Supreme Court finds second anticipatory bail petition maintainable, reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

 

In Digvijay Narayan vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar passed a 4-page long order dated May 4, 2025, wherein, it reversed the order dated February 9, 2026 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. While issuing notice on April 7, 2026, by way of interim relief, the Supreme Court had issued direction for not taking coercive steps subject to cooperation in the investigation. 

The Court's order reads:"....we deem it appropriate to confirm the order of interim protection and deem it appropriate to release the petitioner on anticipatory bail....we direct that in the event of arrest, the petitioner shall be released on bail on furnishing suitable bail bonds and sureties and on such other terms and conditions as may be deemed fit by the Station House Officer of the concerned police station." 

Justice Singh's order had dismissed the second anticipatory bail petition as not maintainable, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in of G.R. Ananda Babu vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 176.  The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with a FIR dated November 29, 2024 registered at Police Station Industrial Area, District Vaishali, for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  

Justice Singh's order dated August 27, 2025 with respect to the first anticipatory bail application had rejected it. It recorded the prosecution case, wherein, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with other accused persons, had fraudulently mutated the land of informant in the name of others on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. The counsel of petitioner had submitted that petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. the petitioner was falsely implicated in this case merely because at the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as Revenue Clerk. The order had noted that the petitioner had two criminal antecedents. The order reads: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, nature of accusation and criminal antecedents of the petitioner, the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner is rejected."

Supreme Court's order has directed the petitioner to join the investigation as and when required and co-operate in the same abiding all the conditions as specified under Section 438(2) of the Cr.P.C./Section 482 of BNSS.

Supreme Court sets aside onerous condition imposed by Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma while granting anticipatory bail

In Vinay Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices M.M. Sundresh and N. K Singh passed a 4-page long order dated March 25, 2026, wherein it concluded: "5. The appeal lies in a narrow compass. While granting anticipatory bail to the appellant, a condition has been imposed by the High Court vide the impugned order to the effect that the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- to the informant. Alleging the said condition to be onerous as the High Court has not considered it in the proper prospective, the present appeal is filed. 6. We find force in the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. When the condition imposed while granting anticipatory bail is onerous, the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law, especially, when we are dealing with a case pertaining to the liberty of a person. 7. In such view of the matter, the impugned condition with respect to the payment of a sum of Rs.2,60,000/- stands set aside and the appeal is allowed, accordingly." The Court allowed the appeal after condoning the delay in case from Siwan pertaining to offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860..

In his 5-page long order dated Jnaury 23, 2025, Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma had concluded:"6. Considering the aforesaid facts and petitioner has clean antecedent, let the petitioner, above named, in the event of his arrest or surrender before the court below within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order, be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000 (Ten Thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan in connection with Mairwa P.S. Case No.03 of 2023, subject to the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure/Section 482(2) of BNSS,2023 and with other following conditions:-(I) At the time of furnishing bail bond, the petitioner shall deposit Rs.1,50,000/-(Rs.One Lac Fifty Thousand) by way of demand draft in favour of the informant and the learned Trial Court is directed to hand over the said demand  draft to the informant or his representative and petitioner shall pay rest amount of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rs. One Lac Ten Thousand) to the informant in the month of February, 2025. If the petitioner fails to pay the rest amount within the aforesaid period, the informant shall be at liberty to move before the learned court below for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. (II) Petitioner shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly represented on each and every date fixed by the Court and shall remain physically present as directed by the Court and on his/her absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, his/her bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below. (III) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail. (IV) And, further condition that the court below shall verify the criminal antecedent of the petitioner and in case at any stage, it is found that the petitioner has concealed his/her criminal antecedent, the court below shall take step for cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner. However, the acceptance of bail bonds in terms of the above-mentioned order shall not be delayed for purpose of or in the name of verification." 

Now Supreme Court has set aside the onerous condition imposed by Justice Verma.    

Supreme Court sets aside order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh

In Md. Kasim vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 4-page long order dated February 19, 2026, wherein, it set aside order dated March 19, 2025 by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh. Patna High Court  has dismissed the appellant’s prayer for bail in anticipation of arrest. 

The appellant figured as an accused in Complaint Case of 2016 dated 22nd November, 2016 under Sections 504, 406, 420, 384, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120-B/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Supreme Court observed;"6. We are conscious that process has been initiated for declaring the appellant as a proclaimed offender owing to the fact that he was absconding for quite some time; however, we are of the considered opinion that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if the appellant is directed to appear before the trial magistrate on each and every date, unless exempted. Ordered accordingly. 7. In such view of the matter, the appeal is accepted and the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 8. It is directed that in the event of the appellant being arrested, he shall be released on bail on terms and conditions to be imposed by the trial court. 9. Needless to observe, the appellant shall not, directly or indirectly, by making inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing such facts to the court. Also, it is made clear that unless exempted, the appellant shall appear in person before the trial magistrate on each and every day. If there be any breach, the protection granted hereby shall cease to operate."

Justice Singh's order rejected the petition for pre-arrest bail of the petitioner is dismissed as not maintainable. It had recorded the State's counsel that "petitioner has been declared absconder and process of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. has been initiated against him to ensure his appearance in the Court as such petitioner is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail (Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 730, State of MP v. Pradeep Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 17)

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Justice Sandeep Kumar quashes order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar

In Mr. S. Kumar @ Shailesh Kumar vs. The State of Bihar    & Anr.(2026), Justice Sandeep Kumar delivered a 29-page long judgement dated January 21, 2026 wherein, he quashed the order granting sanction for prosecution by Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar. The judgement recorded that despite valid service of notice, none appeared on behalf of Milan Kumar Sudhaka, the opposite party no.2. Justice Kumar concluded:"33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case No.238 of 2024 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned sanction order dated 28.12.2020 are hereby quashed qua the present petitioner. 34. Accordingly, the present quashing petition is allowed. "

The application was filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the order contained in memo dated December 28, 2020, passed by the Secretary, Department of Law, Government of Bihar whereby sanction for prosecution under section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was granted against the petitioner in connection with a Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 registered on May 24, 2014. Subsequently, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner moved an Interlocutory Application in 2024 seeking amendment in the prayer portion of the petition and assailed the F.I.R vide Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 and also the charge-sheet of 2021 filed against the petitioner. 

