Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Sunil Dutta Mishra sets asdie order by Special Judge, Special Court (NIA Cases), Patna, directs him to hear case of East Champaran residents afresh

In Reyaz Moarif @ Bablu & Ors. vs. The Union of India through Ministry of Home Affairs & Ors. (2026), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices delivered Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sunil Dutta Mishra delivered a 10-page long judgement dated July 14, 2026, wherein, it set aside the impugned judgment/order passed by the Special Judge NIA and directed the Special Judge to consider the application of the appellants afresh and pass a reasoned order thereon within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy o this judgment."The judgement was authored by Justice Prasad. The judgement recorded that the observations of the trial court that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition does not hold good. Additional Solicitor General had conceded that that part of the order may be set aside and the trial court may be directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law. The other two respondents are: National Investigation Agency (NIA), through its Director General and Director General, NIA.

The appeal was filed in the High Court for setting aside the order dated August 23, 2025 passed by the Special Court (NIA Cases), Patna in Special Case No. 07/2022 whereby and whereunder the application filed by the appellants under Section 45 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) challenging the validity of sanction has been rejected by the Special Judge and the court had imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the appellants. These appellants, the accused nos. 4, 28, 29 and 30 are facing trial in Special Case No. 07/2022 and have been charged under Sections 17, 18 and 18A of the UAPA, 1967. The appellants are from Kuawan, Chakiya, East Champaran, Bihar.

The case arose out of R.C. No. 31 of 2022 originally registered with the Phulwarisharif P.S. in Crime No. 827 of 2022. In this case, the High Court was not required to go into the allegations against the appellants, therefore, for the brevity, Justice Prasad did not go into the charges against the appellants. The bone of contention in the case was the order of the Special Judge, NIA rejecting the application of the appellants to take up the challenge to the sanction order. The trial court had taken a view that the appellants had intentionally chosen to file the petition under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967 during the ongoing trial to prolong the conclusion of trial. The court found that the appellants had not raised this issue at the earliest available two stages i.e. at the stage of the cognizance and the framing of charge. The court had taken a view that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition.

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the central government, by sanction order dated August 1, 2023 in respect of Md. Tanweer, Md. Aabid and Irshad, the appellant nos. 2 to 4 and by order dated March 14, 2024 in respect of Reyaz Moarif, the appellant no. 1, had granted sanction under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967 read with Section 196 Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of NIA’s recommendation but according to him, this sanction order has been issued in a completely mechanical manner, based only on the agency’s report. The counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2610 and submitted that the validity of the sanction may be tested at the threshold. It was submitted that as on July 14, 2026, seventeen witnesses were examined, six separate chargesheets were filed and all the chargesheeted accused were being tried in the same and one trial, there are altogether 423 witnesses as per the chargesheets. The counsel submitted that in such circumstance, the trial court could have well appreciated the fact that examination of the large number of witnesses would take several years and the challenge to the sanction order at the stage of trial may be considered at the earliest opportunity. It was submitted that in the case of Fuleshwar Gope (supra), the Supreme Court held the right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to enable the trial court to determine the question, for its competence to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question. The Supreme Court having considered that in the said case out of 125, 113 witnesses had already been examined, refrained from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the appellants and left it to be raised before the  trial court which was directed to decide it promptly. The counsel also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in National Investigation Agency, Bengaluru vs. Fairoz Pasha & Ors, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 4023. Referring to paragraph ‘19’ of the said judgment, learned counsel had contended that the  Division Bench of Karnataka High had summoned the sanctioning authority and examined the validity of sanction order. If the sanction order is found to be invalid, there is no need to hold further trial, and the accused can be discharged even at that stage. The High Court had further made it clear that the observations of the Court is made with a rider that the prosecution can obtain fresh sanction in that eventuality. 

ASG assisted by Manoj Kumar, Standing Counsel for the NIA opposed the appeal but having gone through the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Fuleshwar Gope (supra) and that of the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Fairoz Pasha (supra), submitted that the observations of the trial court that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition may not hold good, therefore, that part of the order may be set aside and the trial court may be directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law. 

Justice Prasad observed:"9....this Court finds that these appellants are facing trial in Special Case No. 07 of 2022. There is no denial of the assertions made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the huge number of prosecution witnesses are to be examined in this case and out of them only seventeen witnesses have been examined. The appellants have filed an application under Section 45 of the UAPA, 1967. Section 45 reads as under :-'45. Cognizance of offences. [(1)] No Court shall take cognizance of any offence--(i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf; (ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, and [if] such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government. [(2) Sanction for prosecution under sub-section (1) shall be given within such time as may be prescribed only after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in the course of investigation and make a recommendation within such time as may be prescribed to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government.]' 10. It is evident that Section 45(1) bars taking of cognizance of any offense under Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter VI without previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. In this case, the order taking cognizance is not under challenge and that stage is over. The appellants did not challenge the sanction order at the stage of cognizance or at the stage of framing of charge. The challenge is being made at the stage of trial. Sub-section (2) of Section 45 talks of grant of sanction for prosecution after considering the report of such authority appointed by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government which shall make an independent review of the evidence gathered in course of investigation and make a recommendation, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government. It is the contention of the appellants that the sanction order has been issued in mechanical way without considering the case diary, the original statements of eye witnesses and other exculpatory evidence. 11. This Court would not examine this issue on merit in the present appeal, however, keeping in view the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that of the Hon’ble Karnataka High  Court and the stand taken by the learned ASG, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court ought to have examined the challenge to the sanction order at the earliest opportunity as soon as it has been raised by the appellants.'

The relevant paragraph ‘18’ from the relevant judgment of the Supreme Court in Fuleshwar Gope vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2610 reads: “18. The UAPA does not provide for any such saving of the sanction. This implies that, in the wisdom of the legislature, the inbuilt mechanism of the Act of having two authorities apply their mind to the grant of a sanction, is sufficient. This emphasizes the role and sanctity of the operation to be carried out by both these authorities. In order to challenge the grant of sanction as invalid, the grounds that can be urged are that (1) all the relevant material was not placed before the authority; (2) the authority has not applied its mind to the said material; and (3) insufficiency of material. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. The common thread that runs through the three grounds of challenge above is that the party putting forward this challenge has to lead evidence to such effect. That, needless to say, can only be done before the Trial Court. In that view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that while we recognise the treasured right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him under law, in ordinary circumstances challenge to sanction under UAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to enable the Trial Court to determine the question, for its competence to proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on the appellate side would depend on the answer to this question.  In the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping in view the submission made at the bar that the trial is underway and numerous witnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, we refrain from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the present appellant and leave it to be raised before the Trial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised decide, it promptly.” 

