Supreme Court makes its interim order absolute, grants protection from coercive steps

In Manoj Kumar Nirala & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma passed a 3-page long order dated May 4, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....we do not propose to make any direction other than what we had observed in the notice issuing order, i.e., the petitioner shall appear before the Trial Magistrate on each and every date trial is fixed by the Trial Magistrate, unless any exemption is granted to him. The interim order is made absolute. 6. We further make it clear that so long the petitioner continues to abide by the aforesaid condition, no coercive step will be taken against him for securing his personal appearance." In the interim order dated April 9, 2026, the Court had directed that "the petitioners shall not be arrested in connection with Complaint Case No. C-889 of 2024 filed before the Chief Judicial 2 Magistrate, East Champaran at Motihari in 2024 under Sections 406, 420, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, subject to the condition that they appear before the trial magistrate on each fixed day." 

The SLP arose out of impugned final order dated March 12, 2026 passed by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of the Patna High Court. The counsel for Sonu Kumar, the respondent no.2-complainant placed before the Supreme Court, an order dated April 23, 2026 passed by a Coordinate Bench in Om Prakash Chhawnika @ Om Prakash Chabnika @ Om Prakash Chawnika vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. S.L.P. (Crl.) No.16221 of 20251. On perusal of the order dated April 23, 2026, the Court recorded its concurrence with the views expressed by the Coordinate Bench.

The Court observed: "....we may observe that the special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna rejecting his application for anticipatory bail. In view of such rejection, the petitioner is now under an apprehension of being arrested by the police even though no warrant of arrest had been issued under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On facts, therefore, at the time the petitioner applied for anticipatory bail before the High Court, he could have no reasonable apprehension of being arrested in connection with trial of a private complaint. The petitioner invited trouble for himself by unsuccessfully applying for anticipatory bail before the High Court." 

The case had arisen out of PS. Case of 2024 from Thana-East Chanparan. In his 3-page long order dated March 12, 2026, Justice Singh had rejected the prayer for anticipatory bail of petitioners upon considering the nature of accusation and bank statement. Apprehending their arrest in a complaint case, punishable for the offence under Sections 406, 420, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners had approached the court. As per complaint petition, these petitioners had offered to sell their 10 dhur land to the complainant on payment of total Rs.30,00,000/-, whereupon, the complainant paid total Rs.29,88,222/- to these petitioners, but despite receiving the said money, these petitioners did not execute the sale-deed and further demanded Rs. 20 Lakhs from the complainant. Thereafter, when the complainant demanded his money, these petitioners did not return the same and also threatened the complainant to kill.

The counsel for the petitioners had submitted that petitioners are innocent and committed no offence. They were simply a victim of false implication. He had submitted that petitioners have not taken any money from the opposite party no. 2 in lieu of selling his land. As a matter of fact, the complainant/opposite party no. 2 had taken ornaments from the shop of petitioners and when petitioners demanded their money, the complainant has filed this false complaint case. The counsel for the complainant/opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the prayer for anticipatory bail and submitted that petitioners had cheated the complainant by taking a sum of Rs. 29,88,222/- from him, out of which, complainant paid Rs. 24,88,222/- in the bank account of petitioners and Rs. 5 lakhs in cash. In support of his submission, counsel for  the opposite party no. 2 had annexed bank statement of complainant/O.P.No.2 to supplementary counter affidavit.
 

Supreme Court modifies anticipatory bail denial order by Justice Sandeep Kumar

In Putul Rai @ Putul Devi vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan passed a 3-page long order dated May 5, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"....this Court has deprecated the practice of the High Court to direct the applicant to surrender and apply for regular bail while rejecting the anticipatory bail prayer. 5. In such circumstances, we do not find a good reason to entertain the prayer for anticipatory bail. However, we deem it appropriate to expunge the direction in the impugned order which requires the petitioner to surrender and apply for regular bail though, it goes without saying that if the petitioner has been required by the Complaint Court to appear before it, the petitioner must comply with such a direction. 6. With the aforesaid observations, this special leave petition stands disposed of." The High Court's 3-page long order dated February 9, 2026 was passed by Justice Sandeep Kumar.  

Justice Kumar's order had rejected the anticipatory bail application and the petitioners were directed to surrender before the Court concerned within a period of two weeks from the date of the order.

Supreme Court observed:"2. It is not stated that the Court where the complaint proceedings are pending has issued coercive processes, such as non-bailable warrant, to secure the presence of the petitioner. In such circumstances there exists no material for the petitioner to apprehend her arrest." 

It recalled it decision in Om Prakash Chhawnika alias Om Prakash Chabnika alias Om Prakash Chawnika vs. State of Jharkhand and Another 2026 SCC OnLine SC 676, wherein, the Court observed:“10. Once the Court takes cognizance and issues summons, all that the accused has to do is to appear before that Court and join the proceedings. Why should the accused go before the Sessions Court or the High Court, as the case may be, and pray for anticipatory bail? Police has no power to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless there is a non bailable warrant issued by that Court along with the summons.”

The petitioner had approached the High Court apprehending arrest in connection with a Complaint Caseof 2023 instituted under Sections 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code  As per prosecution case, the allegation against the petitioner and her husband was that they had entered into agreement for sale and have cheated the complainant of Rs. 14,60,000/.  The counsel for the petitioner had submitted that petitioner was innocent and she was the wife of co-accused, Bhushan Rai, who was granted anticipatory bail by the Court below. He submitted that the petitioner also deserves anticipatory bail. Since the petitioner had not taken any amount, she was entitled for grant of bail. It was also submitted that she being the wife of the co-accused was not involved in the crime. 

