Kamakhya Giri NDPS case reaches Supreme Court

Patna High Court's Division bench of Justices Ashutosh Kumar and Vipul M. Pancholi had upheld the  judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated March 8, 2019 and March 14, 2019 respectively, rendered by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (NDPS) Act, Aurangabad arising out of a case of 2016, whereby all the appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 8-20 (b) ii (C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,50,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo S.I. for six months each. 

In its judgement dated August 2, 2023, the Division Bench observed: "Thus, only because a Magistrate was not present when samples were drawn, we have no other reasons to doubt the correctness of the prosecution version that the appellants were carrying narcotics with them. 29. We have also gone through the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court while passing the impugned order of conviction and we are of the view that the Trial Court has not committed any error while passing the impugned order of conviction and, therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the same in the present appeals filed by the appellants-accused." The judgement has been challenged in the Supreme Court. The appeal was called on for hearing  on May 13, 2025.

The FIR states that pursuant to a secret information on October 2, 2016, at about 08:10. a.m. that a pick-up van bearing Registration No. BR 04M 0561 which was being used in transportation of huge quantity of Ganja. The pick-up van was intercepted and stopped near Batane river. During search, four persons, namely, Raushan Kumar, Ram Lakhan Tiwary, Upendra Giri and Suraj Sao @ Rukhi Sao were found sitting in the van. It was stated that during search, 898 kg of Ganja was recovered and seized. 

The counsel of the appellants- accused submitted that out of ten witnesses, eight witnesses are police personnel and, therefore, they are interested witnesses. Two other formal witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. However, the prosecution has failed to examine any independent witnesses. Thus, the Trial Court ought not to have relied upon the deposition given by the interested witnesses. It is further submitted that there is no recovery of Ganja from physical possession/conscious possession of the appellants-accused and the seized Ganja was found from the pick-up van, as alleged by the prosecution. However, so far as carrying out the search is concerned, the Investigating Agenc has not complied with the mandatory provisions of NDPS Act. Search was not carried out in presence of Gazetted Officers or Magistrate and, therefore, on the ground of violation of mandatory provisions of NDPS Act, the Trial Court ought to have acquitted the appellants-accused. 

The counsel appearing for the defence also contended that while collecting the samples from the packets which were prepared by the Investigating Agency, proper procedure has not been followed and, therefore, the report given by the concerned FSL may not be believed by this Court. It was further submitted that theguidelines issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mohanlal & Anr., reported in (2016) 3 SCC 379 has not been followed and thereby there is violation of provisions contained in Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

The counsel of the accused Ram Lakhan Tiwary submitted that the accused was only an occupant of the vehicle and he was not at all aware about the fact that alleged Ganja is being kept in the said pick-up van. He urged that impugned order of conviction passed by the concerned Trial Court be quashed and set aside.

Supreme Court warns Shailesh Kumar, an advocate from Begusarai

In Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Surya Kant and N.K Singh observed:"The application is totally frivolous. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. However, we refrain to impose exemplary costs on the petitioner at this time. If he will move any such application in future, strict action will be taken against him." It was filed on October 29, 2024 and registered on January 27, 2025 against Court's final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024. The order May 9, 2025 states that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated October 5, 2024 in M.A. No.1500/2024 in SLP (Crl.) No. 12133/2024 passed by the Supreme Court of India but final judgment and order seems to be unavailable on the Court's website. The order dated February 2, 2024 reads: "The petitioner, who appears in person, is not present. The matter was listed on 10.11.2023 and also on 12.12.2023. However, none had appeared. On two dates, no adverse orders were passed.The special leave petition is dismissed in default."

The order dated August 30, 2024 by bench of Justices Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan had recorded: "The petitioner has informed this Court that now he is law graduate. He candidly acknowledges that earlier he had 42 mobile numbers and about 15 bank accounts. That being so, it would be expedient and in the interest of justice that the petitioner appears before the Trial Court and extends full cooperation in the pending proceedings."

Supreme Court's order dated December 12, 2023 shows that the case arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 12, 2023 in CRWJC No. 2430/2018 passed by the Patna High Court but the judgment and order in question seems to be unavailable on the High Court's website. 

Supreme Court partly sets aside order of Delhi High Court's Division Bench in Wikimedia Foundation vs. ANI Media Private Limited case

In Wikimedia Foundation Inc. vs. ANI Media Private Limited and Ors.(2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan allowed the civil appeal. It concluded:" we are of the firm view that the Division Bench had reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions....we have no hesitation in our mind that such directions could not have issued. Accordingly, the impugned directions contained in para 5 of the impugned order dated 16.10.2024 are hereby set aside." The three other respondents were: Daniel Quilan, Vanamondle and Wikiholic.

The appeal was directed against the order dated October 16, 2024 passed by Delhi High Court's Division Bench comprising Justices Manmohan and Tushar Rao Gedela.

The order of the High Court reads: "On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for respondent No. l had drawn this Court's attention to a page published on the website 'Wikipedia 'wherein the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon. It was stated in the said publication that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge to release the identities of the editors who made the edits amounted to 'censorship and a threat to the flow of information’. This Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comment on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings, and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The sub judice principle, prima facie, seems to have been 'violated with impunity' by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the appellant herein. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel for respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the observations made by this Bench have been 'opened up for discussion' on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand....5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the observations made by this Bench amount to interference in court proceedings and violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt, this Court directs Wikimedia Foundation Inc.- the appellant herein to take down/delete the said pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by this Court within thirty six (36) hours...."

When the related special leave petition was moved on 17.03.2025, Supreme Court while issuing notice to ANI Media Private Limited observed:"We are concerned with the legality and validity of the directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned order."

Supreme Court did not address the merit of the case between the parties. It was primarily concerned with the legality and propriety of the direction of the High Court to the appellant to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the observations made by the High Court. That is the width and scope of this appeal.

ANI has instituted a suit before the High Court against Wikimedia Foundation, the appellant and others praying for an order against the defendants, restraining them from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking, distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff on any platform, including the platform maintained by defendant No. 1 and also pass an injunction against the defendant No. 1 or its agents or any person acting on its behalf or under its authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading and defamatory content against the plaintiff available on its platform, which can tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff and further restrain its users and administrators from publishing anything defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform.

The order dated August 20, 2024 passed by Justice Navin Chawla, a Single Judge of the High Court reads: "The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the ‘Administrators' of defendant No. l. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l submits that they have no connection with defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Keeping in view the above submissions, defendant No. l is directed to disclose the subscriber details of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff, through its counsel, within a period of two weeks from today. On receipt of the said information, the plaintiff shall take steps for ensuring service of summons and notice on the application on the said defendants."

The respondent had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the suit seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant for alleged willful disobedience to the order dated August 20, 2024. 

The Supreme Court has recorded that on September 17, 2024, an opinion piece was published in the Indian Express (E-edition) titled why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge to freedom of speech and information. It was also hosted on the platform of the appellant. The article mentioned that while issuing contempt notice, the Single Judge had reportedly said: If you don’t like India, please don’t work in India: we will ask the Government to block your site. It implied that there was a failure to understand the nature of the medium i.e. Wikipedia, it was claimed that the court’s decision to hold some members accountable and punish a community of volunteers by disclosing their private information was a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The effect this would produce is that any form of critical information that a powerful organization does not like can be censored or become grounds for punishment which would set a wrong precedent.

