Supreme Court's Division Bench stays Justice Bibek Chaudhuri's order for action against SP, Bettiah for failure to comply with directions of 3-judge bench of Supreme Court to preserve CCTV footage

In The State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Suresh Yadav (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Manmohan issued notice and stayed the impugned 6-page order dated February 13, 2025 passed by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of the Patna High Court directing departmental action against Superintendent of Police, Bettiah. Supreme Court's order reads:"In the meantime, the operation and effect of the order impugned passed by the High Court shall remain stayed." 

The order of Supreme Court's Division Bench staying High Court's order seems to be in breach of judicial discipline. It seems to oblivious of the judgement dated December 2, 2020 by the 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Paramvir Singh Saini vs. Baljit Singh AIR 2021 Supreme Court 64. The Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar was one of the respondents in the case. The 3-Judge Bench comprising Justices Aniruddha Bose, K.M. Joseph and R. F. Nariman recalled that the Court, vide order dated September 16, 2020 had impleaded all the States and Union Territories to find out the exact position of CCTV cameras qua each Police Station as well as the constitution of Oversight Committees in accordance with the order dated April 3, 2018 of the Court in Shafhi Mohammad vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311. It also recalled that the Court, while considering the directions issued in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal & Others (2015) 8 SCC 744, held that there was a need for further directions that in every State an oversight mechanism be created whereby an independent committee can study the CCTV camera footages and periodically publish a report of its observations thereon. 

The report of the amicus dated January 25, 2021 mentioned in Court's order dated January 27, 2021 reveals that Bihar government had filed an filed an affidavit of compliance. The Court's order dated March 2, 2021 reads:"So far as the State of Bihar is concerned, nothing has been indicated as to amounts to be allocated for the project despite which a timeline of 24 months to complete the project has been indicated. We are most displeased with this affidavit. It shows a complete lack of any regard for the citizens’ Fundamental Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and for our orders. We make it clear that within an extended time frame having regard to the complexity and size of the State, compliance is mandated. Therefore, we direct the State of Bihar to allocate funds for the purposes mentioned in our orders within a period of four weeks from today. Thereafter, the timeline for compliance will be fixed at a period of eight months after the period prescribed for budgetary allocation, i.e. within nine months from today. Our orders should have been followed in letter and spirit." (p.11-12)

Supreme Court's order dated April 6, 2021 records that the Court perused the progress report qua the State of Bihar. The Paramvir Singh Saini case is pending. It was last heard on February 9, 2024. The Court is monitoring compliance with its judgement and orders. The case from Bettiah reveals that non-compliance with Supreme Court's order has become the norm. Bihar government's affidavit in the Court had submitted that it keeps "12 month back-up" of CCTV footage. 

But the affidavit of the respondents in the High Court reveals that CCTV footage is being maintained by outsourcing agencies they maintain only 20 days record in respect of CCTV footage in the hard-disk and footage beyond 20 days are automatically deleted from the Hard-disk    

In Suresh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar through The Director General of Police, Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Chaudhari bench of the High Court heard the petition filed in the High Court on May 22, 2024. It was registered on May 28, 2024. The other four respondents are: District Magistrate, West Champaran Bettiah, Superintendent of Police, District West Champaran at Bettiah Bettiah, West Champaran, Block Development Officer, Sadar Bettiah Sadar Bettiah and Manoj Kumar Singh, Inspector- Cum- Sho, Bettiah Muffasil Police Station Bettiah. Justice Chaudhari's order dated February 13, 2025 reads:"....this Court finds that the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah is prima-facie found responsible for dereliction of duty when he failed to take any action upon the application dated 03.05.2024 filed by the wife of the petitioner. Such inaction obviously will have adverse impact in the investigation of the case. In view of such circumstances, the Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna, is directed to take departmental action against the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah for the above inaction while supervising the investigation in respect to Bettiah Muffasil P.S. Case No.180 of 2024." 

The High Court's order should also have asked for the status report on the West Champaran District Level Oversight Committee (DLOC) which was required in compliance with Supreme Court's directions. 

The petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ/order/direction to the respondent authorities for Inquiry in a fair, impartial and time-bound manner by special team officer of higher rank or investigation by any independent agency such as CBI on complaint of wife of petitioner having acknowledgment number 1632/PG dated May 3, 2024 regarding false implication by planting Charas by Bettiah Muffasil Police officials on the petitioner in connection with Bettiah Town Thana Case No.180 of 2024 dated April 19, 2024. Suresh Yadav, the petitioner has prayed for direction to the respondent to secure, preserve and place on record the CCTV footage dated April 19, 2024 between the time period of 12:30 PM to 5:30 PM of all the Cameras installed in and around Parking of Zila Parishad, Bettiah near Superintendent of Police Office of CCTV cameras installed at Collectorate, Gate, of CCTV cameras installed by Nagar Parishad between two gates of Bus stand, Bettiah in terms of the Supreme Court’s judgment dated December 2, 2020 passed in the case of Paramvir Singh Saini vs. Baljit Singh & Others. Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.3543/2020. He sought appropriate writ or writs in the nature of certiorari for deleting the name of the petitioner from array of accused in connection with Bettiah Muffasil Case No.180 of 2024 dated April 19, 2024 registered under Sections 414 IPC, 8, 20(B)(ii)(c)/22(c), 23(c) of the N.D.P.S. Act and for quashing all other consequential proceeding thereafter. The petitioner was apprehended in this P.S. case. 

The prosecution story is that on April 19, 2024 two persons were apprehended while riding on a motorcycle and some Narcotic substance were recovered from their possession. Police seized the Narcotic substance, motorcycle and arrested the said two persons. In course of interrogation of the said two persons, they allegedly disclosed that Suresh Yadav, the petitioner was also in the racket. Suresh Yadav was arrested and commercial quantity of Narcotic substance, viz., 04 kgs. of Charas were recovered from the possession of Suresh Yadav. On May 3, 2024 the wife of the petitioner submitted an application wherein she stated that the motorcycle in connection with Bettiah Muffasil P.S. Case No.180 of 2024 was seized from a parking lot at Bettiah and the persons who were apprehended were not traveling by the said motorcycle. Suresh Yadav was implicated in the case on some false and concocted allegations. Therefore, she prayed for preserving CCTV footage dated April 19, 2024 during the period between 12:30 p.m. and 05:30 p.m. in respect of all Cameras installed in an around the parking lot of Zila Parishad, Bettiah, near the office of Superintendent of Police, Bettiah as well as cameras installed at the Collectorate Gate and Nagar Parishad between two gates of Bus Stand, Bettiah as per the direction of the Supreme Court in the case of Paramvir Singh Saini vs. Baljit Singh & Others, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.3543/2020.

Notably, the very first order dated June 5, 2024 passed by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad of the High Court had directed the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah to look into the request of the petitioner. The order recorded that "the petitioner has already submitted a request in this regard in the Public Grievance Cell of Bettiah Police as back as on 08.05.2024 but till date, no action has been taken." The order reads:"Ajay, learned G.A. 5 appears for the State and submits that there is no objection to the said prayer of the petitioner. In the aforesaid view of the matter for the present, this Court directs the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah to look into the request of the petitioner and take steps to secure and preserve the CCTV footage in accordance with law as prayed in paragraph ‘1(ii)’ of the writ application as the same may be required to be considered at appropriate stage."