The relevant paragraph ‘19’ of Karnataka High Court's judgement in National Investigation Agency,  Bengaluru vs. Fairoz Pasha and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 4023 reads: :-“19. Another point raised by Sri. C.V. Nagesh is to be answered now. His argument is that the accused has to wait till the sanctioning authority is summoned, which is usually after other material witnesses are examined. To this answer is that, the practice has been to summon the sanctioning authority after other material witnesses, other than investigating officer, are examined. There is no mandate that the witnesses are to be examined in a particular order, but the investigators will be examined at the end. This procedure is adopted to duly prove contradictions if any, through the investigating officer as contemplated under Section 162 of Cr. P.C. So far as sanctioning authority is concerned, he can be examined in the beginning itself. If the accused is so sure that sanction order is invalid and for this reason there is no need to examine all the witnesses, he can request the court to examine the sanctioning authority in the beginning itself. After the charges are framed, the court can summon the sanctioning authority and examine the validity of sanction order. If the sanction is found to be invalid, there is no need to hold further trial, and the accused can be discharged even at that stage. This observation is of course made with a rider that the prosecution can obtain fresh sanction in that eventuality.” 

Now the special judge, of the trial court judge will have to  to consider the application of the appellants afresh and pass a reasoned order thereon within a period of two months because the observations of the special judge that the appellants ought to have waited till the conclusion of the trial before filing the petition was not correct and has been set aside and has been directed to consider the application afresh in accordance with law.  

Justice Aravind Kumar, Prasanna V. Parale bench seeks clarification on the position of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb’s case by Justice Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose, N.V. Ramana

"19. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. 20. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent on bail is that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc. 21. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order."

 

-Justice Surya Kant's judgement dated February 1, 2021 on behalf of 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. K A Najeeb (2021) upon hearing appeal of Union of India through the National Investigation Agency against an order dated July 23, 2019 by Kerala High Court's Division Bench of Justices A.M. Shaffique and N. Anil Kumar, whereby, bail was granted to the respondent for an offence under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 201, 202, 153A, 212, 307, 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 16, 18, 18B, 19 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. He relied on Court's decision in State of Bihar vs. Rajballav Prasad (2017) 2 SCC 178.

 

Justice Surya Kant's judgement on behalf of 3-Judge Bench is crystal clear but in Tasleem Ahmad vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026), Supreme Court's 2-judge bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and Prasanna V. Parale passed a 28-page long order dated May 22, 2026 and referred to a larger Bench the question of how Article 21 is to be applied against the statutory bar on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, (UAPA) 1967. The provision states that no person shall be granted bail for an offence under the UAPA if a court is of the opinion that “there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true”. 

 

The case arose out of 37-page long judgment dated September 2, 2025 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar. The case was heard along with Abdul Khalid Saifi @ Khalid Saifi vs. State (NCT of Delhi). The appellant's counsel had relied on Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 had submitted before the High Court submitted that if trial is delayed, that itself is a ground for grant of bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. He had stated that in the present case, the accused person is in custody for about five years and that there is no possibility that the trial will be concluded in a reasonable period of time. But the High Court was not convinced and denied bail "on the ground of delay in trial as the arguments on charge were
not advanced by the Appellant in the first available occasion." 

 

The May 22, 2026 order by Supreme Court reads:"5. The issue, as projected before us, is not a narrow one concerning the bail prayer of the present appellants alone. It concerns the proper constitutional approach to be adopted where prolonged incarceration and delay in conclusion of trial are pressed as grounds for bail notwithstanding the statutory restraint contained in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. 6. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to record that K.A. Najeeb (supra) is an authoritative pronouncement of a three-Judge Bench of this Court. It preserves the constitutional force of Article 21, while at the same time recognising the legislative policy underlying special statutes such as the UAPA.  7. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), this Court held that the presence of statutory restrictions such as Section 43D(5) of the UAPA does not per se oust the power of constitutional courts to grant bail where continued detention violates Part III of the Constitution. At the same time, the three-Judge Bench expressly recognised that at the commencement of proceedings courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail; and that the rigour of such provision may melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. 8. The ratio of K.A. Najeeb (supra), therefore, is neither a charter for indefinite incarceration under the cover of Section 43D(5), nor a mathematical command that the mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances, must automatically result in bail. 9. It is in this background that the decision in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [hereinafter referred to as “Gulfisha Fatima”] requires to be understood. The said judgment proceeded on the very premise that K.A. Najeeb binds all Benches of lesser strength. It expressly recognised that Article 21 occupies acentral place in the constitutional scheme; that the right to speedy trial is a facet of personal liberty; and that pre-trial incarceration cannot, by mere passage of time, assume the character of punishment. It further recognised K.A. Najeeb as a constitutional safeguard against unconscionable detention and recorded that there can be no second opinion on the proposition that statutory restrictions must yield in an appropriate case. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to reproduce certain portions of Gulfisha Fatima below:

“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.”

“52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb (supra) must be understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention. Prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional concern and carries great weight. It is not, however, the sole determinant. The Court must consider, in totality, whether continued detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard to the role attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the availability of intermediate remedies.

53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured content in a field where the Constitution itself recognises competing interests.Nor does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It recognises that statutory restraint must yield in an appropriate case where detention becomes punitive by reason of unreasonable and unjustified delay. What it excludes is a mechanical override based on time alone, divorced from legal context.” 

