In ABC vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan passed a 4-page long order dated November 4, 2025, wherein it concluded:'' we appoint Hon’ble Justice Gita Mittal, Former Chief Justice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court to act as a Mediator so as to bring about some settlement between the parties. The parties shall get in touch with the learned Mediator and work out the necessary modalities for the purpose of mediation. The fees of the learned Mediator and other modalities shall be fixed in consultation with the parties. It shall be open for the learned Mediator to talk to the parties either in person or through video conferencing. We firmly believe that it will be in the interest of the parties to put an end to this long drawn litigation....37. We are of the view that since the parties are to sit, talk and reach to an amicable settlement, the settlement should be as a whole. In other words, what we want to convey is that the settlement should be comprehensive. 8. List after receipt of the mediation report.''
The Court's order recorded that the petitioner before it, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent No.2, at the relevant point of time, was serving as the District Superintendent of Police. Since both were posted at one station and were unmarried, they came close and developed intimacy for each other. However, later the relations went sour. This led to registration of a First Information Report for the offences alleged therein at the instance of the petitioner.
The Court observed: ''2. We take notice of the fact that the criminal proceedings ultimately came to be quashed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna vide the impugned judgment and dated 18th September, 2024. It is this order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings which has been made subject matter of challenge before us in the present Special Leave Petition.''
The Supreme Court noticed the fact that a coordinate Bench of the Supreme Court had suggested that the parties should amicably resolve the disputes. Almost 11 years have passed by. During the interregnum, the respondent No.2 got married and is now a father of two children. The petitioner remains a spinster. The order reads: ''Whatever might have happened in the past, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we believe that this legal battle with each other is not going to be in the interest of the parties. 24. We are informed that the petitioner is also now of a rank of Superintendent of Police. Both have a long service ahead. In pursuance of what fell from this Court earlier, the parties did try to talk but with no positive outcome.''
Earlier, in Pushkar Anand vs. The State of Bihar & Nirmala Kumari, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Bhabua (2025), Kaimur Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh delivered a 19-page long judgement dated September 18, 2024.
It recollected that petitioner had moved this Court for quashing F.I.R. of Mahila Police Station case of 2014 vide Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016 but during its pendency, order taking cognizance for the offence punishable under sections 376(C), 354(B), 506 and 509 of Indian Panel Code, was passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kaimur at Bhabhua. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2019 was filed in the said case (Cr. Misc. No. 17457/2016) challenging cognizance order, but Cr.Mis.No. 17457/2016 was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 17.10.2019. The petition in the High Court was directed against order dated 01.04.2019, passed in connection with Mahila Police Station Case No. 47 of 2014, by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (SDJM), Kaimur at Bhabhua in connection with Mahila P.S. case of 2014, by which cognizance has been taken for the offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. against the petitioner as well as for a direction to the court below not to proceed further after passing of the aforesaid order taking cognizance during the pendency of the present application before the High Court.
The prosecution case giving rise to the case was that the informant/ opposite party no.2 is the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Bhabhua. It was alleged by her that only two days after her joining to the post of SDPO, Bhabua, on July 21, 2014 the petitioner who was Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua started extending a friendly hand towards the informant through Facebook and WhatsApp messages. Since, the informant was posted as Sub- divisional Police Officer, Bhabhua, she developed a firm belief that the petitioner was seriously interested in marriage with her and she started talking to her family members. It was also alleged that since the petitioner started frequenting her residence, she gradually developed a close relationship with him and, thereafter, they also came into physical contact. After sometime, informant was also asked by the mother of the petitioner to convey her date and time of her birth so that chances of matching of horoscope could be explored before solemnizing the marriage. It was during this period that the petitioner and the informant developed physical relations with each other and the intimacy continued till the day, when the petitioner refused proposal of marriage stating that the horoscope did not tally and she was having "Mangla-mangli Dosh". It was further alleged by the informant that on the pretext of marriage, the petitioner tortured her mentally and physically and when he threatened to spoil her career as a police officer in his official capacity, she lodged the present case. After institution of FIR, police completed investigation and submitted charge sheet dated November 30, 2018 for offences punishable under sections 376(C), 354A, 506 and 509 of the IPC against the petitioner only. Charge sheet was not submitted against father and mother of the petitioner as the allegation was found patently false and nothing could be found against them.