Justice Chaudhary's order dated February 13, 2025 records:"The respondents have filed a counter affidavit stating, inter-alia, that the record of CCTV footage is maintained by an outsourcing agency under the name and style of AIM and Company Pvt. Ltd. and they maintained 20 days record in respect of CCTV footage in the hard-disk and footage beyond 20 days are automatically deleted from the Hard-disk. Therefore, on the date of the order passed by this Court, CCTV footage dated 19.04.2024 was automatically deleted and it is not possible for retrieve the data." 

The High Court's order reads:"....this Court is of the view that when an application was filed on 03.05.2024, i.e. within 20 days from the date of the alleged incident for restoration of data of CCTV footage around the place of occurrence filed by the wife of the present petitioner before the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah, he ought to have passed the order of protection and restoration of such data for proper investigation. The Superintendent of Police, Bettiah must know that the investigation of a criminal case is not for implicating a person in a criminal offence, but to unearth the truth, when the family member of one of the accused demanded that the truth will be unearth, if the CCTV footage was examined failure to take any action on such application by the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah amounts to an act of police inaction, for which the Superintendent of Police, Bettiah is held liable."

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of the Patna High Court factors in the directions of the Supreme Court for constitution of Oversight Committee at the  State and District levels. The State Level Oversight Committee (SLOC) consists of:

(i) The Secretary/Additional Secretary, Home Department;

(ii) Secretary/Additional Secretary, Finance Department;

(iii) The Director General/Inspector General of Police; and

(iv) The Chairperson/member of the State Women’s Commission.

The District Level Oversight Committee (DLOC) comprises of:

(i) The Divisional Commissioner/ Commissioner of Divisions/ Regional Commissioner/Revenue Commissioner Division of the District (by whatever name called);

(ii) The District Magistrate of the District;

(iii) A Superintendent of Police of that District; and

(iv) A mayor of a municipality within the District/ a Head of the Zilla Panchayat in rural areas.

Supreme Court's judgement reads:" It shall be the duty of the SLOC to see that the directions passed by this Court are carried out. Amongst others, the duties shall consist of:

a) Purchase, distribution and installation of CCTVs and its equipment;

b) Obtaining the budgetary allocation for the same;

c) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;

d) Carrying out inspections and addressing the grievances received  from the DLOC; and

e) To call for monthly reports from the DLOC and immediately address any concerns like faulty equipment.

Likewise, the DLOC shall have the following obligations:

a) Supervision, maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;

b) Continuous monitoring of maintenance and upkeep of CCTVs and its equipment;

c) To interact with the Station House Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “SHO”) as to the functioning and maintenance of CCTVs and its equipment; and

d) To send monthly reports to the SLOC about the functioning of CCTVs and allied equipment.

e) To review footage stored from CCTVs in the various Police Stations to check for any human rights violation that may have occurred but are not reported."

The judgement further reads: "14. The duty and responsibility for the working, maintenance and recording of CCTVs shall be that of the SHO of the police station concerned. It shall be the duty and obligation of the SHO to  immediately report to the DLOC any fault with the equipment or malfunctioning of CCTVs. If the CCTVs are not functioning in a particular police station, the concerned SHO shall inform the DLOC of the arrest / interrogations carried out in that police station during the said period and forward the said record to the DLOC. If the concerned SHO has reported malfunctioning or non-functioning of CCTVs of a particular Police Station, the DLOC shall immediately request the SLOC for repair and purchase of the equipment, which shall be done immediately.

15. The Director General/Inspector General of Police of each State and Union Territory should issue directions to the person in charge of a Police Station to entrust the SHO of the concerned Police Station with the responsibility of assessing the working condition of the CCTV cameras installed in the police station and also to take corrective action to restore the functioning of all non-functional CCTV cameras. The SHO should also be made responsible for CCTV data maintenance, backup of data, fault rectification etc.

16. The State and Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every Police Station functioning in the respective State and/or Union Territory. Further, in order to ensure that no part of a Police Station is left uncovered, it is imperative to ensure that CCTV cameras are installed at all entry and exit points;  main gate of the police station; all lock-ups; all corridors; lobby/the reception area; all verandas/outhouses, Inspector's room; Sub- Inspector's room; areas outside the lock-up room; station hall; in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms/toilets; Duty Officer’s room; back part of the police station etc.

17. CCTV systems that have to be installed must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. In areas in which there is either no electricity and/or internet, it shall be the duty of the States/Union Territories to provide the same as expeditiously as possible using any mode of providing electricity, including solar/wind power. The internet systems that are provided must also be systems which provide clear image resolutions and audio. Most important of all is the storage of CCTV camera footage which can be done in digital video recorders and/or network video recorders. CCTV cameras must then be installed with such recording systems so that the data that is stored thereon shall be preserved for a period of 18 months. If the recording equipment, available in the market today, does not have the capacity to keep the recording for 18 months but for a lesser period of time, it shall be mandatory for all States, Union Territories and the Central Government to purchase one which allows storage for the maximum period possible, and, in  any case, not below 1 year. It is also made clear that this will be reviewed by all the States so as to purchase equipment which is able to store the data for 18 months as soon as it is commercially available in the market. The affidavit of compliance to be filed by all States and Union Territories and Central Government shall clearly indicate that the best equipment available as of date has been purchased.

18. Whenever there is information of force being used at police stations resulting in serious injury and/or custodial deaths, it is necessary that persons be free to complain for a redressal of the same. Such complaints may not only be made to the State Human Rights Commission, which is then to utilise its powers, more particularly under Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, for redressal of such complaints, but also to Human Rights Courts, which must then be set up in each District of every State/Union Territory under Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The Commission/Court can then immediately summon CCTV camera footage in relation to the incident for its safe keeping, which may then be made available to an investigation agency in order to further process the complaint made to it.....

20. The SLOC and the COB (where applicable) shall give directions to all Police Stations, investigative/enforcement agencies to prominently display at the entrance and inside the police stations/offices of investigative/enforcement agencies about the coverage of the concerned premises by CCTV. This shall be done by large posters in English, Hindi and vernacular language. In addition to the above, it  shall be clearly mentioned therein that a person has a right to complain about human rights violations to the National/State Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court or the Superintendent of Police or any other authority empowered to take cognizance of an offence. It shall further mention that CCTV footage is preserved for a certain minimum time period, which shall not be less than six months, and the victim has a right to have the same secured in the event of violation of his human rights.

21. Since these directions are in furtherance of the fundamental rights of each citizen of India guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and since nothing substantial has been done in this regard for a period of over 2½ years since our first Order dated 03.04.2018, the Executive/Administrative/police authorities are to implement this Order both in letter and in spirit as soon as possible. Affidavits will be filed by the Principal Secretary/Cabinet Secretary/Home Secretary of each State/ Union Territory giving this Court a firm action plan with exact timelines for compliance with today’s Order. This is to be done within a period of six weeks from today.....

23. The Supreme Court registry to send a copy of this Order to all Chief/Principal Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories,  both by physical as well as electronic means, today itself."

 

Justice Pancholi led Division Bench upholds judgment of acquittal by Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya

In his 19-page long 20th judgement of the year dated June 17, 2025 in Munni Devi vs. The State of Bihar through the District Magistrate, Gaya & Ors. (2025), Justice Pancholi led Division Bench dismissed the appeal saying, "we are of the view that while passing the impugned order of acquittal, the learned Trial Court has not committed any error, as the prosecution has failed to prove the case against respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt." It was not inclined to entertain the acquittal appeal filed by the informant. The appellant/original informant had filed the appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated September 9, 2024 rendered by the Additional District & Sessions Judge-I, Sherghati, Gaya in Sessions Trial No.138/2022/950/2023, which arose out of Gurua P.S. case of 2020, whereby the respondents-accused, the residents of Auradih, Gurua, Gaya were acquitted by the Trial Court. The three private respondents who were acquitted were: Akhilesh Chaudhary Arjun Chaudhary and Pratima Kumari.