The appellant preferred an appeal against the order dated August 20, 2024, before the Division Bench of the High Court under Section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the said Code for setting aside of the order.

When the matter came before the Division Bench on October 14, 2024, the respondent complained that publishing of such a page on the platform of the appellant was intended to pressurize the Single Judge. When appellant sought for time to seek instructions the court directed the matter to be listed for hearing on October 16, 2024. On October 14, 2024, a talk page was hosted on the appellant’s platform opening up discussions on the ongoing proceedings between the parties before the High Court. On October 16, 2024, the impugned order was passed which referred to the discussion page. It is apparent that the Division Bench was palpably in error in holding that a prima facie case of interference in court proceeding, violation of the sub judice principle by a party to the proceeding and bordering on contempt was made out. The High Court failed to consider that appellant is merely an intermediary having the limited role of providing technical infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update, maintain or monitor the contents on the platform. This was applicable to the talk page as well as to the video. The appellant, not being the author, cannot be said to have violated the sub judice principle merely because the two pages were hosted on its platform. In any case, what were being hosted were secondary source material.

A decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2012) 10 SCC 603 provides for an order for postponement of publication in the event of violation of the subjudice principle but for determining such violation, the Constitution Bench set out the following criteria:
1. There is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice;
2. Reasonable alternative methods will not prevent the risk to fairness of the trial. 

The High Court's Division Bench order did not discuss as to how the pages hosted on the platform to the appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the pending proceedings before the Single Judge. The impugned order seemed devoid of any reason. The direction to take down he said pages seemed to be an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in violation of the right to open justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It impinges upon the freedom of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under Article 19(1)(a).The view taken by the Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on the appellant’s platform borders on contempt seemed wholly unjustified. It failed to consider that the pages were derived from other published secondary sources. Those were publicly available. The passing of orders like the impugned order adversely affected right to free speech and the right to know. It impinged upon the right to freely access and use the medium of internet. The impugned order was unsustainable and was liable to be set aside.

In the penultimate paragraph of the judgement, the Supreme Court observed:"For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key. That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues which are before the court. Both the judiciary and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must supplement each other....Though the contention of the appellant is that it is an intermediary in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 providing only technical infrastructure that host the platform and does not (a) publish, add or remove content on the platform, (b) decide which users are vested with certain technical privileges or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on the platform, thereby not liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by it, we are not inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit.

 Also read: Wikipedia vs. ANI case reaches Supreme Court

Delhi High Court seized with ANI's case against Wikimedia Foundation's Wikipedia

 

Acting Chief Justice led bench takes note of trees which require felling for roads between village Kumardih to Gidhaur in Jamui

Development: Whenever there is a conflict between a road and trees, roads ought to be given priority. 

In Bimal Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy recorded that "sanction has been granted by the Forest Department for felling trees standing on the land over which 200 metres road is to be constructed" and concluded:"It is expected that the road shall be constructed within a reasonable period of time, preferably within a period of four months. The writ petition stands consigned." The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2025. The PIL was filed on February 9, 2023 and registered on February 24, 

On April 28, 2023, the order of High Court's Division Bench of Chief Justice and Justice Madhuresh Prasad recorded that "The petitioner is concerned with a link road between Village Kumardih to Gidhaur in the district of Jamui. The petitioner submits that the link road has been sanctioned and a contractor awarded the work but nothing has happened till date. The learned Additional Advocate General on instructions submits that there is an encroachment case filed and the property is a public land from which certain trees have to be removed." Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui, Bihar had suo motu impleaded as the additional 12th respondent. In its order dated July 21, 2023, it is recorded that "...1.5 kilometers road was to be constructed between Giddhaur, Jamuni road to village Kumardih and what is to be completed is only 200 meters, wherein a number of trees are standing. It is also stated therein that permission was sought for with the Forest Department to cut down the trees, which has not been considered till now."

The High Court's order dated August 18, 2023 had recorded:"...now the sanction has been accorded and the small strip of road which was to be constructed, which is the prayer in the writ petition would be satisfied insofar as the commencement of construction immediately." 

The eleven other respondents were:Collector-cum-District Magistrate, Jamui, Additional Collector, Jamui, Sub-Divisional Officer, Jamui Sadar, Jamui, Deputy Commissioner Land Reforms, Jamui Sadar, Jamui, Block Development Officer, Giddhaur, Jamui, Circle Officer, Giddhaur, Jamui, Principal Secretary, Rural Works Department, Government of Bihar, Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Works Department, Government of Bihar, Executive Engineer, Rural Works Department, Work Division, Jhajha, Jamui, Sub- Divisional Officer, Rural Works Department, Work Sub-Division, Giddhaur, Jamui and Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui.

It is apparent that Divisional Forest Officer, Jamui was eager to save the trees from felling. Had a study been done to secure the trees, co-existence of both trees and roads could have been possible without sacrificing the former.   

Justice Jitendra Kumar endorses order of Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhagalpur for maintenance of wife, daughter

In Avadh Kishore Sah @ Awadhesh Sah vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Justice Jitendra Kumar concluded:"I do not find any perversity of finding of any fact, or error of law, requiring any interference in the impugned order" dated January 14, 2020 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhagalpur. Justice Kumar clarified in his 32-page long judgement that the finding of the High Court regarding validity of the marriage between the parties and paternity of the child is tentative in nature, subject to any contrary finding of competent Civil Court or Family Court.

The Principal Judge had directed the petitioner to pay Rs.3,000/- per month to his wife and Rs.2,000/- per month to his daughter. The maintenance to the daughter is payable till her marriage as per the impugned order and arrears of the maintenance amount was directed to be paid in three installments within six months. The two other respondents are: Soni Devi, wife of Awadhesh Sah and Gudiya Kumari, daughter of Awadhesh Sah from Kalapganj, Mirjanhat, Mojahidpur, Bhagalpur who had filed a case under Section 125 Cr.PC for their maintenance against the petitioner and his parents on July 26, 2012. The petitioner was in government job and his income from cultivation and business was Rs.24,000/- per month.The marriage between the petitioner and Soni Devi was solemnized on march 18, 2010 and out of the wedlock, Gudiya Kumari was born. She had alleged that her husband, the petitioner was having illicit relationship with Khushbu Kumari and wanted to marry her to get handsome dowry.

The petitioner stated that his marriage was forcibly solemnized with Soni Devi at Bababudha Nath Temple, Bhagalpur. He also disputed the paternity of Gudiya Kumari, the daughter of Soni Devi. He stated that Gudiya Kumari was born to Soni Devi on August 8, 2010, whereas his marriage with Soni Devi was solemnized on March 18, 2010. Gudiya Kumari was born just after about 4 and ½ months of his marriage with Soni Devi. Awadhesh Sah claimed that his wife/Soni Devi was having illicit relationship with Vishnudeo Sah, her brother-in-law and she was not interested to continue her matrimonial life with him.  

The High Court recorded that as per Section 125 Cr.PC, wife was entitled to get maintenance from her husband, if she is living separately from her husband with sufficient reason, but not living in adultery, and she has no means to maintain herself and the husband, despite having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain her. As per case laws, here wife means only a legally wedded wife.

As per Section 125(1)(b) Cr.PC, any legitimate or illegitimate minor child whether married or not but unable to maintain himself/herself is entitled to get maintenance from his/her father. 

