Supreme Court sets aside "utterly misconceived" order by Patna High Court, restores criminal application Dharmendra Kumar from Shiv Nagar, Karpi, Arwal

In Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) , Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva passed a 4-page long order dated September 1, 2026, wherein, it restored Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025 "to the file of the High Court for consideration afresh on merits and in accordance with law." It observed:" 4. The learned Judge seems to have lost sight of the fact that the appellant had sought cancellation of the anticipatory bail and had cited grounds therefor. It was not a case of the grant of bail itself being subjected to challenge, by way of a petition for cancellation. 5. This aspect of the matter required to be examined independently to ascertain whether any of the alleged grounds cited by the appellant were established and warranted cancellation of the bail earlier granted. Such an exercise did not entail the learned Judge sitting in appeal over the grant of anticipatory bail by a coordinate Bench. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, utterly misconceived and is liable to be set aside. 6. As all the parties are before this Court, there is no reason as to why this appeal should be kept pending. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, setting aside the order dated 29.07.2026 passed by the High Court." 

Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court had rejected this application by his order dated July 29, 2026 as he did not find "sufficient ground to interfere with the impugned order" dated December 20, 024 passed by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of the Co-ordinate Bench of the High Court. Justice Kumar had passed his 2-page long order dated July 29, 2026 in Dharmendra Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026) Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15460/2025. The application before the High Court was filed for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the Mukesh Kumar, the opposite party nos.2 and Shivam Kuma, opposite no. 3 by Justice Sharan of a Co-ordinate Bench.

Justice Kumar perused the F.I.R. He recorded: "It appears that the petitioner, who is the informant of the case, had appeared before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and opposed the prayer of the opposite party nos.2 and 3 for grant of bail and after considering the submissions of the parties, the Co-ordinate Bench had granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party nos.2 and 3." He observed:"If the petitioner was/is aggrieved by the order of the Co-ordinate Bench, he could have moved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of the Co-ordinate Bench. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion granting anticipatory bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court. Therefore, I do not find any error in the impugned order."

Dharmendra Kumar, the appellant had submitted that he had approached the High Court seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 with sufficient grounds for such cancellation. 

Supreme Court recorded: "3. By the impugned order dated 29.07.2026, a learned Judge of the High Court opined that he could not sit in appeal over the exercise of discretion by the coordinate Bench in granting anticipatory bail to respondent Nos. 2 and 3." 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha, grants anticipatory bail due to compromise between informant, and appellant

In Shayam Mishra @ Shayam Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and Prasanna B. Varale passed a 5-page order dated August 25, 2026, wherein, it set aside the 5-page long order dated June 25, 2026 by Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court in a case from Badhurupiya, Sugauli, East Champaran. Supreme Court's order reads: "5) Inasmuch as this case involves a complaint at the behest of the informant and a counter complaint at the behest of the appellant, and the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties, we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and grant anticipatory bail to the appellant. 6) In such view of the matter, the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40755 of 2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted anticipatory bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court." 

The appellant is implicated as an accused in connection with F.I.R. No.480 of 2021 registered at P.S.: Sugauli, District: East Champaran, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 384, 379, 504 and 506 of the IPC. He was aggrieved by the rejection of the anticipatory bail applications by the Trial Court and the High Court. He approached the Supreme Court. The Court was informed that "the matter has been resolved between the appellant and the informant, via compromise."

Prior to this, in his order Justice Jha had recorded the submission by the A.P.P. for the State, while opposing the prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner, wherein, it was submitted that considering all available materials, the prayer of first anticipatory bail of the petitioner was rejected and, therefore, there is no occasion to reconsider this second prayer of anticipatory bail of the petitioner without having any changed circumstances, which would amount to review of earlier order passed by learned coordinate Bench of this Court, which is not permissible under law. It was also submitted by the A.P.P. that the offence, as alleged, is not compoundable in nature and, therefore, compromise is of no bearing. 

Justice Jha had concluded: "8. In view of aforesaid factual submission and by taking note of the fact as prima facie on the basis of subsequent compromise for non-compoundable offence, the earlier rejection order, which was passed by one of the learned coordinate Bench of this Court, cannot be reviewed by this Court, accordingly, on second consideration also, prayer of anticipatory bail of the  petitioner stands rejected."

The High Court's order recorded that it was the second prayer of anticipatory bail, after rejection of his first anticipatory bail by the 2-page long order dated February 9, 2023 of Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in Cr. Misc. No. 2413 of 2023 dated February 9, 2023, wherein considering all available materials, as petitioner was specifically alleged to cause stab wound due to which the injured sustained grievous injury, his prayer of anticipatory bail was rejected. At the time of the rejection of the first anticipatory bail rejection, there was no compromise between the parties. 

The second anticipatory bail petition was preferred on the sole ground that now this matter was compromised between the parties. The counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted before the High Court that the occurrence was free-fight in nature and petitioner’s side had also received injury during the occurrence. It was also submitted that now the petitioner was selected in Group ‘D’ service of Indian Railway, therefore, in view of compromise, sending the petitioner to jail would not serve any purpose of justice. 

In support of his submission, the counsel had relied upon para 22 of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. Para-22 of the judgment reads:- “22. In Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531, Surya Kant, J. speaking for this court, in a case involving a charge under Section 326 IPC, while annulling the proceedings, felicitously set out the statement of law and applied it to the facts of the said case as under:-“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences “compoundable” within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: 19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;
19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;
19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; and
19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
20.1. Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorised as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. 
20.2. Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest.
20.3. Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed.
20.4. Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s).
20.5. Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties.
20.6. Sixthly, since the appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill will and have no vengeance against
each other.
20.7. Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the appellants; more so looking at their present age.”

Supreme Court's order vindicates the position of petitioner's the counsel Prateek Tandon and the persuasive value of the decision in Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292. It is apparent that Supreme Court has rejected the submission made by Nand Kishore Prasad, APP which is recorded in the order by Justice Jha. Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by APP's reasoning. 

Supreme Court sets aside judgement by Patna High Court by an ex parte order

In Sudhir Yadav vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 6-page long ex parte order order dated August 12, 2026, wherein, it set aside the judgement by Justice Ansul of Patna High Court dated May 11, 2026.  The order reads: "10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered. 11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No.106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused. 12. The appeal shall stand allowed."  

The counsel for Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the respondent No.2 appeared before the Supreme Court for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents but the Court was not inclined to grant time given the nature of the impugned order. In such a backdrop, is an ex parte order jurispridentially defensible? 

Notably, the impugned order by Justice Ansul had set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 3. 

Supreme Court observed: "5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first  information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court. 6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings."

The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. In State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy & Ors. (1977) 2 SCC 699, there was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. 

In Salib @ Shalu @ Salim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(2023) 20 SCC 194, the Supreme Court cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

Supreme Court observed:"8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment. 9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim AIR 1992 SC 604, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself." 