The Supreme Court's order reads: "10. What Gulfisha Fatima (supra) declined to accept was a mechanical or solitary application of delay. The judgment held that the inquiry into delay is contextual and must take into account the nature of allegations, the statutory field, the stage of proceedings, the realistic trajectory of trial, the causes contributing to delay, the role attributed to the accused, the prima facie material, the availability of intermediate safeguards and the risks attendant upon release. 11. The said approach, in our considered view, does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured content in a field where the Constitution requires the Court to accommodate personal liberty, fair trial, societal security and the legislative judgment underlying a special statute. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima understood the findings and ratio in K.A. Najeeb as a principled safeguard against unconscionable detention, and not as a mathematical formula of universal application. 12. In Gulfisha Fatima, bail was granted to five of the seven appellants before the Court. Bail was declined to two appellants not because Article 21 was treated as subordinate to Section 43D(5), but because, upon an accused-specific evaluation, the Court found that their role, the prima facie material attributed to them, and the attendant concerns of trial integrity did not, at that stage, justify overriding the statutory embargo. Even in respect of those two appellants, liberty was reserved to renew the prayer for bail upon completion of examination of protected witnesses or upon expiry of one year, whichever was earlier. That course itself shows that the judgment treated Article 21 as a continuing constitutional check and not as a spent or excluded consideration. 13. One circumstance in the present batch deserves particular notice. The present appellants themselves have placed reliance upon Gulfisha Fatima in support of their prayer for bail. This circumstance is not without significance. If Gulfisha Fatima had proceeded on the basis that Section 43D(5) eclipses Article 21, or that prolonged incarceration has no constitutional bearing in UAPA prosecutions, it could hardly have been invoked by accused persons seeking enlargement on bail. The very reliance placed upon it demonstrates that the said decision cannot be placed in a rigid or one-sided frame. 14. In a later decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu  another coordinate Bench has expressed serious reservations on certain aspects of Gulfisha Fatima, including the manner in which K.A. Najeeb was applied. The later decision has observed, inter alia, that Gulfisha Fatima adopts a narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb and that such reasoning amounts to a hollowing out of the constitutional force of the three-Judge Bench decision."

 

The Supreme Court's 2-Judge Bench observed: "15. We do not propose to enter into any adjudication on the correctness of observations made by a coordinate Bench. Judgments of this Court are not to be answered by counter-observations from another Bench of equal strength. The discipline of precedent demands a higher institutional method. 16. However, where a coordinate Bench entertains reservations about the reasoning of an earlier coordinate Bench, particularly on the application of a binding three- Judge Bench decision, the proper course is well settled. The matter must ordinarily be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench. A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal strength. 17. We deem it necessary to observe that disagreement between coordinate Benches, by itself, is neither unusual nor undesirable. The law has often grown through reasoned difference. What the discipline of precedent does not countenance, however, is a course by which an earlier coordinate Bench is subjected to reservations of a fundamental character, particularly on the alleged misapplication of a larger Bench decision, without the matter being placed before a Bench competent in strength to resolve the perceived conflict. A coordinate Bench may distinguish an earlier decision, may explain its own understanding of the law, and may, in an appropriate case, express doubt. But where the doubt goes to the root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of criticism. A doubt expressed in emphatic terms is still a doubt; it is not a declaration of law. Unless resolved by a Bench of appropriate strength, it only introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice. 18. The obligation of judicial discipline is, therefore, not discharged by merely stating it. It lies in adopting the course which the institution requires. A Bench of equal strength cannot achieve, by language of reservation, what it cannot achieve by declaration of law. If the earlier view is thought to be inconsistent with a larger Bench decision,the proper course is reference. That course protects not merely the judgment doubted, but the authority of this Court itself. In matters touching personal liberty, national security, statutory restrictions on bail and prolonged incarceration, uncertainty in the law is itself an institutional cost. We, therefore, consider it our duty not to add another competing formulation to the field, but to place the perceived conflict before a Bench of appropriate strength so that the law may speak with the clarity and authority expected of this Court." 

 

The order observed: "19. It is possible for Benches of this Court to differ in emphasis. It is equally possible that two decisions may proceed on the same constitutional foundation but apply it differently to distinct factual settings. But where the difference is projected as one concerning the binding force of a three-Judge Bench decision, and where such difference is likely to affect pending trials under special statutes across the country, the matter cannot be left to uncertain application by courts. 20. We are also conscious that an unqualified reading of the proposition that lapse of time by itself must compel bail in every case under the UAPA may have serious consequences. Such an approach may leave little room for courts to examine the nature of allegations, centrality of role, protected witnesses, risk of intimidation, possibility of reactivation of networks, nature of delay and whether such delay is attributable to the accused himself/herself, public order concerns and national security implications.On the other hand, an equally unqualified insistence on Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged incarceration would imperil Article 21. The Constitution does not command either extreme. It is this precise issue that may warrant attention of the appropriate bench dealing with the issues.  21. The question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 survives Section 43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true question is how Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory field where Parliament has consciously imposed restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to affect the security of the State and the stability of civic life.  22. We clarify that nothing in this order is intended to whittle down, dilute, read narrowly, or detract from the authority of K.A. Najeeb. On the contrary, the present reference is necessitated because K.A. Najeeb deserves application with the clarity, consistency and institutional fidelity which a binding three-Judge Bench decision commands. If a coordinate Bench has expressed reservations on the manner in which another coordinate Bench has applied K.A. Najeeb, the proper answer is not further reservation. The proper answer is authoritative resolution. 23. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the issue requires consideration by Bench to be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. This is necessary not merely for the present batch of matters, but to settle the correct approach to bail under special statutes where Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutoryrestrictions intersect.24. Having regard to the importance of the issue, we are of the view that the questions requiring consideration need not be confined to the correctness of any one decision. The controversy raises a broader question concerning the manner in which constitutional courts are to approach bail where prolonged incarceration is asserted in prosecutions governed by special statutes imposing restrictive bail conditions." 

 

It added: "In this background it would be imperative or in other words necessary for the appropriate bench that may be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, to clarify or expound the position of law laid down in K.A. Najeeb’s case, particularly in the backdrop of the rigour of 43D (5) which imposes restriction consciously and has received the assent of the Parliament, which obviously was brought in keeping in mind the valuable right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 25. Registry is directed to place the papers before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench to resolve the aforesaid issues. 26. We clarify that the present reference shall not be understood as an expression of final opinion on the merits of the prosecution case or on the guilt or innocence of the appellants. Nor shall the present order be read as affirming or disapproving any factual finding recorded in any earlier bail order. The reference is confined to the legal questions noticed above." 