The Court observed: "It is also settled principle of law that proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC is summary in nature and meant to prevent the vagrancy and destitution of wife and children and provide a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to them. Hence, strict standard of proof is not required in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC unlike in matrimonial proceedings, where strict proof of marriage or paternity is essential."

The High Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Kamala vs. M.R. Mohan Kumar, (2019) 11 SCC 491. The relevant para of the judgment reads:
“15. Unlike matrimonial proceedings where strict proof of marriage is essential, in the proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, such strict standard of proof is not necessary as it is summary in nature meant to prevent vagrancy. This Court has held that when the parties live together as husband and wife, there is a presumption that they are legally married couple for claim of maintenance of wife under Section 125 CrPC. Applying the well-settled principles, in the case in hand, Appellant 1 and the respondent were living together as husband and wife and had also begotten two children. Appellant 1 being the wife of the respondent, she and the children, Appellants 2 and 3 would be entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.”

In Santosh vs. Naresh Pal, (1998) 8 SCC 447, Supreme Court has held that "...In a proceeding for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC the learned Magistrate was expected to pass appropriate orders after being prima facie satisfied about the marital status of parties. It is obvious that the said decision will be a tentative decision subject to final order in any civil proceedings, if the parties are so advised to adopt."

It emerges from Section 7, 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 that if the Civil Court or the Family Court passes any decree in regard to the validity of the marriage or paternity of the child not in consonance with the finding of the High Court in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.PC, "the decree of the Civil Court/Family Court would prevail and the party concerned would be at liberty to modify the order passed under Section 125 Cr.PC, by moving application under Section 127 Cr.PC, which provides for alteration or modification of the order in changed circumstances."

The High Court observed: "It is also settled principle of law that in revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has no power to reassess evidence and substitute its own finding in regard to positive finding regarding validity of the marriage or paternity of the child, unless there is patent perversity of finding of the fact or error of jurisdiction or that of law. But in case of negative finding of Court in regard to validity of marriage or paternity of child, the High Court is required even in revisional jurisdiction to re- evaluate the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by the Family Court are legally sustainable or not, because on account of negative finding, the child is bastardized and wife is branded as unchaste woman."

The Court referred to Supreme Court's decision in Pravati Rani Sahoo vs. Bishnupada Sahoo, (2002) 10 SCC 510. It reads: “5.... Section 125 CrPC is intended to curtail destitution and also to ameliorate orphancy. The High Courts should be slow to interfere with a positive finding in favour of marriage and paternity of a child. Hence in such instances this Court has pointed out that High Courts shall not interfere with such fact findings. But that principle cannot be imported in the present case where a child happened to be bastardised as a consequence of the order passed by the Magistrate and the claimant was in effect found to be a woman of unvirtuous morality. In such a situation the High Court should have entertained revision and re-evaluated the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by the Magistrate are legally sustainable or not. While maintaining the difference in the overall approach between an appeal and a revision, the jurisdiction of the court has to be exercised by the High Court in revision."

The High Court has recorded that "the petitioner has not proved that his wife-Soni Devi was living in adultery."

The petitioner's claimed that Gudiya Kumari is not his legitimate daughter and she being born out of illicit relationship of Soni Devi with someone else, is illegitimate child of other man and hence, he is not liable to pay any maintenance to her.

The High Court pointed out that as per Section 112 of Evidence Act that a child born during continuation of a valid marriage between his/her mother and any man, the child is held to be legitimate son/daughter of that man, unless it is shown by that man that he had no access to his wife at any time when the child could have been conceived. Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follows :-
“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.—The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

The High Court relied on Supreme Court's decision in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, as reported in (2024) 7 SCC 773, has observed that Section 112 embodies the rule of law that the birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage or within 280 days (i.e., within the period of gestation) after its dissolution shall be “conclusive proof” that the child is legitimate unless it is established by evidence that the husband and wife did not or could not have any access to each other at any time when the child could have been conceived. The object of this provision is to attach unimpeachable legitimacy to children born out of a valid marriage. When a child is born during the subsistence of lawful wedlock, it would mean that the parents had access to each other. Therefore, the Section speaks of “conclusive proof” of the legitimate birth of a child during the period of lawful wedlock.

The Supreme Court has further observed that “access” or “non-access” does not mean actual cohabitation but means the “existence” or “non-existence” of opportunities for sexual relationship. Section 112 refers to point of time of birth as the crucial aspect and not to the time of conception. The time of conception is relevant only to see whether the husband had or did not have access to the wife. Thus, birth during the continuance of marriage is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy unless “non-access” of the party who questions the paternity of the child at the time the child could have been begotten is proved by the said party.

In Goutam Kundu Vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. as reported in (1993) 3 SCC 418, the Supreme Court recalled the well- known maxim pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married women is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, and that every person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed, the law in general presuming against vice and immorality. The High Court relied on this decision.

 

Supreme Court grants bail in fake POCSO case

In Ankit vs. State of Rajasthan (2022),  Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 3931/2022, order dated 15.12.2022, Supreme Court's bench of Justices B.R Gavai and Vikram Nath granted regular bail to a man accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, for kidnapping and raping a minor girl aged 16. The bench accepted the plea of the accused and observed: “Taking into consideration the nature of allegations and further that the charge sheet is filed and the trial has commenced and the petitioner is behind the bars for almost two and a half years, we are inclined to allow the prayer for bail.”

In this case, the FIR against the accused alleged that the minor girl was kidnapped from her parental house at night by the accused and two others and rape was committed repeatedly on her. The accused was 20 years old at the time of the incident. It is alleged that he, along with three other co-accused persons was involved in committing rape upon the daughter of the complainant after abducting her from her home during midnight. The accused has been in incarceration for a period of over 2 years.

The accused’s lawyer argued that the allegations are completely frivolous and vague and it appears that the entire FIR has been written in an afterthought manner as if the father of the alleged victim was present there, in order to to falsely implicate the petitioner and his friend, who happens to be cousin of the alleged victim and there is property dispute between the family. Also, on account of previous enmity between the parties over land dispute, other cases are also pending before various courts.

The petitioner's case was that he and the victim were in a relationship and when the victim’s family came to know about it, they fabricated the entire case. He also argued that as per the medical reports of the alleged victim, nothing could be revealed to show the involvement of the accused in commission of the alleged offence as mentioned in the FIR, nor any injuries were found on the body of the alleged victim which could reveal use of force or vigor upon her.

It was submitted that the three other co-accused, besides the accused in question, were named in the FIR but none of them have been charge sheeted.

Notably, Rajasthan High Court had denied bail to the accused on three occasions. 

Pope Francis cited Martin Heidegger, the author of "Being and Time" in his his last encyclical

On October 24, 2024, Pope Francis released his last encyclical wherein he refers to Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), the author of Being and Time (1927). The books' 1927 edition was edited by the author of On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who established phenomenology as the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. 

The opening paragraph of Heidegger's book reads: 'For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed." 

It reads: "Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being' ? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."

Heidegger writes: "it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question of Being has been clarified and answered and taken as a clue-at least, if we are to have regard for the soil from which the basic ontological concepts developed, and if we are to see whether the categories have been demonstrated in a way that is appropriate and complete. We shall therefore carry the discussion of these presuppositions only to the point at which the necessity for restating the question about the meaning of Being become plain. There are three such presuppositions."
1 . First, it has been maintained that 'Being' is the 'most universal' concept....An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity.'But the 'universality' of 'Being' is not that of a class or genus. The term 'Being' does not define that realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated conceptually according to genus and species...The 'universality' of Being 'transcends' any universality of genus. In medieval ontology 'Being' is designated as a 'transcendens'. 