Earlier, in Tinku Kumar @ Tinku Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Ansul had delivered a 7-page long judgement dated May 11, 026, wherein, he had concluded: "10. In the backdrop of land dispute coupled with this frivolous case, the order of cognizance dated 06.03.2019 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for
the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is quashed so far as the petitioner No. 2 namely Sanjay Kumar Ranjan is concerned. 11. With the aforesaid observations, the present application stands allowed."

Sanjay Kumar Ranjan, the petitioner No. 2 had approached the High Court seeking quashing of the order of cognizance dated March 6, 2019 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-IX, Gaya in connection with Magadh University P. S. Case No. 106 of 2018 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution was initiated on the statement of one Sudhir Yadav. He alleged that in the context of land dispute he was threatened by seven persons including the petitioner. On August 30, 2018, all of them caught him near “Langra Pull Sripur Tar”. Thereafter, the FIR entered into the area of graphic detailing and becomes an exclusive case of over-implication. The informant stated that Shankar Yadav caught his collar, Ramswaroop Yadav caught his neck, Sanjay Kumar Ranjan (Petitioner) caught his both hands, Mahesh Yadav caught his waist, Dhananjay Kumar alias Chotu Singh caught his collar from behind and Tinku Singh caught his hair and then Shankar Yadav, Ramswaroop Yadav alias Master and Mahesh Yadav exhorted to shoot him in his private part. On this, Shankar Kumar alias Yadav fired after pointing towards his private part which hit him in his left rib-cage. 

The counsel for the petitioner had pointed towards the injury report which showed lacerated wound upon left illium or illiuc bone in left flank of abdomen exposing muscles with loss of skin in front of Injury No. 1. The injury report will not even suggest it to be a case of fire arm injury. However, even if it is presumed to be a firearm injury the only conclusion is that the bullet touched the body and passed by him. In the backdrop of admitted land dispute, the FIR itself assumes a serious context. He may be having some dispute with Shankar Kumar but in his over anxiety he spread the net very wide. He has not only implicated others but has attributed specific role as if some novel was being written or cinema was being played out. Moreover, if he says that the shot was pointed towards the private part but it struck his rib-cage then it cannot be a case of point blank firing. The firing must have been made from a distance. In such a situation, persons who were surrounding him had every chance of getting hurt instead of him but nobody got hurt.

Notably, the High Court noted that the quashing jurisdiction which has evolved from the case of State of Karnataka vs. L Muniswamy and Ors reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699 as well as in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and also in Md. Salib vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194. 

The relevant paragraph 8 of the judgement in L Muniswamy case cited by the High Court reads: “8. Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever skilfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other material. The worst that can be said against the respondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal of Accused 1 and prior to the commission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on which no witness has said a word. In the circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to continue against the respondents. The High Court was therefore justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justicc the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed.”

The relevant paragraph 26 of the judgement in Md. Salib case cited by the High Court reads:“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”

Justice Ansul observed:"6. Judicial notice must be taken of this tendency of some seasoned litigants to over implicate people. Over-implication apart from false implication has been the bane of criminal litigation for long. An attempt can be made to define the same. The same occurs in situation where some wrong has been committed with a person by some particular person. He, however, takes it as an opportunity to implicate many of his enemies who may not have any role to play in the crime. In cases of assault it takes the form of being “member of the mob” and assignment of useless and petty roles to accused. “Member of the mob” is a term which is echoing in the courtroom of Bihar for a very long time. It would mean person present at the place of occurrence with no specific overt Act. In matters relating to money transactions it takes the form of persons other than signatories of the documents like agents who negotiated the transactions or before whom money was paid. 7. The legal system is completely aware of such nefarious activities. This has been taken note of very clearly in matrimonial disputes, land disputes and criminal cases arising out of land disputes." 

While the defensibility of the Supreme Court's order will require rigorous attention to factual details of the case and careful perusal of the judgements in question, the fact remains that the observations by Justice Ansul have a ring of truth.   

Supreme Court reverses the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a murder case

In Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division bench of Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli passed a 3-page long order, wherein, it concluded:"5. Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and, particularly, the fact that the identically situated accused are on bail, we are inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail, pending trial. 6. We direct that the petitioner shall be enlarged on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, pending trial. 7. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. 

The petition had questioned the correctness of the order dated October 10, 2025 passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar of the Patna High Court in Aryan Kumar vs. The State of Bihar (2025),  whereby the bail application of the petitioner was rejected.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had already undergone 3 years and 5 months in custody, since he was arrested on February 21, 2023. He drew attention to the Firs Information Report to submit that while the petitioner was named in the first part of the incident which did not cause injury to any person and only a reference to indiscriminate firing was made, there was no reference to the petitioner in the second part of the incident which resulted in the death of four persons. The counsel also drew attention to the fact that identically situated accused are on bail. The counsel further submitted that Bachcha Rai whose name figures in the second part of the incident was also on bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had concluded:"I am not inclined to grant bail to petitioner no. 2, namely, Akhilesh Kumar, as the trial is on the verge of conclusion. 7. So far as the petitioner no. 1, namely, Aryan Kumar is concerned, this Court is inclined to grant bail on medical grounds so that he can get himself properly treated. 8. Accordingly, let the petitioner no. 1, above named, be released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge IV, Patna City, Patna/ concerned Court in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023, subject to the condition that both the bailors should be the close relative of the petitioner no. 1. 9. As a condition of this order, the petitioner no. 1, after being released on bail is directed to co-operate in the trial either by appearing personally or through his lawyer in the trial Court on each and every date fixed in the trial. Noncompliance of the condition will result in cancellation of the bail bonds of the petitioner no. 1. 10. The bail application is allowed with regard to petitioner no. 1 and is dismissed with regard to petitioner no. 2. 11. This bail petition stands partly allowed in the above terms." 

The petitioners had approached the High Court seeking bail in connection with Nadi P.S. Case No. 76 of 2023 registered for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 342, 448, 302, 307 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. From the report of the trial Judge, it appeared that out of nine chargesheeted witnesses, five witnesses were examined. 4. From the report of the Medical Officer, Beur Jail, Patna, it appeared that the petitioner no. 1 was seriously ill and he was admitted to PMCH again and again for his treatment. Notably, e. Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioners were rejected by Justice Kumar by his order dated March 5, 2024. He had concluded: "Considering the fact that it is a case of four murders, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioners."

Justice Satyavrat Verma rejected bail in a murder case

In Brajnod Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Satyavrat Verma passed an order dated February 26, 2026, wherein, he rejected the second attempt to secure bail in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 342, 324, 307, 302, 337 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier, Justice Verma had passed a 3-page long order dated July 14, 2023 wherein, he had concluded:"8. Considering the submissions made by the learned A.P.P. for the State and learned counsel for the informant, the Court is not inclined to extend the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners in connection with a Madhuban P. S. case of 2022 pending in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari/successor Court. 9. Accordingly, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners is rejected."

The counsel for the petitioners submitted thatpetitioners are persons with clean antecedents. The informant alleged that while she along with her husband were returning home in the night, they were intercepted by the accused persons including the petitioners and they assaulted her husband by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. 

The counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioners were falsely implicated in the present case. It was also submitted that it was night as such it cannot be alleged with certainty that it was the petitioners who had assaulted the husband of the informant by iron rod causing injury leading to his death. It was further submitted that during the course of investigation, it came out that the husband of the informant died on account of fall of a bamboo which was being erected. It was also submitted that even the witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution during the course of investigation. It was also submitted that the viscera was preserved and sent to the FSL for examination. It was submitted that though it was alleged that both the petitioners assaulted the husband of the informant by an iron rod causing injury leading to his death but then during the postmortem only one injury was found on the deceased. 

The A.P.P. for the State and counsel for the informant opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioners and submitted that the police investigation was not admissible in evidence during the course of trial. 

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Sandeep Kumar in a UAPA case

In Ram Pravesh Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh  and N. K. Singh passed a 5-page long order, wherein, it set aside the order by Justice Sandeep Kumar of Patna High Court. The order reads:"....we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court." 

The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the facts have been wrongly recorded by the High Court to the effect that the appellant was absconding. The appellant was, in fact, under incarceration from 2016 to 2024, in connection with a different FIR. Although it was stated that there were a number of cases in which the appellant was involved, he was acquitted in most of the cases. In any case, taking into consideration the period of incarceration undergone, he was entitled to bail, particularly, when the co-accused have been granted bail.

The appellant sought regular bail in connection with FIR No.88/2011, dated 17.06.2011, registered at Police Station Amas, District Gaya, Division-Sherghati, Bihar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 379, 384, 386, 435, 427, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 

In the Supreme Court, the counsel appearing for the State admitted that it was not in dispute that the appellant was indeed under incarceration from 2016 to 2024. The finding recorded by the High Court is not correct. Additionally, the appellant has been under incarceration for a further period of more than 1 year. The co-accused was granted bail. 

In his order Justice Kumar had recorded: 3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner and others are said to have stopped the trucks near the Sao Kala Toll Plaza and have set ablaze the trucks. 5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been acquitted in 40 cases registered against him and he has been granted bail in seven more similar cases. 6. Learned APP for the State Shri Jharkhandi Upadhyay submits that from the records, it appears that the petitioner is an absconder in a case of year 2011 and he is an active naxal." The High Court's order reads:"Considering the aforesaid submission of the learned APP for the State, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, this application is dismissed." Now the Supreme Court has reversed this order.  

Supreme Court modifies order by Satyavrat Verma which said "if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect...."

In Mohammad Umair vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan passed an order dated April 30, 2026, wherein, it observed:"The fact that the High Court was satisfied and granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner indicates that a case for relief had been made out.  However, pausing here, the High Court may be correct to the extent that at that point of time, because the police had not found the case true against the petitioner as there was no charge sheet, an observation could have been made that once the Investigating Agency finds evidence against the petitioner, the scenario would change. To this extent, we agree. However, directing that the order granting anticipatory bail shall loose its effect and the petitioner would be arrested, is totally improper. The High Court could have directed the petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and then, seek bail in the matter, once the charge sheet is submitted." 

It added:"7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.40437 of 2024 is modified to the extent that paragraphs no.4 and 6 of the said impugned order, which directs that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the anticipatory bail order shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that he is behind bar, are set aside. The petitioner shall appear before the Trial Court within two weeks from today and seek bail, which shall be considered, in accordance with law." The Supreme Court condoned the delay before hearing the SLP. 

The petitioner was aggrieved by the observation made by Justice Verma in his 3-page long order dated August 2, 2024 which though, had granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with FIR No.5109051240051 of 2024 dated January 18, 2024, registered at P.S. Mufassil Thana, Disrict Gaya, Bihar, for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 337, 307, 504 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but with the stipulation that if the charge sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the said order dated 02.08.2024 granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner shall loose its effect and the Trial Court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that the petitioner is behind bar.

Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma 

Rajiv Kumar Virmani, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that such condition was absolutely unwarranted and causes prejudice to the petitioner in a manner not authorised by law. It was submitted that once the Court had taken a call and was satisfied that a person was entitled to anticipatory bail, merely submission of a charge sheet, should not ipso facto change the situation and make him liable to be arrested. 

Anshul Narayan, Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar submitted that such condition may not be proper.

Supreme Court considered the matter in its entirety, and found force in the submissions of counsel for the petitioner and Additional Standing Counsel for the respondent-State of Bihar.

Justice Verma's order reads: "5. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, let the petitioner above-named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the learned Court below within a period of six weeks from today, be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned court below where the case is pending/successor court in connection with Gaya Mufassil P.S. Case No. 51 of 2024, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438 (2) of the Cr.P.C. 6. However, it is made clear that if charge-sheet is submitted against the petitioner, in that event, the present anticipatory bail order shall lose its effect and the learned trial court shall take all coercive steps to ensure that petitioner is behind bar. 7. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Gaya is also directed to ensure that the case is investigated with all promptness." This order has been modified by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court. The Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan had passed a similar order dated April 24, 2026.  

 Also read: Supreme Court modifies conditional anticipatory bail order by Justice  Satyavrat Verma

 

Supreme Court upholds judgement of conviction by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi, Samarendra Pratap Singh in a murder case

In Adalat Yadav etc. vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N.K Singh delivered a 18-page long judgement dated April 22, 2026, wherein, it dismissed the appeals. The appellant-convicts before the Court were the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. This appeals of 2019 were filed by Adalat Yadav, and Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the 56-page long common judgment by Justices Aditya Kumar Trivedi and Samarendra Pratap Singh dated February 4, 2017 passed in Girdhari Yadav vs. The State of Bihar (2017), whereby the Division Bench had confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated November 22, 2011 passed in a Sessions Trial of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/. These convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently. The High Court's judgement was authored by Justice Trivedi. 

On December 4, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed in March 2009. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding was arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses. 

Supreme Court says, Guddu Ray "shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial" in a murder case

In The State of Bihar & Anr. vs.  Baleshwari Devi (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 3-page long order dated February 25, 2026. The order reads: "Despite notice served, none appears for the contesting respondent(s). Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that a threat was extended by the private respondent to the petitioner even very recently. The Trial Court has also ordered further investigation. It is a case of gruesome murder. The petitioner’s son has been shot dead at point blank range. Though the allegations are quite serious, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) only for the reason that the bail was granted to the private respondents as early as on 13.11.2024 and 20.11.2024. However, in view of the prevailing situation and the fact that the safety of the petitioner and her family is in question, particularly, when threats have been exerted against them by the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025, we direct that the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No.8371/2025 shall not reside in or enter in the village Maqsoodpur, District-Patna, till the conclusion of the trial. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek cancellation of bail in the future in the event of a threat at the instance of the private respondent in SLP(Crl) No. 8371/2025. The Special Leave Petitions stand disposed of, accordingly." It was filed in the Supreme Court on January 12, 2025, registered on February 12, 2025 and verified on February 13, 2025.