The counsel for the petitioner, while placing the facts of the case, denied the accusations made by opposite party no.2 against the petitioner. He submitted that the case was lodged by opposite party no.2 only as a vendetta to the petitioner's action in taking up disciplinary proceedings against the opposite party no.2. FIR was lodged on December 29, 2014 and just prior thereto on December 27, 2014, the petitioner as a Superintendent of Police, Kaimur at Bhabua had initiated disciplinary proceeding against her vide Letter No. 402 dated December 27, 2014. Consequently, faced with such a situation, she lodged the present case making malicious and baseless allegations against the petitioner with the sole intention of not only tarnishing his reputation, but also to ruin his career as an IPS Officer. During course of investigation, on January 2, 2015 opposite party no.2 was placed before a Medical Board and was examined at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua after taking her consent. Medical Board, after due examination of the informant, submitted its report in which allegation of sexual contact was not substantiated against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner preferred pre-arrest bail petition before the High Court vide Cr.Misc. No. 20.5.2016 in which the Court, while granting interim protection to the petitioner, directed the medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. The High Court's judgement records: "It is worthwhile to state that earlier, opposite party no.2 had expressed some reservations with respect to the Medical Board which had submitted its report, saying that the medical report was neither clear nor distinct and was thus wholly false. However, this time opposite party no.2 did not appear before the Medical Board and declined to face any further medical examination (annexure 4), rather she filed an affidavit dated 7.9.2016 to the effect that she was asked to appear before the Medical Board by this Court without taking her consent for the same. She further averred that report and other materials collected during investigations are already on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage for deciding the pre-arrest bail petition. This Court, having no option, relied on the medical examination report and other materials collected on the record, confirmed the interim bail to the petitioner vide order dated 8.9.2016."
The case diary showed that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. The counsel contended that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner.
It was also submitted by the counsel of the petitioner that since the petitioner had taken administrative action against the informant and reported the matter to the Additional Director General, Police Headquarters vide Memo dated December 27, 2014, the informant in counter blast lodged the FIR against the petitioner. The counsel submitted that it can be concluded that facts of the case do not corroborate the prosecution case against the petitioner and in such condition, continuance of criminal proceeding would be abuse of process of court.
The counsel for the petitioner, formulated two issues for the consideration of the Court−
(I). Whether the offence of rape in terms of section 376 (c) IPC as alleged in the FIR is made out and;
(II). Whether there is a misconception of fact in terms of section 90 of the IPC which vitiates consent in the present case or whether there is merely a breach of promise to marry simplicitor.
The counsel for the petitioner addressed the first issue. He placed averments made in the FIR as well as the medical report of opposite party no.2 and the affidavit filed by her, flatly refusing to undergo any further medical examination, to buttress and substantiate his contention that there was no physical relation between the petitioner and informant at all. The entire edifice of prosecution case falls apart, which indisputably shows the prosecution of the petitioner.
The counsel submitted that if the allegation levelled in the FIR assuming to be true, while not admitting, then it must be borne in mind that if there was, at all, physical relation between the parties, it was purely a consensual kind because the petitioner has never resiled from his commitment to get married, rather due to circumstances beyond control of the parties, marriage could not be solemnized on account of mis-match of the Janampatrika (Janam-kundli, horoscope). It was very much evident from the FIR that informant herself informed about good behaviour and habits of the petitioner to her family members. The date of birth and Kundli of the informant was given to the petitioner’s mother for matching of Kundli and since things were moving in right direction and relation was supposed to culminate in marriage, the two got intimate but when informant’s family asked about fixing date of marriage, the same was refused by the petitioner’s family on the ground of non-matching of horoscope. In the society, matching of Janampatrika/horoscope was vital social obligation for solemnizing marriage.
