Supreme Court sets aside "utterly misconceived" order by Patna High Court, restores criminal application Dharmendra Kumar from Shiv Nagar, Karpi, Arwal

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) , Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva passed a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2026, wherein, it restored Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025 "to the file of the High Court for consideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law." It observed:" 4. The learned Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the appellant had sought cancellation of the anticipatory bail and had cited grounds therefor. It was not a case of the grant of bail itself being subjected to challenge, by way of a petition for cancellation. 5. This aspect of the matter required to be examined independently to ascertain whether any of the alleged grounds cited by the appellant were established and warranted cancellation of the bail earlier granted. Such an exercise did not entail the learned Judge sitting in appeal over the grant of anticipatory bail by a coordinate Bench. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, utterly misconceived and is liable to be set aside. 6. As all the parties are before this Court, there is no reason as to why this appeal should be kept pending. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, setting aside the order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the High Court." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had rejected this application by his order dated July 29, 2026 as he did not find "sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order" dated December 20, 024 passed by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court. Justice Kumar had passed his 2-page long order dated July 29, 2026 in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025. The application before the High Court was filed for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the Mukesh Kumar, the opposite party nos.2 and Shivam Kuma, opposite no. 3 by Justice Sharan of a Co-ordinate Bench.

Justice Kumar perused the F.I.R. He recorded: "It appears that the petitioner, who is the informant of the case, had appeared before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and opposed the prayer of the opposite party nos.2 and 3 for grant of bail and after considering the submissions of the parties, the Co-ordinate Bench had granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party nos.2 and 3." He observed:"If the petitioner was/is aggrieved by the order of the Co-ordinate Bench, he could have moved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the Co-ordinate Bench. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting anticipatory bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. Therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order."

Dharmendra Kumar, the appellant had submitted that he had approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 with sufficient grounds for such cancellation. 

Supreme Court recorded: "3. By the impugned order dated 29.07.2026, a learned Judge of the High Court opined that he could not sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion by the coordinate Bench in granting anticipatory bail to respondent Nos. 2 and 3." 

Supreme Court detects error in judgement of 2015 authored by Justice Anjana Prakash, acquits accused in murder of Braj Bhushan Singh from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran in 2001

In Dhrub Singh Etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran delivered a 14-page long judgement dated September 1, 2016, wherein, it detected error in the 20-page long judgement dated December 9, 2015 by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra. It concluded:"The High Court egregiously erred in looking at a complaint against the I.O not produced in the trial, to find the evidence led to be clinching insofar as the culpability of the accused. A faulty  investigation cannot inure to the benefit of the accused, but when there is no reliable evidence, merely because the I.O was recalcitrant or a complaint of collusion was raised against him, the Court cannot presume the guilt of the accused. There is complete lack of evidence in the present case and the testimonies, as we observed, do not inspire confidence. 12. We, hence, acquit the accused and direct that they be released forthwith if any of the appellants are in custody, if not required in any other case, and if they were released on bail, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled. 13.The Appeals stand allowed.” The Supreme Court's judgement was authored by Justice Chandran. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

Dhrub Singh, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/ by judgment dated November 29, 2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002. 15. Justice Prakash had concluded: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present. 16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed."

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. At that very moment Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on 29.8.2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur a P.S. case had been instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. 

Supreme Court's judgement reads:“11. We are unable to find the prosecution having established the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As we noticed, the eye-witness testimony does not inspire confidence and there are no recoveries made or seizures effected as would have been done in a proper investigation. The case is not of a faulty investigation but of no investigation having been carried out. Even the inquest was carried out before the FIS was recorded; making it pre-meditated." 

Supreme Court's judgement recorded that it was a case of murder in broad day light presumably on an election day which had led to the conviction of the six accused, five of whom approached the Supreme Court in these appeals. The 1st accused served his term and was released on remission. The prosecution case was that the deceased along with four others, a son, an employee, a nephew and a villager was proceeding to his fields, when the accused ambushed the party, started indiscriminate firing with exhortation made to kill all and the deceased was shot in the back. The victim succumbed to the gun shot injury and the persons who accompanied him started running away when a patrol car came with a  Magistrate, presumably roaming around on the election day, when the accused too ran away. The victim was taken to the hospital where he was declared dead. The prosecution went to trial with nine witnesses.