The order reads: "27. Having said so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present appellants have undergone substantial incarceration; that the trial is not likely to conclude immediately; that the appellants themselves have invoked the principle of calibrated constitutional discretion recognised in Gulfisha Fatima; and that the determination of the issues may consume further time. The appellants cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely because an important question of law has arisen for authoritative settlement. Without expressing any opinion on merits, and subject to stringent safeguards, we are inclined to grant interim bail to the appellants pending further orders."

The Division Bench of the Supreme Court ordered:"List the matters after orders are passed by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side."

 

In Union of India vs. K A Najeeb (2021), a 3-Judge bench arrived at a 14-page long decision by Division Bench of the Supreme Court which is binding on the 2-judge benches of the Supreme Court, High Courts, all the courts and law enforcement agencies in the country. On the issue of bail in UAPA cases, the law is settled by a binding precedent created by the 3-judge bench of Justices Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose and N.V. Ramana. It was authored by Justice Surya Kant. In his judgement dated February 1, 2021, he concluded: "keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. 20. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent on bail is that Section 43­D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such pre­condition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43­D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well­settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.... 21. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order."

In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi vs. National Investigation Agency, Jammu (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan delivered a 102-page long judgement dated May 18, 2026, wherein, it observed, "We have further discussed the judgment in Gulfisha Fatima. We harbor serious reservations on various aspects of that judgment, including its directive foreclosing the right of the appellants to seek bail for a period of one year. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima would have us believe that Najeeb is merely a narrow and exceptional departure from Section 43-D(5), justified only in extreme factual situations...It is precisely this hollowing out of the import of the observations in Najeeb that concerns us. No reading of Najeeb suggests that the mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding circumstances, mechanically entitles an accused to release. The real concern addressed in Najeeb lay elsewhere." It ruled on bail applications in a  Unlawful Activities [Prevention] Act (UAPA) case.  The judgement dated May 18, 2026 was authored by Justices Ujjal Bhuyan with invaluable inputs of Justice B.V. Nagarathna, wherein, it clarified and reiterated the legal position following K.A. Najeeb case. 

It stated that it had reservations about a recent decision dated January 5, 2026 in Gulfisha Fatima vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026) by Supreme Court's 2-Judge Bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N. V. Anjaria. The 142-page long judgement was authored by Justice Kumar. It  denied bail in a similar UAPA case. Justice Kumar concluded:"430. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material, taken at face value as required at this stage, discloses a prima facie attribution of a central and formative role by the appellants in appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 i.e., Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy. The material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, therefore stands attracted qua these appellants. 431. While the period of incarceration undergone by these appellants is substantial and has been duly considered, the Court is not persuaded that, on the present record, continued detention has crossed the threshold of constitutional impermissibility so as to override the statutory embargo. The complexity of the prosecution, the nature of evidence relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings do not justify their enlargement on bail at this juncture as noticed in detail in the discussion made hereinabove. Hence, the appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 stands rejected. 432. We reiterate that courts are under a constitutional obligation to ensure that criminal proceedings, particularly those involving prolonged pre-trial incarceration, should progress with utmost expedition and the accused are not left to languish in jail. At the same time, the Court is mindful that pre-trial detention, even when justified by statute, cannot be permitted to continue without regard to the progress of the trial. The restraint on liberty contemplated by law must proceed alongside a meaningful advancement of the prosecution. In the present case, having regard to the reliance placed upon protected witnesses, this Court considers it appropriate to provide a defined point for consideration of their prayer for grant of bail. We are of the opinion that on the completion of the examination of the protected witnesses relied upon by the prosecution, or upon the expiry of a period of one year from the date of this order, whichever is earlier, these two appellants would be at liberty to renew their prayer for grant of bail before the jurisdictional Court. In the event of such prayer being made it shall be considered on its own merits, having regard to the stage then reached in the proceedings before the Trial Court, and without being influenced by the impugned orders or the present order. This course gives effect to the statutory discipline embodied in Section 43D(5) of UAPA while ensuring that the constitutional guarantee under Article 21 operates as a continuing check against continued incarceration without there being any substantial progress of the trial."

The judgement reads:"433. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025 (Gulfisha Fatima), SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of 2025 (Meeran Haider), SLP (Crl.) No. 14859 of 2025 (Shifa-ur-Rehman), SLP (Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025 (Mohd. Saleem Khan), and SLP (Crl.) No. 17055 of 2025 (Shadab Ahmed) are allowed as the Court is of the view that, having regard to the role attributed, the nature of the material relied upon, and the present stage of the proceedings, continued incarceration is not shown to be indispensable to the conduct of a fair trial, provided strict safeguards are imposed. The grant of bail in their favour does not reflect any dilution of the seriousness of the allegations, nor does it amount to a finding on guilt. It represents a calibrated exercise of constitutional discretion, structured to preserve both liberty of the individual and security of the nation....v. Each of the appellants, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, shall personally appear twice a week, that is on Monday and  Thursday between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, before the Station House Officer, Police Station Crime Branch, Delhi Police, Office of the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, Jai Singh Marg, New Delhi – 110001 and mark their attendance....vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly contact, influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness or any person connected with the proceedings, nor shall they associate with or participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final report. vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate any information, statement, article or post whether in print, electronic or social media concerning the present case or its participants till conclusion of the trial. viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or address or attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether physically or virtually till conclusion of the trial. ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic form or physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters, banners, etc in any form whatsoever. x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall appear on every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons to be recorded by the Trial Court to its satisfaction and they shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying the proceedings. xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour throughout and in the event of any offence committed during the pendency of the trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek for revocation of the bail granted by filing such application before the Trial Court and in the event of such application being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own merits. 435. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed or in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it shall be open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be necessarily after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants...." 