Drawing on Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger recalled how Hegel defined 'Being' as the 'indeterminate immediate' and makes this definition basic for all the further categorical explications of his 'logic'.  

2. Secondly, it is maintained that the concept of 'Being' is indefinable. This is deduced from its supreme universality, and rightly so...'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity;....nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term "entity" applied to it. "Being" cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that 'Being' no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of' defining "entities". The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face. 

3· Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, 1 some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.

In his 590-page long Being and Time (1962 edition), Heidegger refers to these three kinds of Being:1) availableness (‘readiness-to-hand’ or ‘handiness’); 2) occurrentness (‘presence-at-hand’ or ‘objective presence’; and 3) existence, which is the kind of Being that characterizes human existence or ‘Dasein’. These three are not meant as an exhaustive list of the kinds of Being. He suggests other kinds of Being which includes: life, numbers, and perhaps nature. The works of art also have a distinct kind of Being. 

The relevant part of the Pope's encyclical reads: "For Heidegger, as interpreted by one contemporary thinker, philosophy does not begin with a simple concept or certainty, but with a shock:'Thought must be provoked before it begins to work with concepts or while it works with them. Without deep emotion, thought cannot begin. The first mental image would thus be goose bumps. What first stirs one to think and question is deep emotion. Philosophy always takes place in a basic mood (Stimmung)'."

-Byung-Chul Han, Heideggers Herz. Zum Begriff der Stimmung bei Martin Heidegger, München, 1996, p. 39 cited in https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/20241024-enciclica-dilexit-nos.html#_ftn12

The German word Stimmung refers to something between mood and atmosphere. Being in a mood means a subjective feeling that separates oneself from others.

The encyclical concludes saying: "In a world where everything is bought and sold, people’s sense of their worth appears increasingly to depend on what they can accumulate with the power of money. We are constantly being pushed to keep buying, consuming and distracting ourselves, held captive to a demeaning system that prevents us from looking beyond our immediate and petty needs."

Fixation of eligibility criteria entirely within purview of executive, except when it is absolutely arbitrary, unreasonable: Patna High Court

In Janvani Prakashan Pvt Ltd & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through its Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy heard three writ petitions and consigned them. The judgement reads: "In the present set of circumstances where supply of books in the schools have already been made, we do not wish to decide such hypothetical issues as to whether, in such a situation, a private party would be entitled to have the hands of the clock turned back and in this case, by way of compensation, as for that a separate case of tort, misfeasance, negligence or breach of statutory duty will be required to be proved." The judgement was delivered on May 5, 2025.

The primary grievance of the petitioners was that the eligibility/ qualification criteria in the request for proposal for supply of books in Government schools, viz., of having average turnover of Rs. 4 crores for three financial years, was arbitrary, whimsical and has the potency of excluding good publishers with sound financial health to participate in such bid.

The Court observed: "We are afraid, this is not an area in which Courts could intrude. Fixation of the eligibility criteria is entirely within the purview of the executive and the Courts hardly have any role to play in this process, except when the action of the State is absolutely arbitrary and unreasonable." It referred to Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited vs. State of Karnataka and others (2012) 8 SCC 216. 

The judgement reads: "The very fact that for all these years, the same condition has been incorporated in such tenders which have attracted many bidders and supply of books have been made, is indicative of the fact that the conditions are not very onerous." The judgement was authored by Justice Kumar.

High Court in Judicial side cannot pass order against administrative side of High Court

In Re: Babul Chandra Mitra (1952), Patna High Court's 3-jidge bench of Justices David Ezra Reuben, Vaidynathier Ramaswami and Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha (?) examined the question as  to whether the Bench had jurisdiction in the present case to issue a writ or direction to the High Court in its performance of functions under the Indian Bar Councils Act or under the Letters Patent.

In his leading judgement, Justice Ramaswami observed:"It cannot surely be right to say that High Court can issue a writ or order directly to itself to quash an order made by itself. It is immaterial whether in making the order, the High Court acts in a judicial or administrative role. Under Article 226 of the High Court shall have power to 'issue' to any person or authority directions, orders or writs. It is apparent that a writ cannot be issued by the High Court to itself for the process involves rather the absurd position that it calls upon the Judges to show cause to themselves why they should not be directed to quash something they themselves have determined. It is also manifest on principle that a Judge is without jurisdiction to issue a writ or order to another Judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction and power to compel performance of duties. The very nomenclature of the writs --"mandamus, certiorari, prohibition" implies superior power -- the power of a superior authority to compel an official or an inferior tribunal to act in a certain manner. The same reason which prohibits an inferior Court from controlling the conduct of a superior tribunal applies in equally cogent manner to the effort of one Judge to compel the action of another Judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction and power. It is manifest in the present case that this Bench has no jurisdiction to issue any writ or direction or order to the High Court requiring it to enrol the petitioner as advocate or even to reconsider his application for enrolment." 

Justice Ramaswami relied on the decision in Rex vs. Justices of Central Criminal Court. (1925) 2 KB 43 and Skinner vs. Northallerton County Court Judge (1898) 2 Q.B. 680. In the latter decision it has been asserted that "A judge of the High Court in the exercise of his jurisdiction cannot be controlled by writs of prohibition or certiorari, but only by appeal....he is Judge of law and fact, and his judgments are subject to appeal only, and cannot be reviewed by certiorari." The Court had suggested to the counsel of the petitioner that the present application may be presented to the High Court on its administrative side under Rule 9 of the Bar Councils Rules for reconsideration of its order but the counsel insisted that the matter should be considered and dealt with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Justices Reuben and Sinha concurred with the judgement in their separate orders. The case was decided on March 25, 1952.

Babul Chandra Mitra, the petitioner had asked for a rule calling upon the High Court on the administrative side to show cause why a writ or direction under Article 228 of the Constitution should not be issued commanding that the petitioner should be enrolled as an Advocate. Article 228 provides for transfer of certain cases to High Court.

The High Court's judgement was challenged before Supreme Court's 3-jidge bench of Justices B.K. Mukherjea, N.H. Bhagwati and B. Jagannadhadas. The Court's decision in Babul Chandra Mitra v.s The Chief Justice and Others Judges of Patna High Court AIR 1954 SUPREME COURT 524 dismissed the application on March 11, 1954. It was authored by Justice Mukherjea. The grievance of the petitioner was that in spite of his compliance with all the requirements, that are necessary under the Bar Council Rules of the Patna High Court, for being enrolled as an Advocate, the High Court refused his application for enrolment and that without assigning any reason. The Court observed: "We think that a complete answer to this contention, is furnished by the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, which states expressly that the rules 'shall not limit or in any way affect the power of the High Court to refuse admission to any person at its discretion.' As the matter rests entirely upon the exercise of a discretion by the High Court, and as there is no statutory duty imposed upon that Court to enrol as Advocates such persons as may fulfil certain specified conditions, we do not think that the petitioner can legitimately ask us to compel the High Court to do or forbear from doing some thing, which it is legally bound to do or forbear from doing."

It was contended that the proviso to Section 9(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act was itself void as it conflicted with the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and that it does not come within the protection afforded by Clause (6) of that Article. 