Justice Chandran observed: "The I.Os testimony goes contrary to what the Government Advocate argued, of the victims having gone on a ridge. PW9 specifically speaks of the place of occurrence being a lane which led from Madanpur Distributary Canal towards Arara on the east; a clear pathway made for pedestrians. It is also stated by the I.O that on both sides of the pathway there were fields, which were ploughed recently. Though a sketch of the place of occurrence was prepared, the blood stained earth seized from the place was not sent for testing in a laboratory. He spoke of a tension in the area due to the kidnapping of a girl and also spoke of naxalite movement in the area. The I.O also did not seize the clothes of the deceased or the clothes worn by the witnesses, who, allegedly carried the body to the hospital, in the petrol car. The High Court noticed that though the I.Os attention was drawn to the previous
statement of the witnesses, the cross examination was long, winding and utterly undecipherable. 9. The High Court having narrated the prosecution case and the testimonies of the witnesses, looked into the records of the case and found a complaint against the I.O accusing him of having made a collusive investigation. We cannot but notice that no such complaint was elicited from any of the eyewitnesses and in any event this does not explain the shoddy investigation carried out by the I.O. However, the High Court relying on the complaint made against the I.O found that this is the reason for not recording the statements of the independent witnesses, the blood stained earth being not sent for chemical examination and the failure to seize the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the witnesses. Observing that the investigation was collusive, reliance was placed on the testimony of the witnesses, terming it as ‘consistent evidence’ to accept their version, to convict the accused. The expert evidence on the possibility of the deceased being shot in a sitting position was brushed aside with the conjecture that a shooting hand would shake and when the target is moving, the shape of the injuries are not relevant. The High Court peremptorily came to the finding that the accused armed with a variety of weapons, ambushed the victim and fired indiscriminately causing the death of one person thus proving the common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased, based only on the eye-witness testimony. 10. We cannot but observe that the motive projected is sticky to say the least. The expert medical opinion was against the eye- witness testimony on how the incident occurred. There was no recovery of weapons nor were any cartridges seized from the scene of occurrence; especially when the eye-witnesses spoke of indiscriminate shooting. The eyewitnesses also spoke of five of them walking in a straight line with the deceased leading from the front. The clear case was that the accused came from the back and shot at the deceased on the back. Very unlikely, when the party led by the deceased was walking in a straight line and the ambush as also the firing came from the back. The expert evidence that there was an indication from the nature of the wound, that victim was sitting and that the firing was made from close quarters persuades us to disbelieve the eye-witness testimony. The eyewitnesses were all close to the deceased and admittedly there was a tension in the locality between the group led by the father of A1 in the adjacent village and that led by the deceased; which could have prompted the eyewitnesses to frame the accused. The motive projected of the sister of A3 having been kidnapped by a villager of the deceased cannot be believed since there is no connection established between the boy, who is said to have kidnapped the girl and the deceased. The eyewitnesses were all related witnesses and their presence could have been established by their clothes, which would have been blood-stained if they carried the victim in the patrol car to the hospital. Their presence is doubtful and they had a running dispute with the accused, coupled with the non-examination of independent witnesses puts the prosecution case under a cloud and makes it highly doubtful."

 

Supreme Court to pronounce its verdict on the judgment passed by Justice Anjana Prakash led Division Bench in a murder case from Arara, Adapur, East Champaran

A criminal appeal, Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar was filed in the Supreme Court on April 16, 2016 was filed against the judgment authored by Justice Anjana Prakash of Patna High Court as part of a Division Bench. It was registered on August 14, 2017. Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan heard the matter on January 23, 2025 and passed a 3-page long order. The arguments were concluded on August 21, 2026 and the order was reserved. The counsels appearing for the parties to file their respective written submissions by August 22, 2026.

In this case three appellants have prayed for bail pending the final disposal of their respective criminal appeals which are pending for final hearing before the Court. They were convicted for the offence of murder and their appeals by before the High Court also failed. Supreme Court took notice of the fact that in all eight accused were put to trial. One of the co-accused died during the pendency of the trial. The main accused who is said to have fired had already undergone the sentence of life imprisonment and was released. Out of six convicts, three were ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide orders dated August 10, 2022, December 5, 2022 and July 17, 2023 respectively. The order reads: "7. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are inclined to consider the plea of the three appellants before us for bail. 8. They have also undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far. Out of the three appellants, two of the appellants have undergone almost 9 years of sentence so far, whereas the third appellant has undergone 8 years & 5 months of sentence. 9. All the applications for bail stand allowed. 10. The appellants(convicts) are ordered to be released on bail subject to the same terms and conditions as imposed in the orders passed by this Court at the time of releasing the other co-accused on bail."

In Dhrub Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Anjana Prakash and Rajendra Kumar Mishra delivered a 20-page long judgment dated December 9, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"16. As for alternative argument of considering the case of non-assailants, even while we are inclined to disbelieve the prosecution case in so far as the Appellant Chunnu Singh having ordered Appellant Pappu Singh to fire is concerned, but fact remains that all the accused variously armed had come together and fired which makes out a case of accused having common intention/object to commit murder of the deceased. In such circumstances, we find no merit in such submission. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same is dismissed." The judgement was authored by Justice Prakash. 

The appellant Pappu Singh was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C., 2 years R.I. under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act and also fine of Rs.3000. 

The appellant Dhrub Singh and Appellant Dharmender Singh @ Tarzan Singh @ Tarzan and appellant Dharmendra Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 I.P.C., 2 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 I.P.C. and 3 years rigorous imprisonmentunder Section 27 of the Arms Act with a fine of Rs.3000/. The appellant Chunnu Singh @ Subhash Chandra Singh @ Subhash Chander Singh and appellants Brajesh Singh and Subhash Singh were convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 I.P.C., 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307/149 I.P.C. and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147 I.P.C. by judgment dated 29.11.2010 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in a Sessions Trial of 2002.