The Complaint Case of 2014 was filed on April 4, 2014 in the Court of C.J.M., Patna by the complainant namely, Milan Kumar Sudhakar in the capacity of power of attorney holder of his grandmother, Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav, against two accused persons namely S. Kumar, the petitioner and one Sitaram Chaudhary. In the complaint petition, the complainant stated that power of attorney (POA) was executed in the year 2011 and 2013 by the principal one Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav in his favour to look after her property including her family home, i.e., a three storeyed building situated at B/17, Road No. 12, Rajendra Nagar, Patna since the principal along with her family was living in the United Kingdom. It was stated that the principal had acquired the property at Rajendra Nagar, Patna from her husband, namely Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, who had passed away in the year 2008, through a registered deed in her favour, which was executed in presence of the witness namely one Kumar Indradev in the year 1985. Subsequently thep roperty was duly mutated in the name of the principal-Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav. The husband of the principal much prior to his death in the year 1999, had executed a POA in favour of the Kumar Indradev to look after the property situated at Rajendra Nagar. It was also stated that the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and her husband had two sons namely Gurvindar and Surender and one daughter Manjit Kaur.  

Later, it was alleged that on the strength of the POA when the complainant went to deposit the holding tax with the Patna Municipal Corporation, it came to his knowledge that the property at Rajendra Nagar was mutated in the name of one Kumar Gyanendra who was said to be the son of late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav, whereas he was actually the son of the aforesaid Kumar Indradeo, who was previously given POA by the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav in his lifetime. Upon learning of this illegal mutation, the complainant filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before the Bankipur Circle Office and received a response that the name of Kumar Gyanendra was mutated vide Mutation No. 288/19A/2004-05 in Circle No. 29, Holding No. 687 in the year 2005 itself. It was alleged that the illegal mutation in favour of Kumar Gyanendra was effected asserting falsely that he was the son of Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav however, he was the son of the Kumar Indradev. The complainant accordingly informed the principal Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav and thereafter upon instructions of the aforesaid principal, the complainant filed a complaint case No. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Indradeo and his son Kumar Gyanendra, wherein cognizance was taken under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC against the two persons and the complainant also filed an Appeal against the illegal mutation, before the Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation, which was numbered as Appeal No. 17 of 2012. 

The Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation had remanded the matter back to the Executive Officer for fresh consideration holding that the house owner was neither informed nor the succession was minutely examined. The Additional Commissioner also duly noted that the house owner (principal) Dr. Gyan Kaur Yadav was shown to have passed away on November 7, 2004 whereas a VISA was issued to her on December 27, 2007. 

The complainant thereafter alleged that the petitioner-the Executive Officer in connivance with other accused persons got a report dated February 16, 2013 from the Revenue Officer wherein the Kumar Gyanendra was falsely and incorrectly shown to be the son of the husband of the principal Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav and they had deliberately ignored the documents adduced by the complainant such as, family certificate issued at Darbhanga proving that Kumar Gyanendra was not the son of the husband of the principal, i.e., late Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav. It was alleged in the complaint that subsequently, the petitioner in connivance with other accused persons passed a cryptic order wherein the further proceedings were stayed till the disposal of the Title Suit No. 507 of 2011 to unduly favour Kumar Gyanandra and his faher Kumar Indradeo. It was also alleged that the accused persons in collusion with Kumar Gyanandra and his father Kumar Indradeo also issued holding tax receipts bearing the name of Kumar Gyanandra wherein his parentage was shown incorrectly as Dr. Desh Gaurav Yadav instead of his actual father Kumar Indradeo.

The C.J.M, Patna vide order dated April 5, 2014 had forwarded the complaint case under section 156(3) Cr.P.C for investigation to the Kadamkuan Police Station and thereafter the present F.I.R in Kadamkuan P.S. Case of 2014 was registered on May 24, 2014 against two accused persons including the petitioner. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was serving as the Executive Officer at the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna Municipal Corporation and under such authority and in discharge of his duties, he passed the order of stay. He submitted that the petitioner being the Executive Officer had passed the stay order dated June 27, 2013 observing that with regard to the same property situated at Rajendra Nagar a Title Suit of 2011 was also pending and the house, in question, being in possession of Kumar Gyanendra, the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide the title and therefore, had kept the proceeding of the case pending till the final disposal of the aforesaid Title Suit. He submitted that the core allegation as against the petitioner was that he had passed the aforesaid order dated June 27, 2013 which was cryptic in nature staying the proceedings before him till the disposal of the Title Suit in collusion with the opponents of the complainant for extraneous considerations, however he had emphasised that the order of stay was passed by the petitioner in exercise of his quasi judicial authority and the same can be assailed/appealed before the superior authority in accordance with law, which in fact was done and an appeal had been preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Patna Municipal Corporation. 

It was the contention of counsel for the  petitioner that merely passing an order for stay, in discharge of his official duties, could not lead to initiation of criminal proceeding on the basis of mere imputations of collusion with the beneficiaries of the mutation which was in fact carried out much prior to the petitioner even joining the post as the Executive Officer in the Circle Officer, Bankipur. The counsel for the petitioner pointed out that upon a bare perusal of the complaint petition, it would clearly manifest that the fraud was actually committed by Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo with respect to the property of the principal situated at Rajendra Nagar and the present petitioner was in no way involved in any alleged fraud whatsoever. It was also emphasised that the mutation of the property situated at Rajendra Nagar was effected in the year 2005 itself and the consequent holding tax receipts were issued in the same year in favour of Kumar Gyanendra by the then Executive Officer one R.P Gupta and pertinently the petitioner was not posted in the aforesaid office at the relevant time when the mutation was carried.

It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned sanction order was passed without considering the legal opinion sought by the sanctioning authority. Since the impugned order for sanction was passed de hors the legal opinion wherein unequivocal stand had been taken that the actions of the petitioner cannot be characterized as malafide and that the petitioner never acted beyond his jurisdiction while passing the order of stay, it was therefore submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that no grounds for granting sanction against the petitioner exists in light of the section 197 Cr.P.C. which protects the public servants from vexatious prosecutions and consequently the impugned order of sanction for prosecution is bad in law and cannot be sustained. 

In support of his submissions the counsel drew strength from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177 and Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761.

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of sanction was passed in complete violation of the provisions contained in section 2 and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Adverting to its provisions, he submitted that the petitioner acting as a quasi judicial authority was shielded and no civil or criminal proceeding against the petitioner could have been initiated since the actions of the petitioner was clearly within the ambit of bona fide discharge of his official duties. The counsel for the petitioner had also drawn attention of the High Court to section 77 of the Indian Penal Code to argue that the impugned sanction is in the teeth of the aforesaid section 77 of the IPC. He pointed that the complainant on the strength of the POA in his favour had earlier instituted a separate complaint case bearing complaint case no. 1118 of 2012 against Kumar Gyanendra and his father Kumar Indradeo, wherein the Trial Court had already taken cognizance. In the earlier complaint case the petitioner was not arrayed as an accused. It was only subsequently that the complainant had instituted this complaint case against the petitioner being the Executive Officer and the co-accused being the Revenue Officer in the year 2014. He submitted that the present criminal proceedings was initiated only to settle a personal score among the parties who are fighting over the property at Rajendra Nagar and no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Awdesh Sriwastava vs. State of M.P. reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 693.