The Court's judgement records that APP submitted that "the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned judgment of acquittal and, therefore, in the present acquittal appeal filed by the informant, no interference is required. It is also submitted that State has not preferred any appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal."  

Justice Pancholi led bench relied on in paragraph no. 42 of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415. It reads: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; 
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

It also relied on paragraph no. 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Nikhil Chandra Mondal vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2023) 6 SCC 605. It reads: “22. Recently, a three-Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar has considered various earlier judgments on the scope of interference in a case of acquittal. It held that there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. It has been further held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should
not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Drawing decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, Justice Pancholi observed:"it can be said that there is double presumption in favour of the accused, when the order of acquittal has been accorded by the Trial Court: Firstly, the presumption of innocence that is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law; Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the court. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 

The case began on August 3, 2020, at about 04:15 p.m., informant, Munni Devi's daughter Nirmala Kumar was returning from a Devi temple after offering her prayer. Pratima Kumari of her village started abusing her daughter. When her daughter forbade Pratima Kumari to do so, she caught hold of her hair and pulled her down. Arjun Choudhary, Akhilesh Choudhary and Phulesh Devi came and started assaulting her daughter. When the informant and Sarjun Chaudhary, her husband came there after hearing the alarm, Phulesh Devi caught her, pulled her down and started assaulting her on her breast by leg and assaulted her on her ear by means of iron rod due to which the ear of the informant was torn and started bleeding. Akhilesh Choudhary assaulted her husband on his head by means of iron rod due to which her husband fell down there and started vomiting blood and became unconscious. Thereafter, the accused persons had fled. The local people gathered there after hearing alarm and brought her husband to Gaya Hospital from where he was referred to Blue Diamond Hospital, Patna where her husband died during the course of treatment after two days.  Fardbeyan was given by the informant on August 5, 2020. After recording the fardbeyan of the informant, the concerned police officer, Agamkuan Police Station, Patna sent the same to Gurua Police Station, Gaya. 

The fardbeyan was recorded as formal FIR on August 12, 2020, at 11:00 a.m. The High Court noted that there was "delay in lodging the FIR and there is delay in lodging the formal FIR. No explanation has been rendered by the prosecution with regard to the same." The FIR was registered under Sections 341/323/302/504/34 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Sections 3/4 of the Prevention of Witch Practices Act against the respondents-accused as Gurua P.S. Case No.178/2020. The High Court observed:"Thus, there are serious lapses on the part of the concerned police authorities." The Investigating Officer, PW-7 in his deposition "specifically admitted that rod was not recovered or discovered. He did not find any blood at the place of occurrence."

During the trial, PW-1, Nirmala Kumari, who is daughter of the informant as well as the deceased, has mainly deposed in her examination-in-chief that Pratima Kumari, the fourth respondent/accused was standing on the way and telling that her mother was a dain (witch) and she obstructed fixing of her marriage. 

Notably, PW-3, Tetri Devi, mother of Sarjun Choudhary, the deceased deposed in her examination-in-chief that Sarjun Choudhary was her son who fell after consuming liquor and due to fall he died. The accused persons did not kill her son. The accused Akhilesh Choudhary and Pratima Kumari were her grandson and granddaughter. The police recorded her statement. She had given the same statement before the police saying her son fell in a drunken state and died. The Court noted that PW-3 "was not declared hostile and, therefore, the deposition given by the said witness is required to be considered as it is."

 

Also read: Justice Vipul Pancholi to take over as Patna High Court Chief Justice, dismissed State Government Appeals against acquittal of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2024, set aside judgment of 1991

Supreme Court stays fresh tender process approved by High Court's Acting Chief Justice led bench

In Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd.vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), the Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Augustine George Masih issued notice, returnable within eight weeks. Its order dated June 3, 2025 reads:"In the meanwhile, further tender process shall remain subject to the outcome of the present special leave petition." This implies that the judgement of the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy which approved the fresh tender process has been stayed. 

The Division Bench had heard both the writ petitions filed by Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd and Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd. who had prayed for setting aside the order dated June 26, 2023 issued under the signature of the Member Secretary, Bihar State Pollution Control Board (BSPCB), Patna, whereby the entire tender dated December 22, 2022, for all the seven locations was cancelled despite the respondents/Board having issued the letter of selection for locations at Muzaffarpur and Bhagalpur in favour of Medicare Environmental Management Pvt. Ltd. and for locations Gopalganj and Purnia in favour of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd.  The High Court had dismissed both the writ petitions by its 26-page long judgement dated May 7, 2025.

The tender was issued because the BSPCB was of the view that there was need for setting up seven Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF), one each in Patna, Gopalganj, Madhubani, Purnia, Sasaram, Muzaffarpur and Bhagalpur in accordance with the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016. BSPCB took the decision to cancel the entire tender as it was a composite tender (one tender for all the seven locations) and issued fresh tender for each of the locations and not a composite tender. Both the petitioners have challenged the decision as being arbitrary, unreasonable and based on no logic. They have submitted that before cancelling the entire tender, the successful bidders ought to have been issued notice.

One of the two petitioners, Medicare Environmental Management Pvt.  Ltd.  submitted that for one of the
bidders, namely, M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd., the second petitioner having submitted an erroneous and wrongly filled-up financial bid, the entire tender ought not to have been cancelled. The BSPCB had some justification for cancelling the tender with respect to locations at Gopalganj and Purnia, but there would absolutely be no ground for cancelling the entire tender even if it be a composite tender of all the seven locations. 

BSPCB should have segregated the respective tenders and went ahead with the selection of the bidders in whose financial bids there was no problem and which selection was completely unaffected by the wrong bidding of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd. 

It was submitted that in Government contracts, the authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law while dealing with contractual matters. The “Right to Equality” under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is breached whenever an arbitrary decision is taken. The Court's attention was drawn towards the the decision of the Supreme Court in Mihan India Ltd. vs. GMR Airports Ltd. & Ors. : (2022) 19 SCC 69. In this case, bids were invited for development of a Multi-Model International Passenger Cargo Hub Airport at Nagpur, but before the agreement could be executed with the highest bidder, the bidding process was annulled without any direction for fresh tender process.

The Supreme Court held the view that once the selection of the concessionaire had been declared, then raising objections at the stage of the execution of the concession agreement in the garb of asking clarification with respect to certain formalities, amounted to arbitrary exercise of powers by the authorities, which is not permissible under the law. The Supreme Court relied upon its own judgment in Union of India vs. Dinesh Engineering Corporation : (2001) 8 SCC 491, wherein while dealing with the rejection of the bid of the respondent therein by the Railways in a tender floated for procurement of certain items of spare parts for use in GE governors, the Supreme Court had held that the power to reject bids cannot be exercised arbitrarily; merely because the Railways had the power to do so. Any arbitrary exercise of power to reject bids was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was held that held that a public authority, even in contractual matters, should not have unfettered discretion and in contracts having commercial elements. Even though some extra discretion is to be conceded to such authorities. 