The case of the prosecution according to the Informant Kundan Kumar (P.W.7), son of the deceased, was that on April 19, 2001 at about 2.30 p.m. he left home along with the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh, their Sepoy Chandeshwar Singh, co-villager Bhagirath Thakur and cousin Nilesh Kumar Sharma for their agricultural farm. When they were in the middle of Arara village and Laxmipur School at about 03.30 p.m. suddenly 7-8 persons came, who were identified as Chunnu Singh, Pappu Singh, out of which Chunnu Singh told Pappu Singh to fire at the deceased Braj Bhushan Singh and he did so on taking position from the back, on account of which his father fell down. Just then Appellant Dhrub Singh fired at him but he was somehow saved. They all started running but Brajesh Singh ordered that everyone should be killed else they would go to the police, at which Appellants Dharmendra singh @ Tarzan and Dharmendra Singh started firing but their shots did not hit them. They noticed a patrolling party approaching, at which the accused started fleeing, saying that the deceased had been killed which needed to be reported to Madan Singh that the work had been accomplished. They then took the deceased to Dunkan Hospital, Raxaul but the doctor declared him dead. The dead body of his father was brought home. The motive for the occurrence was that the daughter of Major Harendra Singh had been kidnapped on August 29, 2000 by his co-villager Ramesh Singh. The past Mukhiya Madan Mohan Singh, Dharmendra Singh son of Madan Mohan Singh, Chunnu Singh, Dharmendra Singh @ Tarzan, Subhash Singh, Sanjeet Singh, Manoj Singh, Arvind Singh, Brajesh Singh had come to his village and proposed to his father that he was a reputed person and he should try to use his influence for recovering the girl. His father had made enquiry but it was found that Ramesh Singh had fled away with the girl, on account of which the girl was not recovered. Madan Mohan Singh had felt insulted on account of the inability of the Appellant and had started instigating others that the deceased had played with the reputation of their villagers. On September 12, 2000 Adapur P.S. case was instituted in regard to the case aforesaid. His brother Sanju Dubey (P.W.5) was also sought to be implicated in the case but final report was submitted in his regard. Then in another case, namely, Adapur P.S. case of 2000, once again his name was given but final report was submitted. His cousin brother Satyendra Dubey was a candidate for Mukhiya election and there was every chance of his winning which had caused apprehension in the mind of Madan Mohan Singh, the previous Mukhiya, Arera, who had got the deceased killed. This information was given in the presence of Nilesh Kumar (P.W.2) and Hridesh Dubey (P.W.3) at 06.45 p.m. at home. 

The counsel for the appellants submitted that the manner of occurrence has not been proved by the prosecution on account of various factors, one of which is that important witnesses, such as, patrolling party and the Doctor at Dunkan Hospital have not been examined. P.W.2 and P.W.7 have stated that they did not see anyone while they were walking behind each other during or after the occurrence and hence their depiction of the manner of occurrence is not proved. Further independent witnesses, even by way of hearsay, have not been examined and only interested witnesses, who are somehow related with the deceased, have been produced by the prosecution. The Investigating Officer has committed various lapses including not establishing the place of occurrence and the inquest report and the map prepared by him are contrary to each other. He also did not find any holes in the clothes which the deceased was wearing nor blood on him. He did not produce the blood stained earth nor did he seize the clothes on the person of the deceased and the witnesses, who are said to have carried the deceased to the patrolling party, nor did he send the same. In fact, neither the Informant nor P.W.1 was present at the place of occurrence as is evident from the evidence of P.W.6. Even though it is a case of direct evidence, since the prosecution has brought forth motive for the occurrence they were duty bound to conclusively prove the same. The prosecution case suffers on this count as well. The Doctor’s evidence also further disproves the prosecution case inasmuch as the injuries found on the deceased appear to have been caused while a person would be in a supine position and the time of occurrence in his opinion being about 36 hours before the examination does not match with the prosecution case. The further submission is that the deceased’s own agnates had a grudge with the deceased and there is every possibility of him having been killed by them. In the alternative, the argument is also that there is specific allegation of firing against Appellant Pappu Singh on the orders of Chunnu Singh but no overt act is alleged with regard to the rest of the accused persons and hence they deserve to be acquitted. 

In her judgement, Justice Prakash had observed: "15. On looking into the records of the case, we find that soon after the occurrence a protest petition had been filed against the Investigating Officer that he was making a collusive investigation which explains as to why he did not record the statements of independent witnesses nor send the blood stained earth for chemical examination, nor seize the blood stained clothes on the person of the deceased or the witnesses. In such circumstances, the argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the manner of occurrence or the presence of the witnesses for the aforesaid reason has to be rejected. As for the manner of occurrence, we find that the consistent evidence is that all the witnesses were walking behind each other and suddenly the accused persons sprang upon them and shot at the deceased from the back, on account of which he fell down on his face. From their evidence the fact that they did not hear any accused before the firing or even during the firing is well explained since from the manner narrated it appears that the occurrence had not taken place within minutes. In such circumstances, when Pappu Singh was not being seen before firing at the deceased from the back and the rest firing at the witnesses to scatter them off or even to kill them is well plausible. Also the fact that scratches were found on the face of the deceased further corroborates the prosecution case that after the firing from the back the deceased had fallen on his face. As for the injuries being oval or circular has no meaning in the present case since it is most natural that a person’s hand would shake and not be completely stable while firing is made within a split of second especially when the target is moving. The doctor no doubt stated in his cross examination that when he said that the occurrence had taken place within 36 hours he had meant that it could be within 24 to 36 hours, is not acceptable by the Court. Once he has stated in his examination-in-chief that it was within 36 hours it certainly means that it was within 36 hours and such minute timing of death so precisely could not be given by him especially when he has mentioned that rigor mortis was present."