Justice Alok Kumar Pandey accepts unconditional apology from Advocate P.R. Singh for inadvertent mistake, recalls 2018 order by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi

In Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh vs. The State of Bihar (2026), Justice Alok Kumar Pandey delivered a 30-page long judgement dated March 26, 2026, wherein, he concluded:"43. From perusal of record, it is evident that occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. The appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Hence, to put the appellant in jail for remaining period is too harsh as appellant is aged about 90 years. Hence, the court is of the view that if sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone that would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the period already undergone. 44. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant appeal stands partly allowed. 45. The interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. 46. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Superintendent of the concerned jail for compliance and for record. 47. The records of this case be also returned to the concerned trial court forthwith." 

Justice Pandey observed: "42. So far as sentence of appellant under Section-324 of I.P.C. is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged about 90 years, he is a first offender and appellant has remained in judicial incarceration for one year, one month and nine days. Occurrence is of the year 2005 and appellant has already suffered 21 years in litigation and he has suffered mental agony of facing the trial since 2005 and he has lost his precious time being a first offender. Hence, if the appellant is sentenced to the period undergone, that would meet the ends of justice." 

An  Interlocutory Application was filed on behalf of the appellant for recalling the order dated November 27, 2018, wherein it was submitted that appellant of the appeal namely, Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh was still alive. It was also submitted that due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication, counsel for the appellant inadvertently informed the Court that the appellant had expired, whereas in fact, it was the father of the appellant who had died and not the appellant. It was also submitted that the incorrect statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and no benefit could have accrued to the appellant by making such a submission. However, an unconditional apology was also  tendered on behalf of the appellant for the inadvertent mistake. Prabhat Ranjan Singh was the counsel for the appellant who had made the inadvertent mistake. The Court was satisfied that the incorrect statement was made due to a bona fide misunderstanding arising out of a telephonic communication. 

The November 2018 order reads:"It has been submitted at the end of the learned counsel for the appellant that sole appellant Akhilesh Prasad @ Akhilesh Singh is dead. It has further been submitted that as fine has also been inflicted apart from substantial sentence whereupon, the siblings of appellant (since deceased) intent to proceed with instant appeal and so, substitution is needed and for that an adjournment of four weeks be granted. List accordingly. During midst thereof, the concerned should take proper step." Notably, it was the father of the appellant who had died, not the appellant. 

Accordingly, the 1-page long order dated November 27, 2018 by Justice Aditya Kumar Trivedi was recalled by Justice Pandey. The Criminal Appeal was restored to its original file and number. and I.A. No. 3 of 2018 was allowed. 

The appeal was directed against the judgment of conviction dated January 15, 2009 and order of sentence dated January 17, 2009 passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-IV, Jehanabad in Sessions Trial No. 566 of 2006/138 of 2006, arising out of Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 (G.R. Case No. 413 of 2005) whereby and whereunder the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 447, 341 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years along with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 307 of IPC and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month in each Sections 447 and 341 of IPC. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 

As per prosecution case, the informant Bharteshwar Prasad (PW-6), while undergoing treatment at the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar, gave his fardbeyan before A.S.I. Balmiki Singh of Islampur Police Station on March 21, 2005 at about 10:30 A.M., stating inter alia that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house at village Keur from Islampur Bazaar. As soon as he opened his door, his co-villager Akhilesh Prasad (appellant), armed with a farsa, came to his door along with two unknown persons and abused him in filthy language. Upon protest by the informant, the accused persons disclosed that the informant used to demand the outstanding rent from the wife and sister of the appellant, who had been residing in the informant’s house at Islampur without paying rent for the last two and a half years. On this issue, the accused/appellant allegedly threatened the informant that he would teach the informant and his son Arun such a lesson that they would forget to demand the rent. After a brief altercation, the appellant Akhilesh Kumar, who was having a farsa in his hand, assaulted the informant by giving a farsa blow on his head with an intention to kill him. Due to the assault, the informant sustained bleeding injuries and he became unconscious. He raised alarm for help upon which the local residents assembled at the place of occurrence. After seeing them, the accused persons fled away. The informant was taken to the clinic of Dr. Pravin Kumar at Islampur by the neighbours for treatment. During the course of treatment, he gained consciousness. On the basis of fardbeyan given by the informant/PW-6, Hulasganj Ghosi P.S. Case No. 67 of 2005 dated March 23, 2005 was registered for the offence under Sections 447, 504, 341, 323, 324 and 34 of the I.P.C. Routine investigation followed. Statement of witnesses came to be recorded and on the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 326, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Thereafter, the trial court took cognizance under the aforementioned Sections of the IPC. The case was committed to the court of sessions after following due procedure. The  trial court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 447, 341, 307 and 34 of the IPC. Charges were read over and explained to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined all together seven witnesses. 

Justice Pandey observed:"The presence of injured witness/informant at the place of occurrence cannot be discarded as he is sufferer of crime and has supported the story of prosecution on the point of place of  occurrence, time of occurrence and manner of occurrence. As such, even if the Investigating Officer of
this case has not been examined, the whole prosecution story cannot be thrown out in a case where the place of occurrence is otherwise proved. Even if some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies are found in the evidence of prosecution-witnesses regarding manner of appearance of some of the witnesses, the whole story of prosecution cannot be thrown out when crux of the prosecution story is quite intact and
supportive of manner of occurrence, time of occurrence and how the injured/informant suffered injuries. 