Justice Kumar observed: "The petitioner while discharging his duty as the Executive Officer in the Circle Office, Bankipur, Patna had passed the order dated 27.06.2013 staying the proceedings of Mutation case till the conclusion of the Title Suit No.507 of 2011 since the same parties were ventilating their dispute in the aforesaid title suit for the very same property. There is no dispute that the aforesaid order dated 27.06.2013 has been passed by the petitioner in discharge of his official duty upon remand from the appellate authority." He referred to the decisions that have examined the question of applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 to revenue authorities. In this regard, the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Rajkumar Tamboli vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 3651 delved deeply into the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 and its applicability to revenue officers.

Justice Kumar observed: "....it is quite vivid from definition of Section 2 of the Act of 1985 that the petitioner was empowered to give definite judgment in revenue proceeding. The petitioner at the relevant point of time was empowered to pass an order of mutation of subject land in the names of purchasers (co-accused) under Sections 178 and 110 of the Code respectively and he would fall within the meaning of person under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1985 who is empowered by law to give definitive judgment in revenue proceeding. 23. The question for consideration would be, whether the petitioners are entitled for protection under Section 3 of the Act of 1985 ?"

In Union of India vs. Upendra Singh (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Supreme Court held that even an officer, while discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duties, is amenable to the disciplinary proceedings into his conduct in discharge of the duty.

Justice Kumar underlined that "it is patently clear that the petitioner would fall within the ambit of protections afforded by the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. The protection is obviously not absolute and the State or appropriate authority could proceed against an erring officers in terms of section 3(2) of the aforesaid Act. 31. The order of stay passed by the petitioner which forms the basis for initiating the criminal prosecution is appealable before the appellate authority and any error committed by the petitioner therein could have been rectified by the appellate authority. From the records, it appears that an appeal was preferred agianst the order passed by the petitioner. The present petitioner by his order had stayed the mutation proceedings which was before him on remand from the appellate authority since there was a dispute over the title of the subject property. If the parties to the mutation proceedings were aggrieved by the order of stay passed by the petitioner then they could have availed remedies available under the law to assail the aforesaid order of stay. A bald statement that the order of stay passed by the petitioner being in favour of one of the parties to the mutation proceedings would not suffice to initiate a criminal prosecution against the petitioner. The criminal prosecution launched solely for passing an order of stay by the petitioner while discharging his duties, in the mutation proceedings simpliciter would squarely amount to malafide prosecution. 32. Further, in the present case, the sanction order is totally silent as to the circumstances under which the protection afforded to the petitioner from vexatious prosecution are required to be stripped. Moreover, the impugned sanction order also makes no mention of any material which would warrant initiation of criminal proceeding against the petitioner for staying the mutation case proceeding until the conclusion of the Title Suit which existed for the very same subject property. The substance of why a sanction is required to be passed for criminal proceedings was however entirely missed and skipped by the sanctioning authority, more so, when the petitioner was protected under the ambit of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Therefore the impugned order of sanction suffers from clear non-application of mind and can not be sustained."

Supreme Court reverses judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha in a Arms Act case

In Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh delivered a 46-page long judgment dated November 20, 2025, wherein, it reversed the judgement by Justice Chandrashekhar Jha of Patna High Court. The judgement was authored by Justice Karol. 

The appellant was aggrieved by the refusal of Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha of Patna High Court to exercise his inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in terms of judgment and order dated May, 9, 2025 passed in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu vs. State of Bihar (2025), wherein the prayer was made to quash and order taking cognizance dated June 1,2022 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with Sahasra Sadar P.S. case of 2005 dated April 24, 2005. 

In his 24-page long judgement, Justice Jha had concluded:"....this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2022 as passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in connection with Saharsa Sadar P.S. Case No. 112 of 2005 against petitioner for the offences under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Section 30 of the Arms Act and, therefore, same does not require interference by this Court. 34. Hence, the present quashing petition stands dismissed as being devoid of any merit, including any pending petition, if any. 35. As this case was lodged in 2003 for which cognizance was taken in the year 2022, whereafter almost no progress in the trial was made in last more than two years, the learned trial court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably within six months of this order after taking this matter on Board, on day-to-day basis."

The appellant had approached the High Court praying for for quashing of cognizance order dated June 1, 2022 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa whereby the Jurisdictional Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code as well as Section 30 of the Arms Act and for quashing the supplementary charge-sheet of 2020 submitted under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC and Sections 30 of the Arms Act, as the same is based on no fresh materials was found since the filing of the original charge-sheet of 2005 as well as first supplementary charge-sheet of 2006 where the allegation was not found true. He had also prayed for quashing of the sanction order dated April 27, 2022 granted by the State Government under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the prosecution of the petitioner in connection with Saharsa P.S.Case of 2005, as the same was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court. 

The petitioner did not get any relief from the High Court. Although belated he got relief from the Supreme Court. 

Referring to Justice Jha's judgement, the Supreme Court recorded:"The High Court rejected the application under Section 482, CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses; in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in which time the said report was obviously not furnished."

Unlike Justice Jha, Justice Karol observed:"....why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second chargesheet. When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above- 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right van strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefore, can be granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v The State (2016) Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence." 

Justice Karol concluded:"On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly allowed."

The petitioner's prayer to the effect that his prosecution was not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court stands vindicated. 

The Supreme Court has issued the following directions –

(i) ‘Leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the Court must perform.

(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.

The direction above does not come based on this case alone. The Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. The Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this Judgment, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion. 