Supreme Court refuses to interfere with Patna High Court's verdict after 36 years, despite finding it "strange" that Justice V N Sinha convicted Ajab Rai under Section 307 in breach of Explanation 2 to Section 299, although Ramadhar Rai died because of injury

In Rasik Lal Rai vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 6-page long order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...in our view, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302  IPC would not be proper. Even if we assume that the head injury was caused by the accused, there was no underlying fracture and, therefore, in absence of intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, an offence not graver than 304 Part II would be made out. However, what is strange is that if the High Court was of the view that there was no intention to cause death or of causing such bodily injury which in ordinary course is sufficient to cause death, once the person died there was no occasion to convict him under Section 307 IPC."

Supreme Court's order reads: "24. In our view, the accused besides other offences ought to have been convicted for offences punishable under Section 324 IPC, for causing injuries to the three injured persons, and under Section 326 IPC for causing injury to the deceased, read with Section 149 of IPC. This we say so because the head injury, which, according to PW11, caused the death, was not noticed in the initial medical examination of the deceased. For the sake of completeness, even if we accept that head injury was caused by the accused, the offence will not travel beyond 304 Part II of IPC in as much as it was a solitary blow with no underlying fracture. In absence of any appeal from the convicted accused, without disturbing conviction under other provisions, we deem it appropriate to alter the conviction of the accused-respondents from Section 307 IPC to Sections 324 and 326 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. 25. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1990, and now more than 36 years have passed, we do not wish to interfere with the direction of the High Court that all sentences would stand reduced to the period of sentence already undergone. 26. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms."

Rasik Lal Rai, the informant/complainant had appealed against the judgment dated March 24, 2015 authored by Justice V.N. Sinha of Patna High Court passed in three connected proceedings i.e., Government Appeal (DB) No.11 of 1993, Criminal Appeal No.309/1992 and Criminal Revision No.145/1993 preferred against the judgment and order of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur dated 08.12.1992 in Sessions Trial No.42/32 of 1991/92.

Supreme Court observed: "14. What is interesting is that the head injury which was found to be the cause of death was not noticed by PW9 when he had examined Ramadhar on the date of incident. 15. Based on the evidence led in the course of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted all accused of the charge of murder on the ground of serious inconsistency in medical evidence. Ajab Rai was, however, convicted under Sections 109/307 of IPC."  

The State had filed an appeal against acquittal of the accused from the charge of murder by the trial court, both simpliciter qua Ajab Rai and with the aid of Section 149 IPC qua other accused. The informant (the appellant before the Supreme Court) had filed a revision petition because at that time there was no right of an appeal to the victim. Even the convicted accused had preferred an appeal. The two appeals and the revision were decided by common impugned judgment and order dated March 24, 2015.

The informant/complainant was aggrieved by the order of the High Court, therefore, he approached the Supreme Court. 

Supreme Court recorded:"No appeal has been preferred either by the State or the convicted accused."

The submission on behalf of the appellant was that there was no occasion for the High Court to convict the
accused under Section 307 IPC when the person injured had succumbed to the injuries. In such circumstances, the conviction ought to have been under Section 302 IPC. In support of this  submission, the counsel for the appellant pointed out Explanation 2 to Section 299 of the IPC which provides that where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented. It was submitted that mere fact that the injured remained under treatment for 11 days would not change the gravity of the offence because the person died on account of the injuries sustained in the incident and, therefore, it would be a case of murder inasmuch as the injuries were caused with an intention to cause death.

Supreme Court recorded:"Admittedly, the Autopsy Surgeon in its deposition has indicated that death was a consequence of the head injury." 

Supreme Court observed: "Admittedly, the deceased was hospitalized, and he remained in hospital for over 11 days. The autopsy report indicates an injury on the head. This specific injury was not noticed in the earlier medical examination. There is no explanation for this discrepancy in the prosecution evidence. Therefore, in absence of any clarificatory evidence from the prosecution side that this injury was present, though inadvertently overlooked by the doctor at the time of initial medical examination, the benefit of doubt would have to go to the accused as to whether that injury was caused by them. In such circumstances, it cannot be said with certainty that the sole fatal injury found on the body of the deceased was attributable to Ajab Rai or any of the accused persons."

Earlier, in The State of Bihar vs. Ajab Rai & Ors. (2015), Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices V.N. Sinha and Ahsanuddin Amanullah had delivered a 8-page long judgement dated March 24, 2015, wherein, it concluded:"we are of the view that in view of the evidence on record, both ocular and medical, the offence proved in the present case is Section 307 and not 302 of the Penal Code. The court below has rightly held the respondents in the Government Appeal and appellants in the Cr. Appeal guilty of the offence under Section 307 and other allied Sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them accordingly. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit either in the Government Appeal or in the Cr. Appeal or in the Cr. Revision, which is dismissed. The sentence imposed on the respondents under the impugned judgment is modified to the extent that the period already undergone by them during trial as also during pendency of the appeal will meet the ends of justice. In the result, impugned conviction is upheld with modification in sentence." The judgement was authored by Justice Sinha. 