 

It added: "436. Before we conclude, it bears reiteration that a principle lies at the heart of constitutional adjudication in matters of this nature. The Constitution guarantees personal liberty, but it does not conceive liberty as an isolated or absolute entitlement, detached from the security of the society in which it operates. The sovereignty, integrity, and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of public order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional values which Parliament is entitled to protect through law. Where a special statutory framework has been enacted to address offences perceived to strike at these foundations, courts are duty-bound to give effect to that framework, subject always to constitutional discipline. 437. In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction. Criminal law does not mandate identical outcomes merely because allegations arise from the same transaction. Those alleged to have conceived, directed, or steered unlawful activity or terrorist activity stand on a different legal footing from those whose alleged involvement is confined to facilitation or participation at a different level. To disregard such distinctions would itself result in arbitrariness. 438. The present decision reflects this constitutional method. It neither endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused. It applies the law as it stands, recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety. This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty. 439. Before parting, it is necessary to reiterate the limited nature of the present determination. The Court has not examined the merits of the prosecution case beyond the confines mandated at the stage of consideration of an application seeking bail, nor has it expressed any opinion on the ultimate culpability of any of the accused. All observations are confined to the material presently on record and to the statutory and constitutional standards governing pre-trial liberty under a special enactment."

The decision in Gulfisha Fatima case appears to be per incuriam because it did not follow the doctrine of precedent and judicial discipline. The os whether the situation in Gulfisha Fatima was “ordinary” or not, and whether the circumstances’ ‘extraordinariness’ was significant enough to outweigh long incarceration and trial delays when deciding to grant bail. The decision in Gulfisha also referred to the 3-judge decision but it inferred that it was not applicable because it was not dealing with an ordinary situation. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Patna High Court delivered 7 judgements on Dec. 24, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad led Division Bench grants bail in a weak UAPA case

Patna High Court delivered 7 judgements on December 24, 2025 in Binod Mishra @ Vinod Kumar Mishra @ Vinod Kumar @ Vinod Mishra vs. The Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi, Branch Office Patna, Khushbu Kumari vs. The Union of India, Bindeshwari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Nawal Kishor Singh @ Naval Kishor Singh vs. The State of Bihar, Sikandar Ajam vs. The State of Bihar, Satya Narayan Das vs. The State of Bihar and Devendra Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar.

In Binod Mishra @ Vinod Kumar Mishra @ Vinod Kumar @ Vinod Mishra vs. The Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi, Branch Office Patna, High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey delivered a 6-page long judgement, wherein it concluded:"....there is no material to connect the appellant with any Naxal activity, there is no material that any activity was being conducted from his house or that he was participating in the said activity of the Naxals, further considering that the appellant has remained in jail for one and half year, he has no criminal antecedent and the trial is not likely to be concluded in near future, we set aside the impugned judgment/order of the learned Special Judge, NIA and direct release of the appellant on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge, NIA, Patna in connection with Special Case No. 02/2024 arising out of NIA, New Delhi P.S. Case No. RC/26/2023/NIA/DLI, subject to the condition that during the trial, the appellant shall present himself on the dates fixed in the matter and, in case of two consecutive defaults in putting appearance, his bail bond shall be cancelled by the learned trial court. 13. This appeal is allowed. 14. The case diary and other materials are being returned to the NIA." 

Justice Prasad who authored the judgement observed:" In course of hearing, we called upon learned Special PP for the NIA to demonstrate from the case diary or from the deposition of the witnesses so far that there is any evidence to the effect that any meeting of the Naxals was held in the house of this appellant or this appellant was found present in any of the meetings. 10. Learned Special PP for the NIA could not demonstrate that material from the record. 11. This Court has gone through the disclosure statements of Pramod Mishra and Anil Kumar Yadav. Perusal of the disclosure statements would show that they had reached the house of the appellant all of a sudden, there is no material to show that they were
regularly staying in the house of the appellant or that any Naxal activity was being carried out from the said house. No arms or ammunition has been found either in the house or from the possession of the persons arrested therefrom."

The High Court heard the appeal which was preferred challenging the order dated May 29, 2024 by the  Special Judge, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), Patna in connection with Special Case No. 02/2024 arising out of NIA, New Delhi P.S. Case No. RC/26/2023/NIA/DLI dated August 31, 2023 registered for the offences alleged under Sections 153A, 216A/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 13, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The appellant prayed for regular bail in connection with this case. He was in incarceration since March 21, 2024.

The prosecution case was based on the self-statement of one Gulshan Kumar, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Tekari, Gaya registered on August 10, 2023. In his self-statement, the S.D.P.O. (informant) alleged that on August 9, 2023, he got a secret information from the Central Agency that the dreaded Naxal Pramod Mishra and Anil Yadav were staying in the house of this appellant in village Hurrahi under Tekari Police Station and they were trying to strengthen and expand the organization in the Magadh Area by conducting meetings. On the basis of this information, the informant proceeded to verify it and on August 10, 2023, the police force surrounded the house of the appellant, in course of raid, two persons were found who disclosed their names as (1) Pramod Mishra @ Sohan Da @ Banbari Jee @ Bibi Jee @ Baba aged about 71 years and (2) Anil Yadav @ Ankush @ Lavkush aged 29 years. It was alleged that the
associates of these persons having sensed arrival of police had fled away. On search, from the possession of the two Naxals, one blue-coloured bag was seized from which in a purse seven notes of Rs.500/- and four notes of Rs.100/- total Rs.3,900/-, four letters for strengthening 'Gharelu Nukse’, one book, namely, Dihgam Yog Sandesh, another book, namely, Dastak and four memory card readers and from the door, one Honda Shine Motorcycle were seized. Since no one was ready to become seizure list witness, therefore, the two Constables who were members of the raiding party became seizure list witnesses. Both the Naxals who were caught there, they made their disclosure statements.

The appellant's counsel submitted that so far as the appellant was concerned, during investigation, no material much less sufficient materials have been found against him to show that he was involved in any Naxal activities. There was no material that he was present in any of the meetings with said Pramod Mishra and Anil Yadav. The reason for presence of Pramod Mishra in the house of the appellant was that Pramod Mishra happens to be the co-brother (sadhu) of the appellant and from the disclosure statement of Pramod Mishra itself, it would appear that he had reached the house of the appellant all of a sudden during the night hours when the appellant and his wife were alone in the house. The NIA had not gathered any evidence to show that any meeting was ever held in the house of the appellant. 