The Court observed: "under Section 8 of the Indian Bar Councils Act, no person is entitled as of right to practise in any High Court, unless his name is entered in the roll of the Advocates of that Court maintained under the Act. Under Section 9 of the Act, the Bar Council can certainly frame rules with the sanction of the High Court to regulate the admission of persons as Advocates. The proviso mentioned above however makes it quite clear that there is an overriding power in the High Court to refuse admission to any person at its discretion in spite of these rules. The vesting of power even in an unfettered form in the High Court to exercise discretion in the matter of enrolling Advocates, who would be entitled to practise before it, does not, in our opinion, amount to an unreasonable restriction. Such discretion will have to be vested in some body, and no other or more appropriate authority could be thought of, except the High Court itself."

It was argued that even if the discretion could be vested in the High Court, it will be unreasonable on the part of that Court to exercise such discretion without giving an opportunity to the person, who is affected by its adverse order, to say what he had to say in answer to the allegations, which weighed with the High Court in refusing admission to him. 

The Court observed:"the rule itself does not say that the High Court is to exercise such discretion without giving any notice to the person, whose application is going to be refused. As a matter of fact, it is to be normally expected that the High Court would give notice to the person, whose application for enrolment is before it for consideration, and give him an opportunity to explain anything that might appear against him before it rejects his application. We cannot say, therefore, that the rule is 'per se' unreasonable and hence void.

The Court recorded that this petition was the fifth of a series of applications which commenced as early as the year 1938. The present application was filed on October 9, 1950, and it was circulated to the full court, reference being given to the minutes of all the earlier applications. It was in connection with these minutes that the remark was made by the Chief Justice that there was no reason to modify the previous order. This observation of the Chief Justice was approved of by the majority of the Judges, and in accordance with the majority decision, the application was rejected. 

The Court grappled with the question: "Whether after the lapse of so many years and the consequent change of circumstances the fact of the applicant's association with his brother, who was convicted of a criminal offence, could still be held to be a disqualification standing' in the way of his enrolment as an Advocate, is another matter and upon that, a difference of opinion is certainly possible." 

In its penultimate paragraph, the Court observed:"We do not say that even now it may not be open to the High Court to reconsider the matter if it so desires." It is not clear whether the petitioner approached the High Court again to seek reconsideration of his application.

The judgement concluded that "we are unable to say that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Indian Bar Councils Act is void, as being an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom to practise a profession, or to carry on an occupation, trade or calling, which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or that the discretion has been exercised in this case in violation of the canons of natural justice."

 

Supreme Court grants relief, Patna High Court's Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya had declined anticipatory bail

In Deepak Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025), order of Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan records that "a charge-sheet has been filed. Therefore, there is no occasion to arrest the appellant so long as he continues to appear before the Trial Court." Its order dated May 9, 2025 reads:"Accordingly, the interim order dated 7th April, 2025 is made absolute subject to condition that the appellant shall continue to appear before the Trial Court regularly and punctually and shall cooperate with the Trial Court for early disposal of the case." 

Earlier, on April 7, 2025, the Supreme Court had passed an order saying, "the petitioner shall not be arrested in connection with First Information Report (FIR) No.JAM P.S.Case No.30/2024 dated 9th January, 2024 registered at Jamui Police Station, District Jamui, Bihar subject to condition that the petitioner shall always cooperate for investigation."

Relying on 118-page long judgement dated May 17, 2019 of Patna High Court's full bench of Justices Hemant Kumar Srivastava, Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Ashutosh Kumar in the case of Ramvinay Yadav v. State of Bihar PLJR 2019 (2), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court had passed an order dated January 24, 2025 declining anticipatory bail to the petitioner in a case registered for the offence punishable under Section 30(A) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2022. 

Notably, in Ramvinay Yadav's case, Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi's order had directed the office "to place the records of this case before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the needful". It stated that the majority opinion on question No.2 of the reference is the opinion rendered by him and Justice Hemant Kumar Srivastava. The action by the Chief Justice is required to be ascertained.

Question No. 2 was: Whether the law laid down in the case of Ashok Sahani vs. The State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 26109 of 2017) and as further explained in the case of Barun Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 42985 of 2017) lays down the law correctly or whether the conflicting view in the case of Manish Kumar (supra) reflects the correct position of law?

Question No. (1) was: Whether the provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. continue to apply in spite of the bar created under Section 76 (2) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 and as to whether such an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. for anticipatory bail is maintainable?

Question No. (3) was: Whether the learned Single Judge in the case of Manish Kumar @ Lokesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar Cr. Misc. No. 21578 of 2017 vide an order dated 10.08.2017 while referring the matter for decision by a Larger Bench in deference to the judgment in the case of Ashok Sahani (supra) was justified in declaring it per incurium keeping in view the fact that the judgment was by a Co-ordinate Bench in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Kalika Kuer reported in (2003) 9 SCC 448 and the law laid down in the case of Rana Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. (FB) reported in 1996 Criminal Law Journal 665, and further keeping in view the opinion expressed in the case of Barun Kumar (supra) that such an issue of vires under the High Court Rules could have been decided by a Division Bench Only?

Question No. (4) was: Whether the Division Bench in the case of Manish Kumar (supra) vide order dated 06.11.2017 was justified in not resolving the dispute on the ground of the pendency of the two petitions before the Apex Court relating to the challenge raised to the vires of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016?

Question No. 5 was: Whether even if the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, the Division Bench in the case of Manish Kumar (supra) was denuded by any disability either on the ground of legality or propriety to not proceed to answer the reference made to it more particularly when there is no pronouncement by the Supreme Court in the issue sought to be resolved, and when the matter did require an immediate resolution keeping in view the conflicting views of this Court?

The Chief Justice had formulated these questions/issues for consideration as well as adjudication of Full Bench. The Full Bench was constituted to dispel the existing confusion relating to entertainment, consideration and disposal of anticipatory bail purported to be under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C relating to an offence punishable under Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, (amended, effective from 2ndOctober, 2016) by the Chief Justice purported to be in accordance with Chapter-II, Rule-11 of the Patna High Court Rules, being master of the roster. Before coming to terms of reference, which this Full Bench has to answer, it looks obligatory to flash the existing controversy in order to appreciate the legality, propriety of the reference. Since before existing Excise Act 1915 (Bihar & Orissa Act 11 of 1915) has been redrafted and introduced in the background of Article 47 duly couched by Article 19(1)(g) as well as Article 246 of the Constitution of India proclaiming complete prohibition having nomenclature Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act 2016 which has been subject to challenge under so many writs and vide order dated 30.09.2016 passed in connection with C.W.J.C. No.6675/2016 and other allied writs (Confederation of Indian Alcoholic Beverage Companies vs. State of Bihar and Ors. along with others) as reported in 2016 (4) PLJR 369, the same was declared ultra vires against which, State has preferred SLP before the Supreme Court bearing S.L.P. (C) No.29749/2016 and vide order dated 07.10.2016 notices have been issued during midst thereof, operation of the order impugned has been stayed. The aforesaid SLP is still pending. During the intervening period, again there happens to be an amendment in the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 which has been introduced since 2nd October, 2016 which has also been challenged under C.W.J.C. No.8640/2016 (Abay Kumar Mishra vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) C.W.J.C. No.73098/2016 (Dr. Rai Murari vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) whereupon, the State preferred transfer petition before the Apex Court and during consideration thereof, notices were issued and further directing to tag with the original SLP(c) Nos.27949-29763/2016 further proceeding was stayed. By such amendment 2016, apart from others Section 76 has been introduced curtaining the right of an accused to ask for pre-arrest bail, that means to say, Anticipatory Bail. 