The Division Bench delivered the judgement upon hearing the Government Appeal, Cr. Appeal and Cr. Revision arise out of judgment dated December 8, 1992 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Samastipur in sessions trial of 1991/92, whereunder respondents in the Government appeal, appellants in Cr. Appeal were held guilty of the charge under Sections 307, 148 of the IPC. Under Section 148 of the IPC all the convicts have been directed to suffer rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The appellants Ajab Rai, Vishwanath Rai, Indradeo Rai were directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The appellant Ajab Rai were also convicted for the offence under Section 109 of the IPC, and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years. The appellants Anil Rai, Gajendra Rai and Surendra Rai were directed to suffer sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the IPC. The appellants Anil Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Gajendra Rai were also  convicted for the offence under Section 342 of the IPC  and directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

The prosecution case, as set out in the First Information Report of informant Rashik Lal was that while he was returning to his house from his forecourt situate in Villge Chandpur Dhamaun, Police Station- Patori, around 12:30 noon on July 15, 1990, reached near the entrance, the accused persons variously armed with lethal weapons like Lathia, Gandasa, spear, firearms attacked him on the orders of accused No. 1 Ajab Rai causing grievous injury, he fell down. Hearing the alarm of Rashik Lal, his nephew Ramadhar Rai who came running to save his uncle, was caught by Indradeo Rai, Vishwanath Rai and Anil Rai, Ajab Rai inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury to the nephew. Vishwanath Rai also gave spear blow to Ramadhar Rai after he fell down. While the assault was on, Fakira Rai also arrived and was assaulted by Indradeo Rai with spear on his head, Surendra Rai with lathi causing grievous injury. The wife of Fakira Rai, Dayawati who intervened to save them, was also assaulted with lathi, gandasa by Ajab Rai causing injury on her left leg, whereafter she also fell down. While the assault on the men folk of the prosecution party was on, the female inmates of the house of the accused persons entered the house of the informant, carried away a box containing gold ornament and silver utensil worth Rs. 2500/-, clothes. The female inmates also carried away five bags of wheat causing damage to the belongings of the informant kept inside the house. The villagers named in the fardbeyan also came, saw the occurrence. The fardbeyan was recorded in the same evening at 8:00 P.M. by K. D. Singh, A.S.I., Town Police Station, Samastipur in Sadar Hospital which was forwarded to Patori Police Station where Patori P.S. Case was registered on July 17, 1990 for the offence  under Sections 307, 380 and other allied Sections of the IPC against Ajab Rai and nine others including the five who were put on trial along with Ajab Rai. During investigation of the case Ramadhar Rai died on July 26, 1990 while in treatment at P.M.C.H. The police submitted charge-sheet only against six who were put on trial.  

In support of the charge, prosecution examined 15 witnesses including three Medical Officers and two Police Officers. P.Ws. 7, 12 and 13 are formal witnesses as they have proved First Information Report, endorsement on the fardbeyan and endorsement on the Inquest Report. The seven other witnesses are the eye-witnesses of the occurrence including informant Rashik Lal Rai (P.W. 3), Fakira Rai (P.W. 6) and Dayawati Devi (P.W. 8). 

The trial court considered the evidence on record i.e. evidence of informant and the other two eye-witnesses as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W. 10) and the doctors (P.Ws. 9, 11 and 15) concluded that the prosecution case of assault, as deposed by the witnesses in court including the official witnesses i.e. the Medical Officer who examined the three injured and one deceased, offence under Section 302 of the IPC was not made out as accused persons used the firearm like a lathi, assaulted the injured with butt of the gun and other traditional weapons. One of the injured, nephew of the informant, Ramadhar Rai died after 11 days of the occurrence of the injury. From the post mortem report it did not appear that the accused persons who assaulted him had any intention to kill Ramadhar Rai.

The counsel of the appellants in criminal appeal had assailed the trial court judgment with reference to the evidence of the informant, the two injured and submitted that close perusal of their evidence would indicate that none of the three, either the informant or the two injured, were witness of the complete occurrence as from their version it would appear that they saw the occurrence only in part but deposed as eye-witness of the entire occurrence which does not appear to be true. 

The counsel had also submitted that even accepting the prosecution version, as set out and proved by the prosecution party, the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code was not made out as none of the appellants had any intention to kill either Ramadhar Rai or the informant or the other injured. At best the offence made out against them should have been under Section 326 of the IPC Code. In this connection, he also placed reliance on the injury, post mortem report of the deceased and injury report of the injured.

Ashwani Kumar Sinh and S.C. Mishra, the counsels for the State supported the judgment of trial court. The State submitted in support of the Government appeal that offence under Section 302 of the IPC was made out as Ramadhar Rai who came to save informant Rashik Lal was inflicted Gandasa blow causing head injury, nature whereof clearly establish that the intention of its author was to commit his murder as Ramadhar Rai was preventing the author of his injury from assaulting Rashik Lal. He also submitted that the evidence of the two injured also make out a case of murder and the appeal should be allowed, respondent Ajab Rai be convicted for the offence under Section 302 and others for the offence under Section 302/149 of the Penal Code.