Earlier, in Guddu Ray @ Guddu Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2024), Patna High Court's Justice Chandra Prakash Singh had passed a 3-page long order dated November 13, 2024 concluded: "In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case as well as finding substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the impugned order dated 24.06.2024 passed by the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, is set aside against the appellant. The criminal appeal is allowed. 7. Accordingly, the above named appellant, is directed to be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail-bond of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 arising out of Shahpur P.S. Case No. 147 of 2024, with the condition/s:- (i) The appellant is directed to remain physically present before the learned Court below on each and every date, failing which on two consecutive dates without reasonable cause, the bail bonds of the appellant are liable to be cancelled." The Respondent No.2 was Baleshwari Devi. The criminal appeal was filed on July 23, 2024 and registered on July 26, 2024

The order was passed after hearing an appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 against the rejection of prayer for bail vide order dated June 27, 2024 passed by the Exclusive Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Civil Court, Patna Sadar in Serial No. 158 of 2024 which arose out of Shahpur P.S. Case of 2024 dated April 18, 2024 registered for the offence/s punishable u/ss 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307, 302, 338, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27of the Arms Act and sections 3(1)(r)(s) / 3(2) (va) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. 

As per the prosecution case, on April 14, 2024, the informant along with the some other people was celebrating Ambedkar Jyanti, in the meantime, some anti-social elements started abusing by taking her caste name for which the informant objected. Thereafter, on April 17, 2024, the appellant along with the other co-accused persons having arms came there and started pelting stones on her community members causing injuries to them. It was also alleged that they also fired on them due to that one Vikaram Kumar sustained gun shot injury and subsequently he died. The appellant submitted that the appellant was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The counsel also submitted that the caste name was not disclosed by anyone at the time of the alleged occurrence. As per FIR, no member of public was present at the relevant point of time of the alleged incident hence, no case was made out under section SC/ST Act. There was general and omnibus allegation against the appellant. There was no specific
allegation of firing against the appellant. The co-accused person was already granted regular bail by the High Court vide order dated August 22, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 3192 of 2024. The appellant had no criminal antecedent. The appellant was in custody since April 19, 2024. 

Justice Chandra Prakash Singh 

Trial court records withheld in Bihar, Supreme Court takes note of "incurable injustice" in a murder case, sets aside judgements by Justice Mohit Kumar Shah

In Sanjay Sah & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran passed a 10-page long order dated February 12, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we are of the opinion that incurable injustice was done to the appellants in the course of their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as no specific questions were put to them apropos each piece of incriminating evidence adduced against them. The judgments of the trial court based on such inadequate examination of the accused, therefore, cannot be sustained. The High Court was also in error in overlooking this crucial aspect and in confirming the conviction and sentences visited upon the appellants. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and also the judgments of conviction and the orders of sentence passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated 25.01.2007 registered with Police Station–Adapur, District–East Champaran, Bihar) Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 shall stand restored on the file of the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, to enable fresh examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code strictly in accordance with the legal parameters applicable thereto. As we are informed that the appellants were on bail, prior to their conviction and sentencing, they would be entitled to the same relief pending the fresh exercise to be undertaken by the trial court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed in the aforestated terms. The appellants shall be released on bail on such appropriate terms and conditions as may be fixed by the trial court, pending the exercise to be undertaken by the trial court pursuant to this order. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of." The Appellant no. 2 was Awadhesh Kumar Gupta @Awadhesh Sah. The private Respondents were: Ram Sevak Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and  Srilal Sah. The tagged matters included Ram Sevak Sah vs. The State of Bihar and Mahanth Sah vs. The State of Bihar.

Although Supreme Court had directed the Registry to requisition the trial court records, being of the opinion that the aforestated judgments warranted interference, the Court records that "trial court records have not yet been received. Instead of awaiting receipt of the records, we deem it appropriate to resort to the alternative that is available to us, that is, to remit the matter to the trial court instead of undertaking adjudication of these appeals on merit." On January 21, 2026, the Court had ordered: "Registry shall requisition the trial court records at the earliest and undertake translation of documents in vernacular, if any. E-copies of the trial court records, once received, shall be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties." 

Earlier, on  September 2, 2025, Court's Division Bench of Justices Kumar and Alok Aradhe had passed an order which recorded that the counsel for the State of Bihar had sought "some time to examine whether there was a separate examination by the trial Court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, and if so, file a copy thereof. Registry may also call for the record of the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., if any, from the trial Court/High Court." In its order dated November 12, 2025, the Court recorded that Azmat Hayat Amanullah, counsel for the State of Bihar was present in the Court. "The learned counsel states that it would not be necessary to file a counter affidavit in this matter."

These appeals arose out of the 56-page long judgment dated March 6, 2025 passed by the Patna High Court's Division Bench of Justices Mohit Kumar Shah and Nani Tagia in Ram Sevak Shah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), and 58-page long judgement in Laxman Sah & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2026), confirming the conviction and the sentences visited upon the appellants, vide judgments dated August 27, 2016 and September 2, 2016, passed by the learned VIII Additional Sessions Judge, East Champaran at Motihari, Bihar, in Sessions Trial Nos. 403/2009 and 936/2007 (both arising out of FIR/Case No. 15/2007 dated January 25, 2007 registered with Police Station – Adapur, District – East Champaran, Bihar). The trial court had convicted the appellants under Sections 302, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced them to life imprisonment along with payment of fines. Both the High Court's judgements of the Division Bench were authored by Justice Shah. In the former Sanjay Sah, Awadhesh Sah, Ashok Sah, Madan Sah and Srilal Sah were the appellants besides Ram Sevak Shah. In the latter Inar Sah, Vijay Sah Son, Ajay Sah, Mahanth Sah and Ramekbal Sah were the appellants besides Laxman Sah.   

In the penultimate paragraph of his judgement in both Ram Sevak Shah case and Laxman Sah case, Justice Shah had concluded:"Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence, which has been brought on record to prove the allegations levelled against the appellants beyond pale of any reasonable doubt as well as considering the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence of the prosecution, which has not been discredited during the course of cross-examination coupled with the postmortem report and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find that there is no reason to create any doubt in our minds. We have examined the materials available on record and do not find any apparent error in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, hence, the same does not require any interference." 

The order reads: "We find from the material placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellants that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 19731, was brief to the point of being cryptic and was limited to just three questions. The first question was as to whether the accused had heard the statement of the witnesses. The second question was as follows:- “There is an allegation against you that on 24th February 2007 at 06.30 A.M., in village Harpur, police station Harpur, district East 1 For short “the Code”Champaran, you along with other accused for the fulfillment of a common purpose, killed Shivnath Shah, brother of Suresh Prasad, the complainant in this Case, by hitting with sticks, what do you have to say in this regard?” The third question was as to whether the accused had something to say in his defence. The aforestated three questions were posed to one of the accused/appellants, namely, Mahanth Sah. However, the same format was adopted for examination of the remaining accused. This is not in dispute. Needless to state, the aforestated casual examination of the accused falls woefully short of the required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court has emphasized this point, time and again." 