Gopalganj native Baba Siddique killed in Mumbai by a gang of Lawrence Bishnoi lodged in Sabramati Central Jail?

Patna born Baba Siddique (66), a native of Gopalganj, Bihar and a former Maharashtra Minister was reportedly killed by three attackers from the gang of Lawrence Bishnoi (31) in Mumbai. Siddique was a close friend of Salman Khan, the renowned actor. After being shot at, Siddique was rushed to Lilavati Hospital, Mumbai where he was declared dead. It is apparent that he was killed for being close to the actor.

Siddique was the MLA in Maharashtra Assembly for three consecutive terms in 1999, 2004 and 2009. He had also served as Minister of State for Food & Civil Supplies and Labour under Congress Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh between 2004 and 2008. Siddique had served as Municipal Corporator earlier for two consecutive terms between 1992 and 1997. On February 8, 2024, Siddique resigned from the primary membership of the Indian National Congress. Prior to that he served as the Chairperson and Senior Vice President of the Mumbai Regional Congress Committee and Parliamentary Board of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee. Siddique later joined the Nationalist Congress Party led by Ajit Pawar on February 12, 2024 which is part of the ruling party alliance in the Maharashtra and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance. His son, Zeeshan (32) is the youngest Maharashtra MLA from Bandra East, Mumbai. 

Gurmail Baljit Singh from Haryana and Dharmaraj Rajesh Kashyap from Uttar Pradesh have been taken into custody in  the case of Siddiqui's murder. The police have named two more suspects, Shivkumar Gautam from Uttar Pradesh, and Mohammad Zeeshan Akhtar. The police have arrested Praveen Lonkar, who is said to have provided logistics support. It has been claimed that his absconding brother Shubham Lonkar was the mastermind behind the shooting. The Mumbai Police have confirmed that the gang led by Lawrence Bishnoi, a law graduate was involved in the murder. Bishnoi is currently lodged at Sabarmati Central Jail in Ahmedabad, Gujarat in connection with a ₹ 195-crore drugs case. Mumbai Police has submitted multiple requests for Bishnoi's custody from Sabarmati jail but these requests have been denied due to an order of Union Ministry of Home Affairs preventing transfer of Bishnoi because he faces multiple cases under investigation by both the Gujarat's Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) and the NIA. In August 2024, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs had extended the restrictions on movement of Bishnoi from Sabarmati Central Jail in Ahmedabad for another year. The restrictive order was imposed under Section 268 of the Criminal Procedural Code (CrPC). It was to expire in August 2024. But the restrictive order has now been extended under Section 303 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 till August 2025.

Notably, on July 30 2024, Supreme Court's bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma had passed an order dismissing a special leave petition (SLP) challenging the first information reports (FIRs) lodged against gangster Lawrence Bishnoi on the direction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in connection with the interview given to a private TV while being lodged in high-security prison. The SLP was filed on June 11, 2024, verified on July 25, 2024 and registered on July 30, 2024. The respondents were: the State of Punjab, the State of Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh. 

The Division Bench of the High Court comprising Justices Anupinder Singh Grewal and Kirti Singh had passed a detailed order on December 21, 2023. The High Court took note of the case of Lawrence Bishnoi's interview while hearing a totally unrelated case. 

The High Court's order reads: "While hearing the matter, it had also come to our notice that a known criminal, namely, Lawrence Bishnoi, who is also a suspect in the murder case of a renowned singer Shubhdeep Singh Sidhu Moosewala, had been interviewed by a News channel and the interviews had been telecast in March, 2023. Lawrence Bishnoi was stated to be in the custody of the Punjab police or judicial custody in the State of Punjab at that time. We were informed that the interviewee was in Bathinda jail when the interview was telecast but the place and time the interview was conducted was not known. A two member High-Powered Committee comprising of Director General, STF and ADGP, Prisons had been constituted in March 2023 to enquire into the incident as it had been viewed seriously by the authorities. The report of the Committee had been placed before us in a sealed cover and a copy of the report was also furnished to the learned amicus curiae. Learned amicus curiae submits that there are several aspects which have not been looked into by the Committee and if the matter is properly investigated or re-examined, the exact time and location of the place where the interviewee was situated when the interviews were conducted can be pinpointed. She also submits that after registration of FIR, these aspects can be looked into by the Special Investigation Team. She stated that the telecast of the interviews is having an adverse impact on youngsters who are getting swayed and it creates wrong impression on the young impressionable minds as the interviews glorifies the criminal life and activities and the interviewee has justified taking law in his own hands for settling personal scores. In fact, a prisoner facing so many criminal cases had access to technology while being in custody and then through that technology has justified his criminal acts as desire of God/destiny. The interviews have been viewed by over 12 million viewers. The amicus curiae further submits that after the telecast of interviews, many more young persons have started writing threatening letters to the film actor targeted in the interview of Lawrence Bishnoi. She further submits that although the fundamental right to speech and expression is important, but this right is subject to reasonable restrictions which include public order, decency, morality and incitement to offence. The telecast of the interviews is adversely affecting public order and harmony."

The order reads: "We have also gone through the report which indicates that the Committee has come to the conclusion that it is highly improbable that interviews had taken place either in judicial custody or in the police custody in the State of Punjab. It is apparent that the Committee has not reached a definite conclusion that the interviews were not being conducted in a jail or police custody within the State of Punjab. They have recorded the statements of large number of witnesses in this regard. We find it strange that the Committee took over 8 months to arrive at an inconclusive finding. Nonetheless, the Committee has made a recommendation for registration of two FIRs with regard to two interviews which were conducted in violation of the law. The Committee has recommended that the government may consider registration of two separate FIRs (one each for the respective interview) at a police station having statewide jurisdiction to investigate the matter and take on record relevant evidence/data exercising the powers available under Cr.P.C. If during the course of investigation, the offence(s) relating to any of the two cases or both of them is/are found to have occurred outside the State, the concerned case(s) may be transferred to police station(s) of appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the Committee has also made a recommendation to the Government to remove the URL of the video from the public domain."