Justice Pandey relied on para 22 of the Supreme Court's decision in Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2011 SC 280, which reads: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to
discredit an injured witness."

He drew on para 30 of the Court's judgment in Mano Dutt & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 79, which observed as follows:-"30... Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain, protect the real culprit."

In State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand & Ors. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 629, a similar view was reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. 

Justice Pandey considered as to whether the act of the appellant would attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code or not. "36. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 307 IPC, intention or knowledge to cause death is the essential ingredient. Mere causing of grievous injury by a sharp cutting weapon is not sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, unless intention or knowledge to cause death is clearly established." 

The judgement reads:"37. It has rightly been admitted by P.W. 6/informant that there was no intention on the part of appellant regarding causing death as despite having full opportunity, the appellant did not commit any act of assault repeatedly. The very act of appellant clarifies that the intention was not to kill the informant/victim and, at best, inference can be drawn with regard to causing injury to informant. Considering the fact that only a single blow was inflicted, there was no repetition of assault and there is absence of clear evidence regarding intention or knowledge to cause death, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is quite tenable and sustainable in the light of given facts and circumstances of the case that from the materials on record, only offence under Section-324 of I.P.C. can be made out and, as such, conviction of appellant under Section-307 of I.P.C. is not sustainable. 38. In the background of the discussions made hereinabove and on taking an overall view, the impugned judgment is varied only to the extent that the conviction of appellant stands modified to that under Section-324 of I.P.C. 

In absence of evidence, no offence was made out under Section 341 of the IPC, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-341 of I.P.C. There was no allegation of criminal trespass against the appellant either in the initial version of the prosecution-story or in the evidence of the prosecution-witnesses, including the informant. The informant’s version in the initial version of the prosecution story as well as in his evidence is that on March 20, 2005 at about 8:00 P.M., he returned to his house and as soon as he was opening the door of his house, the accused Akhilesh Prasad came and assaulted him on his head by means of farsa. Hence, it was evident that the incident of assault took place outside the door of informant’s house. In view of the above, no offence is made out under Section 447 of the IPC. Accordingly, appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section-447 of I.P.C.

Supreme Court's Division Bench sets aside order by Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, Partha Sarthy, gnoring Court's 3-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb?

In Dhan Jee Pandey vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices R. Mahadevan and A. Amanullah delivered a 21-page long judgment dated April 10, 2026, wherein, it concluded:"...The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law....The impugned order granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 is set aside. Consequently, the bail bond furnished by Respondent No. 2 stands cancelled. He is directed to surrender before the concerned trial Court within a period of two weeks from today, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps to secure his custody in accordance with law." The judgement was authored by Justice Mahadevan. The impugned 5-page long order dated order dated November 22, 2024 in Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ vs. The State of Bihar (2024) was authored by High Court's Division Bench of Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Partha Sarthy. The case had arisen out of PS. Case No.-4/2016.  

Justice Prasad had authored the High Court's order. His reasoning appears defensible in the light of the decision in Union of India v. KA Najeeb AIR 2021 SC 712, 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered on February 1, 2021. The relevant part of para 18 of the judgement reads:

“... at the commencement of proceedings, courts are expected to appreciate the legislative position against grant of bail but the rigours of such provision melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence…”

The decision in Najeeb's case “lays down the constitutional approach arising from Article 21, whereas Watali (supra) explains the statutory approach arising out of Section 4-3(D)(5) of UAPA” (para 21 of Mohamad Hakim v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2021 SCC Online Del 4623. In its decision in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, delivered by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2019.

  

The judgement by Justice Mahadevan reads: "A perusal of the record indicates that the prosecution case is founded on ocular evidence, which has been duly appreciated and accepted by the trial Court. Without considering the same in a proper perspective, the High Court erred in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2 and released him on bail. 19. The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. 20. It is further evident that the High Court has embarked upon a selective consideration of certain aspects of the prosecution case, which in substance amounts to a premature reappreciation of evidence. Such an approach is directly contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Om Prakash Sahni (supra). 21. As held in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (supra), undue weight cannot be accorded to the period of incarceration or the pendency of the appeal in isolation, particularly where the conviction is founded on credible evidence. 22. The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. 23. Additionally, material has been placed to indicate that Respondent No. 2 has allegedly attempted to intimidate the appellant by issuing threats and initiating false cases. The explanation offered on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that such allegations are motivated, does not inspire confidence of this Court, particularly at this interlocutory stage. 24. Having regard to the seriousness of the offence, the nature of the evidence as accepted by the trial Court, the absence of any apparent infirmity in the judgment of conviction, and the settled legal position governing suspension of sentence, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in granting suspension of sentence to Respondent No. 2. The impugned order, therefore, warrants interference by this Court." 

 

Notably, Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices V.R. Krishnaiyer and N.L. Untwalia in State of Rajasthan vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308 held:"The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court." Justice Mahadevan's judgement has taken note of  

Justice Mahadevan relied on Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana vs. Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, wherein, the Court held that suspension of sentence in serious offences must not be granted as a matter of routine, and that the appellate court must apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the findings recorded by the trial Court. The relevant paragraphs are: “6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said Court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.….9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [(2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case [(2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court while passing the impugned order." Notably, Justice Mahadevan's judgement does not refer to the subsequent decision of 2021 in Najeeb's case.  