Supreme Court sets aside bail denial order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan

In Sonu Kumar @ Sonu Kumar Chaudhary vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Suryakant and Joymalya Bagchi  passed a 4-page long order dated October 31, 2025, wherein, it granted leave and set aside the 2-page long order dated March 17, 2025 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court concluded:"It is, however, not in dispute that further investigation is still going on and the appellant, after he was subjected to custodial interrogation, is presently lodged in judicial custody. In such circumstances, when investigation is yet to be completed, the conclusion of trial will doubtless take some time, and the appellant has already served some time in custody, it seems to us that the appellant can be released on bail at this stage. 3. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. "

The appellant had prayed for enlargement on bail in FIR of 2019 registered at P.S. Bettiah Town, District West Champaran under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472, 120(B)/34 IPC and Section 3 of the Bihar Protection of Interest of Depositors Act, 2002. The appellant, his brother and other family members had constituted a Cooperative Society, known as SWARN lndia Multi State Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd.. The investors were allured to invest in the Society with a promise of handsome returns. The amounts so deposited were, however, allegedly misappropriated; leading to registration of multiple FIRs against the appellant, his brother and other associates. The subject FIR was one of those cases in which the appellant was arrested on January 16, 2024. There were about nine other cases registered against him. The appellant claimed that he was neither a Director nor an authorised signatory of a bank account of the Society.  The State counsel pointed out that as per the allegations contained in the FIR, the appellant was the Managing Director of the Society. 

Upon hearing the case in the High Court, Justice Sharan noted that the petitioner along with other co-accused were said to have defalcated the money of the customers deposited in the Company Swarn India Multi Estate Credit Cooperative Society Limited. APP for the State vehemently opposed the bail petition. Justice Sharam concluded: "6. In the facts and circumstances of the case and the criminal antecedents of the petitioner, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The prayer for bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected at present." Supreme Court has set aside this order.  

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail rejection order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan

In Dharmendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Chief Justice B.R Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran passed a 2-page long order dated October 13, 2025 after condoning the delay. The order reads:'' 4. By way of an ad-interim relief, in the event of arrest, the petitioner is directed to be released on
bail...". It added: ''Needless to state that the petitioner will cooperate with the investigation and report to the Investigating Officer as and when directed to do so.'' The SLP (criminal) arose out of impugned final order dated December 2, 2024 by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court

In Dharmendra Kumar Singh vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2024), Justice Sharan had passed a 2-page long order dated December 2, 2024, wherein, he had concluded:''6. Considering the facts and circumstances of case and the nature of offence, I am not inclined to enlarge the petitioner on anticipatory bail. The prayer for anticipatory bail of the petitioner is hereby rejected.''

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending his arrest in Nautan P.S. Case No. 225 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468/34 of the Indian Penal Code. According to the prosecution case, the petitioner along with other co-accused persons are said to have committed fraud of Rs.11 lakh by opening various savings accounts, term deposits, other accounts and issuing fake deposit certificates. 

The senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was innocent and was falsely implicated in this case. The allegation levelled against the petitioner was not specific rather general and omnibus in nature. He submitted that in terms of Clause7 (xii) of the Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank Accountability Policy, the accountability of an employee is: “No accountability will be fixed for any lapse, which has not been pointed out in the two successive audit reports or four years from the date of the event (i.e. occurrence of lapse) whichever is later”. He also submitted that the departmental proceeding was still going on. The petitioner had one criminal antecedent. The APP for the State as well as the counsel for the Regional Manager, Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank, Regional Office, Siwan, Bihar, the opposite party no. 2 had opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that the investigation was still going on.

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Soni Shrivastava, grants bail

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi passed a 2-page long order dated September 17, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"it is provided that if the petitioner appears before the concerned Magistrate within three weeks from today and submits bail bonds, to the satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate, he shall be released on bail." It has issued notice, returnable on November 12, 2025. 

Before the Supreme Court, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that in respect of executing sale deed in favour of his wife by acting on a power of attorney executed by complainant’s husband when he was no more alive. The petitioner was not aware about the death of complainant’s husband. Moreover, the sale deed was executed in part performance of an earlier agreement between the parties.

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated June 18, 2025, wherein, she concluded:"by his fraudulent act, the petitioner no.1 has kept a widow running from pillar to post for her land and hence for such offence, the petitioner no.1 who has executed the sale deed does not deserve the benefit of anticipatory bail and the application is rejected with respect to petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar." 

The petitioners including Sayed Badi Asghar @Syed Badie Asghar had approached the High Court apprehend their arrest in connection with Patna Complaint Case no. 4634C of 2022 registered under sections 420, 409, 418, 423, 467, 468, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case of the prosecution was that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant Attorney in favour of petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asgar for selling his lands. It was alleged that despite the fact that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant had died and yet based on the Power of Attorney, Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar, the petitioner no.1 executed sale deed in respect of land in question in favour of his wife Sheema Nezami (petitioner no.2) and one Salma Khatoon. It was submitted that husband of opposite party no.2/complainant had made a deed of agreement with petitioner no.1 for the sale of land and subsequently, a Power of Attorney had been executed in favour of petitioner no.1 for the sale of property. The petitioner no.1 had already paid the full consideration amount in the account of husband of opposite party no.2/complainant and her son. He also submitted on their behalf that the case was purely of civil nature and the opposite party/complainant has alternative civil remedies which are being pursued by the complainant by filing a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 191 of 2022. The petitioners have no criminal antecedent and undertake to co-operate in the case/trial.

The counsel for opposite party no.2/complainant submitted that a fraud has been committed by the petitioners as petitioner no. 1 was fraudulently executed sale deed with respect to the land in question in favour of his own wife who was petitioner no.2 and one Salma Khatoon even after having knowledge of the fact that husband of opposite party no.2/complainat who had executed a Power of Attorney in favor of petitioner no.1 had already died and hence, no action could be taken on the said Power of Attorney. It was submitted that deed of agreement which was mentioned in the petition was already cancelled. 

Notably, the application for grant of anticipatory bail of the co-accused Yusuf Abdullah was already rejected by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court vide order dated September 18, 2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 41877 of 2023. 

Justice Shrivastava had observed: ''It appears that the instant case is kept pending for a long time on the ground that the petitioners would approach the opposite party no.2/complainant and get the matter settled.'' 

Supreme Court reverses anticipatory bail rejection order by Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan in a case from Khagaria

In Abhinav Pandey vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Vipul M. Pancholi passed an order dated September 8, 2025, wherein, bail was granted to the petitioner. The order reads: "In the meanwhile, in the event of arrest of the petitioner, he shall be released on bail in connection with the FIR No. 1019 of 2021, registered with Police Station-Mufassil, District-Khagaria, Bihar, if not required in any other case, subject to the satisfaction of the Arresting officer/ Trial Court. 

In his order dated February 7, 2025, Justice Anjani Kumar Sharan of Patna High Court had denied anticipatory bail to the petitioner. The petitioner had approached the High Court as he apprehende his arrest in a case registered for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 147 read with section 120B of Indian Penal Code. 