He averred that if at all there was any relationship between the parties it was purely consensual. He also submitted that the consent with respect to section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. This understanding of consent has also been set out in Explanation II of section 375 of IPC.
The counsel submitted that there was a clearcut distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which was made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. He pointed out that where the promise to marry was false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the act.
1In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharastra & anr. (Cr. Appeal No.1165 of 2019 order dated 21.08.2019) and Sonu@ Subhash Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & anr. (Cr. Appeal No. 233 of 2021 order dated 01.03.2021).
He also drew attention of the Court to paragraph 9 of the judgment delivered by Supreme Court in case of Sonu (supra) which is reproduced herein under:
“9. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), while dealing with a similar situation, the principles of law which must govern a situation like the present were enunciated in the following observations:
"Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it..."
10. Further, the Court has observed:
"To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”
The counsel submitted that the contents of the FIR as well as the medical evidence left no doubt that, on the basis of the allegations as they stand, three important features emerge:
(i) The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature;
(ii) The parties were in the relationship for about a period of 5 months; and
(iii) Subsequently, the marriage couldn't be solemnised on account of mis-match of their horoscope which
was the circumstance beyond the control of the petitioner, leading to the lodging of the present FIR.
It was also the case of the petitioner that in the entire FIR, there was no allegation that the petitioner ever committed act of criminal intimidation attracting offence punishable under section 506 of the IPC. Similarly, there was no allegation against the petitioner of insulting the modesty of opposite party no.2 or uttering any words, making any sound or gesture or exhibited any object or intruded upon the privacy of opposite party no.2 which was an offence punishable under section 509 of the IPC.
The counsel submitted that no case under sections 506 and 509 of the IPC was made out against the petitioner. Thus, the punctilious analysis of the entire gamut of factual-medical evidence left no doubt with respect to the falsity and concoctedness of the allegations which unflinchingly pointed towards to the malicious prosecution of the petitioner. He submitted that the Investigating Officer of the case, in a hurry and hasty manner, without completing the investigation on all the points, submitted charge sheet relying upon few paragraphs of the case diary and even these paragraphs are accepted, then also, no case is made out against the petitioner. More so, court did not apply its judicial mind at all before passing order of cognizance alleged U/ss 376(C), 354(B), 506, 509 I.P.C. As such, allegation of inducement and commission of rape was not made out against the petitioner and in such circumstance, High Court can exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice.
The counsel for the State and the counsel for the informant/ opposite party no.2 opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The latter submitted that apart from filing the FIR, opposite party no.2 also made a complaint before the department upon which, in the light of direction of the Supreme Court for prevention of women from sexual abuse at the work place, the matter was taken up by the Internal Enquiry Committee headed by Inspector General of Police constituted under "The Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention, Prohibition and redressal) Act, 2013" and who enquired the matter in detail. During course of enquiry, statements of several witnesses were recorded by the committee and after detailed enquiry the Committee found the allegation made by opposite party no.2 to be true and hence recommended for initiation of departmental action against the petitioner. This fact would be evident from enquiry report which was communicated to the O.P no.2 on June 16, 2015.
The counsel for opposite party no.2 alleged that from perusal of enquiry report, it would be evident that petitioner not only committed sexual abuse with the opposite party no.2 but also played with the sentiment of so many girls on the pretext of marriage and such fact would be evident from an affidavit submitted before the Committee by one Richa Mishra. That apart, during course of investigation, the Investigating officer recorded statement of the concerned persons. Their statements showed that the petitioner, misusing his official position, made physical relation with the opposite party no.2 on the pretext of marriage deceitfully. After investigation, I.O submitted charge sheet against the petitioner under section 173 (2) of the Cr.P.C and thereafter considering the material collected by the IO in course of the investigation including the material available in the enquiry report of the Internal Enquiry Committee, the S.D.J.M, Kaimur at Bhabhua opined that more than prima facie material is available against the petitioner and consequently he was pleased to take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 376 (c), 354(B),506,509 of the Indian Penal Code.