It is crystal clear from the decision in Najeeb's case that the settled position of law is that the restriction on grant of bail will hold at the initial stages, but as time progresses the statutory restrictions, which “draw this justification on the premise that trial in such cases would be concluded expeditiously” gets diluted. It has been underlined by the Bombay High Court in Vinay Vivek Aranha vs. Union of India and another, (BA 2641/2021).

Significantly, a judgement delivered in ignorance of a relevant statutory position is deemed to be per incuriam. In para 183 of the Supreme Court's decision in AR Antulay v. RS Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602) held that a decision set aside would “demand the decision of its precedent value”. In para 41 of its decision in State of UP and Anr. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. (1991 4 SCC 139) cited from page no. 153 of Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. that a “decision passes sub-silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present in its mind”. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court (1980) 3 SCC 682), it held that the “Supreme Court may not be said to declare the law on these subjects if the relevant provisions were not really present to its mind”.

The criminal appeal was filed in the Supreme Court by the appellant/informant challenging the judgment and order dated November 22, 2024 passed by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1180 of 2018, whereby, the High Court, during the pendency of the appeal, had suspended the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Respondent No. 2, Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ and released him on bail. The prosecution case was that on the basis of the written information (fardbayan) of the appellant /informant, namely Dhan Jee Pandey, Buxar P. S. case dated January 4, 2016 was registered under Sections 302, 307, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 against Respondent No. 2 and other accused persons. It was alleged that on January 4, 2016 at about 04.15 p.m., the appellant, along with his elder brother (deceased), Ramashankar Pandey @ Jhamman Pandey, was proceeding towards his village on a motorcycle. On the way, they stopped at a betel shop located at the village chatti. At that time, the appellant’s father-in-law, Mukteshwar Mishra, also arrived and engaged in conversation with the appellant at a short distance from the shop. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 along with other accused persons reached the spot and began abusing the deceased. Immediately thereafter, two accused persons, namely Shiv Jee Pandey and Ghanshyam Pandey, caught hold of the deceased, while the others took out firearms. Shiv Jee Pandey then fired a gunshot at the head of the deceased, causing fatal injuries. The other accused persons also fired at the appellant, who narrowly escaped. Thereafter, all the accused fled the scene on motorcycles. The deceased succumbed to the injuries and died on the spot.

Upon hearing the interlocutory application, the appellant Shekhar Pandey @ Shekhar Suman Pandey @ Sintu Pandey @ Situ wherein he had renewed his prayer for suspension of sentence and release on bail during pendency of the appeal, in his order, Justice Prasad had concluded: "....we are of the opinion that in the kind of the allegations against the appellant and the materials in which he has been convicted showing that he along with other had caught hold of the deceased, the allegation being general in nature and he has already spent six years seven months in incarceration but the appeal has not been listed for hearing, we direct suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail, during pendency of the appeal, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned A.D.J.-II-cum-Special Judge, Excise Court, Buxar in connection with Sessions Trial No.265 of 2016 arising out of Buxar (I) P.S. Case No.4 of 2016. 10. The fine, if any, imposed as a part of sentence shall remain suspended during pendency of the appeal. 11. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only prima- facie and tentative for the purpose of suspension of sentence and bail only which would not cause prejudice to the either parties."

 

While rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion, the Justice Prasad of High Court in his order dated January 21, 2020 had observed that the Court was not inclined to grant bail to the appellant at this stage. But at the subsequent stage, the the Couryt became inclined because the appellant had already remained in incarceration for over six years seven months and since the rejection of his prayer for bail more than 4½ years had gone past but the appeal had not yet been listed for hearing. 

 

The Supreme Court's Justice Mahadevan "emphasised that reasons must be recorded in writing, reflecting due consideration of relevant factors, and that orders granting suspension of sentence should not be passed mechanically." 

 

In Prem Prakash vs. Union of India through Directorate of Enforcement (2024) SLP (Crl.) 5416/2024, Supreme Court in its decision dated August 28, 2024 upheld the principle laid down in Balchand of bail being the rule and jail being the exception--- through which it can be deduced that in cases of arrest by ED as well, the natural bail principle is to follow. It referred to the Supreme Court's decision in a PMLA matter in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022). Notably, the decision in the case of Prem Prakash relied upon a decision by three justices in Raja Ram Jaiswal AIR 1964 SC 828 but failed to mention that after the decision in the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal came the Constitution Bench's decision in Badku Joti Savant AIR 1966 SC 1746.

 

 

Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya sets aside perverse judgment, decree of 2010 passed by Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara in a Money Suit of 1999

In Priyadarshi Rameshwar Construction Company (P) Ltd. vs.  State of Bihar & Ors. (2026), Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya of Patna High Court delivered a 24-page long judgement dated April 8, 2026, wherein, he concluded:" this Court finds that it is an admitted and undisputed position that the appellant/plaintiff had duly executed and completed the contractual work entrusted to him in the year 2016 within the stipulated time and had thereafter raised the requisite bills in accordance with the terms of the contract. It is further not in dispute that the respondents failed to release the admitted dues within a reasonable period and ultimately made payment only in the year 2023, i.e., after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly seven years. The sole defence sought to be advanced by the respondents, both before the court below and in the present proceedings, is that the agreement does not contain any specific clause providing for payment of interest on delayed disbursement. However, such a contention cannot be countenanced in law, inasmuch as it is well settled that the State and its instrumentalities are under a constitutional obligation to act fairly, reasonably and in a non-arbitrary manner in all contractual dealings. The failure to release legitimate dues for an unduly prolonged period, without any cogent justification, amounts to arbitrary withholding of money lawfully due and payable, thereby entitling the claimant to reasonable compensation by way of interest." Notably, Rameshwar Tiwary, the Director of the company in question argued the case in person.

