicial custody. 2. It appears that respondent nos.2 and 3 in SLP(Crl) No. 4153/2025 and respondent no.2 in rest of the matters, are not served. 3. Let fresh notice be issued to the unserved respondents, to be served through the concerned SHO, returnable after three weeks."

On May 23, 2025, Supreme Court's Division of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale passed an order in SLP (Crl.) Diary No(s). 2135/2025. The order reads: "Delay condoned. 2. Application for exemption from filing Official Translation is allowed. 3. Issue notice. 4. Tag with SLP (Crl.) No. 13924 of 2024."  The case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated November 20, 2024 in CRASJ No. 3726/2024 passed by the Patna High Court.

On July 31, 2025, Supreme Court's Record of Proceedings states that ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. Despite service being complete, none has entered appearance for respondent no.2. Let the matter be processed for listing before the Hon’ble Court, as per rules. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any'' in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 and 8371/2025. 

The order in SLP(Crl.) Nos.2353, 2358 and 2332/2025 reads:'' Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent no.2 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder. List again on 10.09.2025.'' In SLP(Crl.) No.4153/2025, the order reads: ''Respondent no.1 is duly represented. As sought, respondent no.1 may file counter affidavit, in the meantime, if any. Service report with regard to respondent nos.2 and 3 from concerned S.H.O has not been received. Issue reminder.''

On September 10, 2025 also the Supreme Court had passed an order.  

After Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh passed a 3-page long order dated August 22, 2024 in Supan Rai vs. The State of Bihar Patna & Anr. (2025). Justice Singh had set aside the impugned order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in a P.S. case of 2024 against the appellant. The criminal appeal was allowed and the appellant, was directed to be enlarged on bail. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. The Respondent No.2 is Baleshwari Devi, wife of Harbans Ram, resident of Maksudpur, Ward No. 03, Shahpur, Patna. The criminal appeal was filed before the Single Judge of the High Court on July 4, 2024. It was registered on July 10, 2024. 

The Supreme Court recorded: ''It is a case where the petitioner being the complainant has come forward to file this instant petition. Even as per the case of the prosecution, a group of 18 persons came and attacked the deceased and several other persons were injured. Admittedly, only one gun was used at the time of the incident. The main accused is stated to have been absconding.'' It observed: ''Taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, coupled with the fact that no specific overt act is attributed against respondent No.2, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same. Accordingly, the order of non-bailable warrant issued to the respondent No.2, stands recalled, and he is directed to be released from the judicial custody, as per the terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms.''   

Justice Singh of the High Court had passed the order after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 24, 2024 passed by the Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur, Patna P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(1) (r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

According to the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was falsely implicated in this case due to ulterior motive. He also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellants. There is no specific allegation of firing against the appellant. The appellant had no criminal antecedent as stated in the bail petition. 

The counsel for Baleshwari Devi, the respondent no. 2 as well as Special Public Prosecutor for the State was opposed the bail petition of the appellant in the High Court. 

Justice Singh had concluded: "6. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Pankaj Chauhan Special Judge, SC/ST (POA) Act, Patna in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail...." 

Notably, Supreme Court too has directed the release of Supan Rai ''from the judicial custody in terms and conditions already imposed upon him by the High Court'' but it granted liberty to Baleshwari Devi saying, "However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file an application for cancellation of bail, if the subsequent development warrants the same." The order dated October 10, 2025 concluded: ''The Special Leave Petition stands disposed of in above terms. Accordingly, IA No. 245017/2025 also stands disposed of.'' It is noteworthy that SLP(Crl.) No. 013924/2024 was heard along with Interlocutory Application No.(s) 231152/2024, 231153/2024, 231155/2024, 281558/2024 with SLP (Criminal) No.(s) 2332/2025, 2353/2025 and 2358/2025.

From the Archives:A Memorandum No. 641/2025 dated February 19, 2025 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna with reference to Office Memorandum No. 441/Vi.Co. Dated 202/2025 (sic) SLP(Crl.) 13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. on the subject ''Regarding compliance of the order dated 18.04.24(sic) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court New Delhi in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24'' from SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna is in public domain. It reads: ''Sir, With reference to the above mentioned subject, it is to be respectfully apprised that in the light of the points mentioned in the order dated 18.04.24 (sic) passed in SLP(Crl.) No.13924/2024 titled Baleshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors. by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, New Delhi, in PS Shahpur Case No.147/24, a non-bailable warrant NBW has been  received for arresting accused Supan Rai son of late Jodha Rai resident of Maksudpur, Ward No.03, Police Station Shahpur, District Patna and producing him before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.'' 

 

SHO Police Station, Shahpur, Patna wrote: ''When I conducted continuous raids for the arrest of the above accused, it was found that he does not reside at home. After collecting information, it was found that he lives somewhere else due to fear of arrest, yet I am conducting raids at various places for his arrest. As soon as he is arrested, he will be produced before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted for information.''