Justice Sinha observed: "7. Having considered the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence of the informant as also the two injured, we are of the view that true it is that Ajab Rai inflicted gandasa blow on the person of Ramadhar Rai causing head injury but not only the nature of the said injury was simple but also there was no repetition of blow by Ajab Rai, further though the unlawful assembly was armed with firearm yet only the butt of the gun was used to inflict such injuries which can be caused by hard, blunt substance...." Rasik Lal Rai was also one of the appellants before the High Court. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Supreme Court upholds 2017 judgement by Justices Rakesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar Shah affirming judgement by Trial Court in a 43 year old case from Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur

In Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh & Ors vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh delivered a 13-page long judgement dated May 26, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"28. We are satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of the offences charged against the appellants. The concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 29. The brutality of the incident, in which five persons belonging to the same family lost their lives and several others including women and children sustained serious injuries, shocks the judicial conscience. The Courts below have rightly observed that the case leaves no room for misplaced sympathy or leniency. 30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. 31. Consequently, the appeals stand dismissed. 32. The surviving accused persons, except those who have been granted the benefit of juvenility by this Court or Courts below, are directed to surrender forthwith before the Trial Court concerned and serve the remaining part of their sentence. Their bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled." 

The High Court's 142-page long judgement dated August 3, 2017 was delivered by Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rakesh Kumar and Mohit Kumar Shah. It was authored by Justice Kumar. 

The High Court's order dated recorded hat Vidya Nand Rai son of Bhujawan Rai,  Ramadhar Rai, son of Subudh Lal Rai and Rama Nand Rai, son of Mahendra Rai were juvenile on the date of occurrence. Justice Kumar's judgement remitted their cases to the Juvenile Justice Board for imposing appropriate fine to be paid to the family of the victim. The trial court's sentence in respect of these three appellants was set aside. Their current fate is not known. 

Referring to the judgement authored by Justice Kumar, Supreme Court observed: “The High Court has meticulously summarised the role of each accused person and identified those who ignited the straw, those who set the house on fire, those who chased the fleeing victims and those who inflicted fatal blows upon the deceased persons”. All the appellants were residents of village Jamalpur Kodai, Police Station Gaighat, District Muzaffarpur and they were convicted by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur on June 5, 1989 in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 1985 and 127 of 1985. 

Supreme Court asserted: "20. Having carefully considered the submissions advanced and upon perusal of the entire material on record, we find no merit in the appeals. 21. The High Court’s assessment of the evidence is detailed and reasoned.....23. The findings recorded by the High Court clearly establish that the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly, were armed with deadly weapons and acted in furtherance of their common object of setting the house ablaze and causing death of members of the family of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. 24. Once the common object of the unlawful assembly stands established, every member thereof becomes vicariously liable for acts committed in prosecution of such common object. The liability contemplated under Section 149 IPC squarely stands attracted in the facts of the present case." 

 With regard to Jagannath Ravidas, "both the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found that he had actively facilitated the commission of the offence by disarming the victims at a crucial stage and thereby emboldening the mob. We find no reason to take a different view."

The court dismissed the appeals filed by Mahendra Rai alias Harendra Narain Singh and others, the convicts had challenged the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld their conviction and life imprisonment awarded by the trial court. The incident occurred on the day of Holi in March 1983 in a village in Muzaffarpur district. A mob of at least 58 persons, armed with deadly weapons, surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, set it on fire and brutally killed five persons while injuring several others, including women and children. The court noted that the evidence clearly established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, were armed with lethal weapons, and acted in furtherance of their common object to set the house ablaze and cause the deaths. Once the common object is proved, every member becomes vicariously liable for the acts committed. The accused actively participated at different stages — surrounding the house, setting it on fire, chasing the victims, and assaulting them. Several appellants had died during the pendency of the appeals before the High Court, leading to abatement of their cases. It directed the surviving convicts — except those who received the benefit of juvenility — to surrender immediately before the trial court and serve the remaining part of their sentences.

The High Court had affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court against the appellants in connection with a gruesome incident of mass violence which took place on March 29, 1983 in village Jamalpur Kodai, Gaighat, Muzaffarpur. 

The incident was reported to the police, leading to registration of Gaighat P.S. Case of 1983. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheets were laid and the accused persons were sent up for trial. Charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 147, 148, 436, 302/149, 324/34, 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The accused Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, was separately charged under Sections 302/109, 436/109, 379/109, 324/109 and 323/109 IPC on the allegation that he had actively abetted the commission of the offences.