Earlier also the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner had filed before this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 5565 of 2023 but he had withdrawn and the anticipatory bail application of the petitioner was dismissed with a liberty to surrender before the court below and seek regular bail. Justice Sharan had observed: "Now, the petitioner had not surrendered before the court below and filed the second anticipatory bail application on the new ground. Considering the aforesaid fact, I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is dismissed.". Supreme Court has reversed this order. 

Supreme Court upholds order by Justice Soni Shrivastava refusing grant of anticipatory bail

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar (2025), Supreme Court’s Division Bench of Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Vijay Bishnoi passed a 2-page long order dated August 25, 2025 in the case related to a scam in the University and the alleged financial defraud by all the petitioners. . It reads:”It is also a fact that the special leave petitions preferred by Mr. Jitendra Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.7000/2025 @ D.No.22186/2025), Mr. Manoj Gupta(SLP (Crl.) No. 7168/2025 @ D.No. 24324/2025), Dr. Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No.8245/2025 @ D.No.27267/2025) and Mr. Sunil Agarwal(SLP (Crl.) No.8215/2025 @ D.No.27269 of 2025) asking pre-arrest bail have been rejected by this Court. 2) Considering all these aspects, we are not inclined to grant anticipatory bail as prayed for. Accordingly, the special leave petitions stand rejected….3) However, the officers are at liberty to take recourse as permissible.” The special leave to appeal (Criminal) arose out of impugned final judgment and order dated April 17, 2025 in Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar passed by the Patna High Court. 

In Kauleshwar Prasad Sah vs. The State of Bihar through Spl. Vigilance Unit, Patna, Bihar (2025), in her 7-page long order dated April 17, 2025, Justice Soni Srivastava of Patna High Court had concluded:”…it appears that there is strong allegation of conspiracy as against the present petitioner showing his involvement and also considering the fact that similarly situated co-accused persons have already been denied the anticipatory bail by co-ordinate benches of this Court vide order dated 13.02.2025 passed in Cr.Misc. No. 74836 of 2024, Vide order dated 08.04.2025 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 32493 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 22548 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 33718 of 2024, Cr. Misc No. 31143 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32191 of 2024, Cr. Misc. No. 32719 of 2024 and Cr. Misc. No. 83228 of 2024 and also considering the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Devinder Kumar Bansal (Supra), I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner and his prayer for bail is hereby, rejected. 12. This application stands dismissed.” 

Justice Srivastava referred to Supreme Court’s paragraphs 23-26 of the decision in Devinder Kumar Bansal vs. The State of Punjab (Special Leave to Appeal (CRL). No.3247 of 2025) reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291. It reads:  “23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations, which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of the public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice. 24. If liberty is to be denied to an accused to ensure corruption free society, then the Courts should not hesitate in denying such liberty. Where overwhelming considerations in the nature of aforesaid require denial of anticipatory bail, it has to be denied. It is altogether a different thing to say that once the investigation is over and charge sheet is filed, the Court may consider to grant regular bail to a public servant- accused of indulging in corruption. 25. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind and Robert Walpole's famous pronouncement that all men have their price, notwithstanding the un-savoury cynicism that it suggests, is not very far from truth. As far back as more than two centuries ago, it was Burke who cautioned: "Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long". In more recent years, Romain Rolland lamented that France fell. because there was corruption without indignation. Corruption has, in it, very dangerous potentialities. Corruption, a word of wide connotation has, in respect of almost all the spheres of our day to day life, all the world over, the limited meaning of allowing decisions and actions to be influenced not by the rights or wrongs of a case but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations. 26. If even a fraction of what was the vox pupuli about the magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far removed from the truth, that it is the rampant corruption indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to prosperity, undeniably it is corruption. If the society in a developing country faces a menace greater than even the one from the hired assassins to its law and order; then that is from the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government and of the political parties.” 

The petitioner had approached the Court apprehending his arrest in connection with Special Case No. 48 of 2021 arising out of Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) P.S. Case No. 02 of 2021 registered under sections 109, 120B, 201, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471,506 of the Indian Penal Code as well as sections 13(2) r/w 13 (1) (b) r/w 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the FIR, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, while working as the Vice Chancellor, Magadh University, Bodh Gaya hatched a criminal conspiracy with the assistance of Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University, the Registrar, Patliputra University private firms namely, Ms Poorva Graphics & M/s XLICT software Pvt. Ltd and other unknown accused persons and fraudulently and dishonestly cheated the Government to the extent of Rs. 20 crores during the year 2019-21 in the matter of purchase of various items related to the use of University during examination and otherwise, it is alleged that ignoring the advice of the competent officer, the accused persons raised bill to the extent of Rs. 20 crores from Magadh University and Veer Kunwar Singh University without assessing the requirement and violating the tender procedure and justification of rates etc. The Finance Officer, Veer Kunwar Singh University and Registrar Patliputra University cleared all the fraudulent bills of the private firms. The petitioner, who was officiating as the Finance Officer of Patliputra University, was deputed to Magadh University as Finance Officer by the order of the Chancellor/Governor of Bihar where he served in the capacity of Finance Officer from April 15, 2021 to July 4, 2021. The allegation against the petitioner was that he connived with the main accused, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the then Vice Chancellor and other accused persons to clear the fraudulent bills of accused nos. 3 and 4. 

The counsel for the petitioner submitted before the High Court that from bare perusal of the First Information Report, it can be inferred at the outset that the petitioner is not named in the FIR and his name has surfaced during the investigation and the charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner on 20.03.2023. It has been further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It was further submitted that being the Finance Officer, the petitioner is bound to act in accordance with the orders of the Vice Chancellor. Section 16 of the Act also reflects that the Finance Officer has no role in making any financial decisions for the University, rather he holds a formal role as a co-signatory upon the payment of cheques. It has been further submitted that the petitioner had lodged complaints with secretary, Governor Secretariat about the mishaps of the University long before the initiation of the present case. Annexure-4 to the present application has been brought on record to substantiate the said submission. 

The Special Public Prosecutor for the Vigilance (SVU) opposed the prayer for bail and has drawn the attention of this Court to the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the SVU. It has been stated in paragraphs-10, 13 and 14 of the counter affidavit that the petitioner was in connivance with the prime accused and other accused persons. There was a fraud in supply made by the accused nos. 2 and 3 and knowing these facts the Examination Controller and the petitioner signed the cheques. Hence, the petitioner is a part of criminal conspiracy due to which huge amount of Government of Bihar was misappropriated. The counsel for the Special P.P. for the SVU hence, submits that a huge loss has been caused to the state exchequer and the petitioner is part of the said conspiracy. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to the fact that the anticipatory bail application of several similarly situated accused persons have already been rejected by the High Court. In support of their contentions, the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments in Santosh So Dwarkadas Fafat vs. State of Maharastra (2017) 9 SCC 714, Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676, Aman Preet Singh vs. CBI through Director 2021 SCC Online SC 941,  Satender Kumar Antil vs. CBI & Anr. Reported as (2021) 10 SCC 773 and Mahdoom Bava vs. CBI reported as 2023 SCC OnLine SC 299. 