Justice Malviya observed: "In the present case, the appellant has discharged his initial burden, whereas the respondents have failed to adduce any evidence in rebuttal. The learned Trial Court has thus erred in law in placing undue emphasis on technical deficiencies while ignoring substantive evidence on record. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are therefore perverse, being based on non-consideration of material evidence and misapplication of legal principles. 25. The appellant, having established execution of work and corresponding liability of the respondents, is also legally entitled to interest on the decretal amount, both on equitable and statutory considerations. It is well settled that where a party is deprived of the use of money lawfully due to him, interest is payable by way of compensation for such deprivation."

This First Appeal was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the judgment and decree dated April 3, 2010 passed by the Sub-Judge II, Bhojpur, Ara (Trial Court) in Money Suit No. 04 of 1999 wherein the plaintiff/appellant’s suit for money claim arose out of contract/agreement was dismissed by the Trial Court. The High Court's judgement does not mention the name of the judge of the trial court in question.  

In pursuance of tenders invited by the State Government the plaintiff/appellant, Priyadarshi Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, which registered Companies Act, 1956 was awarded 15 separate works for which independent agreements were executed with the concerned departments. 

The plaintiff/appellant duly executed the works with due diligence and in accordance with contractual stipulations to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, whereupon the works were measured, verified, and recorded in the departmental records and part payments were released from time to time. However, certain works were discontinued midway by the defendants on account of administrative constraints, including non-availability of funds, though the works already executed were duly accepted; nevertheless, despite completion and acceptance of the works, a substantial amount remained outstanding and payable to the plaintiff, and notwithstanding repeated demands and representations, including those made pursuant to directions issued in earlier writ proceedings, the defendants failed and neglected to release the admitted dues and rejected the claims on arbitrary and untenable grounds; consequently, the plaintiff was constrained to serve a statutory notice under Section 80 of the CPC and, upon expiry of the prescribed period without compliance, had instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 17,40,989/- towards the outstanding dues. 

The Trial Court had framed following issues for determination:
I. Whether the suit of plaintiff is maintainable as framed?
II. Have the plaintiff got valid cause of action for the suit?
III. Whether the plaintiff has served the notice under Section 80 of the CPC to the defendants.
IV. Whether plaintiff is entitle for the decree of of amount claimed by him?
V. Whether the plaintiff is entitle to get the relief and other reliefs as claimed under plaint?

The other eighteen respondents in the High Court were: Secretary/Commissioner, Water Resource Department, Engineer-In-Chief, Water Resource Department, Managing Director, Bihar State Construction Corporation Ltd., Anishabad, Patna, Chief Engineer, Water Resource Department, Dehri-On-Sone, Rohtas, Chief Engineer Water Resource Department, Aurangabad, Superintending Engineer, Sone Canal Circle, Ara, Bhojpur,  Superintending Engineer Flood Control Circle, Buxar, Superintending Engineer, North Koal Canal Circle, Gaya, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division No. 2, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Sone Canal Division, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division, Buxar, Executive Engineer, North Koal Canal Division Goh, Aurangabad, Commissioner/Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department, Patna, Co-Ordinator/Chief Engineer, Tube-Well Project, Patna, 16. Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Patna, Superintending Engineer, Tube Well Circle, Ara, Bhojpur, Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division, Patna West Bihta, Patna and  Executive Engineer, Tube Well Division Ara, Bhojpur. 

Justice Malviya added:"30. This Court is of the considered opinion that the absence of an express stipulation in the contract for payment of interest does not ipso facto disentitle the appellant from claiming the same, particularly where the delay is wholly attributable to the respondents and is neither justified nor explained by any acceptable material. A contractor entering into an agreement with the Government legitimately expects that payments for completed works would be made within a reasonable time, and while some administrative delay may be anticipated, a delay extending to seven years is per se unreasonable, arbitrary, and violative of settled principles of fairness in State action. The appellant cannot be made to suffer for lapses on the part of the authorities, and the retention of his dues for such a prolonged period confers an unjust enrichment upon the respondents. Accordingly, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to be compensated for the delayed payment by way of reasonable interest, notwithstanding the absence of a contractual clause, and the contrary finding, if any, recorded by the learned court below cannot be sustained in the eye of law."

The judgement reads:"31. Accordingly, the point for determination framed by this Court is answered in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants and against the defendants/respondents. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the settled legal position, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to interest on the decretal amount. The impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court, to the extent it denies such interest, is unsustainable in law and is hereby set aside."  

Justice Malviya pointed out that the Appellate Court has the discretionary power to admit the additional evidence, primarily to prevent the miscarriage of justice and when the evidence is crucial for a just judgment. Notably, it is well settled law that a First Appellate Court has wide powers to re-appreciate evidence provided under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC. He noted that the entire Trial Court record it was apparent that the document proposed to include as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 was on record before the Trial Court but the same was not exhibited by the Trial Court. So, the documents are fit to be exhibited as additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the CPC.