The Court referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) 2 SCC 385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of the Court observed that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the trial court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to put any material circumstances brought on record against the accused, the public prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the court while the examination of the accused is being recorded; he must assist the court in framing the questions to be put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the commission of offence must be punished, it is also his duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the accused. 

The Court recollected its earlier decision by a 3-Judge Bench in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra”(1973) 2 SCC 793, wherein the in pari materia provision in the erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was observed that great care is expected of Sessions Judges, who try grave cases to collect every incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused. 

 

.

Supreme Court sets aside bail denying order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Bansilal Yadav @ Gautam Kumar Ydav vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed a 3-page long order dated February 2, 2026, wherein, it concluded, "....we direct that the present petitioner(s) be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court in connection with Sessions Trial No.675 of 2023 arising from FIR No.83 of 2023 dated 01.04.2023 registered at Police Station Laukaha, District Madhubani, Bihar. The Special Leave Petition(s) and pending application(s) are disposed of accordingly. The case arose out of impugned order dated July 18, 2025 by Patna High Court's Justice Sandeep Kumar. The petitioner had sought bail in connection with a Sessions Trial (which arose out of Laukaha P.S. case  of 2023) registered for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 307, 302, 120(B), 504 of the Indian Penal Code.  Justice Kumar had observed:"4. From the report it appears that it is accused persons who are delaying the trial. 5. In these circumstances, no ground for reviewing the order dated 13.12.2023 passed in Cr. Misc. No.66935 of 2023 is made out. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed." Earlier the prayer for bail of the petitioner was rejected by the High Court on December 13, 2023.

In his earlier order dated December 13, 2023 Justice Kumar had observed:"3. As per the prosecution case, due to land dispute, three persons from the prosecution side was killed by the accused persons and some other persons sustained grievous injury.....6. Considering the fact that the petitioner has participated in the killing of three persons, I am not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. This application is dismissed. 7. The Court below is directed to expedite the trial of the petitioner." The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was in custody since April 2, 2023, he was quite innocent and has not committed any offence. A.P.P. had vehemently opposed the prayer for bail and had submitted that there was sufficient material available on record to connect the petitioner with the crime.

Supreme Court observed: "Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the period of incarceration undergone by the petitioner(s), and the fact that out of ten named accused, six have already been granted bail and two have not been sent up for trial, we are inclined to grant bail to the present petitioner(s)."

"this matter should not have reached Supreme Court, Patna High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction:Justice J. B. Pardiwala

In Vishwajeet Kumar @ Vishwajeet Saini vs. State of Bihar & Anr.(2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K.V. Vishwanathan passed an order dated January 20, 2026. The Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated November 24, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. Notably, the Trial as on date is pending in the Court of Exclusive Special Judge (SC/AT Act), Civil Court (Sadar), Patna.

The High Court of Patna had declined anticipatory bail to the petitioner in connection with ABP No. 79 of 2025 arising out of SC/ST P.S. Case No. 03 of 2018, registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323, 324, 307, 379, 354(B), 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively and Sections 3(l)(r)(g)(p)(w)(z) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, respectively. 

Supreme Court observed:"4. It appears from the materials on record that after the registration of FIR, investigation was undertaken and at the end of the investigation, the Investigating Agency thought fit to file a Closure Report in so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime is concerned. 5. Pursuant to the filing of the Closure Report, notice was issued by the Court concerned to the defecto-complainant. After hearing the defacto-complainant and the State, the Closure Report was ultimately accepted. The order passed by the Court concerned accepting the closure report attains finality. 6. In such circumstances, referred to above, the petitioner was not put to trial. Charge-sheet came to be filed against other co- accused.7. It appears that the original defecto-complainant i.e. the victim entered the witness box for her oral testimony and in the course of her oral testimony, she reiterated the very same allegations levelled by her against the petitioner in the FIR. Thereafter, she preferred an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to add the present petitioner as an accused in the trial.

The petitioner being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Trial Court, adding him as an accused in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code, challenged the order before the High Court. However, the petitioner apprehending arrest at the hands of the Police prayed for anticipatory bail which came to be declined. This prosecution is of the 2018. This matter should not have travelled to the Supreme Court. It was expected of the High Court to exercise its discretion in accordance with law, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

Supreme Court concluded:"We need not say anything further as the original order passed by the Trial Court adding the petitioner as an accused has been challenged before the High Court and the High Court is in-seisin of the original order.12. In such circumstances, referred to above, we order that in the event of arrest of the petitioner by the Police in connection with the offence referred to above, he shall be released on bail, subject to terms and conditions that the Investigating Officer may deem fit to impose.13. Once the petitioner is released by the IO, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail.14. Whether the petitioner should face the trial or not will be subject to the final outcome of the petition pending in the High Court.15. With the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition stands disposed of."

Drawing on decision of the Supreme Court, passed in Bachu Das vs. State of Bihar & others, Justice Singh had concluded:"4. Considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in case of Bachu Das (supra), instant appeal filed for pre-arrest bail to the appellant, is dismissed as being not maintainable."

Supreme Court sets aside judgement authored by Justice Vipul M. Pancholi in a morder case from Rohtas

In Rajesh Upadhayay vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manmohan, N.V. Anjaria delivered a 24-page long judgement dated December 18, 2025, wherein it set aside the 6-page order dated August 28, 2024 authored by Justice Vipul M.Pancholi as part of Division Bench of Patna High Court in Sheo Narayan Mahto @ Sheo Narayan Singh @ Shiv Narayan Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2024).   

This appeal was filed in the High Court against the judgment of conviction dated April 3, 2024 and order of sentence dated April 9, 2024 rendered by the Court of Additional District & Sessions Judge 19th, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Sessions Trial of 2022, which arose out of Baghaila P.S. case of 2021where-under and whereby, the Trial Court had convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/- for the offences under Sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offences under Sections 342/149 of the IPC, To undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 147 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offences under Sections 504/149 of the IPC, to undergo imprisonment for a term of two year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 148 of the IPC. The appellant was also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.  