The order reads: "The ADGP, Prisons, Punjab submits that they recommended registration of FIR as after registration of FIR the matter can be investigated with the procedure prescribed under the Cr.P.C. for summoning the witnesses to record their statements etc. Learned State counsel submits that the report is being considered by the Government and appropriate action would be taken. She also submits that Lawrence Bishnoi is involved in 71 cases in the State of Punjab and had been convicted in 4 cases which includes offences under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, 302 IPC, extortions etc. The State itself appears to have taken up the matter with some seriousness as a High-Powered Committee was set up by the State. In the backdrop of the gravity of the situation where a suspect, who is involved in a large number of serious criminal cases, is allowed to conduct an interview in police/judicial custody and it has taken the Committee over eight months to submit an inconclusive report, we, while directing the registration of the FIR would like the matter to be investigated by a Special Investigation Team. Those, who facilitated the interviews need to be brought to book at the earliest."

The High Court observed: "We have gone through the contents of the interviews which indicate that it glorifies crime and criminals....he interviewee is justifying target killings and his criminal activities. He has reiterated and justified threat to a film actor. As in a large number of cases wherein he is involved, trials are underway and attempt to projecting his persona as larger than life could influence the witnesses....The conduct of the interviews is an apparent jail security breach and violation of the Prisons Act. The interviews have been telecast for the last 9 months and are available on public domain. The Committee has recommended that the Government may ask the police to ensure removal of videos pertaining to Interview-I and Interview-II from YouTube/ internet, wherever possible. We would not like to wait for the government to act at its leisure but would direct the removal of the interviews. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Court on its own motion vs. Union of India and others, (CROCP No.2 of 2023) wherein while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, it had directed the removal/blocking of the offensive content from social media platforms."

It relied on Delhi High Court's decision in the case of ‘X’ vs. Union of India and ors. (Decided on : 20.04.2021),while drawing upon Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India wherein the Court had directed the offending contents to be removed. In the event of intermediary not removing objectionable contents in pursuance to the direction of this Court, it would loose its exemption under Section 79 of the I.T. Act from its liability in cases illustrated therein. Moreover, Rule 3(1)(b)(vii) of The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 provides that, the intermediary shall make reasonable efforts to cause the user of its computer resource not to host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, store, update or share any information which threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order, or causes incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence, or prevents investigation of any offence, or is insulting other nation; (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, Rule 3(1)(d) provides that an intermediary, on whose computer resource the information is stored, hosted or published, upon receiving actual knowledge in the form of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction or on being notified by the Appropriate Government or its agency under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 79 of the Act, shall not host, store or publish any unlawful information, which is prohibited under any law for the time being in force in relation to the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India; security of the State; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; decency or morality; defamation; incitement to an offence relating to the above, or any information which is prohibited under any law for the time being in force.

The High Court had issued the following directions:
i) The DGP, Punjab, is directed to immediately register two FIRs with regard to the conduct of two interviews as recommended by the Special Investigation Team in the police station having State-wide jurisdiction.
ii) The investigation of the FIRs shall be carried out by the Special Investigation Team headed by Mr. Prabodh Kumar, IPS, DG, Human Rights Commission. The other members of the SIT would include Dr. S.Rahul, IPS and Ms.Nilambari Vijay Jagadale, DIG, Cyber Crime.
iii) The Head of the SIT would be at liberty to seek assistance of any other officer or of any other kind, on his making a request, the DGP, Punjab shall provide all necessary help and assistance to him. A copy of the report dated 11.12.2023 and the relevant record shall be handed over to the Head of the SIT. The SIT shall conclude the investigation expeditiously and file a status report before this Court within a period of two months.
iv) The DGP, Punjab is further directed:
(a) to get the URLs/weblinks/videos pertaining to both the said interviews removed/blocked/disable/restrict from all social media platforms like Youtube etc. forthwith;
(b) To ensure that the Press channel, where the said interview is hosted, removes the URLs/weblinks/videos from all its news /social media platforms with immediate effect;
(c) In case the said interviews are discovered by police authorities to be existing on any social media platform in future, the same be get removed with immediate effect;
(d) to direct the intermediary to preserve all the information associated relating to the offending content for use in investigation, in line with Rule 3(1) (g) of the 2021 Rules;
(e) To direct the search engines Google Search, Yahoo Search, Microsoft Bing to globally de-index and de-reference from their search results the afore-said interviews and their related contents as identified by its web URL and image URL. 

(f) All the concerned intermediaries be informed that non- compliance with the foregoing directions would make the non-complaint party liable to forfeit the exemption, if any, available to it generally under Section 79 (1) of the I.T.Act and as specified by Rule 7 of 2021 Rules: and shall make such entity and its officers liable for action as mandated by section 85 of the I.T.Act.
(g) The ADGP, Prisons, Punjab shall file a status report with regard to the timelines for installation of jammers, CCTV cameras, nylon mesh, X-ray body scanners etc. for augmentation of jail security.

A subsequent order of the High Court dated September 24, 2024 records that Tanu Bedi, Amicus Curiae submitted that "the interviewee had been kept at the premises of the CIA Staff Kharar for a long period of time and repeated remands had been taken to keep him there which needs to be examined as to whether there was a deliberate attempt to keep him there for extraneous reasons or he was genuinely required for investigation. It has also been brought to our notice by the counsel for State of Punjab that Inspector Shiv Kumar, the then Incharge of the CIA Staff, Kharar had retired in the year 2023. However, the affidavit filed by the ADGP (Prisons) indicates that Inspector Shiv Kumar was Incharge of the CIA Staff Kharar till January, 2024. It is disconcerting to believe that an officer, who had superannuated, had been given extension and posted at CIA Staff Kharar. Learned State counsel prays for time to seek instructions in this regard and file an affidavit of the competent authority as to why he was given extension and posted at CIA Staff Kharar. The State shall also file an affidavit in response to the submission of the learned Amicus Curiae with regard to stay of interviewee at CIA Staff Kharar and as to whether the officers who have been issued show cause notices are currently at posts having public dealing."