On going through the impugned cognizance order, it would transpire that the S.D.J.M thoroughly perused the material submitted by the IO through his Police report and referred to the case diary in the cognizance order and thus cognizance order. From perusal of the FIR, it was reflected that there was sufficient material on record against the petitioner and it cannot be said that prima facie no case was made out against this petitioner.
The counsel submitted that the Supreme Court's decision in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 6 SCC 2014 SCC 466, held that while the High Court had the power to quash FIRs, it should be cautious in cases involving serious offenses like rape. The court emphasized that the gravity of the offense must be taken into account. Hence, no interference is required by this court at this stage.
Thr High Court observed: "20. In this case, there is specific and direct allegation against the petitioner that on the allurement of marriage, the petitioner committed rape on opposite party no.2. No sooner the FIR dated 29.12.2014 was lodged, opposite party no.2 was examined by the Medical Board at Sadar Hospital, Bhabua on 2.1.2015 after taking her consent. Medical report opines that Fourchette found intact and membrane too was found intact. Meanwhile, opposite party no.2 raised finger on the Medical report, whereupon, this Court while hearing anticipatory bail petition of the petitioner vide order dated 20.5.2016, directed for another medical examination of opposite party no.2 to be conducted by a Board of female gynecologists, nominated by the Principal or Principal In-charge/Superintendent/In-charge Superintendent, Patna Medical College and Hospital, Patna. But this time, opposite party no.2 did not turn up for her medical examination, rather she filed and affidavit dated 7.9.2016 stating that when the earlier medical report is already on the on record, hence no further medical examination is required at this stage. 21. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that opposite party no.2 was in relationship with the petitioner for quite sometime. It is also admitted that when the relationship started, both parties were major and opposite party no.2 had willingly been staying with the petitioner and established physical relation. Now, if the relationship is not working out for the reasons beyond control of the parties, it cannot be a ground for lodging a case against the petitioner for offence punishable under section 376 of the IPC. Hence, initiation of criminal proceeding by the informant against the petitioner is wholly unwarranted.''
Justice Singh relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra).
Justice Singh found substance in the submission of counsel for the petitioner that the proposal of marriage of opposite party no.2 was refused by the petitioner because of the reason which was not in control of the petitioner. Opposite party no.2 has herself mentioned in the FIR that petitioner’s parents asked opposite party no.2 to provide the information regarding time, date and place of her birth to match the Janampatrika/horoscope for solemnization of marriage and when the Janampatrika/horoscope mismatched, then only proposal of marriage was refused by the petitioner side.
Justice relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013 7 SCC 675) in which it was held that ‘there may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not alway amount to misconception of fact.’
Supreme Court in Sonu @Subhash Kumar held that the Court can consider the application for quashing under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., if there was no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. In the case in hand, it appeared from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of petitioner to marry opposite party no.2 which gave rise to the registration of the FIR.
Justice Singh observed: "The Court cannot brush aside the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that no proper investigation of the case was done. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that when the Investigating Officer asked opposite party no.2 to give certain clarifications and also to hand over her mobile phone to send it to the Forensic Science Laboratory for certification and for verification of electronic messages, sent or received either on WhatsApp or through SMS referred to in the FIR, she refused to give the same and told the IO of the case to consult her after 05.05.2016, for reasons best known to her. There is substance in the submission of learned counsel that in view of the provisions of law, without such certification, such electronic messages cannot be considered to be authentic and could not be used as an evidence against the petitioner as alleged in the FIR. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh [2013] 14 S.C.R. 713 has emphasized the importance of proper investigation in cases of serious offenses, particularly against women."
The High Court referred to the Supreme Court in a number of decisions that (1) where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. It was also been held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding was maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the same cannot make out a case against the accused. In this regard, reference is made to the decision of Supreme Court, rendered in case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604.
Will reliance "matching of horoscope" constitute a valid scientific ground for decision making?