The appellant-original complainant questioned judgment and order dated August 28, 2024 by the High Court, whereby the High Court had suspended the sentence imposed on respondent No.2 and released him on bail during the pendency of the Appeal. Supreme Court's judgment records that the appellant-informant’s father named Krishna Behari Upadhyay was murdered. As per the prosecution story, on December 11, 2021 at about 4.30 p.m., the appellant along with his father Krishna Behari Upadhyay reached at Mahavir temple of the village to light ‘Diya’ and to do ‘Arti’. At that time, the accused persons and the co-villagers Bashishthha Singh alias Munna Singh, Ajit Singh, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Sheo Narayan Mahto- respondent No.2 herein wielding the arms and weapons reached, at the temple. Hurling abuses, all of them surrounded the appellant and his father, telling said Krishna Behari Upadhyay that he was not performing Puja and was engaging in politics. The prosecution case was that  that Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay tried to close the main gate of the temple, but the accused persons pushed the gate and made a forcible entry inside the temple. Ajit Singh and Raghunandan Kumar caught hold of Krishna Behari Upadhyay and Munna Singh was stated to have fired at him with a revolver. It was stated respondent No.2 also had a country-made pistol with him and that he as well as another Rajesh Mehto alias Rajesh Kumar were instigatively uttering that the Pandit should be killed as he was excessively indulging in politics. Because of gun fire shots, Krishna Behari Upadhyay fell down inside the temple premises and was in a pool of blood. The appellant somehow managed to flee away from the place and informed his family members. Om Prakash Tiwari and Ritesh Mukhia who were the family members, as well as the other co-villagers reached at the place of the offence. They saw Munna Singh, Ajit Kumar, Naga Kumar, Raghunandan Kumar and Rajesh Kumar Mahto alias Rajesh as also respondent No.2-Sheo Narayan Mahto running away in the Eastern direction. Upon being taken to the hospital, Krishna Behari Upadhyay was declared dead. A Fardbeyan was given by the appellant on December 11, 2021, pursuant to which the police registered the First Information Report for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 342, 504, 506, 302 and 120 (B), IPC, and for the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act against the six persons, including respondent No.2. On February 2, 2022, respondent No.2 surrendered before the Trial Court. Chargesheet was filed on March 28, 2022. The Sessions Court convicted and sentenced respondent No.2. In the appeal proceedings before the High Court, respondent No.2 filed an application praying for suspension of sentence, which was allowed by the High Court and during the pendency of the appeal, respondent No.2 was ordered to be released on bail, suspending the sentence imposed on him.

The Supreme Court observed: "The High Court took the view that the role attributed to respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation, therefore, the sentence could be suspended....5. There is no escape from the fact that respondent No.2 is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC and is imposed with sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life with payment of fine. He is also convicted for the offence under the Arms Act. Respondent No.2 had undergone incarceration so far for three years. His appeal has been awaiting final outcome....5.2. The nature of role played by respondent No.2 was the aspect weighed with the High Court in suspending the sentence awarded to him, the High Court was further persuaded itself to justify the suspension of sentence of respondent No.2 on the ground inter alia that that the FIR was sent to the Magistrate’s court after a gap of three days and that the original copy of the inquest report was not produced. 5.3 At the outset, it may be observed that the High Court was in evident error in resting upon the said two counts. Delay of three days in sending the copy of the FIR to the court of the Magistrate and the non-production of original copy of the inquest report could be said to be illogical considerations applied by the High Court, insofar as those aspects do not have any bearing on the credence of the prosecution’s case which was otherwise established on evidence before the Trial Court. These considerations could not have guided the application of mind of the High Court. 5.4 The High Court was swayed away to observe that the role played by respondent No.2 in the incident was of instigation only. It may be true that respondent No.2 was instigator when the deceased Krishna Behari Upadhyay was shot at, however, it is revealed from the record and the evidence, which the High Court has also accepted and observed, that respondent No.2 also had with him a country-made pistol. 5.5 As stated above, respondent No.2 had pistol with him and he along with Rajesh Kumar and other accused persons had been shouting ‘kill him’ (Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay)." 

Justice Anjaria who authored the judgment observed:"Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending appeal and release of appellant on bail. Conceptually, there is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence." 

He relied on the decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Supreme Court had emphasized that "the Appellate Court is expected to record proper reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of sentence or the order appealed, further observed that before suspension of sentence could be ordered, there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects. It was stated that order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as matter of routine." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "It is also the settled principle that the Appellate Court should not reappreciate evidence at stage of Section 389, CrPC and try to pick some lacunae or loopholes here and there in the case of prosecution. The presumption of innocence of the accused which is a principle applied in criminal jurisprudence, holds good only until the accused is tried. Once the accused is convicted at the end of the trial, the presumption of innocence does not continue."

He relied on the decision in Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.(2021) 20 SCC 818, the Supreme Court was considering the question of grant of bail during pendency of appeal at the instance of appellant who was convicted under Section, 302/149, 201 read with Section 120-B, IPC. It was observed inter alia that the High Court should be slow in granting bail to an accused convicted under Section 302/149, IPC and that once convicted, the presumption of innocence would vanish. ‘The High Court has not at all appreciated and considered the fact that the learned trial court on appreciation of evidence has convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-BIPC. Once the accused have been convicted by the learned trial court, there shall not be any presumption of innocence thereafter. Therefore, the High Court shall be very slow in granting bail to the accused pending appeal who are convicted for the serious offences punishable under Sections 302/149, 201 r/w 120-B IPC.’ (Para 11).

Justice Anjaria referred to the decision in Omprakash Sahni vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr.(2023) 6 SCC 123, Supreme Court reiterated that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted only in exceptional cases more particularly so in cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC. It was further observed that the court should consider the relevant factors like nature of accusation made against the convict, the manner of commission of crime, the gravity of the offence, etc. Distinction was brought out between grant of relief of suspension of sentence in the cases where fixed term sentence is imposed versus the cases where the convicted person is sentenced to life imprisonment, by relying on its own decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai vs. State of Gujarat (1999) 4 SCC 421, ‘When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right, suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course, if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of sentence could be of a different approach.’ (Para 3)

Even in respect of cases where the sentence awarded is for a fixed term, Supreme Court in Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 421 observed that ‘there is a caveat that if there are exceptional circumstances, then the Court may decline to suspend the sentence even in cases where fixed term of sentence is imposed’. It was specifically observed that in respect of plea of suspension of sentence where the sentence is of life imprisonment, such relief has to informed by a gross and apparent error in the judgment of the Trial Court. ‘What could be those exceptional circumstances is not something exhaustive. It is for the Court concerned to look into those exceptional circumstances as may be pointed out by the State. However, the only consideration that should weigh with the appellate court while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment is that the convict should be in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted.’ (Para 16)

Justice Anjaria underlined that "The dictum that the benefit of suspension of sentence, if at all to be granted in the cases involving conviction under Section 302, IPC, it has to be only in exception cases, is well settled in the catena of judgments. In Vijay Kumar vs. Narender & Ors.(2002) 9 SCC 366 it was observed that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC, the court should consider relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which crime is alleged to have been committed and the seriousness of offence. The view was reiterated in Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 281, Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Marashtra8, Gomti v. Thakurdas & Ors.9."

Justice Anjaria observed:"7. Looking to the crime scenario in the instant case, the murder of father of complainant-Pundit Krishna Behari Upadhyay took place inside the temple. The appellant complainant (PW2) in terms deposed that respondent No.2 had pistol in his hand. When all the accused persons came, the father of the appellant got frightened, went inside the temple. Thereupon, as is stated, the accused persons, including respondent No.2, pushed the door of the temple and made a forced entry inside, catching hold of Pandit Krishna Behari Upadhyay. The victim fell down having received gun shot injury to be in a pool of blood. As per the evidence appreciated by the Trial court leading to conviction of respondent No.2 under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, the firearm was used by Munna Singh whereas respondent No.2 with pistol in his hand was instigating. Munna Singh and respondent No.2 had firearms with them. Respondent No.2 had with him a country-made pistol. 8. It is also to be noted that two of the accused persons are absconding." 