Supreme Court stays proceedings before Trial Court, Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refused to quash FIR in a private dispute under corporate law

In Sarita Bajaj & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta passed an order dated July 18, 2025 staying further proceedings before the Trial Court. Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court had passed a 20-page long judgement dated May 9, 2025, wherein, he concluded:"....I have no other alternative but to hold that in the instant case, the F.I.R. being Kotwali P. S. Case No. 45 of 2024, dated 18th August, 2023, cannot be quashed. 32. The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. 33. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest."

Drawing on the judgement passed by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), Principal Bench, New Delhi, Justice Chaudhari was "convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."  He observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

Sarita Bajaj, the Petitioner had invoked Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 at Kotwali Police Station in 2024 for the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Ajay Kumar Bajaj, Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to the Station House Officer of Kotwali Police Station, alleging inter alia, that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He also alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, along with other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. The parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. 

The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicated that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. It was confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, Petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. On February 27, 2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. 

On February 27, 2021, on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated August 30, 2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so. On February 27, 2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on February 28, 2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a resolution, dated August 31, 2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On April 3, 2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting.

The informant had already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in 2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated February 27, 2021 were forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs. Notably, certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition were not complied with or honoured by the informant. In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which has been registered as a Title Suit of 2023. Among other allegations, the informant alleged that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant also claimed that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. 

Under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. 

Besides this, an application was filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench in 2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400. 

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On November 8, 2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated December 4, 2023.

Notably, in the counter affidavit, filed by Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the Respondent No. 5, dated February 4, 2025, the High Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties falsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.. In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid.

However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. Later, Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Court, claiming that, as a Director of Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as August 2, 2021. In the application under Section 7 of IBC, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated September 20, 2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by NCLT, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to NCLAT New Delhi.

 

Justice Bibek Chaudhuri refuses to quash FIR because forgery is a serious offence with criminal liability, decided not to evaluate merit of allegations at FIR stage

In Sarita Baja & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Bibek Chaudhuri of Patna High Court concluded:"The issue involving forgery and a criminal investigation has not been complained of by any instrumentality of the State. The dispute is absolutely private in nature involving two full brothers and their families in respect of partition and subsequent financial irregularity of family-owned companies. Therefore, no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lies. The instant writ petition is, thus, dismissed on contest." The judgement was delivered on May 9, 2025. The two other petitioners are: Ajay Kumar Bajaj and Awi Bajaj. The other four respondents are: Additional Chief Secretary, the Home Department, Government of Bihar, Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna, Station House Officer, Kotwali, Patna and Sushil Kumar Bajaj.

The Court refused to quash the FIR lodged in Kotwali, Patna dated August 18, 2023 because "Forgery (under Section 463 IPC) and using forged documents (under Section 471 IPC) are considered serious offences with substantial criminal liability. This Court recognize that quashing an FIR for such serious offenses like forgery could undermine the integrity of the legal system and prevent the discovery of the truth. At the stage of the FIR, the Court will not evaluate the merit of the allegations. This Court believes that the police are required to investigate the facts and verify the authenticity of the documents before a final decision is made." 

The Court observed:"The writ courts often do not delve deeply into factual disputes and the evidences as to whether the signatures done on Securities Transfer Form (SH-4) was fabricated or not and so the Court can not come to the conclusion as to whether the signature is forged or not but has come across the Judgement of NCLAT, New Delhi where it is seen that the Petitioners were previously capable of producing false document."

The petitioner had invoked Constitutional writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the FIR registered on January 16, 2024 alfor the offences alleged to have been committed under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 

On January 16, 2024, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, the brother of Petitioner No. 2, had submitted a written complaint to alleging that Ajay Kumar Bajaj (son of Late Purshottam Das), Awi Bajaj (son of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), Sarita Bajaj (wife of Ajay Kumar Bajaj), and Asit Baran Paul (Chartered Accountant) were involved in fabricating documents to unlawfully transfer of shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to him, into the names of Awi Bajaj and Sarita Bajaj. He further alleged that the accused forged a letter to illegally withdraw funds from the account of Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently transferred the money to another company, Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited. The complainant, Sushil Kumar Bajaj, and the 4th accused, Ajay Kumar Bajaj, are full brothers. On February 17, 2021, both parties had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/Family Partition agreement. According to the agreement, it was decided that Bajaj Buildcon Private Limited, alongwith other associated companies, would be transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. Additionally, the parties agreed to close all existing bank accounts of the respective companies and subsequently will transfer the shares. The terms of the Family Partition clearly indicate that the first party refers to Sushil Kumar Bajaj and his family, while the second party refers to Ajay Kumar Bajaj and his family. Clause 1 of the memorandum outlines the companies that will be transferred to the first party (the informant), and Clause 2 details the companies that will be given to the second party (Ajay Kumar Bajaj) and his family. The informant has acknowledged the existence of this partition deed in his written complaint. Additionally, it has been confirmed that following the transfer of ownership, the shares of the respective companies will also be transferred to the names of the relevant parties and their families. In accordance with the agreed arrangement, petitioner No. 1, Sarita Bajaj, and Petitioner No. 3, Awi Bajaj, were appointed as Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. On 27.02.2021, the informant submitted his resignation from the Directorship of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. vide a notice dated 27.02.2021 and executed a formal instrument of transfer as required under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 2013. On the same date, i.e., on 27.02.2021, the informant executed two instruments of transfer. One instrument was executed with Sarita Bajaj, transferring 1,11,800 (One Lakh Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., which belonged to the informant, to her, in strict compliance with the terms of the family partition. It is important to note here that while the informant also resigned from Balaji Electrosteels Limited, as indicated in a notice, dated 30.08.2021, he did not transfer the shares of Balaji Electrosteels Limited, despite being obligated to do so.

On 27.02.2021, the informant executed another instrument of transfer, through which he transferred 3,20,000 (Three Lakh Twenty Thousand) shares of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. ltd to Awi Bajaj. These share transfers were carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, and the relevant details were duly communicated to the Registrar of Companies. In fact, the informant formally surrendered the shares to be transferred, and a certificate of transfer was subsequently  issued. The instruments of transfer were properly stamped, executed in the presence of witnesses, and have never been contested or disputed previously. It is important to note that on 28.02.2021, a meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held, during which it was resolved to accept the informant's resignation from the Directorship of the company.