In Mihan India Ltd. case, the Supreme Court in para 64 of the decision took note of the decision in City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. vs. Shishir Realty (P) Ltd. : (2002) 16 SCC 527. It reads:“75. Before we state the conclusions, this Court would like to reiterate certain well pertaining to Government contracts. When we speak of Government contracts, constitutional factors are also in play.
Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and rule of law even while dealing with contractual matters. It is a settled principle that right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process. A transparent bidding process is much favoured by this Court to ensure that constitutional requirements are satisfied.
76. Fairness and the good faith standard ingrained in the contracts entered into by public authorities mandates such public authorities to conduct themselves in a non-arbitrary manner during the performance
of their contractual obligations.
77. The constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness as provided under Article 14, demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. However, the degree of
compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest, so claimed.
78. At this juncture, it is pertinent to remember that, by merely using grounds of public interest or loss to the treasury, the successor public authority cannot undo the work undertaken by the previous authority. Such a claim must be proven using material facts, evidence and figures. If it were otherwise, then there will remain no sanctity in the words and undertaking of the Government. Businessmen will be hesitant to enter Government contract or make any investment in furtherance of the same. Such a practice is counterproductive to the economy and the business environment in general.”

Drawing on this principle, the Supreme Court did not approve of such cancellation of tender in its entirety. 

Justice Kumar who authored the judgement of the Division Bench observed:"In the present set of facts in these two writ petitions, the situation is different." The judgement pointed out that the financial bid of M/s Sangam Mediserve Pvt. Ltd., which was found to be L-1 for two locations, namely, Gopalganj and Purnia, was erroneous. Although for the two locations, namely, Gopalganj and Purnia, there was an alternative of declaring the L-2 for those two locations as L-1 but "This could but have led to spate of litigation as many of the contenders/bidders had participated and offered their bids for number of locations."

The judgement reads:"Since it was a composite tender, any wrong assessment of any one of the bidders to be the lowest or the highest for a particular location would have had a cascading/waterfall effect on all the tenders. In the circumstances and in all fitness of things, it appears that the Bihar Pollution Control Board took a decision of cancelling the entire tender process and re-tendering it. To us, the decision does not appear to be arbitrary or fanciful or imbued with any mala fides." 

Referring to both the petitioners, Justice Kumar observed: "The parties never got an opportunity of any investment and it was only at the threshold stage when the agreement would have been entered into by the successful bidders, that this decision was taken." He concluded: "The reason for cancelling the tender, in its entirety, does not appear to us to be arbitrary or mala fide. Whether it is wise or unwise or that a better option could have been exercised by the respondents/Board has not been addressed by us for the reasons of our limitations of the jurisdiction." 

 

Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey's decision in Ujjawal Sharma's case challenged in Supreme Court

In Kamlesh Kumar vs The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Satish Chandra Sharma heard the petitioner's counsel who has challenged the judgment and order dated August 28, 2024 passed by Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey of the Patna High Court in Ujjawal Sharma vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024) Criminal Miscellaneous No.10990/2024. By its order dated June3, 2025, the Court condoned the delay and issued notice, returnable on August 18, 2025.

In his order, Justice Nawneet Kumar Pandey directed Ujjawal Sharma, the petitioner, a resident Of Pipradih, Chandrapura, Bokaro, Jharkhand "to be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,000/- with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.C.J.M. II Gaya in connection with Magadh Medical P.S. Case No. 416 of 2023". Kamlesh Kumar, a resident of Pandey Parsawa, Magadh, Medical, Gaya was the private respondent in the case.   

Supreme Court dismisses Bihar State's appeal, upholds judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri led Division Bench setting aside Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order

In The State of Bihar vs. Surendra Prasad Singh (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and Joymalya Bagchi dismissed Bihar government's appeal by its 2-page long order dated June 27, 2025 against the 6-page long judgement dated July 23, 2024 by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices P. B. Bajanthri and Alok Kumar Pandey. The judgement by Justice P. B. Bajanthri led Division Bench had rejected Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order dated August 29, 2019 in Surendra Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2019) which was supported by the state government. The order of Director, Secondary Education, Bihar was found untenable. 

Supreme Court's order reads: "The High Court quashed the order of penalty imposed on the respondent on the ground that the inquiry proceedings suffered from lacuna and infirmities. We find from the material placed on record that the State did not examine a single witness in support of the charges. Thus, the issue involved is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570. The Division Bench, while quashing the order of punishment has given liberty to the State to hold a fresh inquiry as per law. Thus, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference. The Special Leave Petition, being bereft of merit, is dismissed."

The High Court's Division Bench judgement was authored by Justice Bajanthri. It records that the appellant was appointed as a Assistant teacher on November 25, 1979 in a privately managed school which was taken over by the Government on October 2, 1980. The official respondents racked up the issue of alleged production of fake and forged certificates by the appellant for selection and appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. Thereafter, charge memo was issued on December 4, 2014 and it was concluded in imposition of penalty of dismissal from service on June 30, 2015, after almost 35-36 years. 

The appellant's counsel vehemently contented that alleged fake and forged certificates were not produced before the inquiry authority. It was required to be marked and proved in the manner known to the law to the extent that author of those certificates were required to be examined and appellant was entitled for cross-examination of such of those authors of the certificates. Thereafter, inquiry officer was required to come to the conclusion that it was fake and forged certificates. The aforementioned infirmity is forthcoming in the departmental inquiry and the same has not been appreciated by the disciplinary authority as well as single judge. 

Allowing the L.P.A., Justice Bajatnthri concluded:"Taking note of the aforementioned submission, it is a serious lacunae to the extent that official respondents have opened their eyes after more than two decades in respect of alleged fake and forged certificates stated to have been produced by the appellant in the year 1979. That apart while holding the departmental inquiry those alleged fake and forge certificates have not been produced as exhibits and further author of those certificates have not been cited as a witnesses and adducing their evidence, examination and further providing cross-examination opportunity to the appellant. These lacunae have not been apprised by the disciplinary authority and so also by the learned single judge. Further, it is to be noticed that appellant was working from 25.11.1979 as a teacher for about one year in the private school. Thereafter, the school was taken over on 02.10.1980. The official respondents should have verified the certificates of the appellant in the year 1980 as and when the school was taken over alongwith the staff. On the other hand, they slept over the matter."

High Court's Division Bench judgement reads: "The concerned respondents are hereby directed to regulate the intervening period from the date of dismissal i.e., 30.06.2015 till reinstatement and extend all service and monetary benefits including grant of annual increments from time to time and further MACP/ACP, if any, revision of pay, during the intervening period, if any. In this regard, pay fixation chart shall be prepared and proceed to calculate arrears of pay and disburse the same in favour of the appellant within a period of four months from today." 

It added: "Reserving liberty to the official respondents to proceed with fresh inquiry in the event of appellant has played fraud in the selection and appointment to the post of Assistant teacher in the year 1979. In this regard, inquiry shall be initiated afresh and completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. If the inquiry is not completed within the time limit stipulated, in that event, the appellant shall not be subjected to further disciplinary proceeding in respect of alleged fake and forged certificates stated to have been produced by the appellant, for the reasons that from the year 1979, Appellant is working as Assistant Teacher." 

The High Court's Division Bench observed: "Learned counsel for the official respondents contentions are not tenable for the reasons that there is a legal lacunae in not proving the alleged fake and forged certificates. Accordingly, the appellant has made out a case so as to interfere with the order of dismissal dated 30.06.2015 read with the order of the learned single judge 29.08.2019. Both the orders are set aside."  It implies that the order of dismissal passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Bihar and Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh's order were set aside. Justice Singh had concluded that "the impugned action of the respondents does not require any interference." The respondents were: Director, Secondary Education, Bihar, Regional Deputy Director, Secondary Education Munger, District Magistrate, Jamui, District Programme Officer, Jamui, District Education Officer, Jamui and Block Education Officer, Block Barhat, Jamui. Justice Singh's order did not pay heed to the Supreme Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570.