Section 76 reads: "Offences to be cognizable and Non-Bailable- (1) All offences under this Act shall be
cognizable and non-bailable and provisions of code of criminal procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) shall apply. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything mentioned in sub-section (1) above, nothing in Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) and Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act.”

The Court recorded: "This sub-clause (2) is the root cause of controversy. As sub-section(2) begins with non-obstante clause, forbidding application of Section 438 Cr.P.C. (as under controversy) apart from others hence, became subject matter of consideration by different Benches (as per roaster). In Cr. Misc. No.26109/2017 (Ashoka Sahani vs. The State of Bihar), the Bench was of the view that on literal interpretation of Section 76(2) of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 (amended Act) there happens to be complete de-recognition of prayer for anticipatory bail either before High Court or before lower court whereupon observed that no petition for anticipatory bail would be entertainable. In the aforesaid background, the registry was directed not to accept any petition purported to be under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C, levelling defect over maintainability."

Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad led bench sets aside hasty judgment of acquittal passed bhy Additional District & Sessions Judge-V, Bhagalpur

In Dulari Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Sourendra Pandey observed: "The judicial conscience of this Court is totally disturbed on finding the kind of insensitiveness on the part of the investigating agency and the Public Prosecutor who were involved in this case. The trial court seems to have acted in haste in closing the prosecution evidence without taking care of it’s own order dated 08.11.2023 by which an explanation was called from the I.O." The judgement was delivered May 9, 2025.

It underlined that the Court "had a duty to find out the truth and for this purpose the Presiding Officer of the trial court was required to exhaust all such procedures which were available to him in law to secure the presence of the witnesses. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal in this case, having been passed in haste is liable to be set aside. 43. This Court, accordingly sets aside the impugned judgment. The trial court is directed to take steps to secure presence of the prosecution witnesses in accordance with law. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur shall ensure presence of the police officers who are charge-sheet witnesses of this case on the dates fixed in the matter."

The seven other respondents are respectively: Shravan Yadav, Haldhar Yadav, Kanki Devi, Lalan Yadav, Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi.

The Court concluded:"Respondent nos. 2 to 8 shall surrender in the trial court within four weeks from today. Since the respondent nos. 3 to 8 were on bail during trial, the learned trial court shall allow them to continue on bail. Respondent No. 2 was in custody at the time of delivery of impugned judgment, therefore, he would be taken into custody. It will be open to respondent no.2 to pray for bail in the trial court." 

The Court drew on Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, IN RE vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2021) 10 SCC 598, the Supreme Court has provided the Draft Criminal Rules on Practice, 2021. The Rules are to be made part of the rules governing the criminal trials. Directions in this regard have been issued to all the High Courts and the State Governments. It also referred to Draft Criminal Rules on Practice, 2021.

The prosecution case was based on the written application of the mother of the deceased (PW-2) addressed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bhagalpur in which she has stated that she had got her daughter married to Shravan Yadav, resident of Bhagalpur in the year 2012 and out of the wedlock, her daughter has got two children. After marriage, her daughter’s husband Shravan Yadav, father-in-law Haldhar Yadav, mother-in-law Kanki Devi, devar Lalan Yadav and Sunil Yadav, Sushil Yadav and Reeta Devi were continuously torturing and beating her daughter for Rupees One Lakh and cow due to which her daughter used to come to her alleged that six months ago, upon compromise with the husband of her daughter and her in-laws showing good faith, the informant allowed her daughter to go to her sasural and also gave two cows worth Rs.60,000/-, but again the in-laws started assaulting her daughter and harassed her. On 22.07.2018, the informant came to know that her daughter has been murdered by her husband and in- laws, they have concealed the dead body and ran away after locking their house. The informant alleged that she gave written complaint in Goradih Police Station but no action was being taken. This written application was sent to the Officer Incharge of Goradih Police Station to ensure proper action as per law. On being receipt of this written application, a case dated August 2, 2018 was registered for the offences under Sections 304B/201/34 IPC at Jagdishpur (Goradih) Police Station. 

After investigation, police submitted a charge-sheet dated November 28, 2018 against Sushil Yadav (respondent no. 7) keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate took cognizance for the offence under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated December 13, 2018. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on March 26, 2019 in which Yadav to which he denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly charges under Sections 304B/34, 302/34, 201/34 and 120B IPC was framed vide order dated April 30, 2019. Thereafter, police submitted supplementary chargesheet dated May 15, 2019 against Reeta Devi (Respondent no. 8) keeping investigation pending against other accused persons. After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate finding prima-facie material against her for the offences under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated 21.05.2019 kept the case for supply of police paper. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on June 19, 2019 in which charges were explained to accused Reeta Devi to which she denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges under Sections 304B/120B/201/34 IPC was framed by order dated February 20, 2020. 

Thereafter, police submitted another supplementary chargesheet dated December 5, 2019 against Shravan Yadav (Respondent No. 2), Lalan Yadav (Respondent No. 5), Sunil Yadav (Respondent No. 6), Haldhar Yadav (Respondent No. 3), Kanki Devi (Respondent No. 4). After receiving this chargesheet, Magistrate finding prima-facie material against these accused persons for the offences under Sections 304(B)/201/120(B)/34 IPC vide order dated December 23, 2019 kept the case for supply of police paper. After commitment, Session Trial was registered on March 15, 2021 in which charges were explained to accused persons to which they denied and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, charges have been framed against Shravan Yadav, Haldhar Yadav, Lalan Yadav, Kanki Devi and Sunil Yadav vide order dated December 1, 2021 under Sections 304(B)/34, 201 and 120(B) IPC. Prio to September 21, 2022, PW-1 and PW-2 of Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were already examined and discharged. In Session Trial No. 1191 of 2019, Ena Devi (PW-1) had been examined prior to passing of the order of amalgamation. Further, we find from the ordersheet of Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 that in the said trial Ena Devi has been examined on May 7, 2022, she has been described as PW-3 but there is no PW-1 and PW-2.

By order dated September 21, 2022, Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 and Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were amalgamated with Session Trial No. 119 of 2019. Prior to September 21, 2022, PW-1 and PW-2 of Sessions Trial No. 223 of 2021 were already examined and discharged. In Sessions Trail No. 119 of 2019, Ena Devi (PW-1) had been examined prior to passing of the order of amalgamation. Further, we find from the ordersheet of Sessions Trial No. 339 of 2019 that in the said trial Ena Devi has been examined on May 7, 2022, she has been described as PW-3 but there is no PW-1 and PW-2.

After analysing the evidences available on the record, trial court found that in the written application, the informant alleged that her daughter was harassed by her in-laws for dowry due to which her daughter many times came to naiher but there is no evidence of any witness to corroborate this allegation. The trial court found that there is no application regarding beating for dowry on record reported to any authority. The trial court further found from the evidence of the defence witnesses that accused Reeta Devi was married and was living in her sasural with her husband and all the brothers of the husband of the deceased were also living separately. The trial court observed that it seems that the informant has tried to drag the entire family of in-laws of her daughter in the dowry case due to said unfortunate incident. The trial court found that the body of the deceased was recovered from river after seven days.The trial court found that PW-2 deposed that there was black mark on neck of her daughter but this fact has not been supported by her husband (PW-3). Learned trial court further found that Post mortem report shows that there was no external injury and it indicates the presence of Celphos in the visceral fluid of the deceased but it does not show that the said Celphos was forcefully administered to the deceased. 