Justice Anjaria observed: "9. In the light of the above highlighted principles applied to the facts of the present case and having regard to the relevant considerations such as nature of accusation, events in the crime and even the attribution of role of the appellant, it has to be held that the High Court should not have suspended the sentence, and releases respondent No.2. A clear error was committed by the High Court. The participation and role played by respondent No.2 in the entire commission of offence has to be viewed as grave and could not have been discounted for its seriousness to suspend his sentence imposed upon conviction under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC. 9.1 It goes without saying that observations in this order are limited to the aspect of suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 and releasing him on bail, not to influence the course of merit of the trial. 10. For foregoing reasons and discussion, impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 28.08.2024 suspending the sentence of respondent No.2 is hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 Sheo Narayan Mahto to is directed to surrender within ten days. The police authorities shall ensure that respondent No.2 is sent behind the bars within the above time permitted for surrendering. 11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed."

P.S.:Subsequent to the order of the High Court dated August 28, 2024, the last order in the case was passed on May 8, 2025 by Justice Pancholi led bench in Re.: I.A. No.01 of 2025. The 3-page long order reads:"The appellant/applicant has filed the present interlocutory application with a request that the Registry be directed to send back the Trial Court Records of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 & 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to the Court of learned ADJ-19th Rohtas, Sasaram....3. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has pointed out that one of the accused has been convicted by the Trial Court whose trial was separated and, therefore, the said accused has filed the criminal appeal before this Court. This Court called for the Trial Court from the concerned Trial Court and the record is with the Registry of this Court. However, trial of other co-accused, whose trial has been separated, is still pending before the Court and, therefore, the original record is required to be transmitted to the Trial Court. 4. In view of the aforesaid request made by the appellant/applicant, office is directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the trial of the other co-accused, which has been separated, can be proceeded further. Learned counsel for the appellant/applicant has shown willingness to pay the cost of the same. 5. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to transmit the record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 to learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram forthwith by special messenger at the cost of the applicant (informant) of this interlocutory application. 6. Registry is also directed to keep photo copies of the entire record of Sessions Trial Nos.45 of 2024 and 381 of 2024, arising out of Baghaila P.S. Case No.96 of 2021 and thereafter transmit the original record to the learned ADJ-19th, Rohtas, Sasaram so that the proceedings in the present appeal may proceed further. 7. Accordingly, this interlocutory application, i.e., I.A. No.01 of 2025 stands disposed of."

Patna High Court delivered 5 judgements on Dec. 20, Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha restores 36 year old initial judgement of Trial Court, sets aside subsequent order, passed on High Court's order

Patna High Court delivered five judgements on December 20, 202 in Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, Ashok Singh vs. State of Bihar, Brij Kumar Pandey & Ors. vs. State of Bihar, Binod Sah vs. State of Bihar and Mainuddin Mian vs. State of Bihar.

In Dasrath Paswan & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of the High Court delivered a 37-page long judgement in a 41 year old P.S. case, wherein, he concluded:"38. The impugned judgment of conviction dated  19.02.2004 and order of sentence dated 20.02.2004 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in Sessions Case No.58 of 1986 arising out of Barhiya P.S. Case No.161 of 1984, G.R. No.759 of 1984 is, hereby, set aside. 39. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed. Appellants are acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Since all above-named appellants/accused are on bail, they are discharged from their liabilities of bail bonds. Sureties stand discharged. 40. Fine, if any, paid be returned to the appellants/accused henceforth."

The appeal was preferred by the appellants-convict under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated February 19, 2004 and order of sentence dated February 20, 2004 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Munger in a Sessions case of 1986 which arose out of Barhiya P.S. case of 1984, G.R. of 1984, whereby the trial court had convicted all the appellants under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The appellants namely, Ram Sabad Paswan (since died), Rambhajju Paswan and Anuj Pawan @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died) were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs.3,000/- to each for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act. 

The appellant Ram Balak Paswan, Dasrath Paswan, Anuj @ Ramanuj Pawan (since died), Chunni Paswan and Bundi Ram were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 149 of the IPC, whereas all the appellants were further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 147 of the IPC. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The case of prosecution, as per fardbeyan of informant namely, Ramprit Pawan (PW-4), recorded by Mr. Sohan Sah, Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station was that while informant was coming to his house after taking bath from the well of Thakurbari on October 8, 1984 at about 6.30 A.M., all the appellants-accused variously armed with lathi, bhala, gadasa and firearms were cutting the bamboos standing on the land which is situated towards east of the house of the informant. The informant Ramprit Pawan forbade them from cutting the same as proceeding under Section 145 of the CrPC was pending between the parties with regard to the land on which bamboo clumps were grown. On objection, the appellants-accused became infuriated and appellant Dasrath Pawan ordered his associates to kill the informant, on which, the appellant-accused Ram Sabad Paswan (since died) fired from his country-made pistol, which hit to the informant in his back and front. The appellant Rambhajju Paswan also fired by his
country-made pistol, which hit to his right hand and shoulder as a result of which, the informant became unconscious and fell down on the ground. After some time, when he regained himself in hospital and he came to know that the accused jointly assaulted his brother Akshay Lal Paswan with garasa and lathi. The informant and his brother came to hospital for medical treatment at 10 A.M. on the same day. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Lakhisarai Police Station forwarded the fardbeyan to Barahiya Police Station for institution of a case. On the basis of fardbeyan, the Officer-in-charge, Barahiya Police Station lodged a case against the appellants-accused. 

After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the appellants-accused. The Jurisdictional Magistrate on the basis of materials collected during investigation, took cognizance of the offence and after compliance of Section 207 of the CrPC, committed the case to the court of sessions for trial and disposal in view of Section 209 of CrPC. 7. The Trial Court on the basis of materials as collected during the course of investigation explained charges to the appellants/accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, to which, they denied and pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed for trial. 8. To substantiate its case, the prosecution had examined altogether seven witnesses. 

Justice Jha noted: "12. It is pertinent to mention that the learned trial court initially acquitted the appellants/accused but, the informant being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment, preferred Criminal Revision No.523 of 1989 before this Court and in exercise of power under Section 401(3) of the CrPC, the High Court has set aside the judgment and remanded back to the learned trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7 to its correct extent. After hearing both sides, the learned trial court has convicted above-named appellants/accused and sentenced them in the manner indicated above." 

It is evident, the High Court had set aside the acquittal of the appellants/accused after hearing a criminal revision petition filed in 1989 and remanded back to the trial court for appreciation of evidences of PWs 2, 4 and 7. In compliance of the High Court's order, the trial court re-heared the case and convicted the appellants who were acquitted earlier. The name of the judge who had set aside the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court is not in public domain.