 

In Roop Singh's case, the Court observed:"10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." It concluded;"Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 

 

The Court recalled Court's decision in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 88, wherein the Court held:"....Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." Justice Singh seems to have shifted the burden of proof.   

Supreme Court sets aside order on narco-analysis test of accused persons by Justice Sandeep Kumar, rejects Bihar State's submission

In Amlesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale set aside the 2-page long interim order dated November 9, 2023 by Justice Sandeep Kumar by its 17-page long judgement dated June 9, 2025. Justice Kumar had accepted the submission of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahua, Vaishali that she would conduct narco-analysis test of all the accused persons (including the Appellant herein) and other witnesses, during the investigation in direct contravention of the exposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Selvi and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263, wherein it was held that forceful subjection of an individual to techniques, such as the narco-analysis test, violates personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. 

Justice Sanjay Karol observed: "we cannot find a reason in the High Court accepting a submission by the Investigating Officer, stating that they will conduct a narco-analysis test of all the accused persons. Such a submission and its acceptance, is in direct contravention to the judgment of this Court in Selvi (supra), being hit by the protections under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, we fail to understand how such an endeavour was accepted by the High Court when adjudicating an application for regular bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is settled law that while entertaining an application for grant of bail, the Court has to take into consideration the allegations against the accused; period of custody undergone; nature of evidence and the crime in question; likelihood of influencing witnesses and other such relevant grounds. It does not involve entering into a roving enquiry or accepting the use of involuntary investigative techniques." 

Notably, the order dated November 9, 2023 has recorded that the S.D.P.O. Mahua, Vaisahali had assured the bench of Justice Kumar that "she will take further steps in the investigation to find out details about the missing woman and for that she has further submitted that she will get narco test of all the accused persons and other witnesses, if required in the investigation." The petitioner had filed the case for regular bail  in the High Court on October 6, 2023 in Police Station case of August 2022. It was registered on October 16, 2023.  

Justice Sourendra Pandey who joined as the judge of the High Court from the bar on March 8, 2025 was not inclined to enlarge the petitioner in question on bail. His application for bail was rejected by Justice Pandey's order dated May 1, 2025. 

With regard to the bail application of the appellant, pending if any, Supreme Court's Division Bench observed that it has "to be decided in accordance with law" in its judgement dated June 9, 2025.  

Prior to this on March 26, 2025, Justice Ashok Kumar Pandey passed an order after hearing the counsel for the parties. His order reads: "Call for a report from the Court of learned C.J.M., Vaishali at Hajipur with respect to present stage of trial, the number of witnesses to be examined and the expected duration that will take to conclude the trial in connection with Mahua P.S. Case No. 545 of 2022. 3. Put up this case on 23.04.2025."

The petitioner is in judicial custody since June 5, 2023. He was made accused in Mahua P.S. Case No. 545 of 2022 dated 24.08.2022 registered under Sections 341, 342, 323, 363, 364, 498(A), 504, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act but he was chargesheeted under Sections 341, 342, 323, 498(A), 364, 120(B), 302, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is that the petitioner was married to the sister of the informant on December 11, 2020. There was demand of dowry being made by the in laws and the informant’s sister was being tortured. It was alleged that on August 22, 2022 informant’s brother-in-law stated that petitioner had called and informed that his sister had escaped. Subsequently, on the application of the informant the FIR was registered against five named accused persons. The APP for the State stated that the wife of the petitioner was admittedly with the petitioner when she went missing and despite admitting that the wife of the petitioner went missing on August 21, 2022, a Sanha was registered on August 28, 2022 to cover up the misdeeds although the FIR was already lodged against the petitioner and another on August 24, 2022 by the brother of the victim. The APP also pointed that in his confessional statement the petitioner described  how he killed his wife and thrown her body in the Saryu River. 

Notably, the mother, father and brothers of Amlesh Kumar, the appellant, a resident of Fatehpur Pakari, Mahua, Vaishali have been granted bail by the High Court. The appellant's prayer for regular bail was rejected vide Order dated August 1, 2023 passed by the Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hajipur in B.P.No.1141 of 2023. The Court was not inclined to grant bail on the basis of the allegations made in the FIR, as well as the confessional statements of the co-accused, who stated that they had thrown the missing person in the river Saryu on the intervening night of the 21st and 22nd August 22, 2022. Dissatisfied with the order of the Sessions Judge, the appellant approached the High Court for grant of a regular bail vide Crl. Misc. No.71293 of 2023. By the impugned interim Order, the High Court accepted the submission of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Mahua, that she will conduct a narco-analysis test of all the accused persons.  

The order dated August 30, 2024 by Justice Partha Sarthy bench of the High Court recorded that the counsel for the petitioner submitted that an application for bail arising out of this very F.I.R., has been decided by this Court by order dated June 5, 2023 in Kailash Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr., (Cr. Misc. no. 17656 of 2023). The order referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court dated January 19, 2024 passed in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha (Cr. Appeal no. 303 of 2024), and directed that the case should be put up before appropriate Bench.

In a subsequent order dated October 25, 2024, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad recorded: "It is pointed out that earlier the predecessor Court had passed an order on 09.11.2023 and being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed a special leave petition being Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No(s). 9701 of 2024 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has stayed the impugned order dated 09.11.2023. It is his submission that the order dated 09.11.2023 is altogether on a different issue and the pendency of the SLP in the Hon’ble Supreme Court as against the said order would not have any impact on the hearing of the bail petition on its own merit, therefore, he would request this Court to hear the bail petition of the petitioner on its own merit...In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioner is expected to apprise his submissions to the Hon’ble Supreme Court where the matter is pending against the order dated 09.11.2023." 

In its judgement dated June 9, 2025 authored by Justice Karol, the Supreme Court examined the order dated November 9, 2023 by Justice Kumar, set it aside and allowed the appeal. The Court held that an accused person does not have an indefeasible right to seek a narco-analysis test to lead the evidence. This decision assumes significance because it has brought clarity to the law following several conflicting High Court judgements on the issue. He observed that the High Court had exceeded the scope of a bail hearing by approving a narco-analysis test. In Selvi vs. State of Karnataka (2010), the Court has held that a narco-analysis test cannot form the sole basis of conviction.

According to B R Sharma, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation & Trials, a narco-analysis test is an interrogation method whereby a suspect of a crime is injected with a psychoactive drug under controlled conditions to suppress their reasoning power or the ability to determine what is good/bad for themselves. The drug used for this test is sodium pentothal, which is also used in higher dosages for inducing general anesthesia in surgeries. However, conducting such tests on persons accused of committing a crime raises serious questions, vis-à-vis, the constitutional protection granted from compulsion to become a witness against oneself under Article 20(3). The constitutional validity of this test, along with similar tests like the polygraph test, came to be challenged before this Court in Selvi (supra). After an elaborate discussion, this Court (three-Judge Bench) held involuntary administration of this test to be hit by Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. The following principles came to be expounded: 
8.1. Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution are non-derogable and sacrosanct rights to which the judiciary cannot carve out exceptions;
8.2. Involuntary administration of narco-analysis and similar tests is in contravention of the protection given by Article 20(3) of the Constitution, i.e. the right against self-incrimination;
8.3. The results of such involuntary tests cannot be considered as ‘material evidence’ in the eyes of the law;
8.4. Conducting such tests in the absence of consent violates ‘substantive due process’ – which is an essential element required for restraining one’s personal liberty. Permitting such tests may lead to a disproportionate exercise of police powers;
8.5. The boundaries of privacy of a person are also breached when these tests are conducted without consent; and
8.6. For voluntary tests, it must be ensured that appropriate safeguards are in place. Moreover, the results of the same cannot be admitted directly as evidence. Pertinently, any fact or information that is discovered subsequent thereto, with the help of the information supplied in the result, can be admitted into evidence with the aid of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872.