The prosecution case disclosed that the genesis of the occurrence lay in an earlier dispute relating to a pumping set and refusal by the prosecution side to withdraw a criminal case concerning the alleged loot of a khesari crop. On the date of occurrence, which coincided with the festival of Holi, a large mob armed with deadly weapons including lathi, bhala, garasa and farsa surrounded the house of Chandra Shekhar Choudhary. At the relevant time Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, one of the deceased, was attempting to defend the inmates of the house with his licensed gun and revolver. The prosecution had alleged that Jagannath Ravidas, the then Circle Officer, arrived at the place of occurrence, forcibly seized the licensed firearm and revolver from the deceased, displayed the same before the mob and thereby emboldened the assailants to proceed with the attack. Immediately thereafter, the mob allegedly set the house ablaze. The family members who attempted to flee from the burning house towards the southern field were chased and mercilessly assaulted by the members of the unlawful assembly.  The investigation disclosed that Mahanth Indradeo Jyoti, Braj Bhushan Choudhary, Dr. Indranand Mishra, Lalan @ Ravi Bhushan Choudhary, and Anil Kumar Jha, died as a result of ante-mortem injuries sustained during the occurrence. The injured persons included Chandra Shekhar Choudhary, Mani Kumari, Uma Devi, Maheshwari Devi, Satyendra Jha, Saraswati Devi, Urmila Devi, Murti Devi, Ram Chandra Mahto, Abinash Choudhary, Dauli (child), Arvind Kumar, Usha Mishra, Rita Devi, Punam Kumari, Doyal Mona, Ajay Kumar Choudhary, Munish Kumar and others, many of whom had sustained grievous injuries. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 46 witnesses including numerous injured eyewitnesses. The defence examined 13 witnesses. 

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Patna High Court delivered 5 judgements on Dec. 20, Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha restores 36 year old initial judgement of Trial Court, sets aside subsequent order, passed on High Court's order

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on December 20, 202 in Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, Ashok Singh vs. State of Bihar, Brij Kumar Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, Binod Sah vs. State of Bihar and Mainuddin Mian vs. State of Bihar.

In Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of the High Court delivered a 37-page long judgement in a 41 year old P.S. case, wherein, he concluded:"38. The impugned judgment of conviction dated  19.02.2004 and order of sentence dated 20.02.2004 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in Sessions Case No.58 of 1986 arising out of Barhiya P.S. Case No.161 of 1984, G.R. No.759 of 1984 is, hereby, set aside. 39. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. Appellants are acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Since all above-named appellants/accused are on bail, they are discharged from their liabilities of bail bonds. Sureties stand discharged. 40. Fine, if any, paid be returned to the appellants/accused henceforth."

The appeal was preferred by the appellants-convict under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 19, 2004 and order of sentence dated February 20, 2004 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in a Sessions case of 1986 which arose out of Barhiya P.S. case of 1984, G.R. of 1984, whereby the trial court had convicted all the appellants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appellants namely, Ram Sabad Paswan (since died), Rambhajju Paswan and Anuj Pawan @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs.3,000/- to each for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant Ram Balak Paswan, Dasrath Paswan, Anuj @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died), Chunni Paswan and Bundi Ram were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 149 of the IPC, whereas all the appellants were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 147 of the IPC. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The case of prosecution, as per fardbeyan of informant namely, Ramprit Pawan (PW-4), recorded by Mr. Sohan Sah, Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station was that while informant was coming to his house after taking bath from the well of Thakurbari on October 8, 1984 at about 6.30 A.M., all the appellants-accused variously armed with lathi, bhala, gadasa and firearms were cutting the bamboos standing on the land which is situated towards east of the house of the informant. The informant Ramprit Pawan forbade them from cutting the same as proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC was pending between the parties with regard to the land on which bamboo clumps were grown. On objection, the appellants-accused became infuriated and appellant Dasrath Pawan ordered his associates to kill the informant, on which, the appellant-accused Ram Sabad Paswan (since died) fired from his country-made pistol, which hit to the informant in his back and front. The appellant Rambhajju Paswan also fired by his
country-made pistol, which hit to his right hand and shoulder as a result of which, the informant became unconscious and fell down on the ground. After some time, when he regained himself in hospital and he came to know that the accused jointly assaulted his brother Akshay Lal Paswan with garasa and lathi. The informant and his brother came to hospital for medical treatment at 10 A.M. on the same day. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station forwarded the fardbeyan to Barahiya Police Station for institution of a case. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Officer-in-charge, Barahiya Police Station lodged a case against the appellants-accused. 

After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellants-accused. The Jurisdictional Magistrate on the basis of materials collected during investigation, took cognizance of the offence and after compliance of Section 207 of the CrPC, committed the case to the court of sessions for trial and disposal in view of Section 209 of CrPC. 7. The Trial Court on the basis of materials as collected during the course of investigation explained charges to the appellants/accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, to which, they denied and pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed for trial. 8. To substantiate its case, the prosecution had examined altogether seven witnesses. 

Justice Jha noted: "12. It is pertinent to mention that the learned trial court initially acquitted the appellants/accused but, the informant being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment, preferred Criminal Revision No.523 of 1989 before this Court and in exercise of power under Section 401(3) of the CrPC, the High Court has set aside the judgment and remanded back to the learned trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7 to its correct extent. After hearing both sides, the learned trial court has convicted above-named appellants/accused and sentenced them in the manner indicated above." 