Being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants/accused/convicts preferred to appeal in the High Court. 

Justice Jha observed: "31. It appears that the statement under Section 313 of the CrPC of accused/appellants has been recorded by learned trial court in very cryptic and mechanical manner and same is not acceptable under law in view of legal ratio as settled through Sukhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab [(2014) 10 SCC 270]". In Sukhjit Singh's case Supreme Court has held: “10. On a studied scrutiny of the questions put under Section 313 CrPC in entirety, we find that no incriminating material has been brought to the notice of the accused while putting questions. Mr Talwar has submitted that the requirement as engrafted under Section 313 CrPC is not an empty formality. To buttress the aforesaid submission, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar [(2009) 6 SCC 595 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 92]. Relying upon the same, he would contend that when the incriminating materials have not been put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC it tantamounts to serious lapse on the part of the trial court making the conviction vitiated in law. 11. In this context, we may profitably refer to a four-Judge Bench decision in Tara Singh v. State [1951 SCC 903 : AIR 1951 SC 441 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 1491] wherein, Bose, J. explaining the significance of the faithful and fair compliance with Section 342 of the Code as it stood then, opined thus: (AIR pp. 445-46, para 30) “30. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of observing faithfully and fairly the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not a proper compliance to read out a long string of questions and answers made in the committal court and ask whether the statement is correct. A question of that kind is misleading. It may mean either that the questioner wants to know whether the recording is correct, or whether the answers given are true, or whether there is some mistake or misunderstanding despite the accurate recording. In the next place, it is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material circumstance which is intended to be used against him. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him. The questioning must therefore be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been occasioned. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice.”

Justice Jha relied on the decision in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat [1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933], wherein Justice Bose speaking for a three-Judge Bench highlighted the importance of recording of the statement of the accused under the Code expressed thus: (AIR pp. 469-70, para 8) “8. Now the statements of an accused person recorded under Sections 208, 209 and 342, Criminal Procedure Code are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial. It has to be remembered that in this country an accused person is not allowed to enter the box and speak on oath in his own defence. This may operate for the protection of the accused in some cases but experience elsewhere has shown that it can also be a powerful and impressive weapon of defence in the hands of an innocent man. The statements of the accused recorded by the Committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box.” 

Justice Jha underlined that this principle has been reiterated in Ajay Singh vs. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 12 SCC 341 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 371] in following terms: (SCC pp. 347-48, para 14)  “14. The word ‘generally’ in sub-section (1)(b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 of the Code was that the attention of
the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give.”

Justice Jha pointed that "32. From perusal of record, it appears that the Investigating Officer of this case has not been examined during the trial. In this context, it would be apt to reproduce relevant paragraph of the legal report of Hon’ble Supreme Court as available through Munna Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), which are as under:-.“38. First, statement of PW-3 under section 161, Cr. P.C. was recorded nearly 24 days after the incident. Since the Investigating Officer did not enter the witness box, the appellants did not have the occasion to cross-examine him and thereby elicit the reason for such delay. Consequently, the
delay in recording the statement of PW-3 in course of investigation, is not referred to and, therefore,
remains unjustified. The possibility of PW-3, being fixed up as an eye-witness later during the process
of investigation, cannot be totally ruled out”.

Justice Jha noted that though PW 4 was said to have reached the place of occurrence at 1.30 p.m. on 5-9-1985 and recovered a bullet in the blood oozing out from the injury at the hip of the dead body, no effort worthy of consideration appears to have been made to seize the weapons by which the murderous attack was launched. It is true that mere failure/neglect to effect seizure of the weapon(s) cannot be the sole reason for discarding the prosecution case but the same assumes importance on the face of the oral
testimony of the so-called eyewitnesses i.e. PW 2 and PW 3, not being found by this Court to be wholly reliable. The missing links could have been provided by the investigating officer who, again, did not enter the witness box. Whether or not non-examination of a witness has caused prejudice to the defence is essentially a question of fact and an inference is required to be drawn having regard to the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. The reason why the investigating officer could not depose as a witness, as told by PW 4, is that he had been sent for training. It was not shown that the investigating officer under no circumstances could have left the course for recording of his deposition in the trial court. 

Justice Jha observed: "It is worthy of being noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court considered the issue of non-examination of the investigating officer. In the facts of the present case, particularly conspicuous gaps in the prosecution case and the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 not being wholly reliable, this Court holds the present case as one where examination of the investigating officer was vital since he could have adduced the expected evidence. His non-examination creates a material lacuna in the effort of the prosecution to nail the appellants, thereby creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. 33. It appears that the witness examined during trial are interested and related witnesses." 

He drew on paragraph No. 32 and 33 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through Nandlal vs. State of Chattisgarh (supra), which are as under:-“32. Undisputedly, the present case rests on the evidence of interested witnesses. No doubt that two of them are injured witnesses. This Court, in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [1957 SCC OnLine SC 13], has observed thus: “11. … Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.”

Justice Jha referred to paragraph no. 4 and 5 of the legal report of Supreme Court as available through State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shamsher Singh (supra), which are as under:- “4. On an appeal preferred by the accused-respondent, the aforesaid conviction has been set aside and he has been acquitted for the offence under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 but has been convicted for the offence under Section 326 IPC and sentenced with imprisonment already undergone. 5. The High Court in acquitting the accused-respondent held that for an offence under Section 307 IPC, the court was obliged to see if the act was done with the intention or knowledge so as to cause death and since the facts do not prove such intention or knowledge on part of the accused-respondent, there cannot be an offence for attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC. It also observed that the intention has to be gathered from the entire circumstances of the case such as nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, severity of the blow or hurt, the part of the body where the injury was inflicted and so on and not merely from the end result”.

Justice Jha record4ed: "35. Taking note of aforesaid available evidence as surfaced during trial, it is an admitted position that occurrence was free fight in nature, where both parties received injuries. The case of appellant for same set of occurrence lodged by appellant side prior to this case. Police upon investigation submitted final form against appellants. Injuries of appellants, which was also of gunshot could not explain by prosecutions. I.O. of this case could not examined during trial, which also appears fatal for prosecution. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 deposed to arrived after actual occurrence. Allegation of firing appears general and omnibus out of testimony of PW-4, whereas same was stated in specified manner in FIR. PW-4 deposed that only two accused persons were carrying country-made pistol, whereas he was silent about Anuj Paswan (since died). All such unanswered events creates a doubt qua occurrence, which creates a serious doubts, the benefit of which must be extended to accused/appellants. 36. In view of aforesaid testimony of witnesses, who are related to informant (PW-4) cannot be wholly reliable as they appears interested witnesses in view of Nandlal’s case (supra). 37. Statement of appellants/accused also appears recorded in very cryptic and mechanical manner in view of Section 313 of the CrPC....." 

The judgement  concluded that the present appeal against appellant Nos. 2, 4 and 5 stands abated. "Now, this appeal survives against above-named four appellants only."