Justice Karol observed:"...it is clear that under no circumstances, is an involuntary or forced narco-analysis test permissible under law. Consequently, a report of such involuntary  test or information that is discovered subsequently is also not per se admissible as evidence in criminal or other proceedings."

The Patna High Court had allowed narco-analysis tests for all the accused persons in a dowry harassment and kidnapping case after hearing a plea for the grant of regular bail by the accused persons. 

Justice Karol recalled that in similar circumstances, where the High Court had ordered lie detector, brain mapping and narco tests, the Supreme Court in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datana vs. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522. observed: “6. Having heard the counsel for the parties, it is surprising to note the present approach adopted by the High Court while considering the bail application. The High Court ordering the above mentioned tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein the court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case.
7. In the instant case, by ordering the above mentioned tests and venturing into the reports of the same with meticulous details, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini trial indeed. This assumption of function of a trial court by the High Court is deprecated.”

Justice Karol considered following three issues:
i. Firstly, whether in the attending facts and circumstances, Justice Kumar could have accepted such a submission. 
ii. Secondly, whether a report of a voluntary narco-analysis test can form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of other evidence on record.
iii. Lastly, whether an accused can voluntarily seek a narco-analysis test, as a matter of an indefeasible right. 

With regard the first issue, he observed: "We are not inclined to accept the submission of the Respondent- State that since modern investigative techniques are the need of the hour, the High Court was correct in accepting the submission that narco-analysis test of all accused persons will be conducted. While the need for modern investigative techniques may be true, such investigative techniques cannot be conducted at the cost of constitutional guarantees under Articles 20(3) and 21. Therefore, the first question framed is answered in the negative. The High Court has erred in accepting a submission to carry out a narco-analysis test of all accused persons by the Investigating Officer." Supreme Court rejected the submission of the State of Bihar which endorsed Justice's Kumar's interim order.  

With respect to the second issue, the judgement reads:"...a report of a voluntary narco-analysis test with adequate safeguards as well in place, or information found as a result thereof, cannot form the sole basis of conviction of an accused person. The second question is, therefore, answered in the negative." 

The Court in had considered voluntary narco-analysis tests in Selvi case and opined that the reports thereof cannot be admitted directly into evidence. Information that is discovered, as a consequence thereof, can be admitted with the aid of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 

Justice Karol added:"The evidentiary value of information received through the aid of Section 27 is no longer res integra." The term res integra is something which has not yet been determined or resolved by the authority of a decided case, so that a judge may decide it upon principle alone. 

Justice Karol recalled Court's decision in Vinobhai vs. State of Kerela2025 SCC Online SC 178, which while placing reliance on Manoj Kumar Soni vs. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 held that in the absence of supporting evidence, a conviction cannot be based solely on such information. It was observed: “8. …..The law relating to the evidentiary value of recovery made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is settled by this Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.. Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads: “22. A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.”  Therefore, in our view, the appellant's guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Justice Karole led bench was informed that there has been a divergence of views taken by High Courts on the issue as to whether a narco-analysis test can be claimed by an accused as a matter of right. Allahabad High Court in Rajesh Talwar vs. CBI; Bombay High Court in Dominic Luis vs. State and Mohd. Samir vs. State; Delhi High Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. Union of India; Kerala High Court in Louis vs. State of Kerala; Guajrat High Court in State of Gujarat vs. Sanjay Kumar Kanchanlal Desai and Punjab & Haryana High Court in Navjeet Kaur vs. State of Punjab, have held that an involuntary narco-analysis test cannot be relied on and have taken an overall view of the circumstances when an accused has sought a narco-analysis test himself.

Rajasthan High Court in Sunil Bhatt vs. State has held that the accused can seek a narco-analysis test at a relevant stage in view of the statutory right to lead evidence in defence under Section 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

 

Given the suspect nature of a report of narco-analysis, therefore, this position required clarification. Supreme Court's Division Bench observed: "In our view, as rightly submitted by the learned Amicus, the above view of the Rajasthan High Court cannot be sustained. It cannot be said that undergoing a narco-analysis test is part of the indefeasible right to lead evidence, given its suspect nature, and moreover, we find the same to be in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in Selvi (supra). It had been categorically observed: “240. We must also contemplate situations where a threat given by the investigators to conduct any of the impugned tests could prompt a person to make incriminatory statements or to undergo some mental trauma. Especially in cases of individuals from weaker sections of society who are unaware of their fundamental rights and unable to afford legal advice, the mere apprehension of undergoing scientific tests that supposedly reveal the truth could push them to make confessional statements. Hence, the act of threatening to administer the impugned tests could also elicit testimony. It is also quite conceivable that an individual may give his/her consent to undergo the said tests on account of threats, false promises or deception by the investigators. For example, a person may be convinced to give his/her consent after being promised that this would lead to an early release from custody or dropping of charges. However, after the administration of the tests, the investigators may renege on such promises. In such a case the relevant inquiry is not confined to the apparent voluntariness of the act of undergoing the tests, but also includes an examination of the totality of circumstances."
 

It also drew on para 253-264 of the judgement which reads: "We are of the view that an untrammelled right of resorting to the techniques in question will lead to an unnecessary rise in the volume of frivolous litigation before our courts. In light of these conclusions, we hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty. However, we do leave room for the voluntary administration of the impugned techniques in the context of criminal justice, provided that certain safeguards are in place. Even when the subject has given consent to undergo any of these tests, the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence because the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test. However, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.”

 

With regard to the third issue, Justice Karole observed: answered in the following terms:"In view of the above exposition in Selvi (Supra), the third question is answered in the following terms: The accused has a right to voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test at an appropriate stage. We deem it appropriate to add, that the appropriate stage for such a test to be conducted is when the accused is exercising his right to lead evidence in a trial. However, there is no indefeasible right with the accused to undergo a narco- analysis test, for upon receipt of such an application the concerned Court, must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the matter, such as free consent, appropriate safeguards etc., authorizing a person to undergo a voluntary narco-analysis test. We deem it appropriate to reproduce and reiterate the guidelines issued in Selvi (Supra) in this regard as follows :
“265. The National Human Rights Commission had published Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie Detector Test) on an Accused in 2000. These Guidelines should be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be adopted for conducting the “narcoanalysis technique” and the “Brain Electrical Activation Profile” test. The text of these Guidelines has been reproduced below:
(i) No lie detector tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a lie detector test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,
emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial Magistrate.

(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a “confessional” statement to the Magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.” 

 

Justice Karol concluded:"....we have no doubt that the impugned Order cannot be sustained" referring to the interim order dated November 9, 2023. 

High Court satisfied with waste management efforts by Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga

In Dheeraj Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Cum Commissioner & Ors. (2025), Acting Chief Justice led Division Bench consigned the petition after observing that "All the issues appear to have been addressed by the respondents. The Storm Water Drainage Scheme has been approved at the cost of Rs.245 crores, which is being implemented by BUIDCO. An agreement has already been executed on 28.12.2023, which indicates that the date of the completion of the project would be 27.12.2026. In the project, there shall be 08 outfall drains with a total length of 46854 meters....". 