Notably, Ajay Kumar Bajaj was authorized to file DIR-12 and any other required documents with the Registrar of Companies, as per the provisions of the Companies Act. Similarly, another Board meeting of Balaji Electrosteels Limited took place, and through a  resolution, dated 31.08.2021, the informant's resignation from the company was formally accepted. On 03.04.2021, another meeting of the Board of Directors of Bajaj Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. was held. The informant claims that he was not notified, informed, or made aware of the meeting the informant has already initiated proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under C.P. No. 250 KB/2022, seeking a declaration that the instruments of transfer, dated 27.02.2021 are forged and illegal, along with other related reliefs.

It is important to note that certain terms of the Memorandum of Family Partition have not been complied with or honoured by the  informant.

In response, Ajay Kumar Bajaj filed a suit for partition in the Court of Sub-Judge-1, Patna, which was registered as Title Suit No. 02 of 2023.

The informant alleges that Kanika Buildcon Private Limited took a loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000.00 (Nine Crore Thirteen Lakh) only from Mandyati Dealcom Private Limited for the period between 2010 and 2017. The informant further claims that according to their understanding, the loan does not incur any interest. It is important to note that under the terms of the family partition, Kanika Buildcon was transferred to the informant, while Mandyati Dealcom was transferred to Ajay Kumar Bajaj. As a result, the rights and liabilities associated with the respective companies were also transferred to the respective parties. Ajay Kumar Bajaj sent a letter under the provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, demanding that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. pay an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only. Additionally, an application has been filed by Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. against Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. before the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, under CP (IB) No. 327/KB/2022, seeking recovery of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- (Eighteen Crore Thirty Seven Lakh Fifty One Thousand Four Hundred) only, which includes both the principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and interest of Rs. 17,15,01,400/-.

During the proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, it was admitted that Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. owes Rs. 1,22,50,000. On 08.11.2023, the Tribunal admitted the application and initiated the insolvency resolution process for Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. Kanika Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, registered as Company Appeal (AT) No. 1540 of 2020. In connection with this, a demand draft for Rs. 1,22,50,000/- was handed over to Mandyati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., as evident from the order, dated 04.12.2023.

The Court found that the accused individually and unlawfully  transferred the share of Respondent No. 5 (the informant) amounting to Rs. 1,98,50,000/- to Awi Bajaj (Petitioner No. 3), and Rs. 69,10,000/- to Sarita Bajaj (Petitioner No. 1). These transfers were made using forged share transfer deeds. The transfer was not authorized by the Board of Directors, nor were the transferees’ signatures obtained.

Although the transfer of shares was recorded with a Board Resolution, dated April 3, 2021, Respondent No. 5 (the informant) was not notified of the meeting, nor were the transferees informed. In collusion with C.A., Asit Baron Paul, the accused parties alsified the share transfer, and forged documents were submitted, which are now part of the records at the Register of Companies.

In regard to the loan amount, being levied on the Kanika Buildcon (which is operated by Respondent No. 5) the Respondent submits that before the partition, both the petitioners and Respondent No. 5 (the informant) jointly handled the company and financially supported each other. As part of this arrangement, Kanika Buildcon managed by Respondent No. 5, took a loan/advance of Rs. 9,13,00,000/- from Mandyati Dealcom, owned by the accused (petitioners), between September, 2010 and April, 2017, which was mostly repaid. However, after the family partition, Mandyati Dealcom unexpectedly demanded Rs. 18,06,20,352/- (eighteen crores, six lakhs, twenty thousand, three hundred and fifty-two), while only Rs. 1,22,50,000/- remained outstanding against the original loan of Rs. 9,13,00,000/-. 

Later on, the Respondent No. 5 discovered that Ajay Kumar Bajaj had filed a false case in the Company Kanika Buildcon, he had written a letter to Sushil Bajaj (Respondent No. 5/informant), the then Director of Mandyati Dealcom, accepting a loan of Rs. 10,00,00,000/- with interest. For the same, an application was filed under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the present Petitioners in December, 2022, claiming an amount of Rs. 18,37,51,400/- which include principal amount of Rs. 1,22,50,000/- and the interest of 17,15,01,400/- till 31.07.2022. Date of default for the same was mentioned as 02.08.2021. In the application under Section 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Appellant claimed that conditions of loans were set out in writing in letter, dated 20.09.2010, written by Director of the Corporate Debtor Company to the Financial Creditor. The matter was first adjudicated by National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench and later went in appeal to National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. 

It finding reads: “24. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was Director from 12.05.2014 Buildcon Private Limited' i.e.. the Corporate Debtor. Letter dated 20.09.2010, which is sheet anchor of the Financial Creditor to contend that there was interest component of 12% P.A. clearly becomes unauthorised and unreliable. Ajay Kumar Bajaj was not Director on 20.09.2010 of the Corporate Debtor and could not have written to the Financial Creditor, containing the terms and conditions of loan whereas no loan was ever extended by Financial Creditor to the Corporate Debtor of the terms and conditions as contained in the Letter dated 20.09.2010. Letter dated 20.09.2010 was impeached and termed as fabricated Letter.” 

It also found: "30. The sequence of the event and transaction between the Parties clearly proves that transfer of the amount by Financial Creditor to the Appellant were done by one Family Company to another Family Company and was not by way of loan nor any disbursal for any time value of money has been proved from any material on the record.” 

Taking note of these findings, the High Court observed that it "is convinced that the allegation made by the Petitioner for outstanding loan is frivolous as the Learned Court has already adjudicated the matter in detail and has come to its finding."

Justice Arvind Singh Chandel orders re-consideration dismissal order

In Dilip Kumar vs. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Justice Arvind Singh Chandel concluded:"Considering the submissions made by both the counsels, the petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach before the respondents who shall re-consider the order of dismissal of the petitioner in the light of mandate of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases so referred earlier herein. It is further directed that the competent authority will exercise and conclude the proceeding as early as possible probably within 60 days from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this Court and pass a reasoned order." It added that the petitioner was granted a liberty to approach the Court again if occasion will arise subsequently. The petition was disposed of. The judgement was delivered on May 1, 2025.