In this regard, Justice Malviya relied on t he judgment of the Supreme Court in K. Venkataramiah vs. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., reported in AIR 1963 SC 1526. It held: “The Appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence, not only if it requires such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment, but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may be cases where the Court finds that it is able to pronounce a judgment on record as it is, and cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that, in the interests of justice, something which remains obscure should be filled up, so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner, Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for only substantial cause under Rule 27.” 

The High Court observed: "19. It is also well settled that once execution of work is established and the same has been accepted by the department, the liability to make payment necessarily follows. It would be unreasonable to deny payment for the work actually done. The State cannot take advantage of its own wrong and refuse to pay for work executed." 

In State of West Bengal vs. B.K. Mondal & Sons, reported in AIR 1962 SC 779 observed:“if a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation”. 

The High Court observed that "the aforesaid principle, embodied under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, clearly applies where the State derives benefit from work executed." 

In A.T. Brij Paul Singh vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1703, the Supreme Court held: “11. Now if it is well-established that the respondent was guilty of breach of contract in as much as the recission of contract by the respondent is held to be unjustified, and the plaintiff-contractor had executed a part of the works contract, the contractor would be entitled to damages by way of loss of profit, Adopting the measure accepted by the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case between the same parties and for the same type of work at 15% of the value of the remaining parts of the work contract, the damages for loss of profit can be measured.” 

In State of Rajasthan and Anr. vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2009) 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed that once execution of work is established and accepted, the contractor becomes entitled to payment in accordance with law. In the present case, the M.B. entries, duly verified by competent authorities, clearly establish execution of work and corresponding liability. The respondents, having failed to rebut such evidence, cannot deny payment, as the same would amount to unjust enrichment. In furtherance thereto, it is well settled that though the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case, once prima facie evidence is adduced, the burden shifts upon the defendant.

Justice Malviya referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Ibrahim Uddin and Anr., reported (2012) 8 SCC 148, wherein, it observed that a party cannot succeed on the weakness of the defence; however, once sufficient evidence is produced, the burden shifts on the opposite party to rebut the same. 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa vs. G.C. Roy, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 508  “33. In the case before us, admittedly the contract does not provide that no interest is payable on the amount that may be found due to any one of them. If so, it follows that the seller, namely, the firm is entitled to claim interest from the date on which the price became due and payable. The finding of the arbitrator in this case is that the price became payable on June 7, 1958. As held by this Court in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram which related to an arbitration proceeding, under Sub-section (2) of Section 61, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the seller is eligible to be awarded interest on the amount of the price for the goods sold. On this principle it follows that the award of interest from June 7, 1958 is justified.”

In Alok Shanker Pandey vs. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1198, the Supreme Court observed: “9. It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B 10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned
interest on it for this period. Hence, equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B. 

Justice Malviya observed: "28. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the appellant had executed the work and the same was duly recorded in official documents; however, despite such execution and acknowledgment, the respondents failed to release the admitted dues, thereby unjustly retaining the amount and depriving the appellant of its lawful use. Such retention of money by the State amounts to unjust enrichment and warrants compensation by way of interest. Further, under Section 34 of the CPC, the Court is empowered to award reasonable interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of institution of the suit till realization. The grant of interest, therefore, is not only equitable but also statutorily recognized." 

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh, grants bail in a rape-murder case

In Dheeraj Jha @ Dheeraj Kumar @ Raghav vs. The State of Bihar, Supreme Court's Division Bench of M.M. Sundresh and N.K Singh passed a 5-page long order dated March 25, 2026 setting aside the order by Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh of Patna High Court. The Supreme Court noted that upon completion of investigation the appellant was chargesheeted only for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC and not other offences. The appellant was the superior of the deceased. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC were not made out and in any case, the deceased committed suicide pursuant to an alleged extra-marital affair with the appellant. Considering the aforesaid submissions made, we are inclined to grant bail to the appellant, particularly, by taking note of the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant and the facts governing the case. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appellant is granted bail on terms and conditions to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court. 

In his 3-page long order dated December 1, 2025, Justice Prabhat Kumar Singh rejected the prayer of the petitioner who sought bail in a case registered for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 328, 376D and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per prosecution case, it was alleged that the petitioner, along with another co-accused, namely Dheeraj Jha, committed rape with the wife of informant and thereafter, administered her poison due to which, during course of treatment, she died. The senior counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner was quite innocent and had committed no offence. Informant was not an eye witness of the occurrence. As a matter of fact, wife of informant and the petitioner used to work at the same Office and on the alleged date and time of occurrence, wife of informant was getting unconscious and therefore, this petitioner, along with co-accused Dheeraj Jha, took her to a hospital and her husband was also informed. Moreover, charge-sheet had already been submitted and petitioner was in custody since November 19, 2024. The petitioner had got no criminal antecedents. A.P.P. for the State and
learned counsel for the informant had submitted that petitioner was named in the F.I.R. with specific accusation that he, along with another accused person, committed rape with the victim and administered her poison. On the way to hospital, the victim herself narrated the whole incident to the informant. Justice Singh had concluded: "6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, specific and direct nature of accusation and gravity of offence, the prayer for grant bail of to the petitioner is rejected. 7. However, considering the fact that the petitioner is in custody since 19.11.2024, the learned trial court is directed to
expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."