 

The order of September 24, 2024 notes that the State counsel filed an affidavit of the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Litigation, Bureau of Investigation, Punjab in Court to submit that "show cause notices have been issued to four officers including the then SSP of the District SAS Nagar as to why disciplinary proceedings be not initiated against them. He has also filed an affidavit of the Additional Director General of Police, Prisons, Punjab indicating the progress made in installation of jammers, AI based CCTV cameras, body worn cameras, X-Ray baggage scanners and prison inmate calling system." The order states that the counsel for Union of India, one of the respondents "furnished a copy of the communication issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs to the Additional Solicitor General of India dated 18.09.2024 indicating that ‘no objection certificate’ to the State Government has been accorded vide letter of even number dated 23.08.2024 to the proposal of the Department of Jails, Govt. of Punjab for deployment of jammers in its jails. The said communication is taken on record." But the order records that Arun Pal Singh, ADGP (Prisons), Punjab, while appearing through video conferencing, submitted that "no objection certificate for installation of jammers in the Central Jail, Sri Goindwal Sahib is still pending consideration before the Govt. of India." 

 

Notably, ABP Network news channel has filed a case in the Supreme Court through Advocate Prasanna S. on August 13, 2024 which was verified On September 13, 2024 and registered on September 12, 2024 in the aftermath of High Court's order wherein it took note of the interview of Lawrence Bishnoi in jail by Jagvinder Patial, a ABP News journalist. In December 2023, the High Court had ordered the registration of FIR and probe by an SIT headed by IPS officer Prabodh Kumar into the interview of Bishnoi. The High Court had acted suo motu in the matter concerning the use of mobile phones by inmates within jail premises. On August 30, 2024, the Supreme Court's bench of Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra passed an order saying, "While the second petitioner shall cooperate in the investigation by the Special Investigation Team which has been constituted by the High Court, we direct that pending further orders of this Court, no coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioners." The second petitioner is Patial, the journalist. The case is pending before the Supreme Court. 

 

It is apparent that subsequently, Lawrence Bishnoi was put in Delhi's Tihar Jail. He was lodged there before being handed over to the Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad in April 2023 even as the case being heard in Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Supreme Court. Gujarat Police had found the role of one Bharat Bhushan alias Bhola Shooter - a member of the Lawrence Bishnoi gang - in the 2021 Morbi drug seizure. Bhushan died while being in jail. Later, National Investigation Agency (NIA) had filled a chargesheet against gangsters Lawrence Bishnoi and Goldy Brar for having links with the banned pro-Khalistan outfit Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) and other similar terrorist groups in one of three terror-criminal nexus cases. The chargesheet named 12 other individuals. NIA had alleged that Bishnoi, along with Canada-based gangster Goldy Brar and has been operating his terror-crime syndicate from jails. Bishnoi is in jail from 2015. Goldy Brar is reported to be hiding in Canada. 

 

Timeline of Crimes by Lawrence Bishnoi (b.1993,  Ferozpur, Punjab)

2010-2012: Several first information reports (FIRs) registered against Lawrence Bishnoi for crimes including an attempt to murder, trespassing, assault, and robbery.

2013: Bishnoi reportedly killed the winning candidate in the Government College elections in Muktsar, Punjab. He shot dead a rival candidate in the Ludhiana Municipal Corporation elections.

2014: Bishnoi engaged in an armed encounter with the Rajasthan Police, leading to his arrest. While being in jail, he allegedly connected with Jaswinder Singh, alias Rocky. The gangster-turned-politician Rocky was shot by gangster Jaipal Bhullar in 2016.

2021: Lawrence Bishnoi was transferred to Tihar Jail in Delhi owing to a case filed against him under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA).

May 2022: Sidhu Moosewala Murder. Punjabi singer and Congress leader Sidhu Moosewala was shot dead in May 2022. Lawrence Bishnoi is alleged to have orchestrated his murder.

March 2023: A National investigation agency (NIA) report revealed Bishnoi’s and his associate Goldy Brar link to Pro-Khalistan outfits.

August 2023: Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad gained custody of Bishnoi, citing a case of drug smuggling, and he was transferred to a high security ward in Sabarmati jail.

September 2023: Sukha Duneke Murder. In September 2023, Gangster Sukhdool Singh, alias Sukha Duneke, of the Davinder Bambiha gang, was shot dead in Canada. A member of Bishnoi’s gang claimed responsibility for his murder later.

November 2023: Shots Fired at Gippy Grewal’s House. In November 2023, shots were fired at Punjabi actor and singer Gippy Grewal’s residence in Vancouver, Canada. Lawrence Bishnoi was behind this attack claiming that she maintained close contact with Salman Khan and had called for justice following Sidhu Moosewala’s killing.

April 2024: Firing Outside Salman Khan’s House. In April 2024, two gunmen fired shots outside the residence of Bollywood star Salman Khan in Bandra, Mumbai. According to Mumbai Police, the shooters were allegedly hired by the Bishnoi gang to kill him. Salman Khan was targeted due to his 1998 Blackbuck poaching case. 

September 2024: Firing Outside Singer AP Dhillon’s Canada House. Shots were fired outside Canadian rapper and singer AP Dhillon’s house in Canada in September 2024. Accused Rohit Godara, a member of Bishnoi’s gang reportedly took responsibility for the attack.

October 12, 2024: Baba Siddique killed in Mumbai.

October 14, 2024: Canadian police claims that Punjab’s category-A gangster Bishnoi was connected to the murder of pro-Khalistan activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada in June 2023. Punjab Police dossier refers to his connection with Harwinder Rinda, Pakistan-based gangster. In a media statement released in Canada late on October 14, 2024, Brigitte Gauvin, Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing, National Security, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, alleged that Lawrence-Goldy Brar gang was connected to the ‘agents of the government of India’. “It (India) is targeting South Asian community but they are specifically targeting pro-Khalistani elements in Canada... What we have seen is, from an RCMP perspective, they use organised crime elements. It has been publically attributed and claimed by one organised crime group in particular — Bishnoi group... We believe that the group is connected to agents of the Government of India," claimed the Canadian statement.