The trial court observed that even if for the argument sake, it is presumed that Celphos was forcefully administered to the deceased and the body was thrown in the river then also there is not a single eye witness to depose from the prosecution side that they have seen the accused persons throwing the dead body in the river. The trial court after considering all the materials found that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubts that the deceased was harassed soon before her death for demand of dowry and due to non-fullfilment of said demand, the deceased was killed by the accused. The trial court found that the prosecution is unable to prove the charges under Sections 304B/34, 302/34, 201/34 and 120B IPC, hence, acquitted the accused persons-respondent nos. 2 to 8. 

The appellant's counsel submitted that the trial court has erroneously closed the evidence without examining the four charge-sheet witnesses including the Investigating Officer of this case and the Officer-in-Charge of Sanhaula Police Station. He submitted that there were ample materials before the trial court to held the respondent nos. 2 to 8 guilty but has erroneously acquitted them from the charges levelled against them without examining all the chargesheet witnesses.

The State defended the impugned judgment but agreed that the trial court closed the evidence without examining the four chargesheet witnesses. 

The Court referred to the discussion on Section 311 CrPC in the case of V.N. Patil vs. K. Niranjan Kumar reported in (2021) 3 SCC 661.The judgment reads: “14. The object underlying Section 311 CrPC is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the discretionary power conferred under Section 311 CrPC has to be exercised judiciously, as it is always said “wider the power, greater is the necessity of caution while exercise of judicious discretion”. 15. The principles related to the exercise of the power under Section 311 CrPC have been well settled by this Court in Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P.2: (SCC p. 141, para 17). “17. Though Section 311 confers vast discretion upon the court and is expressed in the widest possible terms, the discretionary power under the said section can be invoked only for the ends of justice. Discretionary power should be exercised consistently with the provisions of the Code and the principles of criminal law. The discretionary power conferred under Section 311 has to be exercised judicially for reasons stated by the court and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Before directing the learned Special Judge to examine Smt Ruchi Saxena as a court witness, the High Court did not examine the reasons assigned by the learned Special Judge as to why it was not necessary to examine her as a court witness and has given the impugned direction without assigning any reason.”

The case of V.N. Patil was under Sections 304B and 302 IPC read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In the said case Public Prosecutor had filed an application under Section 173(5) read with Section 311 CrPC which was allowed by the learned trial court. The High Court upset the order of the trial court summoning the witnesses but the Supreme Court upheld the order of the trial court.

In its judgement, the High Court observed that in the Dulari Devi case, "the Public Prosecutor who conducted the case at Bhagalpur was not acting with due diligence and care. The records speak for themselves. No summon was issued to the other prosecution witnesses, no explanation came from the two police personnel who were charge-sheet witnesses, even Senior Superintendent of Police did not act on receipt of the letter from the court. In fact the FIR itself was registered after the informant made a complaint to the Dy.SP." The judgement was authored by Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad.

Notably, Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad is one of the five members of the High Court's Committee to consider Draft Criminal Court Rules. The other members are: Justices Bibek Chaudhuri, Rajiv Roy, Sunil Dutta Mishra and Shashi Bhushan Prasad Singh. It is one ofthe 43 committees of the High Court. 
 

 

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refuses to quash FIR because forgery is a serious offence with criminal liability, decided not to evaluate merit of allegations at FIR stage

In Sarita Baja & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court concluded:"The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest." The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2025. The two other petitioners are: Ajay Kumar Bajaj and Awi Bajaj. The other four respondents are: Additional Chief Secretary, the Home Department, Government of Bihar, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Kotwali, Patna and Sushil Kumar Bajaj.

The Court refused to quash the FIR lodged in Kotwali, Patna dated August 18, 2023 because "Forgery (under Section 463 IPC) and using forged documents (under Section 471 IPC) are considered serious offences with substantial criminal liability. This Court recognize that quashing an FIR for such serious offenses like forgery could undermine the integrity of the legal system and prevent the discovery of the truth. At the stage of the FIR, the Court will not evaluate the merit of the allegations. This Court believes that the police are required to investigate the facts and verify the authenticity of the documents before a final decision is made." 

The Court observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

The petitioner had invoked Constitutional writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 alfor the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to alleging that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He further alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are full brothers. On February 17, 2021, both parties had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, alongwith other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. Additionally, the parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicate that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant has acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. Additionally, it has been confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. On 27.02.2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. vide a notice dated 27.02.2021 and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. On the same date, i.e., on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated 30.08.2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so.

On 27.02.2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently  issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on 28.02.2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company.

Notably, Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Similarly, another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a  resolution, dated 31.08.2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On 03.04.2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting the informant has already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under C.P. No. 250 KB/2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated 27.02.2021 are forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs.

It is important to note that certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition have not been complied with or honoured by the  informant.

In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which was registered as Title Suit No. 02 of 2023.

The informant alleges that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant further claims that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. It is important to note that under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. Additionally, an application has been filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under CP (IB) No. 327/KB/2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400/-.

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On 08.11.2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated 04.12.2023.

The Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully  transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties alsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.

In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid. However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. 

Later on, the Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the present Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as 02.08.2021. In the application under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated 20.09.2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. 

It finding reads: “24. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was Director from 12.05.2014 Buildcon Private Limited' i.e.. the Corporate Debtor. Letter dated 20.09.2010, which is sheet anchor of the Financial Creditor to contend that there was interest component of 12% P.A. clearly becomes unauthorised and unreliable. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was not Director on 20.09.2010 of the Corporate Debtor and could not have written to the Financial Creditor, containing the terms and conditions of loan whereas no loan was ever extended by Financial Creditor to the Corporate Debtor of the terms and conditions as contained in the Letter dated 20.09.2010. Letter dated 20.09.2010 was impeached and termed as fabricated Letter.” 

It also found: "30. The sequence of the event and transaction between the Parties clearly proves that transfer of the amount by Financial Creditor to the Appellant were done by one Family Company to another Family Company and was not by way of loan nor any disbursal for any time value of money has been proved from any material on the record.” 

Taking note of these findings, the High Court observed that it "is convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."

Supreme Court sets aside Justice Rajiv Roy's order, restores Criminal Miscellaneous No.10400 of 2017 to file of High Court

In Azimun Khatun (Dead) Through LRS vs The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), in its order dated April 30, 2025, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan observed:"This is a very peculiar case. There were two first information reports (FIRs) registered in connection with the same incident. The incident is of 30th March, 2016. The original appellant in the special leave petition was the mother of the deceased. At her instance, FIR No.181 of 2016 was registered on 10th May, 2016 in which the allegation was that the wife of the deceased has killed the deceased. On 1st April, 2016, FIR No.122 of 2016 was registered at the instance of the wife of the deceased wherein she named brother of the deceased and nine others as accused.

Supreme Court's order reads" "After hearing the counsel appearing for the parties, we find that in the peculiar facts of the case, the petition for quashing filed by the private respondents ought to have been heard along with Criminal Appeal (D.B.) Appeal No.246 of 2022. However, the High Court did not exercise that option. Therefore, only course open for us is to set aside the impugned judgment and remit the petition criminal appeal. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order is set aside. Criminal Miscellaneous No.10400 of 2017 is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The restored application shall be heard along with Criminal Appeal (DB) No.246 of 2022. The interim relief earlier granted in the restored petition by the High Court will continue to operate till further orders. The appeal is partly allowed on above terms."