Supreme Court reverses order by Justice Soni Shrivastava, grants bail

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Joymalya Bagchi passed a 2-page long order dated September 17, 2025, wherein, it concluded:"it is provided that if the petitioner appears before the concerned Magistrate within three weeks from today and submits bail bonds, to the satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate, he shall be released on bail." It has issued notice, returnable on November 12, 2025. 

Before the Supreme Court, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that in respect of executing sale deed in favour of his wife by acting on a power of attorney executed by complainant’s husband when he was no more alive. The petitioner was not aware about the death of complainant’s husband. Moreover, the sale deed was executed in part performance of an earlier agreement between the parties.

In Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Justice Soni Shrivastava of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated June 18, 2025, wherein, she concluded:"by his fraudulent act, the petitioner no.1 has kept a widow running from pillar to post for her land and hence for such offence, the petitioner no.1 who has executed the sale deed does not deserve the benefit of anticipatory bail and the application is rejected with respect to petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar." 

The petitioners including Sayed Badi Asghar @Syed Badie Asghar had approached the High Court apprehend their arrest in connection with Patna Complaint Case no. 4634C of 2022 registered under sections 420, 409, 418, 423, 467, 468, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The case of the prosecution was that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant Attorney in favour of petitioner no.1 Sayed Badi Asgar for selling his lands. It was alleged that despite the fact that husband of the opposite party no.2/complainant had died and yet based on the Power of Attorney, Sayed Badi Asghar @ Syed Badie Asghar, the petitioner no.1 executed sale deed in respect of land in question in favour of his wife Sheema Nezami (petitioner no.2) and one Salma Khatoon. It was submitted that husband of opposite party no.2/complainant had made a deed of agreement with petitioner no.1 for the sale of land and subsequently, a Power of Attorney had been executed in favour of petitioner no.1 for the sale of property. The petitioner no.1 had already paid the full consideration amount in the account of husband of opposite party no.2/complainant and her son. He also submitted on their behalf that the case was purely of civil nature and the opposite party/complainant has alternative civil remedies which are being pursued by the complainant by filing a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 191 of 2022. The petitioners have no criminal antecedent and undertake to co-operate in the case/trial.

The counsel for opposite party no.2/complainant submitted that a fraud has been committed by the petitioners as petitioner no. 1 was fraudulently executed sale deed with respect to the land in question in favour of his own wife who was petitioner no.2 and one Salma Khatoon even after having knowledge of the fact that husband of opposite party no.2/complainat who had executed a Power of Attorney in favor of petitioner no.1 had already died and hence, no action could be taken on the said Power of Attorney. It was submitted that deed of agreement which was mentioned in the petition was already cancelled. 

Notably, the application for grant of anticipatory bail of the co-accused Yusuf Abdullah was already rejected by a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court vide order dated September 18, 2024 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 41877 of 2023. 

Justice Shrivastava had observed: ''It appears that the instant case is kept pending for a long time on the ground that the petitioners would approach the opposite party no.2/complainant and get the matter settled.'' 

Supreme Court set aside "cryptic order" by Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar in Vandana Gupta case, which resulted in "travesty of justice"

In Victim 'X' vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. (2025), Supreme Court's Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta delivered the judgement dated July 21, 2025 wherein it allowed the appeal. The judgement was authored by Justice Mehta. The Respondent no. 2 is Vandan Gupta. The Division Bench concluded:"keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No.2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society." 

The judgement reads:"the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No.2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration. 28. Consequently, it is a fit case, warranting exercise of this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere in the impugned order dated 18th January, 2024 which is hereby quashed and set aside. 29. The bail granted to respondent No.2-accused is hereby cancelled. She shall surrender before the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Court shall cancel her bail bonds and ensure that she is taken into custody for the remainder of trial. The trial Court and the District administration shall ensure that proper protection and support is provided to the victims of the case. In case there is any change of circumstances, respondent No.2-accused shall be at liberty to renew her prayer of bail before the appropriate forum."

The appeal arose by special leave emanates from the order dated January 18, 2024 whereby, the appeal preferred by respondent No.2-accused 2 under Section 14(A)(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19893 was allowed and she was granted bail. The appellant-victim herein was the informant in the FIR. 

The prosecution case as against Vandana Gupta, Respondent No.2 was that she while being posted as the Superintendent of the Uttar Raksha Grih, Gaighat, Patna indulged in administering intoxicating medicines and injections to the appellant-victim and other female inmates of the protection home, who were later on subjected to sexual exploitation and mental torture. It was alleged that she used to send the ladies housed in the protection home, outside for the purpose of providing sexual favours to influential people. The FIR in the instant case came to be based on the intervention of the High Court which took cognizance of a newspaper report narrating the ordeals faced by the females kept in the protection home. The investigation was also monitored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court recorded that during the course of investigation, few more ladies in addition to the appellant herein made allegations of torture and sexual exploitation against Vanadana Gupta, the respondent No.2. The application for bail was filed by respondent No.2 came to be rejected by the Exclusive Special Court (SC/ST Act), Patna6 vide order dated July 10, 2023. Respondent No.2 preferred an
appeal under Section 14(A)(2) of the SC/ST Act before the High Court, assailing the order passed by the Special Court. In the meanwhile, chargesheet came to be filed against respondent No.2 in the Special Court which took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 341, 342, 323, 328, 376, 120B, 504, 506 of the IPC, Sections 3/4 of the IT Act and Section 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act vide order dated August 29, 2023. Notably, in the appeal before the High Court, the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party, and bail was granted to the accused (respondent No.2) in clear violation of the mandate under Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which makes hearing of the victim in any prayer for bail essential. 