In its judgement dated June 20, 2025, the other respondents were Principal Secretary cum Commissioner, Department of Environment and Forest, Patna, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Darbhanga. Central Railways through Divisional Manager, Samastipur and Bihar State Pollution Control Board, Bihar through its member secretary. 

The Court recorded that it was informed that the construction of 650 meters of drain from the Post Mortem Road situated in DMCH premises to Karpuri Chowk has been completed. Work schedule has been planned in advance, the details of which also have been provided in the affidavit. 

With regard to bio-medical waste disposal, the judgement noted that Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga has notified the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 and Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016, which are being implemented properly. The segregation of bio-medical waste is being done and the agency to collect the biomedical waste from DMCH and other private nursing homes, is operating on daily basis. An agency has been entrusted with the work, which has pitched in 04 vehicles and 10 personnel for collection and segregation of the biomedical waste."

It also reads: With respect to air pollution, a serious drive has been undertaken in the town of Darbhanga. Very meticulously, the persons spreading pollution have been identified and have been fined. A total amount of Rs.78,000/- by way of penalty has been recovered from them. The Municipal Corporation of Darbhanga has also conceived of a provision for penalty of environmental compensation against throwing of waste in open spaces/water bodies. Justice Kumar observed:"Considering the efforts taken by the respondents/State, we are satisfied that the directions passed by this Court have, to a large extent, been followed."

The petitioner was the son of President, Swatch Darbhanga Swasth Darbhanga Welfare Association. The petitioner had filed the public interest petition to draw attention towards the inaction of the respondents with respect to water logging in the town of Darbhanga; non-initiation of any steps for storm-drainage construction; for effective bio-waste disposal and for checking air pollution.

Role of circumstantial evidence in Supreme Court's judgement from 1952 cites 1838 case law

In Hanumant vs The State of Madhya Pradesh on AIR 1952 SC 343, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of Supreme Court of India concluded:"We cannot infer any intent to defraud or any intention to injure Amarnath, though in order to protect himself accused Patel made certain allegations against him. We therefore set aside the conviction of both the appellants under the third charge and acquit them. The result is that the consolidated appeal is allowed, the judgments of all the three courts below are set aside and the appellants are acquitted." The appellants were acquitted. The Court delivered the judgement dated September 23, 1952 after hearing the consolidated appeal by special leave from the two orders of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur passed on the March 9, 1950, in Criminal Revisions of 1949. 

In this case it all began with a complaint filed by the Assistant Inspector-General of Police, Anti-Corruption Department, Nagpur, against the appellants H. G. Nargundkar, Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, and R. S. Patel. They were tried in the court of B. K. Chaudhri, Special Magistrate, Nagpur, for the offence of conspiracy to secure the contract of Seoni Distillery from April, 1947, to March 1951 by forging the tender and for commission of the offences of forgery of the tender and of another document. The Special Magistrate convicted both the appellants on all the three charges. He sentenced R. S. Patel to rigorous imprisonment for one year under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively. The appellant Nargundkar was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months under each charge and to pay fines of Rs. 2,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 1,000, under the first, second and third charges respectively. Each of the appellants appealed against their respective convictions and sentences to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Nagpur. The Sessions Judge quashed the conviction of both the appellants under the first charge of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B, I.P.C. but maintained the convictions and sentences under section 465, I.P.C., on the charges of forging. Both the appellants went up in revision against this decision to the High Court but without any success. An application was then made under article 136 of the Constitution of India for special leave to appeal which was allowed by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1950.

The Court observed: "In dealing with circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson, to the jury in Reg v. Hodge ((1838) 2 Lew. 227)" Alderson said:-"The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to from parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete." 

Justice Mahajan observed:"12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence in of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and pendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

The law with regard to conviction based on circumstantial evidence has been crystalised by the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein it was held: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807] 4 SCC 116.20
‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” 
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 

In Shanti Devi vs. State of Rajasthan Criminal Appeal No. 954 of 2005, with regard to circumstantial evidence, “The principles can be set out as under:
    (i) The circumstances from which an interference of guilt is sought to be proved must be conjointly or firmly established.
    (ii) The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
    (iii) The circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that with an all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused or none else.
     (iv) The circumstances should be incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis, same that of the guilt of the accused.” [para 8]

In Padala Veera Reddy vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1989) Supp. (2) SCC 706, the principles are reiterated as follows;
    (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
    (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
    (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
    (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.

 In C. Cenga Reddy vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 10 SCC 193, the Court observed: “21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.”

In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs, The State of Maharshatra (2006) 10 SCC 681, the Court observed: “12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence.”

In Nizam vs. The State of Rajasthan (2015), the Court observed: "In case of circumstantial evidence, court has to examine the entire evidence in its entirety and ensure that the only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is the guilt of the accused. For establishing the guilt on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be firmly established and the chain of circumstances must be completed from the facts. The chain of circumstantial evidence cannot be said to be concluded in any manner sought to be urged by the prosecution."  

These principles have been reiterated in Bodhraj vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2002 (8) SCC 45, 
Bharat vs. State of Maharashtra (2003 (3) SCC 106), 
Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab (2005(12) SCC 438), 
Reddy Sampath Kumar vs. State of Andra Pradesh (2005 (7) SCC 603), 
Deepak Chandrakant Patil vs. State of Maharashtra (2006 (10) SCC 151, 
State of Goa vs. Sanjay Takran (2007 (3) SCC 755) and 
Sattatiyya alias Satish Rajanna Kartalla vs. State of Maharashtra (2008 (3) SCC 210).   

The word ‘Evidence’ has been derived from the Latin word ‘evidere’ which implies to show distinctly, to make clear to view or sight, to discover clearly, to make plainly certain, to certain, to ascertain, to prove. According to Sir Blackstone, ‘Evidence’ signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear or ascertain the truth of the facts or points in issue either on one side or the other. According to Sir Taylor, Law of Evidence means through argument to prove or disprove any matter of fact. The truth of which is submitted to judicial investigation.

All the statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under enquiry; such statements are called Oral evidence. All the documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the court; such documents are called documentary evidence. The definition of Evidence given in the Evidence Act is very narrow because in this evidence comes before the court by two means only- (1)   The statement of witnesses. (2)   Documents including electronic records.

Direct evidence is evidence of a fact based on a witness's personal knowledge or observation of that fact. A person's guilt of a charged crime may be proven by direct evidence if, standing alone, that evidence satisfies a judge beyond a reasonable doubt of the person's guilt of that crime.

Circumstantial evidence is direct evidence of a fact from which a person may reasonably infer the existence or nonexistence of another fact. A person's guilt of a charged crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence, if that evidence, while not directly establishing guilt, gives rise to an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of circumstances which can be relied upon not as proving a fact directly but instead as pointing to its existence. Circumstantial evidence is based largely on inference and uses inductive reasoning.

 In Raja Naykar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2024), , the Court observed: “It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is.” 

In Laxman Prasad @Laxman vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2023), the Court observed: “In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain has to be complete in all respects so as to indicate the guilt of the accused and also exclude any other theory of the crime.” 

In Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan vs. State of Gujarat (2019), the Court observed: “It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence the Courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and will not be sufficient to convict the accused.”

In Kalu @LaxmiNarayan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019), the Court observed:“Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character.”