The  petitioner had prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ, order, direction or directions in nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the concerned respondents to set aside the impugned order dated 15.10.2016 dismissing the petitioner passed by the S.P. Kaimur (Bhabhua) in Departmental Proceeding and also set aside the impugned order passed by the DIG Shahabad Range in appeal of petitioner on 23.12.2016. He also prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ order or direction in nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the concerned authorities to reinstate the petitioner on his own post with all consequential benefits, in term of his acquittal in alleged Criminal Case by the Trial Court. He sought issuance of an appropriate writ order or direction in nature of Mandamus directing and commanding the concerned respondent to reinstate the petitioner on his own post with all consequential benefits, in term of his acquittal in alleged criminal case by the Trial Court as the others have been benefited in similar matter in respect of High Court's order/judgments as well as Supreme Court Judgments. 

The other respondents are: Director General-Cum- I.G. of Police, Bihar, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Shahabad Range, Dehri-On-Sone, Rohtas. Superintendent of Police, Kaimur (Bhabhua). The counsel submitted that the matter of the petitioner is squarely covered with the observations made in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Ors. 1999 (3) SCC 379, G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujrat and Ors. 2006 (5) SCC 446 and Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 2024 (1) SCC. 

These referred judgment passed by the Supreme Court, which has been relied upon by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court also in the case of Prakash Kumar Paswan vs. The State of Bihar in CWJC No. 4084 of 2020.

... 

Patna High Court sets aside judgment by Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna in Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur, Saharsa case

In Vishwanath Gangul v. State of Bihar, Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar, Patna High Court found force in the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. He inferred that the submissions of the Vigilance is devoid of any merits. By its judgement, the High Court set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated February 7, 2012 passed by Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna in connection with Special Case No. 7 of 1998, arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 7/1998. It acquitted all the appellants of all the charges. They were discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds.

The appeals were filed against the judgment of conviction and order of Special Judge, Vigilance-II, Patna, whereby and whereunder the accused appellants and others were found guilty and convicted and convicts Kapildeo Narain Prasad Sinha, Vishwanath Ganguli, Shashinath Jha, Deep Narain Mandal and Anil Kumar Rai were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 467 I.P.C, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 468 I.P.C, rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 471 of the I.P.C. The convicts Kapildeo Narain Prasad Sinha, Vishwanath Ganguli, Shashinath Jha and Deep Narain Mandal were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 13(10(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The convict Anil Kumar Rai was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The case of the prosecution was that an inquiry was conducted by the Crime Investigation Department and it was found that the estimate was prepared in the year 1986 for capital maintenance of Unit No. II of Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur, Saharsa under the supervision of Larson & Turbo Company, Calcutta. This estimate was prepared by the engineers of Larson & Turbo after physical verification of Unit No-II at Birpur. This estimate was prepared for Rs. 5,75,795/-, but the file relating to the said estimate could not return from Head Office, Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB), Vidyut Bhawan, Patna to Birpur and then in November, 1988, on the same basis, another estimate was prepared for Rs. 6,36,852/-. There was difference of time of one year and eleven months in between the first and second estimate and during that period there was price rise and due to which the amount of second estimate was raised. The estimates were prepared by the local Executive Engineer, Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer. 

The second estimate was sent to Chief Engineer, Hydal and Investigation S.B. Ram for its acceptance, who sent it to the then Project Manager, Jal Vidyut Pratishtan, Sikidri K.P. Sinha and Executive Engineer (Civil) Ranchi V.N. Ganguli. These two persons arbitrarily enhanced the estimate to Rs. 8,93,330/- without obtaining price list of the articles. In enhancement of the estimate cost, the role was played by S.P. Ram, K.P. Sinha, V.N. Ganguli and D.N. Mandal, the then Executive Engineers, Koshi Hydal Power Station. It was also alleged that Phulanand Jha, the then Electrical Execution Engineer (now dead) was also one of the associates in enhancement of rate of estimate. D.N. Mandal was camping in Ranchi from Birpur only for this work. The second estimate of Rs. 6,36,852/- was also prepared by him and again a third estimate of Rs. 8,93,330/- was prepared in connivance of D.N. Mandal and other officials. In the file relating to the estimate which was sent to Chief Engineer Ranchi for its acceptance, it was specifically provided that the basis of estimate is Larson & Turbo but the accused persons did not obtain any rate of articles from Larson & Turbo and arbitrarily they enhanced the estimates. 

It was alleged that the materials required for capital maintenance of the second unit was purchased from the market without giving any advertisement or without obtaining any quotation, and as such, the accused persons arbitrarily enhanced the amount of third estimate. The accused persons even did not contact the Larson & Turbo company at the time of preparation of estimate. After that the work was got done by M/s Gaurav Constructions, Birpur on the basis of third estimate and its payment was made by Chief Engineer, Hydal and Investigation, Ranchi. M/s Gaurav Constructions & Company is not authorized for the work, rather it works as middleman and in fact the work was got done by technically expert firm in Ranchi.

On the basis of this report, Vigilance P.S. Case No. 7 of 1998 was registered under Sections 120(B), 420, 468, 467, 471 of the IPC, Section 5(2) r/w 5(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1947, corresponding to Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted against altogether six accused persons above named under the aforesaid sections and thereafter cognizance was taken and the accused persons were put on trial. 

The counsel of the Vigilance has submitted that three estimates were prepared for capital maintenance of Unit No-II of Koshi Hydal Power Station, Birpur. The difference of amount in first and second estimates was due to time gape of one year and eleven months and price rise during that period. The first and second estimates are not under allegation in this case because it were prepared under the assistance of Larson @ Tubro company. However, the third estimate was prepared by the accused persons in connivance with each other without consultation of Larson @ Tubro Company, whereas it was specifically provided that estimate was to be prepared with the assistance of Larson @ Tubro and price fixed by it. 

Notably, Sant Kumar Sharma, the Investigating Officer (IO) has also stated in his evidence in para-5 that during the course of investigation, he came to know that the estimate was to be prepared with the assistance of Larson @ Tubro and the work was to be done by it, but in spite of that the accused persons did not follow the mandate without assigning any reason in this regard and arbitrarily prepared the third estimate enhancing the cost. 

The counsel for the Vigilance had submitted that the work was to be done by Larson @ Tubro company, but in spite of that the accused persons did not prefer to get the work done by Larson @ Tubro without assigning any reason in this regard and they arbitrarily got the work done by Gaurav Construction company. From the materials available on record, it is apparent that the accused persons prepared third estimate enhancing the amount of second estimate arbitrarily without any valid reason in connivance with each others and for their own benefit which caused loss of Rs, 2,56,478/- to the BSEB. The appellant's counsel submitted that prosecution was required to prove with cogent evidence of material but the entire case is based upon surmises and conjecture. The Court found appellant's submission to be convincing.