The appellant-victim approached the Supreme Court through the appeal by special leave to assail the order passed by the High Court. Her counsel contended that the High Court granted bail to respondent No.2 by a cryptic order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and totally ignoring the critical fact that respondent No.2 being the Superintendent of the women protection home was a person in authority, who misused her position to exploit the helpless female inmates of the institution and deliberately orchestrated their sexual exploitation by various influential persons. Numerous women inmates have made grave allegations in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, stating that they were sent out of the institution for providing sexual gratification to outsiders and those who resisted, were injected with intoxicants and under the influence thereof, they were subjected to sexual exploitation by different men. It was also contended that unidentified men were allowed access into the protection home where they would take advantage of the helpless condition of the victims so as to gain sexual favours. 

Pursuant to the release of respondent No.2 on bail, she was reinstated in service, and she was heading another protection home within the State of Bihar. This approach of the State authorities in allowing respondent No.2 to continue functioning as a person in-charge of the protection home, despite there being allegations of misuse of power to facilitate sexual exploitation of female inmates would imminently expose the inmates to a grave risk of being subjected to sexual exploitation. He submitted that it was apparent that the concerned authorities of the State Government were hands in glove with the accused and had no intention of punishing respondent No.2 for her recalcitrant conduct. Rather she has been rewarded with a fresh tenure in an identical protection home where she had earlier committed the atrocities on the female inmates. In case, respondent No.2 is allowed to remain on bail, there is an imminent danger of her influencing the witnesses and frustrating the trial. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, numerous threats have already been given to the witnesses of this case and hence, the continuance of respondent No.2 on bail would be detrimental to a fair trial. The counsel for the appellant implored the Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to cancel the bail granted to respondent No.2.  

The standing counsel representing respondent No.1-State of Bihar supported the submissions advanced by counsel for the appellant-victim. He contended that after thorough investigation, grave allegations of misuse of official position to exploit the helpless and destitute female inmates housed in the protection home have been substantiated. Respondent No.2 being a person in authority shall definitely influence the fair trial of the case and there was imminent threat to the life and limb of the victim ladies, if respondent No.2 was allowed to continue on bail during the pendency of the trial. However, on a pertinent query being posed,  standing counsel was not in a position to explain the conduct of the State authorities in reinstating respondent No.2-accused and putting her in charge of another women’s home in spite of the fact that she is facing a prosecution for abuse of powers and sexual exploitation while working in a similar institution.

Supreme Court observed: "21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened."

The Court relied on the Supreme Court's  decisions in Shabeen Ahmad vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172 while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar vs. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 wherein it cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows:
“18.... A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118].

In Vandana Gupta vs. The State of Bihar (2024), Justice Sunil Kumar Panwar of Patna High Court had passed a 4-page long order dated January 18, 2024 upon hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated July 10, 2023 passed by Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna whereby the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Mahila P.S. Case no. 17 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 328, 376, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3/4 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and sections 3(1)(w)/3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act was rejected. The allegation against the appellant who was a Superintendent of Remand Home was that she used to administer intoxicated medicine and injection to the informant/victim and other girls and they were subjected to sexually exploitation and mental torture. It was also alleged that appellant used to send the girls outside and forced them to be sexually exploited. The appellant used to allow entry of unknown male for wrongful purpose. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that appellant was falsely implicated in this case. She had not taken the caste name of the informant in public view. No offence is made out under the provisions of the SC/ST Act against her. Notably, vide letter No. 836 dated February 16, 2022, one S.I.T. team was constituted for investigation of Mahila P.S. Case No. 13 of 2022 and Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 jointly and the investigation was started jointly but after investigation of the case, the police submitted final form No. 100 of 2022 due to insufficiency of evidence which is apparent from Annexure-3 of the petition itself and also the allegation which was alleged by the informant/victim upon this appellant was not found true. 

The Court order recorded that from perusal of the Supervision Report of the S.S.P., Patna dated June 25, 2022, which was annexed in the petition as Annexure-5(page No-36) in which it was mentioned that no any drug abuse and rape/sexual exploitation have been made in that remand home. From perusal of the report of Uttar Raksha Girh, Gayaghat, Patna, it was mentioned in para-5 that the nature of the informant/victim was quarrelsome. Moreover, the appellant was languishing in judicial custody since August 27, 2022. The appeal for bail was opposed by Special P.P. for the State and the counsel for the informant. By way of filing counter affidavit, it was mentioned in para-2 that "another girl in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. stated that appellant used to send those girls out who don’t have anyone they were sent out if they used to refuse, they were injected with needle and were become unconscious. It was also submitted that from a report of SP, Patna, few men used to come in girh by covering their faces and on the permission of this appellant, those persons entered in the girh without registering their name in register."

Justice Panwar concluded:"....taking into consideration that there is no specific allegation against the appellant, the Court is inclined to allow this appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.07.2023 is hereby set aside. 8. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail after framing of charge if the charge is not framed in connection with Mahila P.S. Case No. 17 of 2022 on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act, Patna."

Quashing this order by Justice Panwar, Supreme Court observed: "25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act."