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973), the Court observed: “Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the 73 5 court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable”

Can documents/material produced by accused be considered at stage of discharge by the Court?, Patna High Court says, no

In Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar vs. The State Of Bihar Through C.B.I. (2025), Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court observed:"In the present case, based on the materials produced by the prosecution the Court below was of the opinion that there are sufficient materials to proceed with the criminal case and it is settled law that documents/material produced by the accused cannot be considered at the stage of discharge". Having recorded the observation of the Special Judge, C.B.I.-I,  Justice Kumar's In 39-page long judgement dated May 16, 2025 concluded:"The impugned order dated 28.09.2015 passed by passed by the learned Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Patna is hereby affirmed." 

The case was heard and decided along with two other petitions by Vishakha Sindhu and Vineet Kumar Verma who too had assailed the order of September 28, 2015 in a 2011 case by Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Patna rejecting their discharge petitions. These petitions were disposed of by a common judgment. 

Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar was the Manager in the Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna, Vishakha Sindhu was the wife of petitioner and one of the Directors of M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited and Vineet Kumar Verma was the brother-in-law of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar and also one of the Directors of M/S. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited. It was alleged that in connivance with each other they had abused the official position of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, the bank manager who had sanctioned pre/post shipment advances to the firms belonging to his relative and associate and thereby, caused wrongful loss to the tune of Rs.368.56 lakhs to the Bank. It was also alleged that they had committed forgery by altering original dates on the aforesaid illegal advances. 

It was alleged that Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, the bank manager unauthorisedly made advances against foreign outward bills for collection to the extent of Rs.148 lakhs to M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited, a firm in which his wife was one of the Directors and with mala fide intention made debit entries in the current deposit nominal account no.259 and correspondingly credited the overdraft account of M/s. Sidhi Exports Private Limited. It was also alleged that the petitioner- Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar falsified the accounts of the Bank with mala fide intention and thereby caused wrongful loss of interest on the aforesaid amount to the bank. It was alleged that petitioner- Vishakha Sindhu one of the Directors of M/S Sidhi Export Private Limited and wife of Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar, dishonestly submitted an export bill for collection to the Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna after altering the name of original collecting Bank on the G.R. forms. She also suppressed the fact that the same bill had already been submitted to the Jammu & Kashmir Bank, the original collecting bank, for advance. It has been further alleged that petitioner - Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar knowingly accepted this forged document in order to cover up the aforesaid illegal act and dishonestly altered the date on the forwarding letter written by the firm to the bank and allowed advances, thereby cheated the Bank. The petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar in connivance with the then Branch Manager, Central Bank of India, Main Branch, Patna, acted dishonestly and without authority sanctioned packing credit limit to M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited without considering business antecedents of the aforesaid firm. He also dishonestly allowed heavy overdrawings in the packing credit account of aforesaid firm and therefore, the illegal actions of petitioner- Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar and other bank officials resulted in wrongful gain of Rs.80.93 Lakh to the firm and a corresponding loss of Rs.80.93 lakhs to the Bank. It was further alleged that in order to conceal the above-mentioned overdrawing positions, petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar also altered the relevant records of the Bank.

The petitioner-Sindhu Ratna Kul Bhaskar in connivance with other bank officials, dishonestly and in an unauthorised manner allowed foreign outward bill for collection advances to M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited, thereby causing the bank to deliver money to the said firm and these actions caused a wrongful gain of Rs.91.50 lakhs to the firm. The petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar in conspiracy with petitioner -Vineet Kumar Verma induced the Central Bank of India to deliver money to the said firm, as a result of which, the firm made a wrongful gain of Rs.69.13 lakhs. It was also alleged that in order to cover up overdrawing position, petitioner-Sindhu Ratan Kul Bhaskar made false credit entry dated August 16, 1999 of Rs.19 lakhs in the packing credit account of M/s. Sidhi Overseas Private Limited by debiting a non-existent Other Term Loan account.  

The counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Velji Raghavji Patel vs. State of Maharashtra reported as 1964 SCC OnLine SC 185 and Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta S.C.C. 591, G. Sagar Suri & Anr. vs. State of UP. & Others reported as (2000) 2 SCC 636, ALPIC Finance Ltd. vs. P. Sadashivan & Anr. reported as (2001) 3 SCC 513, Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Anr., Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. reported as (2006) 6 SCC 736, Rajwant Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported as 2007 (1) PLJR 406 : 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 463, Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI & Anr. reported as 2008(9) SCC 677, R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab reported as 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Another v/s Special Judicial Magistrate & Others reported as (1998 ) 5 SCC 749 ; Bhajanlal & Ors. reported as 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. vs.Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others reported as AIR 1988 S.C. 709 : (1988) 1 SCC 692; Bejai Singh Dugar v/s Certificate Officer Bhagalpur & Others 1965 BLJR - 341 (DB);Smt. Sarla Devi Agrawal vs. State of Bihar reported as 1979 BBCJ 213 (DB); Damodar Prasad Nathani vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. 1999 (1) PLJR 522; Kanhya Lal vs. The vs. the State of Bihar 2002(2) BBCJ 278 and K.K. Ahuja vs. V.K. Vora and Anr. 2009 (10) SCC 48. 

The counsel for the C.B.I. relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Odisha vs. Devendra Nath Padhi reported as (2005) I SCC 568; CBI vs. Aryan Singh & Ors. reported as (2023) 18 SCC 399 and P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerela & Anr. reported as (2010) 2 SCC 398.

Justice Kumar relied on paragraph nos. 14 to 16 of Supreme Court's decision in Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Jagjit Singh reported as (2013) 10 SCC 686, paragraph no.14 to 18 of the decision in Anil Bhavarlal Jain & Anr. vs. The State of Maharshtra & Ors. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3823 and in State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishoresinh Sao reported as (2023) 17 SCC 688.

He observed:"In the present case, the offence, as alleged in the F.I.R. involves defrauding the financial system of the country by the persons who are responsible officer bearers of the Bank. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforese-quoted decisions has held that such offences caused adverse ripple effect in the society and are in the nature of moral turpitude. When an offence of cheating, fraud etc. has been committed by the borrower after weaving a conspiracy with the Bank officials, as alleged in the F.I.R., would not make a case suitable for interference by this Court. 51. Moreover, this Court at this stage, will not not go into the merits of the case and examine threadbare the defence of the accused persons if a strong prima facie case for trial is made out particularly offences affecting the financial and economic system. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to make out a case that the allegations are totally groundless and therefore, the criminal case should not proceed against them." 

Notably, "at any stage" principle in Cr.P.C enables the Court to address issues, gather evidence, and ensure a fair and just outcome by allowing interventions throughout the criminal process. 

Justice Kumar observed that documents/material produced by accused cannot be considered at stage of discharge by the Court. The fact is Section 313 Cr.P.C. (Power to examine the accused) allows a court to examine the accused at any stage of the proceedings, without prior warning, to clarify any issues. It also mandates examination after the prosecution witnesses have been examined and before the accused presents their defense.  Section 258 of CrPC (Power to stop proceedings) states that In summons-cases, a Magistrate can stop proceedings at any stage before judgment, even after evidence has been recorded, under specific conditions.  Section 306 CrPC (Tender of pardon to accomplice) states that Chief Judicial Magistrates or Metropolitan Magistrates can tender a pardon to an accomplice at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial. It is apparent that the court did not pay heed to victim's rights. The victims have the right to be heard at every stage of the proceedings, including during investigation and trial. 

 

If the petitioners approach the Division Bench, they are likely to get relief especially with regard to consideration of new evidence.