It is evident, the High Court had set aside the acquittal of the appellants/accused after hearing a criminal revision petition filed in 1989 and remanded back to the trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7. In compliance of the High Court's order, the trial court re-heared the case and convicted the appellants who were acquitted earlier. The name of the judge who had set aside the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court is not in public domain.

Being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants/accused/convicts preferred to appeal in the High Court. 

Justice Jha observed: "31. It appears that the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC of accused/appellants has been recorded by learned trial court in very cryptic and mechanical manner and same is not acceptable under law in view of legal ratio as settled through Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 10 SCC 270]". In Sukhjit Singh's case Supreme Court has held: “10. On a studied scrutiny of the questions put under Section 313 CrPC in entirety, we find that no incriminating material has been brought to the notice of the accused while putting questions. Mr Talwar has submitted that the requirement as engrafted under Section 313 CrPC is not an empty formality. To buttress the aforesaid submission, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar [(2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92]. Relying upon the same, he would contend that when the incriminating materials have not been put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC it tantamounts to serious lapse on the part of the trial court making the conviction vitiated in law. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. State [1951 SCC 903 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491] wherein, Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance with Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus: (AIR pp. 445-46, para 30) “30. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. A question of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice.”

Justice Jha relied on the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933], wherein Justice Bose speaking for a three-Judge Bench highlighted the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the Code expressed thus: (AIR pp. 469-70, para 8) “8. Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal Procedure Code are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused person is not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused in some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box.” 

Justice Jha underlined that this principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371] in following terms: (SCC pp. 347-48, para 14)  “14. The word ‘generally’ in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of
the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.”

Justice Jha pointed that "32. From perusal of record, it appears that the Investigating Officer of this case has not been examined during the trial. In this context, it would be apt to reproduce relevant paragraph of the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), which are as under:-.“38. First, statement of PW-3 under section 161, Cr. P.C. was recorded nearly 24 days after the incident. Since the Investigating Officer did not enter the witness box, the appellants did not have the occasion to cross-examine him and thereby elicit the reason for such delay. Consequently, the
delay in recording the statement of PW-3 in course of investigation, is not referred to and, therefore,
remains unjustified. The possibility of PW-3, being fixed up as an eye-witness later during the process
of investigation, cannot be totally ruled out”.

Justice Jha noted that though PW 4 was said to have reached the place of occurrence at 1.30 p.m. on 5-9-1985 and recovered a bullet in the blood oozing out from the injury at the hip of the dead body, no effort worthy of consideration appears to have been made to seize the weapons by which the murderous attack was launched. It is true that mere failure/neglect to effect seizure of the weapon(s) cannot be the sole reason for discarding the prosecution case but the same assumes importance on the face of the oral
testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses i.e. PW 2 and PW 3, not being found by this Court to be wholly reliable. The missing links could have been provided by the investigating officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the investigating officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW 4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the investigating officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. 

Justice Jha observed: "It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the investigating officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. 33. It appears that the witness examined during trial are interested and related witnesses." 

He drew on paragraph No. 32 and 33 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through Nandlal vs. State of Chattisgarh (supra), which are as under:-“32. Undisputedly, the present case rests on the evidence of interested witnesses. No doubt that two of them are injured witnesses. This Court, in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [1957 SCC OnLine SC 13], has observed thus: “11. … Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.”

Justice Jha referred to paragraph no. 4 and 5 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shamsher Singh (supra), which are as under:- “4. On an appeal preferred by the accused-respondent, the aforesaid conviction has been set aside and he has been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but has been convicted for the offence under Section 326 IPC and sentenced with imprisonment already undergone. 5. The High Court in acquitting the accused-respondent held that for an offence under Section 307 IPC, the court was obliged to see if the act was done with the intention or knowledge so as to cause death and since the facts do not prove such intention or knowledge on part of the accused-respondent, there cannot be an offence for attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. It also observed that the intention has to be gathered from the entire circumstances of the case such as nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, severity of the blow or hurt, the part of the body where the injury was inflicted and so on and not merely from the end result”.

Justice Jha record4ed: "35. Taking note of aforesaid available evidence as surfaced during trial, it is an admitted position that occurrence was free fight in nature, where both parties received injuries. The case of appellant for same set of occurrence lodged by appellant side prior to this case. Police upon investigation submitted final form against appellants. Injuries of appellants, which was also of gunshot could not explain by prosecutions. I.O. of this case could not examined during trial, which also appears fatal for prosecution. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 deposed to arrived after actual occurrence. Allegation of firing appears general and omnibus out of testimony of PW-4, whereas same was stated in specified manner in FIR. PW-4 deposed that only two accused persons were carrying country-made pistol, whereas he was silent about Anuj Paswan (since died). All such unanswered events creates a doubt qua occurrence, which creates a serious doubts, the benefit of which must be extended to accused/appellants. 36. In view of aforesaid testimony of witnesses, who are related to informant (PW-4) cannot be wholly reliable as they appears interested witnesses in view of Nandlal’s case (supra). 37. Statement of appellants/accused also appears recorded in very cryptic and mechanical manner in view of Section 313 of the CrPC....." 

The judgement  concluded that the present appeal against appellant Nos. 2, 4 and 5 stands abated. "Now, this appeal survives against above-named four appellants only."