Unlike the Supreme Court, the order Justice Rajiv Roy of the High Court reads: "Having gone through the facts of the case, the two FIRs lodged in the present case as also the submissions put forward by the respective parties and the cases cited by them, this Court is in complete agreement with the submissions put forward by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that once the two FIRs were lodged, in one case (in which the petitioner was the informant), the police investigated the case, charge-sheet submitted, cognizance taken, charges framed, trial initiated which culminated into the conviction of accused-Azmat; in another case, the police submitted final form, the learned C.J.M. Sitamarhi differed, the petitioner knocked the door of this Court and interim protection was granted to her, now that conviction order has already been passed, as stated above, the further proceeding in the present case (Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016) lodged by the informant-Azimun Khatun will be an abuse of the process of law. So far as the cases cited by the learned counsel for the informant is concerned, it has been rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that neither the two cases were clubbed together nor it is a case that the two cases were pending before the same learned Judge in which the learned Court failed to take up the matter one after another as also the fact that the trial in which Azmat was accused already stands concluded. In that backdrop, having dealt with the case on earlier occasion also (22.2.2023), this Court is convinced that the further proceeding in Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016, G.R. No. 1369/2016, Tr. No. 1814/2017 cannot continue. Accordingly, the present petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is allowed and the order dated 2.2.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitamarhi in Runni Saidpur P.S. Case No. 181 of 2016, G.R. No. 1369/2016, Tr. No. 1814/2017 stands quashed. The case accordingly stands disposed of." This order which has now been set aside was passed March 17, 2023.

In Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 246 of 2022, the High Court's Division Bench of Justices A.M. Badar and Harish Kumar passed the order saying, "The substantive sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant is suspended and he is directed to be released on bail on executing P.R. bond of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) and on furnishing sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge IX, Sitamarhi, in connection with Sessions Trial No. 404/2016 arising out of Runnisaidpur P.S. Case No. 122 of 2016, till the disposal of the instant appeal. During pendency of the appeal, the recovery of fine is stayed."  The order authored by Justice Badar was passed on July 3, 2023. 

The charge-sheet was filed in FIR No.122 of 2016 on 28th July, 2016. In FIR No.181 of 2016, final report was filed on 10th July, 2016 seeking closure. On the basis of the protest petition, an order dated 2nd February, 2017 was passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. 

In the meanwhile, trial proceeded and the persons named in FIR No.122 of 2016 were convicted. An appeal against conviction preferred by them is pending before the Patna High Court as stated by counsel appearing for the appellants (legal representatives of the mother of the deceased). In the meanwhile, the order taking cognizance passed by the Magistrate on 2nd February, 2017 was challenged by the respondent nos.2 to 13. By the impugned order, the High Court quashed the order of Magistrate dated 2nd February, 2017 taking cognizance.

It added: "We make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the merits of the quashing petition filed by the private respondents as well as pending criminal appeal. All issues are left open to be decided by the High Court." The 5-page long order was passed on April 30, 2025.

Civil Appeal from Begusarai against Darbhanga Industrial Area Development Authority pending in Supreme Court since February 2016

In Chandra Bhushan Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. Letters Patent Appeal No.1074 of 2015, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale called the appeal for hearing, its order recorded that "None is present for the appellant when the matter is called out." It was filed in the Supreme Court on February 5, 2016.

In M/s New Chaudhary Bakery through its Proprietor Ramnandan Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 14685 of 2014, Patna High Court's Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice I. A. Ansari and Justice Chakradhari Sharan Singh had observed:"We do not find any illegality committed by the respondents in cancelling the allotment of land to the appellant. In fact, no illegality in making the order of cancellation of the allotment has been pointed out." The also observed:"In the face of the facts, which have surfaced from the pleadings, and the materials on record, we do not find that the appellant has been able to make out any case, which warrant interference, in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the cancellation of the allotment of the land, in question." 

The other five respondents were: Principal Secretary, Department of Industries, Government of Bihar, Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority, Patna through its Managing Director, Darbhanga Industrial Area Development Authority through its Managing Director, Executive Director, Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority, Regional Office, Darbhanga and Managing Director, Darbhanga Industrial Area Development Authority, Darbhanga.

The appellant’s application seeking allotment of land in the Industrial Estate by Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority (BIADA), Regional Office, Darbhanga, was allotted a piece of land in the industrial area by letter, dated 23.5.1981, issued by the BIADA. In terms of the allotment so made, the appellant received, on a lease, the land, in question, for a period of 99 years for manufacturing polythene bags, on the terms and conditions, which were to be incorporated in the deed of lease to be executed by the parties concerned. Following the agreement, a lease deed was executed by the parties concerned. By letter, dated 30.07.1984, issued by the Managing Director of the BIADA, the appellant was allowed to diversify and start an industry for producing bread and biscuit. The appellant, according to the respondents, did not start the manufacturing process of bread and biscuit. It was, however, claimed before the High Court, on behalf of the appellant, that the appellant had started manufacturing process of bread, but he had to stop the production in the year 2002, because of illness of his wife. There was nothing in the materials on record to show that the appellant had really started manufacturing bread and/or biscuit either within the allotted period from 30.07.1984 to 23.11.1984 or at any point of time thereafter. The appellant was, then, served with a notice, dated 26.06.2007, to show cause as to why his allotment shall not be cancelled. The appellant chose not to respond to the notice to show cause, which had been served upon him. It was thereafter by order, dated 08.08.2007, that the allotment of the land, in question, to the appellant was cancelled by the respondent-authority concerned.

The appellant, preferred an appeal; but in the appeal too, he failed to produce any material to show that he had carried out any manufacturing process on the land allotted to him. By order, dated 12.12.2013, the appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the competent authority. It was thereafter that the appellant filed a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which gave rise to CWJC No.14685 of 2014. By order, dated 28.08.2014, as the Single Judge of this Court has dismissed the writ petition, the writ petitioner-appellant has preferred this appeal. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant, that the State may be directed to allow the appellant a specified period of time so as to enable the appellant to start an industry on the allotted land.

The counsel, appearing for the appellant, referred to the order, dated 18.03.2015, passed, in LPA No.353 of 2008 (Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority & Ors. Vs. Deepak Paints Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.) and analogous appeals, by a Division Bench of this Court to contend that the appellant needs to be given one more chance to utilize the land, allotted to him for establishing and running an industry. 

The High Court's judgement reads: "We notice that the decision, which has been relied upon by the appellant, is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present appeal inasmuch as the decision, in LPA No.353 of 2008, was given in the context of facts, which were different from the ones at hand inasmuch as the writ petitioners, in LPA No.353 of 2008, had replied to the notices to show cause, which had been issued to them proposing to cancel their allotment, whereas the appellant herein chose not to respond to the notice to show cause, which had been served on him. This apart, there is nothing in the materials on record to show as to what manufacturing process the appellant had carried out in the land, in question. At any rate, even according to the statement made on behalf of the appellant, the appellant did not carry out any industrial activity over the said plot of land since after the year 2002. In the circumstances indicated above, we do not find that the appellant can derive any strength from the order passed by the High Court, on 18.03.2015, in LPA No.353 of 2008 and analogous appeals. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed."